Boethius’s second commentary on Aristotle’s “On Interpretation” focuses on semantic theory and the relationship between language and thought. He elaborates on Aristotle’s view that spoken words and written letters are signs of the affections or thoughts in the soul, which primarily refer to things in the world. Boethius argues that words primarily designate thoughts and only secondarily signify things. He presents Aristotle’s semantic theory as a response to debates about the nature of language, highlighting the distinction between the conventional nature of language and the universal nature of thoughts and things. Boethius also explores the problem of how different individuals can have the same thought when observing the same object but using different words. He proposes a causal theory, suggesting that thoughts are identical because they are caused by the same object or event.
In addition to semantic theory, Boethius addresses the topic of future contingents and divine prescience. He examines Aristotle’s discussion on truth and falsehood in relation to future-tense sentences about contingent events. Boethius suggests that future contingent statements are indefinitely, not definitely, true or false. He offers interpretations of how truth values can be assigned to such statements, considering the retrospective fixation of truth value after the event. Boethius also discusses the issue of divine prescience, asserting that God’s knowledge encompasses the contingency of future events and does not imply determinism or necessitate everything to happen of necessity. His commentary provides valuable insights into these philosophical topics.