Boethius’s second commentary on Aristotle’s “On Interpretation” focuses on semantic theory and the relationship between language and thought. He elaborates on Aristotle’s view that spoken words and written letters are signs of the affections or thoughts in the soul, which primarily refer to things in the world. Boethius argues that words primarily designate thoughts and only secondarily signify things. He presents Aristotle’s semantic theory as a response to debates about the nature of language, highlighting the distinction between the conventional nature of language and the universal nature of thoughts and things. Boethius also explores the problem of how different individuals can have the same thought when observing the same object but using different words. He proposes a causal theory, suggesting that thoughts are identical because they are caused by the same object or event.

In addition to semantic theory, Boethius addresses the topic of future contingents and divine prescience. He examines Aristotle’s discussion on truth and falsehood in relation to future-tense sentences about contingent events. Boethius suggests that future contingent statements are indefinitely, not definitely, true or false. He offers interpretations of how truth values can be assigned to such statements, considering the retrospective fixation of truth value after the event. Boethius also discusses the issue of divine prescience, asserting that God’s knowledge encompasses the contingency of future events and does not imply determinism or necessitate everything to happen of necessity. His commentary provides valuable insights into these philosophical topics.

Book 1

On Interpretation, Book 1

INTRODUCTION

Alexander announces in his commentaries that the longest endeavor of explication was undertaken because Aristotle disagreed with many statements from previous writers. A greater reason for my pursuit is that hardly anyone has undertaken to either translate or even comment on a continuous series of works – except Vetius Praetextatus who did not translate Aristotle’s early and final analytical works into Latin but translated Themistius instead, which is easily understood by anyone who reads both. Albinus is also reported to have written on the same topics, of whose geometrical books I know are published, but despite long and much search, I could not find anything on dialectics. So, whether Albinus remained silent, we will talk about what was overlooked, or if he wrote anything, we, too, will imitate the learned man’s effort in the same praise. But although there are many things in Aristotle’s work that are hidden by the subtlest art of philosophy, this book is tightly packed with both sharpness of opinions and brevity of words. Therefore, more perspiration will be spent here in explanation than in the ten categories.

Firstly, we must define what a sound (vox) is. With this clearly and manifestly understood, the entire intent of the book will be revealed.

A sound is an impact on the air caused by the tongue, emitted by the animal through certain parts of the throat called arteries. There are other sounds, produced by the same breath, which the tongue does not strike, such as a cough. This is done by a certain breath exiting through the arteries but is not formed by any impression of the tongue and therefore does not fall under any elements. In no way can it be written. Therefore, it is not called a sound, but only noise.

Another possible definition of sound could be to say it is a noise with some intention of signifying. When a sound is emitted, it is produced for the purpose of signifying something. A cough, even though it is a sound, does not arise for the purpose of signifying something, but rather happens than is produced.

Therefore, our breath behaves in such a way that if it is struck and formed in a way that the tongue hits it, it is a sound. If it is struck in such a way that a specific and enclosed sound exits, it becomes speech, which is called lexis in Greek. Speech is articulate sound, but we will not call this speech (that is, lexin) a diction because we interpret phasin as diction and lexin as speech. The components of speech are letters, which when joined form one joint and compound sound, which is called speech. Whether any sound signifies something, like the word ‘man’; or nothing at all; or whether a given name can signify something, like ‘blityri’ (this sound, since it signifies nothing by itself, but if it is assigned to be a name, it will signify something); or if it does not signify anything by itself but signifies when joined with others, like conjunctions – all these are called speeches. The proper form of speech is a compound sound that can be written with letters. So, for there to be speech, there needs to be a sound – that is, the noise which the tongue strikes so that the sound itself may be determined by the tongue into the noise that can be written with letters. But for this speech to be signifying, it must also be added that there is some imagination of signifying, through which what is in the sound or in speech is put forth. Indeed, it must be said in this way: if in this breath, which we emit through the arteries, there is only the impact of the tongue, it is a sound; but if such an impact happens that it renders the sound into letters, it is speech; but if some force of imagination is also added, that sound becomes signifying.

Therefore, with these three things coming together: the impact of the tongue, the articulated sound of the voice, and some imagination of speaking, interpretation takes place.

Interpretation is an articulate sound that signifies by itself. Therefore, not every sound is an interpretation. There are sounds of other animals, which are not considered interpretations. Not every speech is an interpretation either because (as has been said) there are some speeches that lack signification, and although some of them do not signify anything by themselves, they do signify when joined with others, like conjunctions. However, interpretation remains in only those sounds that are signifying and articulated by themselves. Therefore, it is reciprocal, that whatever is an interpretation, it signifies; whatever signifies, it is called an interpretation.

Therefore, Aristotle himself also taught in the books he wrote on poetry that the parts of speech are syllables or even conjunctions, of which syllables, in that they are syllables, signify absolutely nothing; conjunctions, however, can co-signify, but they designate nothing by themselves. However, in this book, he establishes the parts of interpretation to be a noun and a verb, which indeed signify by themselves; furthermore, the sentence, which is also a voice when joined from significant parts, does not lack signification.

Therefore, because Aristotle treats not only the sentence but also the verb and the noun in this book, and not only speech but also signifying speech, which is interpretation, he named the book after the common name of the things that will be treated in this book, that is, after interpretation, the book itself is also entitled “On Interpretation”. (We have translated the explanation of this, as much as possible, from Porphyry, but also from others, into Latin; for he seems to excel in understanding sharpness and disposition of sentences.) Therefore, the first two parts of interpretation will be the noun and the verb. For by these, whatever is in the intellect is designated; by these indeed, the whole order of the sentence is accomplished.

And in as much as the sound itself signifies the understanding, it is divided (as has been said) into two parts, the noun and the verb, and in as much as the sound shows the things subject to the understanding through the mediation of understandings, Aristotle divided the number of significant sounds into ten categories.

And this is the aim of this book, different from that of the categories gathered in the decimal multitude, that only the number of significant sounds is sought here, as it pertains to the sounds themselves, by which significant sounds the understandings of the mind are designated. These are indeed simple names and verbs, and from these are composed sentences. The aim of the categories, however, is this: about significant voices of things as much as the understanding of the mind signifies them. For there is a certain quality of the sound, the noun and the verb, which indeed signify those very ten categories. For the ten categories will never be spoken without some quality of the verb or the noun. Therefore, the aim of this book will be about significant sounds as much as they signify the conceptions and understandings of the mind. The aim of the book of the ten categories, however, has been said in its commentary, since it is about significant sounds of things, how many parts their signification can be distributed into as much as the voices themselves can show the things subject to understandings through the mediation of senses and understandings.

But in his work On Poetry, he does not divide speech in the same way but adds all parts of speech altogether, affirming the parts of speech to be elements, syllables, conjunctions, articles, nouns, cases, verbs, sentences. For speech does not consist in significant sounds alone, but surpassing the significations of sounds it remains even in articulated sounds. For every syllable or every name or any other sound that can be written in letters is included in the name of speech, which is called lexis in Greek. But interpretation is not the same. For it is not enough for it to be such a sound that can be written down in letters, but it also has to signify something. The reason for the categories is established in this, in which these two parts of interpretation designate things subject to understandings. For since ten things are found in all nature, there will also be ten understandings, which understandings since verbs and names signify, there will be ten categories altogether, which are designated by verbs and names, but two certain things, that is, the noun and the verb, which signify those understandings themselves. Therefore, the elements of interpretation are verbs and names, but the proper parts by which interpretation itself consists are sentences.

Indeed, some discourses are perfect, others imperfect.

Perfect are those from which the full meaning of what is said can be understood; imperfect are those in which the mind still expects to hear something more fully, such as:

Socrates with Plato

for without any addition, the understanding of the speech hangs and wavers, and the listener expects to hear something further. However, there are five parts of perfect discourse: deprecatory, as in:

Jupiter omnipotent, if you are moved by any prayers, Then grant us help, father, and confirm these omens

commanding, as in:

Go now, my son, call the Zephyrs and glide on your wings

interrogative, as in:

Tell me, Damoetas, whose herd is this? Is it Meliboeus’s?

calling:

O father, o eternal power of men and things

and assertive, in which truth or falsity is found, such as:

Trees, at first, have different natures for planting.

However, it has two parts. For there is both a simple assertive discourse and a compound one. Simple like: ‘It is day’, ‘It shines’, composed like: ‘If it is day, it is light.’

Therefore, in this book, Aristotle discusses simple assertive discourse and its elements, namely the noun and the verb. As these are both significant and the significant articulated voice is contained under the name of interpretation, he called the book ‘On Interpretation’ from the common term (as mentioned).

Theophrastus, indeed, in that book he composed on affirmation and negation, dealt with assertive discourse. And the Stoics also argue about the same in those books they call Peri axiomaton. But they speculate both about simple and not simple assertive discourse, while Aristotle in this book considers nothing but simple assertive discourse alone. Also Aspasius and Alexander, as in other books of Aristotle, have published commentaries on this one, but both proclaim that Aristotle dealt with discourse. For to say something in speech (as they say themselves) is to interpret, hence the book ‘On Interpretation’ is clearly written about discourse, as if discourse alone and not also words and names were included under the term of interpretation. For both discourse and words and names, which are elements of interpretation, are called by the name of interpretation. But Alexander added that the title of the book is incomplete: for it does not specify about which discourse he wrote. For there are many (as mentioned) discourses; but he thinks that he should add or understand implicitly that he is writing about philosophical or dialectical discourse, that is, which can expound the true and the false.

But whoever accepts that only a speech can be called an interpretation once, has also erred in the understanding of its own title. For why would he think the title was incomplete because he added nothing about what speech he would argue about? Just as if someone asking “What is a human?” and another responding “An animal”, should blame and say that the other spoke imperfectly about what it is, because he did not pursue all the differences. But even if there are some other things common to this, that is, a man, to the name of an animal, nevertheless nothing prevents him who said “animal” from having perfectly demonstrated what a human is: for whether someone adds differences or not, it is necessary that a man be an animal. In the same way also about speech, if anyone first grants this, that nothing else is called an interpretation but speech, why should he be blamed who wrote on interpretation and did not add what interpretation he was talking about? For it is enough that he made the book’s title also about some common connection, as we have shown above that we made him about names and verbs and about speeches, when all these things were contained under one name of interpretation, when this book was noted by him about interpretation. But the fact that he added that that interpretation alone is called, in which truth and falsity can be found in a speech, as is a declarative speech, is the making (as Porphyrius says) of the meaning of a name rather than of teaching.

And indeed, both in the purpose of the book and in the title, he is mistaken, but not in the same way as he has erred about the judgment of this book. Andronicus does not think that this book is by Aristotle, whom Alexander refutes truly and strongly. Since antiquity has judged him to be a meticulous and diligent judge and discoverer of Aristotle’s books, it is highly worthy of wonder why he is wrong in his judgement of this book. He tries to show from this that it is not distinctly Aristotle’s because Aristotle discusses some things about the understandings of the mind at the beginning of this book, which he called passions of the soul, and he recalls that he discussed these more fully in the books on the soul. And because they called the passions of the soul either sadness or joy or desire or other such affections, Andronicus says from this it is proven that this book is not Aristotle’s, because he did not discuss such affections in the books on the soul – not understanding that in this book Aristotle set passions of the soul not as affections but as understandings. To these, Alexander adds many other arguments, why this work seems to be very much Aristotle’s. For those things are said here, which agree with Aristotle’s views that are on proposition; also that, the style itself, due to its brevity, is more compressed and does not differ from Aristotle’s obscurity; and that Theophrastus, as he usually does in other works, when discussing similar things, which were indeed discussed by Aristotle before, also in the book on affirmation and negation, uses some of the same words that Aristotle used in this book. Theophrastus also gives a sign that this is Aristotle’s book: for in all matters, about which he himself argues after the master, he lightly touches on those things which he knew were said by Aristotle before, but otherwise he more diligently follows through things not discussed by Aristotle. He also did the same thing here. For the things that Aristotle discussed in this book about proposition, were lightly passed over by him, but those things that his master left unsaid, he himself added in a more subtle manner of consideration. He also gives this reason, because Aristotle, being eager to write about syllogisms, could never have done it correctly, unless he made some notes about propositions.

It also seems clear to me, to those looking at it subtly, that this book is a preparation for the Analytics. For just as he argues here about the simple proposition, so too in the Analytics he only considers simple syllogisms, so that the very simplicity of syllogisms and propositions seems to pertain not to anything other than a work of Aristotle.

Therefore, Andronicus, who separates this book from Aristotle’s works because of the name ‘passions’, should not be listened to. Aristotle, however, called the passions of the soul ‘understandings’ because the understandings, which we are accustomed to speak and put forth in speech, have come from some reason and usefulness: for indeed, for scattered people to be collected together and be willing to be subject to laws and establish states, there was some usefulness and cause. Hence, those things which come from some usefulness must also necessarily come from passion. For as divine things are without any passion, so no external usefulness can be added to them. But those things which are capable of suffering always find some reason and usefulness for their support. Therefore, these types of understandings, which are to be put forth in speech to another, since they seem to be collected from some reason and usefulness, have been rightly named passions of the soul.

And indeed, these remarks will suffice about the intent, the title of the book, and why this should be considered primarily Aristotle’s book.

As for its usefulness, he who knows in what truth and falsehood consist in speech will not be ignorant. For these consist only in this assertive speech. Now what divides truth from falsehood, what distributes truth and falsehood definitively or variously and changeably, what can be said conjointly, when separately they can be predicated, what is said separately when they are predicated conjointly, what are the negations according to the manner of propositions, what are their consequences and many other things one can discern diligently in the work itself. He who applies his mind to some investigation will experience their great usefulness. But let us come now to Aristotle’s own words.

First, we must establish what a name is and what a verb is, then what negation and affirmation are, and then what a statement and speech are.

Beginning the book, he has proposed beforehand about what he will deal with in the whole series. For he says that one must first define what he is going to dispute. Here, indeed, “to establish” is to be understood as “to define.” For it has to be determined what all these things are – that is, WHAT A NAME is, WHAT A VERB is, and the rest, which we have said are elements of interpretation. But AFFIRMATION and NEGATION are under interpretation. Therefore, it is clear that a name and a verb are elements of affirmation and negation. For these are conjoined with the composition of affirmation and negation.

Here arises a certain question as to why he promises to determine only two things, a name and a verb, when there seem to be many parts of speech. To these it must be said that Aristotle has defined as much in this book as was enough for him to treat what he had planned. For he deals with simple assertive speech, which is such that it is composed only of conjoined verbs and names. For if someone joins a name and a verb to say:

Socrates walks

he has made a simple assertive speech. For an assertive speech is (as I have mentioned above) one that has the designation of falsehood and truth in itself. But in this that we say “Socrates walks,” either truth must necessarily be contained, or falsehood. For if it is said while Socrates is walking, it is true, if not walking, it is false. Therefore, a simple assertive speech is accomplished from verbs and names alone. Therefore, it is superfluous to ask why he did not propose also the other parts of speech, who set out to distribute not the elements of speech simply, but only those of simple assertion. Although two proper parts of speech must be said to be a name and a verb. For these two things signify by themselves, but conjunctions or prepositions signify nothing at all unless conjoined with others; participles are related to the verb, either because they come from the gerundive mode or because they contain time in their own signification; interjections and pronouns, as well as adverbs, must be placed in the place of a name, because they signify something definite, where there is no signification of passion or action. If some of these cannot be inflected in cases, it is not a hindrance. For there are some names which are called “monoptota”. If anyone thinks that these are far-fetched and not closely sought, he concedes, however, what we have already said above, that it is not right to slander him who does not propose about all speech but only about simple assertion, that he has taken as much for the definition as he thought was enough for the work undertaken.

Therefore, it must be said that Aristotle does not want to define all the parts of speech in this work but only those of the simple assertive speech, which are namely a name and a verb. However, the argument for this is as follows. After he proposed saying: FIRST WE MUST ESTABLISH WHAT A NAME IS AND WHAT A VERB IS, he does not immediately say WHAT SPEECH IS but soon added AND WHAT NEGATION IS, WHAT AFFIRMATION IS, WHAT A STATEMENT IS, finally indeed WHAT SPEECH IS. If he were speaking about all speech, after a name and a verb he would not have spoken of affirmation and negation and after this of a statement but immediately about speech. But now, since after the proposition of a name and a verb he proposed affirmation, negation, a statement and after speech, we must admit, what we have already said before, that he wanted to make a division of parts not of universal speech but of simple assertive speech, which is divided into affirmation and negation, the parts of which are names and verbs.

For these maintain the simple understanding by themselves, which the same are called dictions but are not the only ones called so. For there are also other dictions: speeches either imperfect or perfect, of which I have already taught there to be many parts, among which the species of perfect speech is a statement. And this is also another thing, either simple or compound.

The debate among philosophers and commentators concerning the types of simple propositions is indeed intense. Some, including Porphyrius, assert that affirmation and negation must be presupposed as types of proposition. Others do not agree in any way, arguing that affirmation and negation are equivocal, and although denoted by a single term for proposition, they are predicates of the proposition as an equivocal term, not as a univocal genus; the leader of these is Alexander. It does not seem useless to present the arguments of these factions. First, we must explain how Alexander believes affirmation and negation are not species of proposition, and then add how Porphyrius dissolves this argument.

Alexander states that affirmation and negation are not species of proposition because affirmation is prior. He tries to prove that affirmation is prior because every negation nullifies and destroys an affirmation. If this is so, then the affirmation to be nullified is prior to the negation that nullifies. In things where there is a before and after, these cannot be placed under the same genus, as has been said in that category of predicates which deals with things that exist simultaneously. Further, he says that every negation is division, every affirmation composition and conjunction. For when I say:

Socrates lives

I have connected life with Socrates; when I say:

Socrates does not live

I have separated life from Socrates. Therefore, negation is a kind of division, affirmation a conjunction. But division belongs to the composite and the conjoined. Therefore, conjunction, which is affirmation, is prior, while division, which is negation, is later. He also adds that every proposition made through affirmation is simpler than a proposition made through negation. For if the negative particle is removed from the negation, only affirmation remains. For from this which is:

Socrates does not live

if the particle ‘not’ which is an adverb is removed, ‘Socrates lives’ remains. Therefore, affirmation is simpler than negation. But what is simpler must be prior. In quantity also, what is less in quantity is prior to what is more in quantity. However, every speech is a quantity. But when I say:

Socrates walks

the speech is less than when I say:

Socrates does not walk

So, if affirmation is less in quantity, it must also be prior. He also added that affirmation is a kind of state, while negation is a privation. But a state is prior to privation: therefore, affirmation is prior to negation. And not to pursue each point individually, having also demonstrated in various ways that affirmation is prior to negation, he has separated them from the common genus. For he thinks that no species can be under the same genus in which a prior or subsequent is considered.

But Porphyrius says in his commentaries which he published on Theophrastus that he has taught the forms of a statement to be affirmation and negation; here, however, he refutes the argument of Alexander in such a way. For he says that we should not think that whatever in any way are prior to others, these cannot be placed under the same genus, but whatever in the sense of being one and substance are prior or posterior, these alone are not placed under the same genus. And rightly so. For if whatever is prior cannot be with what is posterior under one genus, then neither can the first substances and the second have a common genus of substance; and whoever says this deviates from the proper order of reasoning. But just as although there are first and second substances, yet they are not equally in a subject and therefore their existence depends on the fact that they are not in a subject, and therefore they are placed under one genus of substance: so also although affirmations are prior to negations in the utterance of speech, yet they equally participate in being and their own nature by means of a statement. But a statement is in which truth and falsity can be found. In which matter both affirmation and negation are equal. For both affirmation and negation equally participate in truth and falsity. Therefore, because affirmation and negation, what they are, equally participate from a statement, they should not be separated from the common genus of a statement.

It also seems to me that Porphyry’s opinion should be followed, so that affirmation and negation are under the common genus of a statement. For those long and multiple arguments of Alexander are solved, when he showed that not in all ways those things which are prior can be placed under a common genus, but those which are prior in their own existence and substance, only these can be established and placed under a common genus.

However, Syrianus, who has the cognomen Philoxenus, asks at this point why the proposer first spoke of negation, then of affirmation saying: FIRST WE MUST ESTABLISH WHAT IS A NOUN AND WHAT IS A VERB, THEN WHAT IS NEGATION AND AFFIRMATION. And first of all, he said nothing specific because in those things in which both affirmation can arise and negation can arise, negation can be prior, but then affirmation can be, as in “Socrates is healthy.” Such an affirmation can be adapted to him, so that it is said about him:

Socrates is healthy

and such a negation can be adapted, so that it is said about him:

Socrates is not healthy

Since therefore an affirmation and a negation can occur in him, it first happens that there is a negation before there is an affirmation. For before he was born: for he who was not born, could not be healthy. He added this to it: to observe Aristotle’s reversed distribution of proposition and execution. For he first proposed about negation after noun and verb, then about affirmation, then about a statement, but finally about speech but defining the proposed items, first speech, then a statement, third affirmation, but last of all he determined negation, which here he had placed first after the proposition of a word and a noun. Therefore, in order for the order to be observed in reverse, therefore he said that negation was proposed first. In which explanation the opinion of Alexander also does not depart. It was also added that it would not be pointless for a statement to be taken as a kind of affirmation and negation, which although (as has been said) affirmation was prior to utterance, yet as to the statement itself, that is, the force of truth and falseness, both are equally established under a statement by Aristotle. And Aristotle also approves of this. For he placed negation first, he placed affirmation second, which matter has no fault, if to the statement itself affirmation and negation are considered equal. For those things which are equal by nature, hold nothing of the contrary when they are taken indifferently.

There is therefore the order which he proposed: first the element of the whole speech, namely a noun and a verb, after these negation and affirmation, which are species of a statement. Of which he named the genus (that is, a statement) third, but he placed speech fourth, which is the genus of the statement itself. And he promised to give the definitions of all these, which for now he leaves aside and passes by and defers to a later discussion, now he adds what are words and nouns or what they themselves signify.

Therefore, before we come to Aristotle’s own words, let us discuss a few things in general about nouns and verbs and about those things which are signified by verbs and nouns.

Whether there be any question and answer, or an ongoing conversation of any speech and another’s hearing and understanding, or this one teaches and that one learns, the entire order of speaking is completed by these three: things, understandings, and words. For things are conceived by the understanding, while the voice signifies the conceptions and understandings of the mind, and understandings both conceive the subject-matters and are signified by words. Therefore, since there are three things by which every speech and conversation are accomplished — things that are the subjects, understandings that conceive things and in turn are signified by words, and words that designate understandings — there is a fourth thing, by which the words themselves can be designated, and that is letters. For written letters signify the very words.

Therefore, these four exist, such that letters signify words, words signify understandings, and understandings conceive things, which indeed have a certain not confused nor random consequence but are constant by their own natural ordination. For things always accompany the understanding conceived by them, and the voice follows the understanding, but the elements, that is letters, follow the words. For understandings arise from the things set forth and established in their own substance. For understandings are always of things, from which again, when established, the signification of the voice arises. Beyond the understanding, the voice signifies absolutely nothing. But because there are words, therefore letters, which we call elements, have been found to denote the quality of the words.

But for knowledge, the situation is conversely for things. For among those who use the same letters and the same elements, they must also use the same names and words (that is, voices); and those who use the same words also have the same understandings in the conception of the mind. But among those who have the same understandings, it is clear that the same things are subject to their understandings. But this does not convert in any way. For among those who have the same things and the same understandings, the same words and letters are not immediately the same. For when a Roman, a Greek, and a barbarian see a horse, they also have the same understanding about it that it is a horse and the same thing is subject to them, the same understanding is conceived from the thing itself but the Greek calls a horse differently, there is also another word in the Roman signification of a horse and the barbarian disagrees with both in the designation of a horse. Therefore, they also inscribe their own voices with different elements.

Rightly, therefore, it was said that among those who have the same things and the same understandings, the same words or the same elements do not immediately exist among them.

But a thing precedes the understanding, and the understanding precedes the voice, and the voice precedes the letters – but this cannot be converted. For if there are letters, a certain signification of the voice does not immediately arise from these. For people who do not know letters, any elements signify no name, indeed, they are ignorant. And if there are voices, an understanding does not immediately have to exist. For you will find many voices which signify nothing at all. And there is not always a thing subject to the understanding. For there are understandings without any subject thing, such as centaurs or chimeras invented by poets. For these are understandings for which there is no subject substance. But if anyone returns to nature and considers it carefully, he will recognize that when there is a thing, there is also an understanding of it; if not among people, certainly with him who by his own divinity in the nature of the substance of the thing itself knows nothing. And if there is an understanding, there is also a voice; and if there is a voice, there are also letters of it, which if they are unknown, mean nothing to the nature of the voice itself. Nor is it that the understanding is some kind of cause of words or the voice is the cause of letters, that when there are the same letters among some people, there must also be the same names; just as when there are the same things or understandings among some, it is not immediately necessary that there be the same words of their understandings or things. For when the thing and the understanding of a man are the same, the substance of this kind is named differently and by different names among different people. Therefore, also when the voices are the same, the letters can be different, as in this name which is ‘man’: while it is one name it can be written with different letters. For it can be written with Latin letters, it can also be written with Greek letters, it can be written with other newly invented letter shapes.

Therefore, since among those who have the same things, the same understandings must exist, among those who have the same understandings, the same voices do not exist; and among those who have the same voices, it is not necessary that the same elements be established – it must be said that things and understandings, since they are the same among all, are naturally constituted, but voices and letters, since they are changed by the different positions of people, are not naturally but by position.

Therefore, it must be concluded that among those who have the same elements, the same voices also exist among them and among those who have the same voices, the same understandings exist; but among those who have the same understandings, the same things are also subject to them: again among those who have the same things, the same understandings also exist; among those who have the same understandings, the same voices do not exist; nor among those who have the same voices, the same letters always designate the words or names themselves.

But we have used elements and letters interchangeably in the above sentences, but I will briefly resolve what the difference is between these. A letter is an inscription and figure of the smallest part of an articulated voice, but the element is the sound of that inscription: as when I write the letter which is ‘a’, the formula itself which is written with ink or a pencil is called a letter, but the sound by which we utter this letter by voice is called an element. Therefore, knowing this, it must be said that he who teaches or who speaks in continuous speech or who asks, is in a contrary position to those who learn or listen or respond in these three things, namely voice, understanding, and thing (for letters are disregarded because of those who are inexperienced in them). For he who teaches and who speaks and who asks, having gone from things to understanding, exercise the force of their own action and duty through names and words (for from things being subjects, they take understandings and pronounce through names and words), but he who learns or who listens or even who responds, having progressed from names to understandings, arrives at things. For he who learns or who listens or who responds, receiving the speech of he who teaches or speaks or asks, understands what each of them says and understanding, also acquires knowledge of things and stands in it. Therefore, it was rightly said that in voice, understanding and thing, those who teach, speak, ask are in a contrary position to those who learn, listen and respond.

Therefore, since these are the four – letters, voices, understandings, things – most closely and principally letters signify words and names. These indeed principally signify understandings, and in the second place also designate things. Understandings, however, are significant of nothing else but things. But the ancients among whom are Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates – these place senses in the middle between things and the significations of understandings in sensible things or certain imaginations, in which the origin of the understanding itself may consist. And now what the Stoics say about this matter must be passed over.

This, however, should be understood from all of these, that those things which are in letters signify that speech which resides in the voice, and that the speech of the voice signifies the speech of the mind and intellect, which is made through silent contemplation, and that this intellectual speech primarily conceives and designates the subject matters. Out of these four, Aristotle indeed says that two are naturally so, the things and the concepts of the mind, that is, the speech that occurs in the intellects, because these are the same and unchangeable among all; but the two are not naturally so, but are established by convention, which are indeed the spoken words, names, and letters, which he does not say to be naturally fixed, because (as has been demonstrated above) not all use the same words or the same elements. And this is what he says:

THEREFORE, THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE IN THE VOICE ARE SIGNS OF THE AFFECTS THAT ARE IN THE SOUL, AND THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE WRITTEN ARE OF THOSE WHICH ARE IN THE VOICE. AND JUST AS NOT ALL LETTERS ARE THE SAME TO ALL, SO ALSO NOT ALL VOICES ARE THE SAME. BUT THOSE THINGS OF WHICH THESE ARE THE FIRST SIGNS, THEY ARE THE SAME AFFECTS OF THE SOUL TO ALL, AND THOSE THINGS OF WHICH THESE ARE LIKENESSES, THEY ARE ALSO THE SAME THINGS. THIS HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF IN THE THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN SAID CONCERNING THE SOUL, FOR IT IS A MATTER OF ANOTHER KIND.

Therefore, when he had previously laid down the name and the word, and had promised to define whatever came after, he briefly prefaces some things about the passions of the soul and their signs, which are indeed the voices.

But why he interposed this in such a way, most commentators neglected to provide reasons, but as far as I know, the reason for this interposition has been explained by three.

Of these, the explanation by Herminus is indeed far removed from the truth of things. For he says that Aristotle interposed talk about the signs of the passions of the soul in order to stress the usefulness of the proposed work. For he was going to discuss voices, which are signs of the passions of the soul, so rightly he prefaces some things about these. For since no one is ignorant of his own soul’s passions, it is most useful also not to be ignorant of the signs along with the passions of the soul. For indeed, they cannot be known except through voices, which are their signs.

Alexander, however, gave another reason for this interposition. Because, he says, words and names are contained in simple interpretation, but speech is made up of words and names put together, and in it truth or falsity is found, and whether any speech is simple or already joint and composite speech, they take their force from those things which they signify (for in these, their order and containment are first, then it overflows into voices): therefore, because the force of the significative arises from those things which are signified, therefore, he first proposes to teach us about those things which the very voices signify.

But Herminus is to be rejected in this place. For he did not explain anything such that it would pertain to the reason for the proposed sentence. Alexander, though passing by with a strictly proximate understanding, indeed touched on the reason, yet did not resolve the main reason for Aristotle’s proposition.

But Porphyry more fully placed before our eyes the cause and origin of this speech, who recounted all the debate and dispute among the ancient philosophers about the power of signification. For he says that it was doubtful in the opinions of the ancient philosophers what exactly was that which was signified by voices. For some thought that things were designated by voices and that the names of these things were those which sounded in voices. But others were contemplating some incorporeal natures, whose significations would be whatever things were signified by voices: somewhat imitating Plato’s incorporeal forms, saying that this very man and this very horse, not this underlying substance of any kind, but that very special man and that very horse, thinking universally and incorporeally, they were establishing certain incorporeal natures, which they thought to come first for signification, and to be able to be joined with other things in significations, so that from these some enunciation or speech could be made. Others, however, thought that senses or imaginations were signified by voices. Therefore, since this was the contention among the predecessors and these things had come all the way to Aristotle’s time, it was necessary that he, who was about to define what a name and a word was, should first proclaim of what things these are the signs. For Aristotle does not think that subject things are signified by names and words, nor indeed senses or even imaginations. In the work “On Justice”, he declares that voices, names and words are not signifiers of senses, saying:

phusei gar euthus dieretai ta te noemata kai ta aisthemata

which can be interpreted in Latin in this way:

For by nature, intellect and senses are separated

So, he believes that sense and understanding are different. But he who says that emotions of the soul are signified by words is not speaking about senses. For senses are bodily passions. So, if he had said that bodily passions are signified by words, then rightly we would understand senses. But because he proposed that names and words signify the emotions of the soul, we should understand that he is not speaking about senses, but about understanding.

But since imagination is also a thing of the soul, someone may doubt whether perhaps he means that the emotions of the soul are imaginations, which the Greeks call phantasias. But he very truly and carefully distinguished these in the books On the Soul, saying:

Fantasia is different from affirmation and negation; for the combination of thoughts is truth and falsehood. But why would the first thoughts differ, not to be imaginations? Or neither these are imaginations, but they are not without imaginations.

which we interpret as:

However, imagination is different from affirmation and negation; for the combination of thoughts is truth and falsehood. But what will the first thoughts dispute, so that they are not imaginations? Or certainly neither these are imaginations but they are not without imaginations.

This sentence demonstrates that imaginations are one thing, and understandings are another; from the combination of understandings, affirmations and negations are made: thus he also doubted whether the first understandings were some kind of imaginations. We call the first understandings those that conceive a simple thing, as if someone were to say “Socrates” only and doubts whether this kind of understanding, which contains neither truth nor falsehood in itself, is an understanding or an imagination of Socrates himself. But he also clearly showed what he seemed about this. For he says or certainly neither these are imaginations but they are not without imaginations – that is what this speech signifies which is “Socrates” or another simple is not indeed an imagination but an understanding, which understanding cannot be made without imagination.

For senses and imagination are as it were the first figures, above which as on some foundation the understanding superimposed rests. For as painters are accustomed to outline a body and lay under where they represent the face with colors, so senses and imagination are naturally underlain in the perception of the soul. For when some thing falls under sense or under thought, first its imagination must necessarily be born, but afterwards a fuller understanding arrives explaining all its parts which had been presupposed confusedly by imagination. Therefore, imagination is something imperfect, but names and words signify not something short but perfect.

Therefore, Aristotle’s opinion is correct: whatever things are dealt with in words and names, these signify not the sense or imaginations but only the quality of understandings. Hence, the Peripatetics, following Aristotle, rightly asserted that there are three speeches, one which can be written with elements, another which can be pronounced by voice, a third which can be connected by thought and one contained by understandings, another by voice, a third by letters. Therefore, since Aristotle thought that what was signified by voices was understanding, and that names and words were significant, he was about to place this in their definitions, he rightly foretold what things would be significant and restrained the reader’s error coming from the various quarrel of the ancients by the manifestation of his opinion. And in this way, nothing is found in him to be superfluous, nothing separated from the continuation of order.

But Porphyry asks why he said: THERE ARE THEREFORE THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE IN VOICE, and not thus: therefore there are voices; and again why he said and those things which are written and did not say: and letters.

He resolves this in the following way. He said there are three kinds of speech among the Peripatetics, one that is written in letters, another that is spoken aloud, and a third that is formed in the mind. Now, if there are three kinds of speech, it is beyond doubt that there are also three parts of speech. Therefore, since a word and a name are primarily parts of speech, there will be certain words and names that are written, others that are spoken, and still others that are silently contemplated in the mind.

So, when he first posits saying,

“First we must establish what a name and what a word is,”

he indicates that there are three kinds of names and words, about which he has primarily posited and which he wishes to define. And since he speaks about these names and words that are spoken aloud, he clarifies this same point even more, saying,

“Therefore, those things that are in speech are marks of the emotions in the soul, and those things that are written are of those things that are in speech,”

as if to say: the words and names that are spoken aloud in speech denote the emotions of the soul, but those words and names that are written preside over the meanings of those words and names that are spoken aloud. For just as the words and names of vocal speech signify the thoughts and understanding of the mind, so too do those words and names that lie in the forms of letters alone signify those words and names that we speak, that is, those that we sound out with our voices.

When he says,

“Therefore, those things that are in speech,”

we must understand him to mean words and names. And again when he says,

“And those things that are written,”

we must again understand him to be referring to words or names. And what he adds: of those things that are in speech, we must understand to mean of those names and words that are brought forth and explained by vocal speech.

If nothing were missing at all, the fullness of the whole sentence would thus be:

“Therefore, those words and names that are in speech are marks of the emotions in the soul, and those words and names that are written are of those words and names that are in speech.”

This is the general understanding, even though what we have added may seem to be lacking. Therefore, the sentence is not disconnected but continues from the first proposition. For, when he decided to define what a word is, what a name is, seeing that the nature of a name and a word is varied, he clearly distinguished about which word and which name he wished to discuss.

So he begins with those names and words that are in speech, discussing what they signify. For he says these designate the emotions of the soul. He also added by what those very words and names that are in speech are signified, namely, by those things that are expressed in the forms of letters. But because not every voice is significant, and words or names are never void of meaning, and not every voice that signifies designates something by position but some naturally, like tears, sighs, and sorrow (even certain voices of other animals naturally show something, as dogs' barking show their anger and other voices of theirs show their flattery), words and names signify by position, they are not just words and names, but significant voices, and not only significant but also ones that by position designate something, not by nature. He did not say,

“Therefore, voices are marks of the emotions in the soul.”

For not every voice is significant, and there are some significant ones that signify not by position but naturally. If he had said it this way, it would not pertain to the properties of words and names. Therefore, he did not want to generally call them voices, but he said only those things that are in speech. For voice is something universal, but names and words are parts. However, every part is in the whole.

Therefore, words and names, since they are within voice, it is rightly said that those things that are in speech, as if he were saying, those things that are contained within voice are indicative of understanding. But this is similar as if he had said, a voice, when it behaves in a certain way, signifies understanding. For (as was said) a name and a word are not just voices. Just as a coin is not just metal stamped with a certain figure, to be called a coin, but also that it has value for some thing; in the same way, words and names are not just voices but are established to indicate certain understandings. For a voice that signifies nothing, as “garalus” is, even though grammarians looking at the form of the voice contend that it is a noun, yet philosophy will not consider it a name, unless it is established to designate some conception of the mind and therefore is able to signify something. Indeed, it is necessary that the name of something be a name; but if some voice signifies nothing, it is the name of nothing; therefore, if it is of nothing, it will not even be said to be a name. Therefore, this kind of voice, that is, a significant one, is not called just a voice, but a word or a name, just as a coin is not called just metal, but properly called a coin, to distinguish it from other metal.

Therefore, this statement by Aristotle, where he says that the things that are in the voice designate nothing else but that voice, which not only is a voice but also, while being a voice, nonetheless possesses some property and some sort of figure of assigned meaning impressed upon it. However, of these things, namely words and names, which exist in the voice in some manner, are indeed those which are significant that are written down, so that what was said about the written down words and names should be understood as being said about what exists in letters. Yet there could also be this reason why he said “and what is written down”: because we call letters and inscribed figures and voices, which are signified by the same formulas, (like ‘a’ itself and the sound of the letter take the name and what in the subject wax describes a voice-signifying shape), desiring to point out, by which words and names those things which are in the voice would be apparent, he didn’t say letters, which could also have been referred to the sounds of the letters, but he said what is written down, to show that he was speaking about those letters that exist in writing, that is those whose figure could be shaped either in wax with a stylus or on parchment with a reed pen. Otherwise, those things which are now in sounds are referred back to those names which are in the voice, since to those sounds names and words are connected.

But Porphyry judged about both explanations, saying: that which he says AND WHAT IS WRITTEN DOWN should not be referred back to the letters but to the words and names that are placed in the inscription of letters. Therefore it remains for us to also add why he didn’t say this: therefore those things which are in voices are notes of understandings, but instead notes of those things which are in the soul are passions. For when the things that are in the voice signify things and understandings, primarily indeed understandings, but the things themselves which that understanding comprehends by secondary signification through the mediation of understandings, the understandings themselves are not without certain passions, which come into the soul from the subjects. For having suffered any property of that thing, which he grasps with understanding, he strives toward its declaration and designation. For when someone understands some thing, he must first in imagination take on the form and property of the thing understood and there happens either a suffering or with some suffering an understanding perception. But this having been placed and located in the seats of the mind, there happens a will of indicating the passion to another, to which a certain act of continuing the understanding immediately comes from the power of inner reason, which indeed he explains and pours out striving by speech the thing that was originally founded in the mind by passion, or, which is truer, by progressing meaning with progressing speech at the same time and matching the motions of signifying speech. Indeed this passion happens like the impression of some figure, but in such a way as it is accustomed to happen in the mind. For naturally a figure proper to the thing itself is inherent in any thing in one way, and in another way its form is transferred to the mind, just like letters or signs of voices are not committed to wax or marble or paper in the same way. And the Stoics talk about imagination transferred from things into the mind, but always with the addition of saying “in the mind”. Therefore, since every passion of the soul seems to be a certain property of a thing, furthermore the voices which designate primarily understandings, afterward strive for the signification of things from which understandings have proceeded, whatever is significant in voices, it designates the passions of the soul. But these passions of souls are generated from the likeness of things. For seeing indeed someone a sphere or a square or any other figure of things, he takes it in the mind’s understanding by a certain power and likeness. For he who has seen a sphere, he considers its likeness in the mind and thinks about it and having suffered in the mind a certain image of that thing whose image he suffers, he recognizes. Indeed every image of a thing, whose image it is, holds a likeness: therefore the mind, when it understands, comprehends the likeness of things. Hence it happens that, when we look upon one body greater, another lesser, after the bodies are subsequently removed from the sense, we remember and know what lesser, what indeed greater body we have seen, which would not happen at all, unless the mind retained the likenesses of things which it once suffered. Therefore since the passions of the soul, which the understanding called certain likenesses of things, Aristotle therefore, when he was going to speak shortly after about the passions of the soul, in a continuous order made a transition to likenesses, since it makes no difference whether he said passions or likenesses. For the same thing indeed in the soul is a passion, but in a thing, a likeness.

And Alexander attempts to explain this passage:

“Therefore, the things that are in speech are marks of those passions in the soul, and the things that are written are of those that are in speech. And just as not all letters are the same for everyone, so also not all speeches are the same.”

He argues, "he has proposed that the things in speech designate the understanding of the mind, and he proves this by another example. For in the same way, the things that are in speech signify the passions of the soul, just as the things that are written designate speech. So, we should understand what he says, ‘and the things that are written’, as if he were saying ‘and also the things that are written of those things that are in speech’. Now, the things that are written, says Alexander, he has shown to be marks of speech, that is, of names and words, from this, that he said ‘and just as not all letters are the same for everyone, so also not all speeches are the same’. For it is a sign that the meaning of speeches themselves is contained in letters, in that where there are various letters and not the same, what is written must also necessarily be various speeches. This is Alexander’s view.

However, Porphyrius, since he proposed three discourses, one contained in letters, a second resounding with words and names, a third that the intellect of the mind unfolds, declares that Aristotle means this, when he says:

“Therefore, the things that are in speech are marks of those passions in the soul.”

He would show this if he had said it this way: “therefore, the things that are in speech, both words and names, are marks of the passions of the soul.” And since he showed whose were the significative speeches, he also taught which signs displayed words or names and therefore added ‘and the things that are written of those things that are in speech’, as if he were saying: “the things that are written, words and names of those things that are in speech, are marks of words and names”. He does not think that the sentence is disjoined or (as Alexander believes) that what he says ‘AND THE THINGS THAT ARE WRITTEN’ should be understood, as if he were saying: “just as the things that are written, that is, the letters signify those things that are in speech, so the things that are in speech are marks of the passions of the soul.” First, because nothing should be added to the simple sense, secondly, because such a brief and necessary sequence of speech should not be cut up, and thirdly, because, if there is a similar significance of letters and speeches, which is of speeches and passions of the soul, it is necessary, just as speeches are exchanged by different letters, so too the passions of the soul are exchanged by different speeches, which does not happen. For the same understanding can be signified by various speeches.

But Alexander, who, as I mentioned above, thought this, tries to prove it with this argument. For he says that even in this there is a similar significance of letters and speeches, because just as letters signify speeches not naturally but by position, so also speeches designate the understanding of the soul not naturally but by some position. But he who previously accepted, as if what Aristotle says ‘AND THE THINGS THAT ARE WRITTEN’ were said, as if he were saying: “just as the things that are written”, whatever seems to add to this sentence, is equally not doubted to err.

Therefore, in our judgement, those who wish to hold more correctly will apply themselves to the sentiments of Porphyrius. Aspasius also very much agrees with the second opinion of Alexander, which we have mentioned above, and he will be blamed by us for the same error as Alexander. But Aristotle thinks that these marks of letters, speeches and passions of the soul are established in two ways: indeed one by position, but also naturally. And this is what he says: “and just as not all letters are the same for everyone, so also not all speeches are the same.” For if letters naturally designated speeches, and the speeches themselves naturally designated the understanding of the mind, all people would use the same letters, and also the same speeches. But since among all people neither the same letters nor the same speeches exist, it is clear that they are not natural.

But here there are two readings. Alexander believes this should be read in the following way:

“But the first notes of these, are the same passions of the soul for all, and of which these are the likenesses, the things are also the same.”

What Aristotle wants is to separate the things that signify by position from those that naturally designate something, he interposes this: the things that signify by position are different, but those that are natural are the same for all. And starting from words he came to letters and first shows that they are not naturally meaningful, saying:

“And just as not all letters are the same for all, so not all words are the same.”

For if letters are proved to be not naturally significant, because they are different among different peoples, it will also likely be that voices do not naturally signify, since individual nations do not converse with each other using the same words. But wishing to teach that the likeness of understandings and of the things subjected is naturally constituted, he says:

“But the first notes of these, are the same passions of the soul for all.”

These, he says, words that are different among diverse nations retain their meaning, which are indeed the passions of the soul, these are the same for all. For it cannot happen that what is understood as ‘man’ among the Romans is understood as ‘stone’ among barbarians. The same way applies to other things.

So the sentence of this kind is the one that says what voices signify does not change among all human nations, as the voices themselves, as he showed above when he said,

“And just as not all letters are the same for all, so not all words are the same,”

are different among many, but what the voices themselves signify is the same for all people and cannot be changed in any way, which are indeed the understandings of things, which since they are naturally so, they cannot be changed. And this is what he says:

“But the first notes of these,”

that is, the voices,

“are the same passions of the soul for all,”

to demonstrate that voices are indeed different, but of which these voices are significant, which are indeed the passions of the soul,

“they are the same for all,”

and in no way, since they are naturally constituted, can they be changed. Nor indeed does he stop at this, to speak of voices and understandings alone, but since he showed that voices and letters are not naturally constituted by proposing that they are not the same for all, he again showed that understandings, which he calls passions of the soul, are natural, because they are the same for all, from which, that is, from understandings, he made a transition to things. For he says,

“Of which these are likenesses, the things are also the same,”

meaning this, that things are also naturally the same for all people: just as the passions of the soul themselves, which are taken from things,

“are the same for all people,”

so also the things themselves, of which the likenesses are the passions of the soul, are the same for all. Therefore they are also natural, just as the likenesses of things are, which are the passions of the soul.

On the other hand, Herminus contradicts this explanation. For he says that it is not true that the understandings, of which the voices are significant, are the same for all people. For what, he says, will be said in equivocation, where one and the same mode of voice signifies many things? But he rather thinks this reading to be true, to be thus:

“But the first notes of these, these are the passions of the soul for all, and of which these are the likenesses, these are the things:”

so that it seems to demonstrate of which voices are significant or of which the passions of the soul are likenesses. And this must be understood simply according to Herminus, that we say this: of which voices are significant, these are the passions of the soul, as if he said: the passions of the soul are what voices signify, and again of which are the likenesses that which are contained in understandings, these are the things, as if he had said: things are what understandings signify.

But Porphyry judiciously and subtly decides on both and more approves of Alexander’s opinion, in this that he says we should not conceal the multiple meanings of equivocation. For the one who speaks pays attention to one thing, namely what he declares by voice understandingly, and one who listens expects again one understanding. But if, when both understand from one name different things, he who said the equivocal name designates more clearly what he wished to signify by that name, he who listens soon accepts it and they agree on one understanding, which again becomes one among those among whom at first the passions of the soul were different because of the equivocation of the name. For it cannot happen, that he who distinguished voices signifying by position from nature by not saying that they are the same for all, did not show those things that he proposed are naturally so to be such, by contending that they are the same for all.

Hence, Alexander needs to be proved either by his own argument or by the authority of Porphyry. But since Aristotle has said,

“The first of these marks, are the same for all the affections of the soul,”

Alexander asks: if the names are for things, what is the reason that Aristotle would say that voices are the marks of the first intellects? For a name is assigned to a thing, as when we say “man”, we certainly signify the intellect, yet the name of the thing is that of a mortal rational animal. Why then are not voices the marks of the first things rather than intellects? But perhaps, he says, this was said because although voices are the names of things, we do not use voices to signify things, but rather those affections of the soul that are innate to us from things. Therefore, for whose significance these very voices are put forth, rightly did he say that they are the marks of the first.

Aspasius is very annoyed at this. For he says: how is it possible, that the same affections of the soul are in all, when there is such a diverse opinion about what is just and good? He thinks that Aristotle was talking about the affections of the soul not about incorporeal things, but only about those things that can be perceived by the senses. Which is completely false. For he who is deceived will not be said to have understood, and perhaps he who thinks that what is good is not the same as what it is but something else, will indeed be said to have had an affection of the soul, but he is not said to have understood. But when Aristotle speaks of similarity, he is speaking of understanding. For it is not possible for one who thinks that what is good is evil to have conceived a similarity of the good in his mind. For he has not understood the underlying thing. But what is just and good are referred to all position and nature. And if he speaks of what is just and good, as of what is called civil law or civil injustice, rightly these are not the same affections of the soul since civil law and civil good are by position, not by nature. But the natural good and the just are the same among all nations. And the same about God: although his worship may be diverse, the understanding of a certain most eminent nature is the same.

Therefore, a brief recapitulation is necessary from the beginning. For it has reached to the point of speech: for what he first said was a verb, what a name, these are the smallest parts of speech; but what about affirmation and negation, now he speaks of composite speech made up of verbs and names, which are again the same parts of an enunciation.

And after the proposition of the enunciation, he proposed to talk about speech, of which the enunciation itself is also a part. And since (as has been said) speech is threefold, which is in writing, which is in voice, which is in the intellects, who was going to define a verb and a name and put them as significative, says first what the words and names are significative of, and begins indeed with those names and words which are in the voice saying,

“Therefore, those things which are in the voice”

and shows what they are significative of, adding

“The marks of the affections which are in the soul.”

Again, he declares that those words and names which are in the voice are the significative words and names which are established in writing, saying

“And those which are written, of those which are in the voice.”

And since these four things are certain: letters, voices, intellects, things, of which letters and voices are by position, but by nature things and intellects, he demonstrated that voices are not naturally but by position through this when he says they are not the same for everyone but various, as is

“And just as not all letters are the same, so too the voices are not the same.”

But to demonstrate that intellects and things are naturally, he says that the same intellects are among all, of which voices would be significative, and again that the same things are among all, of whose likenesses would be the affections of the soul, as is

“But the first of these marks, namely those which are in the voice, are the same for all the affections of the soul and of these similarities, the things are also the same.”

He said affections of the soul, because it has been shown elsewhere that every voice of an animal is uttered either from an affection of the soul or because of an affection. But he called the similarity an affection of the soul, because according to Aristotle, to understand is nothing else but to receive the property and imagination of any subject thing in the consideration of the soul itself, about which affections of the soul he remembers to have disputed more diligently in his books on the soul.

But since it has been demonstrated that words, names, and speech are primarily significant of understandings, whatever significance is in speech comes from understandings. Therefore, anyone who will properly debate about words should first examine understandings a little. Therefore, what he above called passions of the soul and likenesses, he now more openly calls understanding, saying:

However, as in the soul, understanding sometimes exists without truth or falsehood, but at other times it is necessary that one of these be present, so too in speech; for truth and falsehood exist in relation to composition and division. Therefore, the names themselves and the words are similar to understanding without composition or division, like ‘man’ or ‘white’, when nothing is added, for neither truth nor falsehood yet exists. The sign of this is as follows: for ‘goat stag’ signifies something but not yet truth or falsehood, unless ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is added, either simply or according to time.

Since a name and a word and all meaningful speech are passions of the soul, undoubtedly, the property of signification arises from these things that they designate in these words. But here indeed is the whole and continuous Aristotelian order of the sentence: since, he says, those things first are signified by words which we revolve in the mind and thought, of understandings we indeed consider some to be simple and without a statement of true or false, such as when the property of a man is suggested to us by silent imagination (for from this simplicity of understanding neither truth arises nor recognition of falsehood), but there are certain understandings that are composite and joined in which is now a certain examination of truth or falsehood, such as when to any simple perception of the mind something else is attached which constitutes it to be something or not to be something, as if ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ or ‘to be white’ or ‘not to be white’ is attached to the understanding of a man (for in this way, thinkable sentences become participants of truth or falsehood: ‘a man is’, ‘a man is not’, ‘a man is white’, ‘a man is not white’, of which indeed ‘a man is’ or ‘a man is white’ is said by composition. For the former connects ‘to be’ and ‘a man’, the latter connects ‘a man’ and ‘white’ by a composite predication of understanding): but if I add something to the understanding of a man, so that ‘a man is’ or ‘is not’ or ‘is white’ or something similar, then truth or falsehood arises in this thought: therefore, he says, just as sometimes there are certain simple understandings, which lack truth and falsehood, so too there are certain ones in which one of these is found, so also in speech. For those words which declare simple understandings, they themselves are also separated from falsehood and truth, but those which signify such understandings in which either truth or falsehood has already been established, it is necessary that one of these also be found in them. For if someone only says this ‘MAN’ or ‘WHITE’ or even ‘GOAT STAG’, although these signify something, since they signify a simple understanding, it is clear they lack all property of truth or falsehood. And the whole sentence indeed has itself in this way.

However, it must be more carefully observed what it is that he says: “for truth and falsehood exist in relation to composition and division”; what also what was said: “therefore, the names themselves and the words are similar to understanding without composition or division”; that also; why he used a composite name or why he even used the example of a non-subsistent thing, when he said “for ‘goat stag’ signifies something.” And what was said “either simply or according to time” should not be overlooked.

And indeed the first thing to be said is about what he says: “for truth and falsehood exist in relation to composition and division.” For it is inquired, whether all truth is around composition and division, or some is, and some certainly is not. Also, whether in all composition or division truth and falsehood is established, or this is not generally but in a certain part of composition or division truth and falsehood revolves. For in opinions truth is, as often as imagination is taken from the subject thing or even as often as it happens, that the understanding receives imagination as the thing has itself; but falsehood is as often as either not from the subject or not as the thing has itself, imagination is subjected to understanding.

But still, in truth and falsity, nothing indeed is found other than a certain attitude of the opinion towards the subject matter. By what attitude and how the imagination relates to the subject matter, this alone is seen in this truth or falsity. No one would call this attitude a composition. But in division, not even an imagined mode can be understood. We should also consider whether there is any composition or division in these things, which are said to be true according to their substance, as is the true pleasure of living well, as is the false pleasure of warring.

We should also consider the fact that whatever is understood in the greatest of all gods is not understood as occurring incidentally, but substantially. Indeed, we believe that the things that are good about him do not occur incidentally. But if we believe in god substantially, and no one would call god false, and nothing incidentally can happen in him, god himself must be called the truth. Where then is the composition or division in these things which are naturally simple and are joined to no comparison of any kind? Therefore, not all truth and falsity consists around composition and division, but only those which happen in the multitude of understandings and in the utterance of speech. For in the attitude itself of the imagination and thing, there is no composition, but in the conjunction of understandings, composition is made. For when I say:

Socrates walks

This itself, that I conceived him to be walking, is not a composition; but in the progression of understandings, I join the act of walking with Socrates, and a composition has been made. If I have expressed this in speech, again, the same composition is present, and the force of truth and falsity appears around it.

Therefore, in these alone compositions truth and falsehood is found, about which the entire current question is, namely in the noun and verb, in negation and affirmation and enunciation and speech. These compositions, receiving the nature of truth and falsehood from understandings, preserve it in the utterance of meaning. I will speak more clearly a little later about the division that pertains to negation and about the composition that pertains to affirmation.

Now we must see whether it is true that truth or falsehood arises around every composition and around every division, which is completely false. For who would say that this kind of conjunction of names:

both Socrates and Plato

or if these names are divided from each other

neither Socrates nor Plato

holds any truth or false significance? Therefore, we must confess that not around every division or every composition, namely that which is in speech, does falsehood or truth subsist. But it is very true that all truth and falsehood in speech arises in composition and division, yet not every composition or division of speech retains true or false. Therefore, if he had said this way: truth and falsehood are around every composition or division, he would be lying. But since he simply said: truth and falsehood are around composition and division, he is thought to have spoken most truthfully and subtly. For those names which are so-called simple, that they can somehow signify truth or falsehood, are such as to retain a certain composition within themselves and within their meaning, as if someone says:

I read

for to say “I read” is like saying “I myself read”. But this is a composition.

Or whenever one person answers another with just a single sentence in response to a question, it also seems that simple speech can confirm or deny truth. Which is entirely false. For the answer of the listener is appended to the whole order of the preceding assertion: like if one were to ask whether the world is a living being, and the other were to answer, ‘it is,’ this single word seems to contain truth or falsehood, but incorrectly so. For it is not a single assertion but to the power of this response itself, it appears to one as if he were saying, “The world is a living being.” As to when he says “that the names themselves and words are similar to understanding without composition or division,” he points out what he has already said above, that those things which are in speech are notes of the soul’s passions. And if they are notes, just as the letters of words bear in themselves likeness, so do the voices of understandings.

And since it has been stated why he spoke of the likeness of words and names, and of the soul’s passions, and why he also proposed that around composition and division, falsehood and truth exist, it must be stated what composition or division itself is, in which truth and falsity are found. For since he considers simple declarative speech, as he later clarifies himself in division saying, “However, there is a first declarative speech, affirmation, then negation,” he now wants to designate that composition which either constitutes the substance of something or joins something according to existence. For when I say:

Socrates is

I apply this very existence to Socrates and I establish his substance to be. But if I were to say:

Socrates is a philosopher

I have composed philosophy and Socrates according to existence, or if I say Socrates walks, it is of this kind as if I were to say Socrates walking is. Therefore, whenever there is this kind of composition, which according to existence either establishes a verb or substance or joins things, it is called an affirmation and in it, the nature of truth and falsehood is seen. And since every denial is established with respect to predication (for the negation of this affirmation, which is “Socrates is,” is not the one that says “Not Socrates is” but the one that pronounces “Socrates is not” and the negation is applied to that which is said to exist, to declare that he is not that which was previously said to be): therefore, since that which in affirmation according to existence has been either established or conjoined, the negation added to that separates, or the very establishment of substance, or even the conjunction made by that which is said to be something, is called division. For when I say:

Socrates is not

I have separated existence from Socrates, and when I say:

Socrates is not a philosopher

I have separated Socrates from that which is to be a philosopher, which separation, which pertains to negation, he called division.

