In Boethius’s second commentary on Porphyry’s “Isagoge,” he delves into the nature of reality and its connection to language and understanding. He begins by discussing the signification of individual things, noting that individuals can be identified either through descriptions or proper names. Boethius emphasizes that understanding plays a crucial role in mediating the relationship between expressions and reality.
When it comes to universal expressions, Boethius presents a more intricate perspective. He believes that universals are abstracted from reality through understanding, which has the power of abstraction and division. Boethius explains this process using the example of a line in a body, where the mind can discern the abstract nature of the line apart from the concrete body. Universals, according to Boethius, exist in singulars but are thought of as universals. He also discusses the process of abstraction, where the likeness of universals is gathered from existing things, such as the likeness of humanity from individual humans.
Boethius’s commentary on Porphyry’s “Isagoge” had a significant impact on medieval Latin logicians in the twelfth century. His interpretations of Aristotelian logic became influential as scholars relied on his commentaries for their understanding of difficult texts. Boethius played a crucial role in transmitting ancient interpretations of Aristotelian logic into the medieval context. His insights on the relationship between expressions, understanding, and reality were highly regarded and shaped subsequent philosophical discussions in the field.
BOOK ONE
[ 1.01 ]
[1.01.01] This second part of our undertaken exposition will facilitate the sequence of our translation, in which I indeed fear that I may have incurred the fault of a faithful interpreter, having rendered each word expressed and compared.
[1.01.02] The reason for this undertaking is that in these writings, in which knowledge of matters is sought, it’s not the charm of clear speech, but the uncorrupted truth that must be expressed. Therefore, I seem to have made much progress if, through the sincerity of the most accurate translation, there is no more to be desired in the Greek texts by those reading the philosophical books composed in Latin.
[1.01.03] And since the highest good compared to human minds is philosophy, the discourse must proceed like a path and a thread, starting from the efficiencies of the soul itself.
[1.01.04] There are altogether three aspects of soul power observed in animating bodies. One indeed provides life to the body so it can grow by being born and continue to exist by being nourished; another provides the judgment of sensation; the third is supported by the power of mind and reason.
[1.01.05] The duty of the first is to be available for creating, nourishing, and sustaining bodies, but it provides no judgment of reason or sense. This is the domain of plants and trees and anything that is firmly rooted in the ground.
[1.01.06] The second, however, is composed and joined, taking the first unto itself and incorporating it. It can perceive various things about matters and make multifaceted judgments. Every animal that is active in sensation is also born, nourished, and fed. The senses, however, are diverse and grow up to the number of five. Therefore, whatever is only nourished and does not also sense, whatever can sense, the first power of the soul, specifically of being born and nourishing, is proven to be subjected to it.
[1.01.07] To those to whom sensation is present, they not only perceive the forms of things with which they are struck by a sensible body when present, but also, when the sense and the sensed objects have left, they hold the images of the sensed forms and construct memory, and according to the power of each animal, they keep them for a longer or shorter time. But they take these imaginations as confused and unclear so that they can accomplish nothing from their connection and composition. And therefore they can indeed remember, but not equally everything, and they cannot recall and recover memory when forgotten. However, they have no knowledge of the future.
[1.01.08] But the third power of the soul, which draws with it the previous powers of nourishing and sensing and uses them as if they were servants and obedient, is entirely constituted in reason and it revolves around the firmest conception of present things, understanding of absent things, or inquiry into unknown things.
[1.01.09] This is only available to the human species, which not only captures perfect and not disorganized sensations and imaginations but also explains and confirms what the imagination has suggested, with full action of understanding.
[1.01.10] Therefore, as was said, not only those things which it grasps as subject to the senses are sufficient for this divine nature’s cognition, but it can also give names to insensible things conceived in imagination and to absent things, and it reveals what it comprehends by the reason of understanding through the placement of words.
[1.01.11] It is also a characteristic of this nature to investigate the unknown through what is known to it and to desire to recognize not only whether each thing exists but also what it is, what quality it has, and why it exists.
[1.01.12] The nature of man alone, as stated, has been allotted this threefold power of the soul. This power of the soul does not lack movements of understanding, because in these it exercises four distinct powers of reason. Either it investigates whether something exists, or if its existence has been established, it doubts what it is. But if it also possesses the knowledge of both by reason, it investigates what each thing is and examines other incidental moments in it. Once these are known, it seeks why it is so and continues to investigate by reason.
[ 1.02 ]
[1.02.01] Therefore, since this action of the human mind is always involved either in the comprehension of present things, the understanding of absent things, or the inquiry and discovery of unknown things, there are two matters in which the power of the reasoning soul exerts all its efforts. One is to understand the natures of things through a certain method of inquiry, the other to first arrive at knowledge so that it may later practice moral seriousness.
[1.02.02] To inquire into these, it is necessary to have many things that can lead the inquiring mind off the correct path by a not insignificant progression, as happened with Epicurus who thought the world consisted of atoms and measured the honorable by pleasure. But this clearly happened to him and others because, through lack of skill in arguing, they thought that whatever they had comprehended by reasoning also happened in the things themselves. But here is a great error; for it doesn’t work the same way in reasoning as in numbers. In numbers, whatever has come about in the digits of someone calculating correctly, it necessarily happens in the things themselves too, for example, if it happens in the calculation that there are a hundred, there necessarily must be a hundred things subject to that number. But this isn’t observed equally in argumentation: for not everything that the course of discourse has discovered is held to be fixed in nature.
[1.02.03] Therefore, those who discarded the knowledge of arguing and inquired into the nature of things necessarily had to be deceived. For unless one first arrives at the knowledge that holds the true path of reasoning and recognizes which argumentation is reliable and which can be suspect, the uncorrupted truth of things cannot be discovered through reasoning.
[1.02.04] Therefore, when the ancients, having often fallen into many errors, gathered certain false and contradictory things in argumentation – and it seemed impossible that both could be true when contradictory conclusions were made about the same thing, which conclusion of reasoning should be believed was ambiguous – it seemed right to first consider the true and complete nature of argumentation itself, with that understood, it could then also be understood whether what was discovered through argumentation had been truly comprehended.
[1.02.05] Hence the skill of the discipline of logic arose, which prepares paths for recognizing modes of argumentation and reasoning itself, so that it can be recognized which reasoning is sometimes false, sometimes true, which is always false, and which is never false.
[1.02.06] But its power is understood to be twofold, one indeed in discovering, the other in judging. This was clearly expressed by Marcus Tullius in that book which has the title “Topics,” saying:
[2.06] Since every careful reason for discussing has two parts, one in finding and another in judging, Aristotle was the chief of both, as it seems to me. However, the Stoics labored in the other; they diligently pursued the ways of judging with that knowledge they call “dialectic,” but they entirely left behind the art of finding, which is called “topic;” which was both more beneficial for use and certainly prior by natural order.
[2.07] But for us, since there is great usefulness in both and we plan to pursue both if there is leisure, we will begin from the one that is first…
[1.02.07] Therefore, since the fruit of this consideration is so great, the whole intention of the mind must be given to this most skillful discipline, so that, strengthened in the first steps of the truth of arguing, we can easily come to a certain comprehension of the things themselves.
[ 1.03 ]
[1.03.01] And since we have mentioned what the origin of the discipline of logic is, it seems the rest to add: whether it is at all a part of philosophy or (as some people think) a tool and instrument through which philosophy apprehends the knowledge and nature of things. As for this matter, I see that there are opposing views.
[1.03.02] For those who think the consideration of logic is part of philosophy, they usually use these arguments.
[1.03.03] They say that philosophy undoubtedly has speculative and active parts, it is questioned about this third rational part whether it should be placed in part.
[1.03.04] But it cannot be doubted that this is also part of philosophy.
[1.03.05] For just as the investigation of natural and other things placed under speculative is only of philosophy and similarly philosophy alone considers moral and other things that fall under the active part, so also the discussion of this part, that is, of those things that are subject to logic, only philosophy judges. So if speculative and active are parts of philosophy because philosophy alone deals with these, for the same reason logic will be a part of philosophy, since this material for arguing is subject only to philosophy.
[1.03.06] But now they say: since philosophy revolves in these three and since the subjects distinguish active and speculative consideration, as the former seeks the natures of things and the latter inquires about morals, it is not doubtful that the discipline of logic is separated from the natural and moral property of its material. For the discussion of logic is about propositions and syllogisms and others of this kind, which neither those that do not speculate about discourse but about things nor the active part that watches over morals can equally perform.
[1.03.07] So if in these three (that is, speculative, active, and rational) philosophy consists, which are separated by their own triple end, since speculative and active are said to be parts of philosophy, there is no doubt that rational philosophy is also convincingly part of it.
[1.03.08] But those who think not part but instrument of philosophy, they usually bring these arguments.
[1.03.09] They say it is not the same for the end of logic to be the extreme part of speculative and active. For each of them looks to its own proper term so that the speculative indeed accomplishes the knowledge of things, the active indeed perfects morals and institutions; and neither is referred to the other. But the end of logic cannot be absolute but is somehow tied and constricted with the other two parts. For what is there in the discipline of logic that should be desired for its own merit, except for the sake of investigating things this art was found? For knowing how an argument is concluded or what is true, what is like the truth, this certainly tends, so that this knowledge of reasons either refers to the knowledge of things or to finding those things which when led to the exercise of morality produce happiness. And therefore, since there is a certain and definite end to the speculative and active, but the end of logic is referred to the two remaining parts, it is clear that it is not a part of philosophy but rather an instrument.
[1.03.10] There are indeed several things that could be said from either side, of which it suffices for us to have strictly noted what has been said.
[1.03.11] We discern this controversy in such a way.
[1.03.12] For we say nothing prevents the same logic from acting both as part and as an instrument.
[1.03.13] For since it retains its own end and this end is considered by philosophy alone, it must be considered as part of philosophy.
[1.03.14] But since that end of logic, which philosophy alone contemplates, promises its work to the other parts of it, we do not deny it to be an instrument of philosophy.
[1.03.15] And the end of logic is the discovery and judgment of reasons.
[1.03.16] Indeed, it will not seem strange that the same thing is both a part and an instrument, if we bring to mind the parts of the body, which both do something, so that we use these as some sort of instruments, and yet they hold the place of parts in the whole body. For the hand is for handling, the eyes for seeing, and the other parts of the body seem to have their own proper function. Yet, if this is referred to the whole usefulness of the body, they are seen to be certain instruments of the body, which no one will deny are also parts.
[1.03.17] So too the discipline of logic is indeed part of philosophy, because philosophy alone is its teacher, and yet it is an instrument because through it the sought truth of philosophy is traced.
[1.04]
[1.04.01] But since, as much as succinct brevity has allowed me, I have explained the origin of logic and what logic itself is, now a few words must be said about this book which we have undertaken to expound at present.
[1.04.02] For by title, Porphyry proposes that he is writing an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories.
[1.04.03] Now, what this introduction means or what it prepares the reader’s mind for, I will briefly explain.
[1.04.04] Aristotle composed the book titled “On the Ten Categories” with this intent: to grasp the infinite diversity of things, which could not fall under knowledge, by the brevity of types, and so that which could not be brought under discipline due to incomprehensible multitude would be made a subject of knowledge and understanding through the brevity of types, as mentioned.
[1.04.05] Therefore, he considered there to be ten categories of all things - that is, one substance and nine accidents (which are quality, quantity, relation, where, when, action and passion, position, possession) - and since these were supreme categories and no other category could be placed above them, it is necessary for all multitude of things to be found within the species of these ten categories.
[1.04.06] These categories, differentiated by all their distinctions, appear to have nothing in common except the name, as they all are predicated to be. Indeed, substance exists, quality exists, quantity exists, and the word ‘exists’ is commonly predicated of all others, but there is no common substance or nature to them, only the name. Thus, the ten categories found by Aristotle are distributed by all their distinctions.
[1.04.07] But things separated by some distinctions must have something unique to claim them into a singular and solitary form. However, ‘unique’ is not the same as ‘accidental’: accidents can come and go, but unique characteristics are so innate that they cannot exist without those things of which they are unique.
[1.04.08] Since these things are so, and since Aristotle discovered the ten categories of things that either the mind could grasp by understanding or the disputant could express by speaking (for whatever we grasp intellectually, we communicate to others in speech), it happened that five discourses of these things were encountered for the understanding of these ten categories, namely: genus, species, difference, unique property, and accident.
[1.04.09] Indeed, it is necessary to learn beforehand what a genus is, so that we may recognize the ten categories that Aristotle set before other things as genera.
[1.04.10] However, the knowledge of species is of great value so that the species of each genus can be recognized. For if we understand what a species is, we are not disturbed by any error. It can happen that due to ignorance of species, we often place the species of quantity in relation, and we subject the species of any primary genus to any other genus, and thus a mixed and indistinct confusion of things occurs. To prevent this, it is necessary to know beforehand what the nature of a species is. And the nature of a species needs to be understood not only to prevent us from interchanging the species of the prior genera, but also to know how to select the species closest to any genus within the same genus, so as not to soon say that animal is the species of substance rather than body, or human is the species of body rather than animated body.
[1.04.11] But indeed, the knowledge of differences holds a major place in these. For how can we recognize that quality is entirely different from substance or the other categories unless we have seen their differences? And how can we discern their differences if we do not know what difference itself is? Ignorance of difference not only causes us this error but also takes away all judgment of species. For all species are informed by differences; if the difference is unknown, it is necessary that the species also be unknown. But how can it happen that we can recognize any difference if we don’t know at all what the meaning of this term is?
[1.04.12] Now, the use of ‘unique property’ is so great that even Aristotle sought out the unique properties of individual categories. Who can discern what are unique properties before learning what a unique property is at all? This knowledge is not only valuable in these unique properties that are brought out by individual names, like ‘laughing’ for a human, but also in those that are used in place of definitions. For all unique properties include the subject matter within some term of description, which I will mention more suitably in its place.
[1.04.13] Who can doubt how much the knowledge of ‘accident’ contributes, when they see that nine of the ten categories are the natures of accidents? How will we think these to be accidents if we are completely unaware of what an accident is, especially when neither the knowledge of differences nor that of unique properties is known unless we hold the nature of accident with the firmest consideration? It can happen that through ignorance, an accident is placed in place of a difference or a unique property. That this is very faulty, even definitions prove, which, while they consist of differences and the definitions of each thing are made unique, they do not seem to admit accident.
[1.04.14] Therefore, having gathered the categories of things, which surely contain diverse species under them, which species would never be diverse unless they were separated by differences, and having resolved everything into substance and accident, and accident into the other nine categories, and having pursued the unique properties of almost some of the categories, Aristotle taught about these very categories themselves. But as for what a genus is, what a species is, what a difference is, what that accident is about which we are now to speak, or what a unique property is, he passed over as if in passing.
[1.04.15] So that those coming to Aristotle’s Categories would not be ignorant of what each of the things mentioned above signified, Porphyry wrote this book on the understanding of these five things, so that after perceiving and considering what each of the things he set above signified, they would learn more easily the things proposed by Aristotle.
[ 1.05 ]
[1.05.01] This indeed is the intention of this book, which Porphyry indicated he had written as an introduction to the Categories, as the very inscription of the title says. But although the intention of this book refers to this one thing, its usefulness is not simple but manifold and dispersed in the greatest matters.
[1.05.02] The same Porphyry recalls this at the beginning of this book, saying:
“Since it is necessary, Chrysaor, both for the doctrine of the Categories which is in Aristotle, to know what a genus is and what a difference, what a species is, what a unique property, and what an accident, and for the assignment of definitions, and altogether for the things which are useful in division or demonstration, making for you a succinct account of these matters, I will attempt briefly to approach these things which have been said by the ancients, like an introduction; abstaining from deeper questions, and moderately conjecturing simpler ones.”
The usefulness of this book is spread in four ways. For even to that end to which its intention is directed, it is of great use to readers, and for other things: which, although they are outside the intention, no less usefulness is gathered for readers from them. For through this little work, there is easy knowledge of the categories and complete assignment of definitions, right understanding of divisions, and most truthful conclusion of demonstrations. These matters, the more difficult and arduous they are, expect the more discerning and studious mind of the reader.
[1.05.03] Indeed, it should be said that this happens in all books. First, if the intention is known, the extent of the usefulness that can arise from it is weighed; and although, as is the case, many things follow outside of this type of book, however, it seems to have the closest usefulness to what its intention refers to, as explained by the very book we have taken up.
[1.05.04] Since its intention is to provide an easy understanding of the Categories, there is no doubt that this is proven to be its primary usefulness, although definition, division, and demonstration are not lesser companions, some principles of which are suggested to us here.
[1.05.05] The whole sense of this type is as follows: “As it is,” he says, “the knowledge of genus, species, difference, unique properties, and accidents are useful for Aristotle’s Categories and his doctrine, for the assignment of definitions, for division and demonstration, I will attempt to briefly open what is the most useful and abundant knowledge of these things, making a succinct tradition of the things that have been said broadly and diffusely by the ancients.”
Indeed, it wouldn’t be succinct unless it constrained the entire work with brevity. And since he was writing an introduction: “I will spontaneously avoid deeper questions,” he says, “but I will moderately conjecture simpler ones.” That is, I will handle the obscurities of simpler questions, considering them with some reasoning of conjecture.
[1.05.06] Indeed, the whole sentence of this prologue is such that it flatters the mind of the beginner with both abundant usefulness and ease; but it seems necessary to say what more the depth of the discourse may hide.
[1.05.07] “Necessary” in Latin speech, as in Greek anagkoion, signifies several things. For with a different signification, Marcus Tullius says that someone is necessary to him and we say that it is necessary for us to go down to the forum, in which speech some usefulness is signified. There is also another signification where we say that it is necessary for the sun to move, that is, it is necessary.
[1.05.08] Indeed, that first signification should be omitted, for it is altogether alien from that necessary which Porphyry sets forth here.
[1.05.09] But these two [significations] are of such a kind that they seem to contend with each other as to which holds the signification in this place where Porphyry says: “Since it is necessary, Chrysaor”; for, as has been said, necessary signifies both usefulness and necessity.
[1.05.10] However, both seem to fit this place.
[1.05.11] For it is extremely useful to discuss the things mentioned above about genus, species, and the rest, and there is the greatest necessity because if these things are not known beforehand, the things which these prepare for cannot be known. Indeed, the categories are not learned without the knowledge of genus or species, nor does definition neglect genus and difference, and how useful this discussion is will appear when we discuss division and demonstration.
[1.05.12] But even though these five things, about which we are to discuss here, must come to knowledge before those things for which they prepare, it is not put here by Porphyry with that signification in which he would want to signify necessity and not rather usefulness.
[1.05.13] For the very speech and context of the discourse signify this with the clearest reason of understanding. For no one uses reason in such a way as to say that some necessity is referred to something else. Necessity is in itself, while usefulness always refers to what is useful, as here also. For he says: “Since it is necessary, Chrysaor, and for that which is Aristotle’s doctrine of categories.” If therefore we understand this ‘necessary’ as ‘useful’ and we translate it with the name itself, saying: “Since it is useful, Chrysaor, and for that which is Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, to know what a genus is… etc.” the order of the words will be right; but if it is changed to ‘necessary’ and we say: “Since it is necessary, Chrysaor, and for that which is Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, to know what a genus is… etc.” the order of words does not fit the correct understanding.
[1.05.14] Therefore, there is no need to dwell here for long. For although there is a great necessity that, without knowing these, it is impossible to reach those things to which this discussion is intended, “necessary” is not spoken of here about necessity but rather about usefulness.
[ 1.06 ]
[1.06.01] Now, though the same has been said above, let us briefly discuss how knowing about genus, species, difference, property, and accident can aid our understanding of the categories.
[1.06.02] For Aristotle set up ten categories of things that could be predicated of all others, so that whatever could come into signification, if it held a complete signification, would be subjected to one of those categories which Aristotle deals with in the book titled “On the Ten Categories”.
[1.06.03] But this very thing, to be referred to something like a category as a genus, is such as if someone were to assume a species for a genus. But this cannot be done in any way without the knowledge of the species.
[1.06.04] Nor indeed can the species themselves be clearly seen, or of what they are more, unless their differences are known. But if the nature of the differences is unknown, it will be completely unknown what the differences of each species are. Therefore, it should be known that if Aristotle deals with genera in the Categories, and the nature of the genera is to be known, this knowledge is also accompanied by the recognition of species. But with this known, what a difference is cannot be ignored, although in the same book there are many things to which, unless the reader brings the utmost skill and knowledge of genus, species, and difference, no understanding at all will be opened, as when Aristotle himself says: “Different genera and those not placed in subordination have different species and differences according to them” which, if these are not known, is impossible to understand.
[1.06.05] But Aristotle himself investigates the proper characteristic of each category with the most diligent inquiry, so that after many things, he says the unique property of substance is that it can receive contraries in number, or again of quantity, that only in it can equal and unequal be said, also of quality, that through it we propose one thing to be like or unlike another, and in the same way for the rest, as what is the property of contrary, what is according to the relation of opposition, what of privation and habit, what of affirmation and negation. In these he treats as if already knowing and understanding what is the nature of property; if anyone does not know this, he engages in vain in those things which are discussed about them.
[1.06.06] Now indeed it is clear that accident holds a major place among the categories, which it surrounds with its proper name in nine categories.
[ 1.07 ]
[1.07.01] And the utility of this book to the categories is evident from these points.
[1.07.02] But what he says “and to the assignment of definitions” can be easily understood if a division of the reasons for substance is first made. The account of substance is placed in one way in description, and in another in definition. But that which is in description, collects a certain property of the thing of which it reveals the account of substance - and not only does it inform what it shows with a property, but it itself becomes a property, which must also come into definition; if anyone wishes to give an account of quantity, he may say: “Quantity is according to which equal and unequal are said.” Just as, therefore, he placed the property of quantity in the account of quantity, and the whole account itself is proper to quantity, so the description both collects a property and becomes proper itself. But the definition itself does not collect properties, but it itself also becomes proper. For the definition shows substance, joins genus with differences, and making common and of many things that are through themselves into one, it yields equal things to one species which it defines. So, the knowledge of the proper is useful for description, since only property is collected in description and it becomes proper like definition also, but for definition genus (which is put first), and species (to which that genus is fitted), and differences (by joining with genus, species is defined).
[1.07.03] But if these things seem more detailed than the manner of exposition requires, it would be appropriate for one to know this, we, as was said in the first edition, have reserved this exposition to our judgment so that the first edition may suffice for the simple understanding of this book, but for deeper speculation, with knowledge nearly confirmed now and not sticking in the individual words of things, this later version speaks.
[ 1.08 ]
[1.08.01] As for making division, this book is so useful that without knowledge of those things which are discussed in this series of the book, division happens more by chance than by reason. This will be evident if we divide the division itself, that is, if we separate the very name of division into what it signifies.
[1.08.02] For there is a division of genus into species, as when we say: “Color is one thing white, another black, another intermediate.” Again, division is whenever a word signifying many things is explained and how many things are signified by it is shown, as if someone says: “The name ‘dog’ signifies many things, both this barking quadruped and the celestial star and the marine beast,” all of which are separated from each other by definition. And it is also said to be divided whenever a whole is separated into its proper parts, as when we say: “A house has foundations, walls, and a roof as different parts.” And indeed, this threefold division is called partition in itself.
[1.08.03] But there is another which is said according to accident. This also happens threefold, either when we divide an accident into subjects, as when I say: “Some goods are in the soul, others in the body,” or again when we divide the subject into accidents, as: “Some bodies are white, others are black, others of intermediate color,” again, when we separate an accident into accidents, as when we say: “Of the liquids, some are white, others black, others of intermediate color,” and again: “Among the white things, some are hard, some are liquids, some are soft.”