Therefore, it is clear that if the intellect is simple in the passions of the soul, while it does not yet retain any nature of truth or falsehood, its expression is also separate from both. But when a combination or division has been made according to existence in intellects, in which truth and falsehood are principally produced, since voices take on meaning from intellects, it is necessary for them to be true or false according to the quality of the intellects. The novelty of the example and exquisite subtlety have great force. To demonstrate that a single name is neither true nor false, he set up such a name, which was indeed composite, but no substance of it was found. So if a single name could retain truth or falsehood, such a name would be “goatstag” (hircocervus), since there is no substance at all in things, it signifies something false but does not denote any falsehood. For unless a goatstag is said to be or not to be, even though it does not exist in itself, only when spoken there is nothing false or true about it in that speech. Therefore, to demonstrate the force of a simple name, which lacks all truth and lie, he set such a name in the example, which has no real thing subjected to it. But if a single name could signify something true or false, the name that designates that thing, which does not exist in reality, would be entirely false. But it is not: therefore, no truth or falsehood will ever be found in a simple name. Nor was it of small concern not to set up a name that would signify nothing at all but one that, while signifying something, could not be true or false, so that it did not seem to be devoid of truth and falsehood because it signified nothing but because it was simply spoken. Although in the same case he also accomplishes this, to show not only is a simple name very alien to truth and lie but also compound names, if they do not have some composition according to existence or non-existence (as was said earlier), they cannot signify something true or false: as if he were saying: not only does a simple name signify nothing true or false apart from some composition, but also compound names lack both (as he himself has already said) unless either existence or non-existence is added to them, “either simply or according to time”.

Indeed, he added this because in some cases propositions are made in such a way that what is said about them is proposed according to substance, but in others this very existence that is added does not signify substance but a certain presence. For when we say God exists, we do not say he exists now but only in substance, so this refers more to the immutability of the substance than to some time. But if we say:

The day exists

It pertains not to any substance of the day but only to the constitution of time. For this is what “exists” signifies, as if we were to say:

It is now

Therefore, when we say “to be” in such a way as to designate substance, we add “simply exists”, but when we do it in such a way as to signify something present, “according to time”.

This is one explanation we have given. But there is another like this: “to be something” is said in two ways: either simply or according to time. Simply indeed according to the present time, as if someone were to say “a goatstag exists”. But the present time that is said is not time but a boundary of times: for it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, whoever uses “to be” in this speech according to the present, uses it simply, but whoever inserts either the past or the future, they do not simply but already run into the time itself. For as has been said, two times are put forward: past and future. So if someone says it simply when naming the present, when they have said either the past or the future, they use the proposition according to time.

There is also a third explanation like this, that sometimes we use time in such a way that we say it indefinitely: as if someone were to say:

A goatstag exists
A goatstag did exist
A goatstag will exist

This is said indefinitely and simply. But if someone adds:

It exists now

or:

It existed yesterday

or:

It will exist tomorrow

to this very existence that is simply said, they add time.

Hence, according to one of these three expositions, we should understand what he said:

If either existence or non-existence is not added, then either simply or according to time.

But to what he had previously proposed,

“How sometimes there is understanding in the soul without true or false”

he gave as if a consequence that the names themselves and the verbs are similar to simple understandings, like ‘man’ or ‘white’. But to what he says,

“One of these two must now be in it”

he gave nothing in the interim but it will be thought that he filled it with what he said:

“But it is not yet true or false, if either existence or non-existence is not added.”

For this is a certain composition of understandings, in which one of these two must now be in it when either existence or non-existence is added in speech.

Therefore, because he proposed about the noun and the verb and showed as briefly as he could the consequences of voices, letters, understandings and things by the highest reason, to what he first proposed saying:

“First we must establish what a noun is and what a verb is”

he returns, I say, to define these things he had promised.

On Interpretation, Book 2

For defining a noun, he posited it thus:

“A noun, then, is a significant sound, conventional and without time, none of whose parts is significant separately.”

Every definition is formed by the constitution of the genus, but perfected by the composition of differences. For if we gather differences to the proposed genus and fit them to one species we wish to define, until that collection suits only one species, there is nothing that one would desire further to make a definition: as if someone were to define man himself, he must join two differences to his genus which is animal, namely rational and mortal, and he will make an order of this kind: rational mortal animal; which definition, if it is referred to man, is full of the description of reason and substance.

Therefore Aristotle, wishing to define what a noun is, first took its genus saying that a noun is a sound, so as to separate this, what we call a noun, from others, which are not sounds but only noises.

For a noise differs from a sound: a noise is a striking of the air perceptible to sense, but a sound is a breath going out through certain parts of the throat, which are called the arteries, which is formed by some impression of the tongue. And a sound indeed is only of animals, but a noise is also sometimes completed by the clashing of inanimate bodies. Therefore, because he showed that a noun is a sound, he separated and distributed this part of speech from others which are not sounds but only noises. And indeed, he took the sound of a noun as if it were a genus. For it has something else in place of a species different from a noun, which is a verb, and it also has certain utterances which signify nothing in any way, like articulated sounds, whose meaning cannot be found in themselves, such as “scindapsos”.

Therefore, he again puts other differences to this genus, which separated a noun as a sound from other noises, just as these differences divide and discern a noun from other species placed under a sound. For he added that a noun is a significant sound, from these sounds, I say, he separated a noun which signifies nothing at all, like syllables. For syllables, while the whole noun is made up from them, they themselves signify nothing at all. There are also certain sounds composed from letters and syllables, which have no meaning, like “Blityri”.

Therefore, because there seemed to be certain sounds which lacked significance, a noun, which is a sound and always presents itself as the cause of some designation, had to be defined no other way unless it separated it from non-significant sounds. Therefore, he says a noun is a significant sound, so that by sound it was separated from other noises, but by added meaning it was separated from those things which are under sound signifying nothing.

But this [argument] does not yet suffice for the whole definition, for not only is a noun a significant voice, but there are certain voices that signify indeed, but are not nouns, such as those uttered by us in certain emotional states, such as when someone groans or lets out a cry in pain. For the former is a sign of mental pain, the latter of physical pain. And although these are voices and signify a certain passion of either the mind or body, no one would call a groan or a cry a noun. There are also certain voices of mute animals that signify: for instance, the barking of dogs signifies the anger of dogs, another more gentle voice signifies certain flatteries.

Therefore, a distinguishing characteristic had to be added to separate a noun from all these things which were indeed voices and signified but were not bound by the term ‘noun’. What then did he add? He added that a noun is a significant voice not simply, but by agreement. It is ‘by agreement’, that which is adapted according to a certain position and agreement of the one who puts it in place. For no noun is naturally established, nor is it ever, as the underlying thing is by nature, also named by a naturally arising term, but the human race, which both thrives by reason and speech, has set up names and, combining them with whatever letters and syllables it wished, gave them to the individual substances of the underlying things.

This is proven by the fact that, if names were natural, they would be the same among all peoples: as the senses, since they are natural, are the same among all peoples. For all peoples see with no other than their eyes alone, hear with their ears, smell with their noses, take taste with their mouth, indicate hot or cold, smooth or rough with touch. And these things are such that they seem the same among all peoples (as has been said). But the very things that are perceived, since they are naturally constituted, do not change. For sweetness and bitterness, white and black, and whatever else we perceive with the five senses, are the same among all people. For what is sweet in taste to the Italians does not appear bitter to the Persians, nor what appears white to our eyes is black to the Indians, unless perhaps a sense is changed by some illness, but this is irrelevant to nature. Therefore, since these things are natural, they remain the same among all peoples. If, therefore, names were also seen to be natural, they would be the same among all peoples and would not undergo any change: but now the very man is called by one term by the Latins, by another by the Greeks, and by diverse terms by the barbarian peoples. This disagreement in the setting of names is a sign that names were not naturally, but according to the will and agreement of the setters, composed for things.

The same is also shown, because often the names of individual people are changed. For whom we now call Plato, was formerly called Aristocles, and who is now called Theophrastus, was formerly called Tyrtamus by his parents before they named him Aristotle. Also, when many names are added to one thing in the same language, it is shown that that thing is called not by natural but by given names. For if each thing were called by natural names, we would denote one thing with only one name. For what is the point, if names are natural, for there to be multiple terms of one thing, which converge on one designation and demonstration? For we say sword, blade, and point, and these three run towards one underlying substance.

Therefore, it has been shown that names are by agreement, that is, according to the agreement of the ones who place them, as if he were saying that a name is indeed a voice and significant but not naturally significant but according to the agreement and will of the one who places it, namely separating this from those voices which naturally designate, such as these or those which we utter in passions and emotional states or which mute animals try to emit.

But the above-mentioned difference does not yet establish the full form and definition of a noun. For it is common to a verb with a noun that it is a designating voice and by agreement, but with the added difference which is WITHOUT TIME, he distinguished a noun from a verb. For no noun signifies time. For it is of a verb, when either a passion is signified or an action, to also carry with it some force of time, by which that which is said to either do or suffer is produced. For when I say:

Socrates

it is of no time; but when:

I am reading

or:

I have read

or:

I will read

it does not lack time. Therefore, when it is added to a noun that it is said to be without time, a noun is separated from a verb.

Indeed, let no one think that we believe that no noun signifies time. For there are nouns, which demonstrate time by signification: for instance when I say today or tomorrow, they are names of time. But we are saying that with the same noun, time is not signified. For it is one thing to signify time, another to co-signify it. For a verb also signifies time in some particular way: as when it demonstrates the mode of either the agent or the patient, the passion or action itself is not produced without time. Hence we do not say that a noun does not signify time but that the signification of time does not follow from a noun.

However, there remains only one difference, which, if added to the previous ones, will almost fully shape the definition of a noun. This difference separates a noun from a phrase. For there are certainly some phrases that, while being voices and significant and by agreement, since they are formed from nouns, are nevertheless without time, as when I say:

Socrates and Plato

For this phrase, being formed from nouns, is indeed not a noun, but it is a voice significant by agreement and devoid of time. Therefore, to separate a noun from a phrase of this kind, he added this difference, which is “that none of its parts is significative separately”. For a phrase, since it is formed from verbs and nouns, and it is clear that verbs or nouns are significative, there is no doubt that the parts of a phrase also signify something. But a part of a noun, since it is simple, signifies nothing at all. But since every phrase and every noun and verb draw their significative force from the subjects of understanding, it sometimes happens that one noun signifies many understandings.

Therefore, it will also happen that not just a simple noun signifies only one passion and understanding of the mind. For when I say ‘suburban’, it signifies an imagination, but so that separated from the whole name, it signifies nothing when the name itself is referred to: as in what we say ‘equiferous’ (‘horse-bearing’), ‘ferous’ indeed wants to signify something but if it is separated from the whole composition, it signifies absolutely nothing, namely in that name in which joined with the particle ‘equi’ it co-signifies ‘equiferous’. For this whole composition is designative of one understanding. Therefore, ‘ferous’ indeed signifies in a phrase (for ‘equus ferus’ (‘wild horse’) is a phrase that retains two understandings), but in a noun it signifies nothing, since this that we say ‘equiferous’ is designative of one understanding.

But perhaps ‘ferus’ (wild) with the part with which it is joined signifies something together, but when separated, it signifies nothing. This is therefore what he says:

But indeed, not in the same way as in simple names, does this also hold in compound ones. For in those, no part signifies anything; but in these, they do wish to signify something but of none when separated, as in ‘equiferus’ (horseman), ‘ferus’ (wild).

For a simple name neither has any imagination of parts of signification, but a compound name indeed has such parts that they seem to wish to signify something but signify together rather than signify anything separately. So, when it is added to a name, that its parts signify nothing when separated, the name is separated from speech.

After explaining what the addition “whose no part is significant when separated” in the definition of a name would mean (this namely by which a name is separated from speech), he also discusses why what was said according to agreement was added. For since no naming is naturally but every name indicates by placement, therefore it was said according to agreement. For what pleased him who first gave names to things, this is indicated by these words. Now, who can confirm that names are naturally, whose variety among all nations is so diverse? Nor indeed is it said that no voice naturally indicates something but that names do not signify naturally but by placement. Some have this as the sounds of wild and mute animals, whose voice indeed signifies something (like the neighing of a horse indicates the search for a habitual horse, the barking of barking dogs shows anger, and other such things) but when the voices of mute animals signify by their own nature, they are written with none of the elements' formulas.

But a name, even though it is subject to elements, before it is set for some signification of the subject thing, signifies nothing by itself, as when we say ‘scindapsos’ or ‘hereceddy’. These indeed signify nothing by themselves but if they are set for the signification of some subject thing, as it is said either man ‘scindapsos’ or stone ‘hereceddy’, then this that signifies nothing by itself will signify by placement and according to some agreement of the person setting.

So then, a name is significant, when (as he himself says) it becomes a note. But it becomes a note, when according to the agreement of the person setting, the word which naturally indicated nothing is given for the signification of the subject thing. For this is what he says “it becomes”. For if names signified naturally, Aristotle would never say of these “it becomes a note”. For then it would not become a note but would be one. Therefore, since names are significant according to agreement, but the illiterate sounds of wild animals naturally, therefore their voices are not said to be names.

But we say universally: some of all voices are those that can be inscribed with letters, but some indeed that cannot. And again, of those that either are inscribed or least of all, some signify, but some indeed nothing. Moreover, some of all designate according to agreement, but some naturally. Therefore, a name is according to agreement: for by placement it has become a note of the subject thing. For nothing of names is that which signifies naturally. For a name does not inform signification but signification is according to agreement. For also illiterate sounds signify, as are those of wild animals, which he called sounds for this reason, because there are some mute animals that have no voice at all but only make a certain noise. For some fish do not sound by voice but by gills and (as Porphyry asserts) a cicada sends a sound through its chest, of all of which there is no name. But this is said, not because there is no name for these voices that animals make, but because they do not use them as if they were names. For even if the voice is illiterate and signifies by nature a dog’s bark, it is still called a bark, and a lion’s roar, and a bull’s moo. These are the names of the voices themselves which are made by mute animals. But we do not say this because there is no name for them but because none of these sounds is such that it could be a name that is, that wild animals might converse with each other according to these as if using names. For they do have a signification but (as it has been said) it is natural, but a name is according to agreement.

‘Not man’ indeed is not a name. But indeed neither is a name placed, by which it should be called. For neither is it speech or denial but it is an infinite name.

Previously, he separated everything outside of the term from the term by the above mentioned additions. Now, however, since there are some things that fall under the definition of the term, yet appear to differ from the term, he discusses these, so that it would be expedient to see what the complete term appears to be. For what we say ‘not man’ or ‘not horse’ is indeed not a statement. For every statement is either composed of terms and verbs, or of just two or more verbs, or of terms only. But in that which is ‘not man’ there is only one term, which is called ‘man’, and that which is ‘not’ is neither a term nor a verb. Therefore, it is neither from two verbs nor from a verb and a term. For there is no verb in it.

Therefore, what we say ‘not man’ is not a statement. But now it is superfluous to show that it is not a verb, since in verbs times are always found, but in this no one will find any time at all. But neither is it a negation. For every negation is a statement, but ‘not man’ since it is not a statement, it cannot be a negation either. Moreover, every negation is either true or false, but ‘not man’ is neither true nor false. For its sense is not complete: therefore it is also not called a negation for this reason. But who would say it is a term, when every term, whether it is proper or common, signifies definitively? For when I say:

Cicero

I have named one person and one substance, and when I say:

Man

which is a common term, I have signified a definite substance. But when I say:

Not man

I indeed signify something, that which is not man but this is infinite.

For it can signify a dog, and a horse, and a stone, and whoever is not a man. And it is equally said either in that which is or in that which is not. For if anyone says about Scylla that which is not, ‘not man’, it signifies something which does not remain in substance and in the nature of things. But if anyone says either about a stone or about wood or about other things that are, ‘not man’, it still signifies something and always apart from the term-like signification of this kind of term. For if ‘man’ is removed, whatever apart from man is, this signifies ‘not man’, which differs greatly from the term. For every term (as was said) definitely signifies that which is named and is not similarly said both of that which is and that which is not. But this kind of word is both descriptive and at will and timeless and (as was said) its parts signify nothing outside of it.

Therefore, among the ancients the opinion was doubtful, whether they should call this a term, or they should subject this to the definition of a term with some addition. And those who separated this from the term, closed the term with a definition by saying: a term is a voice descriptive at will and timeless of a circumscribed signification, whose parts signify nothing outside of it, so that since ‘not man’ does not signify a circumscribed thing, it would be separated from the term.

But others did not say it in the same way but indeed said it was a term but not absolutely. For they thought it could be placed under the term with some addition in this way, as just as ‘dead man’ is not called simply ‘man’ but ‘dead man’, so also this term, which signifies nothing definite, would not be called simply a term but an indefinite term.

Aristotle is the author of this opinion, who says he discovered this term for it. For he says: “But indeed, no term has been placed, by which that must be called”, saying: that which we call ‘not man’, by what term it should be called, antiquity did not name. And up to Aristotle no one knew what that which was called ‘not man’ was but he placed a term for this speech saying: “but let it be an indefinite term”, not simply a term, since it signifies with no circumscription but an indefinite term, since it signifies many and those infinite things.

But this happens not only to words of this kind, that they cannot be simply placed under the term but there are some others which indeed have all of the term and signify definitively but by some other discrepancy they cannot simply be called terms, as are oblique cases when we say:

Of Cato
To Cato
Cato

and others. For their discrepancy is from the term, for the straight term, when it is joined with is or is not, makes an affirmation: as if someone says:

Socrates is

this is either true or false. For if it was said while Socrates was alive, it would be true, but when dead it is false: therefore it is an affirmation. But if someone says:

Socrates is not

he will again make a negation and in it too truth and falseness are found. Therefore, every straight term joined with is or is not, makes a statement. But these oblique cases joined with is or is not in no way complete a statement.

For a statement is the complete understanding of speech into which truth or falseness falls. If, therefore, someone says:

Of Cato is

it is not yet a full sentence. For what ‘of Cato’ is, is not said. And in the same way ‘to Cato is’ or ‘Cato is’.

In this matter then, because ‘is’ and ‘is not’ do not complete a statement when joined with them, there is a certain discrepancy with the noun, even though they are joined to every noun by definition. Indeed, there is a large discrepancy in that a nominative noun makes a complete sentence when ‘is’ is joined to it, whereas the oblique cases make an incomplete one. What has been said about the oblique cases not making a complete sentence when ‘is’ is joined to them, we do not say because the oblique cases join with no verb in such a way as to complete a statement that needs nothing. For when I say:

Socrates is penitent

it is a statement. But not with every verb, but only with ‘is’ or ‘is not’, do these cases joined make a complete statement in no way. And this is what he means when he says: “The cases of Cato, or to Cato, and any such things are not nouns but cases of nouns.” Hence they also seem to diverge. For these are not called nouns. For those are more properly called nouns which are first posited, that is, which show something. For the genitive case does not show something, but of something, and the dative to something, and the rest in the same way. The nominative case, however, which is first, shows the thing, as if someone were to say Socrates, and therefore it is called nominative, because it alone holds the force of the noun and is the noun.

And it is likely that the one who first imposed names on things spoke thus: let this be called a man, and again, let this be called a stone. But later use has made it so that the name initially posited was derived into other cases. Furthermore, every case is a case of some noun. Therefore, unless there is a noun of which it is a case, it cannot rightly be called a case of a noun. But every case is an inflection. However, the genitive, dative, and the rest are inflections of the nominative: therefore, they will be cases of the nominative. But every case which is according to a noun is a case of the noun. Therefore, the nominative is a noun. But being a case of something is different from being that very thing of which it is a case. Therefore, a case of a noun is not a noun.

As for what he added: “However, its reasoning is the same in all other cases,” he is saying: the reasoning and definition of the oblique case and of the noun is the same in all other things (for they are voices and are significant and according to agreement and timeless and they designate circumscribedly) but (as he himself says) “It differs in that when it is joined with ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be’ it is neither true nor false,” which is completed by the nominative noun without any doubt, as when it is joined with ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be’ it makes true or false. This he signified by this which he said: “However, a noun always,” it should be understood, of course, “makes true and false when it is joined with ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be’.” And he gives an example of these: “Cato is or is not.” In these (as he himself says) nothing is said to be either true or false.

Therefore, the complete definition of a noun is of this sort: a noun is a voice signifying according to agreement, timeless, signifying circumscribedly, whose parts signify nothing extra, and when it is joined with ‘is’ or ‘was’ or ‘will be’ it completes a statement that needs nothing, establishing understanding and a statement.

Since we have therefore cleared up the noun, let us come to the definition of the verb.

On Interpretation, Book 3

“But a word is that which signifies time, none of its parts signifies anything separately, and it is always a note of those things spoken of another.”

The full definition of a word is indeed such: a word is a sound significant by agreement, which signifies time, none of its parts designates anything separately. But because it is common for it to be with a noun as a sound and as a sign and according to agreement, it therefore keeps silent about these things.

However, he started from those things which are unique to the word: it is indeed characteristic of a word to signify time, which separates it from the definition of a noun. Indeed, every word retains the connotation of time, not the denotation. For nouns denote time, but a word, while it principally signifies actions and passions, also brings along the force of time with these actions and passions, as in the phrase ‘I read.’ This word indeed primarily demonstrates some action, but with that very signification of action it also introduces the present time. And therefore, he did not say a word denotes time but connotes. For the word does not primarily designate time (for that is the task of a noun), but with the other things that it primarily signifies, it introduces and interweaves the force of time as well.

Therefore, since both a noun and a word are significant sounds and by agreement, by adding to the word that which signifies time, it is separated from the noun. As has often been said, a noun can denote time, but a word can connote time. And just as he added in the definition of a noun that no part of a noun signifies anything separate from the total composition of the noun because of sentences that would be composed of nouns, such as:

Both Plato and Socrates

so too, he added in the word that no part outside of the word signifies anything separate because of those sentences that words make up, like ‘both walking and running.’ For this sentence is composed of words and individual words both in this sentence and apart from it signify by themselves. But not at all in the word.

And just as in the noun, no part of the noun signifies anything separate, so too, no part of a word designates anything separate. He says, however, that a word is always a note of those things spoken of another, which is as if he were saying nothing else but accidents are signified by words. Indeed, every word designates some accident. When I say:

Running

it is indeed an accident, but it is not said in such a way that it is said to exist or not exist in something. But if I were to say:

He runs

then by proposing the accident itself in someone’s action, I signify it exists in someone. And since what we say, “He runs,” cannot exist apart from a subject (for it cannot be said apart from the one who runs), therefore, it is said every word is significant of those things which are spoken of another, so that the word that is ‘he runs’ signifies something of that sort that is spoken of another, that is, of the one running.

Having thus explained, he illuminated his statement that a verb signifies time using examples. For he said, “I say that it signifies time, as ‘course’ is indeed a noun, ‘runs’ however, is a verb, for it signifies being now.” He most clearly demonstrated the distinction between a verb and a noun by placing examples of verbs and nouns. Indeed, because ‘course’ is an accident and is named as such to be a noun, it does not signify time, but ‘runs’ – the same accident placed in a verb – signifies the present time. And this verb seems to be different from the noun in that it signifies time, while the noun is predicated beyond any consignification of time.

But after he showed that a verb signifies time, he recalled and showed how it is predicated, a point he had made earlier, that a verb always predicates of another. For he said, “And the note is always of those things which are said of another, such as those things which are of the subject or in the subject,” thereby saying: a verb signifies something, such that what it signifies is predicated of another, but as an accident. For every accident is both in the subject and is predicated of its underlying substance. For when I say “He runs,” I predicate this of a man, if it so happens, namely of the subject and the running itself is in the man, hence the verb ‘runs’ is inflected. Therefore, when he says that it is always the note of a verb to predicate things of another, he shows this: a verb always signifies accidents, because he says that those things are shown by the signification of the verb which would either be in the subject or would be said of the subject. Or certainly, for there to be another understanding, since he tends to use indifferently “is predicated of the subject,” as if he were saying “is in the subject,” and often when he says something “is predicated of the subject” he means “is in the subject.” When he wished to show that the signification of accidents is contained in verbs, he said that those things “which are of the subject” are always designated by verbs.

But since this seemed obscure, he made it clear by adding “or in the subject,” so that he might explain what he had earlier said “of the subject” when he added “or in the subject,” as if he were saying: a verb is indeed always the note of those things which are predicated of another subject but lest this perhaps seems obscure to someone, I say that what is “of the subject” is to be “in the subject.”

Or this explanation is better, if we believe he said something similar, as if he said: every verb indeed signifies an accident but in such a way that what it signifies is either particular or universal, so that what he says “of the subject” we should refer to universality, what “in the subject” to particularity alone. For when I say “it is moved,” it is indeed a verb and an accident but universal. For there are many species of motion, as a course is placed under motion. Therefore, if a course is to be defined, we predicate motion of the course. As a result, motion is a kind of genus of course and therefore motion will be predicated of course as of the subject, but the course itself, since it does not have other species, is only in the subject, that is, in the runner. But motion, although it itself is in the subject, is nevertheless predicated of the subject.

Therefore, he says that it is the note of a verb to predicate things of another and he added, as “of those things which are of the subject or in the subject.” He says this: verbs indeed signify the power of accidents but of those which are either universal or particular, so when I say “I am moved,” it is something universal and is said of the subject, as of the course, but when I say “I run,” it is particular and since it is not said of the subject, it is only in the subject.

“I do not, however, call ‘does not run’ and ‘does not toil’ verbs. They indeed signify time and always are of something, but no name has been given to this difference; but let it be called an infinite verb, because it is in a similar way in whatever is or is not.”

Just as he said in the case of the noun that ‘not man’ is not a noun, because it would apply to many others, which are not men, and because what it negates leaves nothing defined in the same predication (for what is ‘not a man’ can be a centaur, can be a horse and others which either are or are not and therefore it is called an infinite noun): so also even in the case of the verb that is “does not run” or “does not toil” it too is infinite, because it is true not only of that which is but can also be predicated of that which is not. For I can say:

“A man does not run”

and what I affirm, “does not run,” I predicate of that thing which is, that is of a man, I can again say:

“Scylla does not run”

but Scylla does not exist: therefore, what I say “does not run” is valid both of that which is and can be predicated of that which is not.

But perhaps someone might contend that this is also in finite verbs. For I can say:

“A horse runs”
“A hippocentaur runs”

and of that thing namely which is and of that which is not…

[Smith notes: “There appears to be a lacuna at this point where the discussion moves on to the next section of text (16b16-18). The transition is found in the first edition (I 60-1) though it addes little to what we have here”]

...and the past, which indeed is future before the present time, is left behind in retrospect. And he used a new and wondrous expression: that which it comprises. And we, as far as Latin could manage, translated this with great and lengthy labor, but it was stated more clearly in the Greek speech. It is thus in the phrase “ta de ton perix”. Anyone proficient in the Greek language recognizes how much better it sounds in Greek speech.

“The very words spoken in themselves are nouns and signify something. For he who speaks establishes understanding and he who hears is at peace. But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify; for to be is not a sign of a thing or not to be, nor if you say this very thing is pure. The very thing is nothing, but it signifies a certain composition, which is not understood without compounds.”

In this place, Porphyrius mixes much about the dialectics of the Stoics and other schools, and in other parts of this book, he has done the same in his expositions, which we sometimes need to neglect. For often, more obscurity is produced by a superfluous explanation.

But now Aristotle’s opinion is of this kind: “The words themselves,” he says, “spoken in themselves are nouns”, not according to that which every part of speech is called a common noun, as we say the names of things but that every word said by itself, and not with what is added about what that word predicates, is such as to be related to a noun. For if I say:

Socrates walks

what I said, ‘walks’, entirely pertains to Socrates, there is no understanding of its own. But indeed, when I only say:

Walks

I said it indeed as if it inheres in someone, that is, as if anyone walks but nevertheless, it is by itself, retaining its own meaning, this is the significance of the word. Hence, it happens that among the Greeks, too, only spoken words are pronounced with the prepositive articles, as is:

to perimatein tou perimatein toi perimatein

But if words are joined with nouns, in Greek speech prepositive articles cannot be added, unless they are spoken alone. Since they signify a thing and in such a way that, although they signify something which inheres in someone, they are nevertheless spoken according to themselves and by their own meaning, therefore they are nouns. And what Aristotle says, “The very words spoken in themselves are nouns,” is such as if he were to say: the very words alone and not joined with others are nouns. He gives this proof of the matter: “For,” he says, “he who speaks establishes understanding, and he who hears is at peace.” This indeed is such: with every name heard, since voice proceeds by syllables, it cuts out a small space of time, in this very progression of time in which the name is said, the mind of the listener also advances: for when I say “unafraid”, as the name progresses through the syllables “un” and “a” and “fraid” and the rest, so also the mind of the listener proceeds through these same syllables. But when someone has completed the name and said “unafraid”, as the name, finished, stands still from the progression of syllables, so also the mind of the listener rests. For when he hears the whole name, he grasps the whole signification and the mind of the listener, which was following the syllables of the speaker, wanting to understand what he was saying, when it has seized the signification, it stands still and the mind is finally established with the perfect name.

This is indeed what he says: “For he who speaks establishes understanding, and he who hears is at peace.” For the one who speaks, after he has said the entire speech, establishes the mind of the listener. For there is not anywhere for the understanding to progress, and with the name itself completed, the mind of the listener, which was advancing with the explanation of the name, is established and rests, and does not proceed further to understanding, since the signification of the name is clarified. But this is common to the word and to the name only if the word is spoken alone. For if it is joined with a name, the listener’s understanding is not yet established. For there is somewhere for the mind of the listener to advance further, which when I say:

Socrates walks

this ‘walks’ is not understood by itself but refers to Socrates and the understanding consists in the whole speech, not in the word alone. But indeed, if it is only spoken, it rests in the signification, just as in the name. Therefore, it is rightly said, “The very words spoken in themselves are nouns”, since “he who speaks establishes understanding and he who hears is at peace”.

Or indeed there will be a better exposition, if we say it this way: that the words themselves, said according to themselves, are names, for the reason that they have the signification of something. For neither if a word retains the signification of something, which always either exists in another or is predicated of another, does it therefore signify nothing at all. Nor if it signifies something that cannot exist apart from the subject, does it therefore also signify that which is the subject. For example, when I say “he is wise”, it does not signify nothing, since this very wisdom cannot exist without someone who can be wise. Nor again, when I say:

He is wise

do I signify that very one who is wise, but that which I say (“he is wise”) is the name of a certain thing, which always, if it is predicated in another and of another, it thereby comes to be understood. For he who hears “He is wise”, although he does not hear a self-standing thing (for it always exists in another and in the one in which it is said, it is not), yet he understands something and relies on the signification of the word itself and establishes his understanding and rests in it, so that he does not seek any further understanding at all, just as it was with the name. For just as the name of something is the proper signification of a self-standing thing, so also the verb is the signification of something not self-existing but leaning on another subject and in a way grounded.

Here is a question. For it does not seem true what he says: “For the one who says establishes understanding and the one who hears rests.” For neither does the one who says establish understanding nor does the one who hears rest. For something is missing to the discourse or the name: as if someone were to say:

Socrates

the listener’s mind immediately asks “What about Socrates? Is he doing something or suffering something?” And the listener’s understanding is not yet at rest, since it asks one of these things. And the same is in the verb: when I say:

He reads

“Who is reading?” the listener’s mind inquires. So, neither the one who says establishes understanding nor the one who hears rests.

But Aristotle is supposed to have referred to this, since anyone hearing a significant word takes it into his mind, his understanding leans on it: as when someone hears “man”, he understands what this very thing that he takes into his mind is and he determines in his mind that he heard a rational, mortal animal. But if someone grasps a word of this kind, which signifies absolutely nothing, his mind, strengthened by no signification nor understanding, wanders and turns and does not rest within any limits of designation. Therefore, Aristotle’s opinion is correct: both words said according to themselves are names, and the one saying establishes understanding, and the one hearing rests.

But this kind of question was proposed by Aspasius and also resolved by him. Therefore, after Aristotle established that words said according to themselves are names, what does he say? “But if it exists or does not exist, it does not yet signify.” Which is something like saying: indeed, something is signified by words as by names, but no negation or affirmation is made from them. For when I say “He is wise”, there is indeed some signification, but it demonstrates neither something existing nor not existing, that is, it is neither something affirmative nor negative. For if affirmation and negation are found in the compositions of understandings, as he has already taught above, neither names said alone nor words will make either an affirmation or any negation. For Aristotle taught in many ways that truth and falsity are constituted not in things but in understandings. For if truth or falsity were in things, a single thing said would either be an affirmation or what is contrary to it, a negation.

But now, since truth and falsity are posited in combined understandings, and speech is the interpreter of opinions and understandings and passions of the soul: truth and falsity do not seem to exist without the combination of understandings and words. Therefore, apart from some combination, there is no affirmation or negation. Therefore, words said by themselves do indeed signify something and are the names of things, but they do not yet signify in such a way as to establish either something existing or not existing, that is, to make either an affirmation or a negation. For just as in the parts of a name or the parts of a word themselves signify nothing, all together designate, so also in affirmations or negations the parts indeed signify, but all together connected designate true or false: as when I say:

Socrates is a philosopher
Socrates is not a philosopher

Each part placed individually relies on its own signification but signifies nothing true or false, but all joined together, as in:

Socrates is a philosopher

They create truth or what is contrary to this, falsity. Therefore, since words said according to themselves are names and they signify something and are some parts of that composition, which makes true and false, they themselves in their proper signification do not designate either existence, which is affirmation, or non-existence, which is negation. For unless the word “he was” is added to the one it is inherent in, it does not become a proposition: as when I say:

He is wise

unless I say what is wise, it is not a proposition.

However, what he added: “for it is not a sign of being or not being,” is such a thing. “Being,” which is a verb, or “not being,” which is an infinitive verb, “is not a sign of a thing,” that is, it signifies nothing by itself. For indeed, “being” is not placed except in some composition.

Or certainly, every word spoken by itself indeed signifies something but if “it is or is not,” it does not yet signify. For not when something has been spoken, for that reason does it signify either to be or not to be. And this is what he says: “for it is not a sign of being or not being.” Indeed, the thing that the word designates to be or not to be is not the sign itself of the word that is spoken about that thing, as if he were saying: for the word that is spoken is not a sign of being or not being of the thing about which it is spoken, in order that what I am saying about the thing being or not being should be such, as though I were saying the thing itself signifies being or not being.

And this is the better understanding, that the word of that thing about which it is said to be or not be, namely to subsist or not to subsist, is not a sign — the former indeed is of affirmation, the latter indeed of negation — and the sense be such: for the word that is spoken is not a sign of the thing subsisting or not subsisting. But what he added: “nor if you have said this very thing is pure,” or if we say “nor if you have said this very thing is a pure being,” Alexander indeed says is or being is equivocal. For all the categories, which are not subordinate to any common genus, are equivocal and being is predicated about all of them. Substance is and quality is and quantity is and the rest. Therefore now he seems to be saying: being itself or is, from whence being is derived, signifies nothing by itself. For every equivocal thing positioned by itself designates nothing. For unless it is adapted to each thing according to the will of the signifier, it by itself is signifying of nothing, because it signifies many things.

Porphyry indeed brought forth another explanation, which is of this sort: this speech, which we say is, shows no substance by itself but is always some conjunction: either of those things which are, if it is simply applied, or of another according to participation. For when I say:

Socrates is

I am saying this:

Socrates is one of those things which exist

and in these things which exist I join Socrates; but if I indeed say:

Socrates is a philosopher

I am saying this:

Socrates participates in philosophy.

Again here too I join Socrates and philosophy. Therefore this is what I am saying has the force of some conjunction, not of a thing. But if it promises some composition and conjunction, a word spoken alone signifies nothing at all. And this is what he says: “nor if you have said this very thing is pure,” that is alone: it designates not only neither truth nor falsehood but is nothing at all. And what follows made it clear: “but it co-signifies,” he says, “a certain composition, which it is not possible to understand without the things composed.” For if is the verb of composition. And it holds the force and proper place of a certain conjunction, a predicate pure and without conjunction signifies nothing but it can signify that very composition which it designates, when those things which are composed have been joined, without the composed things however it is not possible to understand what it signifies.

Or certainly it should be understood this way what he says “it itself is nothing,” not because it signifies nothing but because it demonstrates neither truth nor falsehood, if it is said purely. For when it is joined then an enunciation is made, but when the verb is spoken simply no signification of true or false is made.

And indeed the whole sense of this is such: the words themselves indeed spoken by themselves are names (for both he who speaks sets up understanding and he who hears rests) but although the words signify something, they do not yet signify affirmation or negation. For even though they designate a thing, they are not yet a sign of the thing’s subsisting, nor if we have said this very thing is or is a being, can anything true or false be found from it. For although it itself signifies something, it is not yet true or false but in composition an enunciation is made and in it truth and falsehood are born, which truth and falsehood without those things which are composed and joined it is impossible to understand. And about the word indeed and about the name enough has been said, but in the second volume it is to be considered about speech.

Book 2

On Interpretation, Book 3 (ctd)

[Introduction]

To what extent the human race cultivates and fills itself with the most blissful fruits of intelligence, if only they persisted in the exercise of the mind, we would not have to rely on the rare virtues of people: but where laziness subdues their spirits, immediately the fertile seedbed of the mind is left fallow. I would not admit that this happens from the knowledge of labor but rather from ignorance. For who skilled in labor ever abandoned labor? Therefore, the power of the mind must be focused, and it is indeed true that the mind is lost if it is let go. However, for me, if a more powerful favor of divinity should approve, my fixed decision is this, that although there have been illustrious talents, whose labor and study have contributed much to the Latin language from the matters that we even now handle, they have not yet published a certain order, thread, and grade of disciplines, I will turn every work of Aristotle, whatever comes into my hands, into the Roman style and write their commentaries in Latin speech, so that if anything from the subtlety of the art of logic, from the gravity of moral expertise, from the sharpness of natural truth has been written by Aristotle, I will transfer all this in order, and also illuminate it with a certain light of commentary, and translate all of Plato’s dialogues, or even reduce them into Latin form by commentary. After having done these, I will certainly not despise bringing the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato into a certain kind of harmony, and show them not as most people do, disagreeing on everything, but agreeing on most matters, and those the greatest in philosophy. If life and leisure permit, I will strive for these things, with much usefulness of this work and also labor, in which matter those who are not burned by envy must favor.

But now let’s return to the proposed topics. Aristotle, in beginning his book, first proposed that a noun should be defined, then a verb, then from here negation, after this affirmation, then a proposition, and finally a sentence.

But now, having spoken about the noun and verb, he follows in reverse order, that which he proposed last, he now executes first.

On Interpretation, Book 4

Indeed, he discusses speech, which he last proposed in the layout of his work. For he says:

“Speech, however, is a significant voice, of which parts signify something separately, like a word, not like a proposition. I mean that ‘man’ signifies something but not whether it exists or does not exist, but it will be an affirmation or negation, if anything is added. But not a single syllable of ‘man’. Nor does it signify anything in that ‘shrew king’ is, but it is now just a voice. However, in doubles, it does signify something, but not by itself, as was said.”

Aristotle seems to also consider those words speeches that consist either of nouns or of verbs, but do not yet form a complete understanding, such as:

Both Socrates and Plato
Both to walk and to speak

For although these do not yet have a full understanding, they are composed of words and nouns. For he says that speech is a significant voice, of which parts signify something separately, signify, he says, not co-signify, as in a noun and verb.

However, he teaches that even those incomplete words, which are still composed of nouns and verbs, he calls speeches, as he says when he speaks of the noun, that ‘horse bearer’ does not signify anything, “just like in the speech that is ‘wild horse’.” For ‘wild horse’ is a voice composed of nouns but it does not have a full sentence and he says just like in the speech that is ‘wild horse’. For if according to Aristotle ‘wild horse’ is a speech, why should not other words also, which consist of nouns and verbs, although they are incomplete sentences, seem to be speeches? Especially since he himself defines speech in this way: “Speech is a significant voice, of which parts signify something separately.” Therefore, in these words, which are composed of words and nouns, the parts signify externally, not co-signify. For if every name and verb is significant separately, in these words which are composed of words and nouns, the parts signify externally, not co-signify, even incomplete words composed of nouns and verbs are speeches. For if every name and word is significant, these words, that is, speeches, are composed of names and words, there is no doubt in these words, which are joined from names and words, the parts signify in themselves. And if this is the case, and a voice of which parts signify something separate and by itself, even though it is of an incomplete sentence, it is clearly a speech.

But what he adds that parts of speech signify, “as an expression, not as a proposition,” Alexander believes it to be said as follows: there are, he says, some simple speeches, which are joined by words and names alone, others indeed are composed, whose body already forms speeches. And simple speeches indeed have those parts from which they are composed, words and names, such as:

Socrates walks

However, composed speeches sometimes only consist of speeches, but sometimes also propositions, as when I say:

Socrates walks and Plato speaks

both are propositions, or:

I declare to you, Aeacid, that the Romans can conquer

such a speech is composed from speeches not from propositions. The former simplicity is, the latter composition. However, in which there is something first and last, that without doubt should be defined in the first place, which also precedes by nature. So then since the simple speech is first, but the composed one is last, he first sets the simple speech by definition saying: parts signify “as an expression, not as a proposition,” putting the naming of a simple name or verb as an expression. For in simple speeches, parts of this kind are. In composed speeches, however, sometimes only speeches, but sometimes also propositions, as we have shown above.

He also adds this: “Every definition,” he says, “should either be narrower than the species being defined or should not exceed it.” For if Aristotle had established the definition in such a way as to say that it signifies the parts of speech as sentences and not as words, he would exclude simple sentences from this definition. For the parts of simple sentences do not signify as sentences but as simple words and nouns. For if every sentence will have sentences in its parts, then the parts themselves, which are sentences, will be connected to other sentences. And again, the parts of the parts, which are also sentences, will have other sentences in their parts. And if understanding assumes this, it proceeds to infinity and there will be no first sentence which has simple parts. For it is not possible that a sentence that has other sentences in its parts can be called the first. For parts are prior in their own composition. But if, with understanding drawn to infinity, no first sentence is found, since there is no first sentence, neither is there a last. Therefore, with the first and last removed, all are also removed and there will be no sentence at all. Therefore, the definition would not have been correct, if it had said thus: a sentence is a meaningful voice, whose parts signify something external as sentences.

“But indeed,” Alexander says, "even if some sentences contain sentences in their parts, it does not follow that the parts of these sentences have to be affirmations, as when I say:

Desine meque tuis incendere teque querellis

There are therefore parts of this sentence: one “Desine meque tuis incendere”, another “teque querellis”. Neither of these is an affirmation, although it seems to be a sentence. Therefore, that definition would not have been correct either, if it had said thus: a sentence is a meaningful voice, whose parts signify something external, as an affirmation. For although the parts of this kind of sentence are joined from sentences, the body of the sentence itself is not made up entirely of affirmations. But since in every sentence there are verbs and nouns, which are simple words, but not in all sentences are there affirmations or sentences as parts, he set up what was common in the definition, as if to say: a sentence is a meaningful voice according to agreement, whose parts signify something external, necessarily as a word, but not always as an affirmation or a sentence. For it cannot happen that there is a sentence whose parts do not signify something external necessarily as a noun or a verb, although it can happen that they signify the parts of a sentence, yet are not sentences or affirmations. Therefore, if it had said thus: a sentence is a meaningful voice, whose parts signify something external as an affirmation, this definition would not have encompassed those sentences whose parts are indeed sentences but not affirmations, like the verse I have already set above. But if it had said thus: a sentence is a meaningful voice whose parts signify something external as a sentence, it would have left out of the definition those sentences whose parts are simple, like this:

Socrates walks

But since he says that the parts of a sentence signify in such a way as words, not at all as affirmations, he included both simple and compound sentences in this definition. The simple ones, because any very small and simple sentence is joined by a noun and a verb, which are simple words, but the compound ones, because, although they have sentences in their parts, the parts themselves have simple words, which are the simple words of the whole body. As when I say:

If it is day, it is light

“it is day” and “it is light” are parts of the whole sentence but the parts of these parts again are “day” and “is”, and again “light” and “is”, which are again parts of the whole sentence, through which I say “If it is day, it is light”, but “day” and “is” and again “light” and “is” are simple words. Therefore, the parts of even compound sentences undoubtedly always signify in such a way as words, not as affirmations or some sentences. Therefore, Aristotle correctly established this definition.

So, to this opinion, Alexander clarifies this place, also adding that Aristotle often speaks about affirmations as words, wanting to distinguish, when he said to signify the parts of speech as a word, lest perhaps someone would take up this word also in affirmation, he added as a word, not as an affirmation, as if to say: there is indeed a double word: one simple, the other indeed affirmation but the parts of speech signify something external in such a way, as that word, which is simple, not as that word, which is an affirmation. And in some way understanding holds this whole sentiment of Alexander.

Indeed, Porphyry holds the same opinion but differs in one point. His explanation is as follows: A word, he says, is a simple noun, a simple verb, or composed of two parts, as when I say “Socrates” or “walks” or “horseman”. This name of a word also extends to phrases, but only those combined with simple verbs and nouns, as when I say:

Both Socrates and Plato

or if it is from a composite noun, like “horseman” and “man”. These phrases, even though they are combined and incomplete, are now called words. Moreover, this name of a word also extends to complete phrases, which we will later say are called assertions.

Now an assertion is simple, as when someone says:

Socrates walks

and this is called affirmation. Its negation is:

Socrates does not walk

So, simple assertions are affirmations or negations, composed of individual verbs and nouns. Therefore, when I say:

If it is day, it is light

this kind of phrase as a whole is not called a word. For it is composed and joined from phrases, which are “it is day” and “it is light”. But these are affirmations and are called words. And these very affirmations which are words have in turn other simple words, like “it is day” and “it is” and also “it is light” and “it is”. So, when I say:

Socrates walks

this phrase has parts which are words, namely a noun and a verb, which are indeed words, but not affirmations. But if I say:

Socrates argued in the Lyceum with Plato and the other disciples

this part of the phrase which is “Socrates in the Lyceum with Plato” is also a word but not as a simple noun or verb nor as an affirmation but only as an incomplete phrase, yet composed of verbs and nouns. But if I say:

If man is, animal is

this phrase again has words in parts but not as simple words nor as incomplete phrases but as perfect and simple affirmations. And one affirmation is “animal is”, another is “man is”, but the whole phrase itself is not a word. But if I say:

If animal is not, man is not

again this phrase seems to be composed of two simple negative words, which nonetheless as a whole are not a word.

So, a word beginning from simple nouns and verbs extends even to phrases, even if they are incomplete, and is not just confined to these but also extends further to simple affirmations and negations and there makes an end to its progression. So, because not every phrase has parts which are affirmations and negations, which are perfect assertions of simple words, and because not every phrase has incomplete phrases in parts, yet every phrase retains simple words, indeed as it is composed of verbs and nouns, it means the parts of a phrase always indeed signify as words, but not always as affirmations, in agreement with Alexander, whose explanation I already showed above. And so the more diligent reader will correctly perceive their differences and will communicate understanding in agreement.

At this point Aspasius intrudes inappropriately. He says Aristotle did not want to set up the definition for all phrases but only for simple ones, which consist of two parts, namely a verb and a noun. But he is very wrong. For even if a phrase consists of simple verbs and nouns, this does not mean that a composite phrase does not have words and nouns in a similar way in parts. And if this is common to simple and composite phrases, that they have parts which are indeed simple words, but not affirmations, and even those phrases which have affirmations, yet these have simple words in parts, why he throws this question at Aristotle is left to reason.

However, Syrianus, who is called Philoxenus, does not think there are phrases whose understanding is incomplete and therefore does not think they have any parts. For when he says:

Plato arguing in the Academy

since this is not complete, it does not have parts, he says, thinking that everything which is incomplete is not contained by any parts. And therefore, when Aristotle says: a phrase is a meaningful voice whose parts signify something beyond, he thinks this phrase is established, which retains a perfect sense. For its parts are indeed words and nouns.

But this is ridiculous. Indeed, nothing composite can be made without its proper parts. If, however, any thing, in order to be composed, has ten parts, they still have to be individually added before we get to the tenth part: nonetheless, the parts which we put individually on top of one another to compose the total sum of the whole body are still parts, even if we have not reached what needed to be composed. Therefore, if the earlier parts are parts of the composed and complete entity before the final part is reached, there is no reason that they cannot be said to be parts of an imperfect entity. Indeed, they are not said to be parts of the whole composite, which are parts of the imperfect. For example, if a complete name has four parts, that is, syllables, such as Mezentius, if I take away one syllable and say mezenti, or if I once again place one or two, as are mezen, both syllables of this name, namely me and zen, are parts, and although the composition itself is meaningless and is imperfect, it is nonetheless contained by its parts. Therefore, Syrianus should not be listened to, but rather Porphyrius, who follows Aristotle’s mind and opinion so that his definition, as it is true, does not waver and differs in some other respects. This much for these points.

But Porphyrius says this: Aristotle, he says, wished to show that all speech either has only simple parts or composite ones. He took an example from simple ones, to say that the parts of speech signify, “not as a statement but as a word,” such as when the speech is:

Plato disputes

These indeed are words, but not as statements. However, if the speech were thus:

If Plato disputes, he speaks the truth

“Plato disputes” and “he speaks the truth,” while they are words, they are not however simple, but now as statements. Indeed, a simple word is not a statement or denial, but it becomes so when something is added that either holds the force of an affirmation or a denial. And this is what he says: “I mean that ‘man’ signifies something but not that it is or is not, but it will be an affirmation or denial, if something is added.” This is of such a kind, as if he were saying: a simple noun does not make an affirmation or a denial, unless either “is,” which is an affirmation, or “is not,” which is a denial, is added.

However, what he adds: “But not one syllable of ‘man’. Nor does ‘sorex’ signify ‘king’ in that which is, but the voice alone is now. But in compounds, indeed it signifies something, but nothing by itself, as has been said,” there are two explanations for this passage. For what he had previously said: “But there will be an affirmation or denial if something is added to that word,” which he had proposed above to be simple, when he was talking about the meaningful part of speech, now he completes and explains it, saying that not just any thing added to a simple word will immediately make a statement or a denial, nor indeed a sentence, for if something not signifying by itself is joined to a simple word, therefore a sentence, or even a statement or denial will not be produced. Indeed, if a syllable of ‘man’, which is not signifying by itself, is added to the same word, no sentence is thereby produced. But if a sentence is not made, neither a statement nor a denial. For these are certain sentences. For example, if someone takes one syllable from ‘man’ and adds it to the whole simple word and says ‘man’ ‘mo’ or in any other way, cutting off part of the body of the word and adding it, he will not make a sentence. But if this is so, neither a statement nor a denial, which are certain sentences.

Therefore, it must be understood as if he had said this: “I mean that ‘man’ signifies something but not that it is or is not, but it will be an affirmation or denial, if something is added but not as one syllable of ‘man’ is added” nor of any other word, if it does not signify by itself, as in ‘sorex king’ it does not signify but the voice alone is now. And therefore, if someone, like a part, takes away that which is ‘king’, and adds to it that which is ‘sorex’ and says ‘sorex king’, as if ‘king’ were part of what is ‘sorex’, there is no sentence and therefore neither a statement nor a denial. For these are made up of words signifying by themselves. But ‘king’ in ‘sorex’, since it is part of a name, does not signify anything by itself.

Indeed, our understanding will be better if we apply what Aristotle says in “But not a single syllable of a man” not to the completeness of speech but rather to the significance of a word. That is, since he earlier said that the parts of speech signify like a word, not like an assertion, he was clearly showing what a word would be. For he defines a word as a sound that signifies in itself. So, when he says “But not a single syllable of a man,” it’s as if he said: a part of speech does indeed signify like a word, but these very words are complete names and verbs, not parts of names and verbs. For instance, in the phrase:

The horse runs

“Horse” is a word that signifies like a part of speech but “runs” co-signifies as part of a name, and therefore “runs” is not a word. Therefore, neither is any other syllable that lies in part of a speech, that is, in a name or a verb, significant in itself. Even though it is part of a name, which is a part of speech, it will nevertheless signify nothing in the whole speech: therefore it will not be a word.

So, we must understand it as if he said: "Speech, however, is a significant sound, some part of which is significant when separated, as a word, not as an assertion. And by word, I mean that ‘man’ signifies something and is a kind of word and is simple. For it is neither speech, since it is simple, nor an affirmation nor a denial, since it does not signify to be or not to be. But it will be an affirmation when something is added that constitutes an affirmation or denial. But what I say is a word that we say ‘man’, therefore it is a word, because it signifies in itself. But a syllable of his name, which is ‘man’, since it signifies nothing, is not a word (which is what he meant by ‘But not a single syllable of a man’), or if it seems to signify, yet it is a part of a name and co-signifies in the name, it signifies nothing in the whole speech. For it is not part of speech. Which he meant by saying that ‘Neither in that which is a shrew the king signifies but the sound is now alone’, signifying nothing.

From this it is proven that such particles are not words. For a sound alone is not a word but a sound signifying in itself. However, there are names, he says, that are composed of others, like ‘horse’, they indeed emit a certain image of signifying but they signify nothing in themselves, they co-signify. But in simple names, there is no imagination of signifying, as in the name ‘Cicero’: its parts are simple both in sound and in understanding, beyond any resemblance to any imagination.

But in compound names, a part wants to signify indeed, but there is no separate signification, therefore, since it only co-signifies what the whole body of the compound name denotes, it itself separate (as it has often been said) signifies nothing beyond.

However, every speech is significant not like an instrument but (as has been said) according to agreement.

That speeches are according to agreement, this fact confirms it, that their parts are according to agreement, that is, verbs and names. But if every compound derives its nature from those from which it is composed, the sound that is joined with established sounds also takes its shape according to agreement and position. Therefore, it is clear that speech is according to agreement.

But Plato in that book, which is titled “Cratylus”, established it otherwise and said that it is some kind of furniture and an instrument for signifying those things, which are naturally conceived by the intellects, and for distributing the terms of those intellects. And every instrument, since it is of natural things, is according to nature, like the eye for seeing, he also thinks that names are according to nature. But Aristotle denies this and Alexander strives in many arguments showing that speech is not a natural instrument. But Aristotle uses it thus saying “However, every speech is significant not like an instrument”, as if he said: every speech is indeed significant, but not naturally. For this shows the instrument, as if he said naturally, which he who denies speech to be an instrument, denies it to signify naturally but according to agreement. For the instruments of natural things are natural. Therefore he substituted an instrument for nature, because (as has been said) Plato proposed that the instruments of all arts consist according to the nature of the arts themselves. And Alexander indeed begins to prove that speech is not an instrument in this way: every tool, he says, of natural actions is also natural itself, like vision since it is given by nature, its tool is also natural, like the eyes. In the same way, since hearing is natural, we understand that our ears, which are instruments for hearing, are given to us naturally. Therefore, since speech is according to agreement, not naturally (for it is clear that the parts of speech are put according to agreement, which are namely verbs and names, as the diversity of words among all nations shows): since, therefore, through these it is shown that every speech is according to agreement, and what is according to agreement is not according to nature: therefore speech is not a tool. For the reason and power of signifying is naturally. But if speech is not natural, it is not a tool. With these and similar things, he shows that speech is not a tool. Therefore, we must say that we indeed are naturally vocal and able to imprint words on things naturally, but not naturally significant but by position: just as we are naturally susceptible to individual arts but we do not naturally have them but conceive them by learning: so also the voice indeed is naturally but the signification through voice is not natural. For neither is a sound alone a name or a verb but a sound with some added signification. And just as to move is naturally, to jump, however, is already of some art and position, and just as bronze indeed is naturally, a statue, however, is by position or art: so also the very possibility of signifying and the natural voice is, the signification through voice, however, is of position, not of nature.

So far he has indeed spoken about general speech, but now he transitions to its kinds. For he says:

“However, not every statement is declarative, but only those in which there is truth or falsehood. Not in all [kinds], as a prayer is speech, but neither true nor false. And the rest may be left aside; for they are more fittingly considered in rhetoric or poetry; however, the consideration of the declarative belongs to the present inquiry.”

There are indeed many kinds of speech, but they are divided in various ways. But the Peripatetics distribute all kinds of speech and its parts into five sections. By “kinds of speech” we mean those that are complete, not those that are incomplete. I call complete those which fulfill and expedite the sentence. And let our division be this way: let speech be a genus: some speech is incomplete, which does not expedite the sentence, like if I say:

“Plato in the Lyceum”

On the other hand, some is complete. Of complete speech, one kind is prayerful, like:

“May Bacchus, the giver of joy, be present”

Another is commanding, like:

“Accept and give trust”

Another is questioning, like:

“Where are you going, Moerus? Or where does the road lead?”

Another is calling, like:

“O you who rule the affairs of men and gods with eternal commands”

Another is declarative, like:

“It is day”

and:

“It is not day”

Only in this last kind, which is declarative, the nature of truth or falsehood can be discerned. For in the rest, neither truth nor falsehood is found. And indeed many say that there are more kinds of complete speech, others present innumerable differences among them, but this is not of concern to us. For all kinds of speech are either suited to orators or poets, only the declarative is for philosophers. Therefore, he says: not every speech is declarative. There are indeed many which are not declarative, like those I proposed above. But this is the only kind, in which truth and falsehood can be found. Therefore, since it is for the dialecticians and philosophers to inquire about this kind, in which truth and falsehood are found, and the rest are suited either to poets or orators, rightly, only this will be treated, that is, declarative speech. So far, therefore, he has spoken about the parts of interpretation and about general speech.

Now, however, he confines the mode of dispute to a specific kind and deals with one kind of speech and one interpretation, which is declarative. For the kind of interpretation is a declaration, and the denial and affirmation of a declaration. Therefore, we shall begin here to consider declarative speech most conveniently with Aristotle himself.

On Interpretation, Book 5

There is one primary affirmative declarative sentence, then a negative one; others are joined by a conjunction. However, it is necessary for every declarative sentence to exist from a verb or case. Indeed, if you do not add to a person’s argument that it either is or will be or has been or something similar, it is not yet a declarative sentence. Why then is it one thing and not many, a walking two-legged animal, for it will not be one thing because they are said to be close, it is another’s business to deal with this.

A single sentence is dealt with in two ways: either when it is single by itself or when it is joined by some conjunction. Or perhaps it should be said: some sentences are naturally single, others by position. And naturally single are sentences that are not divided into other sentences, like:

The sun rises

But those that are single by position are divided into other sentences, such as:

If a man is, an animal is

For this separates into other sentences. And just as wood or stone individually consist in their own nature and are single, but a ship or house made from these, although they consist of many, are single by craft, not by nature: so also in sentences we call those simple and naturally single sentences, which are joined only by a verb and a name, and composite ones, which are divided into other (as said) sentences. For conjunction joins many sentences in such sentences, if I say:

Both Plato and Socrates exist

This conjunction both joined both and therefore seems single by position, which naturally and by itself had not been single.