Since all division is thus either in itself or by accident, and each partition happens threefold, and in the previous, one form of division in the threefold partition in itself is to separate the genus into species, this can by no means be done except by knowledge of the genera nor indeed apart from the differences, which are necessary to be taken in the division of species. It is therefore clear how useful this book is to this division, which initially treats the genus, species, and differences. But the second division in itself is into the significations of a word, and this too is not separate from the usefulness of this book. In one way, it can be known whether the word whose division we seek appears to be ambiguous or a genus if those things which it signifies are defined. And if those things that are under a common name are enclosed in definition, they must be species, and that common thing their genus. But if those things which the proposed word signifies cannot be concluded with a single definition, no one doubts that that word is ambiguous and not so common to those things of which it is predicated as a genus, since those things which it signifies placed under itself, cannot be comprehended with one definition according to a common name. Therefore, if it becomes clear from the definition what the genus is, and indeed what an ambiguous name is, and the definition runs through the genera and differences, can anyone doubt that in this form of division too, the authority of this book is of great value? But that division in itself which is of the whole into parts, how can it be distinguished and not rather thought to be a division of the genus into species, unless the genus and species and their differences and their force are previously discussed by the reasoning of discipline? For why should anyone not say that the foundations, walls, and roof are more likely species of a house than parts? But when the name of the genus can fit the whole in each species, but the name of the whole cannot fit in each of its parts, it becomes clear that there is a different division of the genus into species, another of the whole into parts. That the name of the genus fits each of the species is shown by the fact that both a man and a horse are each called animals. Neither the roof, nor the walls, nor the foundations are usually called a house individually, but when the parts have been joined, then they rightly receive the name of the whole. As for the division which is made by accident, no one is unaware that, with the accident unknown and the force of the genus and differences also unknown, it can easily happen that the accident is solved in the subjects as if the genus in species, and in the end the lack of knowledge will most disgustingly mix up this entire order of partition.
[ 1.09 ]
[1.09.01] And since we have shown how this book aids in division, let’s now discuss demonstration, so that the one who has striven with utmost vigilance and keenest effort in this great discipline does not get stuck in difficult and challenging matters. Demonstration, that is, the certain reasoning of something sought, is made from naturally prior knowns, from suitable things, from first things, from causes, from necessary things, from things inherently in themselves. But genera are naturally prior to their proper species; for species flow from genera.
[1.09.02] Likewise, it is clear that species are naturally prior to things placed beneath them, whether species or individuals. But the things that are prior, naturally, are known before and are more known than the things that follow. For something is said to be primary and known in two ways, namely according to us and according to nature. To us, those things are more known that are closer, like individuals, then species, and lastly genera, but in truth, by nature, those things are more known which are least close to us. And therefore, however far the genera have extended themselves from us, the more they will be lucid and naturally known. But the substantial differences are those that we recognize to be inherently in the things that are demonstrated.
[1.09.03] But the knowledge of genera and differences should precede, so that in each discipline, it can be understood what are the suitable principles of the thing that is demonstrated. That those very things that we call genera and differences are necessary, no one doubts who understands that a species cannot exist without genus and difference. For genera and differences are causes of species. For this reason, species exist because their genera and differences are, which, when placed in demonstrative syllogisms, are causes not only of the thing, but also of the conclusion, which the last books on Resolution will say more fully.
[1.09.04] Therefore, since it is extremely useful to circumscribe any such thing by definition and dissolve it by division and confirm it by demonstrations, and these things cannot be understood or practiced without knowledge of those matters which will be discussed in this book, who could ever doubt that this book is the greatest aid to all of logic, beyond which the other things that hold great force in it provide no access to learning?
[ 1.10 ]
[1.10.01] But Porphyrius remembers that he wrote an introduction and does not go beyond the form of a treatise as is the method of instruction. He says that he abstains from the knots of deeper questions, but addresses the simpler ones with a moderate conjecture.
[1.10.02] As for the deeper questions which he promises to defer, he proposes thus:
“Soon,” he says, “I will decline to discuss the genera and species, that is, whether they subsist, whether they are placed in naked and pure understandings, whether they are subsisting bodily or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from sensible things or placed in sensible things and constant in these. For such a matter is very deep and in need of greater investigation.”
[1.10.03] “I am passing over,” he says, “the deeper questions, so that by introducing them inopportunely I do not disturb the beginnings and first fruits of the reader’s mind.”
[1.10.04] But lest he be altogether careless that the reader might think nothing further hidden than what he himself said, he added to that very question which he promised to defer, so that by treating it very clearly and thoroughly, he would neither confuse the reader with any obscurity, and yet, strengthened by knowledge, the reader would recognize what could rightfully be sought.
[1.10.05] However, the questions he promises to keep silent about are both very useful and hidden, and while they have been attempted by learned men, they have not been solved by many.
[1.10.06] The first of these questions is of this sort. Everything that the mind understands, it either conceives and describes to itself rationally as established in the nature of things, or it depicts to itself in vain imagination what is not. Therefore, it is asked what the nature of the genus and the like is – whether we understand species and genera as the things that exist and from which we gain true understanding, or whether we deceive ourselves when we form these non-existent things with vain thought in our minds.
[1.10.07] But if indeed it has been determined to exist, and we discuss that understanding is conceived from the things that exist, then another greater and more difficult question brings forth doubt when the extreme difficulty of discerning and understanding the nature of the genus itself is shown. For since everything that exists must be either corporeal or incorporeal, genus and species must exist in one of these. Therefore, what will be the nature of what is called a genus – will it be corporeal or indeed incorporeal? For we cannot diligently consider what it is unless it is recognized where it ought to be placed among these.
[1.10.08] But even when this question is solved, all ambiguity will not be excluded. For there remains something that, if genus and species are said to be incorporeal, it besieges and detains the intellect demanding to be untangled: whether they subsist around bodies themselves or whether they seem to be incorporeal existences apart from bodies. For there are indeed two forms of incorporeal things: as some can exist apart from bodies and endure separate from bodies in their incorporeality (like God, mind, soul); but others, although they are incorporeal, yet cannot exist apart from bodies (like a line or surface or number or individual qualities), which we pronounce to be incorporeal because they do not stretch out in three-dimensional space, yet they exist so much in bodies that they cannot be separated or removed from them, or if they are separated from bodies, they do not persist in any way.
[1.10.09] Although it may be difficult to solve these questions at the moment with Porphyry himself refusing, yet I will undertake them so that I do not leave the reader’s mind anxious nor consume time and effort on these things that are beyond the course of the task I have taken on.
[1.10.10] First, indeed, I will propose a few points under the ambiguity of the question, then I will try to dissolve and explain the same knot of doubt.
[1.10.11] Genus and species either exist and subsist or are formed by intellect and sole thought.
[1.10.12] But genera and species cannot exist. This, however, is understood from the following.
[1.10.13] For everything that is common to many at one time, cannot be one. For that which is common belongs to many, especially since one and the same thing is entirely present in many at one time. However many species there are, there is one genus in all of them, not that individual species pick some parts from it, but all species have the whole genus at one time. Whence it happens that the whole genus, situated in many individual things at one time, cannot be one; for it cannot happen that when it is whole in many at one time, it is numerically one in itself. If this is the case, a genus cannot be one thing.
[1.10.14] Whence it happens that it is nothing at all; for everything that exists, exists because it is one.
[1.10.15] And the same can be said of species.
[1.10.16] But if genus and species indeed exist but are multiple and not numerically one, then the genus will not be ultimate but will have another genus superimposed, which includes that multiplicity in the power of a single name.
[1.10.17] For just as we inquire into the genera of many animals, since they have something similar but are not the same, so too, since the genus that exists in many things and hence is multiple, has a likeness of itself that it is a genus; but it is not one because it exists in many – so another genus of its genus also needs to be sought, and when it has been found, following the same reasoning that was said earlier, a third genus is again sought. Therefore, the argument necessarily continues into infinity since no limit to the inquiry occurs.
[1.10.18] But if a genus is numerically one thing, it cannot be common to many. For if one thing is common, either it is common in parts and is no longer entirely common but its parts are the properties of individuals; or it passes over time into the uses of those possessing it so that it may be common, like a common slave or horse; or it becomes common to all at one time, yet it does not constitute the substance of those to whom it is common, as is a theater or some spectacle, which is common to all spectators.
[1.10.19] However, the genus cannot be common to species in any of these ways, for it must be common in such a way that it is whole in each individual at one time and it can constitute and form the substance of those to whom it is common.
[1.10.20] Hence, if it is neither one because it is common, nor many because another genus of its multitude needs to be inquired into, it will seem that the genus does not exist at all.
[1.10.21] And the same should be understood of the others.
[1.10.22] But if genera and species and the like are only grasped by intellects, since every intellect either becomes from a subject as the thing is in itself or as the thing is not in itself (for an intellect cannot be made from no subject) –
[1.10.23] If the intellect of genus and species and the rest comes from the subject as the thing itself is, which is understood, then they are not only situated in the intellect but also consist in the truth of things, and again it needs to be inquired what their nature is, as the previous question was investigating.
[1.10.24] But if indeed the intellect of the genus and the rest is taken from the thing, yet not as the thing itself is, which is subject to the intellect, the intellect must necessarily be vain, which is taken indeed from the thing, but not as the thing itself is; for it is false that is understood otherwise than the thing is.
[1.10.25] Therefore, since genus and species neither exist nor is their intellect true when they are understood, there is no doubt that all this care for discussing the proposed five things should be set aside, since neither about that thing which exists nor about that thing from which something true can be understood or declared, is being inquired into.
[1.11]
[1.11.01] This indeed is the current question about the propositions, which we, agreeing with Alexander, will solve with this reasoning.
[1.11.02] For we do not say that every intellect that arises from a subject, but not as the subject itself is, needs to be seen as false and void.
[1.11.03] For in these alone is there false opinion and not rather understanding, which arise through composition. For if someone by intellect combines and joins what nature does not allow to be joined, that it is false is known to all – as if someone joins a horse and a man in imagination and forms a centaur.
[1.11.04] But if this is done through division and abstraction, the thing is not as the intellect is, yet that intellect is by no means false. For there are many things that have their existence in others from which they can either not be separated at all or, if they have been separated, they in no way subsist.
[1.11.05] And so that this is clear to us in a widespread example, a line is indeed something in a body and owes to the body what it is, that is, it retains its existence through the body. This is shown thus: for if it is separated from the body, it does not subsist; for who ever perceived a line separated from a body with any sense?
[1.11.06] But the mind, when it has received from the senses things that are mixed and confused in themselves, distinguishes them by its own power and thought. For all such incorporeal things, having their existence in bodies, the senses hand over to us along with these bodies, but the mind, which has the power both to combine things that are separated and to break apart things that are combined, distinguishes things that are handed over by the senses as confused and joined to bodies in such a way that it observes and sees their incorporeal nature by itself and without the bodies in which they are embedded. For the properties of incorporeal things mixed with bodies are different, even if they are separated from the body. [1.11.07] Therefore, genera and species and the rest are found either in incorporeal things or in those that are corporeal.
[1.11.08] And if the mind finds them in incorporeal things, it immediately has an incorporeal understanding of the genus.
[1.11.09] But if it has observed the genera and species of corporeal things, as is its custom, it removes from bodies the nature of incorporeal things and observes it alone and pure as it is in itself. Thus the mind, when it receives these things mixed with bodies, examines and considers incorporeal things by dividing them.
[1.11.10] Therefore, no one should say that we think falsely about a line, because we understand it with the mind as if it exists apart from bodies, when it cannot exist apart from bodies. For not every understanding that is derived from the subjects is to be thought false just because it exists differently from how the things themselves are, but as it was previously said, indeed that one who does this in composition is false, such as when someone combining a man and a horse thinks there exists a centaur; but the one who accomplishes this in divisions and abstractions and assumptions from the things in which they exist, not only is not false, but even alone can find that which in its proper nature is true.
[1.11.11] Thus, things of this kind are in the corporeal and the sensible, but they are understood apart from sensibles so that their nature can be discerned and their property can be comprehended.
[1.11.12] Therefore, when genera and species are thought about, then the similarity of them is collected from the individuals in which they exist – like the similarity of humanity is collected from individual humans who are different from each other, which similarity, when thought about and accurately observed by the mind, becomes a species; and further the similarity of these diverse species being considered, which can only exist in the species themselves or in their individuals, produces a genus.
[1.11.13] Thus, these indeed exist in individuals, but universals are thought about.
[1.11.14] And nothing else should be thought of as species except the thought collected from substantial similarity of diverse individuals, and a genus is the thought collected from similarity of species.
[1.11.15] But this similarity, when it is in individuals, becomes sensible; when it is in universals, becomes understandable – and in the same way, when it is sensible it remains in individuals; when it is understood, it becomes universal.
[1.11.16] They therefore exist around sensibles, but are understood apart from bodies.
[1.11.17] For it is not excluded that two things of different nature exist in the same subject, such as a curved and hollow line, which things, although they end with different definitions and their understanding is different, always are found in the same subject; for the same line is both curved and hollow.
[1.11.18] Similarly, for genera and species, that is, for singularity and universality, there is indeed one subject; but it is universal in one way when thought about, and singular in another way when perceived in the things in which it has its own existence.
[1.11.19] Therefore, with these issues settled, every question, I believe, has been resolved.
[1.11.20] Indeed, genera and species exist in one way and are understood in another.
[1.11.21] They are incorporeal, but connected to sensible things, they exist in sensible things. However, they are understood as existing in themselves, not having their own existence in others.
[1.11.22] But Plato believes that genera, species and the like are not only universally understood, but also exist and subsist apart from bodies. On the other hand, Aristotle believes that they are incorporeal and universal in understanding, but exist in sensible things.
[1.11.23] I did not think it was fitting to judge between their opinions, for this is a matter of a higher philosophy. However, we have pursued Aristotle’s view more diligently, not because we most approve of it, but because this book is written as a companion to the Categories, of which Aristotle is the author.
[ 1.12 ]
Now, i will try to show you how the ancients, especially the Peripatetics, treated these and the proposed issues in a probable manner.
[1.12.01] Having set aside the questions that he had previously described as deeper, he desires a moderate treatment of introductory work.
[1.12.02] However, so that the omission of these questions wouldn’t be held against him, he added how he will approach the proposed matters, and announces that he will begin this work supported by their authority.
[1.12.03] While promising a moderate approach, removing the difficulty of obscurity, he invites the reader’s attention. To ensure agreement and silence to what he is about to say, he reinforces with the authority of the Peripatetics.
[1.12.04] Therefore, he says ABOUT THESE, that is, about the genera and species which he had previously questioned, AND ABOUT THE PROPOSED, that is, about the differences, properties and accidents, he himself will argue PROBABLY.
[1.12.05] By PROBABLY, he means in a manner similar to truth, which the Greeks call “logikos” or “endoxos”. For often in Aristotle we find “logikos” mentioned as similar to truth and probably, and so too in Boethius and Alexander.
[1.12.06] Porphyry himself also used this word in many places in this sense, that we, of course, in translation, omit what he says “logikos”, interpreting it as if we were to say rationally. For it seemed far better and truer to promise to speak probably, that is, not beyond the opinion of those entering and reading, which is the property of an introduction.
[1.12.07] For as the secret of higher learning is repugnant to the minds of unlearned men, such an introduction should be that it is not beyond the opinion of those entering.
[1.12.08] Therefore, we have interpreted probably rather than rationally, as it seems to us, better.
[1.12.09] However, he says that the ancients argued about the same matters but he himself will follow particularly the treatment which the Peripatetics, led by Aristotle, left behind, so that the whole argument fits the Categories.
BOOK TWO, ON THE GENUS
[ 2.01 ]
[2.01.01] It is customary to inquire, at the beginnings of statements, why each one is placed before others in the order of discussion, as now one can question why the genus is preferred to species, difference, proper and accident; for he primarily treats about it. Therefore, we will respond that it seems to be done rightly; for everything that is universal includes others within itself, but it is not enclosed by them. So, it is of greater merit and of a principal nature that constrains others in such a way that its magnitude in nature cannot be contained by others. Therefore, the genus has species within itself and their differences and properties, and also accidents, and so it was necessary to begin with the genus, which constrains and contains other things by its magnitude in nature. Furthermore, those things are always to be considered prior which, if anyone takes away, the others perish, those are later which, being set, those that complete the substance of others follow, as in the case of genus and others. For if you take away the animal, which is the genus of man, man also, which is the species, and rational, which is the difference, and risible, which is proper, and grammatical, which is accidental, will not remain, and the destroyed genus consumes all. But if you establish that a man is or a grammarian or rational or risible, it is also necessary to be an animal. For whether he is a man, he is an animal, or rational, or risible, or a grammarian, he does not depart from the substance of an animal. Therefore, by taking away the genus, the others are consumed, by setting the others, the genus follows; therefore, the nature of the genus is prior, the others are later. Therefore, it is rightly placed first in the discussion.
[ 2.02 ]
[2.02.01] But since the word genus has multiple meanings – this is indeed what he says:
“It seems that neither genus nor species are said simply.”
For where there is not simple expression, there is multiple significance – first he distinguishes and separates the meanings of this name, in order to present to view about which significance of genus he is about to treat. But since neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor proper, nor accident are of simple significance, why did he say that these two alone, I mean genus and species, are not said simply, when the proper, difference and accident are also of multiple significance? It must be said that avoiding lengthiness, he only named species and for this reason, so that genus would not be thought to be the only one of multiple significance. He enumerates, indeed, the first significance of genus in this way:
“For genus is said both of the collection of those in a certain way relating to one thing and to each other, according to which significance the genus of Romans is said from the relation, indeed, of one, I mean of Romulus, and of the multitude having in some way a kinship to each other, which is from him, according to the division from other kinds said.”
One, he says, significance of genus is that which comes into a multitude from any one principle, to which indeed that multitude is so joined, as to be connected to each other through the principle of the same one, as when the genus of Romans is said; for the multitude of Romans drawing their name from Romulus and joined to Romulus himself and to each other by a kind of inheritance of name. For the same society that descends from Romulus binds and collects all Romans among themselves by one name of a kind. It seems, however, he has divided this significance of genus into two parts, when he mixed in a copulative conjunction saying: “genus is said both of the collection of those in a certain way relating to one thing and to each other,” as though that genus is said to have a certain way to one and this again is said to be a genus, which are joined to each other by the significance of one kind. But not at all; for the same society propagated from any one refers the whole multitude to him who is the prince of the kind, and connects and contains the multitude among itself by one name of a kind. Therefore, he is not thought to have made a division but to have opened up everything that was to be understood in this significance of genus. And the order of the words has itself this way (which is to be understood as a hyperbaton): ‘for genus is said both of the collection of those having in some way to one and having in some way to each other’ – again ‘collection’ is to be understood; for it is a zeugma – of which significance he added an example: “according to which significance the genus of Romans is said from the relation, indeed, of one, I mean of Romulus, and of the multitude again from the relation of those having in some way a kinship to each other, which is from him, that is Romulus, according to the division from other kinds said,” namely of the multitude. For this multitude is said to be a genus having in some way to one and to each other, so as to be distinguished from others, as the genus of Romans is separated from the Athenians and the others, so that the entire order of words is: ‘for genus is said both of the collection of those having in some way to one and to each other, according to which significance the genus of Romans is said from the relation, indeed, of one, I mean of Romulus, and of the multitude according to the division from other kinds said, having namely men in some way to each other that which is from him, that is Romulus, kinship.’ And so much for this; now it must be said about the second significance of genus.
Genus is also said differently, which is the principle of each generation, either from the one who begot or from the place where one is born. For instance, we say that Orestes has his genus from Tantalus, Hyllos from Hercules, and again that Pindar is Theban by birth, Plato Athenian; for the fatherland is the principle of each generation, just as the father is. This seems to be the most obvious significance; for the Romans are those who descend from the lineage of Romulus, and the Cecropidae, those from Cecrops, and their closest relatives.
There are four principles in all that primarily constitute each thing. For there is one cause that is called effective, such as the father of the son, another that is material, such as the stones of the house, the third is the form, such as the rationality of a man, the fourth, for the sake of which, such as the victory of a battle. But there are two that are said by accident to be the principles of each thing, namely place and time. For since everything that is born or made is in place and time, whatever has been born or made in a place or time is said to have its beginning by accident in that place or time. Among all these, in this second significance of genus, he assumes two from either of the others, which seem to be suitable for the significance of genus, from those that are principal, the effective; and from those that are accidental, the place. For he says ‘genus is said from him by whom one is begotten,’ which is the effective principle cause, ‘and in the place where one is procreated,’ which is the accidental cause of the beginning. Therefore, this second significance contains two things, him by whom one is procreated, and the place where one is born, as the examples also demonstrate. For we say that Orestes derives his genus from Tantalus; for Tantalus indeed begot Pelops, Pelops begot Atreus, Atreus begot Agamemnon, Agamemnon begot Orestes. Therefore, this genus is said from procreation. But we say that Pindar is Theban, namely because having been born in Thebes he received such a name of genus. But since that from which one is procreated is different, and the place where one is born, the significance of the genus of the begetter and of the place seems to be different, which, while enumerating in the second part, he made one. But lest it seem to be double, he joined them by similarity, saying:
‘For indeed, the fatherland is the principle of each generation, just as the father is.’
But since in significations it usually happens that something seems to be closer to the understanding of the thing signified, since he posited two significations of genus, namely of the multitude and of the begetter, to which the name of genus seems more fittingly to be applied, he judges and discerns, saying this is the most obvious signification of genus which is derived from the begetter; for they are especially the Cecropidae who descend from Cecrops, they the Romans, who descend from Romulus. Since things are thus, the significations of genus seem to be confused again. For if those are especially Romans who derive their origin from Romulus, and this signification is that which is derived from the begetter, where is the remaining one, which he also enumerated first, which is ‘the collection of the multitude in some way relating to one and to each other’? But for those looking more keenly, there are many differences indeed. For it is one thing to derive one’s genus from any first begetter, another to be one genus of many. For the former can be accomplished through the direct line of blood and not be diffused into many, as if it descends through a single family, to this indeed that second signification of genus, which is derived from the begetter, will be fitted; but the first indeed consists only in the multitude. That also is the case, which does not require the first principle of procreation but, as he himself says, it is sufficient in some way to relate to that from which this kind of genus is taken, the second signification derives its force only from the begetter. Also, in the multitude of the first signification the particularity of this second is contained, as in the genus of the Romans is the genus of the Scipios; for while they are Romans, they are Scipios. For since they are connected to Romulus and to the other Romans according to Romulus’s relationship, they are Romans, but they are called Scipios according to the second signification of genus, because Scipio was the principle of their family and of their blood.
‘At first, genus was named the principle of each generation, then also the multitude of those who are from one principle, such as from Romulus; for dividing and separating from others we were saying that the whole collection is the genus of the Romans.’
The sense is easy and straightforward, if however one ambiguity is resolved. For while he previously referred the signification of the multitude to the name of genus, after however to the beginning of procreation, now in the contrary way he seems to be saying that signification which he first enumerated from himself which is of procreation, that indeed later which is of the multitude; which can seem contrary, if someone looks at the order of the previously organized discussion. But here he is not speaking about himself but about the custom of human speech, in which he says that the signification of genus was first that which is derived from the begetter, but as the age of speaking use was added, the name of genus was also transferred to the multitude relating in some way to someone, this indeed therefore, because previously he said: this indeed seems to be the most obvious signification, so that from this, that is from the second, which he said to be the most obvious signification, that also now would be named which is of the multitude. For at first among humans the genus was named which one would derive from the begetter, but afterwards it happened that through the use of speech even the genus of the multitude relating to someone in some way would be said because of the division namely of the nations, so that there would be among them a distinction of name and society.
[2.04]
Having therefore completed these two definitions, he comes to the third type of ‘genus’, which is discussed among philosophers and is of great use in dialectical reasoning. Indeed, the history or poetry mostly handles the discussion of the first two types of ‘genus’, while the third type is considered among philosophers. He speaks of it in this way:
“Alternatively, genus is again said to be that which a species is predicated upon, perhaps named after the likeness of the other types of genus. Indeed, this type of genus is a certain principle of the species which are under it, and it seems to contain the entirety of the multitude which is beneath it.”
He previously stated two meanings of ‘genus’, and now he strives to show a third, which he believes was named due to its similarity to the previous two. The two previously stated meanings are one, when the name of a genus contains a multitude attached to it due to some ancient principle, and the other, when a genus is derived from each begetter, who is the principle of the things that are begotten. Therefore, as there are two meanings of ‘genus’ proposed previously, he now adds a third, which is the subject of discussion among philosophers. This is the type of genus which a species is predicated upon. He believes this to be called a genus due to an ambiguity of opinion, as it has some likeness to the previous two types. Just as the genus which pertains to a multitude encapsulates the multitude with one name, so too does the genus contain and confine many species. Similarly, as the genus which is described according to procreation is a certain principle of the things which are begotten from it, so too is the genus a principle for its species. Therefore, since it is similar to both, it is very likely that the name of genus in this meaning was borrowed from the previous two.
“Therefore, when genus is said in three ways, the third type is the subject of discussion among philosophers. They have also defined this type while describing it, stating that genus is that which is predicated about many and diverse species in what a thing is, like ‘animal’.”
Rightly do philosophers take this third type of genus for their discussion; for this alone demonstrates substance, while the others show either from whence something exists or how it is divided from other humans into a form of people. For the genus which contains a multitude does not demonstrate the substance of the multitude it contains, but only collects a people into one name, to segregate them from a people of another genus. Similarly, the genus which is described according to procreation does not demonstrate the substance of the thing begotten, but only that which was the beginning of its procreation. But indeed, the genus to which a species is predicated, suited to the species, informs the substance of the species. And because the greatest question among philosophers is what each thing is – for we seem to know each thing when we recognize what it is – therefore, having rejected the others, the discussion among philosophers is mostly about this type of genus, which they have also assigned with the description which he has attached below. He diligently says describing, not defining; for a definition is made from a genus, but a genus cannot have another genus. This is more obscure than to be clear at first attempt. It can happen that a thing which is a genus to others, may be predicated upon another genus, not as a genus but as a species placed beneath another. Hence, a genus cannot be predicated upon something in what it is, but when it is predicated, it immediately becomes a species. Since this is the case, it is shown that a genus itself, in what a genus is, cannot have another genus. Therefore, if he wanted to conclude a genus with a definition, he could not at all; for a genus does not have another that could be placed above it, and therefore he says a description has been made, not a definition.
The description is, as was said in the previous volume, a certain information about a thing from its properties and a depiction as though with certain colors. For when many things have come together into one, such that they all equally apply to the thing they are applied to, unless this collection is made from a genus or differences, it is called a description. Therefore, the description of a genus is this: a genus is that which is predicated about many and diverse species in what a thing is. These three things are required in a genus, that it is predicated about many, that it is about different species, and that it is in what a thing is. We will briefly signify the understanding of this matter with an example. Let ‘animal’ be for us the form of a genus. This is undoubtedly predicated about some things, namely man, horse, cow and others. But these are many. Therefore, ‘animal’ is predicated about many, while man, horse and cow are such that they are distinct from each other, not by any mediocre thing but by the whole species, that is the whole form of their substance. ‘Animal’ is said about these; for man, horse, and cow are called animals. Therefore, ‘animal’ is predicated about many species that are different.
But how does this predication happen? For not for any question asked, is ‘animal’ immediately answered: for if you ask how big a man is, ‘animal’ will not be answered, I think; for this pertains to quantity, not to substance. Similarly, if you ask ‘what sort of’, even to this, the response of animal does not fit, and for all other questions, you will always find this response of ‘animal’ to be unfitting and useless, except for the one which asks what it is. For when we ask what a man is, what a horse is, what a cow is, ‘animals’ will be answered. Thus, the name ‘animal’ is predicated in response to the question ‘what is it’ about man, horse, cow, and others. Hence, it happens that ‘animal’ is predicated about many species that are different in what a thing is. And since this is the definition of a genus, ‘animal’ must be the genus of man, horse, cow. However, every genus is one thing in itself and understood in the thing, and another thing by the predication of another. Its own property constitutes it to be what it is, but relation to another makes it a genus, like ‘animal’ itself, if you seek its substance, I would say it is a substance that is animate and sensible. Therefore, this definition shows the thing as it is in itself, not as if it is referred to another. But indeed, when we say ‘animal’ is a genus, I think we are not then speaking about the thing itself, but about that relation by which ‘animal’ can be referred to the predication of other things which are subjected to it. Therefore, there is a certain character and form of genus in it, which can be referred by predication to those things which, though they are many and different in species, are predicated in their substance.
[2.05.01] The reasoning behind this definition he gives by examples, saying:
Some things that are predicated are said about one thing only, such as individuals like Socrates and this and that, while others are said about many, such as genera and species and differences and proprieties and accidents, which are common but not proper to any one thing. The genus is like an animal, the species is like a human, the difference is like rational, the property is like laughable, the accident is like white, black, sitting.
Porphyrius makes a distinction of all things that are predicated in any way, in order to separate and distinguish the predication of genus from all other things, in this way. Of all things that are predicated, he says, some are spoken of singularity, others of plurality. Those spoken of singularity, he says, are all things that have any one subject that they can be said about, such as the individual subjects like Socrates, Plato, the whiteness in the proposed snow, the bench on which we now sit. Not every bench - for this is universal - but this bench that is now put forward. Nor is it white in the snow - for white and snow are universal - but this white which can now be seen to exist in this snow. For this white in this snow cannot be predicated of any other white, because it is reduced to singularity and confined to the individual form by the participation of the individual.
Others, however, are things that are predicated of many, such as genera, species, differences and proprieties and accidents that are common but not proper to any one.
Genera are indeed predicated of their species, species are predicated of individuals; for human, which is a species of animal, has many humans under it which can be called. Likewise, a horse, which is a species under an animal, has many individual horses which it can be predicated of. Difference itself can also be spoken of many species, such as rational about man and about God and celestial bodies, which, as Plato agrees, are animated and thriving with reason. Even the property, though it is predicated of one species, is said of many individuals, which are placed under the appropriate species, like laughable about Plato, Socrates, and other individuals that are attributed to man.
An accident is also said of many; for white and black can be spoken of many things which are separated from it by genus and species. Sitting is also said of many; for a man sits, a monkey sits, and birds too, whose species are vastly different. But because an accident can be common and properly to someone, therefore he determined saying that accidents are common but not proper to anyone. For those things which happen to someone properly become individuals and capable of being predicated of one only, those things which are commonly received can be spoken of many. As has been said about snow, that white which is in this subject snow, is not a common accident but properly to this snow which is subject to the eyes and to showing. Therefore, from the fact that it could be commonly predicated - for white can be spoken of many, like white man, white horse, white snow - it has become so that that white can be predicated of one snow only, by the participation of which it too has become singular.
But all in all, all genera or species or differences or properties or accidents, if we consider them by themselves insofar as they are genera or species or differences or properties or accidents, it is clear that they are predicated of many. But if we consider those things in which they are, that is, according to the form and substance of their subjects, it turns out that they seem to be led from plurality of predication to singularity. For animal, which is a genus, is predicated of many, but when we consider this animal in Socrates - for Socrates is an animal - this animal becomes an individual, since Socrates is an individual and singular. Similarly, man is predicated of many men, but if we consider that humanity which is in Socrates as an individual, it becomes an individual, since Socrates himself is an individual and singular. The difference, such as rational, can be spoken of many but it is an individual in Socrates. Even laughable, though it is predicated of many men, becomes unique in Socrates. Also, a common accident, like white, though it can be spoken of many, becomes an individual when seen in any one single subject.
A more convenient division could have been made in this way. Of the things that are spoken, some are predicated to singularity, others to plurality; of those which are predicated of many, some are predicated according to substance, others according to accident. Of those which are predicated according to substance, some are said in what it is, others in what quality it has. In what it is, indeed, genus and species; in what quality it has, difference. Again, of those which are predicated in what it is, some are predicated of many species, others not at all; genera are predicated of many species, but species of none. Of those, however, which are predicated according to accident, some indeed are things which are predicated of many, like accidents, others which are of one only, like properties.
However, such a division could also be made. Of the things that are predicated, some are predicated of individuals, others of many. Of those which are of many, some are predicated in what it is, others in what quality it has. Of those which are in what it is, some are said of species that are different, like genera, others not at all, like species; of those, however, which are in what quality it has are predicated of many, some indeed are predicated of species that are different, like differences and accidents, others of one species only, like properties. Of those, however, which are predicated of species that are different in what quality it has, some indeed are predicated in substance, like differences, others in things that happen commonly, like accidents. And by this division, the definitions of these five things can be collected in this way. Genus is what is predicated of many species that are different in what it is. Species is what is predicated of many that are not different in species in what it is. Difference is what is predicated of many species that are different in what quality it has in substance. Property is what is predicated of one species only in what quality it has, not in substance. Accident is what is predicated of many species that are different in what quality it has, not in substance.
[2.06]
[2.06.01] We have made these divisions in order to separate all things from themselves. However, Porphyry’s intention was different. He wasn’t hastily trying to separate all things from themselves, but only to separate the other things from the form and property of a genus. Therefore, he did divide everything that is predicated into those predicated of individuals and those predicated of many; the latter are either genera or species or the rest, and he adds examples of these:
From those things which are predicated of a single individual, genera differ in that they are predicated of many, and from those things which are predicated of many, they differ from species, because species are predicated of many, but not of different species, but of numbers. For example, “man” as a species, is predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not differ from each other in species but in number, but “animal”, as a genus, is predicated of man and ox and horse, which differ from each other not only in number but also in species. A genus differs from a property, because a property is predicated of only one species, to which it is proper, and from the individuals which are under one species, such as “capable of laughter” is predicated only of man and of particular men, but a genus is not predicated of one species, but of many and of different species. Genus differs from a difference and from those things which are commonly accidents, because differences and commonly accidents are predicated of many and of different species, but not in what they are, but rather, in what sort of thing they are. For when we ask about what these things are predicated of, we do not say that they are predicated in what they are, but rather in what sort of thing they are. For when we ask what sort of thing a man is, we say rational, and in what sort of thing a crow is, we say black. Rational is a difference, black is an accident. However, when we ask what a man is, we respond with animal, which is the genus of man.
Now he strives to separate the genus from all other things that are predicated in any way. Since a genus is predicated of many, it immediately differs from those things which are predicated of one only, and which have one individual and singular subject. However, this difference of a genus from those things which are predicated of one is common to it with the others, that is, with species, difference, property and accident, therefore, because they too are predicated of many. Therefore, he collects the differences of each of these from a genus, so that he may lead the understanding of what sort of thing a genus is under the aspect of the mind, saying:
From those things which are predicated of many, a genus differs first from species, because species, although they are predicated of many, yet not of different species, but in number.
Indeed, a species cannot have many species under itself, otherwise it would be called a genus, not a species. For if a genus is that which is predicated of many species differing in what they are, since a species is said of many and in what it is, if it is added that it is predicated of different species, the form of the species changes into that of a genus; this can also be understood through an example. For “man” is predicated of Socrates, Plato, and the rest, which are not separated from each other in species, like man and horse, but in number: indeed, there is a doubt about what it means to differ in number. Something seems to differ in number whenever a number differs from another number, such as a herd of cattle that perhaps contains thirty cows, differs in number from another herd of cows, if it contains a hundred cows; they do not differ in that they are a herd, nor even in that they are cows: they differ in number, because the former has more, the latter fewer. So how do Socrates and Plato not differ in species but in number, when both Socrates and Plato are one, and one unit does not differ in number from another unit? But this should be understood as said of number-differing, that is, in counting-differing, that is, while being counted they differ. For when we say ‘this is Socrates, this is Plato’, we have made two units, as if we touch with a finger saying ‘this is one’ of Socrates, again of Plato ‘this is one’, not the same unit is counted in Socrates which is in Plato. Otherwise, it could happen that the second touch of Socrates would also show Plato. Which does not happen. Unless you have touched Socrates either mentally or with a finger and also touched Plato, you do not make two, therefore, they differ when they are counted, which are number differences. Therefore, since a species is predicated of those differing in number, not in species, a genus is said of many and different in species, such as a cow, a horse, and the rest which differ from each other in species, not just in number. For in three ways something can either differ from something or be the same to something, in genus, species, number. Therefore, whatever things are the same in genus, it is not necessary that they are the same in species, so that if they are the same in genus, they differ in species. But if they are the same in species, they necessarily have to be the same in genus, as when man and horse are the same in genus – each is called an animal – they differ in species, because one is the species of man, another of horse. But Socrates and Plato, when they are the same in species, they are also the same in genus; both are placed under the predication of man and animal. But if anything is the same either in genus or species, it is not necessary to be the same in number, but if it is the same in number, it necessarily has to be the same in species and genus; like Socrates and Plato, when they are the same in the genus of animal and the species of man, they are found to be disjointed in number. But a sword and a blade are the same in number, for a blade is nothing else than a sword. But they are not different in species, for each is a sword, nor in genus, for each is an instrument, which is the genus of a sword. Therefore, since a man, a cow, and a horse, of which animal is predicated, differ in species, they must also differ in number. Therefore, a genus has this more than a species, that it is predicated of those differing in species. For if we give the whole definition of a genus, we will give it in this way: a genus is that which is predicated of many differing in species and number in what it is, but truly of a species like this: a species is that which is predicated of many differing in number in what it is.
A genus differs from a property, for a property is indeed predicated of only one species, which is its own, and of the individuals which are under one species.
A property can always be present to one species, nor does it leave it nor pass to another, and therefore it is named a property, such as laughable in man; and thus it is predicated both of that species which is its own property and of those individuals which are under that species, as laughable is said of man and of Socrates and Plato and the rest which are contained under the name of man. But a genus, not of one species only, as was said, but of many. Therefore, a genus differs from a property in that it is predicated of many species, while a property is called only of one of which it is said and of those individuals which are under it.
A genus differs from a difference, and from those things which are commonly accidents.
The discrepancy of differences and accident from a genus is concluded by a single separation. For indeed, because these are in no way predicated in what it is, by that very fact they are separated from a genus; for in other things indeed they are close to a genus, for they are also predicated of many and of those differing in species, but not in what it is. For if someone asks: what kind of man is he? It is answered rational, which is a difference; if someone: what kind of raven is he? It is said black, which is an accident. But if you ask: what is a man? It will be answered animal, which is a genus. What it says, however: “We do not say these are predicated in what it is, but rather in what kind of thing it is,” this more meets a question of this kind. For Aristotle thinks that differences ought to be predicated in substances. But what is predicated in a substance, this thing of which it is predicated, not what kind of thing it is but what it is, it shows. Hence it does not seem that a difference is predicated in what kind of thing it is but rather in what it is. But it is solved in this way. For a difference demonstrates a substance in such a way that it determines a quality around a substance, that is, it produces a substantial quality. What therefore was said more, such is as if he would say: it seems indeed to signify a substance and therefore to be predicated in what it is, but this is truer, because although it shows a substance, yet it is predicated in what kind of thing it is.
[ 2.07 ]
Therefore, the fact that a genus is predicated of many separates it from those that are predicated of only one of those things which are individuals, but it is separated from those things which are predicated as species or as properties by the fact that they differ in species; and it is separated from differences and generally from accidents by the fact that it is not predicated in “what it is,” but rather in “what kind of thing it is,” or “how it is,” with respect to those things of which it is predicated.
[2.07.01] We have said that there are three things which inform this third meaning of genus, that is, being predicated of many, differing in species and in “what it is.” These individual parts distinguish and separate genus from the rest of the things which are predicated in any way, which he briefly collects and says; that is, ‘what is predicated of many’ separates genus from those which are predicated of only one individual. But individual is said in many ways. An individual is said which cannot be divided at all, like a unit or the mind; an individual is said which cannot be divided due to solidity, like a diamond; an individual is said of which the predication does not apply to the remaining similar things, like Socrates: for although the other men are similar to him, the property and predication of Socrates does not apply to the others. Therefore, genus differs from those which are predicated of only one, in that it is predicated of many. The remaining four then, species and property, difference and accident, from which we collect differences from the genus. Therefore, genus will be separated from these things by single differences. Indeed, the difference by which genus is said of differing species, separates it from those which are predicated as species or as properties. For a species is said absolutely of no species, but a property is predicated only of one species and therefore not of differing species. Likewise, genus differs from difference and accident, because it is predicated in “what it is”; for they are called in “what kind of thing it is”, as has been said. Therefore, genus differs from those which are predicated of one in the quantity of predication, and from species and property in the nature of the subjects, since genus is said of differing species, but property and species are not. Likewise, genus is divided from difference and accident in the quality of predication. For the quality of predication is either in “what it is” or in “what kind of thing it is”.
[ 2.08 ]
Therefore, the given description of genus contains neither anything superfluous nor anything lacking.
[2.08.01] Every description or definition should equal that which it defines. For if the definition is not equal to the defined, and if it is larger, it will also contain some other things and it is not necessary that it always show the substance of the defined; if it is smaller, it does not reach the entire definition of substance. For all things that are larger are predicated of smaller things, like animal of man, but smaller things are not at all predicated of larger ones; no one can truthfully say ‘every animal is a man’. And therefore, if the predication is to be convertible, it will have to be equal. But that can be done, if it has neither anything superfluous nor anything lacking, as in the very description of genus. For it has been said to be a genus which is predicated of many differing in species in “what it is,” which description can be converted with genus, as we say whatever is predicated of many differing in species in “what it is,” is a genus. And if it can be converted, as he says, the given description of genus contains neither more nor less.
BOOK THREE, ON SPECIES
[ 3.01 ]
[3.01.01] The previous discussion on genus may perhaps seem to have consumed all discussion of species as well. For since genus is predicated of something, that is, of species, the nature of genus cannot be understood if the understanding of what species is remains unknown. But since their consideration and distinction in their own natures is different from their combination, he therefore follows through on the division of all these as he proposed in the introduction. And first, after the discussion of genus, he treats of species. About which indeed one can have doubt. For if this was the reason for prioritizing genus over all the rest, because its nature in its largeness contains the rest, it was not fair to place species before difference in the order of the discussion, because difference contains species, especially since the differences themselves inform the species. But what informs is prior to what is perfected by its information. Therefore, species is posterior to difference, and so difference should have been treated of first. Indeed, this would also agree with the introduction, in which he placed the order which the natural order suggested, saying it is useful to know what genus is and what difference is. The answer to this question is, since all things whatsoever are predicated of something, always draw their substance from opposites. So just as there cannot be a father unless there is a son, nor a son unless a father precedes, and the name of each depends on the other, so also one can see in genus and species. For there is no species unless there is a genus and a genus cannot be unless it is referred to a species; nor indeed should genus and species be thought to be certain substances or absolute things, as has also been said above, but whatever that is which consists in the nature of property, this then becomes genus and species when it is referred either to lower or to higher things. Therefore, since their relation establishes either of these, it is rightly the subject of the discussion.
[ 3.02 ]
[3.02.01] So, beginning to talk about species, he says in this way:
Species is indeed said to be the form of each, according to which it has been said: ‘The first species indeed worthy of command.’ But species is also said to be that which is under a given genus, according to which we usually say that man is indeed a species of animal, since animal is a genus, but white is a species of color, and triangle a species of figure.
Just as he distinguished the equivocal significations of genus above, so he does the same thing in species saying that the signification of species is not simple. And indeed he posits two, but it is clear that there are far more, which he therefore passed over, so as not to confuse the mind of the reader with verbosity. But he says indeed that the first species is the vocal form of each, which is perfected by the congregation of accidents. But it has been said very cautiously ‘of each,’ for this is said according to accident. For what form is to each individual, that species does not come from some substantial form but from accidents. For another is the species of substantial form which is called humanity, and this is not as it were subordinated to animal but rather as the very quality showing substance; for this is different both from that which is accidentally implanted in each body, and from that which divides genus into parts. And there are indeed many last things which, while they are the same, are nonetheless understood in different ways when related to different things, as this very humanity which, if you understand it in what it itself is, is species and it determines substantial quality; if you place it under animal understanding it, it draws participation of animal into itself and is separated from other animals and becomes a species of genus. But if you consider the property of each, that is, what masculine face, what firm gait and the rest by which individuals are conformed and somehow depicted, this is the accidental species according to which we say that any one of them is apt for command on account of the outstanding dignity of form. To this he adds another signification of species, that is, that which we subordinate to genus. But we submit that there is a triple signification of species, indeed one of substantial quality, another of the proper form of any individual, a third which he is now talking about, which is placed under genus. And indeed it is to be believed that, because of the obscurity of that which we added, because indeed it would seek a higher and more learned understanding, he set forth the rest having kept them silent and passed over. Indeed, of this species he added these examples, as man indeed is a species of animal, white a species of color, triangle a species of figure; for all these are called species of those things which are genera: animal indeed of man, color of white, figure of triangle.
When also assigning genus, we remember species, saying that it is predicated of many and different in what it is, and we call species that which is under a genus.
When he was assigning the description of genus earlier, he inserted the name of species in the definition of genus, saying that it is a genus that is predicated of many species differing in what they are, so as to define genus through the name of species. Now, however, when he strives to define species, he uses the designation of genus, saying that species is what is put under a genus. This saying seems to rightly raise the following question: every definition should declare the thing that the definition concludes, and it should make it clearer than it was shown by its name. Therefore, the definition should be made from things that are more known than the thing that is being defined. So, when he was describing or defining genus through the name of species, he used the term of species as if it were more known than genus and thus he described genus from more known things. But now, when he wanted to include species in the term of description, he uses the name of genus and reverses the notion of things, so that in the definition of genus the term of species may be more known, but in the definition of species the term of genus is more known, which cannot happen. If indeed the term of genus is more known than that of species, he should not have used the name of species in the definition of genus. But if the name of species is more easily understood than that of genus, the name of genus should not have been added in the definition of species. To this question he responds:
“It is necessary for us to know that, since the genus of something is a genus and the species of something is a species, therefore it is necessary to use both in the definitions of both.”
Everything that is predicated of something draws its substance from the things of which it is predicated; if the definition of each substance ought to show its property, the description is rightly made from either in those things which refer to each other. Therefore, since the genus of a species is a genus and it takes its substance and the word genus from a species, the name of species must be called upon in the definition of genus. And since species takes what it is from the genus, the name of genus should not have been left out in the description of species. And since there are different qualities of species — for some species can also be genera, while others remain only in the property of species and do not pass into the nature of genus — for this reason he gave a multiple definition of species, saying:
“Therefore, they assign species in this way: Species is what is put under a genus and of which genus is predicated in what it is. Moreover, also thus: Species is what is predicated of many and different in number in what it is. But this assignment is of the most specific, and which is only species; others will be also of not the most specific.”
He informed species with three definitions, of which two indeed apply to every species and determine all things that are called species in any way in their conclusion, but the third does not do so. For since there are two forms of species, one indeed when the species of something can also be the genus of another, another when it is only species and does not pass into the form of genus, the first two, that one in which it was said that what is put under a genus is a species, and again in which it was said that what genus is predicated of in what it is, is a species, apply to every species. For only these definitions show what is put under a genus. For both that which says that what is put under a genus is species, signifies the force of species by which it refers to genus, and that which says that what genus is predicated of in what it is, is species, signifies again the form of species that it retains from the predication of genus. But to be put under a genus and for genus to be predicated of it is the same thing, as it is the same thing to be subordinated to a genus and for genus to be set above it. But if every species is placed under a genus, it is clear that every species is included in this scope of description. But the third definition speaks only of that species which is never a genus and which remains only species. But this species is what is least predicated of different species. For if genus has more from species, that which is predicated of different species, if any species is indeed predicated of subjects but not of different species, it will only be a species of a superior genus, but it will not be a genus of subjects. Therefore, the predication that species has to subjects, if it is such that it is not predicated of different species, distinguishes it from those species which can be genera and shows that it is only species and does not hold the predication of genus. Therefore, the third description of species, which is called more species and most specific, is defined in this way: Species is what is predicated of many in number and different in what it is, as man; for it is predicated of Cicero and Demosthenes and the others who, as has been said, do not differ from him in species but in number.
[3.03]
[3.03.01] Therefore, out of the three definitions, two are indeed suitable for both the most specific and the not most specific, but this third one only includes the ultimate species. However, to make this clearer, he begins the matter a little higher up and illustrates it with appropriate examples:
It will be clear what is being said in this way. In each category, there are some things that are the most general and others that are the most specific. And there are others between the most general and the most specific. The most general indeed is that over which no other overarching genus occurs, the most specific, after which there will be no other lower species. Between the most general and the most specific, both the genera and species are the same, taken to one thing and another. Let it be clearly stated in one category. Substance is indeed a genus itself, but under this is body, under body indeed is a living body, under which is animal, under animal indeed is a rational animal, under which is man, under man indeed is Socrates and Plato and those who are individual men. But of these, substance is the most general and what is only a genus, man indeed is the most specific and what is only a species, body indeed is a species of substance, a genus however of living body; and living body is indeed a species of body, a genus however of animal. Animal indeed is a species of living body, a genus however of rational animal. But rational animal is indeed a species of animal, a genus however of man, man indeed is a species of rational animal, not however also a genus of individual men but only a species. And everything that is closest to individuals will only be a species, not also a genus.