But naturally there are two parts of a single sentence: affirmation and negation. But since he did not say: “There is one declarative sentence, either an affirmation or a negation, then one with a conjunction,” but he said: “There is one primary declarative sentence, an affirmation, then a negation,” such a question arises, whether what he says first refers to the affirmation, so that the negation is subsequent, or what he says first referred to the simple sentence, so that the second is what is joined from sentences. He himself resolves this doubt. For he says: “There is a primary declarative sentence, an affirmation,” and in order to show what he would call second, he says “then a negation,” in order to put the first as an affirmation, the second a negation. But if he had said: “There is one primary declarative sentence, either an affirmation or a negation, then one with a conjunction,” it would have to be understood as if he were saying that the first single sentence would be a simple one, whose parts would be affirmation and negation, the second, however, would be the one that becomes single with some conjunction, when it would be joined from sentences. But since what he says first he joined to affirmation saying “there is one primary declarative sentence, an affirmation,” and to the negation he added ‘then’ saying “then a negation,” it must be said that he thinks the first sentence is an affirmation, but the second a negation, to which he appended ‘then’ continuously.

But we again encounter Alexander’s question. For he denies that negation and affirmation should be placed under the same category, under assertion, because a common category cannot be found for these things that are prior or posterior.

But it has already been said above, that it is not necessary to separate all things which are prior or posterior in any way whatsoever from a common category (otherwise, primary and secondary substances will not be placed under one category of substance, also simple and composite discourses, of which simple propositions are primary, composite ones are posterior, will not be contained under one category) but only those that we understand to be prior or posterior in substance, and those that are equal in their being, nothing prevents them from being constituted under the same category. Therefore, since affirmation and negation have their being in truth and falsehood being found in them, and this is an assertion, in which indeed the principle of truth and falsehood is established: since neither affirmation is prior nor negation is posterior to what is indicative of false and true, no one doubts that both affirmation and negation, which participate equally in this, can be supposed under the same category. But affirmation and negation participate equally in the assertion, since indeed assertion uses the signification of true and false, and both affirmation and negation demonstrate truth and falsehood equally: therefore, assertion should be considered as the category of affirmation and negation. Thus, what he says:

However, the first assertive speech is affirmation, then negation; others indeed are the conjunction of one,

it should be understood that he has placed affirmation first, then negation, to which he added ‘then’, in utterance. For affirmation is prior, negation posterior, in utterance only, not according to the designation of true and false. Therefore, nothing prevents affirmation from being considered prior to negation and yet both can be constituted under one category, that is, assertion. But what he followed with:

However, it is necessary that every assertive speech is from a verb or a case,

is of this sort: Aristotle wishing to distribute speech, affirmation, negation, assertion, contradiction, confusedly mixed up sense in brevity and entangled it in the clouds of obscurity.

For it would have been necessary first to establish what a word was, afterwards what affirmation and negation, and again assertion and contradiction were. But he passes over these for now, but now he teaches how assertion is constituted, saying that every assertion consists in a verb. Since a simple word is a noun or a verb, every simple assertion is of this sort, that it always indeed retains either a verb or something equivalent, as if it were said a verb or a case of a verb, in predication, but not always is the subject term made from a noun, but always the predicate from a verb. Let there be a proposition of this sort, which is:

The sun rises

in this proposition, therefore, what I call “the sun” is the subject, but what I call “rises” is predicated. And I call both of these words terms but whatever is first said in a simple assertion, that is the subject, as in this “the sun”, but what is posterior, that is predicated, as in the same “rises”.

Therefore it is necessary that every assertive speech, if it is simple, retains a verb in predication, as in the same itself when I say “The sun rises”, “rises” is a verb – or something equivalent, as is:

Socrates does not walk

“For does not walk” indeed is an infinitive verb and it is not a verb but it retains the same force as a verb. A case of a verb is also often placed, as

Socrates was

But the subject term does not always consist in a noun. For it can also have an infinitive noun, as when I say:

Not a man walks

it can also have a verb, as when I say:

To walk is to move

Therefore (as I suppose) it has been fully shown that the subject is not always a noun, but always the predicate consists in the verb alone. Therefore, approving that verbs are always placed in predications, he added this: unless indeed either is, was, or something of this sort is added, or something equivalent is attached, assertion is not made. For when I say:

Man is

I have placed ‘is’ as a verb in predication, but if indeed I had said:

Man lives

it is equivalent as if I say man is alive.

Therefore, he taught that an affirmation or negation cannot be established without a verb, based on what he said, “Indeed, a human’s definition, if ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, or something similar is not added, is not yet a declarative sentence.” By this, he seems to mean: the definition of a human is, for example, a walking bipedal animal and this is the concept of human substance. Therefore, this definition, unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ or any word (as mentioned above) is attached, a statement is not made; for it is neither true nor false. If I only say a walking bipedal animal, neither truth nor falsehood follows me. But if I said a walking bipedal animal is or is not, an affirmation and negation are immediately established, which are statements. Who would doubt this? But when talking about simple statements, he said a human’s definition or concept is not a statement, unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, or something similar is added, clearly approving that there is only one and not multiple ways of defining a human, to which if ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ were added, it would make a simple statement.

But why there is such a single statement is questioned. For what we call a walking bipedal animal is not made of only two terms, as there are many names. Therefore, he has established for himself and sought an explanation for his proposition, which he now declines to say. For he said, “Why a walking bipedal animal is one thing and not many, for it will not be one because they are closely related, is the task of another to investigate,” specifically questioning as if he were speaking from his own person: I was talking about all simple statements and I proposed that they could not exist without a verb and to prove this matter I took the example of the definition of a human, to which unless ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’ were added, I said it could not become a statement, as if it were one and not a multiple phrase by which the phrase ‘a walking bipedal animal’ is spoken of, from which a simple statement could be made.

But why a walking bipedal animal will be one phrase, “It is another’s task to investigate this matter,” he said, when it is to be understood from things not propositions. For it is not one phrase because it is continuously and conjointly said ‘a walking bipedal animal’. For if this were the case, we could also call this statement, which signifies so much, one, if it is continuously spoken, like:

Socrates the bald old philosopher

Therefore, in what way such a statement is multiple and not one, we will say later.

Now, therefore, let it be clear that this statement which says ‘Socrates the bald old philosopher’ is not one but multiple. Therefore, if the proximity of utterance by itself made one statement, you could also have this as one statement, which will obviously not be one. Therefore, it will not be one statement that says ‘a walking bipedal animal’ because it is said closely and continuously. But what the cause is for it to be one, he put off saying, but he will explain in the books of his work that is entitled ‘Metaphysics’.

However, Theophrastus in his book on affirmation and negation taught this: a definition is always one statement and it should be spoken continuously. For it is said to be one statement, which designates one substance. But a definition, such as a walking bipedal animal for a human, is one statement because it shows one subject, that is, a human. Therefore, if it is said continuously and not divided, it is one statement, because it is said continuously and because it shows the substance of one thing; but if someone divides and delivers a single statement signifying a thing with interruptions, it becomes a multiple statement. For example, if I say ‘a walking bipedal animal’, the entire statement shows me one thing and it is said continuously; but if I say ‘animal’ and then ‘walking’ and repeat ‘bipedal’ with interruptions, the statement becomes multiple by interruption. And again, a question against this. And who would not justly blame it, that a statement which is one could become multiple by the interruption of delivery, when the continuity of delivery did not make one, which would be multiple by nature? For just as in those things, which are naturally multiple, the continuity of delivery cannot make one statement, so too should not one naturally single statement, because it speaks about one subject, become multiple through interruption.

But this is resolved as follows: for when we say ‘animal’ and with interruption again ‘walking’ and again in the same way ‘bipedal’, we do not say it as if all things are combined into one. Therefore, because there is indeed an animal, there is again walking, there is again bipedal, since there are many and spoken in the plural, that is, divided, they do not seem to be able to be predicated about one subject, as when I say, “Socrates the bald old philosopher,” all these things are not a simple statement, even if spoken continuously, because they do not aim at one substance: for they are accidents and come from the outside.

It is proven, however, that neither those statements which are spoken by division, nor those which do not aim at one substance, are one, in this way: if someone says ‘animal’ and again ‘walking’ and again ‘bipedal’, there is not one animal nor one walking nor one bipedal. But if I said “a walking bipedal animal” continuously and closely, it is one, which these three things joined signify, that is, a human.

Now let us turn our minds to those things which indeed signify many things but are spoken continuously, as when I say “Socrates the bald old philosopher”: it seems to be a definition of Socrates, the bald old philosopher, but it is not necessary, if Socrates was such, that everyone who is a bald old philosopher is also Socrates. In many things, therefore, this continuity can occur. Therefore, it does not signify one, although it is spoken continuously. Therefore, if out of all things one thing is signified and spoken continuously, it is one statement, as if the parts that are put in the definition are parts of a defined thing, not accidents. And continuous speech does indeed contribute something to perfecting one statement, but it alone is not sufficient, unless there is also one subject. And therefore Aristotle said a walking bipedal animal is not one statement because it is spoken closely. For neither is the proximity of utterance sufficient to establish one statement and nothing prevents those which are naturally multiple, from being seen as one if spoken continuously and closely.

But Aristotle has deferred the explanation of this matter. Therefore, the meaning of this is as follows: “It is necessary,” he says, “for every assertive statement to come from a verb or a case. Indeed, the reasoning of man, which is also speech itself, if something of the sort ‘it is’ or ‘will be’ or ‘has been’ or similar is not added to it, it is not yet an assertion.” But this happens only in simple assertions, and not in all cases, especially in those connected by a conjunction (as he said above). For when I say, ‘the day is,’ the entire force lies in the verb; however, if I express it with a conjunction:

If it is day, it is light

the whole force lies in the conjunction, that is, ‘if’. For only the conjunction holds the account of truth or falsehood, which proposes a condition, when it says “If it is day, it is light”: for if that is the case, then this happens.

Therefore, all the force of this type of proposition lies in the conjunction, but every simple proposition has its entire force located in the verb. And just as in hypothetical or conditional statements, the conjunctions hold the force of the proposition, so in simple propositions, the predicate holds the force, which is why in Greek, such propositions are also called ‘predicative’, namely those that are simple, because the predicate holds the entire proposition in these cases. For this reason, Aristotle says that a simple statement is made from a verb or a case. For apart from that which contains the entire predicative proposition, that is, apart from the predicate, a statement is not made. Hence it is the case that negation also is not attached to the subject, but always to the predicate. For when I say:

The sun rises

its negation is not:

Not the sun rises

but that which is:

The sun does not rise

For this reason, a negation placed on the subject does not make the proposition contrary, but it does make it contrary when it is attached to the predicate. Therefore, Aristotle was correct to say nothing about the subject. For the subject term does not hold the predicative proposition, but only the predicate, which verifies the entire statement with its own power.

An assertive statement is a single statement that signifies one thing, or joined by one conjunction, but many that signify many things, or unconnected.

From this, it is shown that when he said: “An assertive statement is one primary affirmation, then a negation,” he did not speak of that statement which is naturally one, but of affirmation. Otherwise, repeating here, he would have said: “An assertive statement is one primary statement which signifies one thing.” But since he did not say it this way, it is clear that what he said earlier, he did not refer to a statement which is one apart from the conjunction, but to the affirmation, which would obviously be prior to negation. But this was said above.

However, what this enumeration means, I will briefly explain. For this point, well understood and truly perceived, has resolved many confusions and many errors in statements. And this is an explanation which none of the commentators before Porphyry saw. For it is not the same thing for a statement to be one and multiple, which is simple and compound, and a single one differs from a simple one, and a multiple one also differs from a compound one. Therefore, a single statement is one that signifies one thing, but a multiple one is one that signifies not one thing but many. And this happens in statements of this kind, like when I say:

Cato is a philosopher

This statement is not one: for it does not signify one thing for it can show both that Cato of Utica is a philosopher, and it can also show that Cato the Censor is a philosopher who is also an orator. In this matter, the statement is not one and therefore, in Cato of Utica it is true, but in the orator it is false. Therefore, we call these types of statements multiple. But if it signifies one thing, like when we say:

It is written on paper

we call it a single statement. Therefore, what is a single or multiple statement, is understood from what they signify. For if it signifies one thing, it is one, if many, it is multiple.

Simple and compound statements, however, are not related to their meaning but to the very terms and expressions that are used in the propositions. And indeed, a simple assertive statement is one that consists only of two terms, as in:

A human lives

Whether the term ‘all’ is added to these propositions, as in:

All humans live

or ‘none’, as in:

No stone lives

or ‘some’, as in:

Some humans live

since the terms themselves are two, the proposition is called simple. But it is compound if it asserts beyond two terms, as in:

The philosopher Plato walks in the Lyceum

for here there are four terms, or if there are three, as in:

The philosopher Plato walks

These too, if ‘all’ or ‘none’ or ‘some’ are added to them, are compound in the same way. Therefore, a single or multiple statement is understood if they signify one thing or many, and they are always judged based on their own meaning. However, simple and compound are not determined from their meaning but from the plurality of words or names. For if a proposition has more than two terms, it is compound, but if only two, it is simple. Therefore, if a simple statement, that is, one that consists of two terms, always retained only one significance, it could be indifferently called a single statement and simple (for the same would be one, which is also simple), but since not every simple statement signifies one thing, not every simple statement is one.

Therefore, it can happen that a proposition is simple, yet there are many speeches: it is simple in relation to the composition of words, but there are many in the signification of sentences. So, in this case, there will be a dual difference: one we call a simple and single speech, the other a simple but many speeches.

Again, if all compound speeches signified multiple things as well, we would indifferently call them multiple and compound; but since it can happen that a proposition, though composed of more numerous terms than two, still shows a single meaning, it can occur that it is indeed compound, but still a single speech in meaning, compound in phrasing, as is the case with “animal rational mortal capable of understanding and discipline.” These indeed are many things, but to them is subjected a single substance, that is man, hence also a single meaning. But if someone says:

Socrates walks and speaks and thinks

These are many things. For it is different that he walks, that he speaks, and that he thinks. Therefore, sometimes the speech will be compound, yet single. But since compound speech is sometimes said continuously without conjunction, sometimes joined by conjunction, there arise four differences from this.

For there is one compound speech made from terms spoken continuously and without conjunction, showing a single meaning, such as: animal rational mortal capable of understanding and discipline.

For this speech is indeed compound, composed of many terms, but it does not have a conjunction (for what has been said as capable of understanding and discipline, this conjunction which is “and” has no effect in the whole proposition: for it does not join the proposition but adds a craft, which man appears to be capable of) and it has one subjected meaning, which is man. Another one, however, is compound from terms not joined by any conjunction, multiple, and not signifying a single proposition, such as:

Plato the Athenian philosopher argues

For it is one thing to be Plato, another to be a philosopher, another to be Athenian, another to be arguing, and these joined do not make one thing as if a substance. Therefore, this is multiple, but it is clear that it is joined by no conjunction. Yet another one is compound from unjoined propositions, multiple, such as:

Jupiter is the best and greatest, Juno is the queen, Minerva is the goddess of wisdom

If anyone were to utter these under one continuous context, indeed they are multiple propositions, and the speech is multiple but lacks a conjunction.

Another one, however, is compound either from terms or from propositions joined by conjunction, multiple, and signifying many things. And indeed compound from terms, as if someone were to say:

Both Jupiter and Apollo are gods

From joined propositions, however, it signifies many things, as if someone were to say:

Apollo is a prophet and Jupiter thunders

But besides these there is another compound proposition from propositions joined by conjunction, signifying a single speech, as when I say:

If it is day, there is light

For these two propositions, which are “it is day,” “there is light,” if they are joined by conjunction. But this speech does not signify many things. For it does not propose both that it is day and there is light but if it is day, there is light. Therefore, it signifies a certain consequence, not the existence of the proposition. For it does not say both are but if one is, the other follows, which both somehow fit into a single understanding.

But Porphyrius sets this proposition aside externally, for the reason that it seemed to signify many things (for the plurality of propositions itself imitates a multitude of significations) but (as has been said) it does not signify many things but a single consequence. Therefore, there is a dual manner of compound propositions signifying a single thing. Either it is a compound speech signifying a single thing from unjoined terms, as:

Animal rational mortal is

or it is a compound speech from propositions and joined by conjunction, indeed giving an image of signifying many things, but a speech signifying a single thing, as if we were to say:

If it is day, there is light

Therefore, given this distribution of compound and simple speeches, in a dual way speeches are single and in a dual way many, both simple uncombined and simple combined. And indeed in one way a single speech is said when it is joined by some conjunction, another when it signifies a single thing; again, in one way a speech is called multiple when it is without conjunction, another when it signifies many things.

And this is what he means: “There is one declarative sentence that signifies one thing or is unified by a conjunction, but there are multiple that signify many things and not one or are unconjoined.” For, as has been said, a sentence is double in its unity: either when it exists with a conjunction, or when it signifies one thing. A complex sentence, however, is either one that signifies many things or one that is not joined by a conjunction. He has named those sentences that are multiple and either hold a plurality of meanings or exist apart from conjunctions as ‘many’. And when he says ‘or unconjoined’, he has encompassed everything. For a proposition is complex either if it is simple, as is:

Cato philosophizes

It is also complex if it is composed of terms without a conjunction, as in:

Plato of Athens disputes in the Lyceum

Or if it is composed of propositions without a conjunction, as in:

Man is, animal is

But why, when he said “But there are multiple that signify many things,” did he add “and not one”? This is because there are some things which signify many things in speeches, yet demonstrate one thing in the entire composition, such as a rational mortal animal. For all these things signify many (for ‘animal’ is one thing, ‘rational’ another, ‘mortal’ another) but the whole taken together is one, which is man. But when I say:

Socrates, an Athenian philosopher

Both the individual items and all of them together are many nonetheless. For these are accidents and do not inform any substance. And indeed, he said these things about sentences that were either united by a conjunction or signification, and again about many that were either many apart from a conjunction or with a multiple signification.

What he said later about simple and complex things will be explained when the exposition arrives at that place. But now, let us return to the order.

Therefore, since he had previously said that a simple proposition, which the Greeks call ‘categorical’ and we can interpret as ‘predicative’, is always established by the predication of a verb, but not always by a subject noun, which sometimes may indeed be either an infinite noun or a case of a noun or subjected verbs: since he therefore said that a simple speech is constituted by simple words, and it was clear that affirmation and negation were speeches, he made it clear that affirmation and negation are constituted and formed by speech, in such a way that affirmation and negation were always completed by the sole predication of the verb, but not always by the subjection of the noun.

Therefore, having proposed this, he now explains what is speech, which forms predicative, that is, simple propositions, saying: “Therefore, a noun and a verb alone are speech.” He says “Speech alone,” because there are some speeches that are also affirmations or incomplete sentences, which has already been said. But why a verb and a noun alone are speeches he shows: “Because to speak thus, something signifying a voice, or someone questioning or not, but the one uttering it.” The sense of this is: a declarative proposition is formed mostly by these two things: by its own nature and substance and by its use and treatment. And its nature indeed is such that in it truth or falsity is found, but its use is when something is proposed by questioning and answering, such as whether the soul is immortal, or certainly when someone declares and pronounces his own opinion, as if someone were to say this of his own free will: the soul is immortal. Therefore, the definition of a declarative sentence is given by nature and substance such as this: a declarative sentence is a sentence in which there is truth or falsity. From its use and act, a declarative sentence is what we propose by questioning, to hear something true or false, or from our own utterance, what we propose by showing something true or false. Therefore, since every declarative sentence is either posed in a question or in spontaneous utterance, and in both of these the nature and substance of declaration is such that whether it is posed in a question with an associated answer it has truth or falsity, or whether it is spoken by itself it retains either: words, he says, neither by someone else questioning nor by anyone pronouncing and voluntarily speaking contain truth or falsity. For if someone says, questioning, “Is Socrates debating?” and another answers “He debates,” this that he answers “He debates,” if it is joined with the whole question, it can have an understanding of a sentence signifying truth or falsity, but if it is understood by itself, debates, although someone else has responded to the question, it is left with both truth and falsity. Similarly, also, if someone says “Socrates” or “Walks” with no one asking but he himself pronouncing, he designates neither something true nor false.

Therefore, words and names are only utterances, since they are simple (for there were some other expressions in the compound words and speeches but not yet complete sentences) and because they do not signify truth or falsehood, either when someone else asks or when anyone voluntarily puts them forth. For there were other certain utterances which, either when someone else asks or anyone voluntarily puts forth, would retain truth or falsehood, specifically in those which were affirmations or denials. Therefore, the meaning of this kind is, and the order of words holds as such:

“A name and a verb is only a word,”

since we cannot say something is significant, that is, announce it by word or name. For we cannot say that whoever signifies something with a word or name, that person announces,

“either when someone asks or not but rather putting it forth themselves,”

as if one were to say: words and names themselves are only utterances, since we cannot say that a person signifying something with words and names announces anything, whether someone questions them, or they themselves voluntarily put forth a simple expression. However, to announce is to say a sentence that designates truth or falsehood.

“Of these, this is a simple statement, as something of something or something from something, and this is combined from them as if a speech has now been composed.”

Since he spoke earlier about single and multiple sentences and proposed one that would either be one by conjunction according to utterance or signification according to its own nature, but many that either lacked conjunction or encompassed many things with their signification, since indeed one thing was a single sentence, another simple, another composed, another multiple, after those he returns to the simple and composed, saying a simple sentence is an assertive one that is contained by two terms, one of which is the subject, the other is predicated.

Indeed, when he says “Of these, however,” he means of assertive sentences, which are “This is indeed a simple statement,” and the one that is a simple statement, he himself proposed saying “as something of something,” we should understand this as we predicate, so the meaning here is: of these assertive sentences there is a simple statement, if we predicate one thing of one something, as if I say:

“Plato argues”

about a certain Plato something, that is, I predicated argues. And this is a simple statement, therefore, because it is joined by two terms or parts. But if it has had more terms and its parts exceed the multitude of two terms, these are said to be composed sentences and the composed statement is like this:

“If it is day, there is light”

For “it is day” and “there is light” are two simple statements, which, when joined, have made one composed statement. And this is what he says: “However, this, that is, another sentence, is composed of these,” that is, from simple statements, “as if a certain speech has now been composed.” For this is not a simple sentence. A simple sentence has only two words in its parts, but a composed one also has sentences, like this one I have proposed above.

So, this is the order which he himself has confused: first, he clarified about affirmation and negation, which would be first, which second; then he spoke about single and multiple sentences, finally about simple and composed ones. But since he mixed some things in the middle, we continued the straight line of the sentence a little differently by removing the lengthy Aristotelian hyperbaton with a conjunction of parts.

It may not seem similar to what he said:

“There is one primary proposition: an affirmation, then a denial; the others, however, are unified by a conjunction.”

And again when he says:

“There is one proposition which signifies one thing, or unified by a conjunction, but there are many that signify many things, not one, either separate or with a conjunction.”

And again when he adds:

“But of these, this one is simple, such as something about something or something from something, but this one, joined from these, is like a composition already.”

But indeed the first statement,

“There is one primary proposition: an affirmation, then a denial.”

He referred this to show that the first proposition should be an affirmation, and the second one a denial (as he says “then a denial”, thus “primary” should be attributed to the affirmation). What follows slightly later:

“There is one proposition which signifies one thing, or unified by a conjunction, but there are many that signify many things, not one, either separate or with a conjunction.”

He referred this to teach which sentences ought to be considered single (either those signifying one thing or those made single by a conjunction) and which multiple (either those that retain many significances or those whose structure is not composed by a conjunction). And finally, what he adds:

“But of these, this one is simple, such as something about something or something from something, but this one, joined from these, is like a composition already.”

He referred this to simple and compound sentences, calling simple those joined by two terms only, and compound, those that would join from simple propositions: so the entire order is this way:

“There is one primary proposition: an affirmation, then a denial.”

And again, omitting what follows, this may be added:

“There is one proposition which signifies one thing, or unified by a conjunction, but there are many that signify many things, not one, either separate or with a conjunction.”

And after this, also omitting the following, this follows:

“But of these, this one is simple, such as something about something or something from something, but this one, joined from these, is like a composition already.”

As if he would say: first, among the propositions, there is the affirmative sentence, then the negative one. However, among affirmations and negations, one sentence is that which signifies one thing or which is unified by a conjunction, and the complex one is that which signifies many things or which is not joined by a conjunction. Also among these, there is the simple one, which consists of two terms, “something about something” or “something from something”; the other, however, is compound, which is joined from simple affirmations. What he says, “something about something” or “something from something” is like this: for indeed, “something about something” signifies an affirmation, as when I say:

Socrates argues,

I have asserted something about Socrates, that is, that he argues and it is an affirmation. But if I say:

Socrates does not argue,

I have separated the argument from Socrates and removed it from him, and this is a denial. For an affirmation predicates one thing about another and joins it, but a denial removes anything from anything by predicating it. Therefore, what he said, “something about something”, signified a simple affirmation; what he said, “something from something”, a simple denial.

A simple proposition, however, is a significant voice about that which is something or is not, just as the times are divided.

On Interpretation, Book 6

An affirmation, indeed, is a statement about something of something else, while a negation is a statement from something of something else.

After dealing with the many and the one, as well as simple and composite statements, he treats the simple statement and concludes it by definition saying it is a voice signifying something to be or not to be. What he says, therefore, is that voice, he referred to its genus, what is significant to the difference of the voice itself, what about “something that would or would not be something”, he referred again to the difference of the things signified. For it has, according to the voice itself by which it is uttered, to signify something, what it signifies or around what the statement holds the designation, pertains to the difference of significant voices.

Thus, it has been said, as if he were saying: not all statement signifies but being something or not being something. So, a simple statement is a significant voice about something that is to be or not to be, that is every statement is either an affirmation or a negation. For affirmation posits being, negation posits not being.

But the brevity with which he constrained the definition, some not seeing, have been led astray into the stupid error of falsehood. They argue therefore that affirmation and negation are not types of statement. For if this, they say, is the definition of a statement, and yet every definition of a genus can be accommodated to its proper species (for every genus is univocally predicated of its own species), there is no doubt that this definition of a statement too, if a statement is a genus, would fit affirmation and negation, if indeed these are its species. But who ever said that this definition, which says a significant voice about something being or not being, fits an affirmation? For it cannot happen that an affirmation is a significant voice about something that is to be and not to be but only about something that is to be. Negation, in turn, not about something that is to be and something that is not to be but only about not being, never about being. For negation always destroys, affirmation unites and establishes. Therefore, if this definition of a statement cannot be predicated to affirmation and negation, affirmation and negation are not species of statement.

They seem to me to err greatly: as if indeed anything forbids that both affirmation and negation be concluded together in the same definition. For I can say: affirmation and negation is a significant voice about something that is to be or not to be, so that a significant voice is common to both, about something that is to be is only of affirmation, about something that is not to be is only of negation. But nothing could be made more brief, unless to establish the nature of a statement in the same definition and to make its division. As if indeed he had said: a statement is a significant voice in which true and false is signified, of which one species is affirmative, another negative, he says: “a statement is a significant voice about something that is or is not.” For what he said: “about something that is or is not” is such as if he said: which demonstrates true and false. For everything that posits something to be, like if I say:

It is day

or not to be, like if I say:

It is not day

demonstrates true and false. Therefore, if something is posited to be or not to be, in it truth and falsity is found. Therefore, what he said about the voice being significant “about something that is or is not” is such as if he were to say: a statement is a significant voice signifying true and false. For the signification about something that is to be or not to be is a demonstration of true and false.

But in the same definition, he has made divisions into species with admirable brevity. For just as if he were saying: a significant voice is a statement, in which the true or false is shown, but one part of it is affirmative, another negative, so he says “about that which is something or not.” For the signification about that which is something is an affirmation, and about that which is not is a negation. So, what he says is designative, the voice of the statement “about that which is something or not,” both are gathered together by understanding. For what he said “about that which is something or not” signifies both the demonstration of the true and false, and the division of affirmation and negation.

But Alexander does not desist from his own view nor is he held by any other error than the rest. For he also says here that it appears that the statement of affirmation and negation is not a genus, because he used affirmation and negation as parts in the definition of the statement. However, every composite and every equivocal can be defined either by its parts or by its signified, like if someone wanting to define the number three would say: the number three is that which is combined from one and two, or if someone wanting to define a human would say: a human is either a mortal rational animal or a representation made of these colors or metal: thus the equivocal term was shown from those things which designated the equivocal term itself. So he says in the same way: “A statement,” he says, “is a significant voice about that which is something or not,” as if he would say: a statement is either an affirmative or a negative voice: falling into the same error, not seeing how with one definition he made a division and showed the nature of the statement.

But this explanation (as far as I know) neither Porphyrius nor any other commentator saw.

Aspasius also agrees with Alexander. For Alexander says that Aristotle defined the statement in the same way here, as elsewhere, that is in the resolutoriis. For there he concluded the proposition, which is a statement, by definition saying: “A proposition, therefore, is an affirmative or negative sentence about something regarding something.” Aspasius follows the same.

Porphyrius, however, says: the definition’s subtlety is admirable. For the statement was defined from its own power of affirmation and negation, but the affirmation and negation themselves from their terms. For the affirmation, consisting in two terms, signifies that something is in something, but its entire force is to nod to something being. The negation also signifies that something is not in something but its entire force is to deny and separate. Or again, the affirmation designates something being in something but its entire force is to posit something (for indeed when it demonstrates that something is in something, it posits something), again the negation indeed declares that something is not in something but its entire force is to remove. So now, he says, he defined the statement from the entire force of affirmation and negation saying: “A statement is a significant voice about that which is something or not.” But this pertains to the force of negation and affirmation, as if he would say: a statement is a significant voice which posits or removes something, which are the proper virtues of affirmation and negation. For if he had said: a statement is about that which is something to someone or not; then he would seem to have defined the statement from the terms of affirmation and negation; but when he says “about that which is something or not,” he determines from the entire force of both. For in this affirmation which is:

It is day

I showed something being present to something according to the terms (for indeed I applied it to the day) but the entire force of this proposition is to declare that something is; again when I say:

It is not day

I pronounce something not being in something but its entire force is to say it is not.

Therefore, it is clear, according to Porphyry, that the enunciation is described from the whole force of affirmation and negation, and affirmation and negation themselves are from their own terms. For he says, “An affirmation is an enunciation of something about something,” taking the genus in the definition of affirmation. For enunciation (as has been said) is the genus of both affirmation and negation, which Aristotle himself more clearly demonstrates, who inscribed the name of enunciation in the definition of each, saying: “An affirmation is indeed an enunciation.” For he related this to the genus, but what he added, of something about something, he reduced to terms. For in a simple affirmation, something is predicated about something by enunciating, as in that which is:

It is day

to be day. Negation too is defined this way: “An enunciation of something from something,” as much to the enunciation again from the genus, as of something from something again to terms. For in this negation which is:

It is not day

we remove to be from day by enunciating.

But so that he did not seem to have defined enunciation only for the present time, he added that the definition of enunciation is to be understood for other times too. For he says, “An enunciation is a speech indicative of that which is something or is not,” and he added “as times are divided.” For times are divided into three. For every time is either future, or present, or past, or mixed from these.

Therefore, an enunciation is a significant voice signifying either to be something or not to be, but since this designates the present time, we do not speak only of the present, he says, but also of those times which are divided, so that this to be and not to be may come into the future and into the past, so that at times it may signify to be and not to be, that is, the enunciation may thus posit and take away, as it also posits and takes away the present time, such as:

Socrates is
Socrates is not

and it posits and takes away the past, such as:

Socrates was
Socrates was not

in the same way the future:

Socrates will be
Socrates will not be

Therefore, in all these times according to whether something is or is not, that is, according to positing and taking away, the whole force of enunciation is. Therefore, this is what he says “Of that which is something or is not, as times are divided,” as if he were saying: of that which is something or is not, the enunciative voice signifies either in the present or in the future or in the past, as the times themselves are divided.

Why this order of definitions was chosen, I will clarify briefly. First, he discussed the name, then the verb, then the sentence, then the proposition, then the affirmation, and finally the negation. Every compound is later than its parts, every kind is earlier than its parts: therefore, in compounds, the parts are earlier than the whole, in kinds and species, the parts are later than the whole. Again, in compounds, the whole is later than the parts, in species and kinds, the whole is earlier than the parts. Therefore, because words and names are not species of affirmation, nor of negation, nor of proposition, nor of sentence, but some parts of all these, by which all these are joined, and sentence is a kind of proposition, proposition is of affirmation and negation, affirmation is prior to negation, namely according to pronunciation, as he himself testified: therefore, since all these things – sentence, proposition, affirmation, negation – are joined by words and names, words and names are prior to all these. By a name, however, a thing is signified as either existing in itself or as if existing in itself, but by a verb, an attribute is designated and like another attribute, which is clear from the above. But what exists in itself is earlier: therefore, what a name signifies is earlier than what a verb signifies: therefore, a name is earlier than a verb. Therefore, since name and verb are earlier than sentence, proposition, affirmation, and negation (for the parts are earlier than the things that are composed), these were rightly defined before all. However, since a name is earlier than a verb, the name was defined first, and then the verb. But because every kind is earlier than its species, after these, that is, name and verb, he described the sentence by definition, which would be both the nearest kind of proposition and superior to affirmation and negation; after sentence, he discussed the proposition, which, although a species of sentence, would be the kind of affirmation and negation; after proposition, he discussed affirmation, which, although equivalent to negation as a species according to its own kind, i.e., proposition, in pronunciation it would be prior, as he previously taught, saying:

The first speech act is an affirmative proposition, then comes the negation.

But since we mentioned above that he wanted to define these five things: what is a term, what is a proposition, what is an affirmation, what is a negation, what is a contradiction, he showed what a term is by saying:

“So, a name and a verb alone form a term,”

he showed what a proposition is by saying:

“A simple proposition is a meaningful sound about something that exists or does not exist, divided in accordance with times,”

he showed what an affirmation is by saying:

“An affirmation is a proposition about something regarding another,”

he also defined negation by saying:

“A negation, however, is a proposition about something not regarding another.”

So what remains is to discuss contradiction.

He then explores what a contradiction is, saying:

“Since it is to declare both that what exists does not exist and that what does not exist does exist, and that what exists does exist and what does not exist does not exist, and everything similarly happens regarding the things that are beyond the present times, that someone denies what someone else affirms and that someone affirms what someone else denies: therefore it is clear that every affirmation has an opposed negation and every negation an affirmation. Let this be a contradiction, opposed affirmation and negation.”

Having cleared up everything he had promised to explain, he now turns to the remaining contradiction in order and revisits it from affirmations and negations, saying that all affirmations can have their own negations opposed and, conversely, all negations can have their own affirmations set up.

This is taken from the following: because we know some things to be and some things not to be, and because we ourselves can say and perceive some things to be and some things not to be, four propositions are made from these, pairs of contradictions. For if someone says that what is, is not, such as if someone says while Socrates is living:

“Socrates does not live”

they deny what is, and their denial will be false; again, if someone confirms that what is not, is, such as if someone says while Socrates is not living:

“Socrates lives”

this too is a false affirmation; if someone also establishes that what is, is, with a proposition, such as if someone says while Socrates is living:

“Socrates lives”

this will be a true affirmation; but if someone denies that what is not, is, it is a true denial, such as if someone says while Socrates is not living:

“Socrates does not live”

Therefore from these, that is from true affirmation and false denial and again from true denial and false affirmation, there are indeed four propositions but in two there is affirmation, in two denial is contained, and there are indeed two contradictions. For this is what he says: “Since there is announcing that what is, is not”, he showed a false announcement of denial; and what he added, “And that what is not, is”, he proposed a false affirmation in the announcement. That too which he said, “And that what is, is”, designates an announcement, by which that which is, is brought forth with true affirmation; further, what he said, “And that what is not, is not”, he gave an example of true denial. Therefore, if both that which is can truly be said to be and the same that is can falsely be said not to be, and that which is not can truly be said not to be and that which is not can falsely be said to be, it is manifest that every affirmation has some contradiction of denial opposed to it and every denial, in turn, makes an opposition of affirmation a contradiction. For indeed, if everything that someone affirms can be denied, and what someone denies can be affirmed, who would doubt that neither affirmation can be established which denial does not contradict, nor denial whose affirmation cannot be found? Therefore every affirmation has a denial opposed to it, and denial has an opposing affirmation: therefore a contradiction is an affirmation and denial opposed.

What opposition is, will be explained later, or what a contradiction is, I will show with the most diligent reasoning. But what he said, “And about those things which are outside the present time” is such as if he were to say: just as affirmation and denial can happen in the present time, so too either in the past or in the future. For just as that which is can be established to be, so can that which was be proposed to have been, and that which will be in the hope of future time can be affirmed, as when we say:

“Socrates was” “The sun will be in Cancer in the summer”

Therefore in the same way both about the future and the past, affirmation and denial is established, just as about the present. But the future and past are external and beyond the present time: for the one will come, the other has receded. Rightly therefore he also said, “About those things which are outside the present time” that these sorts of affirmations and denials can occur. For about the past and the future, which is external to the present time, “similarly everything happens” (as he himself says) “that which someone affirms can be denied and that which someone denies can be affirmed”. From which it happens that in all times it is consistent that a denial can be opposed to every affirmation and an opposing affirmation can be established for every denial.

Now, however, he shows what kind of opposition should be assumed in affirmation and denial. For this is a contradiction, an affirmation and denial opposed. But if these opposed ones constitute a contradiction, what kind of opposition in these should constitute a contradiction, he rightly pursues.

“I say, however, that opposition is of the same about the same, not, however, equivocally and whichever other of these we determine against sophistical nuisances.”

With two terms a simple proposition is consistent, and one is the subject, the other is predicated, but the subject is what is first said, and the predicate is what is said afterwards, he says that that opposition of affirmation and denial which have the same subject, also the same predicate, constitutes a full contradiction, such that neither the subject nor the predicate signifies multiple things. Otherwise, there will not be a contradiction or any opposition. Such as when I say:

“Socrates is white”

and another says:

“An Ethiopian is not white”

this affirmation and denial are not opposed, therefore, because there is a different subject and the same predicate. In the affirmation, “Socrates” was the subject, in the denial an Ethiopian. Again, when I say:

“Socrates is white”

and another says:

“Socrates is not a philosopher”

nor does this denial retain opposition against the affirmation, therefore, because a different predicate is proposed in both. In the affirmation ‘white’ is predicated of Socrates, in the denial, a philosopher. But if both are different, much more there will be no opposition: such as when I say:

“Socrates is a philosopher”

if another responds:

“Plato is not a Roman”

here neither is the subject the same nor is the predicate the same and these are more different and they are not opposed with any opposition against each other and therefore both can be true and if it so happens both can be false and also one true, one false. For things which do not destroy each other, nothing prevents them from being found both false or both true or one true, the other false.

Therefore, we do not say that things are opposites where either the subject or the predicate is different. Hence, it follows that those that signify many things, if they are subjects or predicates, are not able to maintain contradictory negation. For if someone were to posit an equivocal name as the subject and predicate something different, and if someone were to establish a negation against such an affirmation, it would not create opposition. For example, when I say:

Cato killed himself at Utica

The name that is said here, ‘Cato’, is equivocal. It can indeed be understood to mean either the orator or the one who led the army in Africa. Therefore, if someone says:

Cato killed himself at Utica

It could perhaps be understood to mean Cato Marcius. If someone responds that Cato did not kill himself at Utica, they could be negating it with respect to Cato the Censor. But since Cato the Censor and Cato Marcius are different, and the very name of Cato signifies different things, the affirmation and the negation will be different from each other. The negation does not completely destroy what the affirmation establishes. For the affirmation establishes that Marcius Cato killed himself at Utica, but the negation says that Cato the orator, if it happened so, did not kill himself at Utica.

Therefore, they do not constitute a truth and a falsehood between themselves, for they are different from each other. For both are true: both that Cato killed himself at Utica, namely Marcius, and that Cato did not kill himself at Utica, namely the orator. And here, the equivocal subject has made it so that this affirmation and negation in no way constitute an opposition. But if the predicate has been equivocal, a contradiction is not made in the same way. For let someone say that

Cato is strong

and he predicates strength of mind of Cato, with someone else responding:

Cato is not strong

referring to the weakness of his body: so then the equivocation of strength has caused ambiguity, which could not create opposition by any reasoning. And if both terms, both the subject and the predicate, have been equivocal, the propositions will be even more different from each other and not opposed, and they will not divide truth and falsehood between themselves but both could happen to be true, sometimes both could happen to be false.

Therefore, it is necessary for there to be one subject and one predicate, so that what the affirmation has predicated and joined, the same the negation may divide and disjoin and what the affirmation has predicated of some subject, the same the negation denies. For if both terms are equivocal or any one of them, it can happen that the negation takes away something different than what the affirmation posited and thus there is no opposition. Therefore, this should not be done, but the same subject and predicate should be in the affirmation, the same in the negation. And this is what he says: “I mean they oppose each other when they are about the same subject.” What he says “about the same” he referred to the subject and it is to be understood that “I mean they oppose” is a negation “of the same predicate” about the same subject but that they should not be equivocal neither the subject nor the predicate and much more so that both should signify one thing. This is what he said “but not equivocally.” Not only equivocation, if it is not there, is strong enough to establish opposition. For there are many things that he has determined in the Sophistical Refutations against those who try to overturn the path of true reasoning with fallacious arguments, how propositions should be made and how the fallacy of arguments should be discovered. What he says here: “And whatever other such things we determine against sophistic importunities,” as if he were saying: I say, indeed, that a negation is opposed to an affirmation of the same predicate about the same subject, but not equivocally: this and whatever other things are, which have been determined in the sophistic refutations against the importunities of the arguers.

And indeed, here, since it was another matter, he very conveniently and briefly skimmed over it. But we do not hesitate to append, as far as brevity permits, what he determined in the Sophistical Refutations for the establishment of contradictory opposition. For not only if equivocation is placed in the propositions, no contradiction is made, but also if univocation is placed in the negation, that opposition will have absolutely no contradiction. For there is opposition having contradiction, in which if the affirmation is true, the negation is false, if the negation is true, the affirmation seems deceitful.

Therefore, when terms are put according to univocation, both affirmation and negation can turn out to be true, as if someone says:

A man walks
A man does not walk

The affirmation is true about some man, the negation is true about a specific man. But a specific man and a particular man are univocal: therefore, when univocal terms are taken, no contradiction is made. But indeed, neither if an affirmation and negation are placed to one part and another, does any division of truth and falsehood occur in them, but both can turn out to be true: when I say:

An eye is white
An eye is not white

For in one part it is white, in another part it is not white: and so both the negation is true and the affirmation. Neither if referring to one thing or another, does any contradiction result from it, as when I say:

Ten are double
Ten are not double

For if I refer to five, the affirmation is true, if to six, the negation is true. Neither if different time is taken in the affirmation and negation, as when I say:

Socrates is sitting
Socrates is not sitting

For at another time, sitting makes the affirmation true, at another time not sitting makes the negation true. Furthermore, if someone says in the negation something different than what he proposed in the affirmation, it intercepts the force of contradiction. For if someone says the affirmation potentially, but the negation actually, both the affirmation and the negation can be established with truth at the same time: as if someone says:

A puppy sees
A puppy does not see

For potentially he sees, but actually he does not see.

Therefore, it must be done if a contradiction is to be made “of the same” (as he himself says) predicate “about the same” subject, not equivocally, nor univocally, to the same part, related to the same thing, at the same time, established in the same way. All of which he pursued most diligently in the Sophistical Refutations.

Now, remembering a few things, he postponed the complete discussion to that book. But an enunciation is about something being or not being: the affirmation is indeed about something that exists as:

Plato is a philosopher

The negation, however, is about something that exists not being, as:

Plato is not a philosopher

These two enunciations:

Plato is a philosopher
Plato is not a philosopher

Destroy each other and placed as if in some opposite contention, they make a contradiction. But contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation, in which neither can both be false nor both true but one is always true, the other indeed false. If however, there are any of this kind, in which the affirmation and negation do not divide the true and the false, in these something different and not entirely opposed is found.

Porphyry says that the evidence for our claim that an affirmation should be opposed to a denial such that one true statement immediately brings falsehood to the opposing one, is the common usage in our speech. For whenever someone says something exists, and someone else denies it, we suspect one of them is telling the truth and the other is lying. Moreover, if something either exists or does not exist, and no middle ground can be found between being and not being, an affirmation posits that something is and the same thing a denial removes, and there is a contradiction between the affirmation and the denial. Such opposition creates a complete contradiction, in which both the affirmation and denial cannot be true. The nature of affirmation and denial refers to a certain quality. For a certain quality is both affirmation and denial.

Beyond this quality, there is also a quantity of propositions, which will be discussed shortly. But Aristotle, wishing to teach us what a contradiction is, first showed where it is. For every contradiction must exist in opposition. Therefore, since contradiction exists in opposition, but what kind of opposition creates this contradiction is still unknown, this opposition is either in the quality of propositions, in their quantity, or in both, and we have talked about the quality of propositions that lie in affirmation and denial: now we will talk about quantity, so that once it is known too, we can see whether the contradiction in propositions is in their quality, in their quantity, or in both.

On Interpretation, Book 7

However, these are universals of things, while those are singular; I call universal what is naturally predicated of many, but singular what is not, such as ‘man’ is universal, ‘Plato’ of those which are singular. It is necessary, however, to state that there is something or there is not, sometimes indeed of those that are universal, sometimes however of those that are singular.

Every proposition derives the properties of its meaning from the understandings of the subjects. But since understandings of things must be likenesses, the power of propositions also extends to things. And therefore, when we wish to affirm or deny something, this refers to the quality of understanding and mental conception. For what we conceive in imagination and understanding, we affirm or deny by placing it in affirmation or negation. And propositions primarily derive their power and property from understanding, and secondly from things, from which understandings themselves must be composed.

Hence it happens that a proposition participates in both quantity and quality. In quality, indeed, in the utterance of affirmation and denial that someone issues from their own judgment; in quantity, however, from the subjects of the things that understandings capture.

For we see that there are such qualities in things that cannot apply to another except in one particular and singular substance. For one quality is singular, such as that of Plato or Socrates, another is that which, being shared with many, offers itself entirely to individuals and all, such as humanity itself. For there is a certain quality of this kind, which is entirely in individuals and entirely in all, for whenever we contemplate something of this kind in mind; we are not led by this name in mental thought into any one person but into all those who participate in the definition of humanity. Hence it happens that this latter is common to all, while the former is incommunicable to all, yet proper to one. For if it were permissible to invent a name, I would name this singular and incommunicable quality by its invented name for some other subsistence, to make the form of the proposition clearer. Let’s call the incommunicable property of Plato “Platoness.” For in this way we can name this quality Platoness with an invented word, just as we say the quality of a man is humanity. So, this Platoness is of one single man and not of any man, but only of Plato, while humanity is both of Plato and of the rest who are contained under this term. Hence it happens that, since Platoness applies to one, Plato, the listener’s mind refers the word Plato to one person and one particular substance; but when he hears the word man, he refers understanding to several people whom he knows to be contained in humanity. And therefore, since humanity is common to all men and is entirely in each (for all men retain humanity just as one man does: for if it were not so, the special definition of a man would never fit the particular substance of a man): since these things are so, therefore man is said to be something universal, but Platoness and Plato are particular.

With these principles laid out, since that universal quality can be predicated in all and in individual cases, when we say “man,” it is ambiguous and it can be doubted whether it is said of a species or of a particular instance. This is because the name “man” can be said of all and of any individuals who are contained under the species of humanity. Therefore, it is not defined whether we mean all when we say “man” or any individual and particular substance of man. So, if we try to separate this quality of humanity from its ambiguity, it has to be determined and either extended to plurality or gathered into the unity of number. For when we say “Man”, it is undefined whether we mean all or one, but if ‘all’ has been added, as in the predication “Every man” or “Someone,” then the distribution and determination of universality occurs and we utter universally the name which is universal (that is ‘man’) saying “Every man” or particularly saying “Someone man.” Every name signifying universality is indeed universal. Hence, if ‘every’ which signifies universality is joined to ‘man’ which is also universal, the universal thing which is man is universally predicated according to the quantity definition added to it. But if it has been said “Someone man,” then the universal that is man, with particularity added through ‘someone,’ is put forth and the universal thing is stated particularly.

But since the predication “Someone man” is particular, the predication of Plato (since “someone man” and Plato are both said of one) is also particular. They are not, however, said to be particular in the same way. For Plato demonstrates one and definite substance and property, which cannot fit another, whereas ‘someone man’ which is said to be particular determines indeed the universal name itself, but if ‘someone’ were missing, what we say, ‘man,’ would remain universal and therefore ambiguous. But what we say, ‘Plato,’ can never be universal. For even if the name ‘Plato’ is imposed on many, it does not, for that reason, become universal. For humanity is, in a way, gathered from the individual natures of men into one intelligence and nature, whereas this name which we say ‘Plato’ might appear to be common to many according to the word, but no one else would have that property of Plato, which was of the property or nature of that Plato who was Socrates’s pupil, even though they might be named by the same word.

This is because humanity is natural, whereas a proper name is positional. It is not being said now that the name can’t be predicated of many, but Plato’s property can’t. For that property is naturally not said of many, as of man, and therefore it is incommunicable (as has been said), this quality itself is Plato-ness, whereas the communicable quality is universal which is in many and in individuals. Hence it happens that when I say “Every man” I extend the proposition to a number, but when I say Socrates or Plato, I do not extend it to a number but I compress and predicate the quality and property of one into the unity of its individual and singular substance.

Therefore, in this too, these two particulars ‘someone man’ and ‘Plato’ differ greatly, that when I say ‘Plato,’ I have designated by the word the man I have spoken of and the property of any individual I name, but when I say ‘someone man,’ I have only rejected the number and reduced the proposition to unity, but this particularity has not submitted to me whom I should speak of. For ‘someone man’ can be Socrates, and Plato, and Cicero, and each of the individuals whose properties are different from each other in reason and nature of singularity.

Hence Theophrastus most conveniently called such particular propositions, such as:

Some man is just

undefined particulars. For he removes part from man which is universal either by word or by nature, which, however, is part and described by which property, does not determine or define. Hence, he called universal that which is naturally predicated of many, not how the name of Alexander is said of a Trojan and of the son of Macedonian Philip and of many. For this is said of many by position, that by nature. And he subtly says that it is born to be predicated in many. For this is natural universality. But he called that property of the name and thing which is particular singular, saying: “But Plato is among those things which are singular.”

What he followed up saying: “However, it is necessary to assert since something is inherent or not sometimes indeed of those things which are universal, sometimes however of those things which are singular”, is such as if he had said: indeed every affirmation and denial demonstrates to be inherent or not to be inherent. And whatever is declared or of that which is proposed to be, as:

Plato is a philosopher

(for this proposition sets philosophy to be inherent in Plato), or of that which is proposed not to be, as:

Plato is not a philosopher

(for by dividing philosophy from Plato, he proposes the same philosophy not to be inherent in him).

Therefore, since it is necessary to say either something is inherent in someone or something is not inherent in someone, it is also necessary that what we say something is inherent in is either universal (as when we say:

A man is white

we show whiteness to be inherent in a universal thing, that is, man) or certainly particular and singular, as if someone says:

Socrates is white

for he signaled whiteness to be inherent in Socrates, a singular substance and incommunicable property. But in singulars whether something is affirmed or denied there is one mode of opposition, which retains the force of contradiction. For since the singular and individual is divided by no section, the contradiction made according to it will also be simple. In those things, however, which are made in universals there is not one mode of contradiction.

Indeed, when I say,

Socrates is a man
Socrates is not a man

only such an opposition, if all those things which have been said against the impertinences of the arguers above agree, is found suitable to create a contradiction. However, if such a subject exists about which something is predicated that is universal and meant to be predicated in many instances (as he himself says), it’s not a simple opposition of contradiction.

For there are three distinctions in propositions that are made about universal things: one that includes everything, as when I say:

Every man is an animal

another that, from an undefined multitude and countless plurality, gathers and constrains the force of the proposition into one. Such is the case as if someone were to say:

Some man is an animal

The other one, however, is neither aimed at plurality nor reduced to particularity, such as what is proposed without any determination, like:

Man is an animal
Man is not an animal

For here, we have added neither ‘some’, which belongs to particularity, nor ‘every’, which belongs to universality. Hence it happens that singularity is simply predicated, while universality is sometimes universally predicated, as:

Every man is an animal

Man, as a universal thing, is universally predicated. For, since man is universal, what is added to him as ‘every’ has made it be called universally universal.

Again, it is so that universality can be particularly predicated, as when I say:

Some man is an animal

‘Some’ determines the particular but, when joined to man, it makes the universal substance be particularly predicated. There’s also to predicate the universal not universally, as often as a universal name is simply placed without the addition of universality or particularity, as is:

Man is an animal

Determinations, however, are those that either expand the universal thing into the whole, as ‘every’, or contract it into a part, as ‘some’. But ‘every’ or ‘some’ determine the quantity of the proposition, which quantity, joined with the quality of propositions, changes in four ways (the quality of propositions, however, is in affirmation and negation): either it universally predicates the universal thing affirmatively, as:

Every man is an animal

or it predicates the universal thing particularly affirmatively, as:

Some man is an animal

or it predicates the universal thing universally negatively, as:

No man is a stone

or it predicates the universal thing particularly negatively, as:

Some man is not a stone

However, in those things which are proposed with a universal determination, negation must be made in the determinations themselves, so, since the universal determination of a thing is universal, when we say:

Every man is just

if we will negate universally, we say:

No man is just

And what I say by ‘no’ intercepts that universality which is ‘every’, not that which is man.

Again, if I wish to negate the same:

Every man is just

particularly, I will say:

Not every man is just

by the particular negation cutting off the force of universality. But not so in particulars. For if I want to negate that which is a universal thing’s particular determination, as is:

Some man is just

I will say, in a particular way:

Some man is not just

However, this happens because it has a certain similarity and ambiguity, whether it’s said universally or particularly, if in universal propositions the negative particles are applied more to predicates than to terminations. For if against this affirmation which is:

Every man is just

I put this one which says:

Every man is not just

it seems to signify two things: both that no man is just, for it proposed that every man is not just, and that there are some men who are not just, for it denied every man to be just. But this doesn’t prevent that someone is unjust, someone just. For if there is some just man, it doesn’t contradict the truth of the proposition that says:

Every man is not just

For not every man is just, if some are just, others indeed unjust. Therefore, because it is of a double signification, therefore the definition of universal negation, which is ‘no’, takes away the determination of universal affirmation, which is ‘every’.

And therefore, in particular negations, it’s necessary that negation be applied to the universality of affirmations themselves, as in that which is:

Every man is just

the negation opposed to it is:

Not every man is just

not that which is:

Every man is not just

so it isn’t ambiguous whether it denies universally or particularly.

For it’s been said that this negation which is:

Every man is not just

both indicates the destruction of universality and the proposition of particularity. However, as often as something particular is removed, in these the particle of negation is no longer applied to the determination but to the predicate, as in that which is:

Some man is just

no one says:

Not some man is just

For here, the negation is not applied to the particular determination, which is ‘some’, but we say:

Some man is not just

namely to the predicate which is just.

Hence also to indeterminate propositions, which are without the determination of ‘every’ or ‘no one’ or ‘some’, the negative particle is always applied to the predicate, as is:

Man is just

For no one says:

Not man is just

but:

Man is not just

In singulars also I don’t say:

Not Socrates is just

but:

Socrates is not just

And unless ambiguity sometimes prevented it, negation would always be put to the predicate. But all those things which are placed in determination are such, which either gather the whole into an affirmative, as is ‘every’, or destroy the whole in a negative, as is ‘no one’, or gather a part into an affirmative, as is ‘some’, or cut off in a negative a part, as ‘some not’, or in a negative destroy the whole particularly, as is ‘not every’.

Therefore, these two – the universal affirmation and the particular affirmation – are said to be subaltern, likewise, the universal negation and the particular negation are said to be subaltern, precisely because particularity is always subsumed under universality. It must be considered in these that where there is a true universal affirmation, there is also a true particular affirmation and where a universal negation is true, the particular is also true. For if it is true that:

Every man is an animal

it is true that:

Some man is an animal

And if it is true that:

No man is a stone

it is true that:

Some man is not a stone

But if the particular affirmation is false, like in:

Some man is a stone

the universal affirmation is false:

Every man is a stone

The same is true in negation. If, for instance, the particular negation is false, as in:

Some man is not an animal

the universal is false:

No man is an animal

Thus, universals precede in truth, in the same way, particulars precede in falsehood. The universal affirmation and the universal negation are indeed called contraries. This is because the nature of such contraries is to be as distant from each other as possible, and if they have any middle, it is not always the case that one of them is inherent in the subject, like white and black: we cannot say that every body is either white or black. For it can be neither white nor black and both can be false because there is a middle color. However, if they do not have a middle, one of them must be inherent in the subject, like when we say every body is either at rest or is moving, there is no middle of these and every body must either be at rest or be moving. But it is impossible for contraries to coexist in the same thing. For it is not possible for the same thing to be both white and black. This is evident in universal affirmations and negations. For the negative and affirmative universal are most distant from each other. For what the one affirms of all, the other denies of all and wholly denies. For when it says:

Every man is just

it asserts of every man, what says:

No man is just

it admits nothing in the definition of humanity to be just. Thus they are very far apart from each other. Furthermore, if what they signify have some middle between them, it is not necessary for one to be true and the other to be false, as in:

Every man is just
No man is just

since there can be some middle, as in:

Neither no man is just (since there is some);

Nor every man is just (since not everyone is), and both the affirmation and the negation can be found to be false. For it is not true that every man is just or no man is just.

Therefore, it can happen that in those matters where some middle ground is found, the universal affirmation and the universal negation do not divide truth and falsehood but both may be false, as an example of contraries which contain some middle ground among them. For in these cases, it can happen that both contraries may not be present in the subject, as we have shown above. However, in those which lack a middle ground, one must always be true, the other always false, as in:

Every man is an animal
No man is an animal

Such propositions are such that one is true, the other false, because there is no difference between being an animal and not being one, similar to contraries which lack a middle ground. In these, one must be inherent in the subject.