We have said that Aristotle arranged ten categories, which he therefore called categories because they are predicated of all other things. But whatever is predicated of another, if the predication could not be reversed, the thing that is predicated is greater than the thing of which it is predicated. Therefore, these categories, being the greatest of all things because they are predicated of all, are shown. In each of these categories, some things are the most general genera and there is a long series of species and a descent from the greatest to the smallest. And those things which are predicated of others as genera and are not subordinate to any others as species, are called the most general genera, precisely because no other genus is superimposed on them, but the lowest things which are not said of any species, are called the most specific species, precisely because they take up the complete name of any thing which are pure and unmixed in the property of that which is sought. But since a species has its name from that which it is, because it is subordinate to a genus, it will be a simple species, if it is so subordinate to a genus, that it is not placed above any other differences as a genus. For a species which is so subordinate to another, that it is placed above another, is not a simple species but has a certain mixture of genus, but that species which is so subordinate to a genus, that it is placed least above other species, is only a species and a simple species and for this reason it is called the most specific and the most species. Therefore, between the genera which are the most general and the species which are the most specific, there are in the middle some things which are species compared to those above, but genera compared to those below. These are called subaltern genera. They are genera in such a way that one is placed under another. Therefore, what is only a genus, is called the most general genus, but those which are genera in such a way that they can be species, or are species in such a way that they can sometimes be genera, are called subaltern genera or species. But what is a species in such a way that it cannot be a genus to another, is called the most specific species.
[3.04]
[3.04.01] With these things understood, let’s take an example of one category. So that from it in the other categories also and in the other species in one thread and order what happens can be recognized. Therefore, substance is the most general genus; for it is predicated of all other things. And first of this are two species, corporeal, incorporeal; for both what is corporeal is called substance and also what is incorporeal, substance is predicated. But under corporeal, living and non-living body is placed, under living body animal is placed; for if you add sensible to living body, you make an animal, the remaining part, that is species, contains living insensible body. But under animal, rational and irrational, under rational, man and god; for if you put mortal under rational, you make a man, if immortal, a god, and indeed a corporeal god; for the ancients called this world god and they deigned to dignify it with the name of Jupiter and also the sun god and the other heavenly bodies, which both Plato and a large chorus of scholars have judged to be living. But under man indeed are individual and unique men like Plato, Cato, Cicero and others, the number of whom infinite plurality does not receive. Let the description of this thing place an example under the eyes:
incorporeal body living | non-living living body sensible | non-sensible animal rational | irrational rational animal mortal | immortal man | Plato Cato Cicero
The description placed above shows all the order from the most general to individual predication. In which indeed substance is called the most general genus, since it is placed over all, but it is not subordinate to any, and only a genus for the same reason, man however only a species, since Plato, Cato and Cicero, to whom it is placed above, do not differ in species but only in number. But indeed corporeal, which is placed second from substance, is proved to be both species and genus, species of substance, genus of living. But indeed living is genus of animal, species of corporeal. For living is genus of sensible, but living sensible is animal; therefore living for its proper difference, which is sensible, rightly is said to be genus of animal. But animal is genus of rational and rational is mortal. And since rational mortal is nothing other than man, rational becomes species of animal. Genus of man. But man himself of Plato, Cato, Cicero will not be, as was said, genus but is only species. Nor is only the species of rational difference man, but also of Plato and Cato and the other ones it is called species, for a different reason. For rational is species, because rational is divided by mortal and immortal, since man is mortal. But the same man is species of Plato and the others; for their form will be man substantial and ultimate likeness. But there is a common rule for all, that those are the most specific species which are placed only above individuals, like man, horse, raven – but not bird; for there are many species of birds but only these are said to be species – whose subjects are so similar to themselves, that they cannot have substantial difference. But in all this disposition, prior genera are joined with lower ones, so that later ones make species; for so that body may be substance, it is joined with corporeality and is corporeal substance body. Also so that it may be living, corporeal and substance are joined to living and it is living substance corporeal having a soul. Also so that it may be sensible, those three higher ones are joined to it. For what is sensible, is only as much as substance corporeal living retaining sense, which is entirely animal. Also all higher things joined to reason make rational and last of all man all higher things no less terminate; for man is substance corporeal, living. Sensible, rational, mortal. But we indeed render a definition of man saying rational animal, mortal, in animal including both substance and corporeal and living and sensible. And in the other species and genera in this way either genera are divided or species are described.
[ 3.05 ]
Just as substance, being supreme because there is nothing above it, is the most general genus, so too is man, because it is a species beyond which there is no other species nor any of those things that can be divided but only individuals – for Socrates and Plato are individuals – it will be the sole and final species and, as has been said, the most specific. Those things which are in the middle, those which are above them, will be species, but those which are after them, genera. Therefore, these things have two relations: that which is towards the superior, according to which they are said to be species, and that which is towards the posterior, according to which they are said to be genera. The extremes, however, have one relation. For the most general has a relation towards those things that come after, since it is the genus of all that is highest, but it does not have that which is towards the superior, since it is the highest and first principle. The most specific, on the other hand, has one relation, that which is towards the superior, of which it is a species, but it does not have a different one towards the posterior, but is also called the species of individuals but the species of individuals as containing them, and the species of the superior, as being contained by them.
[3.05.01] The name and proportion of the species reveals that of the genus. As the genus, since it does not have a genus above itself, is called the most general genus, such as substance, so the species, since it does not have a species below itself but individuals, is called the most specific species, such as human. What does it mean for a species not to have anything below it? To preside over those which can neither be divided into dissimilar things, as genera are divided, nor be cut into similar ones, as species are. Those entities which are established between the most general genera and the most specific species are called both species and genera, since they are subordinated to others and subjugate other things, whose partition could either be into dissimilar or similar parts. And since there are two attitudes, or rather opposing comparisons, which circulate in all genera and species, one indeed that looks to the superior, like species, which are subordinate to their genera, another that looks to the inferior, like genera, when they are preferred to their proper species, the most general genera retain only one attitude, that which encompasses the inferior, but they do not have that which is compared to the superordinate. For the most general genus is subordinated to none. Similarly, the most specific species possesses only one attitude, by which it is indeed compared to genera alone, but it does not have that which is committed to the inferior; for it is not preferred to any species. However, the subordinate genera fulfill both attitudes. For they possess both the attitude that looks to the superior, because the subordinate ones have a superordinate genus, and that which is predicated of the inferior; for the subordinate genera have subordinate species, as corporeal retains the attitude towards substance by which it can be placed under a genus, but towards animate by which it can be predicated of a species. Even though the most specific species are preferred to individuals, they will not have the superordinate attitude, therefore, because those things which are subordinated to the ultimate species are such that, as far as their substance is concerned, they are one thing, not having substantial difference but difference is made by accidents, as they seem to differ at least in number, so it could almost be said that a species presides over many and in a way is not preferred to any at all. For since a species shows one substance, which is the substance of all individuals positioned under the species, in a way it is not preferred to any, if one wants to look at the substance. But if one considers accidents, there are many of which the species is predicated, not due to diversity of substance but due to multitude of accidents, so it happens that a genus always has many species under it; for species is predicated of differences, but difference does not apply except to plurality. But a species can sometimes preside even over one individual. If, as is reported, there is only one phoenix, the species of phoenix is predicated of only one individual; also the species of the sun is understood to have the sun as its subject. So no multitude is inherently contained in a species, since even if there is only one individual, the understanding of species does not perish; for it presides over its own parts as if they were similar, as if you divide a bronze rod, according to that which is called bronze, both the parts and the whole are understood to be the same. Therefore it was said that a species, although it is preferred to individuals, nevertheless possesses only one attitude, namely that by which it is a species. For since it is subjected to the superordinate, it is called a species, and is a species of the superordinate just as it is a species of the subordinate, therefore because it shows their substance. We call the substance of a species species, and the species is not the substance of individuals, in the same way as the genus of a species; for the latter is part of the substance, like animal is part of human. For the remaining parts are rational and mortal, but human is the whole substance of Socrates and Cicero; no substantial difference is added to human to make Socrates or Cicero, as rational and mortal are added to animal so that human may be included in the full definition. Therefore, the most specific species is only a species and possesses only this single attitude, to the superordinate indeed, because it is contained by them, to the subordinate however, because it shapes and contains their substance.
[ 3.06 ]
Hence, he defines the most general category in such a way that, while it is a genus, it is not a species, and furthermore, above which there is no other overriding genus. The most specific category, on the other hand, is that which, while it is a species, is not a genus and which, while it is a species, is never divided into species and that which is predicated of many things that are different in number in the ‘what it is’. Those things which are in between the extremes are called subaltern genera and species, and each of them is considered to be both a species and a genus, taken in different ways. Those things which precede the most specific category up to the most general are also called genera and species and subaltern genera, such as Agamemnon, son of Atreus, and son of Pelops, and son of Tantalus, and lastly, son of Jupiter.
[3.06.01] After he has shown the nature of genera and species and their diversity, he mentions their order of definition and description. He first introduces the term for the most general genus, this being the most general genus that, while it itself is a genus, does not have a superimposed genus, i.e., it is not a species, and furthermore, above which there is no other overriding genus. For if it had another genus, it would not be called the most general. He describes the most specific species in this way: that which, while it is a species, is not a genus, conversely, since opposites are sometimes described from opposites. For since preposition is opposite to supposition, and genus is preposed, species is supposed, if it is therefore the first genus, because it is so superimposed, that it is least supposed, it will therefore be the last species, because it is so supposed, that it cannot be preposed, thus the definition of opposites is rightly made from opposites. There is another description: that which, while it is a species, is never divided into species, i.e., it cannot be a genus. For if every genus is a genus of species, if something is not divided into species, it cannot be a genus. There is another definition: that which is predicated of many things and different in number in ‘what it is’. About this definition, there has been much demonstration above.
Now this must be noted. If, as was said a little above, one individual can be the subject of a species, as the phoenix its atom, as the sun this bright body, as the world or moon, whose species are superimposed on their individual ones, who agrees to say that the species is that which is predicated of many things different in number in ‘what it is’? For there are some things which are not said to be different in number, such as the phoenix, sun, moon, world. But about these, there is the reason of which we have also previously rendered a few, which, a little bent, most conveniently unties the knot of the question. For all things that are under the most specific species, whether they are infinite or established by finite number or are led to individuality, while there is some individual, the species always remains and is not diminished by the reduction of individuals, as long as any one remains, the species is not consumed. For, as has been said, even if there are several individuals, they will not have substantial differences. Indeed, it is not suitable to say in the genus, that which presides over those which are disaggregated from it by substantial difference; it presides over species which are informed by diverse differences. Therefore, if one of them perishes and is reduced to the unity of the species, it cannot be a genus, because the species is predicated of different things. Not so in species. For if the nature of all individuals is consumed and it has arrived at the predication of the superimposed species of one individual, it still is and remains a species. Such are those things which perish and are lacking, such is that which has remained and is subject. But what we say that species is predicated of many things different in number, this will be explained in two correct ways, firstly, because there are many more species which are predicated of numerous individuals, than these to which only one individual seems to be supposed, and then this, because many things are said in power, although they are not always so in act, as a man is said to be capable of laughter; even if he does not laugh at all, since he is capable of laughing. Thus, therefore, the species is predicated of many things different in number; for no less would the phoenix be predicated of many phoenixes, if there were many, than now, when it is said to be one. Likewise, the species of the sun is now said of this one sun which we know, but if we imagine many suns in our mind and thought, it will no less be predicated of many suns in individuals than of this one. Therefore, the species is said to be predicated of many things different in number even when there are some which are named after individual ones. Those things which are called subaltern can be defined in this way: a subaltern genus is that which can be both a genus and a species, and it is in this way as in families, which both procreate and are procreated, as the following example shows: “As Agamemnon is the son of Atreus, and the son of Pelops, and the son of Tantalus, and lastly, the son of Jupiter.” For Atreus, being the son of Pelops, is as a species to Agamemnon’s genus. Likewise, Agamemnon is the son of Pelops and the son of Tantalus, with Pelops compared to Tantalus and Tantalus to Jupiter each appearing as species and Tantalus to Pelops, Pelops to Atreus appearing as genera, while Jupiter seems to be the most general genus of them all.
[ 3.07 ]
In families, matters are usually reduced to a single principle, for instance, to Jupiter. But it doesn’t work this way with genera and species. There isn’t a single, common genus for all beings nor are all things of the same genus according to one supreme genus, as Aristotle states. But assume, as in the categories, the first ten genera are like the first ten principles. Or if someone calls all beings entities, they are named equivocally, not univocally. If there were one common genus for all beings, entities would be referred to univocally. But as there are ten primary ones, the communion is only by name, not also by reasoning, which is by name.
[3.07.01] When speaking of subordinate genera, he gave the example of a certain family line that extends from Agamemnon to Jupiter, whom he placed at the end in reverence of the deity. As far as the ancient theologians go, Jupiter is traced back to Saturn, Saturn to Sky (Caelus), and Sky in turn is led back to the most ancient Ophion, from whom no origin exists. So that we wouldn’t believe that what applies to family lines also applies to things, namely, that all things can be traced back to a single origin of their name, he therefore determines that this cannot be the case with genera and species; for just as there can be a single origin for any family line, so it cannot be that there is a single origin for all things. Indeed, some held this view, that there should be one ultimate genus of all things that exist, which they call being, derived from what we call ‘is’; for everything exists and is predicated of all things. And so both substance exists and quality exists and quantity also exists and the rest are said to exist; and nothing would be discussed about these unless it was established that these, which are called categories, exist. Given these considerations, they posited being as the ultimate genus of all, namely that which is predicated of all things. From what we call ‘is’, they derived the participle and called it on in Greek and being in Latin. But Aristotle, the wisest knower of things, objects to this view and does not think that all things can be traced back to a single origin, but rather there are ten categories in things, which not only differ from themselves, but also cannot be reduced to a single common principle. These ten categories he sets down as substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, doing, undergoing, and having.
However, because ‘is’ is predicated of all these – for indeed, all the above-mentioned categories are said to exist – he refuted and repelled this notion by saying not every common name forms a common substance, nor should a genus be deemed common just because a common name is predicated of some things. For those to which the common definition of a name applies, they will rightly be judged species of the common name and are predicated univocally under that common term, but for those to which it does not apply, there is only a common term, but no substance. This is clarified more obviously with examples in this way. We declare that animal is the genus of both humans and horses; let us suppose the definition of an animal, which is a sentient living substance; if we apply this to a human, it will be that a human is a sentient living substance, and the definition is not tainted with any falsehood.
Again, if we apply it to a horse, a horse will be a sentient living substance; this too is true. Therefore, this definition applies both to an animal, which is common to a human and a horse, and to the horse and human themselves, which are posited as species of the animal. As a result, both human and horse are called animals univocally. But if someone calls a painted human and a living human by the common name of animal, let him define an animal in this way, to be a sentient living substance. But this definition applies to the living human, indeed, but not at all to the painted human; for he is not a living substance. Therefore, for the living and painted human, to whom the common definition of the name, that is, of animal, cannot apply, animal is not a common genus but only a common term and this term ‘animal’ is said in the living and painted human not as a genus but as a term signifying several things; and a term signifying several things is called equivocal, just as the term indicating a genus is called univocal.
Therefore, that which is called being, even though it is predicated of all categories, since no definition of it can be found that can be adapted to all categories, is therefore not said univocally of categories, that is, as a genus but equivocally, that is, as a term signifying several things. It is also proved by this reasoning that what we call being cannot be the genus of categories. For there cannot be two genera of one thing unless one is subordinated to the other, as the genus of a human is animal and animated, with animal subordinated to animated as though to a species. But if two are so equal to each other that never is one subordinated to the other. These cannot be the genera of the same species. Therefore, being and one are neither subordinated to each other; for we cannot say that the genus of one is being or of that which we call being, one. For that which we call being is one and that which is called one, is being; but genus and species are not at all convertible.
If, therefore, being is predicated of all categories, so is one. For substance is one, quality is one. Quantity is one and the rest in this way. Therefore, since being is predicated of all things, it will be the genus of all, and one, since it is predicated of all, will be the genus of all. But one and being, as has been shown, are not at all subordinated one to another; therefore, there are two equal genera of each of the categories, which cannot be. Given these considerations, Porphyry determined, saying that things cannot be reduced to a single principle as in family lines, nor can there be a common genus of all things, as Aristotle would have it; BUT LET THERE BE SET DOWN, he says, JUST AS IN THE CATEGORIES it was stated, THE FIRST TEN GENERA LIKE THE FIRST TEN PRINCIPLES, namely that no further reason should be sought for now, but yielding to Aristotle’s authority, we should believe that these ten categories are not subject to any other genus, which if anyone calls beings, he will name equivocally, not univocally; for no common definition according to a common name can be applied to all of them. This situation leads to the fact that nothing is predicated univocally about them. For if it were predicated univocally, their common name would be a genus that is predicated of all; but if it were a genus. The definition of the genus would apply to the species. But since this does not happen, what we call being, common to these, is a term by the signification of the term, not by the reasoning of substance.
[ 3.08 ]
“There are indeed ten most general things, but the most specific are indeed in a certain number, but not infinite, and the individuals that come after the most specific are infinite. Therefore, Plato orders one to rest when descending from the most general to the most specific, but to descend through the middle by dividing with specific differences; ‘Leave the infinite,’ he says, 'for there can be no discipline of these things.’”
[3.08.01] Since knowing the nature of species pertains to the division of genera and because knowledge cannot be infinite – for no intellect encompasses infinity – therefore he pursues the multitude of genera, species, and individuals with the most sound reasoning, stating that the number of supreme genera is known – for there are ten categories found by Aristotle which should be preferred in place of all things – but species are far more numerous than genera. For since there are ten supreme genera and since many species, not just one, are posited under one genus, and the closest species are subordinate genera to the supreme genera, until one descends to the most specific species, it is necessary that many species exist scattered from one genus, and that the most specific are much more than the subordinate ones, because one descends through a multitude of subordinate genera to the most specific species. This is especially demonstrated by the fact that they are inferior; for genera always divide into multiple subjects.
Indeed, it is clear that there are far more species of the ten genera than of one, but although there are more, they are contained in a certain number; which anyone could easily discern if they dissect and pursue the species of all genera. However, the individuals that are under each species are infinite either because they are so many and located in different places that they cannot be included and comprehended in number and knowledge, or because they are situated in generation and destruction, now they begin to exist, now they cease. And therefore, the highest genera, the subordinate, and the species which are called the most specific, because they are finite in number, can be included in the limit of knowledge, but individuals in no way. Therefore, Plato ordered to make a division from more general to more specific, that is, the most specific; for he ordered to descend through those which were finite in number, but when it came to individuals, he advised to stand still, so as not to gather infinity, which nature does not support. Indeed, he approved the division of genera into species so that they would be dissolved by specific differences. But we will discuss these specific differences more fully in the title where the difference is debated. For here it suffices to say that they are specific differences which inform species, such as ‘rational’ or ‘mortal’ in humans. Therefore, when we divide ‘animal’, we separate ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, ‘mortal’ and ‘immortal’. So, Plato thought the other genera should be divided by such differences which inform the species beneath them until one arrives at the most specific, then to stop and not to follow the infinite, since there would never be discipline or number of individuals.
[ 3.09 ]
“Therefore, when descending to the most specific it is necessary to go through a multitude by dividing, but when ascending to the most general, it is necessary to gather the multitude. For the collective is the species of many into one nature and more so that which is a genus, but particulars and individuals always divide what is one into a multitude; for by the participation of the species many men are one, but by the particulars one and the common are many; for what is singular is always divisive, but what is common is collective and unifying.”
[3.09.01] To divide is to dissolve. ...the individual," Plato advised to section down to the most specific species (specialissima). He instructed to descend by division through those things that were finite in number, but when it came to individuals, he advocated that we should stop, so as not to gather the infinite, which nature does not allow. He approved of the division of genera into species in such a way that they should be resolved by specific differences. We will discuss these specific differences more fully in the section where we debate difference. But here it will suffice to say that these are specific differences which inform species, like rational or mortal in humans. Thus, when we divide ‘animal’ into rational and irrational, mortal and immortal, we separate it. This and other genera should, according to Plato, be divided by such differences which inform the underlying species, until you reach the most specific ones, and then stop, and not follow the infinite, since there would never be a discipline or number of individuals.
[ 3.09 ]
“Therefore, in descending to the most specific, it is necessary for the divider to go through a multitude, but in ascending to the most general, it is necessary to gather the multitude. For the collective is the species of many things into one nature and more so that which is the genus, while particulars and singulars always divide what is one into a multitude. For by participation of species, many humans are one, but by particulars, one and the common are many. For what is singular is always divisive, but what is common is collective and unifying.”
[3.09.01] To divide is to break up what was one into a multitude, and division contemplates the opposite of composition and conjunction. For that which is divided into parts by being dispersed, is composed again from many parts by being gathered. Thus, as was said earlier, species gather the similarity of individuals, and genera gather that of species. But similarity is nothing other than a certain unity of quality. So, it is clear that species gather the substantial similarity of individuals, while genera contract and reduce the substantial similarity of species to themselves. Then, the unity of genus is distributed into species by differences, and the unity of species into single and individual persons by accidents. Therefore, since this is so, it is always necessary, when descending from the genus to the species, to make a multitude by division, and when ascending from species to genera, to gather and unite the many things that were in the differences of species by the similarity of quality. The same can be observed in species. For just as they gather the infinite individuals into one substantial similarity, so they distribute the species into individual proprieties by their own infinity.
For indeed all individuals are disaggregating and dividing, but species and genera are collective, with species collecting and uniting individuals, and genera, so to speak, collecting species. Genus distributes the species and species are derived from individuals into a multitude, but genus again collects many species, while species lead a particular and unique multitude towards the unity of individuality. Thus, genus is more unifying than species. For species only collects individuals, but genus collects both species and the individuals of those species and unique persons. But in this, he uses a suitable example saying that “by participating in species,” that is, of man, Cato, Plato and Cicero “and many other men are one,” that is, thousands of men in that they are men, are one man; but indeed one man, who is special, if considered in the multitude of men who are beneath him, become many. Thus, many men in the special man are one, and one special one in many is infinite. Therefore, what is singular is dividing, but what is common, since it is one of many, like genus and species, is collective and unifying.
[ 3.10 ]
“Once the genus and species have been established, what each is, and the genus is one, but the species are many - for the division of the genus is always into more species - the genus is always predicated of the species and all higher things of lower ones, but the species is neither of the next genus to itself nor of higher ones; it does not indeed convert. But it is necessary that either equals be predicated of equals, like ‘neighing’ of ‘horse’, or greater things of lesser ones, like ‘animal’ of ‘man’, but lesser things not at all of greater ones; for you will not say that ‘animal’ is ‘man’, just as you will say that ‘man’ is ‘animal’. But of those of which the species is predicated, necessarily both the genus of the species will be predicated and the genus of the genus up to the most general; if indeed it is true to say that Socrates is a man, and man is an animal, and animal is a substance, it is also true to say that Socrates is an animal and a substance. Therefore, always with the higher things predicated of lower ones, the species indeed will be predicated of the individual, but the genus both of the species and of the individual, and the most general both of the genus and of the genera, if there are several intermediates and subalterns, and of the species and of the individual. For the most general is indeed predicated of all genera and species and individuals under it, but the genus that is before the most specific, of all the most specific and of individuals, only the species however of all individuals, and the individual of only one particular. An individual is indeed said to be Socrates and ‘this white object’ and ‘this one coming’, like ‘the son of Sophroniscus’, if Socrates is his only son.”
[3.10.01] He briefly summarizes everything that has been previously discussed in this way. He says, After we have defined what is genus and what is species, and after we have comprehended and taught these things through their definitions that a single genus always resolves into multiple species, we add, he says, that all superior things are predicated of inferior things, while inferior things are hardly ever predicated of superior things. And he correctly addresses those things that are useful concerning the mode of predication. Moreover, he shows that a genus always resolves into multiple species given the assigned definition of a genus. For he defined a genus as that which would be predicated as to its ‘whatness’ about multiple things differing in species. But multiple things differing in species are nothing but multiple species; and whatever the genus is predicated about, it is dissolved into those things. Therefore, it has been shown by the assignment of the definition that there are multiple species of a single genus. As such, indeed, the genus is predicated of the species, and the species of the individuals, and all superior things of the inferior, while the inferior are in no way predicated of the superior. The reason for this happening I will briefly explain. We have said beforehand that those things that are superior are essentially genera, and what are genera are more extensive than any single species. For the genus would not be divided into very many, unless it turned out to be larger than any single species. As such, the name of the genus applies to the whole species; for not only does the magnitude of the genus equal that of the species, but it also surpasses the species. Therefore, every human is an animal, since both ‘human’ and the rest are contained within the term ‘animal’.
But truly no one would say: every animal is a human; for the name ‘human’ does not reach the whole of ‘animal’, because, being smaller, it in no way equals the term of the genus. Therefore, those things that are greater are predicated of the lesser, those that are lesser are not converted, so as to be predicated of the greater. However, if there are some that are equal, they must be converted according to the likeness of their nature, such as ‘neighing’ and ‘horse’, for they equal each other in such a way that neither is the horse not neighing nor is what is neighing not a horse. Therefore, it happens that every neighing thing is a horse and every horse neighs. As such, those things that are superior are predicated not only of those inferiors that are closest to them, but also of those inferiors that are below the inferiors. For if it is accepted that those things that are superior are predicated of the inferiors, the inferiors of the inferiors are much more inferior to the superiors, like ‘substance’ is predicated of ‘animal’, which is inferior; but ‘human’ is inferior to ‘animal’, therefore ‘substance’ will also be predicated of ‘human’. Again, ‘Socrates’ is inferior to ‘human’, therefore ‘substance’ will be predicated of ‘Socrates’. Therefore, the species are predicated of the individuals, the genera indeed both of the species and of the individuals. This cannot be reversed; for neither are the individuals predicated of the species or genera nor the species of the genera. Thus, it happens that the genus, which is the most general, can be predicated of all subaltern genera, and of the species, and of the individuals, but of itself nothing can be predicated. The ultimate genus is that which is placed before the most specific species and can be spoken of only about the most specific species, while the species about the individuals, as has been said, and the individuals about each one, like ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’, and these especially are individuals which fall under the indication of the finger, like ‘this bench’, ‘this coming person’ and those that are designated by some note of accidents proper to them, as if someone wants to show ‘Socrates’ by a sign, he does not say ‘Socrates’, lest there be another who may perhaps be called by this name but he says ‘the son of Sophroniscus’, if he was the only son of Sophroniscus. For individuals can most certainly be shown, if they are pointed out to the sense of sight itself by a silent name or by touch, or if they are signified by some accident or by a proper name, if he alone has obtained that name, or by parents, if he is their only son, or by whatever other accident singularity is demonstrated. Because it has one predication for being, and its utterance does not transfer to another, just as indeed that of the genus to the species, but of the species to the individuals.
[3.11]
“Individuals are called such because each one of them is made up of unique properties, the combination of which will never be the same in another. For example, the properties of Socrates will never exist in any other individual, while the properties that are of man, by this I mean the common man, will be the same in many, especially in all particular men in that they are men.”
[3.11.01] Because he previously called it an individual, he tries to show the reason for this name. Indeed, only those things which are common to many are divided; each one is divided among those things which it shares in common and whose nature and likeness it contains. However, those into which the common is divided, share in the nature of the common and the common property of the thing agrees with those to which it is common. But the property of individuals is common to none. For instance, the property of Socrates, if he was bald, had a snub nose, a pot belly, other body features, or was characterized by certain manners or a particular voice, did not apply to anyone else; these properties, which arose from accidents and combined his form and figure, did not apply to anyone else. Whoever’s properties do not apply to anyone else, their properties will not be common to anyone; and whose property is not common to anyone, there is nothing that can share in his property. But what is such that nothing shares in its property, cannot be divided into those that do not share; rightly therefore, those whose property does not apply to another are called individuals. But the property of a man, that is specific, applies to both Socrates and Plato and others, whose properties arising from accidents do not apply to any other single individual for any reason.
[3.12]
Therefore, the individual is contained under the species, and the species under the genus. For the genus is a certain whole, and the individual a part, but the species is both a whole and a part - a part of something else, a whole to others; for the whole consists of parts.
Regarding the genus and species, and what is the most general and the most specific, and which genera are the same as species, and which are also individuals, and in how many ways genus and species are spoken of, it has been sufficiently said.
[3.12.01] Here, he briefly reviews everything that he previously dealt with in greater length, saying that the individual is contained by the species, and the species themselves by the genus, and giving the reason for this, he says: “For every genus is a whole, and the individual a part.” For the whole genus is contained in what is a genus. Although it can be a species; for the whole is not a species as a genus but as that which is supposed for the genus. Therefore, insofar as a genus is a genus, it is a whole to the species, for it always contains them. But the individual is always a part, for it never concludes anything with its own property. The species, however, is both a whole and a part, a part indeed of the genus, a whole indeed to the individuals. And when it is a part, it refers to singularity, when a whole, to plurality. Since one genus stands over many species, any one species is a part of the genus, that is of one; however, since the species stands over many individuals, it is not a whole to one individual but to many. Therefore, it is called a whole, because it contains and coheres many. For to be a part of something, one itself can be a part of one, but to be a whole, one itself cannot be a whole of one. Therefore, the species is indeed a part of another, but a whole to others.
And about the genus and species it has been said, and what is the most general genus, because it is that to which no other genus is superimposed, and what is the most specific species, because it is that to which no species is subordinated, and which genera are the same, the same and species namely subordinate to which something is superimposed, something is subordinated, which are also individuals, namely those whose properties cannot agree with another, and in how many ways genus or species is spoken of, genus indeed either in multitude or in procreation or in participation of substance. Species indeed either from the figure or from the supposition of the genus, it has been sufficiently said. Having finished these, I will end the volume, so that the area of the fourth book may be reserved for differences.
BOOK FOUR, ON THE DIFFERENCE
[ 4.01 ]
[4.01.01] When discussing differences, we should not encounter the same issue that we faced in our treatment of genera and species about the order of placement. There, we remembered the question of why the genus was placed first for all to come to in the discussion, why the species was added after the genus. But now it is unnecessary to ask why the difference was taken after the species, since it has already been asked why it wasn’t placed before the species. If it seemed surprising that the species was placed before the difference in the order of discussion because the difference is more comprehensive and broader than the species, what is there that anyone could wonder at if that same difference is placed before the proper and the accidental, since the proper always belongs to one species, as will be shown later, and the accidental shows some external nature and is not completely predicated in substance, while the difference contains both, and is predicated about multiple species and in substance? But enough of this for now, let’s turn to the words of Porphyry.
“Difference is generally, properly, and more properly spoken of. Generally, one is said to differ from another, which differs by some alterity in any way either from itself or from another. For example, Socrates differs from Plato by alterity and he differs from himself either as a boy or as a man, and as someone doing something or resting, and always by having alterities in some way. Properly, one is said to differ from another when it differs from another by an inseparable accident. An inseparable accident is like the curvature of a nose, blindness of the eyes, a scar, when it has hardened from a wound. More properly, one is said to differ from another when it has a specific difference, just as a human differs from a horse by the specific difference of rational quality.”
We have previously stated that something differs from another in three ways: by genus, species, and number, in all of which either a thing differs from another according to some substantial differences or according to accidents. For those things that differ by genus or species are separated by certain substantial differences, because genera and species are informed by certain differences. For instance, that a human differs from a tree in genus is made different by the quality of a sensible animal. For the added quality of sensibility makes an animate thing an animal; if this quality is removed, it makes the animate thing insensible, which are twigs. Therefore, humans and trees differ in genus – neither can be placed under the genus of animal – they differ by the difference of sensibility according to genus, which informs only the genus of one of the proposed, that is, the human, as was said. It is obvious that those things that differ in species also differ by substantial differences, as humans and horses differ by substantial differences, by rationality and irrationality. But those things that are individuals and differ only in number, differ only by accidents. These are either separable or inseparable, separable indeed, such as moving, sleeping; for one differs from another because one is weighed down by sleep, the other is awake.
One also differs by inseparable accidents, because one has a longer stature, the other the smallest. Since these are so, Porphyry gathers these diversities of differences into a triad and adds to them the names he will use afterwards, saying: “Every difference is either generally, properly, or more properly named.” He takes the general difference to show any accident, which consists in some kind of alterity, as if Plato differs from Socrates because one is sitting, the other is walking, or because one is old, the other young. One can often differ from oneself, as if one is now doing something, when before one was resting, or if one has now become a young man, when previously one was living as a tender infant. These are called common differences because they can’t be the proper differences of any one thing but indicate only separable accidents. For standing, sitting, doing something, not doing something are clearly separable accidents of many and indeed all. Those who differ by these are said to differ by common differences.
In addition, being a child, a young person or an old man, these too are separable accidents. For by necessity of nature, we proceed from childhood to youth, and from there to old age, and finally to decrepit age. Perhaps there is some doubt about the shape of each person’s body, whether it can be separated in any way. But it too is separable, for no shape endures in a long-lasting and stable way. Therefore, a foreign father cannot recognize his child left at home if he sees him as a young man when he returns; for the shape is always changing from what it was before, and the very alterity by which we differ from another is always different. Therefore, it is clear that this common difference applies especially to separable accidents, but the proper one indicates inseparable accidents. These are such things as when someone is born with blind eyes, when someone has a crooked nose; for as long as the nose and eyes are there, the one will always be blind, the other always crooked. And these are by nature. There are other things that happen to bodies accidentally, as if a wound inflicted on someone is covered by a scar, this if it has hardened. It makes a proper difference; for one will differ from another because this one has a scar, the other does not at all. Finally, in all these things, whether separable accidents or inseparable ones, some are naturally accidental, others are external, naturally indeed like childhood or youth and the whole formation of the body, like blind eyes and a crooked nose. And the former examples are of a separable accident by nature, the latter ones of an inseparable one. Also externally, to walk or run; for this is not brought by nature but by will alone, nature has only given the ability, not also the act.
And these are examples of a separable accident coming from outside, those of an inseparable one, as if any scar has hardened, covering a wound. But more proper differences are predicated, which form not an accident but a substance, such as the rationality of a human; for a human differs from others, because he is rational or because he is mortal. These are therefore more proper, which show the substance of each one. For if these are called common because they are separable and belong to all, others are proper. Because they cannot be separated, even though they are among accidents, those are rightly called more proper, which not only cannot be separated from the subject, but also complete the species and substance of the subject itself. Therefore, from these three diversities of differences, that is common, proper, and more proper, discrepancies arise according to genus or species or number. For from common and proper differences arise differences according to number, but from more proper ones according to genus and species.
[ 4.02 ]
“Therefore, universally, every difference alters whatever it attaches to. However, the difference that exists generally and specifically makes something altered, but the difference that exists more specifically, makes something other. Indeed, some differences cause alteration, others make something other. Those differences which make something other are called specific, and those which cause alteration are called simple differences. For instance, when the difference ‘rational’ is applied to the ‘animal’, it creates another thing and forms the species of animal, while the difference ‘capable of movement’ only alters it from being at rest. Therefore, this one makes it other, while that one simply alters it.”
[4.02.01] Every difference creates a separation between one thing and another. But this difference can either be general and encompassing, or it can be with a certain specific and more specific way of differentiation. Therefore, whatever is different from another in any way is said to be altered. However, if this difference also carries a specific difference, then it is not only altered but also said to be other. Therefore, alteration is encompassing, whereas otherness is contained within the scope of alteration; for whatever is other, is also altered, but not everything that is altered can be called other. So, if differences are made by accidents, then it is altered indeed, because any diversity considered from any differences implies alteration, but it does not become other, unless it is separated from the other by substantial difference. Thus, common and specific differences, being accidental as stated, only make something altered. They do not make it other, but more specific differences, as they hold the substance and are predicated in the form of the subject, not only make something altered, which is common to either substantial or accidental difference, but they also make it other, a trait held only by the difference that contains the substance and form of the subject.
Hence, these differences that make something other are called specific because they indeed create the species; when they have informed it with substantial differences, they make it so different from others that it is not only altered but also wholly other. Therefore, this division is made: some differences cause alteration, others make something other. And those which cause alteration are simply called differences by name, while those which make something other are called specific differences.
To clarify what is meant by alteration and otherness, they can be described or demonstrated by the following example: Something other is entirely different in the way of species, like a horse from a human, as the difference ‘rational’ coming to an ‘animal’ made a human and constituted him as other than a horse. Likewise, if one human sits and another stands, it does not create a different human from a human, but only alteration separates them, making the standing one altered from the sitting one. Also, if one has black eyes and the other has blue, nothing regarding the form of humanity has changed. Thus, based on these differences, only alteration exists. However, if a horse lies down and a human walks, the horse is both other and altered from the human – altered in two ways but other in one way. Altered is that which is entirely different in species – and is other, because, as stated, every other is also altered – or that which is separate by accidents, such as one lying down and the other walking. Yet, it is only other once, separated by the rational and irrational differences, which are specific and are called substantial. Therefore, altered is whatever is different from another in any way.
[ 4.03 ]
“Thus, according to those differences which make something other, divisions are made from genera to species, and definitions are assigned, which are from the genus and differences of this kind. According to those differences which only cause alteration, only alteration exists and changes in ways of behaving.”
[4.03.01] Since, at the beginning of this work, he said it was useful to understand the nature of genus, species, differences, proper and accidental for division and definition, therefore, now, after making a division of differences themselves, he divides and separates them, determining which differences are suitable for divisions and definitions, and which are not. Therefore, as the division of the genus into species should be made in such a way that these species are completely different from each other in all respects of substance, therefore he does not approve of taking for division those differences which either signify a separable or inseparable accident, because they, as stated, only cause alteration, but cannot create or inform otherness.
Therefore, these differences that cause alteration are useless for division. Thus, common and proper differences should be separated from the division of the genus, and only those which are more specific should be taken. These make something other, which seems to be what the division of the genus requires. These more specific differences also contribute the most to the definition, while common and proper ones are set aside as useless; common and proper differences, since they bear accidents of a different kind, conform nothing according to the reasoning of the substance, while every definition aims to show the substance. However, specific differences are those which, as said before, inform the species and perfect the substance; these are more specific. Therefore, the same differences are taken both for division and definition. As it was said, the same differences are taken sometimes as constitutive for the definition of species, and sometimes as divisive for the partition of the genus. Therefore, when they are divisive of the genus, they create otherness. In the definition of substance, however, they make an informing of the species. Since they are more specific and make something other and are specific, they are suitable for divisions insofar as they make something other. Insofar as they inform the species, they are suitable for definitions. However, common and proper differences, since they neither make something other but only altered, nor show the substance at all, are equally removed from division as from definition.
[ 4.04 ]
Therefore, it must be said, returning to the ideas mentioned earlier, that some differences are separable and others are inseparable. To move, to rest, to be healthy, to be ill, and all things nearest to these are separable, while being an eagle or a snub-nosed, rational or irrational being is inseparable. Of the separable, some are in themselves, others occur accidentally; for being rational is inherent to humans, as is being mortal and being perceptible to learning. However, being an eagle or snub-nosed occurs accidentally and not in itself.
[4.04.01] Previously, he divided the differences into three parts saying that they can be either common, proper, or more proper. He then split them again with another division into two parts saying that these make one thing, those make another. Now he makes a third division, saying some are separable, others inseparable. It’s clear that many divisions can be made from each kind of difference, as there are many differences in every object. For if every division is distributed according to differences, and there are many differences, there must also be many divisions. It happens that the animal is divided in this way: some animals are rational, others irrational, some mortal, others immortal; some have feet, others do not; some feed on plants, others on meat, others on seeds. Therefore, it should not seem surprising if multiple divisions have been made from differences. And first, he categorized differences into three types: common, proper, and more proper. The second division included common and proper within the term for changing, while more proper was included within making something different.
The third division, which says “differences are either separable or inseparable,” includes one type of difference that makes changes under the term of separable differences, and all the rest under the term of inseparable differences. Those differences that cause changes, that is, the proper difference, and the rest that are shown to make something different, that is, more proper, are said to be inseparable differences. These inseparable differences are further divided. Some are in themselves, others occur accidentally; the more proper ones are in themselves, while the proper ones occur accidentally. Something is said to be in itself when it shapes the substance of something else. If any species exists because it is constituted by a substantial difference, that difference is present in the subject in itself, not accidentally or through any other medium, but its presence shapes the species it safeguards. Like rationality in humans; for this difference is inherent in a human, that’s why a human is a human, because rationality is present. If rationality were to leave, the species of human would not remain. And no one can deny that these differences, which are substantial, are inseparable; they cannot be separated from the subject unless the nature of the subject is destroyed. However, the inseparable differences that occur accidentally are those that are called proper, like being an eagle or a snub-nosed. These are called accidental because they occur externally to the already constituted species and offer nothing to the substance of the subject.
[ 4.05 ]
“Therefore, those which are in themselves, are understood in the context of substance and they make something different, while those which occur accidentally, are not spoken of in the context of substance nor do they make something different but rather something changed. And indeed those which are in themselves, do not allow for more or less, but those which occur accidentally, even if they are inseparable, admit of intensification and remission. For neither is the genus predicated more or less of that which is its genus, nor the differences of the genus by which it is divided; for they indeed are what complete the definition of each thing. However, being the same and one thing for each does not admit of intensification or remission. But being an eagle or a snub-nosed or colored in some way both intensifies and remits.”
[4.05.01] Having properly divided differences, he shows their distance from each other and revisits one which he previously stated. For he had said there were three differences, common, proper, more proper, he had said the proper and common ones cause change, but he reserved making something different for the more proper ones alone. Now he repeats this, saying that inseparable differences, which show substance, that is, which inherently exist in the subjects of the species and complete them, make something different, while those that are proper, that is, differences that are inseparably accidental, are neither inherent in the substance nor make something different but only, as was previously said, something changed. There is also another distance between those differences which are according to substance and those which are accidental, because those which show substance cannot be intensified or relaxed, but those which are accidental both increase with intensity and decrease with relaxation.
This is proved in the following way: the existence of each thing cannot increase or decrease; for whoever is human cannot gain or lose their humanity. For neither can he be more or less human today or at any other time, nor can one human be more human than another, nor one animal more animal than another. For they are equally said to be animals, equally humans. Therefore, if the existence of each thing cannot be enlarged by increase or diminished by decrease, it can easily be shown by this that genera or species do not vary with intensification or relaxation, there is no doubt that differences, which form the substance of each species, neither suffer the damage of relaxation nor the increase of intensification. Therefore, substantial differences neither admit of intensification nor relaxation. The reason for this is that being is the same and one thing for each, and does not admit of intensification or relaxation. For genus cannot be said to be more or less genus for anyone; for genus is equally imposed on all. Differences, too, which divide the genus and shape the species, since they complete the essence of the species, neither admit of intensification nor relaxation. But inseparable differences that are accidental, like being an eagle or a snub-nosed or colored in some way, both admit of intensification and relaxation. For it can happen that this one is a little darker, this one is more snub-nosed, that one less of an eagle, but that not all humans are equally rational and mortal seems neither to be allowed by the nature of species nor differences.
[ 4.06 ]
“Therefore, since there are three types of differences, and these indeed are separable, while those are inseparable, and again among the inseparable, these indeed are essential, while those are accidental, again of those differences that are essential, some indeed are according to which we divide genera into species, and others according to which those divided are specified, as all essential differences are of this kind, animate and inanimate, sensible and insensible, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal, indeed the difference of animate and sensible constitutes the substance of an animal – for an animal is an animate sensible substance – but the difference of mortal and immortal, and rational and irrational, are divisive differences of the animal; for we divide genera into species through these.”
[4.06.01] The complete and ultimate division of differences is now made, which is of this kind. Some differences are separable, others inseparable, of the inseparable ones, some are accidental, others essential. Of the essential ones, some are divisive of the genus, others constitutive of species. When he says, “Therefore, since there are three types of differences”, he referred back to this, that in the first division of differences, some of them are said to be common, others proper, others more proper, which he then showed are in turn three differences, some separable, others inseparable, the separable ones being common, the inseparable ones proper and more proper. But he made a division of the inseparable ones, saying that some are accidental, which are called proper, while the more proper ones are considered according to substance. Of those which are according to substance, he makes a subdivision, that some of them divide the genus, others inform the species.
In this division, all these differences are called specific, for they are differences of genera and species, but of genera indeed divisive, of species however constitutive.
This is proven in this way. The differences of body and incorporeal partition substance, indeed body and inanimate animate, animate sensible and insensible. Therefore, the substantial differences partition genera and are called divisive of genera. But indeed, if these same differences which descending from the genus divide the genus, are collected and combined into one that can be joined, the species is informed. For when the animal is a species of substance – for all superiors are predicated of inferiors and whatever inferior will be, will also be a species of the superior – however animate and sensible, which are differences, if they are referred to genera, they are divisive, but they become constitutive of the animal and they form and constitute its substance and conform the definition, so that the animal is an animate sensible substance. Substance indeed is the genus, however animate and sensible are constitutive differences of the same. Again, animal is divided by rationality and irrationality, also divided by mortality and immortality but joined rationality and mortality, which were divisive of animal, become constitutive of man and perfect his species and inform and complete all its definition. But if irrationality is joined with mortality, a horse will be made, or any animal, which does not use reason, but joined rationality and immortality inform the substance of god. Thus, the same differences when they are referred to genera, become divisive of genera, but if they are considered in relation to inferior species, they inform species and constitute their substance by appropriate conjunction.
In this is sought, how these differences would be said to be constitutive of species, when the difference of irrational and immortal seem to make no species. We first respond that it pleases Aristotle not to be celestial bodies animate: which indeed is not animate, cannot be an animal; but which indeed is not an animal, neither can it be granted to be rational. But he confirms the same bodies to be eternal because of their simplicity and perpetuity of motion. Therefore, there is something which is composed from these two differences, namely irrational and immortal. But if more is to be yielded to Plato and celestial bodies are to be believed to be animate, indeed no subject can exist for these differences – for whatever is irrational is subject to corruption and generation, cannot be immortal – but yet these differences, since they are among the substantial differences, if they could have been joined in any way, could have made their nature and species also.
And in order that it may be understood, what this power is of making substance and of forming species, let us look at the proper and common, which even though they are joined, constitute species and substance by no reason. For if someone speaks walking, which are two common differences, or if white and long, does he therefore constitute his substance by these? Not at all. Why? Because they are not of the same kind, which could constitute and conform the substance of anything. Therefore these, that is irrational and immortal, even if they can not have any subject, could yet make a substance, if they could be joined and coupled in any way. Moreover, irrational joined with mortal makes the substance of a beast: therefore the irrational difference is constitutive. Again immortal and rational joined make a god: therefore immortal forms a species. But if they cannot be joined among themselves, it does not for that reason cancel out what is in the nature of them.
[ 4.07 ]
But these indeed, which are the distinguishing differences of genera, become comprehensive and formative of species; for example, the ‘animal’ is divided by the difference of rational and irrational, and again by mortal and immortal. But the ones that are rational and mortal form the human species, rational and immortal forms God’s species, and the ones that are irrational and mortal forms the species of irrational animals. Similarly, the highest substance also is divided by the difference of animate and inanimate, and sensible and insensible. The differences of animate and sensible, when combined, have perfected the substance of an animal.
[4.07.01]
He demonstrates there are two uses of differences, one indeed by which genera are divided, and another by which species are formed; for differences not only do this, that they partition genera, but also while they divide genera, they create the species into which the genera are led. Therefore, those that are dividing of genera, become formative of species, and an example of this matter is what he himself has added: for indeed the differences of ‘animal’ are dividing rational and irrational, mortal and immortal, by these the predication of ‘animal’ is divided. For everything that is an animal, is either rational or irrational or mortal or immortal. But these differences, which divide the genus of ‘animal’, form the substance of the species which they constitute. For as man is an animal, it is made by rational and mortal differences, which a while ago were dividing ‘animal’. Similarly, as a horse is an animal, it is constituted by irrational and mortal differences, which a while ago were dividing ‘animal’. But God, as he is an animal, as we would say of the sun, is made rational and immortal by differences, which the division of the genus showed a little while ago. But here, as we have said, God must be understood as corporeal, like the sun and the sky and other such things, which while Plato confirms to be animated and rational, then they are proven to be assumed in the term of gods by the reverence of antiquity, they are demonstrated to come from the first kind, that is, substance. For as its dividing differences are animated and inanimate, sensible and insensible, the joined differences of sensible and animated make an animated and sensible substance, which is an animal. Therefore, it has been rightly said, the dividing differences of genera, are the same as the formative of species.
[ 4.08 ]
Therefore, since they are the same, in some way indeed they are taken to be formative, in some other way however they are dividing, they are all called specific. And these are most needed for the divisions of genera and definitions, but not those which are inseparable according to accident, nor more so those which are separable.
[4.08.01]
Everyone knows that all differences proceeding from a genus divide the genus itself from which they proceed. But those which divide the genus, if they are applied to later species, they inform the substances and perfect them. Therefore, they are the same constituting of species, the same dividing of genera, but considered in one way and in another, that if related to the genus indeed they are looked upon in contrary division, they are found to be dividing of the genus, but if they can effectively join something, they are constitutive of species. Since things are this way, these differences which divide the genus, are most rightly named dividing— for those that form the species, are specific but they form the species, these differences which are dividing of the genus— and the same ones are formative of species.