Thus, the universal affirmation and the universal negation can both be false, and that one is true, the other false, is also conceded: that both can be true cannot happen, as it is also true that contraries cannot coexist. Therefore, the universal affirmation and the universal negation are very rightly called contraries. However, the particular affirmation which is:

Some man is just

and the particular negation which is:

Some man is not just

have properties contrary to those of universals and contraries. For those could not be simultaneously true, but to be simultaneously false was often not forbidden by any reason. However, it can happen that both particulars are true, that both are false cannot happen: as in:

Some man is just

this is true,

Some man is not just

this is also true; that both are found to be false cannot happen. And in this, they are unlike contraries.

However, they seem similar to these in that just as opposites sometimes divide the true and false, such that one is true and the other false, so too can particulars, one can be true, the other false, like:

Some man is an animal
Some man is not an animal

They, however, maintain a stable and unchangeable order of both similarity and opposition.

For, since both contraries can be false, in whatever instances both contrary propositions are found to be false, in these the subcontraries are both true. But since both contraries cannot be found to be true, therefore, both subcontraries cannot be found to be false, as in the case of:

Every man is just
No man is just

Since these are false, the particular propositions contained under these are true, like:

Some man is just
Some man is not just

But if universal propositions divide truth and falsehood among themselves, and one is true, the other false, particulars will also do the same, as in:

Every man is an animal
No man is an animal

The universal affirmation is true, the negation false. But when I say:

Some man is an animal
Some man is not an animal

The particular affirmation is true, the particular negation false. These therefore are called subcontraries, either because they are positioned under the contraries or because they have properties contrary to the superiors under which they are (as was said).

In this straight opposition of contraries and subcontraries, in the superiors, falsehood can exist in both, but never truth; in the inferiors, truth can exist in both, but never falsehood. But if anyone looks at the corner cases, and opposes a universal affirmation to a particular negation and compares a universal negation to a particular affirmation, one will always be found true, the other false and it can never happen that if a universal affirmation is true, a particular negation is not false or if this is true, that falsehood does not immediately follow. Again, if a universal negation is true, a particular affirmation is false; if a particular affirmation is true, a universal negation is false. However, this can also be measured in the description given and the same will be seen in any other terms that the considering mind has attached to itself. For in the case of:

Every man is just

Since this is false, the following is true:

Some man is not just

And again, in the case of:

No man is just

With a false negation, the affirmation is true:

Some man is just

Now, these universal affirmations and particular negations, which are corner cases, and the universal negation and particular affirmation, which are also corner cases, are called contradictions. And this is what a contradiction seeks, in which one is always true, the other always false.

We have provided an example of the whole description of the above discussion so that what has been conceived in the mind and thought can be more firmly imprinted on the memory when it is set out visually.

With these things being the case, let us look at indefinite propositions and singular propositions.

And first, we have to discuss indefinites. Indefinite propositions do not divide truth and falsehood in themselves. For indeed when I say:

Man is just
Man is not just

It can happen that both are true as indefinite propositions. Therefore, we separate them from contradiction: for a contradiction is established (as has been often said) by the fact that both can never be found to be true or both false but one is always capable of truth, the other of falsehood. But those that bring forward an undefined universality, they hold the power of defined particulars. For such is what I say, “man is just”, as if I say:

Some man is just

And again, such is what I say:

Man is not just

As if I say:

Some man is not just

This is proved by the fact that, just as defined and particular propositions can be true in some cases and divide falsehood and truth in others, and it can never happen that both are found to be false, so too in undefined propositions that signify a universal, it can happen that both are simultaneously true, as in what we say:

Man is just
Man is not just

It is impossible to assert both as false but we easily find one true, the other false in these, namely in terms that naturally and necessarily adhere to underlying substances or cannot be present in them: for since an animal necessarily exists in a man, if someone says:

Man is an animal

And this is denied:

Man is not an animal

Or:

Man is a stone
Man is not a stone

One immediately finds one true, the other false. And therefore, these make a contradiction against universally predicated universals. For if against the one that is:

Every man is just

The one that is:

Man is not just

Is set up in opposition, one is always true, the other false; and if against the one that is:

No man is just

The indefinite proposition that is “man is just” is opposed, the propositions distribute truth and falsehood among themselves, just as defined propositions of universals also make contradictory oppositions according to opposed quantities of particulars and universals.

Hence, it is clear that those statements which do not universally declare a universal proposition, and are indefinite, neither put forth a particular nor a universal proposition, do not always divide truth and falsehood among themselves, yet are similar to definite particulars. However, singular propositions which uphold one mode of opposition among themselves: if you have proposed these in the same subject, the same predicate, the same part, the same time, the same relation, in the same way, they distribute truth and falsehood among themselves, as in:

Socrates is just
Socrates is not just

Therefore, there are two contradictions: one which occurs in universals with diagonally opposed particulars, the other which occurs in singulars with all those determinations opposed, as outlined in the Sophistical Refutations.

So, as we have shown how propositions form contradictory oppositions in whatever way, let us now turn to Aristotle’s own words, in which an easy understanding can be achieved through our prior learning.

“So if he speaks universally in the universal, that it is or is not, there will be contrary statements. I call a universal statement in the universal, such as every man is white, no man is white.”

This further illuminates our previous description. He says: when a universal thing is universally designated and someone affirms it universally, if another person universally denies the same thing, these propositions, when compared to each other, are contraries. And in this he makes his sentiment clearer. He says, “I call a universal statement in the universal, such as every man is white.” For when the universal is man, in the universal man there is a universal statement, by which it is said that every man is white. So, a universal thing (that is man) is universally predicated by ‘every’ and this is done affirmatively. The universal, however, will be stated negatively in this way:

No man is white

‘No’ indeed is the universality attached to the universality that is man. Therefore, in this way, the affirmation and denial which pronounce universally in the universal are contrary, as he himself bears witness, and as we have set out in our above explanation.

“But when they do not speak universally in the universals, they are not contraries, but what they signify is to be contrary. I call non-universal speaking in those things that are universal, such as a man is white, a man is not white. For even though man is a universal, he does not use a universal statement. Indeed, every is not universal but because it universally co-signifies.”

To show what kind of proposition an indefinite one is, it was not only necessary to remove the universal determination from the universal term, but also the particular, and it had to be said in this way: however, when they do not universally nor particularly speak in the universals, they are not contraries. Now, since he did not add ‘particularly’, it seems that he is not speaking about indefinite propositions, in which neither universality nor particularity is present, but only about particulars, from which he only subtracted the universal, not also the particular. But what he wanted to show, he taught with fitting examples. For he did not place examples of a particular proposition but of an indefinite one. For he says, “I call non-universal speaking in those things that are universal, such as a man is white, a man is not white.” But if he wanted to demonstrate a particular, he would say: such as:

A certain man is white
A certain man is not white

But since he showed what he wanted through an example, we also think that the previous proposition, which is: when they do not universally speak in the universals, should be thought to be missing either ‘or particularly’, so that it removes both particularity and universality from the entire discourse as the examples taught, not to be speaking of a particular but of an indefinite one. Therefore, he says: but if the propositions are neither universal nor particular, which must be understood, they are not contraries. For those are contraries which universally propose a universal term, while indefinite propositions do not have a universal termination for the universal term. The reason why he only separated universality from the indefinites and not also particularity, is that he was separating indefinite propositions only from the contraries, not also from the particulars. But what I am saying is this: if he wanted to properly demonstrate indefinite propositions, he would say neither are they particular nor universal. Those propositions which in the universal neither universally nor particularly propose, that is, neither are universal nor particular, are indefinite. For those which are neither universal nor particular, are neither contraries nor subcontraries. They are not subcontraries, because they do not have an added particular determination; indeed, they are not contraries because there is no universal determination in these. But now, since he only wanted to demonstrate that they are not contraries, and wanted to omit the subcontraries for now, he said that those are indefinites which do not have a determined universal universally, so that we would understand that these are not contraries. The reason why he did not add that they do not have particularity, is because he wanted to separate the indefinites only from the contraries, not also from the subcontraries.

Therefore, if he had wanted to separate indefinite propositions from contraries and sub-contraries, he would say: “However, when propositions are universal but not applied universally or particularly, they are neither contraries nor sub-contraries.” But because he did not want to show them as not being sub-contraries at this point, but only not being contraries, that’s why he only said “However, when propositions are universal but not applied universally” and did not add “or particularly.” For if he had added this, it would have pertained to sub-contraries, about which nothing has been added. Therefore, he says: these, which are indefinite, since they lack universality, are not contraries.

But while they are not contraries in themselves, they can, however, signify certain contraries. What this means is clarified in various ways by different interpreters.

Hermimus, for instance, says that the reason why indefinite propositions can sometimes signify contraries, even though they lack contrariety themselves, is because they pertain to universal matters, but they do not have a universal modifier added, only in those cases where the things that are affirmed or denied are naturally inherent to the subject. For example, when we say:

A human is rational
A human is not rational

since rationality is such a thing as is in the nature of a human, the affirmation and negation divide truth from falsehood and some kind of contraries are indicated by these. But this has nothing to do with signifying contraries in those things that are indefinite. For even particular propositions also divide truth from falsehood in such cases, as in:

Some human is rational
Some human is not rational

Therefore, according to Hermimus, we see these propositions can signify contraries. So why also did he say that while they are not contraries, “what they signify can be contrary”?

Alexander, on the other hand, says this: because these are indefinite propositions, nothing prevents them, he says, from being reduced to both particular and universal propositions, which seem to be contraries, as in the case of “a human is an animal, a human is not an animal”. Since these are indefinite propositions, they can be understood as if they are contraries. For if we say “a human is an animal”, it can be understood as if we say “every human is an animal”, and again “a human is not an animal” can be heard as if we said “no human is an animal”. However, when we say:

A human walks
A human does not walk

the listener’s mind is led not to contraries but to sub-contraries. Therefore, indefinite propositions can sometimes signify contraries, because being indefinite, nothing prevents them from being reduced to the signification of contraries and universals.

And indeed, this opinion has some validity, but it doesn’t fully represent what Aristotle said. He rejects a better interpretation on his own, which Porphyry later approved. For there are some negations which retain within themselves the contrariety of the affirmation they deny, as in:

He is healthy
He is not healthy

what is said – “He is not healthy” – signifies “He is sick”, which is contrary to being healthy. Again, when we say:

A human is white

if we deny this through the statement:

A human is not white

it could signify that a human is black (for one who is black is not white) but being black and being white is contrary. Therefore, some negations and affirmations signify contraries, but not always. For in:

A human walks
A human does not walk

there is no contrary contained. For there is nothing contrary to walking. And for this reason, he says that these are indeed not contraries, because while they are universal they are not universally stated, but can sometimes signify contraries, when a contrary of the affirmation is included within the negation.

Aspasius, indeed, and Alexander also approved this later interpretation. However, we say that although Alexander’s opinion does not indeed contradict reason, this one is better. For what Aristotle says,

“However, when in universals not universally, there are no contraries, but what is signified is to be contrary”

this is not explained by Alexander, but only stated when the propositions themselves can be contrary. But Porphyry has carefully explained when what is signified can be contrary, which the text of Aristotle himself has expressed. Although Alexander also saw the same exposition that Porphyry set forth, yet (as it was said) he rejected it on his own and confirmed to himself that this exposition’s sentiment was disagreeable. To me, however, both expositions seem to be accepted, or the latter judged better. For Aristotle himself also shows this in a certain way when he says:

“For at the same time it is true to say that there is a white man and there is not a white man, and there is a virtuous man and there is not a virtuous man. If indeed he is ugly, and not virtuous; and if something becomes, and it is not.”

Of this passage, what the explanation is, when we come to it, we will demonstrate.

However, it must be known and remembered that whatever universal propositions have been universally predicated, if these are affirmative, those indeed are negative, always both are contrary, if nothing of equivocation or time or other things that have been determined above obstructs to make the opposition of contrariety. However, not all whatsoever are contrary, these either put the proposition in universals universally or one is affirmative, the other negative, as in that which is:

“Socrates is healthy
Socrates is sick”

For here, neither in the universal is universality posited nor on the other hand one is an affirmation, the other indeed a negation, but they are contrary propositions. For contraries are what they signify, therefore it is very rightly said that whatever in universal things would universally pronounce, if one of them was affirmative, the other negative, immediately naturally they would be contrary: but whatever would be contrary, it is not necessary for them either to universally state the universal or one to be affirmative, the other negative but sometimes indeed these can be contrary, which do not signify the universal in universals but this in those only which would be in the subject about which the affirmation is naturally made, as in that which is an animal and a man. When we say:

“Man is an animal”

because the animal is inherent in the nature of man, therefore, these seem to be contrary, the one affirming, the other denying, although there no determination of particularity or universality is added…

[Smith: “I think that Meiser is probably right to suggest a lacuna here, since this summary includes only the case of contradiction mentioned by Herminus (which Boethius found to be an unsatisfactory explanation of the wording) and not those adduced in the explanations of Alexander and Porphyry”.]

In the case where what is predicated is universal, to universally predicate a universal is not true; for no affirmation will exist in which a universal is predicated of a universal predicate, such as ‘every man is every animal’.

What is said in this way is: every simple proposition consists of two terms. Often, either a determination of universality or particularity is added to these. But Aristotle seems to explain to which part these determinations should be added: it is not necessary for a termination to be joined to the predicate term. For in this proposition which is:

Man is an animal

it is asked whether the subject should be said with determination, so that it is:

Every man is an animal

or the predicate, so it is:

Man is every animal

or both, so that it is:

Every man is every animal

But neither of the things said later should happen. For a determination is never joined to the predicate, but only to the subject. For it is not true to say:

Every animal is every man

therefore, because every predication is either greater than the subject or equal (as in what we say ‘every man is an animal’, ‘animal’ is more than ‘man’, and again in what we say ‘man is laughable’, ‘laughable’ equals ‘man’), but it cannot be that the predicate is less and narrower than the subject. Therefore, in those predicates which are greater than the subject, as in what is ‘animal’, the proposition is clearly false if the determination of universality is placed on the predicate term. For if we say:

Man is every animal

‘animal’, which is greater than ‘man’, we shrink by this determination to the subject ‘man’, although not only to ‘man’ but also to other things can the name ‘animal’ be applied.

Again, the same thing happens in those which are equal. For if I say:

Every man is every laughable thing

first, if I refer to humanity itself, it is superfluous to add determination; but if to each and every man, the proposition is false. For when I say:

Every man is every laughable thing

I seem to signify: each individual man is every laughable thing, which cannot happen. Therefore, the determination should not be placed on the predicate, but on the subject.

Aristotle’s words are as follows and are said with this understanding: adding something universal to those predicates which are universal, such that a universal predicate is universally predicated, is not true. This is what he says: “In that which is predicated universally”, that is, what has a universal predicate, “to predicate the universal universally is not true.” Indeed, in a universal predicate, that which is universal and is predicated, to predicate that very predicate, which is universal, universally, that is, with the addition of a universal determination, is not true. Nor can there be any assertion in which a universal determination is predicated of a universal predicate. He illustrates the concept of this matter with an example, saying:

Every human is every animal

We have already discussed above how inappropriate this is.

“I say an affirmation is opposed to a negation contradictorily, which signifies the same universally, because it is not universal, such as: every human is white, not every human is white, no human is white, some human is white; however, a universal affirmation and a universal negation are opposed contrarily, such as: every human is just, no human is just. Therefore, it is impossible for these to be true at the same time, but it happens to their opposites in the same, such as: not every human is white, some human is white.”

He shows what the full contradiction is with these words. For he says that the opposition is contradictory, which states that a universal thing is not universal in response to that which proposes a universal thing universally. And this is what he says: “I say an affirmation is opposed to a negation contradictorily, which signifies the same universally, because it is not universal,” as that which is:

Every human is just

Is opposed to that which signifies the universal but not universally, such as that which is:

Some human is not just

For it signifies the human universally but not universally, as when he says:

Not every human is just

This is a contradictory opposition, such as if there is a universal affirmation, there is a particular negation, if there is a universal negation, there is a particular affirmation. For only angular propositions (as has been said) make a contradiction.

The words, therefore, are obscure, but the meaning is clear. For he states that an affirmative statement is contradicted by a negative statement, or a negative statement by an affirmative statement, whichever would signify universally what the other would signify not universally, that is, would signify universally, such as in these which we have previously mentioned. For example, this statement:

Every man is just.

Signifies a universal thing universally. And the statement:

Not every man is just.

Contradicts the same universal statement about man by not universally negating it:

Not every man is just.

Again, the one that states:

No man is just.

Universally negates a universal thing by saying ‘no one’. But the one that states:

Some man is just.

Particularly affirms a universal thing, and does not do so universally. For it proposes that some man is just, but does not universally declare a universal thing. Therefore, it examines all properties of propositions. For it says: “on the contrary, a universal affirmation and a universal negation”. Just as he previously said those which would universally signify a universal, either in affirmation or in negation, are contrary, so now he repeats the same, saying a universal affirmation and a universal negation are contrary. And he gives examples of them, which show both to be universal, like:

Every man is just
No man is just

And he proposed what would be the property of these, saying: such propositions cannot both be true at the same time, but those opposed to these can sometimes both be true. But those opposite to these are both particular: a particular negation is opposed to a universal affirmation, and a particular affirmation is opposed to a universal negation. Therefore, these two, a particular affirmation and a particular negation, which are opposed to a universal affirmation and a universal negation respectively, can sometimes be true. And in the same, as in what is:

Some man is just
Some man is not just

But:

Some man is just

Is opposed to what is:

No man is just

And the one which is:

Some man is not just

Is opposed to what is:

Every man is just

But both among themselves, that is:

Some man is just

And:

Some man is not just

Agree in truth. This is therefore what he says: “But it happens that the opposite of these” and he designates them with examples, “as not every man is white, some man is white”.

Therefore, having posited two propositions, a universal affirmation and a universal negation, an art must be given, to what extent their opposites can be found.

I call opposites those which are contradictory, not contrary nor in any other way. For example, this affirmation:

Every man is just.

And this negation:

No man is just.

Against the affirmation that is:

Every man is just.

There appear to be these negations – one:

No man is just.

Another:

Some man is not just.

Another:

Not every man is just.

And the last indefinite:

Man is not just.

Which of these therefore, against what is:

Every man is just.

Is constituted contradictorily? And I call contradictory the opposition in which neither the affirmation nor the negation are both true or both false, but one is always true, the other false. Therefore, if it is opposed against what is:

Every man is just.

What is:

No man is just.

Namely, the universal negation, it is not an opposition; for both are false. But if what is opposed is:

Man is not just.

Indefinite, it also does not make an opposition. For since it is indefinite, it can sometimes be understood as a universal negation based on the listener’s expectation. Therefore, it does not make an opposition either. For if it is heard this way, when it is taken as a contrary, they are found to be false at the same time.

Therefore, what remains is either what is:

Not every man is just.

Or what is:

Some man is not just.

But these agree with each other. For the same thing is stated by the one who proposes:

Some man is not just.

And by the one who says:

Not every man is just.

For if some man is not just, not every man is just; and if not every man is just, some man is not just. Therefore, both particular negations are contradictorily opposed to the universal affirmation. For in these, neither are both true nor both false, but one is true, the other is false. Let the universal negation be:

No man is just.

Against this appear to be opposed these affirmations:

Every man is just.
Man is just.
Some man is just.

But against what is:

No man is just.

If what is opposed is:

Every man is just.

Both can be false; therefore, they are not opposed contradictorily. But also the one which says:

Man is just.

Since it is indefinite, can be understood in some cases as if it says:

Every man is just.

But if this is the case, it can sometimes be false along with the negation which is:

No man is just.

Therefore, it is not the opposite. It therefore remains that what is:

Some man is just.

Appears to be contradictorily opposed to what is:

No man is just.

Therefore, they must be sought at right angles, so that against the universal affirmation, that which is under the universal negation is placed, against the universal negation, that which is under the universal affirmation is constituted contradictorily. For Aristotle, wishing to show this, thus says:

Therefore, whichever are the contradictions of universals universally, it is necessary for one to be true or false, and whichever are in singulars, such as Socrates is white, Socrates is not white.

Indeed, in those things which are contradictory to universally universally stated, truth and falsehood are always divided in these. The contradictory statements are the particular negation of universal affirmation and the particular affirmation of universal negation. Therefore, one of these is always true, the other always false. And this is what Aristotle is saying: “Therefore, whatever contradictions are universally of universals”, and here it must be distinguished to be understood thus: therefore, whatever contradictions are of universally proposed universal propositions, it is necessary that one be true and the other false. And in these, truth and falsehood are first divided, which are opposed to each other both in quality and in quantity: in quality because one is a negation, the other an affirmation, in quantity because one is universal, the other is particular. However, in the second way, in those things that are singular, if there are no clouds of argument, truth and falsehood are divided, as in what is:

Socrates is white
Socrates is not white

Indeed, one is true, the other false, if (as has been said) no ambiguity of equivocation impedes.

However, whatever are not universally in universals, this is not always true, but that is false. For at the same time, it is true to say that a man is white and a man is not white, and a man is good and a man is not good. For if he is shameful, and not good; and if something becomes, and it is not. However, it will seem to be suddenly inappropriate, therefore because it seems to signify a man is not white, at the same time also that no man is white. But this neither signifies the same nor necessarily at the same time.

Aristotle tries to show that the propositions which are put forward in universals but not universally are not always true or false. He shows this through contraries. For that proposition which is:

A man is white

and its negation which is:

A man is not white

are shown in this way that truth and falsehood cannot always be divided between them: for if it is true, as these two affirmations:

There is a white man

and

There is a black man

both are true at one time, it is also true that an undefined affirmation and an undefined negation can both be found true at times. For if it is true that there is a white man, it is equally true that there is a black man (for while the Gaul is fair, the Ethiopian is found very black): therefore, it is true at the same time to say that there is a white man and there is a black man.

But he who is black is not white: therefore, it is true at the same time to say that there is a white man and there is not a white man. The same also about the good and the shameful. For if it is true to say that there is a good man, if someone says this about a philosopher, and again it is true that there is a shameful man, if someone says this about Sulla, both are true, both that there is a good man and that there is a shameful man. But he who is shameful, is not good: therefore, it is true to say at the same time that there is a good man and there is not a good man.

But perhaps it will seem that he has said something contrary to himself and the demonstration proceeds more difficultly, which is proposed through examples of this kind, which seem to be contrary. For white and black and good and shameful are contraries and perhaps someone will doubt whether these contraries can be found in some things at the same time. But he added another example, which, although it is not contrary, nevertheless from it as in contraries also a negation is produced: as if someone says:

There is a good man

and another says:

A man becomes good

if someone either being taught by another or correcting himself by some discipline of reason becomes apparent. Therefore, to be good and to become good has nothing contrary; for it is not so contrary as to be a good man and to be a shameful man. Therefore if it has nothing contrary, there is no doubt but that they can exist at the same time. But what becomes is not yet when it becomes: therefore he who becomes good is not yet good. But it was true to say along with what is:

There is a good man

that a man becomes good. But he who becomes a good man, is not a good man: therefore, it is true to say at the same time, that there is a good man and there is not a good man, even though not weak examples have been set from contraries. For nothing prevents contraries from existing in different subjects at the same time. Therefore, it is clear that undefined propositions, through what he proposed in the examples above, can sometimes be seen to be true and do not always divide truth and falsehood among themselves. But what he says: “However, it will seem to be suddenly inappropriate, therefore because it seems to signify that there is not a white man, at the same time also that there is no white man”, is of this kind: for he said the proposition of affirmation that says:

There is a white man

can be true along with the one that says:

There is not a white man

Now he notices this: it seems, he says, sometimes to be inappropriate and inconsistent to say that which says:

There is a white man

and that which is:

There is not a white man

can be true at the same time, therefore because that which is:

There is not a white man

gives off a certain imagination that it signifies that there is no white man. For a negation of this kind, which is:

There is not a white man

also seems to signify at the same time that there is no white man, as if someone said:

There is not a white man

it would seem that he said, there is no white man. But this, he says, that is “There is not a white man” and again “No man is white”, neither signifies the same nor are they always together. For he who says:

No man is white

determining universality proposes negation about universality, but he who says:

There is not a white man

does not completely deny about the whole universality but it is enough for him to have denied about the particularity. And that which is:

No man is white

if there is one white man, is false, but that which says:

There is not a white man

even if there is not one white man, is true. Therefore, they do not signify the same.

I say, therefore, because not entirely, whenever it has been said:

There is no white man

it immediately signifies that no man is white. For when I say:

No man is white

it signifies the same as ‘there is no white man’ (for the universal contains within itself the indefinite): but when we say:

There is no white man

it does not entirely signify ‘no man is white’, for the indefinite does not contain within itself the universal. For we have shown above that the indefinites retain the force of the particulars. Therefore, if when there is a universal negation, there is an indefinite negation, but when there is an indefinite negation, there is not entirely a universal negation, it does not convert according to the consequence of subsisting. Therefore, they are not simultaneous. For what is not converted, is not simultaneous, as the book of Categories taught us. Therefore, neither do the negations:

There is no white man
No man is white

signify the same thing, nor are they simultaneous, because they are not converted to the consequence of subsisting.

However, Syrianus strives to show that the indefinite negation obtains the force of the definite negation. He tries to prove this with many arguments, most of all against Aristotle. And not only with his own, but also with Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning he tries to prove: that which says:

There is no just man

is of the same kind as that which says:

No man is just

But we, serving the Aristotelian authority, approve that which is truthfully said by him. For what Syrianus says, that the indefinite affirmation indeed obtains the force of the particular, but the indefinite negation of the universal, how falsely it would be said and how both of them are proposed most correctly in the particulars, we have shown above and in those books which we composed about categorical syllogisms in the first book we have carefully expressed.

Now Aristotle himself is a witness to us and Syrianus is easily convinced, because in the Analytics he also says that from two indefinites a syllogism cannot be inferred while from the affirmative particular and the universal negative a negative particular collection may be possible. But if the indefinite affirmation and negation and the universal negation and particular affirmation obtained force, Aristotle would never say these propositions do not infer a syllogism. But this is truer, since from two particulars nothing is inferred in any proposition combination, which he said in those propositions that are indefinite, because he judged indefinite propositions to obtain the force of particulars. Therefore, Syrianus' arguments are broken in many ways.

But let us turn our course of exposition to the following.

It is evident, however, that a single negation corresponds to a single affirmation; for it is necessary that the negation denies the same thing that the affirmation asserts, and about the same thing, either about a particular or a universal, universally or non-universally. I mean that as in ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Socrates is not white’. However, if something else is the case or about another the same, it is not contradictory but different from it. To the statement that ‘every man is white’ corresponds ‘not every man is white’, to ‘some man is white’ corresponds ‘no man is white’, to ‘a man is white’ corresponds ‘a man is not white’.

From this, it also becomes apparent that an indefinite affirmation and an indefinite negation do not always correspond to each other as one being true and the other false. And from this, we learn that an indefinite negation does not have the same value as a universal negation can have, and there is a difference between a universal and an indefinite negation. For if to each affirmation a single negation seems to be opposed, and there are different kinds of affirmation like the one that says:

A man is white

and the one that says:

Some man is white

they will also have different negations. And that which is an indefinite affirmation will have an indefinite negation, as in the one that says:

A man is white

is opposed by:

A man is not white

But the one that says:

Some man is white

will have the opposite negation that says:

No man is white

Therefore, if a particular definite affirmation and again an indefinite affirmation are different from themselves, it is true that they also have contradictory negations that are different. Therefore, the one that is:

No man is just

is different from the one that says:

A man is not just

And this is what Aristotle is now dealing with: he says that a single negation can always be set up against a single affirmation. And he tries to show the reason for this, that every negation has the same terms in the statement but is different in the way it states. For what the affirmation posits, the negation removes, and what the former connects as predicate to the subject, the latter separates and disconnects. Therefore, if the same predicate, the same subject in the negation is present as the affirmation had previously set up, there is no doubt that a single negation seems to oppose a single affirmation. For if there were two, either one would change the subject or the predicate. But whatever these are, they are not opposed. This is what he means when he says: “But if something else or about another the same, it is not contradictory but different from it.” The sense of such is: if the negation negates something else by predication than was in the affirmation (as if the affirmation is “A man is white”, the negation says “A man is not just”, it has predicated something different in the negation than was established in the affirmation) or if it asserts the same as was in the affirmation about a different subject (as if the affirmation is “A man is just”, the negation responds “A lion is not just”, the same predicate is present, the subjects are different): so if either it predicates something different in the proposition or it predicates about a different subject the same thing that the affirmation had previously set up, those are not an opposed affirmation and negation but merely different from each other; for they do not negate each other. And he added this demonstrative thing and that there could be no argument of a single affirmation except a single negation, whether in singulars, as in what he himself says by example: “Socrates is white, Socrates is not white”, or in universally predicated universals. With these, particulars are set up in contradictory opposition, as in the universal universally affirmative:

Every man is white

in the universally particular negative it is said:

Not every man is white

to the one which is universally particular affirmative:

Some man is white

is opposed a universally universal negative proposition:

No man is white

to the one which in the universal is non-universal affirmative:

A man is white

that which in the universal is non-universal negative:

A man is not white

so that what he says either about some particular pertains to these examples: “Socrates is white, Socrates is not white”; but what follows “or about a universal, universally” seems to have been said to those examples which are: “Every man is white, not every man is white, some man is white, no man is white”; but what he added “or non-universally” namely in universals he referred to those examples which are: “A man is white, a man is not white.”

From this point, he briefly repeats everything again, saying that he has already stated that one negation is opposed by one affirmation and not in any random manner, but contradictorily, specifically dividing truth and falsehood. He also recalls having described what these things are that he called contradictory. Indeed, he said they are angular, namely the universal affirmative and the particular negative, and then the particular affirmative and the universal negative. He further mentions having discussed, “And since others are contrary”. For not the same things are contrary that are contradictory. Contraries, indeed, are the universal affirmative and the universal negative to each other. He also elaborated, “Since not every true or false is a contradiction”. Now, he didn’t specifically, but generally discuss contradiction about those things that are opposed to each other, either in a contrary or subcontrary way. These, indeed, do not always divide truth and falsehood among themselves, so that one is always true, the other false. For it could happen that contraries would be found to be false simultaneously, and subcontraries true at the same time.

Regarding those things that are properly contradictory, he subsequently recalls having explained, and why one is true or false, and when. For a universal affirmation is opposed to a particular negation by the force of contradiction because they differ from each other in all respects, both in quality and in quantity. The former is an affirmation, the latter a negation; the former is universal, the latter is particular. Therefore, both cannot be found to be false or true. However, when this happens, it is clear that one is true, the other false. And this is what he says, “And why and when [it is] true or false”, recalling that it has been said, namely why there is opposition and when one is always true, the other false: certainly when they are established angularly, because propositions differ from each other both in quantity and in quality. But it is for us to say, when contrary or subcontrary oppositions are either found to be both false at the same time or both true at the same time, or one false, the other found to be true again. For in contraries, if those things which are not naturally predicable are predicated, both are false, like whiteness, as it is not natural to a human, both are false that predicate whiteness. It is false to say:

Every man is white

And it is false to say:

No man is white

But when both are false, the subcontraries are true, such as:

Some man is white
Some man is not white

But if something natural is predicated in contraries, the affirmation is true, the negation false, as it is natural for a human to be an animal, true is what says:

Every man is an animal

False is what says:

No man is an animal

In the same way, in subcontraries, the affirmation is true, the negation false. But if something impossible is predicated, the affirmation is false, the negation true, as it is impossible for a man to be a stone, if we say:

Every man is a stone

This is false, while:

No man is a stone

Is true. The nature of subcontraries also retains the same force: for here, the affirmation is false, the negation is true.

On Interpretation, Book 8

However, an affirmation and a denial are the same when they indicate one from one, whether universally applicable or not similarly, such as “Every man is white”, “Not every man is white”; “A man is white”, “A man is not white”; “No man is white”, “Some man is white”, if white signifies one.

The things which were diligently explained by us above, he now himself clarifies more clearly. We have said that a proposition is one which signifies any one thing and not several, so that it neither has an equivocal subject nor an equivocal predicate; for a proposition is thus made one. Now he says: a proposition is one which signifies one thing, that is, which neither has an equivocal subject nor predicate. Whether it be a universal affirmation or a universal denial or a particular affirmation or a particular denial or both indefinite or opposed to each other obliquely: it is that one proposition, which signifies one thing in affirmation or denial. But here the question is, how can a universal affirmation signify one thing, when universality itself is predicated not of one but of many. For when I say:

Every man is white

signifying individual men who are many, I designate many things in the affirmation itself.

Therefore, there will be no universal affirmation or denial, which can signify one thing, therefore because universality itself is predicated of many (as has been said) individuals. But to this we reply: when something universal is said, it is somewhat brought to the order of a single collection of the whole proposition and it is not applied to particularity but to universality which is a single quality: as when we say every man is just, we do not then understand individuals but whatever is said about man is brought to one humanity. Therefore, whether it is a universal affirmation or a universal denial or even in singulars, they can be made to be one, if they are held by one signification. And this is what he says those propositions which he proposed above, which are “Every man is white”, “Not every man is white”; “A man is white”, “A man is not white”; “No man is white”, “Some man is white”, seem to be one, if white, he says, signifies one. For if white, which is predicated, signifies many things or if man, which is the subject, is not one, there is not one affirmation nor one denial. But he shows this more clearly in the following, saying:

If one name is assigned to two, from which there is not one, there is not one affirmation, as if. Someone assigns the name tunic to a man and a horse, “This tunic is white” is not one affirmation nor one denial.

The sense of this is: if one thing signifies many, from which many one can be made, that affirmation, in which that name is either predicated or is subjected, does not signify many things, as in that which is a man. What we say man signifies animal, signifies rational, signifies mortal; but from these which signify many, one can be made, which is a rational mortal animal. Therefore, this name man, although there are many things which it signifies, however because they come together in a way into one body and they accomplish one thing from themselves combined, when it has been said in this way, as if from these which it signifies something one is made, that name signifies one thing which all those combined accomplish is apparent. And this is what he says: If indeed one name is assigned to two, from which there is not one, there is not one affirmation. For if such a speech signifies many things, from which combined one cannot be made a body, and they cannot those things which are signified by that one name come together into one species of substance, that is not one affirmation. However, what name is it that being placed does not make one affirmation, because it signifies many from which one cannot be made, he showed with the most clever skill of an example, saying:

If someone assigns the name tunic to a man and a horse, “This tunic is white” is not one affirmation nor one denial. For this differs nothing in saying than “A horse and a man are white”. This however differs nothing than saying “A horse is white” and “A man is white”.

If someone assigns to a man and a horse the name tunic, he says, and in the proposition this name is placed, that proposition is not one but multiple. For if for example a tunic a man and a horse are said, so that, when someone says a tunic, he designates either a horse or a man: if someone says in a proposition thus:

The tunic is white

it is not one affirmation. For what he says:

The tunic is white

is such a kind as if I say “A man and a horse are white”. For indeed the tunic showed a man and a horse by signification. But what he says:

A man and a horse are white

differs nothing as if he says:

A horse is white
A man is white

But these are two propositions and not similar, for in these the subjects are diverse. Therefore, if these affirmations are two, that affirmation also is double, which says a man and a horse are white. But if this again is double, since it was proposed to signify a tunic a horse and a man, when we say “The tunic is white” it does not signify one but many things. Therefore, if that affirmation which designates many things is not one, this affirmation also will not be one, whose either predication was equivocal or subject. And this is what he says:

Therefore, if these signify many and are many, it is apparent that the first also signifies many or nothing; for there is no man who is a horse.

If indeed, he says, a white horse exists and a white man exists, they signify many things, then that primary proposition, which is that a white tunic exists, from which these have flowed, also signifies many things. Or if someone should say that it does not signify many things, they undoubtedly concede that nothing at all is shown by the meaning of the proposition itself. For then a single name signifying many things could converge into one meaning, whenever one of the things it signifies could be joined and established as a substance, as in what I proposed above, when man signifies a rational and mortal animal, which can be congruently joined into one. But now if a tunic signifies both man and horse, it signifies many things, but these do not come together into one body. For it cannot be the case that some man is a horse. Therefore it either signifies many things, which is true, or if someone should argue that it does not signify many things but something joined from those things it signifies, since there is nothing that is joined from a horse and a man, it signifies nothing at all. For this is what Aristotle said,

For there is no such thing as a man horse,

and this should be read as one term, not pronounced discretely as man and then horse, but man horse, so that from these joined it can appear that absolutely nothing can be established. But why he said this, the following discourse shows. For if opposition must be made in this way, that against such an affirmation is opposed a negation, which divides the true from the false in opposition, so that one is true, the other false, there must be one affirmation and one negation, which happens, if neither the subject nor the predicate signifies many things. But if it signifies more things and is equivocal, it will not be the case that in such propositions one is always true, the other false.

However, Hermogenes thinks that what Aristotle says: “If one name is indeed applied to two things, from which no one thing can be made, there is not one affirmation,” applies in the case where we say “a man is capable of walking” because what we call capable of walking can be demonstrated to be either a biped, a quadruped, or a multiped animal. From all these, he says, one thing is made, which is “having feet”; this kind of affirmation, he says, does not signify many things.

But this does not follow Aristotle’s opinion at all. For from all these things, no one thing is made, nor do having four feet, two feet, and many feet make one have feet. For this is a matter of the number of feet, not the constitution of feet. Therefore Hermogenes should be disregarded.

However, both Aspasius, Porphyry, and Alexander in their commentaries they published on this book agreed with the explanation that I discussed above. But lest Aristotle’s example obscure us with its darkness any longer, this should be seen in a familiar example and word. For when we say: “Ajax killed himself,” it demonstrates both Telamon’s son Ajax and Oileus, from which two one thing cannot be made. For absolutely nothing is joined from two individuals. Therefore this kind of proposition signifies many things. But let us stop here for now.

On Interpretation, Book 9

Now, however, he is clarifying that the things he has already said above about propositions pertain not to all times but only to the past and the present, regarding how they hold themselves in truth and falsehood. In the future, the judgment in a proposition is not the same as it is in the past and the present, because truth and falsehood in propositions are already found when something has happened or when it is definite. For instance, when I say:

Brutus first established the consulship under King Tarquin,

someone else might say:

Brutus did not first establish the consulship under King Tarquin,

here one is true, one is false, and the affirmation is definitively true, the negation definitively false. Again, in the present, when we say:

It is springtime.
It is not springtime.

If this is said during the spring, the affirmation is true and definitively true, the negation is false and definitively false. But if this is said in the fall, the affirmation is definitively false and the negation is definitively true, because whether in the past or in the present, the truth of an affirmation or negation has already occurred.

In the future, however, things do not behave in the same way. For instance, when we say:

The Goths will defeat the Franks,

if someone denies it:

The Goths will not defeat the Franks,

indeed one is true, one is false, but which is true and which is false, no one can recognize before the outcome. And this is what Aristotle says:

Therefore, in those things that are and have been done, it is necessary that either an affirmation or a negation be true or false. In universals indeed, always universally this is true, that is false, and in those things that are singular, as has been said.

So not only is one always true, the other false in a complete contradiction, but it also has that quality where truth or falsehood is found definitively in any one thing. So that truth and falsehood in propositions are divided in singulars, but in universals, if particularities are opposed to them (as has been said), one must necessarily be true, the other false, but with definitive truth or falsehood of propositions, as I discussed above. Therefore, some things about the future need to be dealt with in the following, and because this is a greater task (as we can see than can be briefly said) and we have drawn out the series of the second volume for too long, let us end this tiresome length here.

Book 3

On Interpretation, Book 9 (ctd)

[INTRODUCTION]

The subjects contained in the sequence of this book are somewhat more profound than is fitting for a discussion within the logical discipline. However, as has often been said, since sentences express ideas and it is clear that things are the subject of these ideas, it is without a doubt that what is found in things is often transferred to words. Therefore, it seems right for me to expound upon Aristotle’s most subtle doctrines in a dual order of commentary. For what the previous edition holds prepares a somewhat easier path for those who venture into these deeper and subtler matters; however, what the second edition elaborates in revealing subtle doctrines, this is intended to be read and learned by those advanced in their studies and knowledge. Therefore, first, a few things need to be said, lest the matters which we will later discuss seem unfamiliar to our readers.

The Greeks call those propositions ‘categorical’ which are asserted without any condition of position, as in ‘it is day’, ‘the sun exists’, ‘man exists’, ‘the just man exists’, ‘the sun is hot’, and the rest which are proposed without the knot and bond of any condition. However, conditional propositions are of this kind:

If it is day, it is light

which the Greeks call hypothetical. They are called conditional because a certain condition is proposed, as when it is said, if this is, that is.

And indeed, those which the Greeks name categorical, we Latins can call predicative. For if a category is a predication, why also are not categorical propositions called predicative? Some of these, which signify eternal truths, as the things they signify always exist and never depart from their nature, thus the propositions themselves also have an immutable signification, such as if someone says:

God exists
God is immortal

For these propositions, as they speak of immortals, so also have an eternal and necessary meaning. This is not apparent in the nature of a single time, but in all. For when we say:

God is immortal

or:

God was immortal

or:

God will be immortal

it does not deviate from the necessity of its proper signification. We call those propositions necessary, in which what is said must necessarily have happened, is happening, or will certainly happen.

And these which signify eternal things are of eternal necessity. For even if in these the nature of truth is not apparent, nothing prevents there from being a constancy of necessity in nature, as if it is unknown to us whether the stars are even or odd, this cannot result in the stars seeming to be neither even nor odd but without any doubt they are either even or odd. For any multitude of these things retains one of the two in its nature. Therefore, even in these, if someone says:

The stars are even

and another responds:

The stars are not even

or if someone says:

The stars are odd

and another responds:

The stars are not odd

one of them necessarily speaks the truth, which, I say, even if what each of them says is unknown to us, it must necessarily be unchangeably true. These, then, are immutable and necessary propositions.

There are also others, which, not signifying eternal things, are nevertheless necessary, as long as those subjects exist about which the proposition affirms or denies something. As when I say:

Man is mortal

as long as man exists, it is necessary that man is mortal. For if someone says:

Fire is hot

as long as fire exists, the proposition is necessarily true.

There are yet others, which deviate from the nature of necessity and signify only certain contingencies, but these either have an equal tendency towards affirmation and negation, or tend more frequently to one or the other. They have an equal tendency, as when someone says I am to be praised today, I am not to be praised today. For neither affirmation nor denial will more likely occur, as both are equally not necessary. Those, however, which tend more to one side are of this kind, as when someone says a man grows grey in old age, a man does not grow grey in old age: it happens more frequently that he grows grey, yet it is not prevented from happening that he does not grow grey.

The nature of predictive propositions is gathered from the truth and falsehood of things. For just as things are in themselves, so are the propositions that signify them. If things retain any necessity in themselves, then propositions are also necessary. But if they only signify something as being present – as if someone says:

The man walks

he has shown that walking is present in the man – they are merely signifiers of something being present, devoid of any necessary condition. However, if things are impossible, propositions that demonstrate those things are called impossible. But if things happen and cease to happen contingently, the proposition revealing them is called contingent.

Now, as times are some future, some present, and some past, things subjected to these times are also varied by these temporal diversities. Some are of the present time, some of the future, and some of the past. Similarly, propositions sometimes hold the meaning of past time, as when I say “The Greeks overthrew Troy”; sometimes of the present, as “The Franks and Goths are engaging in battle”; and sometimes of the future, as “The Persians and Greeks will wage war.” And about past and present matters, as the things themselves, they are stable and defined. For what has happened cannot be not-happened, and what has not happened is not yet happened. Therefore, it is true to say definitively about what has happened that it has happened, and false to say that it has not happened. Again, about what has not happened, it is true to say that it has not happened, and false to say that it has happened. And this applies to the present as well. What is happening has a definitive nature in its occurrence, and so must also have definitive truth and falsity in propositions. For what is happening, it is definitely true to say that it is happening, and false to say that it is not happening. What is not happening, it is true to say it is not happening, and false to say it is happening. So we have already spoken about the definition of past or present propositions.

Now, however, it turns to the order of discussion regarding the truth and falsehood of those propositions which are said about the future and are contingent. It tends to call those things “future” which are commonly said to be “contingent”. According to the Aristotelian view, contingent is whatever either comes by chance or comes from the free choice and will of anyone or can possibly return to either outcome due to the ease of nature, that is, it can either happen or not happen. These things indeed have a definite and established outcome in the past and present. For things that have happened cannot have not happened, and things that are happening now cannot not be happening when they are happening. But for those things that are in the future and are contingent, something can either happen or not happen.

But since we proposed three modes of contingency above, which we treated better in physics, let’s provide examples for each. If I went out of the house yesterday and found a friend I had in mind to search for, but was not searching for then, it could have been that I didn’t find whom I found before I found them. But after I found them or after they were found, it could not have been that I had not found them. Again, if I went out to the field on my own last night, before this happened, it could have been that I did not go. But after I went or when I went, what was happening could not have not happened or what had happened could not have not been. Furthermore, it’s possible to tear this tunic I’m wearing: if it was torn yesterday, while it was being torn or after it was torn, it could not have been that it was not torn or was not torn. But before it was torn, it could have been that it was not torn. Therefore, it’s clear in the present and past, even in contingent things, that the event is definitive and established.

In future events, however, any one of the two can happen, but one is not definitive and tends to swing either way, and either this or that must happen by necessity, but for any one thing to definitely happen, or any other thing to definitely happen, it cannot be. For contingent things happen in either direction. But what I’m saying is such: it is necessary for me, leaving the house today, to either find a friend or not find a friend (for in all cases, there’s either affirmation or denial), but to find without doubt definitely or certainly if this is not it, again definitely not to find, just as yesterday, when leaving, I found a friend (it is definitive that it is not true that I didn’t find him), not in the same way in things that are contingent and future but only either this or that is and this by necessity. But for any one thing or any one event to be definitive and already almost certain, it cannot be.

And in this matter, propositions of contingent and future things are unlike those that are of the past or present. For although they are similar in that, in these there’s either affirmation or denial, just as also in those which are past or present, they are different in that in these, namely past and present things, the event is definitive, but in future and contingent things it is indefinite and uncertain, not only to us ignorant, but also to nature. For although we do not know whether the stars are even or odd, it is clear that one or the other is definitely in the nature of stars. And this is unknown to us, but very well known to nature. But it is not so whether today I will see a friend or not see, what will happen is unknown to us, but known to nature. For this does not happen naturally but by chance. Therefore, propositions of this sort will not be referred to our knowledge, but to the knowledge of nature itself, according to the uncertain event and inconstant truth and lie. For such is the nature of contingency, that it either holds equally in either part, as today I am to be praised or today I am not to be praised, or more in one, less in another, as an aging man to turn grey or an aging man not to turn grey. For one thing happens more, the other less. But nothing prevents what happens rarely from still happening.

So, therefore, the subtlety of Aristotle, intending to dispute these things, begins first from singulars and opens the way to the treatment of universals. For contradictions were occurring in two ways: either in singulars or in universals universally predicated and their opposites. However, he enters into this from the three things already said above: from chance, from free will, and from possibility, all of which he called indifferently by one name, inventing, as it were, a name for this, because these things are not of one and certain outcome, but can happen in any way. But this is indicative of an unstable nature that swings to either side without any resistance from anything. However, it should not be supposed that those things are of any outcome and of a contingent nature, whatever things are unknown to us. For indeed, if it is unknown to us whether ambassadors were sent from the Persians to the Greeks, it does not follow that their being sent is of uncertain outcome; nor, if medicine detects a fatal sign in the face of a sick person, so that it cannot be otherwise unless he dies, and this is unknown to us due to a lack of medical skill, it does not follow that he is judged to be of any outcome and of a contingent nature that he will die, but only those things are without doubt to be considered such, whatever things are unknown to us because, by their own nature, it cannot be known what kind of outcome they have, because they swing to either side due to their own unstable nature, i.e., to the outcome of affirmation and negation, they are changed by their own instability and inconstancy.

But there is a debate among philosophers about the causes of things that happen, whether everything happens by necessity or some things by chance. And on this point, there is a great dispute between the Epicureans, the Stoics, and our own Peripatetics, whose opinions we will briefly explain. For the Peripatetics, among whom Aristotle is the leader, establish both chance and the judgement of free will and necessity in things that happen and things that are done with the most serious authority and the most obvious reasoning. And they have proven that chance indeed exists in physical things: whenever something is done and it does not happen for which that thing was started that was being done, what happens is thought to have happened by chance, so that chance indeed is not without some action, but whenever something else happens through the action that is being done than was hoped, that happened by chance, the authority of the Peripatetics proves. For if someone, while digging the earth or sinking a pit for the sake of agriculture, finds a treasure, that treasure was found by chance, not without some action indeed (for the earth was dug when the treasure was found) but that was not the intention of the doer, that a treasure be found. Therefore, to the doer, one thing happened, but something different happened to the one doing the action. Therefore, this is said to happen by chance, whatever happens by any action, not for the thing started, which happened to someone doing something. And indeed this is in the very nature of things, so that our ignorance would not stand firm, so that things might seem to happen by chance because they are unknown to us, but rather that they would be unknown to us, because these things, whatever they are that happen by chance, hold no constancy of necessity or measure of providence.

The Stoics, however, thinking that everything indeed happens by necessity and providence, measure what happens by chance not according to the nature of fortune itself but according to our ignorance. For they think that happens by chance, which, though it is with necessity, is nevertheless ignored by humans. And about free will, too, the dispute is almost the same between us and them. For we place free will, with no external force compelling, in what appears to us to be done or not to be done, having weighed and considered, to which thing, having first formed a presumption, we come to accomplish and do, so that what happens takes its beginning from us and from our judgement, with no external force compelling violently or impeding violently. But the Stoics, giving everything to necessities, try to preserve the free judgement of the will in a certain reversed order. For they say that the soul indeed naturally has a certain will, to which the proper nature of that will is impelled, and just as in inanimate bodies certain things are naturally borne downwards, light things go upwards, and let no one doubt that this happens by nature, so too in humans and in other animals there is a natural will in all, and whatever is done by us according to the will which is natural in us they consider, yet they add this, that we desire what the necessity of that providence has commanded, so that indeed a will is naturally granted to us and what we do we do by will, which is in us, but that will itself is constrained by the necessity of that providence. Thus, everything indeed happens by necessity, because the natural will itself follows necessity, but also what we do happens from us, because that will is from us and according to the nature of the animal.

But we do not call free judgement of the will that which anyone has wished but that which anyone has gathered by judgement and examination. Otherwise, even mute animals would have free judgement of the will. For we see that they spontaneously avoid certain things, spontaneously rush at certain things. But if to desire something or not to desire it were properly to be held by the term of free judgement, this would not only be of humans but also of other animals, who does not know that the power of free judgement is absent from them? But free judgement is, which the very words reveal, a free judgement from us about the will whenever indeed certain imaginations rush upon the mind and stimulate the will, reason considers them and passes judgement on them, and what seems better to it, when it has weighed with judgement and gathered with judgement, it does. And for this reason, we reject certain sweet things and things showing the appearance of usefulness, certain bitter things, although unwilling, we nevertheless bravely endure: so much does free judgement consist not in the will but in the judgement of the will, and not in the imagination but in the consideration of the imagination itself. And for this reason, we ourselves are the principles of certain actions, not followers. For this is to use reason, to use judgement. For everything is common to us with the other animals, we are separated only by reason.

If even with mere indication, we are distinguished from other animals, why should we doubt that reason is what it is to use judgment? If someone removes this from things, they would have removed the reason of a man, and with man’s reason removed, even humanity itself will not remain.

Therefore, our Peripatetic philosophers have put it better, giving chance a role in things themselves, beyond any necessity, and also placing free will not in necessity nor in what is not from necessity, yet not in us as chance, but in the choice of judgment and in the examination of the will.

However, there is a certain disagreement between the Peripatetics and the Stoics in what is said to be possible, which we briefly resolve in this way. The Stoics define the possible as what can happen, and what is prevented from happening, they say, does not exist, referring this to our own possibility, as in what we can do, they would call possible, what is impossible for us, they would deny as possible. The Peripatetics, however, do not place this in us, but in nature itself, so that some things are such that they are possible to happen, and also possible not to happen, such as that it is possible for this pen to break, and also not to break, and they do not refer this to our possibility but to the nature of the thing itself. The view that everything happens by fate, a view held by the Stoics, is contrary to this. For what happens by fate comes about from principal causes but if this is the case, what does not happen cannot be changed. However, we say that some things are possible to happen, and also that they are possible not to happen, measuring neither from necessity nor from our possibility.

With these points clarified, it will suffice to add that it would have been easy for Aristotle, who adhered to a fixed point of view and discipline, to demonstrate the mode of contingent propositions about the future: to make both parts and therefore not to have a determined constancy of outcomes. If it were not so, all things would be believed to happen out of necessity, which will become clearer when we come to Aristotle’s own words. Aristotle did not inconveniently or inconsistently shift the debate to higher matters and perhaps those not relevant to the art of logic, when speaking of propositions. For it would not be possible to establish the correctness and significance of propositions, unless he had proven this to be so from things themselves.

Indeed, predicative propositions (as has been stated) do not lie in speeches or in the composition of predications but in the signification of things. Therefore, having explained all that needed to be predicted, let us arrive at the task of unveiling and untangling the sentences of Aristotle himself.

Therefore, in things that exist and have happened, it is necessary that an affirmation or denial is true or false, universally in universals, always this one is true, but that one is false, and in singular things, as has been stated. However, in those things that are not universally stated in universals, it is not necessary; it has been said also about these.

Categorical propositions, which can be called predicative in Latin (as we have already said), are judged by the complete rule of reasoning from the things that these propositions signify. Those that we call hypothetical or conditional derive their own power from the condition itself, not from the things they signify. For when I say:

If a man exists, an animal exists

and:

If a stone exists, an animal does not exist

the former is consequent, the latter is opposing. Therefore, from the consequence and opposition of propositions, all power in a proposition is turned. Hence, it happens that not the signification but the proposed condition establishes the power and nature of hypothetical statements: predicative propositions (as has been stated) primarily take substance from things.

Therefore, because some things exist in the present time, some in the past, as the occurrence of things in the present time or past is certain, so too the certain truth and falsity of predicative propositions about the past and present is certain. However, the mode of contradiction was twofold: either the universal was angularly opposed to the particulars or the singular affirmative meaning eradicated the singular denial through contradictory opposition. And in these, one was always found to be true, the other false. But in those things that were indefinite, it was not necessary that one be true, the other false. But in those in which truth and falsity were divided, in these not only is one always true, the other always false, namely in the past and present, but also one retains certain and definite truth, the other certain and definite falsity. But in those things that are in the future, if they are necessary propositions, even though they are said according to future time, it is necessary not only for one to be true, the other false but also for one to be definitely true, definitely the other false, as when I say:

The sun is going to enter Aries this spring

if someone else denies this, not only is one true, the other false, but also the affirmation is definitely true, the denial definitely false.

But Aristotle is not accustomed to call those things future that are necessary, but rather those that are contingent. Contingent things, however (as we have already said), are whatever things have an equal tendency toward being or not being, and just as they themselves have indefinite being and non-being, so too the affirmations about them have indefinite truth or falsity, when one is always true, the other always false. But which is true and which is false is not yet known in contingent things. For just as things that are necessary to be, in these being is defined, but things that are impossible to be, in these non-being is defined, so things that can both be and not be, in these neither being nor non-being is defined, but truth and falsity are taken from what is being and what is non-being of the thing. For if it is what is said, it is true, if it is not what is said, it is false. Therefore, in contingent and future things, just as being itself and non-being are unstable, yet it is necessary to be or not to be, so too in affirmations revealing the contingencies themselves, truth or falsity is uncertain (for which is true, which is false according to the nature of the propositions themselves is unknown), yet it is necessary for one to be true, the other false.

However, Porphyry does mix in some aspects of Stoic logic: these are not familiar to Latin ears, and this very matter under discussion is not recognized; therefore, we will skip over these details with due diligence.

However, the case is not the same for singular and future things. For if every affirmation or denial is true or false, and everything necessarily either exists or does not exist. If indeed one person says something will be, while another does not say this same thing, it is clear that it is necessary for one of them to speak the truth, if every affirmation is true or false. For both cannot be true simultaneously in such cases. For if it is true to say that it is either white or not white, it is necessary for it to be either white or not white, and if it is white or not white, it is true either to affirm or to deny; and if it is not, they are lying, and if they are lying, it is not. Therefore, it is necessary for either an affirmation or a denial to be true. Hence, nothing either is or becomes or happens by chance or indiscriminately, but everything occurs out of necessity and not indiscriminately. For either the one who affirms is true, or the one who denies. Similarly, either something will occur or it will not; for nothing is more likely to be or not be or will be. Moreover, if it is white now, it was true to say initially that it would be white, hence it has always been true to say any of those things that have happened, because they will be. And if it is always true to say that it is or will be, this cannot not be or not be in the future. And that which cannot not occur, it is impossible not to occur; and that which is impossible not to occur, it is necessary to occur. Therefore, everything that will be, must necessarily happen. Therefore, nothing will occur by chance or indiscriminately; for if it happens by chance, not out of necessity.

It has already been stated and will be mentioned again now that there are two contradictions in the above propositions, where one must be true and the other false. But the things to be said about future and contingent events will be better understood if we speak about those contingents that arise in single contradictions. For there is a fundamental contradiction of universals in contingents of this sort:

Tomorrow all Athenians will engage in naval battle
Tomorrow not all Athenians will engage in naval battle

However, in singular cases it is like this:

Tomorrow Socrates will argue in the gymnasium
Tomorrow Socrates will not argue in the gymnasium

But we should not be ignorant that contingents like these:

Socrates will die

and

Socrates will not die

and those which say:

Socrates will die tomorrow
Socrates will not die tomorrow

are not the same. For the former are not contingent at all, but are necessary (for Socrates will necessarily die), while the latter, which define time, are not counted among contingents, because for us it is uncertain whether Socrates will die tomorrow, but it is not uncertain to nature, and therefore it is also not uncertain to God, who knows nature best. But those are properly contingent, which are neither in nature nor in necessity but either in chance or in free will or in the possibility of nature: by chance, for example, when I leave the house not with the intention of doing so, I see a friend; by free will, as I can either wish or not wish, and whether I wish this before it happens is uncertain; by possibility, because when something can both happen and not happen, and before it happens, it is uncertain because it can go either way.