Therefore, what are dividing of genera and what are formative of species, are rightly named specific. Therefore, it is clear that these must be accepted in the division of genus and in the definition of species. For since they are dividing, the genus must be divided by them, and since they are constitutive, the species must be defined by them; for by those things by which each thing is constituted, they are also defined. But the species are constituted by the dividing differences of the genus, which are specific. Therefore, rightfully only specific ones are put both in the division of genus and in the definition of species. And this is the account for the specifics, but of these which contain either separable or inseparable accidents, nothing can be assumed in the division of genera or definition of species, therefore because those which are dividing, divide the substance of the genus, and those which are constitutive, constitute the substance of the species. But those which are inseparable accidents, do not inform any substance. Hence it happens that much less separable accidents are suited to the divisions of genera or definitions of species; they are entirely unlike substantial differences. For inseparable accidents perhaps have this in common with specific, that is substantial differences, that they equally do not leave the subject, just as neither do specific differences. But separable accidents not even this; for they can be separated, not only by power and mental reasoning but also by actual presence, and entirely by the variations of coming or going they are changed.
[ 4.09 ]
“Those who define also say: The difference is that by which the species exceeds the genus. For man has more than animal: he is rational and mortal. For animal is neither of these things itself – for where will the species get their differences? – nor does it possess all the opposites – for the opposites would exist in the same thing at the same time – but, as they prove, it has all differences under it potentially, but none in actuality. And thus, neither does something come from nothing, nor are opposites about the same thing.”
[4.09.01] He concludes the specific differences by definition, saying that substantial differences are determined by some due to such a reason: “The specific difference is that by which the species exceeds the genus.” Let the genus be animal, the species human: thus, the human has in him the differences, rational and mortal, that constitute him; for every species retains within itself the differences constituting its form and cannot exist apart from them, by the congregation of which it is perfected. Therefore, if the animal is solely the genus, and man is a rational mortal animal, man has more than the animal in what is rational and mortal. Therefore, by what the species exceeds the genus, by what it surpasses the genus and by what it has more from the genus, this is the specific difference. But to this definition, a question seems to occur that begins from two intrinsic propositions, one indeed, that two contraries cannot exist in the same thing, the other, that nothing comes from nothing.
These propositions give rise to such a question. It was said that difference is that by which the species would have more from the genus. So what then? Is it to be said that the genus does not have those differences that the species possess? And where will the species get the differences which the genus does not have? For unless there is a source from which they come, differences cannot enter into the species.
[ 4.10 ]
“And they define it also this way: The difference is that which is predicated of multiple and different species in what it is; for rational and mortal is predicated of man in what some quality of man is spoken, but not in what he is. For if you ask us what is man, it is appropriate to say animal, but if you inquire what kind of animal, because it is rational and mortal, we will appropriately assign.”
[4.10.01] There are three inquiries to which genus, species, difference, property, and accident respond, these are: what it is, what it is like, how it behaves. For if someone asks: what is Socrates? It is appropriate to respond through the genus and species either animal or human. If someone asks how Socrates is doing, rightly an accident will be responded, that is, either he is sitting or reading or others. But if someone inquires what Socrates is like, either difference, property, or accident will be responded, that is, either rational or capable of laughter or bald.
Therefore, being asked what each thing is like, if we want to give the quality of the substance, we predicate difference. This difference is never predicated of one species alone, such as mortal or rational but of multiple. Therefore, that which is predicated of multiple species differing from each other in response to the inquiry which asks what it is like of the subject of inquiry, this is the difference of which he put forth the definition: “Difference is that which is predicated of multiple different species in what it is like.”
[ 4.11 ]
[4.11.01] In discussing the reason and cause for this definition, he says:
“For things that consist of matter and form or that have their constitution similar to that of matter and form, just like a statue consists of bronze as its matter, and its form is its shape. Similarly, the common and specific man consists in the same way of genus as matter and difference as form, and all of this constitutes the rational, mortal animal that is man, just as there the statue.”
Previously, he mentioned that differences are what can be predicated in the quality of a species; now, however, he carries out the reasons why the quality of a species is a difference. “All things,” he says, “either consist of matter and form or receive their substance in a way similar to matter and form. All corporeal things subsist from matter and form; for if there were no corporeal subject to receive form, nothing could exist at all. If stones had not existed, there would be no walls or buildings, and if wood did not exist, there could not be a table, which is made from the matter of wood. So when matter is assumed and form comes upon it, a corporeal thing is made that subsists from matter and form, like the statue of Achilles is made from bronze and the figure of Achilles. Those things which are corporeal, it is clear, subsist from matter and form; but those things which are incorporeal have, in the likeness of matter and form, prior and more ancient natures upon which differences, coming into being, make something that appears to consist, in the same way as a body, from matter and figure, as in the case of genus and species where species are brought about by adding differences to the genus. Therefore, just as in the statue of Achilles the bronze is the matter and the form is the likeness of Achilles, from which the statue of Achilles is made and perceived by the senses, so too in the species that is man, the matter is the genus, which is animal, and the rational quality coming upon this makes a rational animal, that is, it makes the species. Therefore, the matter of the species is a sort of genus, and the form, or rather the quality, is the difference. Therefore, what bronze is in the statue, that is the genus in the species; what the shaping figure is in the statue, that is the difference in the species; what the statue itself, formed from bronze and figure, is in the statue, that is the species in the species, joined from the genus and the difference. And so, if the matter of the species is the genus and the form is the difference, and every form is a quality, then every difference is rightly called a quality. Therefore, when asked what quality something has, one rightly responds.”
[ 4.12 ]
“However, they describe differences of this kind in this way: a difference is that which is naturally able to divide things which are under the same genus; for rational and irrational divide man and horse, which are under the same genus, which is animal.”
[4.12.01] While this definition is common and plainly laid out, he nevertheless explains it more fully and clearly. For all differences are called differences because they cause species included under one genus to differ, as man and horse are distinguished by their own differences. For just as man is an animal, so too is a horse, and therefore they are not distant at all according to genus. So those things that do not disagree according to genus are distributed by differences. Rational is added to man, and irrational to horse, and so man and horse, which were under the same genus, are distributed and differ by the addition of differences.
[ 4.13 ]
“And they assign it in this way too: a difference is by which individual things differ from each other; for according to genus they do not differ. For we are mortal animals, both we and the irrational animals, but the addition of rational separated us from them, and we are rational, both we and the gods, but mortal being added separated us from them.”
[4.13.01] Some offer a definition that seeks to explain what he wants but in a flawed and unhealthy manner. They say that a difference is that by which each thing is distinct from another. In this definition, there is no difference whether he said it thus or concluded thus: a difference is what is a difference. For by the name of difference, he used the definition of the same difference, saying: “A difference is by which individual things differ.” But if we still do not know what a difference is, unless it is clarified by a definition, how can we recognize what it means to differ? Therefore, he who used the name of difference in the definition of the same brought no more knowledge. However, this definition is common and vague and does not include substantial differences but any kind at all, as when he says: “A difference is by which individual things differ.” For those things which are the same in genus, differ by difference, as when man and horse, which are both animals, differ by the rational difference, and as when gods and men are positioned under rationality, they differ by mortality. Therefore, rational is the difference of man to horse, and mortal is the difference of man to god, and substantial differences are gathered in this way. But if Socrates is sitting and Plato is walking, the difference will be walking or sitting, which is not a substantial difference. For this definition also seems to include this difference when it says: “A difference is by which individual things differ.” For in whatever way Socrates is distinct from Plato – and he can be distinct in no other way except by accidents – that will be a difference according to the above definition’s term. This point, indeed, was also seen by those who, reproaching the vagueness and generality of this definition’s end, added a term of definite conclusion.
[4.14]
“Digging deeper into the topic of difference, they say that not every distinguishing characteristic found under the same genus is a difference, but rather, what contributes to being and what is part of the essence of the thing; for the ability to sail is not the difference of a man, even if it is peculiar to him. For we say, ‘These animals are indeed suited for sailing, but those are not at all,’ distinguishing them from others, but being suited for sailing is not a constitutive part of their substance or a part of it, but is a certain aptitude of theirs. Therefore, it is not such as are the differences called specific. Therefore, specific differences will be any that create another species and any that are understood in what is qualified. – And these points are sufficient about differences.”
[4.14.01] The sense of this proposition is as follows. Because he had previously said that some have determined difference to be that by which individual things are distinguished from each other, he says that others, more carefully examining the topic of difference, didn’t think the definition proposed above was correct. For not all things that differentiate under the same genus can be counted as the differences we’re dealing with now, that is, specific differences. For many things divide species positioned under one genus without substantially forming them, because only those differences seem to be specific which contribute to the being of the thing and which are placed in the part of some definition. These are, for example, the rationality of a man. For it both shapes the substance of a man and contributes to his being and is part of his definition.
Therefore, unless it contributes to the being of the thing and is part of the essence of the thing, it cannot in any way be called a specific difference. But what is the being of a thing? It is nothing other than definition. For to the question posed to any thing, ‘what is it?’ if one wanted to show what its being is, they say the definition. Therefore, if it is part of the definition, it will be part of what designates the being of each thing. The definition indeed reveals and brings forward what each thing is, and what it is to be for each thing is demonstrated by the assignment of the definition. But those differences that do not contribute to the substance, but bring something as it were extraneous, are not called specific, although they make species under the same genus to be distinguished, such as if someone gives this difference between a man and a horse, being suited for sailing. For a man is suited for sailing, a horse is not at all, and since a horse and a man are under the same genus of animal, the added difference ‘being suited for sailing’ distinguishes the horse from the man. But being suited for sailing is not of the kind that can form the substance of a man but only shows a certain aptitude and opportunity to do something or not to do something. Therefore, it is not called a specific difference. Hence, not every difference which distributes species under the same genus can be specific, but only that which contributes to the substance of the species and which is accepted in the part of the definition. Thus, he concludes, the specific differences are those which make other species from themselves through substantial differences. For if to each thing what it is to be is whatever substantially is, whatever differences are substantially diverse, they make the species to which they belong, altogether different and distinct in substance, and these are taken in the part of the definition. For if the definition shows the substance and substantial differences make the species, substantial differences will be parts of definitions.
[ 4.15 ]
ON THE PROPER
Indeed, they divide the proper in four ways. For there is that which happens to a single species alone, though not to every member of it, as in the case of man being a doctor or a geometer, and that which happens to every member, though not exclusively, as in man being bipedal, and that which happens to a single species, to every member, and sometimes, as in man growing gray in old age. The fourth, however, is that which occurs to a single species, to every member, and always, such as in man being capable of laughter. For although he may not always laugh, he is nonetheless said to be capable of laughter, not because he is laughing now, but because he is naturally disposed to do so; this is a natural constant for him, just as for a horse to whinny. These are properly called the proper, since they can also be reciprocated. For whatever is a horse, is capable of whinnying, and whatever is capable of whinnying, is a horse.
[4.15.01] Previously, it was said that all properties derive from the category of accidents. For whatever is predicated of something either informs its substance or exists as an accident. However, there is nothing that can reveal the substance of any given thing except for its genus, species, and difference, with the genus and difference pertaining to the species, and the species to individual things. Therefore, everything else is categorized as an accident. But since accidents themselves exhibit some differences amongst each other, this is why some are called properties, while others, in an older and more traditional term, are called accidents. And about accidents we will talk a bit later, but now about properties. These are divided in four ways, not as if a certain genus of properties could be divided and dissected into four species, but this thing they say about division must be understood as if they were saying ‘they are named’, that is, properties are said to be divided in four ways. He lists the meanings of this fourfold naming to demonstrate what the appropriate and congruent naming of a property should be. He therefore states that the proper accident is that which is present to one species in such a way that it does not equal it but remains beneath and subsists, as it is proper for a man to be a doctor, since this cannot exist in any other animal. Nor do we consider whether this can be predicated of every man, but only that it cannot be said of anyone other than man to be a doctor.
And indeed, this meaning of the proper is said to be in “only, though not in every”. For it is in a single species only, even though it does not match every individual, as medicine is only present in man but not in every man with knowledge. Another property is that which is said to be in “every, though not in only”. Something of this sort contains and transcends the entire species. And since there is nothing in the subject species that does not make use of this property, we say “every”, but because it transcends into others, we say “not only”: something of this sort is like man being bipedal, for it is a property of man to be bipedal. Every man is indeed bipedal, even though not exclusively, for birds are bipedal. Therefore, the two meanings of the proper stated above have something missing, the first because it is not in every, the second because it is not in only. If we combine them, we make “in every and only”. But we subtract something in terms of time, if we add sometimes to it, thus the third name of the proper is ‘in every and only but sometimes’, as is the case in growing gray in old age or growing hair in youth; for every man experiences hair growth in youth, and graying in old age, and only man. For hair growth is indeed exclusive to man, but only sometimes, for it is not at all times but only in youth. Therefore, this definition of the proper is indeed absolute in the way that it is in every and only, but it diminishes something or contracts, when we say “sometimes”. But if we remove this, we achieve the complete and simple meaning of the property in this way: a property is that which is always in every and only. It is to be understood in every and only species and always, like man being capable of laughter, horse being capable of whinnying; for every and only man is capable of laughter, and always. Nor should we be disturbed by any doubt that man does not always laugh; for it is not laughter that is man’s property, but being capable of laughter, which consists not in act but in potential. Therefore, even if he does not laugh, because he can laugh and this possibility always exists in every and only man, it is appropriately called a property. For if the act is separated from the species, the potential cannot be separated by any reasoning.
[4.16]
“There are therefore four proper meanings,” he said. The first meaning is when an accident is so present to a species that it only applies to that species, even if not to all members of the species, such as medicine to man. The second is when it is not present only to a species, but always applies to all members, such as being bipedal to man. The third is when it applies to all and only members of a species, but only at certain times, such as puberty for all humans in youth. The fourth is when it applies to all, only, and always, such as the ability to laugh.
Therefore, the others cannot be converted: indeed, what applies to only, but not all, members of a species cannot be equated. It can be said of the species, but not of the individual. For instance, someone who is a doctor can be called a human, but a human is not said to be a doctor. Likewise, what is unique to another, as it applies to all, even if not only to that one, can indeed be predicated of the species, but not the species of it. For instance, being bipedal can be predicated of a human, but human cannot in any way be predicated of being bipedal.
Again, what is present in such a way that it applies to all and only members of a species, but only sometimes, because it depends on time, has something diminished and is not simply always present and thus cannot be converted. For we can say ‘everyone who hits puberty is human’, but not ‘every human hits puberty’: for one might not reach youth, and therefore not puberty.
The fourth property is what applies to someone in such a way that it holds only the species, applies to all members, and is absolute from the condition of time, like being able to laugh. This is the furthest from the previous ones because who can laugh can always laugh. However, someone who can hit puberty in youth, when youth itself is not always, it is not always present to them that they may hit puberty in youth.
The fourth property is therefore absolute and thus can be converted and property and species are predicated of each other; for a human is laughable and a laughable thing is human.
[4.17]
ON ACCIDENTS
“An accident is what is present and absent beyond the destruction of the subject. It is divided into two: into separable and inseparable. Indeed, sleeping is a separable accident, but being black happens inseparably to the crow and Ethiopian, though we can imagine a white crow and an Ethiopian losing color beyond the corruption of the subject. It is also defined in this way: an accident is what happens to be and not to be, or what is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor property, but is always subsisting in the subject.”
“Once everything that has been proposed has been established, I mean by genus, species, difference, proper, and accident, it is necessary to say what they have in common and what is proper to them.”
[4.17.01]
Since, as was said above, the things that are predicated of something are said either substantially or accidentally, and those things that are predicated substantially contain the substance and definition of the thing they are predicated of and are older and greater than it, those things made from predicates are substantial. When those things that are said substantially perish, it is necessary that at the same time they also destroy those things which made their nature and substance.
[4.17.02]
Given this, it is necessary that those things which are said accidentally, since they do not inform the substance, can both be present and absent beyond the corruption of the subject. For only those things that make and conform what are substantial can corrupt the subject when they are absent, but those things that do not make the substance, like accidents, when they are present or absent, neither inform the substance nor corrupt it. Therefore, an accident is what is present and absent beyond the corruption of the subject.
This is divided into two parts. For one accident is separable, another inseparable, separable indeed like sleeping or sitting. Inseparable like the black color for Ethiopians and crows. However, there arises such a doubt in this matter. It is indeed defined in this way: an accident is what can be present and absent beyond the corruption of the subject.
The same accident is sometimes said to be inseparable; but if it is inseparable, it cannot be absent. It is therefore futilely placed that an accident is what can be present and absent, since there are certain accidents that cannot be separated from the subject. But it often happens that qualities which cannot be separated in act, are separated by thought and cogitation.
In conclusion, all these matters having been settled, that is, genus, species, difference, property, and accident, and their limits having been described as much as the brevity of teaching demanded, the work then tackles the matters in common, to demonstrate with moderate consideration what differences and what commonalities these five things, about which was argued above, have, so that not only what they are, but also how they compare with each other, may appear.
BOOK FIFTH
[ 5.01 ]
[5.01.01] Having thoroughly clarified all the topics he proposed, and as much as could be examined in each case, he now turns briefly to the endpoint of knowledge, no longer discussing the nature of individuals, that is, either genus or difference or species or property or accident, but their relationship to each other. For he who collects the commonalities and differences of things does not consider them as they are in themselves, but as they are compared to others. This can happen in two ways, either by similarity, when he pursues commonalities, or by dissimilarity, when he examines differences. Given these conditions, we too will follow, as we have done so far, the philosopher’s steps for clearer understanding and will discuss these commonalities which apply to genus and species and difference or property and accident.
“It is common to all to be predicated of many, but the genus is predicated of species and of individuals, and the difference likewise; but the species of those individuals which are beneath it, and indeed the property of the species to which the property belongs and of those individuals which are beneath the species, the accident of species and individuals. For example, ‘animal’ is predicated of horses and cows [and dogs], which are species, and of this horse and this cow, which are individuals; irrational is predicated of horses and cows and those which are particulars; however, the species, like ‘man’, is predicated only of those which are particulars; the property, which is to be able to laugh, of man and those which are particulars; black, which is an inseparable accident, of the species of crows and of those which are particulars; and movement, which is a separable accident, of man and horse, but primarily of individuals, and in the second sense of those which contain individuals.”
Before examining the relationship each of them has to each other, he first considers that commonality they all seem to share with each other. This commonality is the predication of the proposed five topics to many things - for all are predicated of many. Therefore, they all share this commonality. For both the genus is predicated of many, as well as the species and the difference and the property and the accident. Given these conditions, their shared, undifferentiated commonality is to be predicated of many. However, he breaks down this commonality of predication, showing how it happens in each case, showing which of the proposed topics is predicated of many. For he says the genus is predicated of many, that is of species and of the individuals of species, just as ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’ and ‘horse’ and of those individuals which are beneath ‘man’ and ‘horse’. In the same way, the genus is predicated of the differences of species, and rightly so. For since the species are informed by differences, when the genus is predicated of the species, it follows that it is also spoken of those things which form and constitute the substance of species. Consequently, the genus is also predicated of differences and not just of one, but of many; for it is said that the rational and again the irrational are animals. Thus the genus is predicated of species and differences and of those individuals which are beneath them. But difference is predicated of many species and of their individuals, just as ‘irrational’ is predicated of ‘horse’ and ‘cow’, which are multiple species, and in the same way is predicated of those individuals which are beneath them; for what is predicated of the universal, is also predicated of the individual. If difference is predicated of species, it will also be predicated of the subjects of the same species. But the species is predicated only of its own individuals; for it is not possible that what is the last species, and is indeed called more specifically a species, be reduced into other species. If this is so, only individuals remain after the species. Therefore, it is right that the species are predicated only of their own individuals, such as ‘man’ is predicated of Socrates, Plato, Cicero and the rest. Property is also predicated of the species to which the property belongs; for it would not be a property of anything if it were said of something else; that which is said of each thing ‘and only and always’, is shown to be its property. Given these conditions, property is said of the species, such as the ability to laugh is predicated of man; for every man is capable of laughing. It is also predicated of the individuals of the species of which it is predicated; for Socrates, Plato, and Cicero are capable of laughing. But an accident is predicated of many species and of individuals of different species. For instance, the crow and the Ethiopian are called black, and this crow and this Ethiopian, who are individuals, are called black according to the quality of blackness. This is an inseparable accident. But separable accidents adhere much more to many, such as movement to man and cow – for both are moved – and again those individuals which are beneath man and cow, are often predicated to be moved. However, it should be noted, according to Porphyry, that those things which are accidents are primarily said of those in which they are, that is individuals, and secondarily are referred to the universals of individuals. And so, the predication of superiors is returned, for since blackness is present to individual crows, infecting them with the accident of blackness, therefore we also predicate it of the species saying that the crow, the species itself, is black.
[ 5.02 ]
[5.02.01] In all of this, one might wonder why he didn’t claim that the genus is predicated of its own property, nor indeed the species of the same property, nor the difference from its own property, but only the genus of species and differences, the difference of species and individuals, the species of individuals, the property of species and individuals, the accident of species and individuals. For it can happen that those of greater predication are predicated of all the lesser, and those that are equal are converted among themselves, and this leads to the genus being predicated of differences, species, properties, accidents, as when we say ‘what is rational, is an animal’, the genus of difference, ‘what is a man, is an animal’, the genus of species, ‘what is laughable, is an animal,’ the genus of property, ‘what is black’, if perhaps we are pointing out a crow or an Ethiopian, ‘is an animal,’ we predicate the genus of an accident. Again ‘what is a man, is rational’, difference of species, ‘what is laughable, is rational,’ difference of property, ‘what is black, is rational’, if we are pointing out an Ethiopian, difference of accident; also ‘what is laughable, is a man’, species of property, ‘what is black, is a man,’ if we designate an Ethiopian, species of accident. In this matter even ‘what is black, is laughable’ in the demonstration of Ethiopians as if property is predicated of accident. But an accident can be converted to the whole, because since it is proposed to exist in individuals, therefore it is also predicated of superiors, since Socrates is an animal, is rational, is laughable, and is a man, and since baldness, which is an accident, exists in Socrates, the same accident is predicated of animal, of rational, of laughable, of man, so that the accident is predicated of the four others. But this question is deeper and there is not enough time to solve it, let the understanding of those entering in only expect this, that some things are indeed predicated in the right order, others indeed in the oblique, because it is right for a man to move, what moves is said to be a man in the converse expression. Therefore, Porphyry assumed a direct proposition in all things. But if anyone has paid attention to the force of predication and solution comparing in each predication, they will find those expressions which are right, to have been enumerated by Porphyry, those indeed which are predicated in the reversed order, to have been set aside.
[ 5.03 ]
ABOUT THE COMMONALITIES OF GENUS AND DIFFERENCE
“It is common to genus and difference to contain species. For difference also contains species, although not as many as genus. ‘Rational’, even if it does not contain those which are irrational as ‘animal’ does, but it contains man and god, which are species. And whatever is predicated of genus as genera, and of those which are under it as species, are predicated, and whatever are predicated of difference as differences, and of that which is a species from it, will be predicated. For when the genus is ‘animal’, not only are ‘substance’ and ‘animate’ predicated of it as genera, but also these are predicated of all the species which are under ‘animal’ down to individuals. And when the difference is ‘rational’, what uses reason is predicated of it as difference. Not only of that which is rational but also it will be predicated of those which are under the rational species. However, it is also common that by eliminating genus or difference, those which are under them are simultaneously eliminated; just as if there were no animal, there is no horse nor man, so if there is no rational, there will be no animal that uses reason.”