Therefore,

Tomorrow Socrates will argue in the gymnasium

is contingent, because this comes from free will. So, in contingents of this sort, if one is always true and the other always false about the future, and one is definitively true and the other definitively false, and things agree with words, everything must either be or not be and whatever happens, happens necessarily, and nothing can be that could not be, and there will be no free will and there will be no chance in anything, with necessity ruling over everything. For in these cases, that is, in singular contradictions, both cannot speak the truth. For these were contradictory, which cannot exist simultaneously. But neither can both negations and affirmations be false in contradictories. For these were contradictory, which could not simultaneously not exist. Therefore, one will speak the truth, one will lie. But if nothing is allowed in things of this sort, that is, contingent with an unstable order of events and uncertain declaration of truth and falsity, whatever is spoken truly in a definitive affirmation, this definitively must be, whatever is spoken falsely in a denial, this must not be. Therefore, everything will either be or not be out of necessity. So, there is neither chance, nor free will, nor any possibility in things, if indeed everything is held by necessity.

Aristotle, however, taking this hypothetical proposition, if everything that is said about the future is either definitively true or definitively false, shows everything happens necessarily and nothing by chance, nothing by judgement, nothing by possibility, in a well-ordered manner. And given that one is definitively true and the other definitively false, he shows everything happens necessarily due to the agreement of things and propositions in this way: for he proposes this condition and confirms its truth from the very necessity of things.

The condition, however, is: if every affirmation or denial led into the future is definitely true or false, and everything that happens occurs out of necessity, and nothing either by chance or by own and free will and judgment, nor truly by any possibility, which he called all these by either term. For he sets forth this condition saying:

If every affirmation or denial is true or false (it is to be understood “definitely”), and everything necessarily is or is not. If one indeed says that something will happen in the future, and another does not say this same thing, it is clear, one of them speaks the truth, if every affirmation or denial is true or false. For both will not be true at the same time in such cases.

Therefore, the sense of this is: “if every,” he says, "affirmation or denial is definitely true or false, and everything necessarily is or is not, which either an affirmation establishes or a denial destroys.

For if anyone says that something exists and another says that the same thing does not exist, one indeed affirms, the other denies but in affirmation and negation, which are placed in contradiction, one is always true, the other false. For it cannot be that both are true. For the discourse now is not about subcontraries or indefinites. For subcontraries, that is, a particular denial and particular affirmation, and indefinites both could be true in the same, but contradictories by no means. For it cannot be, that these which are contradictions either in singulars or universally opposed at right angles are ever true at the same time. For this is what he says “for both will not be true at the same time in such cases,” that is, both assertions will not be true in contradictory assertions.

Therefore, with this condition set: if every affirmation definitely is true or false, all things happen out of necessity, he tries to show this very consequence and resemblance of the things themselves and propositions saying:

If it is true to say, because it is white or not white, it is necessary to be white or not white, and if it is white or not white, it is true to affirm or deny; and if it is not, he lies, and if he lies, it is not. Therefore, it is necessary for the affirmation or denial to be true.

“Every,” he says, "affirmation and every denial with the things themselves is either true or false, but he takes examples of this matter from the present. For just as assertions behave according to necessity in the present time, so will they also behave in the future.

Let us therefore observe in the present what the necessity of things and propositions is. For if any proposition said about any thing is true, that thing which it said to exist must be. For if it said, because snow is white, and this is true, the truth of the proposition follows the necessity of the thing. For it is necessary for the snow to be white, if the proposition that was predicated about this thing is true. But if someone said that pitch is not white and this is true, it is clear that the truth of the proposition also follows the thing.

Moreover, propositions also follow the necessities of things. For if something exists, it is true to say that it exists, and if something does not exist, it is true to say that it does not exist. Thus, the necessity of a thing’s substance follows according to the truth of affirmation and denial, and the necessity of things accompanies the necessity of propositions.

This is certainly the case in true statements. The same is also true in false statements, but in the opposite sense. For if an affirmation is false, it is necessary that the thing about which it speaks does not exist, for example, if the affirmation that says “the magpie is white” is false, then it is necessary that the magpie is not white. Again, if a denial that says “the snow is not white” is false, it is necessary that the snow is white. Again, if something does not exist, any affirmation about that thing is necessarily false. But if, again, the thing does not exist which a false denial can state, without any doubt that denial is false and this must be so, for since a false denial can state about the snow that “it is not white”, this very thing that the false denial says, that is “it is not white”, does not exist. For the snow is not “not white”.

Hence, falsity and truth are converted according to the necessity of things. For if something exists, it is truly said of the same, that it exists, and if it is truly said, that thing about which something is truly predicated must exist; but if what is said does not exist, it is a false statement, and if statements are false, it is necessary that the thing does not exist.

But if these things are so, it is assumed that every affirmation and denial is definitively true, because the truth or falsity of propositions follows the necessity of things according to existence or non-existence (indeed existence according to truth, as has been said, non-existence according to falsity): nothing happens by chance or by free will or by any possibility. For those things which we call “either/or” are such things, which when they are not yet done and can be done and not be done, if however they have been done, could not have been done, like me reading Virgil’s book today, which I have not yet done, indeed it may not be done, it may also be done, but if I have done it, I could not have done it. Therefore, all things of this kind are said to be “either/or”. However, “either/or” itself more clearly shows what it is saying: for “either/or” is nothing more than this or not this, or will be this or not this. For “either/or” is that which either towards existence or towards non-existence equally holds itself, that is neither must it necessarily exist nor must it necessarily not exist.

However, some people, including the Stoics, thought that Aristotle was saying that future contingents are neither true nor false. For what he said, that it holds nothing more towards existence than towards non-existence, they thought as if it mattered nothing whether they are considered false or true. For they did not consider them to be either true or false. But they were mistaken. For Aristotle does not say that both are neither true nor false, but rather that any one of them is either true or false, but not definitively so as in the past or as in the present, but rather that there is a kind of double nature to declarative expressions, some of which are not only found to be true and false, but also among which one is definitively true, the other definitively false, whereas in others one is true, the other false, but indefinitely and changeably, and this by their own nature, not due to our ignorance or knowledge.

Therefore, it was rightly said that if every affirmation or negation was definitively true, nothing would happen or exist either by chance or under the common name “either/or”, nor would it exist or not exist contingently, but either it would definitively exist or it would definitively not exist…

[Smith: Lacuna as Meiser thinks]

...but rather everything arises out of necessity. This, indeed, follows from the person who either asserts the truth or denies it. But if this were true, it would likewise either be true or, with falsehood, not occur, which was stated by those announcing the truth or falsehood. But if this is impossible, and there are some things that do not exist by necessity (for we see that some things occur by chance, some by will, and some by their own possible nature), it is in vain to think, as in the past, that also in future statements one will be true, the other false definitely.

This, therefore, was one line of his argument. But he enters another, opposing himself, as it were, with a stronger debate:

“Furthermore, if it is white now, it was true to say first that it will be white, which is why it was always true to say any of the things that have happened, since it will be. If it is always true to say that it is or will be, this cannot fail to be or not be in the future. But what cannot fail to happen, it is impossible not to happen; and what is impossible not to happen, it must happen. Therefore, all things that are to come must happen. Nothing, therefore, will be either by chance; for if by chance, not by necessity.”

In order to prove that not all future statements are definitely true or false from the same strength of argument and the same possible outcome, he nonetheless takes a different course of action. For earlier from things that had not yet happened, if they were truly predicted to happen, he concluded that there could only be necessity in things. But now he takes his argument from things that have happened, if they were truly predicted before they happened, the chain of necessity contains the outcome of all things. For those who say that even contingent propositions have a stable mode of statement according to truth and falsehood, assert that everything that has happened could have been predicted, since they will happen. For this indeed was in nature before but the event of the thing itself revealed this to us. Therefore, if all things that have happened are and those that are to happen could have been predicted, it is necessary that everything that is said is either definitely true or definitely false, since their outcome is definite according to the present time. Therefore, in all things in which something happens, it is true to say, since it will happen, even if it has not yet happened. This, however, is proven true by the fact that what could have been predicted has happened; if it had been predicted, the event to come would have been predicted with definite truth.

Taking this, Aristotle leads to the same impossibility by the strongest argument and links the nature of the present time with the future statement. For he says it is similar to state about present things according to the necessity of truth and about future things: for if it is true to say, since it is something, it must be, and if it is true to say, since it will be, it certainly must be in the future: therefore, everything is to come by necessity: leading the argument to the same impossibility. However, he takes this order of impossibility from propositions which are indeed easier to understand, yet have the same strength in this way: “If it is always true to say, since it is or will be,” he says, “whatever was then true to predict, that cannot fail to be or not to be in the future. Just as what is truly said to exist in the present, this cannot fail to exist, if there was a true proposition about it, which said it exists, so also in the future what says something will be, if it is true, it cannot fail to be what it predicts. But if what is predicted by a true proposition cannot fail to happen, it is impossible not to happen. For it is the same to say it cannot fail to happen, as to say it is impossible not to happen. But what is impossible not to happen, it must happen. For the same impossibility has contrary predication to necessity, as he taught later. For what is impossible to exist must not exist. For what is not possible to exist, it is necessary not to exist. But if this is, and the opposites will be in the same way. What is impossible not to exist, this must exist. But it has been said that what true predictions announce is impossible not to exist, and this is to exist necessarily.”

Therefore, what is predicted must happen by necessity. Nothing, therefore, will be either by chance or at all according to free will, which the term “either” has completely enclosed. For what it says “either” holds both possibility and chance and free will in signification. Therefore, nothing happens by chance. For if it says that some things happen by chance, it destroys necessity in that thing again. For what is by chance is not by necessity. But nothing happens by chance, since everything comes from necessity, whatever true statement has predicted. But this kind of impossibility happens because it was granted earlier, everything that has happened could definitely have been predicted truly. For if what happens happens necessarily, it was true to say that it will be. But if it does not happen necessarily but contingently, it was not rather true to say that it will be but rather that it happens contingently. For who says it will be, places a certain necessity in the prediction itself.

This is understood from it, that if one says truthfully what is predicted to be in the future, it is not possible for it not to happen, and this necessarily happens. Therefore, the one who says that something of those things which occur contingently will be, in saying that what occurs contingently will be, may be lying; or if the thing which he predicted happens, he has nevertheless lied: for the event is not false, but the mode of prediction. For it should have been said in this way:

Tomorrow a naval battle will happen contingently

That is to say: it happens, if it happens, in such a way that it could not have happened. He who says thus speaks truly, for he predicted the event contingently. But he who denies it in this way:

Tomorrow there will be a naval battle

as if it were necessary, pronounces it thus. But if it happens, he has not therefore spoken truly because he predicted it, since he predicted what was to happen contingently as necessarily happening. Therefore the falsity is not in the event but in the mode of prediction. Just as if anyone, while Socrates is walking, says:

Socrates walks of necessity

he has lied, not in that Socrates is walking, but in that he is not walking of necessity, which he predicted him to be walking of necessity, so too in this he who says something will be, even if this happens, he is nevertheless false, not in what was done, but in that it was not done in the way he predicted it would be. But if it were definitely true, it would necessarily be in the future.

Therefore, he predicted it would necessarily be in the future, whatever he pronounced would happen without any other way. Therefore, the falsehood is found not in the event of the thing but in the declaration of the prediction. For it is necessary to predict something in contingencies, if the declaration will be true, in such a way that it indeed says something will be in the future, but so that it again leaves it possible for it not to be. However, this is the nature of the contingent to predict contingently in a declaration. But if anyone has simply predicted that what may happen contingently will be in the future, he predicts the contingent thing to be necessarily in the future. And therefore even if what is said happens, he has nevertheless lied in that this indeed happened contingently, but he predicted it to be of necessity.

Therefore, since there are four modes of truth and falsehood in statements, specifically those that are predicted in the future (either because both what is said will and will not be, that is, both the affirmation and the denial are true, or because neither will nor will not be, that is, both the affirmation and the denial are false, or because it will either be or not be, yet one definitely true, the other false, or again because it will either be or not be, with both being indeterminate in truth and falsehood, and equally tending towards truth and falsehood), he indeed previously taught that both being and not being can occur, when he says,

For both will not be at the same time in such cases.

He also taught for some time that there can’t be definite being or not being in contingent and future propositions. Now he adds this, that neither being nor not being, that is, neither can be truly said, can both be found false, which are said in future propositions. But if neither both are true nor both are false nor one definitely true, the other definitely false, it remains that one indeed is true, the other false, yet not definitely but in any and unstable way, as if this indeed or this must occur, yet a single thing, in any way, cannot definitively and necessarily come to pass or not come to pass. However, he begins to demonstrate that both cannot be false:

But neither because neither is true does it occur to say, as neither will be nor will not be. For first when the affirmation is false, the denial will not be true and when this is false, the affirmation happens to be not true. Moreover, if it is true to say that it is white and large, both must be; but if it will indeed be tomorrow, it will be tomorrow; but if neither will nor will not be tomorrow, neither will be, such as naval warfare; for it will be necessary neither for naval warfare to occur nor for it not to occur.

The sense of this argument is as follows: neither can it be said, he says, that neither of the propositions of contingents is true in the future. However, this differs nothing from saying that if someone says both are false. For this is impossible. For in contradictions, both cannot be found to be false. For this is the characteristic of contradictions: as they avoid the characteristic of subcontraries in that they cannot be true at the same time, so they also avoid the characteristic of contraries in that they are not found to be false at the same time. Therefore, they have their own nature, that they neither are false at the same time nor true. Therefore, one of them will always be true, always the other false. It is therefore impossible, when the denial is false, for the affirmation not to be true, and again when the affirmation is false, for the denial not to be true. Therefore, neither is this to say, that neither are true. Which he said through this when he says: but neither because neither is true does it occur to say, that is, it does not occur to us to say, this is impossible to say, because neither is true, namely what is proposed by affirmations or negations for contingents, namely future ones.

However, those who have thought that Aristotle judged both propositions in the future to be false, if they had very diligently read these things which he now says, would never be carried off by such great errors. For it is not the same to say neither is true as to say neither is true definitely. For a naval war will happen tomorrow and it will not happen, not because both are entirely false but because neither is true or either of them definitely false but this indeed true, that false, yet not one of them definitely but either of them contingently. To these he adds another thing saying: if the truth of propositions depends on the substance of things, that whatever is true in propositions, it must be said that this is so, if it is true to say that something will be white, the necessary event of the thing follows the truth. But if someone says that any such thing will be white tomorrow, if he has said this truly, it will necessarily be white tomorrow. Thus therefore, if someone says true that neither is true of those propositions which are said in the future, it is necessary that what is said and signified by those propositions neither is nor will be. For with both the affirmation and denial being false, neither what the affirmation says can happen nor what the denial says. Therefore, necessarily neither happens, which either the affirmation says or the denial. Therefore, if the affirmation says a naval war will happen tomorrow, because the affirmation is false, there will not be a naval war tomorrow. Again, if the same denies saying there will not be a naval war tomorrow, because this also is false, there will be a naval war tomorrow. Therefore, neither will there be a naval war, because the affirmation is false, nor will there not be a naval war, because the denial. But this absurdity not even the mind can imagine for itself. For who ever said that something by necessity neither is nor is not? Which he namely says, who says that both propositions in the future exist as false.

So, these inconsistencies occur and others like this, if every affirmation and denial or in those which are said universally or in those which are singular it is necessary for this to be true, that false, but nothing either is or happens in those which happen but all are or happen by necessity. Therefore, it will not be necessary either to advise or to negotiate, because if we do this, it will be this, but if this, it will not be. For nothing prevents this one from saying this will be a thousand years from now, but this one not to say. Therefore, it was necessarily true to say any one of those things then.

Believing that everything in the future is definitely either true or false in propositions, this impossibility follows: for nothing can happen either from the free decision of the will or from any possibility, nor by chance, if all things are subject to necessity. Although some have not hesitated to say that everything happens by necessity and have tried with certain arts to join what is in us with the necessity of things.

Some, such as the Stoics, claim that everything that happens comes about due to the necessity of fate, and that everything that the course of fate orchestrates necessarily happens. However, they believe that only those things are within us and are due to our will, which the force of fate fulfills and perfects through our will and through us ourselves. For they assert, our will is not within us but we desire and despise the same things, whatever the necessity of fate has commanded, so that even our will appears to depend on fate. Thus, because through our will, some things happen from us and the things that happen within us occur because the will itself is from the necessity of fate, we also perform those things that we do by our will, because the necessity has commanded them, impelled by this necessity. Therefore, in this way, they argue, confusing the meaning of free will, it is impossible to join necessity and that which is within us, and to link them together. For free will is within us, which should be free from all necessity and self-governing, and we are, in a way, masters of certain things, either to do them or not to do them. But if the necessity of fate also commands our will, the will itself will not be within us but in fate, and there will be no free will but rather a will serving necessity. Therefore, those who confine every act and event to necessity, claim that we also do not bend our knee unless fatal necessity has commanded it, nor do we scratch our head, nor wash, nor do anything. I will also add to this either doing or suffering something happily or unhappily. Therefore, they argue that there is neither chance, nor free will, nor any possibility in things, fearing to destroy free will, they imagine another meaning for it, through which the free will of man is nonetheless overthrown.

Aristotle’s authority, on the other hand, confirms that these things are so placed and established in things, that he does not explain now, what is chance or what is possible or what is within us, nor does he prove and demonstrate that these things are in things, but these things are so manifestly in things to him, that he says it is impossible for the opinion that all future statements are true, because it overthrows chance, possibility, and free will. For he thinks that these things are so established in things, that there is no need for any demonstration of them, but any argument that tries to overthrow either the possible or chance or that which is within us is judged impossible. And he has already shown how the definite truth in future propositions destroys chance. But now, he follows through with great force of argument, saying that it is impossible for all things of this sort to happen, if anyone imagines one part of a proposition to be definitely true or false.

However, following Porphyry, when we began the exposition of this argument, we predicted that he said what he did first about singular and future instances for the reason that the understanding of the argument would be easier if these were first seen in singulars. Now, after having thoroughly pre-discussed these singulars, he speaks of universally predicated universals and the contradictions that occur within them. He says it thus:

“If of every affirmation and negation, whether in those things that are universally stated about universals or in those that are singular, it is necessary that one of the opposites is true, and the other false.”

However, Alexander thinks that he spoke of singular and future instances as if he were speaking about future events that are involved in generation and corruption. For there are certain future events that are not involved in generation and corruption, such as predictions about the sun, moon, or other heavenly bodies. These events, which occur in those things that have a nature to be born and perish, do not always have to be one true and the other false. But I do not reject either explanation, for both are established with the most truthful reasoning. Yet any sense is such that by it Aristotle undermines the notion that necessity alone governs things: all that is natural is not in vain; humans naturally have the capacity for deliberation; if necessity alone would rule in things, then deliberation would be pointless; but deliberation is not in vain, for it is natural: therefore, not all in things can be necessity. And the order of this is as follows:

“These and other such inconvenient occurrences happen,” he says, “precisely because the chance in things is overthrown, and others because the possibility and the will of free choice are lost.”

And he has followed up on how these occur by saying:

“If of every affirmation and negation, whether in those things that are universally stated about universals or in those that are singular, it is necessary that one of the opposites is true, and the other false, then there is nothing indeterminate in those things that happen, but everything is or comes about out of necessity.”

For these inconveniences occur when every affirmation and negation is definitively true or false, whether in these contradictions that occur universally in universals or in singulars. For then, nothing is indeterminate, but all things are out of necessity, since the truth and falsity of propositions necessarily follow the outcome of things. Why, as he himself says, there should be no deliberation or negotiation, for if we do this, it will be so, but if we do that, it will not. Deliberation is overthrown, if it is in vain, and he says it is in vain who posits only the necessity of fate in things. For why should anyone deliberate if nothing will come of it, with all being governed by necessity? Hence, it will not be necessary to deliberate, or if one deliberates, they should not negotiate.

Negotiation, however, is to undertake something and to conduct a matter, not for profit but for some cause or action. For he himself will accomplish nothing through his action and deliberation, unless the necessity of fate is imposed.

He explained what deliberation is through this saying:

“If we do this, it will be so; if we do that, it will not.”

For deliberation always happens like this: if Scipio is there, he will deliberate like this: if I lead the army to Africa, I will remove Hannibal’s disaster from Italy; but if I do not lead, Italy will not be saved. For this is to say: if I do this, such as if I lead the army to Africa, this will be, that is, Italy will be saved; but if that, that is, if I stay here, this will not be, Italy will not be saved. And in all other things in the same way. But he showed at the same time that there is no necessity in deliberations. For, he says, if I do this, it will be so, and if I do that, it will not be. But if there were necessity in things, whether anyone did this or did not, what was necessary would occur. Therefore, what happens through the reason of deliberation does not happen by the force of necessity. He added to it the statement about deliberation and negotiation, and the order is like this:

“Therefore, it will not be necessary to deliberate or negotiate, for if we do this, it will be so; if we do that, it will not be. (For nothing prevents this man from declaring this to be future for a thousand years, while that man does not declare it. Therefore, either of them was right to say so at that time) nor to negotiate.”

That is, to begin an action and conduct a matter. For deliberation is prior, negotiation is posterior, but he placed negotiation after deliberation and he added everything that needed to be added about the nature of deliberation after the interposition of negotiation. And it is this way: if all things, he says, are driven by necessity, it will not be necessary to deliberate, for if we do this, this will happen to us, but if we do that, it will not happen. For nothing prevents one man from saying in vain, another man denying and saying: if we do this, it will be so, or it will not be. For what is going to happen will happen, whether he through deliberation guesses this can happen, if he does something else, or whether he denies this can happen, if he does what he said. For it will be necessary that whatever one of them said truly will happen. But if it is not at all necessary to deliberate, it will not be necessary to negotiate, that is, to start any business. For whether anyone starts or does not start, what is necessary will undoubtedly happen. Therefore, one man will not differ from another man. For we judge men to be better because they are superior in deliberation. But where deliberation is in vain, with all things being done by necessity, men also do not differ among themselves. For the deliberation itself makes no difference whether it is good or bad, since the outcome consists in the administration of fate’s necessity. Therefore, if men of good counsel are worthy of praise, men of bad counsel of reproach, this will not be justly so, unless the bad action and bad counsel, and conversely the good, is in our power and not in fate. For when the outcome of a matter is not constrained by any necessity, then also the free choice of the will exists, so as not to be enslaved to fatal necessity.

Therefore, neither those who place simple orders of things in this world should be accepted, nor those who in this mixed worldly mass also accept mixed causes of actions should be rejected. For neither those who say that everything happens by chance think correctly, nor those who invent everything by the violence of necessity are held in a sound opinion, nor is it evident that everything is from free will, but of all these both the causes and the outcomes are mixed. For there are some things that happen by chance, some out of necessity, and some we even see held by free judgment. And indeed, the will of our actions is in us. For our will is in a way the mistress of our actions and of the entire reason of life but the outcome is not likewise in our power. For while we do something for one reason out of free will, chance interposes from the same causes. When someone, for instance, digs a hole in order to plant a vine, if they find a treasure, the digging of the hole comes from free will, but chance alone brought about finding the treasure, yet chance has that cause which the will brought. For unless the hole had been dug, the treasure would not have been found. But some outcome depends on our wills, some it hinders, some violent necessity. For to eat or read and other things of this kind, as they are from our will, so too often their outcome depends on our will. But if now a Roman wishes to command the Persians, the decision indeed of the will is in him but harsh necessity retains this outcome and forbids it to be brought to perfection.

Therefore, both chance and will and necessity dominate all things and not one of these things should be placed in all but the mixed power of the three. From which it happens that of sinners more the mind rather than the outcome is considered and the mind, not perfection, is punished, for the reason that our will indeed is free but often the order of perfection is retained. For if all things were done either by chance or by necessity, neither praise worthy of those doing good, nor punishment of offenders, nor any laws would be just, which either would reward the good or repay penalties to the bad. I come now to that which is asked in many ways, whether divination remains if not all things in matters occur from necessity. For what is in true prediction, the same is in knowledge, and just as when someone predicts something true, what is truly predicted must be, so what someone knows will be, that must necessarily be.

But divination does not announce all things as future by necessity and for that reason it often divines in such a way, as is most easily recognized in ancient books: this indeed will happen but if this happens it will not happen, as if it could be interrupted and happen in another way. But if it is so, it does not happen by necessity. Whether indeed, if god knows all future things, all things must be, let us inquire. If someone says the knowledge of god of future events follows necessity, he will indeed be turned around, if not all things happen by necessity, god cannot know all things. For if the necessity of events follows the knowledge of god, if the necessity of events is not present, divine knowledge is destroyed. And who is so tortured in mind by such an impious reason, as to dare to say these things about god?

But perhaps someone will say, since it cannot happen that god does not know all future things, from this it happens that all things are by necessity, since it is unholy to take away from god the knowledge of future things. But if someone says this, it should be seen by him, that while he tries to make god know all things, he contends to make him ignorant of all things. For if someone proposes that he knows that the number two is odd, he does not know but rather he is ignorant. So what is not of the power to know, to believe that one knows is rather of impotence. Therefore, whoever says that god knows all things and because of this all things are future by necessity, he says that god believes things will happen by necessity, which do not happen by necessity. For if god knows all things will happen by necessity, he is mistaken in his notion. For not all things happen by necessity but some happen contingently. Therefore, if he knows what will happen contingently as what will happen by necessity, he is false in his own providence. For god knows future things not as happening by necessity but as happening contingently, so that he also does not ignore that something else can happen, yet he investigates what will happen according to the reason of men and of actions. Therefore if someone says all things happen by necessity, it is also necessary to snatch away good will from god. For his kindness produces nothing, since necessity manages all things, so that the doing good of god is in some way by necessity and not from his will. For if some things happen from his will, so that he is bound by no necessity, not all things happen by necessity. Who therefore is so impiously wise as to also bind god by necessity? Who says that all things happen by necessity, will this also happen by the force of impossibility? Therefore, it should be set in things that some things can happen by chance and be accomplished by will and be constrained by necessity and the reason which undermines any of these is to be judged impossible.

Therefore, Aristotle not unjustly leads to an impossible reason saying both possibility and chance and free will disappear, which cannot happen, if of all future pronouncements one is always true definitely, the other always false definitely. For the truth and falsehood of these necessity follows, which subjugates both chance and free will from things.

Therefore, repeating the same idea now, he says: nothing prevents whether one says something will happen a thousand years from now, or another denies it. For it is not according to affirmation or denial that all things should be done or not done. But if it is necessary for the things affirmed or denied to follow the one who affirms or denies, even if they do not say what they had to happen as they said, it is necessary for it to happen even when they do not say. And he says this in the following way:

However, it doesn’t matter whether some people have expressed a contradiction or not; for it is clear that things are such that even if one person affirms and another denies, it will not be or will not be because of the denial or affirmation nor in a thousand years more than at any time. Therefore, if at all times things were such that one of them would be truthfully said, it would be necessary for this to happen, and each of the things that happen would be such that it would happen by necessity. For when someone truthfully says that it will happen, it cannot fail to happen, and what has happened was always true to say, because it will happen.

Aristotle, considering the outcomes of necessary events not from the truth of the predictor but from the nature of the events themselves, says: although it is necessary, whoever has made a true prediction about something, for the event he has foretold to occur, however, the necessity of events does not depend on the truth of the prediction but rather the truth of divination is weighed from the necessity of events. For it is not necessary that something is because it has been truly predicted, but rather, because it was going to happen necessarily, for this reason, something could be truly predicted about it. But if it is so, the cause of an event occurring or not occurring is not the one who predicts it will happen or denies it. For it is not necessary for an affirmation or denial to be, but because the things that are to come necessarily are, because they have a certain necessity in their nature, which if someone runs into, what he predicts is true. Therefore, if whatever is now done it would have been true to say that they will be, whether he said or did not say, these things that are now done were going to happen necessarily. For it is not due to the one affirming or denying that there is a necessity in things, but because of the necessity of things, truth is found in the prediction or falsity. Therefore, even if those things that are now done could have been truly predicted because they will be and with these things so positioned, it would be necessary for the matter to occur, whether they predicted or did not predict, it is necessary that everything that happens is going to happen by necessity and nothing at all is either way in things. For if divination does not help the necessity of things at all and it doesn’t matter whether someone predicts that something will happen or denies it or no one predicts anything either in affirmation or in denial, it is clear that there is no difference either about it, whether someone has truly predicted that something will happen a long time before or a few days or hours or moments before. For it doesn’t matter: whether someone predicted a thousand years ago that what was going to happen by necessity, or a year or a month or a day or an hour or a moment ago, it would not change anything about the necessity of the event happening. For it doesn’t matter whether it was predicted or not predicted, it also doesn’t matter whether it is predicted closely or farther away. But if these things are so and everything that has happened had to have been going to happen, all free will is lost, all chance is taken away, all possibility of things beyond necessity is excluded.

But at the same time, Aristotle joining prediction and outcome confirms the necessity of things from the truth of the propositions themselves, saying: if these things are so, that at all times every single thing that happened was such that it could be truly predicted, it would be necessary for this to happen, that is, it would be necessary for what was truly predicted to occur. For each of the things that happen and are truly predicted is such that it happens by necessity. But the reason why this happens is this: what someone truthfully says, must happen. For that truth is born from the necessity of things. But if even what has happened was truthfully predicted to happen, there would be no doubt that everything comes from necessity. But if this, he says, is impossible (for we see some things come from the beginning of free will and from the source of our actions), why do we hesitate to exclude the trivial reason of all necessity and not to take away the choice of human life by the interposition of necessity?

For what distinction will there be among men, if free judgment of the will perishes? Why then are laws established, why are legal decisions publicly issued? Why are institutions and customs, public and private acts contained by the constitutions of princes and the bonds of judgments, if it’s certain that nothing is permissible according to human designs? For all things are in vain if free will does not exist. We know that laws and the like have been established to control the minds of men. But if these minds do not govern themselves and some violent necessity drives them, there is no doubt that these laws are void, which propose nothing to those who act spontaneously. But how impossible these things are, Aristotle himself proves, whose correct judgment neither eliminates chance nor necessity nor possibility on either side of nature, nor does it remove free will, but by mixing all these, he does not think the world is made up of more things and is contained by simple chance, necessity, or judgment of free will.

“But if these are not possible: for we see that there is a principle of future things and from what we deliberate and act upon, something.”

Impossible, he says, are those things that everything should come out of necessity. For we ourselves are also the principles of certain things, and our mind formed by reason and our actions directed by that reason hold the principle of certain things. For we seem to have what is within us: with nothing external hindering or compelling, we spring towards what seems to us, judging by reason. Not everything is to be snatched away by necessities. For the genus of all animals in that they are animals is subject to another by nature, another by the celestial course of stars, another also to the reason of the mind and the thought of the soul. Trees and irrational animals are subject only to nature, but cattle are also subject to heavenly decrees. But humans are subject to nature, stars, and their own will. For many things we do or suffer with nature dominating, such as death or such a state of the body. Many things the necessity of things themselves brings with it, such as those things which we wish to do, but still cannot do. But many things give the free judgment of the will, which are done by us wanting them [to be done if we wish]. Therefore, it happens that nature, which is the principle of motion, also shares in the power of free will by the reason of the soul. But the soul, as if bound to bodies, which nature dominates, shares in imaginations and desires and ardors of anger and others, which bodies bring, from that nature to which it is bound. But all subject to divine providence, we also depend on that will of the divine. So neither is the necessity of the heavens completely overturned nor does this discussion about things eliminate chance and affirm free will.

But these are greater things than can now be treated worthily. So we are also principles of things, and many things consist of our plans and actions. But if those things that are taken away by this reason are clear, but what is put, that is, every affirmation and denial in the future is not equally clear, why do we doubt to escape the mendacious way of reason and hold to those things which both are true and are manifest, rejecting those things which are neither firm with any truth nor bright with clarity? And because he had already said above: “Therefore, it is not necessary to deliberate or to negotiate,” he now returns this to what he says deliberating, saying “there is a principle of future things and from what we deliberate;” to what he says “nor to negotiate,” he returns what he added “and we act.” Therefore, such a short speech is constrained, so that the necessity of reason and order is held in it.

“And since it is altogether in these things which are not always in action to be possible and not, in which either happens and to be and not to be, therefore both to happen and not happen. And many things are manifest to us having this condition, as because it is possible for this garment to be cut and not be cut but worn out first. Similarly, however, it is possible not to be cut. For it would not be worn out first, unless it was possible not to be cut. Therefore, also in other things to be done, whatever are said according to power of this kind: it is manifest, because not all things either are or happen by necessity but some indeed either one or the other and not more either affirmation or denial, others indeed more in most cases one but it happens for the other to happen, the other least of all.”

The sense is indeed continuous from the above in this way: for above he says that if these are not possible that is, that all things are managed by necessity: for we see that there is a principle of future things from us and from our actions and plans: to these he added this: and since there are some things that are possible indeed to be when they are not and not to be when they are. These also are taken away together, if necessity dominates in all things. And the sense is indeed connected with the above in this way, but what the whole sentence holds of argumentation, must be seen in this way: that which is said to be possible is easily turned in either direction according to its nature’s reason, so that also when it is not, it is possible to be and nor when it is that it not be, no thing prohibits. So then we also separate what we call possible from necessity.

For it is said to be possible for me to walk while I’m sitting, in another way it is possible for the sun now to be in Sagittarius and in a few days to move into Aquarius. For it is possible in such a way that it is also necessary. But we usually call possible that which when it does not exist, can exist, and when it does exist, can again not exist. If therefore someone has subjected all things to necessity, that person intercepts the nature of possibility.

There are therefore three views on possibility.

Philo, for instance, says that a thing is possible if its own nature can accept the truth of a statement, such as when I say I will reread Theocritus' Bucolics today. If nothing external prevents this, it can, as far as it is concerned, be truthfully predicted. In the same way, Philo defines that which, when true, can never be susceptible to falsehood as necessary. He considers non-necessary that which could be false in its own nature. But something is impossible if it can never accept truth by its own nature. However, he asserts that the contingent and the possible are one and the same. Diodorus defines possible as that which either is or will be; impossible as that which, being false, will not be true; necessary as that which, being true, will not be false; and non-necessary as that which either is or will be false.

The Stoics, on the other hand, proposed the possible as that which could accept a true statement if nothing external prevents it, even if those things coexist with it. The impossible, they said, is that which never accepts truth when prevented by external events. The necessary, they stated, is that which, being true, could not accept a false statement under any circumstances.

But if all things occur from necessity, we must without doubt arrive at Diodorus’s incorrect view. He thought, for instance, that if a man were to die at sea, he could not have died on land, a claim neither Philo nor the Stoics make. Even though they don’t make this claim, they are forced to agree with Diodorus if they judge one part of a contradiction by its outcome. For if it was necessary for anyone who died at sea to have been killed at sea, it was impossible for him to have died on land. This is blatantly false. All those who insist that one side of a future contradiction is true are forced to accept these impossibilities, and they claim that necessity alone exists in things. For if someone has perished in a shipwreck at sea, this doesn’t mean that if he had never sailed, he would have been immortal on land. Therefore, contradictions of propositions are not indicated by the outcomes of things, but by the nature of those accepting the outcomes. If all things are available for me to go to Athens now, even if I don’t go, it’s clear that I could go; and since I could also not go, this is also unquestionable among those who rightly judge outcomes from the nature of things. It’s not that what is possible becomes necessary, but although what is necessary is possible; there is, however, some other nature of possibility which is distinct from both the impossible and the necessary.

Aristotle, for instance, holds this opinion about those things which must always exist. He thinks these have no relation to their opposites: snow, since it is always cold, is never associated with heat. Fire, too, is never related to cold, because it is always engaged in opposition to cold, that is, in heat. Therefore, all things that are necessary have no relationship to the opposite qualities that they possess. If fire had any relationship to cold, this relationship would be in vain, since fire never changes into cold. But we know that nature never acts in vain in performing its own function. Therefore, let those things be deemed necessary which have no relation to their opposites. But those things which do relate are not necessary, but because they appear to be naturally related to both sides of a contradiction, it is possible for events to occur on either side: this piece of wood, for instance, can be cut, but it is not precluded from having a relationship to the opposite, for it can also not be cut, and water can indeed be heated, but there is nothing to prevent it from also being cold. And to speak universally: anything which is not always the case or not always not the case, but sometimes is and sometimes is not, this very fact of being and not being implies a relation to opposites. These things lie between the impossible and the necessary. The impossible can never be, the necessary can never not be: between these lies the particular nature of some things which are midway between both, and which can both be and not be. Therefore, he now says: we see, he says, “in things that are not always actual” (and those are not always actual which have a relation to both opposites: fire is always actually hot, but water is not always so) therefore we see “in things that are not always actual” there are some possibilities and impossibilities, that is, to be and not to be. This happens in those things “in which both may occur, that is to be and not to be”, like water being hot and not being hot, becoming hot and not becoming hot.

Many things are clear to us, such as when an outcome can occur on either side without any obstacle, like a garment that can indeed be cut, but perhaps it happens that it isn’t divided by a knife before it is worn out by age. And it can happen that any garment disintegrates more by use than by being cut. Likewise, not only is it possible for it to be cut. For it wouldn’t be worn out before being cut, unless it were possible for it not to be cut first. For when it is worn out, it isn’t cut. He shows that this occurs universally in things that are made. For this, he says, happens in productions. Productions are those in which there is generation and decay. Whether something is created naturally or artificially, he calls them productions. In these productions, some things are in potentiality, others in actuality: like water that is potentially hot, for it can become hot, but in actuality, it is cold, for it is cold. But this state of being actual and potential comes from matter. For since matter is the recipient of opposites and has a relation to both sides of a contradiction, if it is considered in itself, it doesn’t possess any of the qualities it can take on, and it is nothing in actuality, but all things potentially. When it receives opposites, although it possesses one contradiction, it also has the other at the same time, but not actually, as in the same water. For the matter of water can receive both heat and cold, but when it has received either heat or cold, it is indeed hot if it happens to be so, it is also cold at the same time, but not in the same way. For it might be hot in actuality, cold potentially.

Therefore, what is potential in things comes from matter. Otherwise, there is absolutely nothing potential in divine bodies but everything is in act: like the sun, which never has light potentially, for it has no darkness, or there is no rest for the whole sky. Therefore, things stand in matter as if they were all potential, and nothing is in act, at the discretion of nature, which distributes individual movements in the matter itself according to their reason, and places individual properties of qualities in individual parts of matter. Nature itself has indeed ordained some of these as necessary, so as long as that thing exists, its property remains in it, like heat in fire. For as long as there is fire, it is necessary for the fire to be hot. However, it has assigned other qualities to other things, which they can lack. This necessary quality informs the substance of each thing. For this quality is conjoined with the matter itself by nature. But these other qualities are external, which can be admitted and can also be rejected. Hence there is generation and corruption.

Therefore, from nature and from this matter comes the possibility in things. In this regard, chance also sometimes creeps in, which is an indeterminate cause and falls without any reason. For it is not nature, which achieves nothing in vain, nor is it free will, which consists in judgment and reason, but chance is outside, which, because of another thing, arises suddenly and unexpectedly from certain deeds. From this possibility also comes the reason of free will. For if it were not possible for something to happen, but everything either necessarily existed or necessarily did not exist, free will would not remain. Therefore, it rightly proposed that not everything happens by chance as Epicurus did, or by necessity as the Stoic did, nor again does everything happen by free will, but by mixing all things together in a mixed world, it also proposed that the causes of things are mixed, so that some things indeed come about by necessity, others by chance or by free will or, finally, by possibility. All these things have one name, whether in chance or in will or in possibility.

But it makes a division of these things. For among those things which are either-or, some are equally related to affirmation and denial. They have, like my reading Virgil today and not reading: either way, it is either-or. For this is what it means “and no more either affirmation or denial”. For I can equally read Virgil now and I can not read.

However, other things are not equally related but although it happens more frequently in one thing, it is not prohibited to happen in the other, like the whitening of a man in old age. Indeed, this happens to many but “it happens to be otherwise”, that is, he does not turn white, while the other is hardly so, that is, he turns white. Therefore, by the strongest and most valid argumentation, it has established that both from possibility and from chance and from free will, a contradiction in one part about the future is not definitively true or false. And to these it adds this:

Therefore, what exists must exist when it does, and what does not exist must not exist when it does not, but not all that exists necessarily exists nor does all that does not exist necessarily not exist. For it is not the same for everything that exists to necessarily exist when it does, and to simply exist by necessity.

A twofold mode of necessity is shown: one which is put forward with the necessity of some accident, the other which is put forward by simple predication. And it is indeed put forward by simple predication when we say it is necessary for the sun to move. For not only because it is moving now but because it will never not move, therefore necessity comes in the sun’s movement.

The other kind of necessity, which is said with a condition, is like this: as when we say it is necessary for Socrates to sit when he sits, and not to sit when he does not sit. For since the same thing cannot sit and not sit at the same time, whoever sits cannot not sit, then when he sits: therefore it is necessary to sit. So when someone sits, then when he sits, it is necessary for him to sit. For it cannot happen that when he sits he does not sit. Again, when someone does not sit, then when he does not sit, it is necessary for him not to sit. For the same thing cannot not sit and sit. And this can be a conditional necessity, that when someone sits, then when he sits, he must sit by necessity, and when he does not sit, then when he does not sit, he must not sit by necessity. But this necessity which is proposed with a condition does not bring with it that simple one (for not everyone who sits necessarily has to sit but with the addition that is then when he sits), just as we say it is not necessary for the sun to move then, when it moves, nor do we add this, that the sun must move when it moves but we only say simply that the sun must move.

And this simple necessity said about the sun will perfect the truth in the speech. But that which is said with a condition, as when we say it is necessary for Socrates to sit, then when he sits, what we propose then when he sits and if we separate this condition of time from the proposition, the truth of the whole proposition perishes. For we cannot say that Socrates necessarily sits. For he can also not sit. For the power of Socrates has a certain agreement and kinship both to sit and also not to sit. Therefore, what we say, that it is necessary for Socrates to sit, then when he sits, we propose with respect to an accident. For since it happens to Socrates to sit and at the time when it happens to him it cannot not happen (for thus it will happen that the same thing both happens and does not happen to the same thing at the same time, which is impossible), therefore looking at his accident we say it is necessary for Socrates to sit but not simply but then when he sits.

And just as saying unqualifiedly that an Ethiopian is white is false, yet it is true that in some respect he is white (for there is whiteness in his eyes or teeth), so too it is false to say unqualifiedly that Socrates is sitting out of necessity, but it is true to predicate this necessity at a certain time, not unqualifiedly, like when we say when he is sitting. Just as we say unqualifiedly that the sun must move, if we say unqualifiedly that Socrates must sit, it is false. However, if we say “the marble Socrates,” since if Socrates is shaped while sitting, it is necessary for him to sit, it is true, and necessity can unqualifiedly be predicated of such a Socrates. Yet, about Socrates himself, such necessity is not spoken of unqualifiedly. For it is not possible for Socrates to sit out of necessity, unless perhaps when he is sitting. For when he is sitting, since he is sitting and cannot not sit, he sits out of necessity. Otherwise, he does not unqualifiedly sit out of necessity but contingently, for he can stand up. But that which is necessarily unqualifiedly, cannot change that necessity: for since the sun must unqualifiedly move, the sun cannot by any means stand still.

Therefore, Aristotle says: everything that exists, when it exists, and everything that does not exist, when it does not exist, must exist or not exist with condition, but not unconditionally or unqualifiedly. For these have been attributed to those necessities alone which are in no power or relation to opposites, like the sun to stillness or fire to cold. For it is not the same, says Aristotle, to exist necessarily something, when it exists, with condition or not to exist, when it does not exist, and unqualifiedly to say everything must exist or not exist. For condition made the former true, while the nature of unqualifiedness produced truth in the latter. “Similarly,” he says, “also in what does not exist.” Even in that which does not exist, it is the same: not everything that does not exist must not exist, but when it does not exist, then it must not exist, and this again with condition, not unqualifiedly.

So, with these two types of necessity demonstrated, one conditional, the other unqualified, he now returns again to contradiction concerning the future and the contingent.

And in contradiction, the same reasoning applies. Everything must necessarily exist or not exist, and future things must be or not be; however, it cannot be said categorically that one of the two necessarily is. For instance, it is necessary that there will either be a naval battle tomorrow, or there will not be one, but it is not necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, or there will not be one. That something will or will not happen is necessary. Therefore, since the truth of statements is the same as the truth of things, it is clear that whatever can exist either way, and where both alternatives are possible, the same applies to contradiction. This happens with things that are not always the case and are not always not the case.

He explained very clearly what he thought about contingent and future propositions by saying: in these, although the whole contradiction is stated, each part is true and the other is false, but not in a way that anyone can divide and respond by saying this one is necessarily true and the other is necessarily false. For instance, in what we say:

The sun sets
The sun does not set today

Someone dividing these easily says, since it is necessary for the sun to set today, it is false for it not to set. For the nature of divine bodies is such that in them there is no relationship to opposites, and therefore they either exist out of necessity or do not exist out of necessity. However, those things that are in generation and corruption are not like this. For they, in the very fact that they are generated and corrupted, are related to opposites, and therefore it is not the case in these to take one part of the contradiction and assert it as necessarily existing and to propose the other part as necessarily not existing. Even though any part of the total contradiction is true, the other part is false but unknown and indefinite, and not due to us, but the very nature of these things which are proposed is uncertain. Like in the proposition:

Socrates will read today
Socrates will not read today

One part of the total contradiction is indeed true, one false (for he will either read or not read) and this is seen in a confused way in the whole statement. But no one can divide and respond, because it is true that he will read or surely because it is true that he will not read. This is not because we do not know about the future, but because the same thing can either exist or not exist. Otherwise, if this were to happen from our ignorance and not from the variable and indefinite occurrence of these things themselves, that impossibility would happen, that necessity would govern everything. For not due to our knowledge that which is necessary is going to happen, but even if we do not know, the outcome of something will be determined and certain: it is necessary for that thing to happen. Therefore, since this cannot happen and there are some things which do not come about out of necessity but contingently, although in these the truth or falseness is found in any part of the total contradiction, no one should divide and say this one indeed is true, the other indeed is false.

He showed this kind of thing with an example: for it is necessary that either a naval battle will happen tomorrow or it will not happen, yet it will not necessarily happen tomorrow or it will not necessarily not happen tomorrow, so that someone can divide and predict by saying it will happen tomorrow, that he speaks truly and so it will happen definitively, or again it will not happen tomorrow, and this will happen in the same way: this cannot happen, but only indefinitely, any one part of the contradiction is true, the other false, but which one will happen.

The occurrence of events is indeed indiscriminate: either outcome can occur. This is the case because the outcome of events is not determined by some earlier causes as if by a kind of chain of necessity, but rather they come from our free will and choice, in which there is no necessity. “Indeed,” he says, “if sentences are true in the same way as things are,” this he derived from Plato, who said that sentences are similar to things, and in a certain way related in their signification, if the things are unchangeable and remain stable by reason, then the speech about these would also be true and necessary. But if it were something that never remained constant due to the variation of nature, then in speeches too, the fixed truth would not exist and no demonstration would arise from such speeches.

Thus, taking this, Aristotle said, as if well put: “since,” he says, “speeches behave in the same way as things, it is clear that whatever things are such that either of two outcomes can occur and the opposite of them can occur, it is necessary that the contradiction behaves in the same way. That is, about those unstable and indefinite things, if the things are doubtful and indefinitely variable in outcome, the contradiction about these things will also have a variable and indefinite outcome.” What, however, would be such things whose event would be various and indefinite, he most clearly demonstrated by saying:

Things that happen to those which are not always, and are not never.

For these are things where either outcome can occur, which are neither always (for they can be destroyed) nor always not (for they can be generated and become). For these are things that are related to opposites, as the very occurrence of things in their own substance teaches. For being and not-being are opposites. But what did not exist and is generated and comes from what did not exist, is. Therefore, it had in this relation to being and not-being, that is, to opposites. But if the same thing that is, is destroyed, from what was, it will not be. It will therefore again have relation to opposites. Therefore, just as the occurrence of these things that are in generation and corruption is indefinite, so also are the parts of contradictions, although in the whole contradiction one part is true, the other false. For it is indefinite and indiscriminate which of these is true, which the other is false.

Indeed, one part of the contradiction must be true or false, not this or that, but either, and rather one true, not yet true or false. Therefore, it is clear, since it is not necessary for this of every affirmation or negation of opposites to be true, and that to be false.

He taught us above that in things where either outcome can occur, one part of the contradiction is not definitively true, the other definitively false: now he draws an argument from the more frequent and the rarer. For he showed above that there are some things that happen more frequently, but it is not ruled out that the opposites sometimes happen. For it happens that it happens more rarely and less frequently. Therefore, if in those things that happen more frequently it is not necessary for one to be true, the other false (because anyone who says that a man grows gray in old age and that this happens out of necessity will be lying, for he can also not grow gray): if therefore in these there is not definitively one true, the other false, where one thing happens more frequently, the other more rarely, much less in those where the occurrence of opposites is equal. And it is true to say, because this happens more frequently, but not absolutely because it happens, therefore because, although more rarely, the opposite still happens. But if neither in those that are said of the more frequent is one definitively true, the other false and much less in those whose occurrence is equally indiscriminate, it is clear in future and contingent propositions that there is not one true, the other false. For this at the beginning he contended with the strongest argumentation.

For not as in those that are, so it is also in those that are not, yet it is possible to be or not to be, but as has been said.

He brings back the entire question to the division of times made at the beginning. For he said before that propositions are predicted about things that happen either in the present or in the past or in the future. And indeed, those that are spoken about the past or the present have a definite truth or falsehood, whether they are said about eternal and divine things or about those being born and dying, in which either can occur, since they have relation to opposites. But in future things, if someone speaks about divine and unchanging things, it is definitively one true, the other false. For these kinds of natures do not have relation to opposites. But in those things that are in generation and corruption, spoken about the future either affirmatively or negatively, the mode of definite truth is not the same, but of the whole contradiction indeed, one part is true, the other false, definitively however one is true, the other false at least. But now he did not place both times, namely the present and the past but only the present. For he said:

For not as in those that are, that is in those that are present.

But what he says, “in those that are not, yet it is possible to be,” he speaks of future things, which although they do not exist yet they can exist. For a proposition posited in the present does not behave in the same way as in the future, namely in those things that can either occur and consist in generation and corruption. For in those, that is, the past and present, definitively one is true, the other false: in these, that is, future and contingent, the truth and falsehood of propositions are not constrained by any definition.

But since we have, as far as we could, diligently expressed Aristotle’s opinion about future propositions, let us end the length of the volume.

Book 4

[Introduction]

Indeed, this book – called “On Interpretation” in Latin, but Peri Hermeneias among the Greeks – is an obscure discourse with the most obscure thoughts added, and for this reason I would not have addressed this with great volumes, had I not also given my utmost effort to explain as clearly as possible in this second commentary, what I had omitted due to its depth and subtlety in the first edition. But we must grant indulgence for verbosity, and the length of the work must be weighed against the obscurity of the book. However, there are levels with us that satisfy the reader’s diligence and distaste for those wanting to understand the great things most easily. Indeed, after these two commentaries on this book, we make a kind of summary, so that in some things, and almost in all, we use Aristotle’s own words, only that what he said obscurely with brevity, we make clearer with a few added things, so that a middle style may intervene between the brevity of the text and the spread of the commentary, gathering the diffusely said things and spreading the most narrowly written ones. And this will be done later.

Now however, since it has been shown above by Aristotle that the truth and falsehood of propositions about future contingents are not divided by a stable or definite reason, and whatever the broadest dispute has encompassed above, now this is his intention, to hand down the number of categorical propositions, whatever are made simply with a finite or infinite name. For it has been said in the first volume that a name is as ‘man’, and an infinite name as ‘non-man’. Predicative and categorical propositions are those which consist only of two simple terms: these either with a finite name, as it is:

A man walks

or with an infinite name, as it is:

A non-man walks

Therefore, he strives to hand down the number of these categorical and simple propositions, whatever are made by the addition of an infinite name.

But since all propositions differ either according to quality or according to quantity (according to quality, because this is indeed affirmative, that indeed negative, according to quantity, because this indeed includes many, that indeed few): according to what difference do these propositions that say a man walks and again a non-man walks differ from each other? According to quality or quantity? For what I say:

A man walks

designates a certain quality of substance, that is, a man walks and pronounces a defined thing and substance to be a walking species, but what I say:

A non-man walks

removes indeed a defined name, but signifies innumerable things. Therefore, what indeed says:

A man walks

differs according to quality, but what:

A non-man walks

seems rather to differ according to quantity. Or surely, this is more true: [that] what I say:

A man walks

‘man’ as a simple name is as close as possible to an affirmation, but what I say:

A non-man walks

‘non-man’ as an infinite name seems to be similar to a negation? But affirmation and negation differ according to quality, these however are similar to affirmation and negation: thus they rather differ by quality than by any quantity.

Is it more accurate to say that just as the proposition “Socrates walks” relates to the one stating “a certain man walks”, so “a man walks” relates to “a non-man walks”? For the proposition:

A certain man walks

if many are walking, it must be true, but if many are walking, such as:

Socrates walks

it is not necessary. For many can walk, and Socrates may not walk, but when many are walking, a certain man walks. This happens because what we say:

A certain man walks

We attach particularity to universality, that is, to man, and if any are under that universality, that is, under a walking man, it is necessary for the statement:

A certain man walks

to be true.

But when it is said:

Socrates walks

Since Socrates pertains to the property of a certain individual, unless Socrates himself has walked, even though all men walk, it is not true to say Socrates walks. Therefore, just as:

A certain man walks

is indefinite,

Socrates walks

is specific and defined; so it is also with what is man and non-man. He who says:

A man walks

says that a certain animal walks, and he determines it by name and quality, saying “A man walks”. But he who says:

A non-man walks

does not indeed subvert everything, but only man; he asserts that other animals are capable of walking.

Therefore, whether a horse or an ox or a lion walks, it is true to say “A non-man walks” but it is not true to say “A man walks”, if the man himself does not walk. Therefore, just as “A certain man walks” relates to “Socrates walks”, in which, if many men were walking, it was true to say “A certain man walks”, but not “Socrates walks”, unless Socrates himself was walking: so also in what is “A man walks” and “A non-man walks” can be said. For if many non-men were walking, it is true to say that a non-man walks, but it is not true to say that a man walks, unless the man himself walks. According to definition and property, they seem to differ more than any whole quantity or part or again any quality. For, as will be demonstrated later, that which says a non-man walks is more an affirmation than a denial. And this is enough to have said for now.

On Interpretation, Book 10

“But since there is an assertion about something signifying something, and this is either a noun or a nameless term, and there ought to be one thing about one thing that is in the assertion (now a noun and a nameless term have been mentioned earlier; for ‘not a man’ is not a noun I would say, but an indefinite noun; for ‘one’ in some way signifies ‘indefinite’, just as ‘not run’ is not a verb, but an indefinite verb), every assertion will be either from a noun and a verb or from an indefinite noun and verb. Apart from a verb there is neither affirmation nor negation. For ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, ‘becomes’, or whatever else is of this kind, are the verbs from which are the ones placed; for they signify time. Therefore, the primary affirmation and negation are ‘is a man’, ‘is not a man’, then ‘is not a man’, ‘is not not a man’; again ‘every man is’, ‘every man is not’, ‘every not man is’, ‘every not man is not’.”

In the second (as I suppose) book, we have stated beforehand that every simple statement or predicate consists of a subject and predicate, one of which would always either be a verb or could be the same as a verb, as if the statement of a verb were put: for example, when we say:

“A man walks”

a verb is posited; but when we say:

“A man is rational”

the verb ‘is’ should be understood here, so the whole understanding would be “A man is rational”. Therefore, it is necessary either that a verb always be the predicate, or that which is similar to a verb and can serve the same role in statements. As for what the subject should be, it should either be a noun or something that could act in place of a noun.

Therefore, the key takeaway is that every subject in a categorical proposition is a noun, and every predicate is a verb. But since, when he spoke about a noun, he introduced another kind of noun which strictly speaking and by itself is not a noun, but would be called an indefinite noun, which is uttered with a negative particle, and every proposition consists of the subjection of a noun, and a categorical proposition is one which predicates or denies something about something, and that about which it predicates is indeed a noun and since an indefinite is also called a noun in the noun, it is always necessary that a categorical proposition have a subject that is either a noun or what is called indefinite.

An indefinite noun, however, is what he now calls a nameless term. Therefore, every predicative proposition is divided into two species: either the subject is from an indefinite noun or from a simple noun. From an indefinite, indeed, when I say:

“Not a man walks”

from a definite and simple, however, as:

“A man walks”

Of this, however, there are two species which are from a definite and simple: which either apply a universal noun, as “A man walks”, or singular, as “Socrates walks”.

Therefore, this is the division: of all simple statements, which consist of two terms, some are from an indefinite noun as the subject, while others are from a definite and simple.

Of those that have a simple subject, some are those which apply a universal simple, others that apply a singular.

Above, however, he thoroughly taught what the differences are of simple propositions that put a simple noun in the subject: that some are universal, some particular, some indefinite. And indeed, they differ in this way according to quantity, but according to quality, in that some are affirmative, others negative.

The same also applies to these propositions which are stated with an indefinite noun as the subject. Some of these, indeed, are indefinite, others are definite. Of the definite, some are universal, others particular. Here too, according to quantity and not less according to quality, the same differences are found in the propositions of indefinite nouns too. For we say some are affirmative, others negative. The description given teaches which are simple affirmatives, which are negatives, and again which are affirmatives from an indefinite noun and which are negatives, and all these we have joined in their proper determinations, and no less have we also posited the indefinite in each species of propositions having a singular subject in simple propositions rejected.

Indeed, these are simple indefinites:

A man walks

A man does not walk. In contrast, these are divided by the negative term:

Not a man walks
Not a man does not walk

The universals from a simple subject term are these:

Every man walks
No man walks

In contrast, these are the universals divided by the negative term:

Every non-man walks
No non-man walks

Again, the particulars from a definite subject term are:

Some man walks
Some man does not walk

Again, these are the particulars divided by the negative term:

Some non-man walks
Some non-man does not walk

This, however, is clarified by the subject’s description:

Indefinites from a simple subject term:

A man walks

A man does not walk

Indefinites from a negative subject term:

Not a man walks

Not a man does not walk

Universals from a simple subject term:

Every man walks

No man walks

Universals from a negative subject term:

Every non-man walks

No non-man walks

Particulares from a simple subject term:

Some man walks

Some man does not walk

Particulares from a negative subject term:

Some non-man walks

Some non-man does not walk

Therefore, by dividing and making propositions out of two terms, it gathers every proposition from the subject term, and only takes those for division, which are made by the negative term, making this kind of division primary, so that it is: some propositions are from a definite term, others from a negative. Indeed, anyone wishing to divide everything according to the differences of propositions should not only take negative names but also verbs. But since he knew that indeed a negative name preserves the proposition he found, as if in the affirmative it would maintain the affirmative statement, as is:

Not a man walks

If in the negative, the negative, as is:

Not a man does not walk

However, the infinite verbs joined in the proposition do not affirm but complete a negation, therefore he was silent about these, because these which are more from the infinite verb belong to one quality of proposition that is the negative. For always from an infinite verb a negation is made. Therefore, gathering these, he says: “But because there is an affirmation about some subject” that is, predicating, that is because every proposition is from the subject and predicate. But that the subject “is either a name or a non-name.” A non-name, however, is what undermines the proposed name, as is ‘not a man’. For the name which is ‘man’ differs from the negative name by privation, which is ‘not a man’, and therefore also called it a non-name.

He then indicates the nature of the proposition which he treats, saying: “One should however be and of one this which is in the affirmation,” that is, a proposition must consist of two terms. He also mentions what he previously described as ‘un-named’, since what we would call ‘not man’ Aristotle would not call a name but what he would simply not call a name with this added infinite he would call an infinite name, therefore since it signifies one thing but is infinite. ‘Not man’ indeed, which removes the meaning of what we call man, is one and stealing a single meaning, there are many things left to the senses of those who understand. He also recalls that he called ‘not running’ an infinite verb above and not simply a verb.

“Therefore, since an affirmation is something about something, and this which is the subject must either be a name or unnamed, that is, an infinite name, a dual type of proposition is found. Indeed, every affirmation is either from a name and a verb, or from an infinite name and a verb. The same is also the case for negation. For you will never find an affirmation, for which a negation cannot be found. If therefore there are two kinds of affirmations, there are also two kinds of negations.” He also recalls what he has already said above. Although from a name and a verb, and again from what is not a name but an infinite name, and a verb, there is both an affirmation and a negation which are predicative i.e., categorical: but that there is any affirmation or negation other than the verb, or other than what signifies the same as the verb, whether in implication or in some other way, cannot happen.

He also lists words which almost in all propositions either fall under the proposition itself or are equivalent to it. “For it is,” he says, “or it will be, or it was, or whatever other words signify time, are verbs, as we can learn from these things which were previously put forward and conceded, when a definition of verbs was given: verbs are words that signify time. Therefore, if these signify time, there is no doubt that they are verbs. But there is no proposition other than these or other equivalent things.”

Therefore, it was correctly said that a predicative proposition cannot be established other than by verbs. However, one may rightly seem to oppose the question, why, having already said that other than the verb, propositions cannot be established by any method, he now repeats the same, as if he had foretold nothing about these things earlier. But this should not seem superfluous. “For indeed, a finite name with a negative particle is an infinite name, therefore perhaps one might think that negation is what we call not man. If this is a negation, man is an affirmation.” So that no one may fall into this error, he said this and suitably repeated it, that a statement cannot be other than the verb, as if he were to say: let no one think an infinite name is a negation nor a name an affirmation, for other than the verb, no affirmation or negation can ever be established by any method. He also knew in this that an infinite verb both signifies a negation and is an infinite verb. For what we call ‘not walking’ is both an infinite verb and a negation but in itself if it is said simply without some other additions, it is an infinite verb; but if indeed it is spoken with a name or with an infinite name, it is no longer an infinite verb but is taken as a negation: as ‘not’ a negative particle with ‘walks’ joined makes an infinite verb not walk but in the proposition which is “A man does not walk” signifies a man is not walking. And for that reason, he says subjects in propositions can either be names or infinite names, but predicates other than verbs cannot be.

For if one joins anything in affirmations, he has certainly predicated a verb, if in negations, not an infinite verb but only a verb, to which added the particle ‘not’ changes the entire quality of the proposition from affirmative to negative.

Therefore, he rightly made no difference of propositions about infinite verbs. For infinite verbs are then infinite, when they are alone. But if they are joined with an infinite name or a name, they are no longer infinite verbs but are finite, however with the understanding of negation in the whole proposition. Therefore, if as the Stoics want, negations were placed with names, so that “Not man walks” was a negation, it could be ambiguous, when we say ‘not man’ whether it was an infinite name, or indeed finite joined with negation.

But since Aristotle thinks that negations should be joined with verbs, infinite verbs are more ambiguous in understanding, whether they appear infinite, or finite with negation. And for this reason, it is distinguished as such: taken with a name an infinite verb becomes a negation and a negative proposition, as is “A man does not walk”, by itself however it is said, an infinite verb is, as ‘does not walk’. And for this reason, he here gave only the difference of names and infinite names in propositions, not also of infinite verbs, because he was speaking about joined things, that is about names or infinite names and verbs. In this conjunction, that which is said per se an infinite verb is a negation. For it is not necessary just as every proposition consists either of a finite name or an infinite name, so also to consist either of a verb or an infinite verb. For an infinite verb in propositions is not, but as often as something (as has been said) such is posited, indeed the verb is finite but the joined negation deprives and destroys the whole proposition. And indeed, an infinite verb joined to names must make a negation, but an infinite name joined to verbs does not need to make a negation.

Indeed, when we say “A man is not walking,” it is an affirmation, not a negation. Thus, because an affirmation must signify something about something, and the infinite noun is something, whenever we say:

A man is not walking

we are predicating walking (that is, “something”) of ‘not man’ (that is, “of something”). But if we say ‘he does not walk,’ we have not rather predicated something about someone, but from someone. For indeed he who says a man does not walk, takes away walking from the man, does not predicate about the man. Therefore, it is more a negation than an affirmation. For if it were an affirmation, that is, if the verb were infinite, it would predicate something about something. But now it takes away something from someone: it is therefore not an infinite verb, but rather a negation, whenever it is taken in the whole proposition.

However, he also subjected the number of propositions, which we also described above: undefined indeed first, afterwards, the ones that are lying in opposition. But if someone either reverts to these or intends here in mind, in which either our disposition or the Aristotelian one differs, he diligently recognizes. For we have proposed both contrary and subcontrary, but Aristotle has proposed only contradictory ones lying opposed to themselves. But Aristotle not only in the present time says there are the same differences of propositions which he proposed but also in other times which are external. However, he calls times external which are beyond the present, indeed the past and the future.

But when a third is adjacent, it is predicated, oppositions are said in two ways. I mean as is a just man; there is a third, I mean to add a noun or verb in affirmation. Therefore, for this reason there will be these four, of which two will hold themselves to affirmation and negation according to consequence as privations, but two in the least. I mean because either it will be adjacent to the just or not just, therefore also negation. Therefore, there will be four. But we understand what is said from these which are underwritten. A man is just, its negation is not a just man; a man is not just, its negation is not a not just man. For this is in place here and is not adjacent to the just and not just. Therefore, these, as was said in the resolutive ones, are so arranged.

There is also another inscription which is in this way: I mean because either it will be adjacent to man or not man, therefore also negation. And again a little later: For this is in place here and is not adjacent to man. Therefore, these, as was said in the resolutive ones, are so arranged.

What is said, however, is very obscure and is explained by many carelessly, whose opinions I will recount with a competent judgment. After he explained these propositions, which consist of two terms and have a subject or a noun or (as he himself says) an unnamed, that is an infinite noun, now he transitions to those, in which a third is adjacent is predicated, one subject with two predicates: as in that which we say a just man is a man is the subject and both just and is are predicated. Therefore, in this there are two predicates, one subject indeed.

And perhaps some might ask why he said it this way: but when a third is adjacent, it is predicated. For the third is not predicated but the second. For there are two that are predicated, one subject indeed. But it was not said in this way, as if in the proposition that says a just man is the third is predicated but because the third is adjacent and is predicated. Therefore, what is said to be a third refers to being adjacent. For indeed in that proposition that says a just man is the third is adjacent, it is predicated not as a third but as a second. Therefore, the third numbered is adjacent, the second numbered is predicated. This is therefore what he says: But when a third is adjacent, it is predicated, not because the third is predicated but the third adjacent is predicated, that is in the third place.

Therefore, he now makes a consideration in these propositions, in which a third adjacent is predicated as the second. And just as in these in which only ‘is’ is predicated, not also the adjacent was predicated, as a man is, he made a consideration of the subject, in how many ways the taken subject would make differences of propositions (either indeed the noun is the subject or the infinite noun), so now he speaks about the predicate and treats of the differences of predicates. For in these propositions, in which a third adjacent is predicated, the taken predicate, sometimes a noun, sometimes an infinite noun makes differences of propositions. And I mean the predicate in that proposition which posits:

A just man is

‘just’. For this predicate is about man, ‘is’ however is not predicated but the third adjacent is predicated – that is in the second place and adjacent to just, the third indeed in the whole proposition is predicated, not as a certain part of the whole proposition but rather a demonstration of quality. For this is not what we say is constitutes the whole proposition but what kind it is that is, because it is affirmative, it demonstrates.

And so, Aristotle didn’t say “the third is predicated” only, but “the third adjacent is predicated”. Because it’s not only the position of the third that’s predicated, but the third that is adjacent in the second place and somehow predicatively accidental. It could also be understood this way: Aristotle said ‘is’ in these third adjacent ones is predicated, since it can sometimes also be predicated essentially, like when someone says:

Socrates is a philosopher

So that this proposition means:

Socrates, the philosopher, lives

For ‘is’ is put in place of ‘lives’. So if anyone says it this way, two subjects are found, ‘is’ is only predicated, not also adjacent. Because what we say ‘Socrates is a philosopher’, both are subjects and ‘is’ is only predicated. But if anyone says “Socrates is a philosopher” to not any longer mean Socrates is a philosopher and lives but signifies Socrates philosophizes and is a philosopher, then one subject is found, two predicates. For Socrates is a subject, but philosopher and ‘is’ are predicates of which philosopher indeed is primarily predicated, ‘is’ is adjacent to philosopher and itself is predicated but not simply predicated but adjacent. There are also other propositions in this way:

Socrates reads in the Lyceum

And these are from three terms.

But it treats nothing of this nature of propositions for now, but only of those in which the third adjacent is predicated, as it is:

A man is just

But two oppositions of these indeed. Therefore, rightly, two oppositions are four propositions. But this is the sort: “When the third adjacent is predicated”, what is primarily predicated will either be a name or an infinite name. And these must either be predicated affirmatively or negatively. Therefore, the affirmation of a simple name and the negation of a simple name is one opposition and two propositions. The finite and infinite here are not subject but are taken as predicate, as in what is, a man is just, just is predicated. But this name will either be a name or an infinite name. Therefore, from these two affirmations arise: a man is just, a man is not just. And this indeed in indefinites. Later, it will be shown this also in those that are to be, which have a determination of universality or particularity. Now, however, let the order of these declare the subject number and opposition.

One opposition:

Simple affirmation: Simple negation:
A man is just A man is not just
One opposition:

Affirmation from the infinite: Negation from the infinite.

A man is not just A man is not unjust

I called propositions in the above description simple, in which a name is predicated, as:

A man is just
A man is not just

But from the infinitives, in which an infinite name is primarily predicated, as:

A man is not just
A man is not unjust

Whether ‘is’ is first said or later it’s the same and this should not trouble that Aristotle first said ‘is’, but we, however, last, but it’s the same.

Therefore, two oppositions arise, there are four propositions. These four propositions from the number of six propositions are reduced to fewer. For if they were simple and from two terms, they would be like this:

A man is
A man is not
Just is
Just is not
Unjust is
Unjust is not

And these would be six propositions. Indeed, it could even be added, as of an infinite name subject, propositions are made, as:

Not man is
Not man is not

But of these, it says later. But now those six simple ones have been seized into four, therefore, since simple things naturally return fewer when combined. For the very combination diminishes the number, as if there are ten things and each is combined with each, so that they become pairs, the number of combination returns five. So also here, there were six propositions in this way (as I have taught above), which were said simply, but these have been bound and diminished by combination. For those four set:

A man is
A man is not
Just is
Just is not

These have been reduced into two by combination. For a man combined with just made two propositions:

A just man is
A just man is not

Again, to that same man, when the infinite is predicated, other two propositions reasonably arise from the infinite predicate:

A man is unjust
A man is not unjust

Of these there are two oppositions, but four propositions. So then from six propositions, that is:

There is a man

There is no man

There is a just

There is no just

There is an unjust

There is no unjust

(Which while they are six propositions, nevertheless have three oppositions) a man being just and a man being unjust as subject, made only four propositions, but double opposition. Those, indeed, who said that more propositions arise from those, in which ‘is’ was predicated as an adjacent, than from those which consist of two terms, clearly did not understand the nature of things, which is so, that always from more simple things, rarer things return and fewer when combined.

He says: in “in which a third is predicated,” as this states, “a third” is not referred to predication but rather to order, he himself clarified this by saying: “I mean, like ‘a man is just’; I say that a noun or verb ‘is’ as the third thing that accompanies in affirmation.” He does not say that the third is predicated but that the third accompanies, that is, in order, not in predication, so that the third would indeed accompany, but what accompanies would be predicated, that is, not predicated simply. For the term ‘is’ is not above in the proposition. And therefore, if anyone wants to resolve the proposition into its terms, he does not resolve into ‘is’, but into ‘what is a man and just’. And there will be two terms: the subject indeed ‘man’, the predicate ‘just’, however ‘is’ what accompanies is predicated and the third accompanying is not in terms but rather in the quality of the proposition (as was said) will be more properly understood.

He says that a “noun or verb” ‘is’ for this reason. For he said that the third noun accompanies, in order to teach that the first two are namely ‘man’ and ‘just’, but he says “noun or verb”, because words are also names. And he said this before saying: “words in themselves are indeed names”. Therefore, after he said, what he wanted to show through what he said “is the third accompanying is predicated”, because it is to order not to predication, he later laid out how many propositions there are saying: “why then there will be these four”. But he mentioned a common quality of these four, which I will shortly thoroughly explain. But what happens is this: since these are four propositions, which he will posit below, two of them will have themselves “to affirmation and negation in such a way following consequence like privations, two indeed not at all”. But I will show this quality to these propositions shortly.

But now let’s consider, how he himself says that four propositions are made. For he says: “I say that ‘is’ will accompany either just or not just”. There will be a double proposition, if ‘is’ accompanies either ‘just’ or ‘not just’, in this way:

A man is just
A man is not just

Therefore, he says, if ‘is’ is placed in an affirmative manner now indeed with ‘just’, now however with ‘not just’, he has made twin propositions, namely affirmatives, the same is also with the conjunction of negation, that is ‘not’ also makes twin negations, namely those which are: ‘a man is not just’, ‘a man is not not just’. This is however what he says: “I say that ‘is’ will accompany either just or not just”. For if it accompanies ‘just’, it makes this affirmation:

A just man is

if it accompanies ‘not just’, it makes this affirmation:

A not just man is

Therefore, also a negation, which joined with ‘is not’, makes. Therefore, this negation coupled with ‘just’ and ‘not just’ will make two negations against those propositions which we mentioned above. For if it is added to ‘just’, it makes such a negation:

A just man is not

if to ‘not just’:

A not just man is not

But why does this happen? Because ‘is’ and ‘is not’ accompanies ‘just’ and ‘not just’, ‘is’ with ‘just’ and ‘not just’ making two propositions; ‘is not’ again with ‘just’ and ‘not just’ two other ones. Out of which four are two oppositions, as he said above: “when a third accompanying is predicated, oppositions are said in two ways”.

Therefore, the whole sense holds itself this way. But since there is also another text of the passage, it says: “I say that ‘is’ will accompany either to a man or not to a man, therefore also a negation. Therefore, there will be four. We understand however what we say from those things which are written below. A just man is, of this negation is not a just man; a not just man is, of this negation is not a not just man”, ‘is’ this place and ‘is not’ accompanying a man.

Expositors were troubled and they doubted what this would be, that when he had said above: “I say that ‘is’ will accompany either to a man or not to a man”, in their example and disposition, he did not add ‘is’ to man or not man but to just and not just saying: “we understand however what is said from those things which are written below. A just man is, of this negation is not a just man; a not just man is, of this negation is not a not just man”, and after he added ‘is’ and ‘is not’ to just and not just, which he did not say before but proposed to accompany to a man and to not a man, then he concludes: “for ‘is’ in this place accompanies a man”, who had set ‘is’ and ‘is not’ to accompany just and not just.

Hence, Alexander also says that it is the fault of the text, not the philosopher speaking correctly, and that the text must be corrected. However, he should not have been confused if he introduced ‘just and not just’ for ‘man and not man’. For these examples are more illustrative than a necessity of propositions. When he said ‘it applies to man and not man’, he took it as if a man were being predicated, as in the case of:

Socrates is a man

or again:

Socrates is not a man

Therefore, intending to take any predicate, sometimes simple, sometimes infinite, he introduced ‘just and not just’, indifferently having whether ‘man and not man’ or ‘just and not just’ would be predicated, as long as in the predicate a noun would sometimes be taken, at other times an infinite noun. Therefore, Alexander and others should not have been disturbed by this inscription in which the philosopher wished to exercise us, just as Porphyry and Herminus were not disturbed, who say that these examples are of a finite predicate and infinite, in which any predicate should be taken equally. For example, when he had said ‘it applies to man and not man’ is and is not, if he later introduced ‘white and not white’, it would suffice. For this predicate is sometimes taken as finite, sometimes as infinite by any names. And what he says ‘it applies to man and not man’ is and then he introduced ‘just and not just’ and added man, it should not be thought that he wanted to speak of the subjects, that is, of man and not man and then made an error in the predicate ‘just and not just’, but rather he took ‘man and not man’ as if it were predicated in something, as (as it has been said):

Socrates is a man
Socrates is not a man

So here ‘man and not man’ is predicated. Again, if someone says:

Man is just
Man is not just

it makes no difference. For in the same way, the predicate in one proposition is taken as simple, in the other as infinite, as if I say:

Snow is white
Snow is not white

in the same way. Therefore, the writing should not be blamed which, when it had previously proposed ‘it applies to man and not man’ is, introduced ‘just and not just’. For it makes no difference whether ‘just or not just’ or ‘man or not man’ is predicated, as long as the predication sometimes takes the infinite, sometimes indeed the finite, then when a third thing is predicated. The philosopher, most skilled of all things, wished to exercise our understanding and sharpness, not to confuse by false writing.

However, when he collects what he said above, he says: “For in this place it applies to man and not man” is and is not, he means, since in this proposition that says “Man is just”, which he had proposed above, ‘just’ is predicated of man, ‘is’ however will apply adjacent to ‘just’; and in the one that says “Man is not just”, since ‘just’ is predicated of man, ‘is not’ however will apply adjacent, ‘is not’ therefore will also apply to man. For this is what he says: “For in this place it applies to man and not man” is and is not. For if ‘just’ is predicated of man, is and is not applies adjacent to ‘just’, it will also apply to man, as has been said.

Alexander also thinks that this writing should be corrected and should be done this way, as we also previously explained: “For in this place it applies to just and not just” is and is not. But the order of the whole sentence has been carefully laid out, whether this writing or that. Neither should be changed. And one indeed has more exercise, the other ease but both arrive at one understanding.

Therefore, we must explain more carefully what he says: “Why therefore these four will be, of which two indeed will have themselves towards affirmation and negation according to consequence as privations, two however not at all”. For this place is constricted with great brevity and difficult with too much obscurity and subtlety. And we indeed, going through this in the first edition of this work, have explained and given as brief an exposition as in other things too.

But now what sense of truth it has in itself, what hides in this brevity, as much as ability allows, we ourselves will reveal, and as much as the reader’s mind can stretch. If perhaps they seem a little obscure to him, he should attribute it to the difficulty of the things; if however they are clearer than he thought, he should be grateful to his own acumen.

But first I will explain what Herminus thinks about this place as possibly as I can. Herminus says that propositions can be put forward in three ways with an infinite noun: either they have an infinite subject, as is

Non-man is just

or an infinite predicate, as:

Man is not just

or an infinite predicate and infinite subject, as:

Non-man is not just

Of these, he says, whichever have an infinite noun towards the predicate term are similar to those which declare some privation. However, those declare privation which say man is unjust. Therefore those of this kind which propose:

Man is unjust

those, he says, agree which are from an infinite predicate, as the one which is:

Man is not just

For it is the same thing, he says, to be a just man and a not-just man. But those which have either an infinite subject, as is:

Non-man is just

or both infinite, as is:

Non-man is not just

do not agree with the privative proposition, which is:

Man is unjust

There is no similarity of that proposition which says:

Non-man is just

and that which says:

Man is unjust

Nor indeed of that which proposes:

Non-man is not just

and that which declares:

Man is unjust

For those which have an infinite noun in predication, these agree with privatives, but those propositions which either have an infinite subject or both infinite are far different from privatives.

But Hermunius presented these, quite at odds with the complete understanding and rationale of the sentence, which would either occur from both being indefinite or the subject being indefinite. However, what he meant when he said “according to consequence”, or which two things held themselves “according to consequence” as privations, but which did not, he explained nothing clearly, and the meaning is no more clear after Hermunius’s explanation than it was before it.

We, however, follow Porphyry and, agreeing with this most learned man, we say this: there are four propositions, two of which are from definite nouns, and two are from indefinite predicate nouns. They are from definite nouns in this manner: the affirmation is a just man, the denial is not a just man. From indefinite predicate nouns, the affirmation is that which says:

There is an unjust man

The denial proposes:

There is not an unjust man

But we will call these propositions from indefinite predicate nouns infinite in the rest of the discussion, so the infinite affirmation is outside of the explanation, that which says:

There is an unjust man

And the infinite denial is that which says:

There is not an unjust man

So that what we were going to say is a proposition from an indefinite predicate noun, we call this infinite, and we call those other two which have no infinite noun neither subject nor predicate simple.

Therefore, the simple propositions are these:

There is a just man
There is not a just man

And I call any propositions that have privation privative. Privative propositions are in this manner:

There is an unjust man

For this will deprive the subject of justice, and again:

There is not an unjust man

This again will deprive the subject of injustice. Therefore, since there are two simple propositions, one affirmative, the other negative, and there are two privative, those also one affirmative, one negative, and there are also others infinite, again affirmative and negative, I say that, just as privative propositions, namely affirmation and denial, have related to simple affirmations and denials, so will those which are infinite relate to the same simple ones, namely according to consequence.

But what I am saying is this. Let the two simple ones be arranged first, that is, the affirmation which says:

There is a just man

And again, the denial which says:

There is not a just man

But let the privatives be arranged under these: under the simple affirmation indeed the negative privative, under the simple negative the affirmative privative, so that under that which says:

There is a just man

Place that which says:

There is not an unjust man

And under that which says:

There is not a just man

Place that which proposes:

There is an unjust man

Again, let the infinite ones be arranged under the privatives: under the affirmation, the affirmation, under the denial, the denial. Under the privative affirmation which says:

There is an unjust man

Arrange the infinite affirmative:

There is an unjust man

But under the privative denial which says:

There is not an unjust man

Place the infinite denial which says:

There is not an unjust man

And the description given teaches this:

SIMPLE

Affirmation: Denial:
There is a just man There is not a just man
PRIVATIVE
Denial: Affirmation:
There is not an unjust man There is an unjust man
INFINITE
Denial: Affirmation:

There is not an unjust man There is an unjust man

Therefore, with these things arranged, I say that, just as privative ones, that is affirmation and denial which say:

There is an unjust man
There is not an unjust man

Relate to simple ones which propose:

There is a just man
There is not a just man

According to consequence, so will the infinite propositions, affirmation and denial, namely these which are:

There is an unjust man
There is not an unjust man

Relate to the same simple ones which are:

There is a just man
There is not a just man

Let us see what the consequence of simple and privative ones is, so that we may recognize whether the infinite ones hold themselves to the simple ones, just as privative ones hold themselves to the same simple ones. Therefore, arranged in the first order are simple propositions, simple affirmation which says:

There is a just man

And simple denial which says:

There is not a just man

Under these, that is under simple affirmation, two denials, one privative which is:

There is not an unjust man

And the other infinite which is:

There is not an unjust man

But under the simple denial which says:

There is not a just man

Two affirmations, one privative which says:

There is an unjust man

And the other infinite which says:

There is an unjust man

It should also be seen in the description that the affirmations and denials regard each other angularly. For the simple affirmation:

There is a just man

Regards angularly both affirmations, namely infinite and privative which are:

There is an unjust man
There is an unjust man

Again, the simple denial which is:

There is not a just man

Regards angularly two denials, namely infinite and privative.

And indeed, in truth, a privative negation follows a simple affirmation. For if it is true to say that a man is just, it is true to say that a man is not unjust. For he who is just is not unjust. And we can put forward this continuous and joined proposition: if a man is just, he is not unjust. Therefore, a privative negation follows a simple affirmation, so if a simple affirmation is true, a privative negation will also be true, and the truth of a simple affirmation leads to the truth of a privative negation. However, this does not apply in reverse. Indeed, a simple affirmation does not follow a privative negation. For if it is true to say that a man is not unjust, it is not entirely true to say that a man is just. For it can truly be said of a horse that the horse is not an unjust man (for a horse is not a man at all, and therefore it is not an unjust man), but it cannot be said of a horse that a horse is a just man. Therefore, since it is not true of a horse that a horse is a just man, the truth of a privative negation does not lead to the truth of a simple affirmation. Therefore, a continuous proposition and a conjunction cannot be put forward from this. For it is not a true proposition, if someone says: “if a man is not unjust, he is just.” For of a horse (as has been said), it is true because he is not an unjust man, yet it is not true that a horse is a just man. Therefore, a simple affirmation does not follow a privative negation.

Therefore, it has been shown that while a privative negation would follow a simple affirmation, a simple affirmation would not follow a privative negation. Let’s look again at the opposite side of the argument. In contrast, a simple negation follows a privative affirmation, but a privative affirmation does not follow a simple negation. For if it is true to say that a man is unjust, it is true to say that a man is not just. For he who is unjust is not just. And the truth of the privative affirmative that says:

A man is unjust

is followed by the simple negation which is:

A man is not just

However, this does not turn the other way around. For a privative affirmative does not follow a simple negation. For if it is true to say that a man is not just, it is not entirely true to say that a man is unjust. For of a horse it is true to say that a horse is not a just man (for he who is not a man at all is not a just man), but it cannot be truthfully said of the same horse that a horse is an unjust man. For he who is not a man cannot be unjust. Therefore, the truth of a simple negation does not lead to the truth of a privative affirmation, but the truth of a privative affirmation necessarily leads to the truth of a simple negation.

Hence, it has been shown in both cases that a privative negation would follow a simple affirmation, but a simple affirmation does not follow a privative negation; again, a simple negation follows a privative affirmation, but a privative affirmation does not follow a simple negation.

Therefore, with these positions established, let us deal with infinite and privative propositions.

For privative and infinite affirmations agree with affirmations, and negations agree with negations in this way. The privative affirmation that says:

A man is unjust

agrees with the infinite affirmation that says:

A man is not just

Both of these, the privative affirmation and the infinite affirmation, mean the same thing, and although they differ in some speech utterance, they do not differ in meaning, except only that what the former, i.e., the privative, designates as unjust, the latter designates as not just. And again, the privative negation which is:

A man is not unjust

agrees and is in harmony with that negation which is infinite:

A man is not not-just

These also mean the same, as they agree with each other. However, the simple affirmation which says:

A man is just

is followed by the privative negation which says:

A man is not unjust

therefore the same simple affirmation is also followed by the infinite negation, that is the one that says:

A man is just

and the one that proposes:

A man is not not-just

For if a privative negation and an infinite one agree with each other, the one that a privative negation follows, the infinite negation also follows. But the simple affirmation which proposes:

A man is just

is followed by the privative negation which says:

A man is not unjust

therefore, the infinite negation also follows the same simple affirmation which states:

A man is just

Again, the same happens from the opposite side: since the privative affirmation that says:

A man is unjust

was followed by the simple negation which proposes:

A man is not just

it is also followed by the infinite affirmation that says:

A man is not-just

and the simple negation that says:

A man is not just

For if a privative affirmation and an infinite one agree, the one that follows the privative, the same follows the infinite. But the simple negation that proposes:

A man is not just

follows the privative affirmation that says:

A man is unjust

since a privative affirmation and an infinite affirmation mean the same thing and agree with each other: therefore, the simple negation that is:

A man is not just

follows the infinite affirmation that says:

A man is not-just

But this does not happen in reverse. For now it has been shown that an infinite denial follows a simple affirmation, and a simple denial follows the truth of an infinite affirmation, but it is not in reverse, so that a finite affirmation follows an infinite denial, and an infinite affirmation follows a simple denial. For if the private denial that is “he is not an unjust man” and the infinite denial that says:

He is not a not just man

Because the simple affirmation that says:

He is a just man

Does not follow the private denial that is:

He is not an unjust man

As we have shown above, the very same simple affirmation that proposes “he is a just man” does not follow the infinite denial that announces:

He is not a not just man

Furthermore, on the other hand, if the private affirmation that proposes:

He is an unjust man

Means the same thing as the infinite affirmation that says:

He is a not just man

But the private affirmation that proposes:

He is an unjust man

Does not follow the simple denial that says:

He is not a just man

Nor does the same simple denial that proposes:

He is not a just man

Follow the infinite affirmation that says:

He is a not just man

But although the reason for the consequence and necessity show this, let us also teach with examples what we have demonstrated by reason. For I say that the simple affirmation that says:

He is a just man

Follows the infinite denial that says:

He is not a not just man

Just as the same simple affirmation followed the private denial that proposes:

He is not an unjust man

For if it is true to say that he is a just man, it is also true to say of him that he is not a not just man (for he who is just is not not just), just as it was true to say, that the same who is just is not unjust. Therefore, an infinite denial follows a simple affirmation, just as a private denial followed the same. But this does not convert. For it is not immediately true that he who is not a not just man is the same as a just man. For a horse is not a not just man (for a horse is not a man at all: and he who is not a man at all, cannot be a not just man), but about a horse, about which it is true to say that it is not a not just man, it is not true to say of him that he is a just man, just as it would be true to say about the same horse the private denial that proposes:

He is not an unjust man

(For this could also be said of a horse) nor was it true that this would follow, that is, the private denial by the simple affirmation that would say:

He is a just man

Therefore, the simple affirmation that proposes:

He is a just man

Does not follow the infinite denial that is:

He is not a not just man

Just as it does not follow the one that agrees with the infinite denial, that is, the private denial that proposes:

He is not an unjust man

By the one that says:

He is a just man

The simple affirmation did not follow. Therefore, in concluding, it must be said that an infinite denial indeed follows a simple affirmation, just as it followed a private denial, but a simple affirmation does not follow an infinite denial, just as it did not follow a private denial.

Again, in another part, the same happens in reverse. An infinite affirmation is followed by a simple negation, just as a privative affirmation was also followed by the same simple negation. For whoever is not a just man is necessarily not just, just as whoever is an unjust man is necessarily not just. But indeed, if it is true to say that he is not a just man, it is not at all necessary for him to be an unjust man. A horse, for example, is not a just man (for whoever is not a man at all cannot be a just man) but no one can say of the same that a horse is an unjust man (for whoever is not a man cannot be an unjust man), just as when we said:

He is not a just man

it did not follow the privative affirmation which says:

He is an unjust man

For a horse is not a just man, but no one says of the same horse that he is an unjust man. Therefore, it must be concluded again that an infinite affirmation follows a simple negation, as it also followed a privative affirmation, but does not convert. For an infinite affirmation does not follow a simple negation, just as it did not follow a privative affirmation.

So then, since there are four propositions, two simple, two infinite, of which the two simple ones are:

He is a just man He is not a just man

and the two infinite ones are:

He is an unjust man He is not an unjust man

(and of these four, two indeed, that is, the infinite negation and the simple negation, follow the two, that is, the infinite negation follows the simple affirmation, the one which says:

He is not an unjust man

the one which says:

He is a just man

the infinite affirmation, however, the simple negation, the one which says:

He is an unjust man

the one which proposes:

He is not a just man

but the other two, that is, the simple affirmation and the infinite affirmation do not follow the infinite negation and the simple negation. This also happens in privatives, as the privative affirmation does not follow the simple negation, while the simple negation follows it, and again, the privative negation follows the simple affirmation, while the simple affirmation does not follow the privative negation): it was rightly said of these four, that is, of the two simple propositions and the two infinite ones, that two are consequential to the other two, and have some consequence to others, as the infinite negation and the simple negation follow the simple affirmation and the infinite affirmation, as do privations. For the privative negation followed the simple affirmation and the simple negation followed the privative affirmation.

Therefore, the two have a consequence, that is, the infinite negation and the simple negation have a consequence to the simple and infinite affirmation, as do privations also (for privations are likewise, as I have often shown above), but the other two do not have a consequence. For neither does the negative infinite follow the simple affirmative nor does the infinite affirmative follow the simple negative, as was also the case in privations. For in privations, neither did the simple affirmation follow the privative negation, nor did the privative affirmation follow the simple negation. The sense of this, therefore, is: “these four will be”, that is, four propositions, from which he said a double opposition would arise. But these four are two simple: the affirmative is a just man, the negative is not a just man, and two infinite: the affirmative is an unjust man, the negative is not an unjust man.

Of these, he says, the two, namely the negative infinite and the negative simple, will be related to the affirmation and negation according to consequence, that is, the two negations follow in this way the other two simple and infinite affirmations, as the privations followed them; “but the other two do not”, that is, the simple affirmation and the infinite affirmation: they will not be according to consequence, the two affirmations themselves to the two negations, namely the infinite and the simple, which they did not follow, as neither did these negations follow the privative affirmations.

But what he said about affirmation and negation should not be understood as if there is one affirmation or one negation, but rather because in the four propositions, in which indeed there will be two affirmations and two negations (affirmations: the simple one is “The man is just”, the infinite one is “The man is not just”, negations however: the simple one is “The man is not just”, the infinite one is “The man is not not just”), because the two affirmations, the simple one:

The man is just

and the infinite one:

The man is not just

were followed by two negations (the simple negation which is “The man is not just” followed the infinite affirmation which says “The man is not just”, and again the infinite negation followed the simple affirmation), thus (as has been said) the two affirmations, simple and infinite, were followed by two negations, simple and infinite, this was also the case with privations, hence it was said to have affirmation and negation according to the consequence of these four propositions, just as privations would also have. But he said regarding affirmation and negation, that two affirmations were followed by two negations, but not at all the other way around, that is, two negations were not followed by two affirmations. For neither did the simple affirmation follow the infinite negation, or the infinite affirmation follow the simple negation, as was also not the case with privations, which has often been demonstrated above. But let no one think that we are talking about the same kind of proposition of negation and affirmation. For we are not saying that the simple negation follows the simple affirmation. For this is impossible. For the simple affirmation and the simple negation never agree with each other, nor do the infinite negation and the infinite affirmation. For it cannot happen, that either the negation which says:

The man is not just

agrees with the affirmation which proposes:

The man is just

or that the affirmation which says:

The man is not just

agrees with the negation which says:

The man is not not just

[Smith: "Meiser suggests a lacuna here. What follows gives an objection raised by some unspecified people that the resationship of the following propositions is different and that there is therefore no consistency in them: a privative negation follows a simple affirmation, a simple affirmation does not follow an infinite negation. This objection requires a little more introduction than is given in the MS.]

For that which says:

There is a just man

a simple affirmation is followed by a negative privation which says:

There is not an unjust man

But they say that the negative infinite, which is:

There is not a non-just man

does not follow the simple affirmative which says:

There is a just man

So, just as the negative privation which is:

There is not an unjust man

follows the simple affirmative which says:

There is a just man

not in the same way does the same simple affirmation which says:

There is a just man

follow the infinite negation which says:

There is not a non-just man

To those it must be said that they do not understand this consequence correctly nor does anything in this consequence of propositions of this kind differ. Why indeed should they note, that the finite affirmation which says:

There is a just man

does not follow the infinite negation which is not a non-just man? For this should not seem to be anything strange. Therefore, indeed, the simple affirmation which says:

There is a just man

does not follow the infinite negation which says:

There is not a non-just man

because neither before did it follow the privation. For neither did the same simple affirmation which says:

There is a just man

follow the negative privation which says:

There is not an unjust man

and that is why it also does not follow the infinite. For the infinite and the privative (as has often already been said above) agree with each other. Therefore, there is no discrepancy. For if the simple affirmation followed the negative privation, it would also follow the infinite.

Now, however, since the simple affirmation does not follow the negative privation, neither does it follow the infinite negative. But those who assumed that the negative privation would follow the simple affirmation and in the same consequence said there was a discrepancy, that the simple affirmation did not follow the infinite negation, it was not necessary to assume a discrepancy but rather if, just as the privative negation follows the simple affirmation, so the infinite negation does not follow the simple affirmation, then in the consequence there would be a discrepancy, but now there is absolutely no discrepancy. And in this part, indeed, there is absolutely no discrepancy and discordance.

Let us now look at the other part, which they say there is a discrepancy in the consequences of the infinite and privative to the simple, so that in it also if anything truly disagrees we may see. For they say indeed that the privative affirmation which says:

There is an unjust man

agrees and concords with the simple negative which says:

There is not a just man

and just as the simple negation follows the privative affirmation, they say, because it does not follow the simple negation which says:

There is not a just man

the infinite affirmation which says:

There is a non-just man

For this does not follow it. To those it must be said again, that therefore the infinite affirmation which says:

There is a non-just man

does not follow the simple negation which proposes:

There is not a just man

because the privative affirmation which says:

There is an unjust man

does not follow the simple negation which proposes:

There is not a just man

But if the privative affirmation followed the simple negation, without a doubt, the infinite affirmation would also follow the same simple negation.

Now, however, since the privative affirmation does not follow the simple negation, neither does the infinite affirmation follow the simple negation. For the privative affirmation and the infinite affirmation agree with each other. But those who wished to show a discrepancy in the consequences of the infinite and privative to the simple, that while the simple negation follows the privative affirmation not in the same way does the infinite affirmation follow the simple negation, it was not necessary to infer a discrepancy but rather if, just as the privative affirmation which says:

There is an unjust man
There is not a just man

so the infinite affirmation which declares:

There is a non-just man

followed the simple negation which is:

There is not a just man

then it would have been necessary to say something about the discrepancy in the consequences of the privative and infinite to the simple.

Now, however, just as the privative affirmation does not follow the simple negation in the same way, it is clear that the infinite affirmation also does not follow the simple negation in the same way. There is no discrepancy in this, rather it is very similar in all respects, and those who wish to argue otherwise through this rationale are not accurately doing so. In fact, they tend to obscure the meaning further with greater obscurities. But rather, it should be understood like this, when Aristotle says: “Two of them will relate to affirmation and negation according to their consequences, as privations, but the other two will not,” we should understand it as if he said: Four propositions, two simple and two infinite, two, that is, the simple and infinite affirmations, are followed by two negations, simple and infinite, like privations (for in privations, the simple affirmative is followed by the privative negation, and the simple negation follows the privative affirmation). The remaining two, that is, the simple and infinite affirmations, have no consequence to negations, that is, simple and infinite, just as privations do not (for the privative affirmation does not follow the simple negation, nor does the simple affirmation follow the privative negation). Thus we say in this manner: “Therefore, there will be these four: two simple, two infinite, of which the two, that is, the simple and infinite negations, will have a relation to the simple and infinite affirmations according to consequence, as privations, but the other two will not,” that is, the simple and infinite affirmations, to the two negations, that is, simple and infinite.

For this is what he says: “They will relate to affirmation and negation in such a way, according to their consequences,” that is, negations will follow those that are affirmations, “as privations,” as it was said in privations, “but the other two,” that is, the simple and infinite affirmations, will not have a relation according to consequence to the two negations, that is, simple and infinite, just as privations also did not have a relation according to sequence. For the privative affirmation does not follow the simple negation, nor does the simple affirmation follow the privative negation.

There is also a simpler explanation, which Alexander gave after many other explanations that he considered, as follows: “There are,” he said, "four propositions, of which two are infinite, and two are simple. The two infinite ones equally relate in affirmation and negation to the privative ones, while the two simple ones do not relate similarly to these privative ones in this way: for the infinite affirmative agrees with the privative affirmative. For the infinite affirmative that says:

‘A man is not just,’

agrees with the privative affirmative which says:

‘A man is unjust.’

And the infinite negation that says ‘a man is not unjust,’ agrees with the privative negation which says ‘a man is not unjust.’ And indeed these two, that is, the infinite affirmation and the infinite negation, relate to affirmation and negation, ‘as privations,’ that is, they affirm or deny the same things that privations also affirm or deny. But the other two, that is, the two simple ones, do not relate in this way to affirmation and negation, like privations. For it is not at all the case that the simple affirmation agrees with the privative affirmation. For the one that says:

‘A man is just,’

does not agree with the one that says:

‘A man is unjust.’

Nor does the simple negation agree with the privative negation. For the one that says:

‘A man is not just,’

which is a simple negation, very much disagrees with the one that says:

‘A man is not unjust,’

which is a privative negation. Therefore, since there are four, a simple affirmation and a simple negation, an infinite affirmation and an infinite negation, two of these, that is, the infinite affirmation and the infinite negation, affirm or deny something in the same way as privations (this is what he means when he says: ‘They relate to affirmation and negation, as privations’), but the other two do not. For neither do the two simple ones affirm and deny in the same way as the two privative ones. For the simple affirmation differs from the privative affirmation, and similarly, the simple negation differs and disagrees considerably from the privative negation.

But this, as we have said, is Alexander’s interpretation, simpler than many others, yet it should not be rejected, as the previous one seems to be more accurate, because Aristotle himself attests to it. For he says shortly after: “So these things are arranged, as has been said in the Analytics,” which is what the Greeks call the first book of the Prior Analytics. For he arranged this consequence, which I mentioned in the previous interpretation, of private and infinite things to simple ones at the end of the Analytics.

Porphyry also says that there were some of his contemporaries who were interpreting this book, and since they were finding many things contrary to and discordant with the individual interpretations put forward by Hermias or Aspasius or Alexander, they thought this book of Aristotle’s could not be interpreted as it deserved to be, and many men of that time passed over all the teaching of this book, thinking it was an unfathomable obscurity. But we in the first edition briefly passed over this place, but because we placed it briefly there for simplicity of understanding, we here with all breadth have expanded the whole force and extent of the sentence. Therefore, since we have (as it seems to me) adequately expressed the preceding things, let us examine the order and sentence of the following text.

Similarly, if there is an affirmation of a universal name, as “every man is just”, not every man is just; “every man is not just”, not every man is not just. But it does not happen the same way with angular propositions. Sometimes it does happen though.

Having spoken in advance about some indefinite propositions, he now says about those that are limited according to addition of universality and particularity, that they too are similarly, just as those were also said without any determination, simple opposition and infinite. What he says: “Similarly, if there is an affirmation of a universal name,” others have understood it as referring to the number of oppositions and propositions. For just as there are two oppositions in those things that are indefinite and indeterminate, one of simple negation and simple affirmation, the other of infinite affirmation and infinite negation, and there are four propositions, as has already been said, so too in those things that have a termination according to universality and particularity, there are four propositions and a double opposition.

For one opposition is that of the simple universal affirmation and simple particular negation, such as:

Every man is just
Not every man is just

And this is indeed one opposition. The other is that of the infinite universal affirmation and infinite particular negation, such as:

Every man is unjust
Not every man is unjust

Therefore, here too, since there are two oppositions, there will undoubtedly be four propositions, just like in those things about which he spoke above, which were without determination.

Others who have closely examined Aristotle’s mind do not say that determined propositions are similar only in the number of oppositions and propositions, but also in consequence. For the consequence of negations to affirmations in these simple and infinite propositions, which are said without determination, the same similarity exists in those propositions that are made with termination. But since not all things are similar in all things, therefore he added a note: “But it does not happen the same way with angular propositions. Sometimes it does happen though.” The whole sense of this is as follows: he says, similarly, these propositions which are called determined are related to the infinite ones and the simple ones to the infinite ones, just as those which were called indefinite without determination were related. But there is some dissimilarity, because angular propositions in those things that are said with determination are not true in the same way as those that were uttered without determination, whether they were infinite or simple.

Let us see, therefore, first whether the same consequence is in those that are determined as in those that are put forward indefinitely, afterwards let us see what difference there is in the corners. Therefore, let not only those that are simple or infinite be arranged but also those that are privative. And let them first be arranged in this way: simple affirmation and simple denial and these indeed indefinite, that is, beyond the addition of universality or particularity. Under these, let a privative denial be placed under the simple affirmation, under the simple denial, however, a privative affirmation: these too, in turn, indefinite. Under these, however, let there be placed under the privative affirmation and under the simple denial an infinite affirmation, but under the privative denial and under the simple affirmation let there be placed a negative infinity, and these too indefinite and indeterminate without any universality or particularity. Under these, however, let these be arranged, which we call determined either by the quantity of universality or by particularity. And first, indeed, a simple universal affirmation, against this a simple particular denial. But under the simple universal affirmation, let a particular privative denial be placed, but under the simple particular denial a universal privative affirmation. Again, under the particular privative denial and under the simple universal affirmation, let a particular infinite denial be placed, but under the universal privative affirmation and under the simple particular denial, let there be placed a universal infinite affirmation. The description will be of this kind:

INDEFINITE

Simple affirmation: Simple denial:
The man is just The man is not just
Privative denial: Privative affirmation:
The man is not unjust The man is unjust
Infinite denial: Infinite affirmation:
The man is not non-just The man is non-just

DEFINED

Simple universal affirmation: Simple particular denial:
Every man is just Not every man is just
Particular privative denial: Universal privative affirmation:
Not every man is unjust Every man is unjust
Particular infinite denial: Universal infinite affirmation:
Not every man is non-just Every man is non-just

In this order of propositions which we have described above, what are corners is obvious. For indeed, affirmations are to affirmations, denials to denials. And in these, that are in definite, in the same way, corners are affirmations. Indeed, the simple affirmation which says:

The man is just

is a corner to the privative affirmation which says:

The man is unjust

and to the infinite affirmation which proposes:

The man is non-just.

But the simple denial which is:

The man is not just

is a corner to the privative denial which says:

The man is not unjust

and to the infinite denial which is:

The man is not non-just.

Likewise, if someone looks at the defined propositions, he will find the same without any doubt. For the simple universal affirmation which is:

Every man is just

is a corner to the universal privative affirmation which announces:

Every man is unjust

and to the universal infinite affirmation which proposes:

Every man is non-just

Similarly, the simple particular denial which is:

Not every man is just

is a corner to the particular privative denial which says:

Not every man is unjust

and to the particular infinite denial which proposes:

Not every man is non-just.

Therefore, affirmations are cornerstones to affirmations and negations to negations, both in the order of indefinite propositions and in the order of definite ones. Therefore, their sequence must be examined. For it has been said before that a simple indefinite affirmation is followed by a privative and infinite negation, but these are not followed by a simple affirmation. Furthermore, a simple negation follows an infinite affirmation and a privative affirmation, but these do not follow a simple negation. Again, if one looks to the order of definite propositions, he will find the same. A universal simple affirmation is followed by a particular privative negation and a particular infinite negation. For if the simple universal affirmation is true, which says:

Every man is just,

the particular privative negation is also true, which says:

Not every man is unjust.

This happens because the statement:

Not every man is unjust.

can mean the same as a simple one similar to it which proposes:

Some man is just,

a simple particular affirmation. For if not every man is unjust, some man is just. But a simple particular affirmation follows a simple universal affirmation. For when the universal affirmation is true, which says:

Every man is just,

the particular affirmation is also true, which proposes:

Some man is just.

But the statement:

Some man is just.

agrees with the particular privative negation which proposes:

Not every man is unjust.

Therefore, the particular privative negation will also agree with the simple universal affirmation. Hence, the statement:

Every man is just,

which is a simple universal affirmation, is followed by the one that proposes:

Not every man is unjust,

which is a particular privative negation. But this particular privative negation which says:

Not every man is unjust.

agrees with the infinite particular negation which says:

Not every man is not just.

For if it is true that not every man is unjust, it is also true that not every man is not just. For to be unjust is the same as not being just. But a particular privative negation follows a simple universal affirmation: therefore, the infinite particular negation follows a simple universal affirmation and agrees with it, if the universal affirmation is true first. Therefore, the statement:

Every man is just,

which is a simple universal affirmation, is undoubtedly followed by the particular privative negation:

Not every man is unjust,

and the infinite particular negation:

Not every man is not just.

Therefore, negations also follow affirmations here. But this is not reversible. For since (as has been said) the particular privative negation which says:

Not every man is unjust.

agrees with the simple particular affirmation, namely the one which says:

Some man is just,

the universal affirmation does not follow this particular affirmation (for if it is true that some man is just, it is not necessary for every man to be just): therefore, the simple universal affirmation:

Every man is just,

does not follow the simple particular affirmation:

Some man is just.

(for this could be true while the universal is false) but a simple particular affirmation agrees with a particular privative negation: therefore, neither does a simple universal affirmation follow a particular privative negation. Hence, the statement:

Not every man is unjust,

is not followed by the simple universal affirmation which proposes:

Every man is just.

But the particular privative negation agrees with the infinite particular negation: therefore, a simple universal affirmation does not follow an infinite particular negation. Hence, the statement:

Every man is just,

a simple universal affirmation, is not followed by the statement:

Not every man is not just,

an infinite particular negation. Therefore, the two negations, both infinite and privative, follow the simple universal affirmation, just as they did with those that are indefinite. For two negations, both infinite and privative, followed the simple indefinite affirmation. But not conversely. For a simple universal affirmation does not follow either an infinite particular negation or a privative one, just as an indefinite affirmation did not follow either a privative or infinite indefinite negation. Therefore, in this one order, definite propositions behave similarly to indefinite ones. For true negations are equally true with true affirmations, but the truth of affirmations does not follow true negations nor agree with them.

Let’s now examine in the other part, how universal affirmative statements lead to particular simple negations, that is, in a privative and infinite sense. For the universal privative affirmation:

Every man is unjust

is followed by the particular simple negation:

Not every man is just

For the one that says:

Every man is unjust

agrees with the simple universal negation that says:

No man is just

For if every man is unjust, no man is just. But this, that is, the simple universal negation, is followed by the particular simple negation. For if it is true that no man is just, it is true that not every man is just. But the simple universal negation agrees with the privative universal affirmation: therefore, the particular simple negation that is:

Not every man is just

follows the privative universal affirmation that proposes:

Every man is unjust

But this agrees with the infinite universal affirmation. For these mean the same thing:

Every man is unjust

and:

Every man is not just

Therefore, the particular simple negation that is:

Not every man is just

also follows the infinite universal affirmation that says:

Every man is not just

Here also the universal privative and infinite affirmations are followed by a particular simple negation, but not the other way around. Indeed, because the particular simple negation that says:

Not every man is just

does not follow the universal negation that proposes:

No man is just

(For it is not the case that if it is true that not every man is just, it is true that no man is just), and this, that is, the simple universal negation, agrees and means the same thing with the privative universal affirmation: therefore, the privative affirmative that says:

Every man is unjust

does not follow the particular simple negation that proposes:

Not every man is just

just as the same particular negation did not follow the universal negation. But the privative universal affirmation agrees with the infinite universal affirmation: therefore, the particular negation that says:

Not every man is just

does not follow the infinite universal affirmation that proposes:

Every man is not just

Therefore, here also two universal affirmations, that is, privative and infinite, are followed by a particular simple negation, just as the two indefinite privative and infinite affirmations were followed by an indefinite negation. But the two universal privative and infinite affirmations do not follow a particular simple negation, just as the indefinite privative and infinite affirmations did not follow an indefinite simple negation. Therefore, the definite ones behave in the same way as the indefinite ones according to the consequence. But the angular ones do not behave in the same way. For it happens that the angular propositions of the indefinite can be true at the same time. For if it is true that there is a just man, which is a simple indefinite affirmation, nothing prevents it from being true that which says:

There is an unjust man

and again that which says:

There is a man who is not just

which are privative and infinite indefinite affirmations. Again, it can happen that the angular negations are true, like the one that is:

There is no just man

if it is true, nothing prevents it from being true also that which says:

There is no unjust man

and that which proposes:

There is no man who is not just

Therefore, nothing prevents the angular ones from agreeing in truth in the indefinites, but only in these terms, as we have taught in the second volume of this work, which are neither natural nor impossible. For if someone says:

There is a rational man

to this, the angular ones cannot be true, these ones that say:

There is an irrational man

and again:

There is a man who is not rational

For rationality is naturally inherent in man. Similarly, we must also speak of the impossible. But if there are such things that are neither impossible nor natural to be (as in the proposition which says:

There is a just man

justice is not necessarily natural to man nor impossible to be), it is clear that the angular ones always agree in truth with each other. And this is also rightly said of the angular negatives. Therefore, in these terms which are neither natural nor impossible, it always happens that angular negations and affirmations are simultaneously true. And this is true in the indefinites. But in the definite ones, and those that partake of universality and particularity, it is not the same way. For in any terms, whether possible or natural or impossible, affirmations cannot agree with each other in truth in the angular ones, but negations can agree in truth with negations in the angular ones, only in these terms which are neither natural nor impossible.

First, we must demonstrate that affirmative statements can’t be simultaneously true with their corresponding contradictory affirmative statements in any given terms. For the statement:

Every man is just

And the statement:

Every man is unjust

Which is, of course, contradictory, cannot both be true at the same time. The statement:

Every man is unjust

Differs not at all from the proposition:

No man is just

But “Every man is just” and “No man is just”, since they are contrary, cannot both be true at the same time. However, the statement:

No man is just

Agrees and concurs with the proposition:

Every man is unjust

Therefore, the following statements can’t both be true:

Every man is just

And

Every man is unjust

Yet the same statement that proposes:

Every man is unjust

Agrees (as often mentioned) with the one that says:

Every man is not just

Therefore, neither of these statements can agree with the truth that every man is just. Hence, the universal affirmative:

Every man is just

In no way can concurrently agree with the contradictory universal affirmations:

Every man is unjust

And

Every man is not just

Just as those which were undefined and affirmations could agree with affirmations, and negations with negations, in truth. But in the defined ones, contradictory affirmations can’t both be true.

It is therefore rightly said that in all other respects the sequence is similar for defined and undefined. For negations agree with affirmations in truth, but not all affirmations agree with negations, which is a similarity in the sequence of both i.e., in both the defined and the undefined. But there is a difference, that “it does not happen similarly that contradictory ones are true”. And affirmations can be true with affirmations, and negations with negations in undefined, namely, those that are contradictory. But in the defined ones, it is in no way possible for contradictory affirmations to be true at the same time. This will be clear if someone proposes examples for himself in which there are natural and impossible terms, and in which there are possible and neither natural nor impossible ones. In all of them, he will find that defined affirmative statements cannot both be true at the same time. But what he added “however it sometimes happens” is like this: although defined contradictory affirmations can’t both be true at the same time in any proposed terms, it can still happen that negations are found to be true and there is this similarity to the undefined contradictory ones. For as there, negations could be true with negations in undefined contradictory ones that were neither natural nor impossible, so too here i.e., in the order of the defined, it is possible for defined negations to be true at the same time with defined contradictory negations that are neither impossible nor natural. For the particular negative statement which says:

Not every man is just

Can be true at the same time with the one that says:

Not every man is unjust

For it is possible that some are just, and some are not just and in this both are true, both the one which says:

Not every man is just

Because some are unjust, and the one which says:

Not every man is unjust

Because there could be some who are just. But this agrees with the particular infinite negation which says:

Not every man is not just

For it is the same to say “Not every man is unjust” as “Not every man is not just”. Therefore, these contradictory statements can both be true at the same time. For if some are just, some unjust, it is true to say that not every man is just, because some are unjust, and it is again true to say not every man is not just, because some are just. Therefore, defined contradictory negations can both be true at the same time and this is similar to the undefined, in which as affirmations agree with affirmations, so also in truth, contradictory negations agree with negations.

The sense of this passage then is as follows: “However,” he says, “the same applies,” that is, the sequence of propositions will be similar to what it was in the case of indefinites, “even if there is an affirmation of the universal name,” that is, even if definite affirmations and negations are put forth, as shown by the examples given previously. To the simple universal affirmation “Every man is just,” he contrasts “Not every man is just,” namely the particular simple negation. And again, proposing the infinite universal affirmation which is “Every man is not just,” he contrasts this with the one that says “Not every man is not just.” These, he says, behave in the same way with regard to consequence as the indefinites. How they behaved with respect to consequence has been shown above. “But,” he says, “the same does not apply to the angled ones being true.” For in the case of indefinites, angled affirmations could both be true at the same time. But this cannot happen with those that are definite. “However, it sometimes happens,” just as with the angled ones being true in the case of definites, just as with the indefinites. For definite angled negations sometimes agree in truth, as we also found in the indefinites described above. Thus, this understanding is complete.

Hermineus, however, explains it differently: “Similarly,” he says, “four propositions will create two oppositions if there are two simple and two infinite ones, but with a specification added.” He demonstrates it in the following way: he first proposes a simple universal affirmation that says:

Every man is just

Against this, he sets a simple particular negation:

Not every man is just

Under the simple universal affirmation, he proposes an infinite universal affirmation that says:

Every man is not just

Against this, under the simple particular negation, he proposes an infinite particular negation: “Not every man is not just.”

Every man is just
Every man is not just

Not every man is just
Not every man is not just.