[5.03.01] After what seemed to be common to all, he investigates the similarities and differences among each of them. And since among the five proposed, genus and difference are of more universal predication, for indeed genus contains species and differences, differences contain species and are contained by them in no way, he first gathers the similarities of genus and differences. And he first posits this one. For he says it is common to genus and difference, that they enclose species; for just as genus has species under it, so also difference even though not as many as genus has. For genus, because it also encloses difference and not only one difference under it, holds and retains more species under it than any one of those differences which it encloses, as ‘animal’ is predicated of rational and irrational. If so, it will be predicated also of those species which are placed under rational and under irrational. It is therefore common to ‘animal’ and ‘rational’, that is to genus and difference, that just as ‘animal’ is predicated of man and god, so also is ‘rational’. That which is difference, ‘rational’, is said of god and man. But this predication is not as extensive as that of ‘animal’, that is of genus. For ‘animal’ is not predicated of god alone and man but also of horse and cow, to which rational difference does not extend. But whenever we suppose god to be animal, we do so according to that opinion which affirms the sun, stars, and this whole universe to be animate, whom they also called gods by the name of god, as has often been said. The second commonality of genus and difference is that, whatever things are predicated of genus as genera, the same things are predicated of those which are under it as species; to this similarity, whatever things are predicated of difference as differences, and of those which are under difference as differences are predicated. The explanation of this doctrine is as follows. There are several things which are predicated of genera as genera, for ‘animate’ is said of animal, it is said to be substance, and these as genera. Therefore, these are also predicated of those which are under animal, as genera again; for man’s genus is animate and substance, just as it had been of animal. Similarly, in differences themselves, some differences are found which are predicated of these differences, as two differences are said of rational. For what is rational, either uses reason or has reason. But to use reason is different from having reason, as to have sense is different from using sense. Indeed, even a sleeping person has sense but does not use it, so also a sleeping person has reason but does not use it. Therefore, some difference of rationality is to use reason but man is placed under rationality: therefore, it is predicated of man to use reason as some difference. For man differs from other animals, because he uses reason. It has therefore been demonstrated because just as those which are predicated of genus, are said of those subjects to genus, so also those which are predicated of difference, are said of those which are supposed under difference. The third commonality is that just as when genera are taken away species are destroyed, so also when differences are taken away, those species of which differences are predicated, perish. For this is common, that subjects perish when universals in substance perish. But the first commonality demonstrated that genera are predicated of species, just as also differences. Therefore, because of this similarity, if genera are taken away, species perish, just as also species must perish which are under differences, if their universal differences are destroyed. An example of this is: for if you remove animal, you will have removed man and horse, which are species placed under animal, if you remove rational, you will have removed man and god, who are gathered under the difference of rational. And that’s it for commonalities, now he will consider the differences between genus and difference.
[ 5.04 ]
On the Proper Aspects of Genus and Differentiation
“It is characteristic of a genus to be predicated of more things than differentiation and species and property and accident; for ‘animal’ is predicated of man, horse, bird, and serpent, ‘quadruped’ of only those four-footed, ‘man’ of only individuals, and ‘neighing’ of horse and of those which are particulars, and accident similarly of fewer.” Furthermore, we must accept those differences by which the genus is divided, not those that complete the substance of the genus. Additionally, the genus contains the difference potentially; for an animal is either rational or irrational. Further, the genera indeed are prior to those which are placed under them by differences, for which reason they indeed remove them together, but they are not removed together; for when ‘animal’ is removed, rational and irrational are removed. However, differences do not remove the genus; for if all are removed, still the animate sensible substance is understood, which is ‘animal.’ Further, the genus indeed is predicated in what a thing is, the difference, however, in what kind of thing it is, as has been said. Furthermore, the genus indeed is one according to each species, as for man that which is animal, but the differences are many, as rational, mortal, perceptible to the mind and to instruction, by which it differs from others. And the genus indeed is similar to matter, but the difference to form. But since there are also other common things and properties of genus and difference, let these now suffice.
[5.04.01] What is proper is indeed defined by a suitable and complete term. But through misuse, even those things are also called proper which contain a difference in each thing from others, even though they are common with others. For by itself, laughter is proper to man, because it is always present to him alone, but by an usurped phrase, even the rationality of man is said to be proper, not properly because it is common to him with the nature of gods, but rationality is called man’s property for distinguishing from an animal, which is not rational; indeed this is for the reason that what each has is called his own. Therefore, by which one differs from another, his property is not absurdly predicated. But now he says what is proper to a genus is predicated of more than the other four, this indeed is such a property of the genus as what is proper in itself is usually said, that is, what is always and everywhere and only present to the genus. For it is present only to the genus, as difference, species, property, accident are more copiously and abundantly predicated.
But about these differences, species, properties, and accidents it can be said that they are under each genus, that is, the differences indeed which divide any genus, but the species which is informed by the divisible differences of the genus, the property however of that species which is under that genus that is divided by differences, and the accidents which adhere to these individuals which are under that species that the designated genus includes. Examples clarify this more easily. Let animal be a genus, four-footed and two-footed are differences placed under the animal containing, man and horse are species established under the same genus, laughing and neighing are the properties of the same species, but swift or warrior are accidents that happen to these individuals that are contained under the species of horse and man: therefore, animal, which is a genus, is predicated both of four-footed and two-footed, which are differences, but four-footed is not said of two-footed but only of those animals which have four feet; therefore, the genus is predicated more than the difference.
Furthermore, man is predicated of Plato and Socrates, but animal not only of individual men, but also of other irrational individuals; therefore, the genus is predicated more than the species. But since neighing is the property of the species of horse and since the genus is predicated more than the species, the predication of the genus also exceeds the predication of the property. An accident although it can be in many, is often found contracted to the genus, as warrior is properly said only of man, as speed is found in few animals. It happens, therefore, that the genus is predicated more than difference, species, property, and accident. And this is one property of the genus that separates and distinguishes the genus from all others. “It is necessary,” he says, “now to understand those differences by which the genus is divided, not by which it is informed.” For those by which the genus is informed are predicated without doubt more than the genus itself, as animate and corporeal extend beyond animal, since they are differences of animal but not divisive but rather constitutive; for all higher things are predicated of lower things. But those which are predicated of lower things cannot be converted, these are predicated more by those which are lower.
[ 5.05 ]
[5.05.01] After this, he shows another unique property of ‘genus’ by which it is separated from those differentia that are placed under the same ‘genus’. For every ‘genus’ contains differentiae potentially, but differentia cannot contain ‘genus’. For ‘animal’ potentially contains ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’; neither irrationality nor rationality can contain ‘animal’. He says ‘potentially’ contains ‘animal’ differentiae because, as stated above, ‘genus’ indeed potentially has all differentiae under itself, but not actually. From which it happens that another property arises. For if you remove the ‘genus’, the differentia perishes, just as if you remove ‘animal’, ‘rationality’, which is a differentia, is destroyed. But if you remove ‘rational’, the ‘irrational animal’ remains. But one could object: what if I remove both differentiae at the same time, can the ‘genus’ still remain? We say: it can. For everything takes its substance not from those things of which it is predicated, but from those things from which it is made. Therefore, it happens that the ‘genus’ can remain even when the divisive differentiae are removed, as long as those differentiae remain which constitute the form and substance of the ‘genus’ itself. For since ‘animal’ is constituted by the differentiae ‘animated’ and ‘sensitive’, if these remain and are joined, ‘animal’ cannot perish, even if those things perish of which ‘animal’ is predicated, namely ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. For everything, as said, takes its property of substance from those things from which it is made, not from those things of which it is predicated. Moreover, if the ‘genus’ potentially contains both differentiae, it does not in itself actually include either of them. But if it does not actually contain them, but only potentially, then it can also be actually separated from them; for to contain them potentially is the same as not to contain them actually. But ‘genus’, which does not actually contain any differentiae, is also actually separated from them. Again, another unique property of ‘genus’ is recognized from the property of predication. For every ‘genus’ is suitable to answer the question 'what is each thing?’, as ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘what is man’, but differentia is not, but in ‘what kind’ it is; for every differentia consists in quality. But this unique property is such as we mentioned above, not said per se but according to a certain differentia. Otherwise, this is common to ‘genus’ with ‘species’, as it is predicated in ‘what it is’. But since ‘genus’ is different from differentia, because differentia indeed is in ‘what kind it is’, ‘genus’ however is predicated in ‘what it is’, it is said to be a unique property of ‘genus’, not per se but in comparison to differentia.
And in all the remaining things, it is fitting to observe the same reasoning; for whatever is said to be unique to ‘genus’ in such a way that it is not common to any other thing but only this has ‘genus’ as every ‘genus’ and always, that is called unique in itself, but whatever is common with any other thing, that is not unique in itself but is said to be unique in comparison to another’s differentia. Again, another separation of ‘genus’ and differentia is that ‘genus’ indeed always gives one ‘species’, namely the nearest one – for there can be several superior ones, such as ‘animal’ and ‘substance’ for ‘man’ but the nearest one of the same ‘man’ is ‘animal’ only – but several differentiae can be present to one ‘species’, as ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ to ‘man’. Therefore, a definition is made from one ‘genus’ indeed but from several differentiae, as ‘man’ is a ‘rational mortal animal’. Again, another distinction is that ‘genus’ indeed holds the place of a subject, but differentia of form, so that the former is a kind of matter which receives a form, but the latter is a form which, coming upon it, completes the substance and rationality of the ‘species’. Therefore, he separated differentia from ‘genus’ by several differentiae, because it contains a certain similarity of ‘genus’, because it is universal and greatest after ‘genus’ among the rest. But since many other common and unique properties of ‘genus’ and differentia can be found, now, he says, these suffice. For it is enough to assume any differentiae for the distinction, even if not all that can be said are collected.
[ 5.06 ]
“Genus and species have in common several things, as has been said, to be predicated. But let ‘species’ be taken as ‘species’ and not also as ‘genus’, if it were both ‘species’ and ‘genus’. And common to these is to be prior to those things of which they are predicated, and that each is a certain whole.”
[5.06.01] He lists three common things of ‘genus’ and ‘species’, one indeed, to be predicated of many; for ‘genus’ and ‘species’ are predicated of many, but ‘genus’ of ‘species’, as has been said, and ‘species’ indeed of individuals. But now he is talking about that ‘species’ which is only a ‘species’, that is, which is not also a ‘genus’ but the last ‘species’. If we consider such a ‘species’ which can also be a ‘genus’, and say about it that it has in common with ‘genus’ to be predicated of many, it makes no difference whether we say this or that ‘genus’ has this in common with itself to be predicated of many. For such a ‘species’ which is not only a ‘species’, that is also a ‘genus’. And it is also common to these that both are prior to those things of which they are predicated. For everything that is predicated of something, if it is said in the correct order, as was mentioned above, is prior to those things of which it is predicated. Moreover, this is also common to them, that both ‘genus’ and ‘species’ are a whole of those things which they contain and hold together within their scope; for ‘genus’ is the whole of all ‘species’, and ‘species’ is the whole of all individuals. For both ‘genus’ and ‘species’ are unifying of many, and whatever unifies many, that which reduces those things to the form of unity, is rightly said to be a whole.
[5.07]
About the unique characteristics of genus and species
The distinction lies in that the genus indeed contains species under it, whereas the species are contained and do not contain genera. For the genus is broader than the species. Therefore, it is necessary that the genera take precedence and, formed by specific differences, make species; hence, the genera are naturally prior and simultaneously perishable but which do not simultaneously perish. Indeed, when the species exists, so does the genus; but when the genus exists, it is not entirely a species. Moreover, genera are univocally predicated of species, whereas species are least predicated of genera. Further, the genera abound in containing those species which are beneath them, while the species abound from genera by their own differences. Moreover, neither will a species ever become the most general nor a genus the most specific.
[5.07.01]
Having clarified the common aspects of genus and species, he now discusses their differences. For he says that genus differs from species because the genus contains species, like ‘animal’ contains ‘human,’ but species do not contain genera; for ‘human’ is not predicated of ‘animal.’ Therefore, it occurs that species are contained by genera but never contain genera. For everything that is predicated more, is the container of what is said less. Therefore, if the genus is predicated more than the species, it is necessary that the species be contained by the genus, but the genus is included in the species by no extent of predication. The reason for this is because the genus always accepting a difference makes a species. For example, the genus, which had the broadest predication, becomes narrowed by difference and becomes a species; for indeed, the difference attached to the genus renders a species and contracts from the universality and broadest predication into the narrow boundary of the species. For ‘animal’, whose predication per se is widely diffused, if it takes on the difference of being ‘rational’, and even ‘mortal’, it diminishes and contracts into one species of ‘human.’
Hence, the species is always less than the genus, and therefore is contained but does not contain, and if the genus is removed, so too is the species; for if you remove the whole, there will be no part. However, if the species is removed, the genus remains, just like when you remove ‘animal’, ‘human’ is also destroyed, but if you remove ‘human’, ‘animal’ remains. This is also the reason why the genus is univocally predicated of the species, that is, the species accepts the definition of the genus and the name but not vice versa. For it does not seem that the genus accepts the definition of the species; the lower things receive the substance of the prior ones. If you define ‘animal’ and say that a standing thing is animate and sentient or if you predicate of ‘human’ ‘animal’, you have spoken the truth. If you also predicate the definition of ‘animal’ about ‘human’ and say that a human is a sentient and animate substance, nothing in the proposition will be false. But if you return the definition of ‘human’ ‘rational mortal animal’, these do not suit ‘animal’; for what is an animal cannot be said to be a ‘rational mortal animal’. Thus it happens that as the species accepts the name of the genus, so also it takes its definition, and as the genus does not accept the name of the species, it is also not demonstrated by its definition, but whose name and definition are predicated of something, it is said univocally. Therefore, when both the name and definition of the genus are predicated of the species; the genus is univocally said of the species. However, since neither the name nor the definition of the species is predicated of the genus, univocal predication does not occur. Genera differ from species in this way too, that genera surpass their species by containing other species, while species surpass genera by the plurality of differences. For ‘animal’, which is a genus, surpasses ‘human’, which is a species, because it not only contains ‘human’ but also ‘ox’, ‘horse’ and other species, which its area of predication includes. But species, like ‘human’, surpasses genus, like ‘animal’, by the multitude of differences. For what actually does not have ‘rational’ or ‘mortal’ - for no differences are actually retained by the genus - the species holds these as inherent and innate to its substance. For ‘human’ is rational and mortal, which the genus is not at all; for ‘animal’ is neither mortal per se nor rational. So if the genus indeed contains more than one species, but the species are informed by many differences, the genus indeed surpasses the species by the containment of species, but the species surpasses the genus by the plurality of differences. There is also this difference, that the genus, because it is the first of all, can never descend so much as to become the last, and the species, which is the lowest of all, cannot ascend so much as to become the highest of all; therefore, neither will the species ever become the most general nor the genus the most specific. But from these things that have been said, there are other differences that properly and jointly determine the genus from the species, and others that not only separate the genus from the species, but also from the rest and determine them. Nor only in these differences that have been said, but also in the rest, they should be considered if we properly seek to recognize the rule of discretion.
[ 5.08 ]
On Common Aspects of Genus and Property
“It’s common for genus and property to follow species. For if a human is, then an animal is, and if a human is, laughter is possible. The genus is equally predicated of species and property is of those things which participate in it; for instance, both a human and a cow are animals, and both Cato and Cicero can laugh.” Thus, the genus is universally and univocally predicated of the species itself and the property of its own.
[5.08.01] He declares three things to be common to genus and property. The first of these is that the genus follows the species just as the property does. When the species is established, the genus and property must be understood; neither abandons their proper species. For if a human is, then an animal is, and if a human is, laughter is possible; thus, just as the genus, the property doesn’t abandon that species which is its own. Moreover, participation in genus is equal, just as it is in the property. Every genus is equally participated in by species, and property equally attaches to all individuals. It is evident that participation in the genus is equal; a human is not more of an animal than a horse or a cow, but in that they are animals, they are equally so, that is, they draw the term genus to themselves. Both Cato and Cicero can laugh equally, even if they do not laugh equally; in that they are capable of laughing, they can be called capable of laughter, not because they are already laughing. Therefore, those things which are under the genus receive the genus equally, as do those things which are under the property, the property. The third thing is that just as the genus is univocally predicated of its proper species, so too is the property univocally spoken of its species. Since the genus contains the substance of the species, not only is its name predicated of the species, but its definition also. But property, because it does not leave the species and always follows it, does not cross into another species or exist below, it also gives its own definition to the species; for whose name only fits one species to which it is coequal, it cannot be doubted that its definition also fits the species. This makes it such that as the genus is predicated of species, so the property is univocally predicated of its species.
[ 5.09 ]
On the Peculiarities of Genus and Property
“However, it differs because genus is prior and property is posterior. It must be an animal first, and then divided by differences and properties. And genus is predicated of many species, but property is predicated of only one species which is its own. And property indeed is conversely predicated of that which is its own, but genus is conversely predicated of none. For neither if an animal is, then a human is, nor if an animal is, laughter is possible. But if a human is, laughter is possible, and vice versa.” Furthermore, property is always inherent to its species and only to it, but genus is indeed always inherent to every species of which it is the genus, but not only to it. Moreover, if species are destroyed, their genera do not simultaneously perish, but properties when destroyed, simultaneously destroy those of which they are the properties. And when those of which they are the properties are destroyed, they too are simultaneously destroyed.
[5.09.01] Again, he takes up such property that can be called property in comparison to another. For he says that it is peculiar to genus to exist before properties. For the genus must exist first, which as matter is presupposed to differences, and as differences come about, species come to be, with which properties are born. Therefore, if genus is prior to differences, and differences are prior to species and coequal with properties, there is no doubt that properties are posterior to genera, and thus, through what has been said, it is common to genus with difference. For differences, conforming species, are considered to exist prior to properties, if indeed they are prior to species themselves, which properties determine by reason. But as said, this peculiarity must be understood with respect to the difference of property, not such as the peculiarity established by itself above. Again, genus differs from property in that genus is predicated of many species, but property is not. For there is no genus, unless it produces many species from itself, nor property, if it can be common to any other species. Therefore, genus indeed has many species under itself, like an animal has a human and a horse, but property has only one, like laughter possible has a human. Hence arises this difference: genus is indeed predicated of species, but it is posited in no predication, whereas property and species exchange positions in alternate predication. For predication happens either from greater to lesser or from equal to equal. Therefore, genus, which is greater, is predicated of all species, but species, which are lesser, are not spoken of genera, as animal is spoken of human, but human is in no way predicated of animal. But property, being coequal with species, is equally predicated and posited, as laughter possible is spoken of human – for every human can laugh – and in the same way it is reciprocated; for every laughter possible is a human. Property also differs from genus in that property is always present to one species and only to it, but genus retains two of these but is different in one. For to their species they are always present and to all, but not only to them; this adheres to properties, that they contain only single species, this to genera, that they contain more. Therefore, properties indeed seize single species, but genera do not seize single species. Thus, property is present to one species alone and always and to all, but genus to all indeed and always but not to one alone, as laughter possible to human alone, animal indeed to the same human but not to one alone; for it is over others which we call irrational. Moreover, if genus is removed, species are destroyed – for if there is no animal, there will be no human – if species are removed, genus is not destroyed; for if there is no human, animal will not perish. But species and property, since they are equal, consume each other in turn; for if there is no laughter possible, there will be no human, if there is no human, laughter possible will not remain. Therefore, genera consume the species positioned under them, but are not consumed by them in turn, but species and property perish mutually and destroy each other.
[ 5.10 ]
On the Commonalities of Genus and Accident
Indeed, it is common to both genus and accident to be predicated of many, as previously stated, whether they are separable or inseparable; for movement applies to many as does blackness to crows, Ethiopian men, and certain inanimate objects.
[5.10.01] “There is nothing among the rest that is so distanced from the rationale of a genus as an accident is. For while a genus reveals the substance of anything, an accident is far separated from the substance and comes from outside, there is hardly anything more obvious it can have in common with a genus than being predicated of many. For a genus is predicated of many species, and an accident of many not only species, but also of animate and inanimate genera, as ‘black’ is said of a rational man, of an irrational crow and of an inanimate ebony, ‘white’ also of a swan and marble, movement of a man, of a horse and of stars and of an arrow, which are examples of separable accidents.”
[ 5.11 ]
On the Unique Features of Genus and Accident
However, a genus differs from an accident, because a genus is prior to species, while accidents are posterior to species; for even if an inseparable accident is considered, it is still the case that that to which it happens is prior to the accident. And those that participate in a genus, participate equally, but not so in an accident; for participation in accidents allows for intensification and relaxation, but not so in genera. And indeed, accidents mainly subsist in individuals, but genera and species are naturally prior to individual substances. And genera are predicated of those under them in terms of ‘what it is’, while accidents in terms of ‘what kind of thing it is’ or ‘how each thing is’; for if asked ‘what kind of thing is an Ethiopian’, you will answer ‘black’, and ‘how is Socrates’, you will answer that he is sitting or walking.
[5.11.01] "The first difference he proposes between genus and accident is that a genus is indeed before the species, as it stands in place of the material and generates species by being informed by differences, but the accident is found after the species. For it is necessary for what will have something happen to it to exist first, and then for the accident to occur; for if there is not a subject to receive it, the accident cannot be. Now if a genus is the subject to species and species cannot exist unless a genus is presupposed to them like material, and accidents cannot exist unless species are presupposed to them, it is clear that a genus is before species, and accidents after species. Another difference is that a genus can neither be intensified nor relaxed. Thus, those that participate in a genus equally receive its name and definition; for all men are equally animals and so are horses, and when compared amongst themselves, man and horse and other animals are equally predicated as animals. But participation in an accident can be intensified and relaxed. You will find someone walking a little longer, slightly more black, and among Ethiopians, you will observe that all are not equally covered in black color. Another difference is that every accident primarily exists in individuals, but genera and species are prior to individuals; for unless each crow were stained with blackness, the species of crow would not be said to be black. Thus, accidents seem to exist after individuals. For if what will have something happen to it is prior to that which happens, there is no doubt that individuals are prior, and the accident posterior. Genera and species, however, are considered above individuals; for this reason, they are predicated of all of these and establish their substance with their own predication. But it can be said that even the genera themselves and species are found after individuals; for unless there were individual men and individual horses, the species of man and horse could not exist, and unless individual species exist, their genus of animal could not be.
But we must remember that it was said earlier that a genus does not derive its substance from those things of which it is predicated, but rather from that which is perfected by their constitutive differences in substance and form. Therefore, if a genus, even when the divisive differences are destroyed, is not destroyed but remains in those which are constitutive of it and complete its form and definition, and since divisive differences are prior to the species of a genus – for they shape and establish the species themselves – there is no doubt that a genus can remain in its own substance even when species have perished. The same should be said about species; for species are informed by superior differences, not by posterior individuals. Given that this is the case, species also subsist before individuals. Accidents, however, cannot exist unless there are those to whom they happen, and none have them happen to them prior to individuals; for these are subject to generation and corruption and are always changing due to various accidents. He also counts that difference which was said earlier: that a genus, because it demonstrates a thing and is predicated of a substance, is said in ‘what it is’, but an accident in ‘what kind it is’ or in ‘how it comports itself’. For if you question the quality, an accident will answer, as if ‘what kind is a crow’, ‘black’, if ‘how it comports itself’, another accident, either ‘it sits’ or ‘it flies’ or ‘it caws’. For since an accident is divided into nine predicaments, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, action, being acted upon, all of the others are put in the question ‘how does it comport itself’, but quality usually answers in a question of quality. For if we are asked ‘what kind is an Ethiopian’, we will answer with an accident, that is ‘black’, if ‘how does Socrates comport himself’, then we will say either ‘he sits’ or ‘he walks’ or one of the other accidents mentioned above."
[ 5.12 ]
"We have already discussed how a genus differs from the other four. However, it also happens that each of these differs from the other four, so that when there are indeed five, each differs from the other four. Four times five makes twenty total differences. But when we count the later ones and overcome one difference with the second ones, because it has already been taken into account, there are two for the third, three for the fourth, and four for the fifth. This makes ten total, four, three, two, one. A genus indeed differs from a difference, species, property, and accident; so there are four total differences. It has been mentioned before how a difference differs from a genus, when we were discussing how a genus differed from it; it remains to discuss how it differs from a species, property, and accident, and there are three. Again, we have discussed how a species differs from a difference, when we were discussing how a difference differed from a species; and how a species differs from a genus was mentioned when we were discussing how a genus differed from a species; so what remains is to discuss how it differs from a property and accident, and these are two differences. But how a property differs from an accident remains; for how it differs from a species, difference, and genus, has been foretold in their differences to it. Taking these four differences of a genus to the others, three of a difference, two of a species, and one of a property to an accident, all ten are derived, four of which, which were of a genus to the rest, we have demonstrated above.