So with these arranged in this way, two, he says, are the oppositions. For against the one that is “Every man is just,” he contrasts the one that proposes:

Not every man is just

This is so because the simple universal affirmation and simple particular negation are contradictory opposites. And this is one proposition. Again, against the same simple affirmation that says “Every man is just,” an infinite universal affirmation is contrasted, which says “Every man is not just,” and this in a contrary manner. For the one that says “Every man is not just” signifies the same and agrees with the one that says “No man is just.” But this, which proposes “No man is just,” is contrasted in a contrary manner with the one that says “Every man is just.” Therefore, even the one that proposes “Every man is not just” will be contrarily opposed to the one that says “Every man is just.” Therefore, this is also another opposition. So, there are two oppositions, just as in the indefinites: although they were opposed in a different manner, there were two oppositions. However, it is not always the case that they are both true according to the diameter, as he himself says. For since they were indefinites, it was possible for them to be true simultaneously according to the diameter and all with all. This can be clearly recognized if someone refers back to the descriptions of the indefinites. However, he says, this is not the case with those that are definite. He demonstrates this as follows: for the proposition that says “Every man is just” does not agree with its contradiction which says “Not every man is just.” Again, the one that says “Every man is not just” does not agree with the one that says “Not every man is not just.” For this was in agreement with its contrary. Therefore, when the simple universal affirmation that says “Every man is just” is true, without a doubt the one that says “Every man is not just” is false. But with this being false, its contradiction is true: therefore, the one that denies, saying “Not every man is not just,” is true. Therefore, these two angled propositions are sometimes found to be true:

Every man is just
Not every man is not just

So, it sometimes happens that they are true, but, he says, not always. For if you start from the infinite particular negation, it is not the same, that is, not the same truth follows. This is proven in the following way: for if it is true that “Not every man is not just,” then the one that says “Every man is not just” is false. For it is contradictorily opposed to it. But with this one being false, which says “Every man is not just,” it is not necessary that the one that proposes “Every man is just” is entirely true, because these two are opposed to each other as contraries. And we have previously shown that contrary propositions can both be false. Therefore, it is not necessary, if “Every man is not just” is false, that the one that says “Every man is just” is true. If it is not necessary, then it can happen that both are false. Therefore, it sometimes happens, when the proposition which says “Not every man is not just” is true, that the one that proposes “Every man is just” is false. Therefore, propositions do not always agree in truth according to the diameter. And indeed, Hermineus disturbs the order by not explaining this correctly. However, if anyone carefully understands either what Hermineus says or what we said above, they will recognize a great difference in the explanations and, judging the previous one to be better, will rightly agree with us, if they trust us.

Therefore, these two are opposite, but others add something to “not human” as the subject, such as “A just non-human is”, “A just non-human isn’t”, “A non-just non-human is”, “A non-just non-human isn’t”. No more oppositions will be beyond these. These, however, will be on their own outside of those, as they use “non-human” nominally.

He had already mentioned above that every subject is either from a simple and finite name or again from an infinite name, and he showed their oppositions, that there would be two and four propositions, two indeed having a simple subject name, but two having an infinite one. After these, when a third attribute was being asserted, he also said that oppositions happened in two ways, namely when a finite name was the subject or an infinite predicate, and he demonstrated their consequences among themselves, like the privative ones to the same simple ones, to which propositions from an infinite name would be compared. And since every variety of these propositions happens when a third is being asserted, either both the subject and predicate are finite or indeed the subject is finite, but the predicate is infinite (about which he had spoken above when he demonstrated their consequence), or they have an infinite subject but a finite predicate or both the subject and predicate are infinite. And propositions indeed have both as finite, such as:

A just human is
A just human isn’t

but a finite subject, infinite predicate, such as:

A non-just human is
A non-just human isn’t

And the consequence of these indeed was shown above. But there are others which have an infinite subject and almost use an infinite name nominally, such as:

A just non-human is
A just non-human isn’t

For these propositions use ‘non-human’ as a subject, that is as a name, and what is just as the predicate. This is indeed what he says: “But others add something to ‘not human’ as the subject”. For if anyone posits “non-human” indeed as the subject and predicates about this either a finite name, such as ‘just’, or infinite, such as ‘non-just’, in either way he will make a double opposition again. However, these four propositions are:

A just non-human is
A just non-human isn’t
A non-just non-human is
A non-just non-human isn’t

Therefore, in these four propositions, but with two oppositions, “non-human” indeed is the subject, but in the higher opposition the finite name which is ‘just’, is predicated. But those, he says, which have an infinite predicate but a finite subject or for which both the predicate and subject are finite, have some consequence to themselves, but these which we mentioned later, that is, which would have an infinite subject, but either an infinite or finite predicate, have no consequence to those propositions which, whether with a finite or infinite predicate, would consist from a finite subject nonetheless. This is indeed what he says: “But these will be on their own outside of those”, that is, those which retained an infinite subject in the order of the proposition have no consequence to the higher ones which consist from a finite subject.

After therefore he enumerated both which would consist from both finite ones, that is, both subject and predicate, and those which would be from a finite subject indeed, but an infinite predicate, he also added those which would be from an infinite subject and from a finite predicate and also those which would seem to consist from both infinites: after therefore he enumerated these, he says: “No more oppositions will be beyond these”. For every opposition (which was already said above) is either from both finite ones, such as:

A just human is
A just human isn’t

or from a finite subject, infinite predicate, such as:

A non-just human is
A non-just human isn’t

or indeed from an infinite subject, but a finite predicate, such as:

A just non-human is
A just non-human isn’t

or from both infinites, such as:

A non-just non-human is
A non-just non-human isn’t

but that a fifth opposition could be found, no reasoning of things makes it possible. Therefore, let these things have been said about these in which a third attribute is being asserted.

But in these where ‘not’ fits, as in that which is to run or to walk, they do the same as if ‘is’ was added, as in ‘every human runs’, ‘not every human runs’; ‘every non-human runs’, ‘not every non-human runs’. For it shouldn’t be said ‘not every human’ but ‘not’ should be added to the negation of ‘human’. For ‘every not’ signifies universal but because it is universal. But it is clear from that which is ‘a human runs’, ‘a human doesn’t run’; ‘a non-human runs’, ‘a non-human doesn’t run’. For these differ from those because they are not universal. Therefore ‘every’ or ‘no’ signifies nothing else but that it affirms or denies universally about the name. Therefore, the rest should be added the same way.

There are some propositions in which indeed a third attribute is asserted and this is known by the sound itself and the pronouncement, but there are others in which such a verb is asserted, which does not assert a third attribute, but it does contain and hold within itself the verb ‘is’. Which assertion if it is resolved into a participle and verb, that which was said before by the verb alone is predicated according to the predicate, in the third place ‘is’ will be asserted and a similar proposition becomes, as though it also had the verb ‘is’ in the pronouncement. For if someone says: “Every human runs” in this proposition there is one subject, the other is asserted. For ‘human’ is the subject, ‘runs’ is asserted. For we can’t suppose in this proposition that there are three terms, therefore because ‘every’ is not a term but the determination of the subject term. For it signifies that the universal thing, that is human, is universally subjected to running, when he says: “Every human runs”.

Indeed, there is no exception for man, where every determination is to run. Therefore, what we say to be ‘every’ is not placed in the position of a term, but is rather the determination of the subject’s term. Regarding this in the proposition that says: “Every man runs”, there are two terms: man and runs. Therefore in the same, although the word does not predicate in the utterance, it is concluded in the meaning of the word that is ‘runs’. For if anyone resolves this proposition that says: “Every man runs” into a participle and a verb, it makes “every running man is”, and the participle joined to the verb signifies the same thing that the verb signifies, which it encompasses both. For when I say “Every man runs”, I declare the action to be available to every man; but if I again say the same “Every running man is”, it proposes the same action to be again present in man. Therefore, the verb ‘runs’ signifies the same thing as ‘is running’. And in that proposition that says: “Every man runs” although it is not said in the utterance, yet the third is powerfully predicated, which is known from this, if the whole proposition is dissolved into a participle, that is, and a verb. Therefore, just as an assertion is made from the infinite noun subject, not in the same way can an assertion be made from the infinite verb but the force of negation is immediately recognized in it. For how do we make an assertion by saying:

Every non-man runs

By putting ‘non-man’, that is, the infinite subject, we cannot say an assertion is made when we propose:

Every man does not run

For this now is a negation. Therefore wherever ‘does not run’ or ‘does not work’ or ‘does not walk’ or ‘does not read’ is, a negation is made in all, in whichever the infinite verb is predicated.

However, someone will doubt whether, just as an assertion cannot be made from the infinite verb but always a negation from this predicate is made, so also if the same proposition is resolved into a participle and a verb, can an assertion be made from the infinite participle. For it is asked whether, as in this proposition that says:

Every man runs

who proposes thus by saying:

Every man does not run

cannot make an assertion but without doubt makes a negation, so also if the same is resolved into a participle and a verb, to say someone:

Every man is running

if it is made infinite, ‘not running’ and it is said:

Every man is not running

whether this is an assertion or certainly a negation worth as much as if someone says:

Every man is not running

But there were those who gathered this from many others and from some syllogism of Plato and knew what to define from it by the authority of the most learned men. For a syllogism cannot be made from two negatives. For in a certain dialogue, Plato questions a syllogism of this type: sense, he says, does not touch the reason of substance; what does not touch, nor does the notion of its truth touch: therefore the senses do not touch the notion of truth. For he seems to have made a syllogism from all negatives, which cannot be done, and therefore they say he put the infinite verb which is ‘does not touch’ for the infinite participle that is ‘not touching is’. For in many others, there is frequently the ability to find the infinite verb put for the infinite noun. Therefore, some have said that the verb always makes a negation if the infinite is proposed, but the participles or nouns, if they are infinite, can make an assertion. And therefore, whenever the infinite verb and two negations are proposed in a syllogism by great men, it is defended by this reason, that it is said the infinite verb is proposed for the participle, which participle is predicated in the place of the noun in the proposition.

And indeed, Alexander Aphrodisius and several others hold this view. For they argue that an infinite verb cannot give rise to an affirmative statement, because just as an infinite verb promptly completes a negation, so too do the verbs that contain within themselves the word “is” not produce an infinite affirmation but rather a negation. For if someone were to say:

A running man is not

no one would call this an affirmation. However, if one were to say:

The man does not run

neither is this proposition an affirmation because “runs” is a verb that contains within itself and just like “is” joined with a negative particle does not create an affirmation but rather a negation, so too does a negation attached to that verb which contains within itself the verb “is” completes a full negation.

However, Aristotle does not seem to distinguish these points but appears to consider them similarly, whether “is” is posited with the participle or the verb that closes and encompasses within itself. For he says in this way:

“In these indeed, in which there is, it does not agree as in that which is to run or to walk, they do the same thing as if ‘is’ were added.”

And he subjoined an example of this, “as if ‘runs’ every man.” For in this proposition which says:

Every man runs

it is not indeed appropriate to posit the verb “is”; in the same way, even if someone were to say:

Every man walks

here too, it is not appropriate to posit the verb “is”, but these are such, as if “is” were added. He taught this by example. For just as “Every man is running” is an affirmation showing the presence of running, so too “Every man runs” is an affirmation of the same power and the same meaning. From simple subjects, he consequently enumerates these affirmations in which it is not appropriate to say “is”, saying:

Every man runs

placing the middle determination, which is “every”, between “runs” which is the predicate and the subject which is “man”: against this, he posits simple negation saying:

Every man does not run

Again, he makes an affirmation from an infinite noun:

Every non-man runs

he opposes this with a negation of the infinite noun of the subject:

Every non-man does not run

And he proposed these, therefore, to show that the same thing happens in those in which it is not appropriate to predicate “is”, as in those also in which the third adjacent was predicated. But since he says in the negation of the infinite noun of the subject:

Every non-man does not run

someone could say that he did not make the negation of his affirmation which is:

Every non-man runs

with this, which says:

Every non-man does not run

but rather, the opposition should have been established like this:

Every non-man runs
Not every non-man runs

From this, however, he demonstrates that the negation should be done as he himself arranged it. For he says: “For it should not be said ‘not every man’ but rather the negation should be added to ‘man’.” The sense of which is of this sort: Whenever we make, he says, a negation against this affirmation which says “every non-man runs”, the negative particle “not” should not be joined to that which is “every” but rather to the subject that is the noun “man”. For when we thus say:

Every non-man runs

the negation to be made is:

Every non-man does not run

For it should not be said:

Not every non-man runs

and the negative particle “not” should not be added to “every” but rather to “man”. The reason for this is that “every” as a determination is not ascribed to the number of terms but rather to its own force, that is, to determination. For “every” does not signify something universal itself but signifies indeed the universal “man”, while “every” is a determination, since someone predicates that which is universal, that is, “man” universally. Therefore, “every” as a determination does not signify something universal but rather that a universal noun is predicated universally. And therefore, whenever a negation is made in these, the negation should be drawn to the subject noun rather than to the determination.

But let not anyone doubt, and claim that oppositions should likewise be formed in other ways too. For in those things which have a finite subject, when we say:

Every man runs

if a contradictory opposition is placed against this, a negation must be set up to determine the negative particle, so that against the one that says:

Every man runs

there is the one that says:

Not every man runs

However, in those things which are made from an infinite noun subject, either in affirmation or in negation, the negation should not be separated from the subject noun. This is most easily understood if determinations are briefly removed and examination is made of those propositions from an infinite noun subject that are indefinite. Let there be an indefinite affirmation:

Not-man runs

Against this will be the negation:

Not-man does not run

Therefore, if these propositions are made in universal terms (for the universal term is man) but do not have an added determination, since they are universally predicated, that is to say, every, and the negative particle is preserved both in affirmation and in negation to the subject (for it always necessarily became infinite), even then when something is added that determines, the negation is not to be added to the determination but rather to the subject noun. When this in affirmation was infinite, the same infinite must be preserved in negation. Just as the finite term and simple must be kept in these indefinite propositions for affirmation and negation, so we say:

Man runs
Man does not run

So too in that opposition which is from an infinite noun subject, the same must be preserved, so that what is the subject in affirmation is preserved also in negation. But if this happens in those things that are indefinite, why should not the same seem necessary in those things which are definite? For this alone defines the definite from the indefinite, that when the indefinite predicate universals beyond the determination of universality, the determined and definite predicate that same universal with addition and signification that it is universally predicated. Therefore, every or none signifies nothing else, except that which is universally said is universally predicated. So all the same things that were posited in indefinite affirmation and negation must also be preserved in the same definite ones. For every and none are not terms but determinations of universal terms.

Following the ideas outlined by Aristotle, we also take from the Syrian, whose cognomen we previously mentioned as Philoxenus, a very pertinent and useful enumeration of all propositions which are discussed in this book. Firstly, it must be understood how many undefined propositions are in categorical propositions. For as many undefined propositions as there are, so are there universal, particular, and individual propositions. Let us first consider affirmations in this manner: there are four types of propositions: they are either undefined, universal, particular, or individual. Therefore, if we can discern how many undefined affirmations there are, and if I multiply this by the number four, I will have gathered the number of affirmations. If I double this, the number of negations will also be gathered. For ‘is’ is either predicated alone or certainly with a third adjacent term. And if ‘is’ is predicated alone, it either refers to a simple and finite noun or to an infinite one. From these two, there are two affirmations:

A human is
A non-human is

However, when ‘is’ is predicated with a third adjacent term, there will be four affirmations: either when the subject is infinite alone, as in:

A just non-human is

or when the predicate is infinite alone, as in:

A non-just human is

or when both are finite, as in:

A just human is

or when both are infinite, as in:

A non-just non-human is

“There are no more than these”, as he himself says. Therefore, since there are six affirmations, two in which ‘is’ is predicated, and four with an adjacent term, if I multiply these by four, there will be twenty-four. If I then multiply these by two, the total increases to forty-eight. Therefore, there will be as many affirmations and negations made with either the verb ‘is’ or with a third adjacent term and predicate. Now, since there are three other qualities of propositions, which are necessary, contingent, and merely signifying being, according to which qualities all these propositions are made, if we multiply these forty-eight propositions by the number three, the total number of predicative propositions discussed in this book will increase to one hundred forty-four. But now, besides these three qualities, there are forty-eight propositions with their negations (which, if multiplied by the qualities of propositions, namely necessary, contingent, and merely signifying being, will make one hundred forty-four), which we have noted below.

IS ALONE

A human is Not a human is
A non-human is Not a non-human is
Every human is Not every human is
Every non-human is Not every non-human is
Some human is Not some human is
Some non-human is Not some non-human is
Socrates is Not Socrates is
Non-Socrates is Not non-Socrates is

ALSO IS WITH A THIRD
A just human is Not a just human is
A just every human is Not a just every human is
A just some human is Not a just some human is
A just Socrates is Not a just Socrates is
A just non-human is Not a just non-human is
A just every non-human is Not a just every non-human is
A just some non-human is Not a just some non-human is
A just non-Socrates is Not a just non-Socrates is
A non-just every human is Not a non-just every human is
A non-just some human is Not a non-just some human is
A non-just Socrates is Not a non-just Socrates is
A non-just non-human is Not a non-just non-human is
A non-just every non-human is Not a non-just every non-human is
A non-just some non-human is Not a non-just some non-human is
A non-just non-Socrates is Not a non-just non-Socrates is

We have set out these propositions by name, following the Syrian’s tallying. We do this to make it easier to believe in the number, if they are shown through examples, and also because someone badly taught was arguing most perversely about these propositions, placing affirmations in the place of negations and vice versa, thus confusing the whole order. Therefore, so that no one’s speech would lead anyone away from the truth of correct reasoning, we have made this arrangement to aid the memory.

Since the negation is contrary to “every animal is just”, namely, “no animal is just”, it is clear that they will never be both true at the same time or in the same respect. However, their opposites will sometimes be true, “not every animal is just” and “some animal is just”.

It has also been demonstrated above with the utmost care that contrary propositions often divide truth and falsehood, if they are proposed either about natural things or about impossibilities: but sometimes they can both be found false, if they predicate neither natural things nor impossibilities. It was said that contraries are any that make a universal affirmation or denial. Therefore, now it says: “contrary propositions”, he says, “cannot both be true at the same time”. And he spoke this with a certain determination of things. He says, "since the negation is contrary to ‘every animal is just’", namely, to the affirmation, "that which signifies that ‘no animal is just’", namely, the denial, “these”, he says, “being contrary, which cannot both be true, it is clear that they will never be both true at the same time or in the same respect”. But what he said, “nor both true at the same time”, is like this: for nothing prevents both a universal affirmation and a denial from being able to be proposed truly at different times. For example, if someone says:

Every human is just

this, if it were said in a golden age, would be most truly proposed. But if someone again says:

No human is just

this, if pronounced in an iron age, will be a true proposition. Therefore, both a universal affirmation and a denial, which it is clear are contraries, can be true, but not at the same time: for the former in a golden age, if it happens to be so, and the latter in an iron age. But these times are different and are not at the same time. Therefore, he correctly added to say “it is clear that they will never be both true at the same time”. What he added, “nor in the same respect”, applies to another determination of the same thing. For again, at the same time and simultaneously, a universal affirmation and a universal denial can both be true, but if they do not predicate the same thing. For example, if someone says:

Every rational animal is

this, if predicated about humans, is a true affirmation. But if someone says:

No rational animal is

this, if pronounced about horses, will be true at one and the same time against a universal affirmation made a universal denial but not in the same respect. For the former affirmation was made about humans, this denial indeed about horses. Therefore, it is correctly said that contraries can never be true at the same time nor about the same subject. But since the opposites were to a universal affirmation a particular denial, and to a universal denial a particular affirmation, and we have said these are called subcontraries because they suffer from contraries in different ways, it is clear that just as contraries cannot both be true at the same time, yet they sometimes divide truth and falsehood between them, so too subcontraries sometimes divide truth and falsehood between them, when the contraries also divide, but they can be found to be true at the same time, when the universal and contrary are both false, but that they should be both false, no account of things permits.

Therefore, no one will ever be able to find contrary statements to be true at the same time and in the same respect, but it is possible to find subcontrary statements, which are opposed to universals and contraries, to be true when compared to each other. This can be seen in the very example that he himself proposed:

Not every animal is just

This is true, and again:

There is some just animal

This too is true. So, contrary statements cannot be true at the same time, but there is nothing preventing subcontrary statements from being found true simultaneously.

Next, these follow: this one which is “no man is just”, that one which is “every man is not just”, but that one which is “there is some just man” is the opposite because “not every man is unjust”. For there must be someone.

He sufficiently discussed above the consequence of simple and infinite propositions, but now this is his aim, not that a particular affirmation or negation follows a universal affirmation or negation, which he already showed above, but that a universal negation follows a universal affirmation, or that a particular negation agrees with a particular affirmation, of course. And he proposes these four, saying that a simple universal negation and an infinite universal affirmation follow each other and agree with each other, and not less do their opposites, that is a simple particular affirmation and an infinite particular negation, in truth and in falseness follow each other and in no way diverge from each other. For these four are arranged: the first is an infinite universal affirmation which says:

Every man is not just

Under this is a simple universal negation agreeing with it, which proposes:

No man is just

Then on the other side, against the infinite affirmation, is a simple particular affirmation which says:

There is some just man

And under this is an infinite particular negation which proposes: “Not every man is unjust”

Every man is not just. There is some just man
No man is just. Not every man is unjust.

So, with these thus arranged, if the infinite universal affirmation is true, which says:

Every man is not just

It is also true which it proposes:

No man is just

Which is a simple universal negation. This, however, is better known in truer examples. For let it be said:

Every man is not quadruped

This is true, and again:

No man is a quadruped

This too is true. But if one of these is false, the other will also be false. For if it is false that every man is not just, as it is truly false, that simple negation also falsely proclaimed which says:

No man is just

Therefore, an infinite universal affirmation and a simple universal negation agree with each other, so that if one is true, the other must also be true, and if one is false, the other is also false. The same thing happens on the other side. For if it is true that some man is just, it is also true that not every man is unjust, for there is someone. For what is said “not every” is the same as if someone says “some is not”, which will appear more clearly in another example. If someone says:

Not every man is just

This is to say “Some man is not just”. Therefore ‘not every’ ‘some’ does not signify. Therefore, if someone proposes:

Some man is not unjust

Whoever he says is not unjust, he confirms to be just. Therefore, he of whom it is said that he is not unjust will be just.

From this it happens that what says:

Not every man is unjust

Agrees with that which says:

Some man is not unjust

But this agrees with that which says:

Some man is just

Therefore this too agrees with that which proposes:

Not every man is unjust

But since this perhaps seems somewhat obscure, the consequences of these must be taken this way. And let it be assumed that an infinite universal affirmation and a simple universal negation agree with each other, so that the truth or falseness of one follows the truth or falseness of the other. If the infinite universal affirmation which says:

Every man is not just

is false, its opposite will be true, which is the infinite particular negation which proposes:

Not every man is unjust

But since the infinite universal affirmation is false, the simple universal negation which says:

No man is just

is also false. But with this being false, the particular affirmation which is contradictorily opposed to this must be true, which is:

There is some just man

Therefore, when the infinite universal affirmation is false, the infinite particular negation is true and when the simple universal negation is false, the simple particular affirmation is true. But the infinite universal affirmation and the simple universal negation are false at the same time and agree with each other in falseness: therefore, the simple particular affirmation and the infinite particular negation will be true at the same time. Again, if the infinite universal affirmation is true, the infinite particular negation will be false: for it is contradictorily opposed to it. If again the simple universal negation is true, the simple particular affirmation is false. But the infinite universal affirmation and the simple universal negation are true at the same time: therefore, the simple particular affirmation and the infinite particular negation will be false at the same time. Therefore these also, that is the simple particular affirmation and the infinite particular negation, agree with each other in truth and in falseness and follow each other’s truth and lie. Therefore, both the affirmation and the negation, each being universal, this one simple, that one infinite, follow each other and agree with each other. The particulars, however, that is those opposed to the universals, simple affirmative and infinite negative, also agree with each other. Therefore, the order is correct, just as the simple universal negation agrees with the infinite universal affirmation, so the infinite negation agrees with the simple particular affirmation.

However, it is clear that even in singular instances, if it is true to deny the question, it is also true to affirm it, as in “Do you think Socrates is wise?” “No”; therefore, Socrates is not wise. In universal statements, however, what is similarly said is not true, but the negation is true, as in “Do you think every man is wise?” “No”. Therefore, every man is not wise. This is false. But it is true that not every man is wise; this one is the opposite, while the other one is contradictory.

Discussing the logical consequence of propositions and temporarily departing from this topic to teach how they agree, he proposed what may come in response to individual things if a particle of negation is attached to their predication, which again in universal propositions added to the predication would result in a negative particle. For it is not necessary for statements to be similarly made. For it is not the same that happens from each predication. But this is apparent: if someone, asked about a particular thing, denies, the questioner can create from the indefinite name of the predicate, joining that negation which the responder had previously denied, and will predict this truthfully. But it will appear from universal things that the same truth cannot happen, if an affirmation is composed from these. For if someone asks another, “Do you think Socrates is wise?” If the person responds “No”, the former rightly concludes by saying, “Therefore, Socrates is not wise.”

Let this be made clearer in another example, and let us ask someone in this way: “Is Socrates Roman?” The person answers: “No”, we can rightly conclude: “Therefore, Socrates is not Roman”, making an affirmation from the negation which he answered and from the name which we predicated in the proposition from the indefinite name, which says: “Socrates is not wise” or “Socrates is not Roman”. For these affirmations have been shown above to be from an indefinite name. Therefore, if someone asks in the same way in universal subjects, saying: “Is every man wise?” We will certainly answer: “No”. Then, the other person concludes in the same way. He says: “Therefore, every man is not wise”. So, no man is wise. For what he says:

Every man is not wise

has been shown to agree with what says:

No man is wise

It seems, therefore, that a false conclusion has been brought in from a true answer. To this we say that we indeed responded with a negation, not so that this negation would be joined to the predicate but rather to the determinant. For we did not wish to remove wisdom from every man, when we denied in response to the question of whether every man was wise, but rather from every, that is, the determinant, we wished to abstract wisdom, indicating that, wisdom would belong to some and not to others, so that what we said would hold as much as if we had said not every. Therefore, if that negation is joined to the name, that is, to the wise, it becomes a universal affirmation which says:

Every man is not wise

agreeing with the universal negation which proposes:

No man is wise

But this is contrary to the question. For the question was:

Is every man wise?

This holds a universal affirmation, to which is contrary a universal negation, to which again agrees the infinite universal affirmation. Therefore, to the simple universal affirmation, which is placed in the question, that is, is every man wise? The contrary is what the conclusion says because every man is not wise. But if it says:

Not every man is wise

and it is true and it is opposed to it. For it is against what the question says:

Is every man wise?

When the response was “No” and the negation was joined to “every”, it becomes a particular negation saying:

Not every man is wise

which is opposite to the universal affirmation which is proposed in the question [universal].

For this is what he means when he says: “This is opposed, that is contrary”. Through words this sense is thus consistent: “However, it is apparent”, he says, “that in singular instances, such as Socrates and whatever is individual, if it is true to deny when asked, that is, if when someone asked something, he truthfully denies, when someone is asked whether Socrates is Roman, he denies, and it is also true to affirm?” such as the questioner making an indefinite affirmation from the negation and the predicated name. And the example of this is: “Do you think Socrates is wise?” The answer is “No”. The conclusion is “Therefore, Socrates is not wise.”

But this does not hold similarly in universal instances, which he shows through what he says: “However, in universal instances, what is similarly said is not true”, that is, the indefinite affirmation made from the predicated name and the respondent’s negation is not true but rather, the negation is true, not the affirmation. The example of this is: for the question is “Do you think every man is wise?” The answer is “No”. The false conclusion is “Therefore, every man is not wise”. For this is false and similar to what we have said before about the singular subject but rather, what he says:

Not every man, therefore, is wise

so that the respondent’s negation is joined to “every” and it becomes a particular negation. For this is true and this is opposed. For when the universal affirmation was asked, what says:

Every man is wise

from the negative particle it became:

Not every man is wise

in conclusion and they are opposed. For that is a universal affirmation, but this is a particular negation. “But that is contrary”. For if the negation is not joined to the predicate, it becomes an infinite universal affirmation, which agrees with the finite universal negation. But this is contrary to the finite universal affirmation which is placed in the question. Therefore, the infinite universal affirmation will also be contrary.

We must ask what the reason is why, in singular propositions, an affirmative statement with an infinite name agrees with a finite negation, but in universal propositions, a universal affirmation from an infinite name does not agree with a particular finite negation. For if someone says “Socrates is not wise” and “Socrates is not wise”, are they not the same and do they not agree with each other? But if someone says:

Every man is not wise

and then:

Not every man is wise

These two do not agree with each other. The reason is that in singular subjects there are not double oppositions but only one, which creates the negation. But in universally predicated universals, there is a double opposition, one contrary, one contradictory.

Therefore, if there is an affirmation of this kind which says:

Socrates is wise

Opposite to this there is only one opposition which proposes:

Socrates is not wise

So if someone says:

Socrates is not wise

This will have no other understanding than what says:

Socrates is not wise

We have said that there is only one opposition in singulars. Therefore, whatever others there may be, they will concur with the same meaning. But in universally predicated universals it is not the same. For if there is a universal affirmation which says:

Every man is wise

Contrary to this, there is also one which says:

No man is wise

And also one that says:

Not every man is wise

The first is contrary, the latter is contradictory. So this double opposition cannot agree with itself. For the former, which is a universal negation, takes away the whole, while the latter, which is a particular negation, takes away a finite part. But a universal negation from an infinite name agrees with a universal affirmation: therefore, it will be different from a particular finite negation. Therefore, since the opposition is double in universals and single in singulars, it is right that in the same mode of predication, truth and falsity do not occur in the same way.

“However, according to the infinite opposed names or verbs, such as in ‘not man’ or ‘not just’, they will seem to be negations without a name or verb, but they are not; for it is necessary that a negation is either true or false, and whoever said ‘not man’, was no more true or false about a man, unless something is added. However, ‘every not-man is just’ signifies none of the same nor is it opposed to ‘not every not-man is just’. And what is ‘every not-just not-man’ signifies the same as ‘no just not-man’.”

We know that propositions can be made from infinite names: therefore Aristotle, resolving these, takes up the word of the infinite name and disputes about it, if it is compared against a finite name, whether it seems to create some kind of enunciative opposition. For if someone takes what we say ‘not man’ and opposes it to what we say ‘man’, it may seem to create an opposition to some extent. Since every negative particle added to a verb, which contains a proposition, makes a negation, if some mode of proposition is not predicated, which will be shown later, it seems to create a negation when a negative particle is added, as if the particle ‘non’ is added to what is ‘man’ it makes ‘not man’.

This is what he says: “However, those which are according to the infinite opposed names or verbs, such as in ‘not man’ or ‘not just’, seem to be negations without a name or verb.” For if someone says ‘does not run’, this becomes a negation without a name; but if someone says ‘not man’, this too is a negation without a verb. These words according to the infinite name and verb are opposed to the finite verb or name which is ‘runs’ and ‘man’: therefore these will seem to be negations according to the infinite name or verb which are predicated but are not. For the greatest proof convinces that these are not negations, that every negation is either true or false, but what we say ‘not man’ or ‘does not run’, although simple and finite, namely ‘man’ and ‘runs’, signify nothing true or false, however these infinite ones much less demonstrate anything true or false. Not that simple signify something true or false, therefore we say infinite words show less truth or falsehood than simple ones, but although a simple name or verb signifies nothing true or false, it still proposes something definite, as in ‘man’ there is something finite and a single species. But he who says ‘not man’, while it removes the present species, still allows to understand infinite others, proposing nothing itself.

Therefore, although finite words or names cannot be true or false in themselves unless they are joined with others, far less capable of truth or falsehood are infinite names or verbs, which neither establish what they signify but destroy it, and do not establish anything else in the signification: finally, finite understandings are closer to truth or falsehood. Therefore, the statement of an infinite name is less true or false than that of any simple and finite word.

“‘Every not-man is just’ signifies none of the same nor is it opposed to ‘not every not-man is just’. And what is ‘every not-just not-man’ signifies the same as ‘no just not-man’.”

After sufficiently discussing propositions having an infinite predicate and showing their oppositions and demonstrating their consequences, having briefly noted in passing that infinite names were not negations, he now returns to those propositions which have an infinite subject, but a finite or infinite predicate.

And first, indeed, he teaches whether these propositions, which are from an infinite subject, are the same and mean the same and have some sequence with these which are from an infinite predicate, or from both being finite. For he says that these two propositions, which are: “every non-human is just”, “not every non-human is just”, do not signify the same as any of those which could be either from both being finite or from an infinite predicate.

Let those propositions, either from both being finite or from an infinite predicate, be arranged. And first, let a simple universal affirmation be posited, under it a universal negation from an infinite predicate agreeing with the above simple affirmation. In contrast, let there be a simple universal negation and under it a universal affirmation from an infinite predicate, which clearly agree with each other, the universal affirmation from an infinite predicate leading the way.

Every human is just. No human is just.

No human is not just. Every human is not just.

So then, since these affirmations and negations, which indeed have a simple subject, but an infinite or simple predicate, have been posited, now Aristotle says that these propositions, which have an infinite subject, do not signify the same as any of the above which we have arranged. For this, which says:

Every non-human is just

does not agree with the one that says:

Every human is just

nor again with the one that says:

Every human is not just

nor again with these which are:

No human is just

or:

No human is not just

For all these have a human subject, but that one has a non-human. Therefore, neither will its negation, that is, the particular negation of the universal affirmation from an infinite subject, be able to agree with any of those which have a finite subject. For the one which says:

Not every non-human is just

neither with the one which proposes:

Every human is just

nor with the one which says:

Every human is not just

nor with those which state:

No human is just

or:

No human is not just

But he does not say this, because the propositions from an infinite subject are different from those which are either from a finite predicate or from an infinite predicate but a finite subject. For although the predications may indeed be different, they can occasionally signify the same, as the one which says:

Every human is unjust

although different from the one which says:

No human is just

yet they sometimes mean the same, if a privative affirmation has preceded. For it was said that negations undoubtedly follow preceding affirmations therefore he does not say this, because they are different from the infinite noun subject, either finite or infinite predicate, but a finite subject but that they do not at all agree with each other nor mean the same, that is, they are completely different in the power of proposition.

And indeed, he has said these things about those which have a finite subject, but an infinite predicate. But now he comes to their consequences which are made up of an infinite noun subject and just as he taught above the consequence of those which were both finite or from an infinite predicate, so also now conversely, he shows what consequence those have which consist of both infinite names or an infinite noun subject by saying: this, which is:

Every unjust non-human

signifies the same as the one which is:

No just non-human

He only shows these two propositions, specifically, the universal affirmative from both being infinite which says:

Every unjust non-human

agrees with that which is a universal negation from a solo infinite subject which says:

No just non-human

In these, however, the particle “is” is understood, so that the whole proposition is:

Every unjust non-human is

and again:

No just non-human is

For just as in these, which had a finite subject, but either an infinite or finite predicate, a universal affirmation from a finite subject and infinite predicate, specifically, the one which says:

Every human is not just

was followed by a simple universal negation which consists of both being finite, that is:

No human is just

so also in these, with only the subjects exchanged, the same thing happens. For just as there a universal negation from both being finite followed a universal affirmation from a finite subject and infinite predicate, so also here a universal negation from an infinite subject follows a universal affirmation from both being infinite. And he ascribed these two propositions to have only this consequence, but for the others, which he thought would be easy to understand, he neglected to pursue. But we, so that nothing may seem to be left out, add them. For the sequence is in this way:

Every non-human unjust is. Some non-human is just.

No non-human is just. Not every non-human is unjust.
Every non-human is just. Some non-human is unjust.

No non-human is unjust. Not every non-human is just.

Therefore, if anyone looks carefully at these two comparisons, they will show the most fitting consequence and agreement.

Book 5

On Interpretation, Book 10 (ctd)

[INTRODUCTION]

Having covered a significant portion of the work, we now venture more boldly and spiritedly into the following sections. Although these sections are tangled with substantial questions, we must not tire when explaining and unfolding the doctrine of dialectics in each part. Hence, we have weaved together a proper sequence of commentary.

“Transposing names or words signifies the same, as in ‘a white man is’ and ‘is a white man.’ For if this were not so, there would be many negations of the same thing. But it has been shown that there is only one of one. For the negation of ‘a white man is’ is ‘a white man is not’; but the negation of ‘is a white man,’ if it is not the same as ‘a white man is,’ will be either ‘is not not a white man’ or ‘is not a white man.’ But the one is the negation of ‘is not a white man,’ the other of ‘a white man is.’ Therefore, there would be two of one. Hence, it is clear that with the transposition of a name or a verb, the affirmation or negation remains the same.”

He teaches us now that if words or names are transposed, and one thing is predicated first, and another later, they undoubtedly retain the same meaning. Whether someone says:

A man is white

or:

Is a white man

or:

A white man is

or:

Is a man white

or changes the order of the predication in any other way, the meaning will undoubtedly remain the same. This perhaps may not be as apparent to orators or poets as it is to dialecticians. Indeed, for those concerned with the composition of speeches, the order in which the words and names of predication are presented matters greatly. For it makes a significant difference whether Cicero said:

Nature brought you to this madness, willpower practiced it, fortune preserved it

in the way he did, or in this way: nature gave birth to you in this madness, willpower exercised it, fortune preserved it. For in this way, the sentence is less impactful and less radiant in what stands out and reveals itself, even against the listeners' will. Again, when Vergilius says:

And to impose custom on peace, he could have kept the meter

if he had said it this way: and impose custom on peace, the sound would have been weaker and the verse would not have been considered as brilliantly composed as it is now.

Thus, a change in the order of words and names does not have the same effect for orators or poets. For those concerned with composition, they will find much ornament in the order of sentences. But for dialecticians, who have no regard for the elegance of speech and who seek only truth, it makes no difference in what order words and names are interchanged, as long as they retain the same force in their meaning as before. But not even among them does a change in the order of speech always preserve the same force and meaning. For this particle that is negative, that is, ‘not’, has great power and makes a significant difference when placed in various positions. For if someone says:

A white man is not

they make an indefinite simple negation. But if someone says:

A man is not white

they make an indefinite affirmation from an infinite predicate. However, if someone predicates:

Not a man is white

they establish an indefinite affirmation from an infinite subject. Again, if someone says this way:

Every man is not just

this agrees with what says:

No man is just

But if the same ‘not’ is not placed towards universality, so that it is said:

Not every man is just

there no longer becomes a universal affirmation from infinite predication agreeing with a universal simple negation but rather a particular simple negation.

Do you therefore see how many differences the negative particle makes when connected with different name predications? But although this is the case, the same particle can nonetheless, placed differently in different positions, preserve the same force and meaning.

For if the ‘not’ particle is used together with its universality and it is frequently transposed with the same universality, the meaning undoubtedly remains the same. For if someone says:

Not every man is white

it is a particular simple negation. But if someone says this way:

A man is not entirely white

the meaning is the same, or in this way:

A white man is not entirely

this does not depart from the previous meaning, or if someone even further transposes it saying:

A white man is not everyone

it does not differ from the previous meaning. In the same way, if it is transposed in any other way but still with its proper universality, the same must always necessarily be preserved in meaning.

In the same way, if the same ‘not’ particle is connected with another name or word and frequently transposed, as when we say a just man is not, again a man is not just, again is not a just man, the same meaning is retained. Therefore, if only the negative particle is transposed and is not always predicated in the same order, it makes many differences in propositions. But if it is frequently transposed together with another name (as said), the same meaning will remain in all transpositions. Therefore, having set these things in order, we must consider what is Aristotle’s proof that transposed words and names always subject to the same force and meaning.

Indeed, he says, "But when words or names are transposed, they signify the same, as in ‘a white man is’ and ‘a man is white’". For, with these transposed names and words, it retains the same meaning. In the former, ‘white’ is first, ‘man’ is second, while in the latter, ‘man’ is first, ‘white’ is second. If this is false and they are not the same but differ from each other, something impossible and inconsistent arises. For there will be two negations of one affirmation, which is impossible. For it has been shown that there is a single negation of a single affirmation.

Now, let us see if these affirmations which say:

A white man is

and:

A man is white

are not the same but different, how there could be two negations of one affirmation. And first let them be arranged this way:

A white man is
A man is white

So, of this proposition which says:

A white man is

the negation will be that which proposes:

A white man is not

For another that could reasonably exist cannot be found. Let us arrange these same statements again and the first with its own negation:

A white man is
A white man is not
A man is white

So, since the negation of this which says:

A white man is

is that which proposes:

A white man is not

if that which says:

A man is white

will be different from the proposition which states:

A white man is

its negation will be different. Let it then be either that which says:

It is not that a man is not white

or that which says:

A man is not white

So, let the two original affirmations be arranged again alternatively, and the confessed negation of the former opposite. Against the second, however, let both these negations we speak of be inscribed.

A white man is, A white man is not

A man is white, It is not that a man is not white

A man is not white

With these arranged this way, of this proposition which says:

A man is white

that cannot be its negation which says:

It is not that a man is not white

For its negation is that which has an infinite subject, which says:

It is not a white man

Similarly, however, if anyone should propose any other negation, undoubtedly another affirmation will be found for it. Hence, it results that the one that proposes:

A man is not white

remains as its negation.

So, the negation of that which says:

A man is white

is that which says:

A man is not white

But the negation of this affirmation which proposes:

A white man is

is also that which says:

A man is not white

This is proved by the fact that they divide the truth and the false between themselves. For if it is true that a man is white, it is false that a man is not white. But if it is found to be true in some things, this is recognized according to the definition of a proposition, not according to the form of negation, that they are opposed to each other more in terms of quantity than in terms of quality. This thing shows if someone says this way:

Every man is white

If against this it is proposed that not every man is white, it is clear that they divide both truth and falsehood between themselves. For one must necessarily be true, one false. Therefore, even if the determinations are removed, the same opposition returns, although it is indefinite. For just as in this which says:

Every man is just
Not every man is just

removing ‘every’ and ‘not every’, in:

A just man is not

the affirmation and negation are opposed. So, in these, removing ‘every’ and ‘not every’, that which says:

A white man is

is opposed to that which says:

A man is not white

For adding the determinations, one is always true, the other false. But we have said that the negation of this affirmation which says:

A white man is

would be:

A white man is not

So, the two negations:

A white man is not

and:

A man is not white

are of one affirmation which declares:

A white man is

This happens if these negations which say:

A man is not white

and:

A white man is not

are different from each other. This arises from what was proposed earlier that this which says:

A white man is

is different from that which says:

A man is white

But if this is impossible, that one affirmation has two negations, and it is clear against that affirmation which says:

A white man is

both these negations which say:

A white man is not

and:

A man is not white

are opposed, they are not different from each other and they agree with each other and are only distant by the permutation of a name, but in all other respects they are the same. If these negations are the same, then the affirmations are also the same.

It is rightly said, therefore, that transposed words and names retain the same power and meaning. The entire sense is thus. However, the order of words goes like this: “Transposed names or words,” he says, “signify the same.” And the example of these: "As is ‘white man’, is ‘man is white’". In these, for the names have been transposed. “For if this is not,” that is, if transposed words and names do not mean the same thing, something is impossible and inappropriate. For he says, “There will be many negations of the same,” that is, there will be many negations of the same affirmation. But this is impossible. For it has been shown that one negation of one affirmation exists.

Therefore, two negations opposing one affirmation, if transposed words and names do not signify the same thing, he demonstrates thus: “For indeed, the negation of the affirmation which is ‘a white man exists’ is ‘a white man does not exist’ (for this negation is rightly put against that affirmation), but of the one which is ‘a man is white’, that is of another affirmation, 'if it is not the same as the one which is 'a white man exists”, that is if it differs from the prior proposition which says:

A white man exists

and it is not the same as it, as if he were saying: if it does not agree with it, “The negation will either be ‘a white man does not not exist’ or ‘a man is not white’ or whatever else,” which, if anyone posits, is refuted by the same argument by which he refutes this which he posited. However, he refutes this in this way: for he says: "But one indeed is the negation of ‘a white man does not exist’, another indeed of ‘a white man exists’". Between the two negations which he posited, that one namely which says:

A white man does not not exist

and that one which he proposes:

A man is not white

that which says:

A white man does not not exist

is a negation of an affirmation having an infinite subject which says:

A non-white man exists

The other, namely which he proposes:

A man is not white

is a negation of that which is:

A white man exists

For with this one, he divides the true and the false. Therefore, there will be two negations of one affirmation. But this is impossible.

“Therefore, since with the transposition of a name or a word the same affirmation or negation is made, it is clear:” confirming the previous argumentation with this conclusion of his sentence. He made this syllogism in the second hypothetical way which he calls indemonstrable in this way: if the first is, the second is; but the second is not, therefore the first is not, that is if with the transposition of words and names the propositions are not the same, there are two negations of one affirmation; but this is impossible: therefore, the propositions are not different with the transposition of words and names.

On Interpretation, Book 11

“But indeed to affirm or deny one thing of many or many of one, if one thing is not made from many, there is not one affirmation nor denial. However, I mean not one if one name is placed, and there is not one from those, such as a human may be strong and an animal and biped and gentle but from these one is made; but from white and man and walking not one. Therefore neither if one affirms something from these, will there be one affirmation but rather one voice, multiple affirmations, nor if these things about one but similarly many.”

Many have been confounded by the obscurity of this passage, as they could not suitably deal with what Aristotle was saying. However, we have already said above that the ancient philosophers of the Peripatetic school took great care to discern what constituted a single affirmation or denial, and what constituted multiple. For these are not recognized by the sound of the voice or by the number of terms. Indeed, it can be that one thing is predicated of one thing and it is not one statement. It can also happen that either multiple things are predicated of one thing or one thing of many, yet from all these one statement is made. They were very careful about this, so that where a clear rule occurred, it would not be overlooked. For if someone says:

The dog is an animal

it is not one statement. For “dog” signifies many things.

But if someone says:

The human is a rational, mortal animal

or a rational, mortal animal is a human, these are single statements, therefore because one thing can be made from all. For from an animal, mortal and rational, joined together, one human is made. Similarly, there are other things which are predicated of many, from which one thing cannot be made and established. Neither if those things are predicated of another, nor if another is predicated of those, is there one affirmation or one denial but as many affirmations are to be said to exist as are these things which are either predicated of one or of which one is said, as when we say:

Socrates, a bald philosopher, walks

From baldness and philosophy and walking nothing one is joined, so as to form a kind of species. Therefore whether these are predicated of one or one of these, it cannot be one statement. And generally indeed the sense of the whole proposition is of this kind.

But now let’s get to Aristotle’s own words. For he says:

“But indeed to affirm or deny one thing of many or many of one, if one thing is not made from many, there is not one affirmation nor denial.”

He says, if you predicate many of one, as when you say:

Socrates is a bald, walking philosopher

or again when you predicate one of many, as when you say:

Socrates, a bald philosopher, walks

if from these many things that you either predicate or propose, one thing is not made, just as one thing can be made from these things which we predicate a sentient, living substance, that which is an animal, there is neither one denial nor one affirmation, since either many things are predicated or proposed, from which gathered together one species does not exist. But if someone predicates one thing of one, where one name signifies many, from which many one thing is not made, again there is not one affirmation nor one denial.

For if someone says:

The dog is an animal

the name “dog” signifies both a barking creature and a celestial and marine creature, from which joined together nothing one is made. Therefore since one thing cannot be made from these many, also from that name, there is not made one affirmation and one denial, which is predicated or proposed, since it signifies many from which one thing cannot be made. He shows this when he says:

“I mean not one if one name is placed, and there is not one from those.”

Indeed, it can happen that one name is predicated of one, but if one of them signifies many, from which one thing is not, there is not one affirmation nor one denial. For not one voice completes a statement but the simplicity of what is signified, or if there are many, the potential of something collected into one to make one thing. And he added an example of this matter, by which many are deceived, saying:

“Such as a human may be strong and an animal and biped and gentle but from these one is made; but from white and man and walking not one.”

For some thought that he said this to show that he had given this as if it were a definition, lest perhaps someone would suppose that he had put this as the true definition of a human, which is a gentle, biped animal. Therefore, they say, he said “may be strong and an animal and biped and gentle”, so that no one would think that Aristotle supposes this kind of thing to be the definition of a human. Others, however, did not receive this saying in that way, but rather interpreted Aristotle’s saying and writing in this sense: “such as a human may be equally an animal and biped and gentle but from these one is made”, so that it was understood this way: a human indeed is equal to that which is a human and to that which is a gentle, biped animal. Therefore, if it is the same and equal to say “human” and “gentle, biped animal”, it is necessary that as many times as these many are predicated of one, that is a gentle, biped animal of a human, because it is equal to a human, which is one thing, you are predicating one thing, even if you seem to predicate three voices.

But all these understand nothing at all, but there is a better explanation that Porphyrius gave. Wanting, says Aristotle, to show what was a single affirmation, what was not a single one, he first said that to predicate many of one or to propose many to one is not for a single statement, unless something one would be made from those many. Seeing also that there can still be multiple affirmations even with these predicated, which even if they are many, one thing can be made from these, he said “may be strong and an animal and biped and gentle”. But what I’m saying is of this sort: it should be clear that if many are predicated of one, from which one thing cannot be made, or if many are proposed to one, from which one thing is not, since there is not one affirmation or denial.

Now, let’s discuss about the several things from which one thing can be made. For we will find that even in this very manner of stating, multiple propositions often exist and not one is found, although one thing can be made from many. For if someone thus says: a man is a mortal rational animal, by simultaneously linking mortal rational animal, as it has been continuously stated and from these one thing is made, it is one assertion. But if there is any interval, as if someone says: man is an animal and again rational and after a short pause says is mortal, it is not one affirmation nor one denial. For this interval makes multiple propositions.

Again, if they are spoken with conjunction, man is an animal and rational and mortal, this way too there are many propositions. It makes no difference whether by pausing or by inserting conjunctions as if someone says:

Man is an animal
Man is rational
Man is mortal

which are clearly many propositions. Therefore seeing this, Aristotle thus said: A MAN IS PERHAPS ALSO AN ANIMAL AND BIPEDAL AND GENTLE. To this he adds ‘perhaps’ as if he said: from man and bipedal and gentle, one thing is made but it is sometimes likely that there are multiple propositions, when a certain conjunction separates and discerns. For perhaps man and animal, so that this is one proposition, and bipedal as another and gentle as another again. But from these one thing is made, which, when continuously uttered, since from these one thing is produced, it is one proposition. However, the same does not occur in all cases. FOR A WHITE MAN AND WALKING DO NOT BECOME ONE.

For if someone says:

Socrates, a white man, walks

it is not one affirmation, since from man, whiteness and walking, no species is made at all. Therefore, the conclusion is, since neither from these many things, from which one thing does not become, one thing is not predicted, as from earthly, barking, heavenly and merino, since one does not become from these and one thing is predicted from these, which we call a dog, this type of name which signifies many things, from which one thing does not become, if it is predicted from another or if it is subjected to another, one affirmation does not become nor one denial but it will indeed be one word, but multiple affirmations. Whether one from many is predicted, from which one thing does not become, or many of this type from one, or if one from one is predicted, which predicate signifies many things, from which one thing does not become, whether this predicate is subjected to another, absolutely one affirmation does not become nor one denial. However, this is the rule of this type: one affirmation is, if either two terms signify individual things or if many are predicted from one or subjected to one, as if from these one thing can be made, or one name which signifies many things, whether it is predicted or subjected, can gather all these into one kind of species.

Therefore, if dialectical question is a request for response, or a proposition or contradiction of another part, the proposition of one contradiction is not, there will not be one response to these; nor one question, nor if it is true. This has been said in Topics about these. Similarly it is evident, since not even this itself what is dialectic is a question. For it is necessary given from the question to choose which as if part of the contradiction to state because it is necessary for the questioner to determine, whether this is a man or not this.

Whoever uses dialectical questioning, either simply asks and places one proposition in the question, so that there is one response against it, or asks both, to which there is not a simple response but a whole proposition is responded. For if someone says asking:

Is Socrates an animal?

Against this such is the response:

Either so or not

But if indeed someone asks this way:

Is Socrates an animal or not?

Against this there is not one response. For if it is responded ‘so’, it is unknown about what you assented, about affirmation or about denial; again if you do not respond, it is unknown which you wanted to deny, affirmation or denial. Therefore against this type of questions a whole proposition must be responded, that is another part of the contradiction, either the whole affirmation or the whole denial, so you will say either Socrates is an animal or, if this does not seem so, you respond Socrates is not an animal. Therefore in these things which are many, from which one cannot be made, if a question is made, both it itself is reprehensible and against it is one response. For whoever asks these many things, from which one cannot be, makes many questions. Against which if a response is simply made, even if the response itself is true, however it is rightly reprehensible.

For against a multiple question should be a multiple response. For if someone says asking:

Is Socrates a philosopher and reads and walks?

Because it can happen that he is indeed a philosopher and reads, but does not walk or walks but does not read, it can likewise happen that he both reads and walks, against this type of proposition there is not one response. For who so asked:

Is Socrates a philosopher and reads and walks?

Either ineptly or captiously asked. Against which question, if it happened that Socrates is a philosopher and walks and reads, if it is responded: it is so, this response too is reprehensible. For against many questions one response should not be used, even if truly by this one is responded as in this too, if he is a philosopher and reads and walks. Therefore if dialectical questioning is a request for a response, by which response a proposition is made, as when someone said asking:

Is it day?

Another responds ‘no’, a denial is made from this:

It is not day

or certainly another part of the proposition, when so is asked:

Is it day or is it not day?

So that it can suitably be responded it is day or it is not day, that is the whole proposition: these which are made from these many and are asked, as if one cannot be made from these, are not simple questions. Therefore neither against them is a simple response to be given. He recalls himself in Topics having said about these.

Again, because “dialectical questioning is a request for an answer” (as said above) either to a proposition or to one part of a contradiction, which will soon be demonstrated, those who ask ignorantly say:

What is an animal?

or:

What is a man?

For someone asking dialectically should give a choice in their question, whether the responder would prefer to choose affirmation or negation. However, whoever asks in such a way, wanting the responder to define what something is, that question is not dialectical. Yet some ask in this way:

Do you think the soul is fire?

When the responder denies this, they add:

Don’t you think there is something between fire and air, a middle substance, that could be the soul?

When the responder also denies this, they continue:

Or perhaps do you believe more that the soul is water or earth?

When the person neither consents to the soul being earth nor water, then exhausted by the questions, they ask:

So, what then is the soul?

But this is not a dialectical question but rather that of a student wanting to learn something from a teacher. For the one who wants to learn something asks him who can teach what it is that they are uncertain about.

However, a dialectician (as has been said) ought to ask in such a way that the responder has the option to choose either an affirmation or a negation. We should know, since every “question is a request for an answer”, that dialectical is not simply a request for an answer but one that gives a choice between two options. Therefore, this question itself, what something is, is not a dialectical question. For it is necessary to ask in such a way that from the question the responder can choose one part of the contradiction. For the one asking should determine and define, whether this is what is being said or not, such as:

Is a man an animal or not?

So that the person may either respond affirmatively or negatively. That which said dialectical questioning to be a request for an answer, either to a proposition or to one part of a contradiction, is this: whoever asks expects an affirmation; they expect either that the listener responds to them in the same way or with a contradiction, such as if someone asks:

Is a man an animal?

If the other person agrees, they have made a proposition, specifically the one that the questioner proposed; however, if while someone is asking whether a man is an animal, the responder says:

No, he is not

it seems they have responded with a contradiction. For one person asked for affirmation, the other responds with negation, which is a contradiction.

Again, if a question asks for negation and the person responds with negation, they have made the same proposition that the one asking had previously proposed; but if while one person asks for a negation the other responds with an affirmation, a contradiction has been answered. Therefore, this is what it means to say a question is a request for an answer and to which answer it added, either to a proposition, if the responder answers the same as what the questioner asked, or to the other part of a contradiction, if when the questioner asks for an affirmation, the responder answers with a negation, or if when the questioner has placed a negation in the question, the responder gives an affirmation in the response.

According to the Peripatetics, there are two types of questions: either when the question is dialectical or when it is not dialectical. There are two species of non-dialectical questions, as Eudemus teaches: one indeed when we take an accident in a question, we ask to whom that accident pertains, as when we see the house of Cicero, if we ask:

Who lives there?

or when we take the subject itself and the thing, but we ask what accident happens to it, as if someone sees Cicero and asks:

Where is he going?

And this is one type of those things which we question non-dialectically according to accident. But the other is when we propose a name and ask what it is, or require a genus or a difference or a definition, as if someone asks:

What is an animal?

or when we take a definition or something higher of the previously mentioned things and ask, to whom those belong, as if someone asks whose definition is a rational mortal animal.

“Because some of these are said as compounds, so that each category of those which are predicated outside is one, while others are not, what is the difference? For it is true to say of man and outside of animal and outside of two-footed and as one and man and white and these as one. But not if cithara-player and good, then also good cithara-player. For if, because either is said, and each is said, there will be many and inconvenient things. For it is true to say of man and man and white, therefore and all. Again, if white, and all. Therefore it will be white white man and this to infinity. And again walking musician; and these same things often implied. Further, if Socrates Socrates and man, then Socrates Socrates man. And two-footed, and man two-footed.”

There are many things which, when they are predicated individually, are true, but if someone joins them together and predicates them, they retain their truth in predication. However, there are other things which, if they are predicated on their own and separately, are true; but if they are said together, they do not retain their truth in predication. Therefore, what the difference is between these things must be recognized. For if someone says that Socrates is an animal, they have spoken truthfully, and if someone again predicates that Socrates is two-footed, this is also true. But if these are said together, as in:

Socrates is a two-footed animal

it does not deviate from its own truth. And these indeed are in the genus and the difference which is substantial to Socrates. But if it is also said about an accident, the same result can nonetheless occur. For if someone says thus:

Socrates is a man

it is true, again:

Socrates is bald

this too is true. But if they join them together saying:

Socrates is a bald man

they will again make a true predication from the joined parts.

In these instances, what was said to be true individually, once combined, remains true. There are, however, other instances where statements may be true individually, but lose their validity when joined together. For example, if someone says that Socrates is good, this is true; they may also say that Socrates is a citharist, and this may also be true. However, it is not necessary that combining these claims yields a true statement: ‘Socrates is a good citharist.’ A man can indeed be good and a citharist, but not necessarily good at being a citharist. He could be good in some other respect, and only an amateur, not perfect, in his art. This will be clearer with an example: if one says ‘Tiberius Gracchus is bad,’ this is true; they may also say ‘Tiberius Gracchus is an orator,’ and this is also true. If, by joining these statements, they then say ‘Tiberius Gracchus is a bad orator,’ they have spoken falsely, for he was an excellent orator.