[5.12.01]
Since he has pursued the differences and commonalities of a genus to a difference, a species, a property, and an accident, he attempts to do the same to the others, and foretells how many total differences there could be which, when compared and mixed with each other, could result from the things proposed above. There are indeed twenty. For when there are five things, if each thing differs from the other four, four times five, twenty differences are made, which is shown by the example of the following letters. Let there be five things, for instance, five letters A B C D E. Therefore, A differs from the other four, that is B C D E, there will be four differences. Again, B differs from the other four, that is A C D E, there will be four again; these, joined to the first ones, make eight. C, indeed, the third, differs from the other four, namely A B D E; these four differences, joined to the first eight, make twelve. The fourth, D, is compared to the other four and differs from them, that is A B C E, so there will be four again; these, joined to the first twelve, make sixteen. And if the last, E, differs from the other four, namely A B C D, there will be four other differences; these, composed with the previous ones, make twenty. And let the description be of this kind:
A –> B C D E
B –> A C D E
C –> A B D E
D –> A B C E
E –> A B C D
Given these conditions, the same consideration will apply to genera, species, and the other terms. Therefore, there will be four differences, by which a genus is distinguished from a difference, a species, a property, and an accident. And another four, by which a difference is separated from a genus, a species, a property, and an accident. And again, four for a species when compared to a genus and a difference, a property, and an accident. And four for a property when compared to a genus, a difference, a species, and an accident. And an additional four for an accident when compared to a genus, a difference, a species, and a property. All these combined make twenty differences. However, this is if we refer to the nature of the number and the alternation of comparison. For if the diligent reader looks at the natures of the differences themselves, they will often find the same differences repeated. For by what a genus differs from a difference, by the same, a difference stands apart from a genus. And by what a difference is separated from a species, by the same, a species is separated from a difference, and so forth in the rest. Therefore, in this arrangement of differences, which I have set up above, I have often enumerated the same ones. And if we subtract the similarities of the differences, there are ten differences in total, which we must consider as diverse and dissimilar for the present discussion.
Let’s proceed. For instance, a genus differs from a difference, a species, a property, and an accident by four differences, which we have already mentioned above. Likewise, let’s take a difference: this will first differ from a genus, then from a species, a property, and an accident. But how it differs from a genus has already been explained above when we were saying how a genus differs from a difference. Therefore, taking away this comparison, since it has already been mentioned above, there remain three distances by which a difference is separated from a species, a property, and an accident; these, joined with the four above, yield seven differences.
Next, let’s take a species. According to the diversity of number, there would indeed be four differences when it is compared to a genus, a difference, a property, and an accident. But the first two comparisons have already been mentioned. For how a species differs from a genus was stated when we were discussing how a genus differs from a species, and how a species differs from a difference was recalled when we were rendering the dissimilarities of a difference from a species. When these are subtracted, two complete and untouched discrepancies remain of a species to a property and an accident; these, joined with the seven, make nine differences.
Furthermore, if the differences of a property are considered numerically, there will be four, namely when it is compared to a genus, a difference, a species, and an accident, of which indeed the first three differences have already been stated. For how a property differs from a genus was stated when we showed how a genus differs from a property. Again, how a property differs from a difference has been demonstrated above in collecting the distance between a difference and a property. And how a property differs from a species was expounded when we were saying how a species differs from a property.
Therefore, what remains is one difference of a property to an accident, which, joined with the previous ones, concludes with ten differences. As for an accident’s differences to the others, there could indeed be four, unless all are proven to be exhausted. For how an accident differs either from a genus or a difference or a species or a property has been shown above, and there are no diverse differences of an accident to the others than those of the others to an accident.
Therefore, it happens that, since there are five entities, if the first one is taken, four differences are made. If the second one, three, and the differences of the second entity to the others are surpassed by the differences of the first to the others by only one distance; for when the first has four, the second retains three. If the third one is taken, it will have two differences, which are surpassed by the first four differences by two; if the fourth one is taken, it will have one difference, which is surpassed by the first four differences by three, but the fifth, since it will have no difference at all, is surpassed entirely by the first four differences.
And this progression of numbers indeed extends up to the number ten: four, three, two, one, so that there are indeed four of a genus, but three of a difference, two of a species, one of a property, none of an accident. And the first comparisons of a genus indeed hold four new differences, but the second comparisons of a difference hold three new ones; for one has been added above, and it is surpassed by the first four new differences by only one. The third comparison of a species has only two new differences, for we recognize two that have been added above, and it is surpassed by the first four by only two new differences. The property retains one new one, since it has three that have been added above, and it is surpassed by the first by three new differences. As for the fifth, the comparisons of an accident, since they retain no new difference, are surpassed entirely by the first four of the genus. And in this way, out of twenty differences according to the number, ten are reduced according to dissimilarity.
However, to ensure that we can have markers for these differences according to dissimilarity, not only in the number five but in the other numbers as well, the following rule will be given which fully replicates the dissimilarity of differences in any plurality of numbers. For if you take away one from the number of the proposed things and multiply what remains after subtracting one by the total sum of the numbers, half of what is produced by multiplication will be equivalent to the plurality which the differences of the proposed things will contain.
Therefore, let there be four things A, B, C, D; from these, I subtract one, making three; so I multiply these four times, making twelve; I hold on to half of these, which is six. So, there will be six differences when these four things are compared to each other: A, indeed, retains three differences to B, C, and D, while B to C and D retains two, and C to D retains one; which, when added up, complete the number six. This rule may now be given simply and without demonstration, but in the exposition of the Predicaments, the reason why it is so will also be explained.
[ 5.13 ]
ON THE COMMONALITIES OF DIFFERENCES AND SPECIES
The commonality between difference and species is equal participation; individual humans participate equally in humanity and rational difference. Also common is the constant presence in those that partake; Socrates is always rational and always a man.
[5.13.01] It has been frequently stated that the elements that form substance neither contract due to remission nor extend due to intensity; for each thing, its being is one and the same. If the difference of species demonstrates substance, but species individualizes, then both are equally removed from intensity and remission, resulting in equal participation. All individual humans are equally mortal and rational as humans. For if ‘to be’ for a human is the same as ‘to be rational’, since all humans are equally humans, they must be equally rational. They also share another commonality in that the participants of difference do not relinquish their species. Socrates is always rational — for Socrates partakes in rationality — always a man, because he partakes in humanity. As the participants of difference do not relinquish, so species is always attached to those who partake in it.
[ 5.14 ]
ON THE PARTICULARS OF DIFFERENCES AND SPECIES
The particular quality of difference is found in what it is predicated of, and of species in what it is; even if a man is regarded as a quality, he will not be a quality simply, but according to the difference added to the genus. Furthermore, difference is often observed in many species, as the quadruped is in different animal species, but species exists only in those individual instances under the species. Also, difference is primary from that species which exists according to it; if rationality is removed, it destroys the man, but if the man is destroyed, it does not remove rationality, as God exists. Moreover, difference is composed with another difference — rational and mortal are combined in the substance of a man — but species does not combine with species to create another species; a certain horse and a certain donkey may breed to produce a mule, but a horse simply combined with a donkey will never create a mule.
[5.14] Having explained the commonalities relevant to the establishment of difference and species, now we gather their differences by saying they differ in that species is predicated in what something is, and difference in what it is like. This could raise an objection. If humanity itself, which is a species, is some kind of quality, why is species predicated in what it is, since it seems to be some kind of quality due to a certain property of its nature? We respond to this by saying that only difference is a quality, while humanity is not just a quality, but is completed by quality. For difference, coming upon genus, created species; therefore, genus is formed by a certain quality of difference, in order to proceed into species, but the species itself, while it has a certain quality, according to the difference which is pure and simple quality, by which it is completed and conformed, is not pure and simple quality, but substance made from qualities. Therefore, rightfully, difference, which is purely and simply quality, answers to inquiries about what something is like, while species, even though it too is some kind of quality, not simple but informed by other qualities, answers to what it is. Again, difference is such because it contains under it more species, whereas species only presides over individuals. Rationality, for example, includes both man and God, quadruped includes horse, ox, dog, and others, but man includes only individuals. And it is the same with other species. Hence, definitions followed, that difference is what is predicated in many different species regarding what something is like, and species is what is predicated about many numerically different things in what they are. Therefore, differences are also of a superior nature, since they are containers of species. If anyone removes a difference, they will also remove the species, such as if rationality is removed, it will destroy both man and God, but if man is removed, rationality remains in the remaining species. So, there is a distance between difference and species in that one difference can contain multiple species, but species never can. Another difference is that often one species is joined from multiple differences, but no species substance is joined from multiple species. For instance, man was made from the differences of being mortal and rational, but no species is ever formed from the union of other species. If someone objects, saying that a horse mixed with a donkey produces a mule, they would not be correct. Individuals joined with individuals may indeed produce other individuals, but the horse in general, that is universally, and the donkey universally, can neither mix nor produce anything if they are mixed conceptually. Therefore, it is clear that several differences can come together to form one species substance, but species in no way can match up to the nature of another species.
[ 5.15 ]
ON THE COMMONALITIES OF DIFFERENCE AND PROPERTIES
Difference and property have in common that they are equally partaken by those who participate in them; the rational are equally rational, and the laughable are equally laughable. And both have the commonality of always and entirely being present. If one who is bipedal is crippled, it is always said in relation to what he naturally is; for laughability in what one is naturally inclined to do has what is always there, but not in that one is always laughing.
[5.15] Now the commonalities of difference and property are pursued in continuous reasoning. For it is said to be common to property and difference that they are participated in equally - all humans are equally rational, equally laughable - one, because it shows substance, the other, because it is the property inherent to a species and does not leave the subject species. He also adds another commonality: difference is always present in subjects equally as property; humans are always rational, as they are always laughable. But it might be objected that a human is not always bipedal, as bipedal is a difference, if one is crippled of one foot. This objection is resolved in such a way. Properties and differences are not always present in that they always exist, but in that they can always naturally exist, and are always said to be present in subjects. If someone is crippled of a foot, it matters not to nature, just as it does nothing to detract from the property if a man does not laugh. For these things are not said to be always present in that they are present, but in that they can be present by nature. For we say that ‘always’ exists not in actuality, but in nature. For it can never happen, by the very property of its nature, that a man is not always bipedal, even if it can happen that he is crippled of a foot, even if he is born with a foot missing; for in these cases, the individual born is being detracted from, not the species or substance.
[ 5.16 ]
ON THE DISTINCT NATURE OF DIFFERENCE AND PROPERTY
Indeed, the nature of a difference is that it is often said about many species, for instance, rationality is attributed to both man and god. On the other hand, a property applies only to one species, which it is characteristic of. Furthermore, a difference follows those from which it is a difference, but does not lead back to them. Properties, in contrast, are predicated in reverse of those things of which they are properties, precisely because they do convert.
[5.16.01] Difference is distinct from property because a difference encompasses many species and is predicated about all of them, while a property matches only the single species to which it is connected. For instance, rationality pertains to both man and god, quadruped to a horse and other animals, but laughter belongs solely to one species, that is, man. This is why a difference always follows a species, but a species does not necessarily follow a difference. However, a property and its species accompany each other with equal predication. ‘To follow’ is said when, once the former is named, the latter fits to be named, such as when I say ‘every man is rational’, first, I named man, then I added the difference; therefore, a difference follows the species. But if I reverse the terms and say ‘every rational being is a man’, the proposition does not hold true; thus, a species does not follow a difference in any sense. But because a property and a species can be interchanged, they follow each other: every man is capable of laughter, and everything capable of laughter is a man.
[ 5.17 ]
ON THE COMMONALITIES OF DIFFERENCE AND ACCIDENT
Indeed, the commonality between difference and accident is that they can both be said of many things. Another commonality with inseparable accidents is their ever-present and universal presence; for example, being bipedal is always present in all crows, and similarly, being black.
[5.17] He proposes two commonalities between difference and accident, one of which is common to separable and inseparable accidents with difference, and from which separable accidents are excluded. Only the inseparable is concluded in the second commonality. It is common to differences and all accidents to be predicated of many; for both separable and inseparable accidents, just like differences, are predicated of many species and individuals. For example, being bipedal is predicated of both the crow and the swan and of the individuals that are under the crow and swan. Similarly, being white and black, which are inseparable accidents, are predicated of the same crow and swan. We say walking or standing, sleeping, and staying awake about the same things, which are separable accidents, but the rest of the commonality seems to include only those accidents that are inseparable. For just as a difference always adheres to the species it underlies, so also inseparable accidents never seem to leave their subject. For just as being bipedal, which is a difference, never leaves the species of crows, so neither does black, which is an inseparable accident. A difference, therefore, does not leave its subject, because it completes and perfects its substance, but an accident of this kind does not separate because it cannot; for it cannot be an inseparable accident if it ever leaves its subject.
[ 5.18 ]
ON THE DISTINCT NATURE OF DIFFERENCE AND ACCIDENT
They differ, however, in that a difference encompasses but is not encompassed – rationality encompasses man – while accidents in a certain sense do encompass, in that they are in many things, but are also encompassed in that subjects are susceptible not to one accident but to many. A difference is unalterable and unremitting, while accidents accept more and less. Contrary differences are indeed unmixed, while contrary accidents are mixed.
Such are indeed the commonalities and characteristics of difference and the rest; how a species differs from a genus and a difference, has been discussed in what we have said about how a genus differs from the rest, and how a difference differs from the rest.
[5.18] After having delivered the commonalities of difference and accident, he now treats their differences. He first proposes such a difference. Every difference, he says, encompasses a species. For example, rationality encompasses man, because rationality is predicated more than the species, that is, man: for it surpasses the substance of man and is extended as far as god. Accidents, on the other hand, sometimes contain and are sometimes contained. They contain, because each single accident is accustomed to being present in many species, for example, white is present in both the swan and the stone. Black is present in the crow, the Ethiopian, and the ebony. They are contained, however, because many accidents happen to one species, so it seems that species contains many accidents. When it happens that the Ethiopian is black, it also happens that he is snub-nosed, curly-haired, which are all accidents of the Ethiopian. The species, which is man, seems to include all the many accidents it has within itself. To this can be objected: differences too are in a way contained and in a way contain, as rationality contains man – because it is predicated more than man – and it is also contained by man, because man contains not only this difference, but also mortality.
We respond: all things that are substantially predicated of many cannot be contained by those about whom they are spoken; so that indeed, differences are not contained by the species, even if there are many differences that make up the species. Accidents, however, are contained, because accidents do not constitute the substance of the species in any predication; for neither are accidents properly called universals, when they are spoken of many species, but differences especially. For those things that are universals of anything, must of necessity contain the substance of those things of which they are universals. Therefore, because differences indicate substance, they lack intensification and remission – for each substance can neither be contracted nor be remitted – but accidents, since they profess no constitution of substance, increase by intensification and decrease by remission. Another difference between them is that contrary differences cannot be mixed so as to make something, but contrary accidents are mixed and some medium is joined from one contrariety or the other. For from rational and irrational nothing can be joined into one, but from white and black joined, some middle color is made.
Therefore, after explaining the distances of difference to others, it remains to speak about the species, whose differences to the genus we have previously collected, when we were speaking about the differences of the genus to the species, we also mentioned the distances of the species to the difference, when we were showing the dissimilarities of the difference to the species. It remains, therefore, to connect the species to the community of the proper and accidents, and then to separate it from the difference.
[ 5.19 ]
ON THE COMMONS OF SPECIES AND PROPERTY
However, species and property share the common trait of being predicable of each other; for if a man, he is laughable, and if laughable, he is a man – And indeed, as it has been said many times, the laughable should be considered according to its natural aspect – for species are equally present in those who partake of them, and properties in those to whom they belong.
Porphyry says, “Property and species share the commonality of having reciprocal predication. Just as a species is predicated of its property, so the property is predicated of the species; for as man is laughable, so the laughable is man; and this has been mentioned before multiple times.” He then explains the reason for this commonality, namely that species are equally present in individuals, just as properties are equally present in those to whom they belong. This reasoning seems more fitting for the similarity between properties and species, not the reciprocal predication, because just as species are equally present in individuals, so are properties; for example, both Socrates and Plato are equally human, just as they are both equally laughable. Thus, we should understand this added phrase, “species are equally present in those who partake of them, and properties in those to whom they belong,” as an additional shared aspect. Or perhaps it should be understood as if he had said ‘species and properties are equal’? For the species belong to those who partake of the species, and properties belong to those who partake of the properties; therefore, species and properties are equally present in both, that is, neither species surpasses those who partake of the species, nor properties surpass those who partake of the properties. And since these properties belong to species, species and properties must be equal and predicable of each other.
[ 5.20 ]
ON THE PROPERTIES OF SPECIES AND PROPERTY
However, species differs from property in that a species can also be a genus for others, whereas it is impossible for a property to be a species for others. Moreover, species precedes property, as the property comes after the species; for man must exist before he can be laughable. Additionally, the species is always present in the subject in actuality, whereas the property can be present potentially; for example, Socrates is always actually a man, but he does not always laugh, even though he is always potentially laughable. Furthermore, if the terms differ, the entities themselves are different; it is indeed the property of the species to be under a genus, to be predicated of many different things in terms of ‘what it is’, and other things of this sort, whereas the property of the property is to be present to only one thing always and entirely.
[5.20.01] The first difference between property and species is that species can sometimes be derived into other species, i.e., it can be a genus, like ‘animal’ can be a genus of man, while being a species of living being. However, properties can never be genera, as they are equivalent to the most specific species; these, since they cannot be genera, nor can properties which are equal to them, allow themselves to be genera. Again, species always exists before property – unless there is a man, he cannot be laughable – and although these exist simultaneously, the concept of substance precedes the concept of property. Every property is placed in the category of accidents, but it differs from an accident in that it contains the force of its own predication around a single species. If substances are prior to accidents, and species is substance, but property is an accident, there is no doubt that species is prior, and property comes later. Species and properties are also distinguished by the nature of actuality and potentiality; species is always present in individuals in actuality, but properties are sometimes present in actuality, and always potentially. For example, Socrates and Plato are actually men, but they do not always actually laugh, they are said to be laughable, because even if they do not laugh, they can laugh. Therefore, species and property are always present in subjects by nature, but in act, species is always present, and property is not always present in act, as has been said. Also, since definition reveals substance, those entities that have different definitions must be different substances; however, species and properties have different definitions, so they must be different substances. The definition of species is to be under a genus and to be predicated of many different things in terms of ‘what it is’; this definition, frequently explained above, does not need to be repeated here. But the property is not defined in this way: a property is what is always present to every single instance of a species. Therefore, if the definitions are different, there is no doubt that species and property differ according to their own terms.
[ 5.21 ]
ON THE COMMONS OF SPECIES AND ACCIDENT
However, species and accident have the common trait of being predicated of many things; yet other commonalities are rare, because an accident and the thing to which it happens are greatly different from each other.
[5.21.01] The common similarity between species and accident is that they are predicated of many things; for example, species is predicated of many things, just as an accident is. However, he says that their other commonalities are rare, because there is a significant difference between what happens (the accident) and to what it happens (the subject). For the subject is the underlying substance, while the accident is the overlaying addition of nature. Furthermore, what is posited is substance, but what is predicated as an accident comes from outside. All of these aspects create a substantial difference between the subject and the accident. However, other shared features of species and inseparable accidents can also be found, such as always being present to subjects – just as ‘man’ is always present to individual men, so inseparable accidents are always present to individual subjects – and as species is predicated of individuals, so accidents are equally predicated of multiple individuals; for example, ‘man’ is predicated of Socrates and Plato, whereas ‘black’ and ‘white’ are predicated of multiple crows and swans to whom these properties occur.
[ 5.22 ]
ON THE PROPERTIES OF SPECIES AND ACCIDENTS
“The properties of each are, for species, that what it is can be predicated of those of which it is a species; for accidents, that they indicate how something is or behaves; and that each substance participates in one species, but in many accidents, both separable and inseparable; and that species must be understood before accidents, or if they are inseparable – for there must be a subject for something to happen to – but accidents are of a later genus and of an adventitious nature. And the participation of species is equal, but of accidents, or if inseparable, it is not equal; for an Ethiopian will have a different color from another Ethiopian, either more or less intense according to their blackness.”
Therefore, it remains to speak about the property and accident; for what property differs from species and difference and genus has been said.
[5.22.01] Now, promising to unfold the property of species and accident, such property is to be understood, as said above, as something that is said in comparison with different things. For species is predicated in that what it is, whereas accident in that how it is. This distinction does not distinguish species only from accidents, but also from differences and properties, and not only species from them, but also genus. Moreover, that species is predicated in that what it is, and accident in how it behaves, is also common with genus; for genus is divided from accident in that what it is and how it behaves. Also, every substance seems to be contained in one species, like Socrates is a human, and therefore, only one kindred to Socrates is the species of man. Again, to an individual horse is one species of horse nearest, and likewise in the rest; for each substance is presided over by one species. But not one accident is joined to each substance; for many accidents always happen to each substance, as to Socrates being bald, snub-nosed, blue-eyed, with a protruding belly, and in other substances, the same applies to the number of accidents. Then, species are always understood before accidents. For unless there is a man to whom something happens, there can be no accident, and unless there is any substance to which an accident can be attached, there is no accident. Every substance is contained in its proper species. Therefore, species are rightly understood first, and accidents later; for they are, as he says, of a later genus and of an adventitious nature. For those that do not inform substance are rightly said to be of an adventitious nature and of a later genus; for substances which have previously been informed by differences are joined to these. Again, because species show the substance, and substance, as has been said, is devoid of intensity and remission, the participation of species does not accept intensity and remission. But accident, even if inseparable, can vary with an increase and decrease of intensity and remission, as the inseparable accident that exists in Ethiopians, blackness. For it can be present in some, so as to be close to brown, and in others, so as to be very black.
What remains is to pursue the commonalities and differences of the proper. But how the proper differs from the genus or species or difference has been demonstrated above, when we showed what genus or species or difference is distinguished from the proper. Now the remaining consideration is towards commonality or difference, what joins or segregates the proper from accidents.
[5.23]
On the Commonalities of Proper and Accidental Qualities
A common feature of proper and inseparable accidental qualities is that they never exist without the entities in which they are observed. Just as a human cannot exist without the capacity to laugh, so too an Ethiopian cannot exist without a dark complexion, and just as the proper quality is always present, so too is the inseparable accident.
[5.23.01] Since a proper quality is always present in species and never leaves them, and since an inseparable accident cannot be separated from the subject, this seems to be a common feature between them. They cannot exist without their own proper or inseparable accidental qualities. He compares inseparable accidental qualities because, as said in the species, resemblances between species and accidents are very rare. Therefore, commonalities between proper qualities and accidents are even more difficult to find. An accident usually divides into contrary, into separable accident and inseparable accident, but those under a genus that divide into contrary, participate only by a generic predication. But if the proper quality is a certain inseparable accident, it differs greatly from a separable accident, and therefore seeks no similarities between proper qualities and separable accidents. But because the proper quality differs from inseparable accidents for certain reasons, their commonalities can be found, and they can differ from each other. One of these differences is the one we explained above, the second is because, as the proper quality is always present to each species. So is the inseparable accident; just as the capacity to laugh is always present to every human, so too is blackness always present to every crow.
[5.24]
On the Properties of Proper and Accidental Qualities
However, a proper quality differs in that it is present only to a single species, such as the capacity to laugh to a human, while an inseparable accident, like blackness, is present not only to an Ethiopian but also now to a crow, charcoal, ebony, and certain other things. Therefore, the proper quality is conversely predicated of that of which it is the proper quality and it is equally present, but the inseparable accident is not conversely predicated. And indeed, there is equal participation of proper qualities, but for accidents, some more, some less.
There are indeed other commonalities or properties of those that have been said but these too are sufficient for the distinction and transmission of their commonality.
[5.24.01] The first difference between proper and accidental qualities is that a proper quality is always said of only one species, but an accident is by no means, but its predication spreads into many substances and species of different kinds. For the capacity to laugh is predicated of no other than a human, but blackness, which is an inseparable accident to some, is present both to a crow and an Ethiopian, which are different species, and to a crow and ebony, which differ in genera, not only in species. As a result, an equal conversion is preserved in proper qualities, but by no means in accidents. For since proper qualities can be present in individuals and contain all, species are predicated in reverse order; for what is capable of laughter is a human, and what is a human, is capable of laughter. But not so for blackness, but it can indeed be predicated of those in which it is present, but these cannot be converted and withdrawn to its predication; for blackness is predicated of coal, ebony, human, and crow, but these are by no means predicated of blackness. For what contains many can be predicated of those which it contains, but those which are contained, are by no means named for those containing them. Again, a proper quality is participated in equally, an accident is changed by relaxations and intensifications. For every human is equally capable of laughter, but an Ethiopian is not equally black, but as was said. One is indeed a little less black, another, however, is found very black.
And enough has been said about the differences between proper and accidental qualities. It remained indeed to explain the commonalities and properties of an accident to the rest but these have been enumerated above, when we assigned the similarities and differences of genus, difference, species, and proper quality to an accident. But perhaps a mind trained in these will find other commonalities or differences of the five things that are placed above, beyond those which we have now said, but for the distinction and comparison of their similarities, those that have been said are nearly sufficient. We too, since we hold the port of the promised work and have made clear the sequence of this book, first indeed by the rhetorician Victorinus, then by us translated into Latin speech, by a double exposition, here set a limit to a long work containing the discussion of five things and preserving the Predicaments.
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