But lest anyone thinks we are saying this without understanding that the definition of an orator is someone skilled in good speech, these examples are given to illustrate a point, rather than to lay claim to truth. These arguments were put forward by Aristotle, whose text reads as follows: “But since,” he says, “some things are predicated in combination and as composites, so that from these a single category is made of the things that are truly said outside, whereas other things, even though they are truly predicated individually and separately, do not make a true predication when combined, we must examine what the difference between them is. Examples of these are as follows. Among those things that are truly predicated outside and do not lose their truth even when combined, an example is to say of a man that he is both an animal and a biped. For it is also true to say of the same man, such as Socrates, that he is a biped animal. Moreover, it is true to say of the same Socrates that he is a man outside, and white if it happens to be so, and to predicate of him ‘biped animal’ does not depart from truth.”

So, these are things that, when predicated individually and truly outside and combined, are true. If it is predicated of someone that he is a citharist, and this is true, and then it is also predicated of him that he is good, and this is true, it is not necessary to say that he is a good citharist. He can indeed be a citharist, but a good man. Thus far he has arranged these matters. But because some seemed to think that all things that were truly predicated individually could also be rightly said when combined, he argues against them, saying that many inconsistencies and impossibilities will occur if one says that everything that is truly predicated individually is also truly predicated when combined. For it is true to say of a man that he is a man. For of Socrates, who is a man, it is truly said that he is a man.

Again, it is true to say of the same Socrates that he is white. Therefore, if you combine these and predicate them as one, it is true to say of some man that he is a white man. But of a man who is white, it is true to say of him that he is white. Therefore, even if you combine these: the predication will be “Socrates is a white white man”! For it was true to say of Socrates that he is a white man. But of a white man, it is true to say that he is white. These combined make “white white man”. But if you want to predicate white of the same white man again, it is true: therefore, even if you combine these: the predication will be “white white white man”. And the same applies ad infinitum.

Again, if someone says of some man that he is a musician, if he speaks truly, and adds that the same man is walking, he speaks truly, if he combines these saying that he is a walking musician. But if it is true to predicate of some man that he is a walking musician, and of a walking musician it is true to say that he is a musician, the predication will be “he is a walking musician musician”. But of the same man, it is true to say that he is walking, therefore it is true to say of him again that “he is a walking walking musician musician”.

Furthermore, Socrates is Socrates and also a man: therefore Socrates is Socrates man. But also biped: therefore Socrates is Socrates man biped. But it is true to say of Socrates that Socrates is a biped man. But when I said man of him, I have already said biped (for every man is biped): it is therefore true to say of him that he is biped. But it was true to say that Socrates is Socrates man biped: therefore the predication will be true, Socrates is Socrates man biped biped. But again, I said man and named biped in him (for every man is biped): therefore Socrates is Socrates man biped biped biped. And this, extended to infinity, is found to be superfluous talk. Therefore it is not possible that whatever is said outside is truly predicated when combined in all ways.

“Therefore, if anyone simply posits composites, it is obvious that many inconsistencies occur; however, we now say how they should be posited. Therefore, those things that are predicated and of which they are predicated, whatever is said by accident, either of the same or of one of the other, these will not be one, such as ‘the man is white’ and ‘the man is a musician’ but it is not the same thing to be white and to be a musician; for both are accidents of the same thing. Nor if it is true to say ‘the musician is white’, will ‘the musician is white’ be one thing; for the musician is white by accident. Therefore, ‘the musician is white’ will not be one thing. For the same reason, ‘the citharist is good’ is not simply so, but ‘the biped animal’; for it is not by accident. Furthermore, not whatever things are in another. Therefore, neither ‘the white is frequently white’ nor ‘the man is a man animal or biped’; for both ‘biped’ and ‘animal’ are in ‘man’.”

What he has outlined above, he now determines with the clearest reasoning, saying that of these things which are truly predicated outside, a single predication cannot be made true if they are joined together, whatever are either accidents to the same thing, or when one thing happens to another, an accidental thing is predicated of that accident. For if someone says of Socrates that Socrates is a citharist, and then again that Socrates is good, if he truly predicates both, he has predicated two accidents of one subject, that is, of Socrates. Therefore, a single predication cannot be made from these, as to say ‘Socrates is a good citharist’.

Again, if Socrates is said to be musical (let’s assume Socrates is musical), and if white is predicated of the musician, and this perhaps may be true, it’s not necessarily the case that the musician is white. For if Socrates is the musician, if white is predicated of the same musician, indeed the subject Socrates is being described as a musician, and of the musician, which is an accident, white is being predicated, another accident: therefore, it is not possible to make a true proposition here that Socrates, the musician, is white. For not always can the musician be white, but this is the nature of accidents, that they come and go. Therefore, if the heat of the sun should tan the skin of the white musician standing in the sun, he will not be white, even though he is a musician.

So, even then when it was truthfully being predicated, that Socrates is a white musician, neither then was the predication true and correct. For the nature of an accident does not have permanence, to always be truthfully predicated. The logic of words stands thus: “Therefore,” he says, “if anyone says that combinations can occur in any way at all, that is, you propose this complex and conjoined thing you’ve predicated singly, it happens that one says many inconsistent things (for many impossibilities occur, as he himself showed above, when he led them to excessive talkativeness by frequently repeating the same names), we say now how it should be set, that is, however things that are truthfully said singly should be predicated together, now,” he says, “we say.”

“All things,” he says, “which are predicated of another and again about which other things are predicated are in a twofold manner: either they are accidents or substances. And some predications are indeed accidental, whenever either two accidents are predicated of a substance or an accident of an accident is predicated of some substance, but others are not accidental, whenever something is said substantially about something else.”

Therefore, of those which are said accidentally, if they are two accidents and are predicated of the same thing or if one accident is said about another accident, from these a proposition cannot be made nor will it be one if they are joined. For man is both white and musical but white and musical, because they do not come together in one form, will not make a proposition. For white and musical are not the same. For both are accidents of the same thing, but they are not the same. And if we predicate white of the musician, that is, an accident of an accident, and this is true, it is not necessarily the case that what is musical is white. For one is not something. What is musical is white only accidentally. For because the very thing to which being musical happens is white, therefore it is called a white musician. But a white musician is not the same. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it is held that the same cannot be a good cithara player nor make something one when joined to one body, even though they are truthfully predicated singly.

If someone predicates something substantially and speaks of two things individually, they can return to a single proposition, which substantially and separately truly predicate. For a human being, being both an animal and biped, is a biped animal and a single predication is made from these. For neither does “animal” accidentally apply to human, nor does “biped”. This is shown by what he says: “But a biped animal; not accidentally.” He also adds that not all things which are conjoined are correctly predicated, those which are contained either subtly or in expression in some of the terms which are put in the proposition. This is why one should not say “white” about a white man, to avoid the predication “white white man”, since “white” is already contained in “white man”.

Again, “biped” should not be predicated of a man, because even though it is not expressed, whoever is a man is a biped. But if someone predicates “biped” of a man, he predicates “biped” of a being with two feet and of this difference that it is a biped. Thus, it will also be “biped biped man”. For “man” contains within himself “biped”, and he who says “man” speaks with his difference. Therefore, if anyone predicates “biped” to this, he has predicated “biped” of a being with two feet. Thus, it will be “biped biped man”. But it should not be predicated thus. For “biped” is contained in “man”, to which if you again predicate “biped”, you will make a very annoying repetition. This is what he means when he says: “Moreover, neither any things that are in another”: they are contained either by expression, as in “white man” (white is contained in it, since it has already been said by expression) or by power and force, as in “man” is contained “biped”, even though it has not been fully said.

“But to truly speak of someone and simply, like calling a man a man or calling a white man white; not always but when something of opposites is in the adjective which results in contradiction, it is not true but false, like calling a dead man a man, but when it is not in it, it is true.”

This question is contrary to the previous one. For there it was asked, if things were predicated individually, whether the same would be said truly when joined and composed; but here, conversely, it asks the same, whether those things which are truly predicated when composed, when said individually are true. For after the death of Socrates, we can say that this corpse is a dead man, and by uniting man and dead, make from them a single true predication. However, to simply call that corpse a man is not true.

Again, it is true to call the same Socrates alive because he is a biped animal and it is true to say individually because he is an animal. Therefore, the question is what is the difference of this predication as well, that when they are said conjoined and truly predicated of the subjects, on the one hand, they can be truly said elsewhere, but on the other hand, if they are said simple beyond that conjunction, they are false. He said this as if hesitating. For it should be read as if he hesitatingly said: is it true to speak of someone compounded and conjoined, like calling a man a man or calling a white man white, so that each of these is predicated simply, or certainly not always?

And he gives a rule by which we may know, whether those things which are said compounded can be said the same individually or not at all. For whenever such things are predicated with another, that the things predicated in themselves do not have contradiction, they can be said separately with truth. But if they have in themselves some contradiction which is predicated and said compounded truly, they cannot be truly predicated separately. He who says that the corpse is a dead man speaks truly, but cannot truly call it a man alone, therefore, because he previously predicated with a conjunction saying a dead man, and the dead which is adjoined to the predication of man (for it is predicated with man) holds a contradiction against man. For man is an animal, but the dead is not an animal: therefore, dead and man have some contradiction between them. For that is an animal, but this is not an animal. Therefore, since these things have some opposition between them, a man is not simply said separately from a dead man.

In the same way, too, if anyone says that the hand is of a marble statue, he speaks the truth, but to say that it is the hand which is of the statue alone is false. For the hand has the ability to give and receive, but the marble one does not. Therefore, there is some contradiction between the hand and the marble hand, because this can give and receive, that cannot. These indeed oppose each other in this way.

So, whenever something of this kind is predicated, as a man of a corpse, to which something of this kind is conjoined and adjoins, which makes a contradiction against the predicate (as here dead is adjoined to man and at the same time is predicated of the corpse, to make a contradiction against man itself and contains it in itself), one predication cannot be separated, to be said individually, but if there is not this contradiction, it can: as in:

Socrates is a biped animal

Animal and biped oppose each other with no contradiction: therefore, both animal and biped can be said of him individually and simply. The meaning of such a thing is indeed this, but the order is thus.

For hesitatingly he said: “However, to truly speak of someone compounded and connected and then simply, like calling a man a man or calling a white man white, is it certainly not always, but when in the adjective, that is in that which is predicated with something else, there is something of opposites such that a contradiction immediately follows, that is, an opposition followed immediately by a contradiction, like the opposition of man and dead followed by the contradiction of animal and non-animal: if they are so, it is not true to predicate simply but false, like calling a dead man, whom you can truly call conjoinedly, the same man alone you will not truly predicate. But when this opposition is not in those which are predicated, it is true that what you have predicated conjoinedly and simply predicate. The adjective, however, is in which often comes such an opposition, as in “dead man”, dead is added to man. Otherwise, a man cannot be truly predicated of a corpse.”

“Or even when it is in it, it is not always true, but when it is not in it, it is not always true, like Homer is something, like a poet. Therefore, is he or isn’t he? For it is predicated accidentally that he is of Homer; because he is a poet but not according to himself, he is predicated of homer because he is. Therefore, in as many predicaments as there is no contradiction, if definitions are said for names, and they are predicated according to themselves and not accidentally, in these it will be true to say simply. But what is not, because it is opinable, it is not true to say that it is something. For his opinion is not because he is, but because he is not.”

Because he had said above, when there was a contradiction in the adjective, it was not true to predicate simply, but when it was not there, it was true to say simply what was said conjointly, this itself seemed in some respects not to be true, consequently he corrects it. For he says it is true that which was said above, whenever there was some contradiction in the adjective, it is not true to predicate simply what was said conjoinedly, but when there is no contradiction, it is not always true to say simply what was said conjoinedly but sometimes true, sometimes indeed false.

The example of this matter is as such: when I say:

Homer is a poet

I have truly spoken of Homer and the poet jointly. But if I were to say:

Homer is

it is false, although there is no contradiction between ‘is’ and ‘poet’, nor is there any such opposition in the adjective that a contradiction would follow.

But the reason why this happens is such: for we mainly predicate ‘poet’ of Homer when we say ‘Homer is a poet’, but we mainly predicate ‘is’ of the poet, and of Homer in a secondary place. For we do not predicate ‘is’ because ‘Homer is’, but because ‘poet is’. Therefore, removing that which is mainly predicated, that is ‘poet’, although ‘is’ does not have any contradiction, which is adjacent to ‘poet’, against ‘poet’, it does not become true predication by saying ‘Homer is’. For ‘is’ is predicated secondarily, not mainly. However, when the main predication is removed, what was predicated secondarily is found to be false immediately.

But he adds:

“Therefore, in any categories, no contrariety is present, if definitions are said in place of names, and they are predicated in themselves and not secondarily, in these it will simply be true to say.”

It is of this kind. He collected in one reason what he said earlier, saying: whatever things are predicated in such a way that they hold no contrariety in either the names or in their proper definitions, these things are true when they are simply and externally predicated, like in what is a dead man, dead and man: these indeed by names are of no contrariety or contradiction but if definitions are taken in place of these names, then the contrariety of opposition is recognized. For if someone has given a man’s definition, he says it to be a rational animal, if someone dead’s, he says it to be a body, truly deprived of life and inanimate and from this, the whole force of contradiction appears.

Therefore, if definitions are taken in place of names and in these, some contrariety will seem to be present or if something is predicated secondarily, like is the case with Homer, when it is mainly predicated of the poet, whatever composite things were predicated, they will not be predicated simply true. But if there is no contrariety at all and they are predicated per se and not secondarily, whatever composite thing is said truly, this is simply predicated truly. However, there were some who would say this very thing that is not is, joining the whole syllogism with these propositions:

“What is not is conceivable” “But what is conceivable is” “Therefore, what is not is”

Therefore, he says: if it is true to predicate, he says, of what is not because it is conceivable, indeed we predicate ‘is’ of what is conceivable, but secondarily of what is not. For since what is not is conceivable, therefore in the second place we predicate ‘is’ of what is not. Therefore, we cannot simply say what is not is. For it is conceivable, because it is not. For it would be knowable, if it were per se, not conceivable, just like Homer is said to be, because he is a poet, not because he is per se. Or indeed, Homer is said to be a poet, because his poetry exists and persists, just like we often say some live on in their children. Therefore, what is not is said to be conceivable, because it is an opinion of it, not however because what is not can be something per se.

Therefore, having dealt with these things beforehand and having put them in order, he turns the discussion and treatment to the modes of propositions, a matter most useful in dialectic. Now, it remains to discuss the modes of propositions and oppositions. For many have doubted for many reasons, whether the same mode would be of propositions placed without mode, which also of those which end in their proper modes and qualities. He begins, however, the doubt about these matters like this.

On Interpretation, Book 12

Once these things have been clarified, we must examine how negations and affirmations relate to each other, particularly those regarding the possible and the not-possible, the contingent and the not-contingent, the impossible, and the necessary, for these create some uncertainties.

Every proposition is either expressed in an unqualified way, such as “Socrates is walking” or “it is day,” or whatever is stated absolutely and without any quality. However, there are others that are expressed with their own modes, such as “Socrates is walking quickly.” For a manner has been added to Socrates’s walking, when we say he walks quickly. How he walks, is signified by what we predicate quickly of his walking. Similarly, if someone says, “Socrates is well taught,” how he is taught is shown, not only said that he is taught but also adds the manner of Socrates’s teaching. But since there are other ways in which we say something can happen, something exists, something is necessary, something happens by chance, it is also sought how the opposition of contradictions should be made in these cases. For in these propositions, which are simply and without any mode predicated, the place of contradiction is easily recognized. For this affirmation:

Socrates is walking

if the negation is literally posed, as it is:

Socrates is not walking

it rightly separates walking from Socrates by making an opposition. Again, this proposition which is:

Socrates is a philosopher

if someone puts a negation to the verb, it will make a complete negation saying:

Socrates is not a philosopher

Indeed, it cannot happen that in simple affirmations, a negation is placed elsewhere than to the verb which contains the whole force of the proposition. For if someone in this proposition, which is “a man is white,” does not say that the negation is the one which is “a man is not white,” but rather “a man is not white,” in this way it is shown to be false: by proposing a stone, let it be asked about it:

Is that stone a white man?

so if he denies it, placing the negation of that which is:

A white man is

that which says:

A man is not white

it should be said to him: if it is not a true affirmation of this stone which says:

A white man is

the negation will be true about it, namely the one that says:

A man is not white

But this is also false. For a stone is not a man at all, and therefore it cannot be predicated of it because a man is not white. But if neither the affirmation nor the negation of it is true, and this is impossible, that contradictory affirmations and negations predicated of the same thing both be false, it is clear that it is not of this affirmation which says:

A white man is

that negation which says:

A man is not white

but rather that by which it is proposed that he is not white. Therefore, the negation should not be placed anywhere else in these things which are simply and without any mode predicated, than to the verb which contains the whole proposition.

But we have already said enough about these things. But in those in which some mode is applied, there is doubt, whether the negative particle is placed on that mode, or whether it keeps its place at the verb, just as it was happening in these propositions too, which were proposed simply and without any mode. For if it keeps its place, the negative particle, to be placed at the verb, the property of contradiction falls out, and it does not divide the true from the false among themselves. For a certain mode is of making something, whenever we say it is possible, or it is necessary, or anything of this kind. Therefore, if someone says to me now that I can walk, and denies the same by putting a negation to the verb which is “to walk,” and says that I can not walk, an affirmation and a negation, contradictories said of the same thing, will be found true at the same time. For it is clear that I can both walk and not walk. But if in this way of possibility the negative particle is not rightly joined to the verb, even in those which have no difference, whether the negation is put to the mode or to the verb, such opposition must be maintained which fits this species of propositions which are stated with a mode. In this proposition which says:

Socrates is walking quickly

whether someone denies it thus:

Socrates is not walking quickly

by putting a negation to the verb, or thus:

Socrates does not walk quickly

by joining a negative particle to the mode, it will almost seem to be similar. For it divides the truth and falsity with the affirmation in both ways, a suitable negation.

But since there are many modes, in which if a negative particle is joined to the verb, there is no negation of the affirmation stated above, therefore in all propositions according to mode this opposition must be maintained, so that in one and the same way oppositions of all may be said to be made, that in those indeed which are simple, the negation negates the thing, in those however which are with a mode, it negates the mode, as in that which is:

Socrates is walking

the thing itself that is walking is denied and taken away by the proposition saying:

Socrates is not walking

In those however which are with a mode, it agrees that the thing is, but denies the mode, as in that proposition which says:

Socrates is walking quickly

the negation says:

Socrates does not walk quickly

so that whether he walks or does not walk there is no difference, but the mode, that is, walking quickly, is destroyed by the opposite constituted negation.

Although this is not the case in some instances. For together with the mode itself, the thing must also necessarily be destroyed, as in the case of:

Socrates can walk
Socrates cannot walk

The particle of negation intercepts both the mode and the thing bound to the mode. But this usually happens in those instances where not just something is said to be occurring and the act itself is added to the mode, but rather a mode of doing something in the future is added, as if one were to say that Socrates is able to walk, not because he is currently walking, but because it is possible for him to walk. If a negation is joined to the possible, it will seem to have removed the thing about which that possibility is predicated. But if someone says that Socrates is walking quickly, they say that he is doing something and attach a mode to that action, so that anyone may recognize in what manner he is doing what is said to be done. In these cases, the thing indeed remains, but the mode is undermined, as was said above. Or rather, should we say that it is more accurate to say that these kinds of propositions always remove the mode, but do not destroy the thing about which that mode is predicated? And in which the thing is posited, as in the case of:

Socrates walks quickly

And in which the act itself and the present are predicated, because it is done and performed, it is clear that the mode indeed is undermined, but the thing which is said to be done remains, as when we say:

Socrates does not walk quickly

His walking is indeed not removed but only this negation has separated speed from walking. However, those which posit the possibility of doing something in the future through mode, do not posit any act at all, but only mode. When the negation is attached to this mode, the mode is indeed destroyed but the thing about which the mode was predicated does not remain, precisely because even then when it was predicated with the mode, no thing was proposed to be done or acted upon, as if one were to say:

It is possible for Socrates to walk

The mode indeed is posited, but the thing is not actually constituted. For it was not said that he is walking, but that it is possible for him to walk.

Therefore, the negation removes this possibility in the proposition which says:

It is not possible for Socrates to walk

But in the same proposition, the thing about which that mode was spoken does not remain. But this happens because even in the affirmation, the thing about which the mode was predicated was not posited. Therefore, the thing was not destroyed by the negation, since the negation did not find the thing posited, but only the mode, which was even constituted by the affirmation. But there is a great difference, whether the negation is applied to the mode or to the verb. For if I place it with the verb, the predicate is separated from the subject, as in:

Socrates does not walk

For ‘walks’, which is the predicate, is separated from ‘Socrates’, which is the subject. But if it is placed with the mode, the predicate is not separated from the subject, but the mode is rather separated from the predicate, as in:

Socrates does not walk quickly

This proposition does not separate walking from Socrates, but speed from walking, that is, the mode from the predicate. And this is more easily and clearly apparent in those which are predicated in such a way…

Smith: Meiser suspects a lacuna at this point.

...and happens.

However, we must define what is possible, what is necessary, what exists, and display their meanings. This will benefit us for understanding the intricacies of the topic we are discussing and will clarify any previous discussion regarding contingencies, revealing the thoughts of the Analytics to us in the clearest light.

There are four modes that Aristotle sets forth in his book “On Interpretation”: something is either said to exist, or to happen, or to be possible, or to be necessary. Among these, to happen and to be possible mean the same thing and there is no difference between saying “it is possible that there will be a circus tomorrow” and “it is likely that there will be a circus tomorrow”, except for the fact that possibility can be removed by privation, but contingency cannot. This is because while the statement “it is possible” and the negation of possibility, such as “it is not possible”, often suggest privation, as in “it is impossible”, what we call “impossible” is the privation of possibility. However, in the case of contingency, even though it means the same thing, only negation is opposed to it, no privation is found: if we want to eliminate what is contingent, we say “it is not contingent”, which is a negation, but no one will say “it is un-contingent”, which is a privation.

Therefore, although “to be contingent” and “to be possible” mean the same thing, according to Porphyry there is much diversity between them, as there are between those things which are necessary, those which merely exist, and those which are contingent or possible.

For when it is said that something exists, it is judged in the present time. If something is currently present in something else, this is said to exist. But if something is present in such a way that it always is and never changes, it is said to be necessary, such as the motion of the sun and moon when the earth obstructs their light. But those things which are said to be contingent or possible, we do not look at their occurrence according to the present time or any unchangeability, but only as much as the proposition of the contingent promises. For what is said to be possible or to happen, does not yet exist, but can exist. Whether it happens or does not happen, it is called a contingent or possible proposition because it can happen. These types of propositions are not judged by the event but rather by the meaning in this way: if someone says “it is possible that there will be a circus tomorrow”, the assertion is possible and contingent. But if there is a circus tomorrow, nothing about the contingent or possible proposition is changed so that it appears necessary, which it had promised possibly. And if there is not a circus tomorrow, again, nothing has changed so that it seemed necessary that there was no circus. For these are not judged by the event (as said), but rather by the promise of the proposition itself. For what does anyone say when they say “it could be a circus tomorrow”? This, as I think, whether it happens or not, no necessity prevented it from happening.

Therefore, two of the four modes are the same, contingent and possible, and these two differ from the remaining two, and the remaining two differ from each other. For possible and contingent differ from the proposition which says something exists. For this proposes an affirmation according to the possibility of future time, but that according to the act of the present. And both, both the one which signifies to exist and the one which signifies to be possible or to happen, are separated from the necessary proposition. For necessity not only wants something to exist but also to exist unchangeably, so that what is said to exist can never not exist. Therefore, the order of consequences is also clearly apparent. For what is necessary, without that which is to be, or to happen, or to be possible, cannot be said. For whatever is necessary is and can be, or if it could not be, it would not be at all. If it were not, it would not be said to be necessary. Therefore, everything necessary is and is possible. But not everything that is, is necessary (for there can be some things, which are not necessary to be, such as Socrates walking or other things taken from separable accidents), or again what happens to be or is possible, is soon necessary to be. Therefore, while necessity follows being and possibility, neither being nor possibility follows any necessity.

Furthermore, every being follows possible being. For what is can be. For if it could not be, without any doubt it would not be. However, possible being does not follow being. For what is possible can also not be, like it is possible for me to proceed now, but it is not for me to be. For I am not proceeding now. Therefore, this entire sequence is gradual. For necessary is, and being follows, and possibility.

Furthermore, the same possibility follows being, but neither being follows possibility nor necessity. It is clear, therefore, that there are two modes of possibilities: one that already follows necessity, the other that does not follow necessity itself. For when I say:

It is necessary for the sun to move now

this is also possible, but when I say:

It is possible for me to take the book now

it is not necessary. Therefore, Aristotle will rightly question a little later, whether that is possible which agrees with necessity. But when we come to the same places, we will recognize what this similarity of possibilities wants or how it can be distinguished.

Now, having explained the consequences of affirmative propositions, let us explore the consequences of negative ones. Indeed, of these four propositions, which are made from “is,” “must be,” “can be,” or “happens to be,” there are four negations: “is not,” “need not be,” “cannot be,” or “does not happen to be.” But just as “can be” and “happens to be” were the same according to their meaning, so too the negations are the same. For it does not differ to say “cannot be” than if one asserts “does not happen to be.” The consequences, however, were such in the affirmatives that necessary propositions would follow those signifying “is something” and “can be,” but those that say “is something” would be followed by “can be,” but they would not agree with “is something” nor “must be.” Conversely, it is the opposite in negatives. The negation of possibility follows both the negation of “is something” and “must be.” However, the negation of “must be” does not follow either the “is not” or “cannot be.” Let all of them be arranged in order this way:

Can be | Cannot be
Happens to be | Does not happen to be
Is | Is not
Must be | Need not be

So it is necessary to briefly repeat the consequences of affirmatives, so that how they are conversely in negatives might be more clearly shown. “Is” follows “can be” and “happens to be,” but “can be” and “happens to be” do not follow “is,” “must be” follows both “is” and “can be” and “happens to be,” but neither “is” nor “must be” follows “can be” and “happens to be.” However, it is the opposite in negatives. “Cannot be” and “does not happen to be” follow “is not.” For whatever cannot be is not. However, “is not” does not follow “cannot be.” For what is not is not entirely excluded from being able to be. For now, I do not see the Forum of Trajan, but it is not necessary that I not see it. For it can happen that I see it if I approach closer.

Again, “cannot be,” “does not happen to be,” “is not,” and “need not be” do not follow each other. For it seems that what cannot be is truly said not because it is not necessary to be, but rather because it is necessary not to be. However, the negation of necessity, that is “need not be,” does not follow either “is not” or “cannot be.” For when I walk, it is not necessary that I walk. For nobody walks from necessity.

Nor again can what is not necessary be unable to happen. For whoever walks does not necessarily have to walk, but can do so. Therefore, what is not necessary to be is not entirely excluded from being able to be. And the same reasoning applies to “does not happen to be.” Therefore, the negative conversion is in a different way than in affirmatives. For there, necessity, being, and possibility were followed by being, but neither being by possibility or necessity, nor being by necessity were followed. But here, “cannot be,” “is not,” and “need not be” are followed. But neither “need not be” follows “is not” nor either of the negations of possibility, which proposes that something cannot be.

Or should we rather say that, just as it was in affirmatives, so also in negatives, as Theophrastus most keenly saw? For there was a consequence in affirmatives that necessity and being would be followed by possibility, but neither being nor necessity would follow possibility. The same will appear entirely to those observing in negatives. For when a negation comes in necessity and makes such a negation which says “need not be,” it breaks the force of necessity and leads the whole proposition to possibility. For what is not necessary to be, with the strictness of necessity broken, has been led to possibility. But neither being nor necessity followed possibility. Therefore, correctly, when a negation says “need not be,” neither “is not” nor “does not happen to be” follows the broken necessity and led to possibility.

Again, one who says “can be,” if a separation of negation is added to him, takes away the possible and recalls the whole proposition to the perpetuity of necessity in a negative form, as “cannot be.” For what cannot possibly be cannot be, and what cannot be must not be. Therefore, this proposition in which we say something cannot be has some necessary force. But necessity was followed by being and possibility. But “need not be” looks to possibility. Therefore, correctly “need not be,” which is now of possibility, will follow the proposition which says “cannot be,” which is of necessity.

Therefore, there are other orders of propositions, but the force is the same, so that everything would follow necessity, but necessity does not follow possibility.

Here arises a somewhat difficult question. For if possibility follows necessity, but “need not be” is adjacent to possibility, why does “need not be” follow what we say “need not be”? For if possibility follows necessity, but “need not be” is possibility, what we predicate as “need not be” ought to follow necessity. This is resolved in this way: “cannot be,” although it has the force of necessity, nevertheless differs from necessity in that the former has an affirmative form, but the latter a negative. Thus, also “can be” and “need not be” differ only in that the former is affirmative, but the latter negative, while the force of the signification is the same. But the affirmation of possibility and happening were followed by necessity. Although, however, what we say “need not be” imitates and agrees with possibility, it is nevertheless a negation. Therefore, correctly, the affirmation that it is necessary to be does not follow the negation by which we propose something need not be. And indeed, Theophrastus, the most learned man, found this solution to the question.

However, having determined these points, let’s proceed to the following. For there are, as Aristotle himself states, many doubts in these matters. But first, we lay out the fullest meaning of the entire text. Although it is long, I will not hesitate to append it so the sentence does not seem to be cut off.

“For if of those things that are comprised, those that are opposed to each other are contradictions, whichever are arranged according to being and not being, such as the negation of ‘is a man’ is ‘is not a man,’ not ‘is not not a man’ and of ‘is a white man,’ ‘is not a non-white man’ but ‘is not a white man.’ For if of all, either affirmation or negation, it will be true to say ‘is not a white man.’ But if this way, and however much ‘not’ is added to ‘is,’ it will do the same as is said for ‘is,’ like for ‘a man walks’ not ‘not a man walks’ but ‘a man does not walk;’ for it makes no difference to say ‘a man walks’ or ‘a walking man is.’ Therefore if this way in all, and of ‘is possible to be,’ ‘is not possible not to be,’ not ‘is not possible to be.’ It seems the same can be and not be; for everything that is possible can both walk and not walk and it is possible not to divide. But because everything that is possible this way is not always in act, therefore a negation will also be inherent; thus it can both not walk what is able to walk and not be seen what is able to be seen. But indeed it is impossible for true opposing statements to be about the same thing; therefore this is not a negation. It happens from these to either say the same thing and deny it simultaneously about the same thing or not according to being and not being the affirmations or negations which are imposed are made. Therefore if that is more impossible, this will be more chosen. Therefore the negation of ‘is possible to be’ is ‘is not possible to be.’ The same reasoning also exists for ‘is contingent to be;’ indeed its negation is ‘is not contingent to be.’ And similarly in other ways, like necessary and impossible, for in these ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are applied, and the subjects are indeed ‘white,’ and indeed ‘man,’ in the same way here ‘is’ indeed becomes the subject, ‘possible’ and ‘contingent’ are determining applications, just like in those ‘is’ and ‘is not’ truth, similarly these also in ‘is possible to be’ and 'is not possible to be.’”

While Aristotle is subtly examining these, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a significant difference between defining the force and nature of possibility itself or concluding its quality from its own science, and judging what a possible statement should be like. For in the knowledge of what is possible, it is only seen whether what is said can happen without any external chance hindering it. Even if this happens, it doesn’t change the status of the previous possibility. The judgment of the statement of possibility itself differs greatly, which will be able to be known soon from the very debate about possible statements. For just as it is not the same to answer the definition of a man to those inquiring and to include the very definition with another term of definition, so it is not the same to deal with a possible statement and what possibility itself is.

Hence it happens that, while ‘possible’ and ‘contingent’ are the same in their meanings, they appear to be different in their statements. For indeed we taught above that possibility and contingency are of the same meaning, so that what could happen would be the same as possible, what was possible would also be what could happen. But a possible statement is not the same as a contingent one. Nor indeed if someone proposes a possible affirmation and opposes it with a contingent negation, will he make a direct contradiction. For if someone says any given thing is possible, another responds denying that thing will happen, although as much as it is in its meaning he has taken away the previous possibility, yet a contradiction is not to be said, in which other terms are announced in the negation, others in the affirmation. For a possible affirmation ought to have a negation about possibility, not about contingency. The same also in contingents. Nor indeed if someone says something will happen, should the negation of possibility be opposed to him, although what is possible is the same as what is contingent. It is therefore agreed that the reason for judging in itself and a statement, which is predicated with the way and with quality, are very different. Hence it happens that although in their meanings possibility and contingency are the same, they are proposed by Aristotle as if different in the order of ways.

It should also not be ignored that to the Stoics it seems to be more universal by which possible is distinguished from necessary. For they divide statements in this way: they say, some statements are possible, others impossible, of the possible some are necessary, others not necessary, again of the not necessary some are possible, others indeed impossible: foolishly and imprudently constituting the same possible as both a genus of the not necessary and a species. But Aristotle knows both that possible which is not necessary and that possible again which can be necessary. For in the same way it is not said to be possible, that which either sometimes transitions from falsehood to truth or again from truth to falsehood. Like if someone says now, because it is day, he has spoken truth, the same if he predicates this at night, it is false and this truth of the proposition is changed into falsehood thus therefore there are some possibilities, so that they can both be and not be, which are not said in the same way as those which do not have a changeable nature, like these which we call necessary. Like if someone says the sun moves or it is possible for the sun to move, this will never be changed from truth to falsehood. But now silence must be kept about the disagreement between Aristotle and the Stoics.

However, this only should be more eagerly sought, where the negation should be placed in these propositions, in which a mode is predicated, like what will be said to be possible statements. Possible, contingent and necessary statements and whatever propositions are with a mode, will be truly said to be, in the meanings of which the quality of the thing about which they predicate is found, like when I say:

“Socrates speaks well”

there is a certain mode of Socrates speaking.

Therefore just as in these propositions, whichever promise the subsistence of any of these things, the negation is put to this very subsistence (like when we say “Socrates is,” the negation is applied to being, when we deny “Socrates is not”), so also in these which say the mode of subsistence the negation should be put to this mode, which seems added to that subsistence, like when we say:

“Socrates speaks well”

the mode of the thing itself is what is predicated as good: therefore to this mode and quality the negation should be put. However we say those propositions are possible or contingent, in which the mode itself is shown and rather it is not said not to be about the mode but the mode about what is said to be. For when we say it is possible to be, indeed we say something is, how it is added is, that is possible, so that it is not said to be necessary or in any other way except only according to power.

The subject, then, is understood to be existence, and the predicate is a mode or condition, whether contingent, possible, necessary, or any other kind. The propositions thus characterized are made according to a mode, in which there is no doubt about the substance, but only about the mode and quality. However, if a mode is subjected and existence is predicated, then the nature of the thing is sought, not the mode. For instance, if one were to say that it is possible, thereby affirming the possible to exist in things, no mode has been added to this proposition. For when we say that it is possible to have a mode, we do not say this of itself, but by removing part of the proposition. Indeed, we see this as if it were connected with the proposition. If we join it with its proper proposition, then it becomes clear in what way it is predicated. When we say that it is possible, to signify a mode, it is part of a proposition. When we add it to its body to make some proposition, we recognize what that mode professes. Let’s consider what I’ve said as possible and combine it with other predicates and make one statement, such as “It is possible for Socrates to walk”. Do you not see the mode in the proposition “possible”, that even if Socrates walks or does not walk, anyone can understand from the mode of the proposition itself that he can still walk? So, if we remove from the whole the part “possible”, we look at the statement as if it were a complete proposition, as in those phrases which determine plurality. For example, if we are in doubt whether “all”, “none”, or “not all” should be placed, we should examine them as if they were entire propositions, which are clearly determinations of propositions.

Thus, in conclusion, it must be said that in those things which predicate a mode, all other things are subject to being or to walking, or reading, or speaking, or any other thing that is said to occur in some way. However, when the mode itself is predicated, in order for there to be a complete proposition, it does not have a proposition with a mode, but only a proposition about the existence of the mode is made. For example, if one says that it is possible, he is saying something in things is possible; and again if it is contingent, he is saying that something in things can happen; and again if it is necessary, he says that something in things is necessary. Here, the discussion is not about the mode, but about existence itself. Therefore, whenever existence is the subject and the mode is the predicate, as when we say:

“It is possible for Socrates to walk”

a denial must be attached to the mode. But whenever the mode is the subject and existence is the predicate, a denial must be placed on the existence.

For instance, when we say “it is possible”, because we say it as if we were saying “possibility exists”, and when we say “it is contingent”, we say it as if we were saying “contingency exists”, a denial must be placed on the existence, and it must be said “it is not possible”, which is the same as if it were said “possibility does not exist”. The same also applies to contingency. However, for those who are not perfectly observant, the subject, which is said to be found first, and the predicate, which is always said second, should not always seem the same. For in some cases, it is true, while in others we gather from the meaning of the propositions which term is the subject and which is the predicate. For when I say:

“Man is an animal”

I must first say “man”, then predicate “animal”, hence “man” is called the subject, and “animal” is predicated. However, in those where a mode is added, it goes like this: when we say:

“Socrates speaks well”

it is the same as if we were to say:

“Socrates is speaking well”

and indeed, “well” is first said, then “speaking” is said, and it appears that the subject is what was said to be “well”, and the predicate is what was said to be “speaking”. But this is false.

From this, it can be most easily found that no one is unaware that the speaker is the one who is said to speak well when they hear “Socrates speaks well”, but the force of the whole proposition lies in the mode. For that is where the mind must focus, not on whether he speaks. For this is beyond doubt. For he who says that he speaks well also agrees that he speaks. Therefore, the mind must be directed to the mode, to what has been said to be “well”. For “Socrates speaks well” means what he said, it is not enough to say that he speaks, unless he also says well. Therefore, the mode contains the whole proposition. But again, the proposition contains the predicate: therefore, in these propositions, the mode is rather predicated.

Therefore, it must be concluded universally that every contradiction of modes does not happen according to the verb “to be”, nor according to the verb again that contains existence in itself, but rather according to the mode. Verbs that are said to contain existence in themselves are, for example, when we say “he speaks”. For it is just as much as if we were to say “he is speaking”. Therefore, whichever propositions contain any mode in themselves, there should be no doubt that the denial rightly applies not to what posits existence, but rather to that mode in which something is declared to be or to occur. For every affirmation with a mode is such that the listener’s mind should not focus on what is said to exist, but rather on how that thing is said to exist.

For instance, when we say:

“Socrates speaks well”

it is not necessary to see whether he speaks, but rather the intention of the mind should be directed to how he speaks. For this seems to contain the whole proposition. Therefore, against “it is possible to be”, the denial that says “it is not possible to be” is not the one that applies, but rather “it is not possible to be”. In the same way, against the one that says “it is contingent to be”, not the one that says “it is not contingent to be” applies, but rather the denial that says “it is not contingent to be”.

The same approach should also be taken with necessary, impossible, and other modes that Aristotle, in his usual brevity, has passed over. But since the power of commentary lies not only in broadly conveying the force of the meaning, but also in connecting the text itself in terms of its words and sequence, let’s divide the points that were previously discussed in a disordered way, now according to the order of the words spoken by Aristotle himself.

Aristotle states, “Once these are established, we should observe how negations and affirmations relate to each other, especially those regarding possible and not possible, contingent and not contingent, impossible and necessary; for there are some doubts.”

He continues, "We must observe, regarding affirmations and negations, how they seem to oppose each other in these propositions, which some mode contains, such as those which are possible or contingent or necessary or impossible or true or false or good or bad, or whatever is predicated with some quality. ‘For there are,’ he says, ‘some doubts,’ and he immediately presents the doubts that he has.

Aristotle then says, “For if these which encompass the opposites to each other are contradictions, whichever are arranged according to being and not being.”

The entire meaning of this is: in all the combinations of propositions, opposition operates in those that deal with being and not being. As when we say:

A man exists

the negation of this is:

A man does not exist

but not that which says:

A non-man exists

And again, the negation of that which proposes:

A white man exists

is that which says:

A white man does not exist

not that which proposes:

A non-white man exists

Moreover, since of that which says:

A white man exists

the negation is not that which says:

A non-white man exists

but rather that which says:

A white man does not exist

He demonstrates this in the following way:

“For if about all things there is either an affirmation or a negation, it will be true to say that a non-white man exists.”

Briefly stated, it seems it can be explained as follows: let’s propose, he says, wood, about which two assertions are made. However, it should be clear to us about all things, if the affirmation is true, the negation is false, specifically, the one that is opposed contradictorily, and if the negation is true, the affirmation is false. Therefore, let’s assert about the proposed wood, that this wood is a white man. This is false. If this affirmation is false, then the negation of it must be true. If the negation of the affirmation that says:

A white man exists

is that which negates by saying:

A non-white man exists

this negation will truly be asserted of the wood, with anyone saying that this wood is a non-white man. But this can’t be done. For it’s clearly false that the wood is a non-white man. For something that is in no way a man cannot be a non-white man. Therefore, both are false, the affirmation which says about the wood that it is a white man and the negation about it which says that it is a non-white man. If both are false, this negation is not that of the affirmation. Therefore, another negation that divides the true and the false with it must be sought. In this matter, no other will be found against it which says:

A white man exists

except that which says:

A white man does not exist

For if the one that states:

A non-white man exists

is said to be the negation of this affirmation which says:

A white man exists

then, it will be that from the wood, about which the affirmation said is false, the stated negation will be true, and it will be true to say about the wood, that this wood is a non-white man. But this is impossible. It’s clear therefore, neither is the proposition which says:

A non-white man exists

the negation of the affirmation which proposes:

A white man exists

and the one which says:

A white man does not exist

is the negation of the same affirmation which says:

A white man exists

Do you see then how almost all affirmations and negations are made according to being or not being? For the one that said that white is, denies that white is not, and the one that says again that man is, the other denies saying man is not, and in the other things, it’s the same way.

Aristotle further explains, “And if in this way, and in whatever ‘being’ is not added, it does the same as what is said for ‘being’, such as in ‘a man walks’, not ‘a non-man walks’ is the negation, but ‘a man does not walk’; for it does not differ whether a man walks or a walking man exists.”

He continues, “Not only can this happen in these propositions, which are arranged according to being or not being, but also in those which contain such words, like ‘walks’, which imply being. As in ‘a man walks’, where ‘walks’ includes within itself ‘being’. It’s the same as ‘walks’ and ‘a walking man exists’. Therefore, a negation must be adapted to these words, which contain ‘being’ in the propositions. If every contradiction is made according to being or not being, and these words contain ‘being’ in their proper signification, and since these words are set down as if ‘being’ itself were put down, it’s clear that a negation must be placed on those words which contain ‘being’, in similarity to the propositions which oppose themselves according to being and not being, in the way stated above.”

Therefore, he pursues what might be the inconsistency among the aforementioned.

“So if this is the way it is in all cases, and the negation of what is possible to be is it’s possible not to be, it is not possible not to be. However, it seems that the same thing can both be and not be; for whatever is possible to be divided or to walk and not walk and not be divided is also possible.”

Above it was demonstrated how oppositions according to being and not being would occur in the propositions that encompass them. Now he says: if this, he says, must be done in all propositions, so that their contradictions are posited according to being and not being, and in those which declare something possible to be, the negation is not to be posited in such a way that it says not possible to be, but rather it is to be established according to not being, so that it is said to be possible not to be, the negation of its being that which says it’s possible to be. But if we say this, he says, the affirmation and negation, being contradictory, do not divide the true and the false among themselves. For whatever can be, the same can also not be. For whatever can be divided, the same can also not be divided and whatever can walk, the same can also not walk. But what kind of possibility this is, through which when something is said to be able to occur, that nevertheless can not occur, he subsequently explains by saying:

“The reason, however, is because everything that is possible in this way is not always in actuality, therefore a negation will also belong to it; thus, what is capable of walking can also not walk and what is visible can also not be seen. But it is impossible for true opposite statements to be about the same thing; thus, this is not a negation.”

The cause, therefore, he says, why that which is said to be possible to be, the same can also not be, is because everything that we say is possible, we pronounce it in such a way, as it is not always in act, that is, it is not necessary. For everything that is always in act is necessary, as the sun is always moving: thus, motion is always happening to it. But if someone says I can walk, since the motion of walking does not always happen to me and sometimes I do not walk, it is also true that it can truly be said of me that I can not walk, when it is truly pronounced that I can walk.

Therefore, whatever things are not always in act, both can be and can not be. Thus, what is capable of walking, that is, what can walk, can also not walk and what is visible can also not be seen. Therefore, it is taught that the negation of that which says it can be is not that which proposes it can not be, therefore because both are true in those which (as he himself says) are not always in act. For one of either things that Aristotle says happens:

“Either to say and deny the same thing at the same time about the same thing or not according to being and not being, affirmations or negations are made,”

either the affirmation and negation are the same and agree with each other, if according to being and not being in all things a contradiction is made, as it is in that which is can be and can not be (for the same are both and agree with each other and if someone says it is a contradiction, they say a contradiction agrees with itself), or certainly not in all negations according to being and not being, what is made affirmations or negations, that is, not in all negations according to the apposition of being or not being or of those words which contain being a contradiction is made.

“So if that, he says, is more impossible, this will be more preferable.”

He had posited two things above that would occur from the aforementioned reasons: either one and the same thing to say and deny at the same time about the same thing, that is, as if speech and denial were the same thing predicated about the same thing and agreed with each other, or not according to being or not being a contradiction is made. But both seem in some way to be inconvenient, since that one thing is even impossible, as affirmation and denial agree, that other thing that is not according to being and not being oppositions are made is inconsistent with other propositions, in which it is manifest that a contradiction is made in this way.

Now therefore he says this: since both, he says, are inconvenient, but one of these must be chosen, which is less impossible, this must be taken. But less impossible is that according to being and not being oppositions are not made. For nothing prevents this, but the other is more impossible, as affirmation and denial agree. Therefore this will rather be chosen: these propositions which now exist do not have oppositions, which are made according to being and not being, but rather those which are posited according to the mode. However, he did not say it is more impossible, as if one is impossible but rather referred to this that both seem somewhat inconvenient, of which it is not doubted that one is even impossible.

Hence he also arranges according to some mode of propositions which are pronounced, which posit being negations. For he says:

“Therefore, the negation of that which is possible to be is that which is not possible to be,”

certainly adding negation not to the verb to be but to the mode that is possible. He also says the same reason is in contingents. For the negation of that which is to happen to be is not to happen to be. He also teaches about necessary and impossible the same thing seems to him. But what the nature of this opposition is, although briefly, is however most truthfully expressed, about which we spoke at greater length above. But if anyone considers more carefully, they communicate the understanding of the place with this gradually advancing explanation.

Indeed, as in those cases where “to be” and “not to be” are juxtapositions, the subject matters are indeed “this is white”, “that is a human”, in the same way, in this case, the subject indeed becomes “being”, while “possible” and “contingent” are the determining juxtapositions, like “being” and “not being” determined truth in the previous cases, and similarly these too in “possible being” and “impossible being”.

He calls juxtapositions predications. So, he says in these propositions, which are spoken beyond some manner, they always predicate “to be” and “not to be”, or those words that contain existence, while the things about which these are predicated are subjects, like “white” when we say “white is”, or “human”, when we say “human is”. And so, because in these the predication contains the whole truth and falsity of the proposition and that predication determines, and “being” is predicated, or whatever contains “being”, rightly contradictions are placed according to “being” and “not being”. But in these, that is in which some mode is predicated, indeed “being” is the subject, or those words which contain “being”, but the mode is, in some way, solely predicated. For what is said to exist alone without any mode, the substance of that thing itself is pronounced and in it somehow whether it is, is sought: therefore, with “being” positing, negation says “not being”. But in these in which some mode is, it is not said that something is, but it is said to be with some quality, so that “being” neither affirms ambiguously nor negates, but about the quality, that is how it is, then it is doubted among some. And therefore, with someone positing that Socrates speaks well, the negation is not posited that Socrates does not speak well but that Socrates does not speak well, therefore, because (as it was said) the whole proposition is not formed according to “being” or the words that contain “being”, but rather the mind of the listener is directed toward the mode, when the affirmation pronounces something to be. If therefore, these contain the force of the whole proposition and what contains the force of the proposition is predicated and according to what is predicated, oppositions always occur, the force of negation is rightly attached to modes alone.

With these things reasonably established, he then carries out that not only is there no contradiction between “it is possible to be” and “it is possible not to be”, but also such propositions, which placed with modes, yet have negation attached to being, are not at all negations but affirmations. For other negations of these can be found. He says:

“The negation of what it is possible not to be is not possible not to be.”

He argues to such an extent that there is no contradiction of what it is possible to be and what it is possible not to be, that what he says “it is possible not to be” is convinced not to be a negation but rather an affirmation. But an affirmation is never opposed contradictorily to an affirmation. It is taught, however, to be an affirmation that which says “it is possible not to be”, because another certain negation of it is found, namely that which says “it is not possible not to be”. At the same time, he adds: there are, he says, two of this proposition which says something is possible to be, which seem to be negations, namely that which says “it is possible not to be” and that which proposes “it is not possible to be”, hence it is recognized which of these is contradictory against that which says “it is possible to be” an affirmation: for indeed whatever divides truth and falsity with it, it can more likely be its contradiction than what agrees with it. And to what it is possible to be agrees that which says “it is possible not to be”, as I have already shown above: that which says “it is not possible to be”, if it is false, true is that which says “it is possible to be”, this again if it is false, true is that which declares “it is not possible to be”. Therefore, these divide truth and falsity, which can be found most easily in individual examples. For indeed if someone says that it is possible for me to walk, he has spoken the truth, but if someone says that it is not possible for me to walk, he has lied. Again, if someone says that it is possible for the sun to stand still, he lies, but if someone says that it is not possible for the sun to stand still, no one doubts its truth.

Therefore, these namely which say “it is possible to be” and “it is not possible to be”, divide truth and falsity, but those follow themselves which say “it is possible to be” and “it is possible not to be”. Therefore, those which agree are not contradictions, but those which divide truth and falsity among themselves are more likely thought to be contradictions. Which he says through this:

“Therefore, they will seem to follow each other”

And which propositions follow each other, he says:

“For the same thing is possible to be and not to be”

And why they follow each other, he shows adding:

“For they are not contradictions to each other”

For if they were contradictions, they would never follow each other. But he declares what are contradictions saying:

“But it is possible to be and it is not possible to be are never at the same time”

And why they are never at the same time, he does not hide. For he says: “For they oppose each other”. For therefore, they are never at the same time and divide truth and falsity, because they oppose each other. He also teaches that the negation of the proposition which says “it is possible not to be” is that which proposes “it is not possible not to be”. He goes from the same force to the proposition. For he says:

“But indeed it is possible not to be and it is not possible not to be are never at the same time”,

by which it is shown that this is an affirmation, but this a negation. For universally, whatever posits the same thing about the same thing, this removes, if this is an affirmation, that is a negation and nothing of equivocation or universal determination impedes, they are opposed contradictorily to each other.

The remaining topics are already clear as he says, and they don’t require lengthy explanations, unless some things need to be intermixed in their order, to make clearer what is clear by itself. He continues in the same manner with the other modes, stating which propositions are not negations of certain affirmations, and which are, and those which he claims are not negations, in order to show they are affirmations, he counters with other negations. “However, similarly,” he says, “and of that proposition which is ‘necessary to be’, it is not that negation which says ‘necessary not to be’ (for this is an affirmation, as he soon proved by opposing a negation) but rather, it is that negation of ‘necessary to be’ which says ‘not necessary to be’.” In the same way, he pursues everything, saying: “Indeed, of that which is ‘necessary not to be’, which he had previously said is not opposed to that which says ‘necessary to be’, that negation is which proposes ‘not necessary not to be’. For all those which have a negation applied to being, should be considered as affirmations, if they are in a mode. Indeed, of that which is ‘impossible to be’, it is not that negation which says ‘impossible not to be’ (for it does not have the negative particle joined to the mode) but rather that which says ‘not impossible to be’. For these divide the true and the false among themselves. However, of that which has the negative particle applied to being, which it is obvious is an affirmation, that is of that which says ‘impossible not to be’, that negation is which says ‘not impossible not to be’.” He also briefly concludes what he had previously demonstrated, saying:

“And universally indeed (as has been said), ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ should be placed as subjects, while ‘negation’ and ‘affirmation’ are to be appended to one and these should be considered to be opposed phrases.”

Universally, he says, as has been already mentioned above, in those propositions which have modes attached, ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ should rather become subjects, while modes should be predicated. Therefore, for any single mode, i.e., according to one, an affirmation and a negation should always be made so that just as the predicated mode contains the affirmation, so the negative particle joined to the mode should contain the whole negation. However, he proposes these as he considers them to be opposed phrases:

Possible Not possible
Contingent Not contingent
Impossible Not impossible
Necessary Not necessary

And what he added, ‘true not true’, pertains to the inclusion of all modes. For indeed, ‘true’ is a certain mode, just as ‘well’, ‘quickly’, ‘happily’, ‘seriously’, and whatever modes there are, the contradiction should be done in this manner: it is true, it is not true, not however it is not true, to walk quickly, not to walk quickly but not that which says not to walk quickly. Therefore, the negation should always be added to the conclusion according to the mode. For these always oppose each other, as was already mentioned above, which have negative particles joined according to predicates. However, modes are predicated in these, as we have already shown. Therefore, a negation placed according to modes in these will produce the entire force of contradiction.

Having explained the oppositions of modes, a subtle and useful discourse will be held about the consequences and agreements of propositions. Therefore, if ‘possible to be’ were to be said simply, a simple and easy agreement of propositions would seem to exist and nothing could err in their consequence: but now, since it is said in two ways, according to different modes, the consequences of propositions are not the same. However, what I say is such. There are two parts of the possible: one, that it can be when it is not, the other, that it is said to be possible because it already exists indeed. The former part is proper to corruptible and mutable things. For in mortals, Socrates can exist when he did not exist, just as mortals themselves, who are what they were not before. For a man can speak when he does not speak and walk when he does not walk.

Therefore, this part is said according to that which is not yet, but can be. However, that other part of the possible, which is said according to that which is something already in act, not in potential, fits both natures, namely eternal and mortal. For what is possible to be in eternal things is, again, what is in mortal things, and this does not depart from the possibility of existing but only differs, because that which is in eternal things in no way changes and always has to be, while that which is found in mortal things can both be and not be and it is not necessary for it to be. For when I write, the ability to write is in me, hence, it is possible for me to write but since I myself am mortal, this power of writing is not necessary: for I do not write out of necessity. However, when we say that motion is in the sky, there is no doubt that the sky must move. Therefore, in mortal things, when something exists and can be, it is not necessary for it to be, in eternal things, however, what is, has to be and because it is, it is possible to be.

Therefore, since there are mainly two parts of the possible: one, which is said according to that which can be when it is not, another, which is predicated according to that which is something already in act not only in potential, this kind of possible, which is already in act, produces two species from itself: one, which, when it exists, is not necessary, another, which, when it exists, also has that it is necessary for it to be.

This isn’t something that was discovered only by Aristotle’s subtlety, but Diodorus also defined what is possible as what is or will be. Therefore, Aristotle considers what Diodorus said will be possible to be what can nevertheless become, even if it is not, while Aristotle interprets what Diodorus has said is possible as being called possible because it is already in act. We have taught that there are two parts of this kind of possibility: one that we call necessary, the other that we declare as non-necessary. However, of this non-necessary one there are again two parts: one which comes from potentiality to actuality, and another which has always been in act, from the moment that thing which could receive it came into existence. And that which comes from potentiality to actuality is susceptible to contradiction of both parts, as now I who am writing have come from potentiality to actuality and being active I can write. For before I wrote, I had the potential to write but from the potential of writing I came to the act of writing. Therefore, both are suitable for me: not to write and to write. For I can both not write and write, which is a sort of contradiction.

And for this reason, whatever things have come from potentiality to act, I can both do and not do, and be and not be, as someone who speaks, because they could speak before they spoke and now can speak because they are speaking, and can speak and can choose not to speak. But other things which were never in potentiality but were always in act, from the moment the thing itself existed which could be said to be something in potentiality, are only suitable for one thing, as fire was never potentially hot, so that it could be perceived as actually hot later, nor was snow cold in potentiality, then in act, but from the moment fire existed it was actually hot, and from the moment snow existed it was actually cold. Therefore, these powers are not suitable for both. For neither can fire cause coldness nor can snow create anything warm.

Therefore, such a division needs to be made from the beginning: one part of the possible is that which, although it does not exist, can still potentially exist, while the other is that which is in actuality and therefore is called possible. For if it couldn’t be possible, it would not exist at all. There are two parts of this possibility, according to the way it is described, that which is already in actuality: one according to what we say exists out of necessity, the other according to what we consider, although it exists, not to necessarily exist. Of this non-necessary possibility, there are two other parts: one which comes from potentiality to actuality and receives the capability to both be and not be, the other which, because it never ceased to have actuality, from when it was said to be possible for it, is only suitable and possible for one part, namely the one that the act always exercised, such as heat to fire, or cold to snow, or hardness to a diamond, or liquidity to water. But let no one suppose from the type of necessary possibility that what we say could never have been potentially is actual in certain things, like heat to fire. For the fire itself can be extinguished. In those things which are necessary, not only should the quality never depart from the subject, which also appears to be the case in fire, from which its quality of heat does not recede, but also that the subject substance appears to be immortal, which does not happen to fire. For the sun and the other bodies of this world, which are celestial and immortal, are considered so by the Peripatetic discipline, and therefore it agrees with itself in saying that the sun necessarily moves, not only because that motion never departs from the sun, but also because the sun itself will never cease to exist. Therefore, the inference of propositions, which are the purpose of these premises, must be pursued more carefully.

On Interpretation, Book 13

“And the inferences are indeed made in order as follows: those which are possible to be, are those which happen to be, and this is converted to them, and it is not impossible to be and not necessary to be; those which are possible not to be and happen not to be are those which are not necessary not to be and not impossible not to be; those which are not possible to be and do not happen to be are those which are necessary not to be and impossible to be; those which are not possible not to be and do not happen not to be are those which are necessary to be and impossible not to be. Let’s consider how we say from the subscription.”

Aristotle fittingly added these about the inference of propositions to what we mentioned above. Even though they are apparent to those looking closely, so that we do not seem to have added nothing to this place as well, we will go through them with the briefest explanation. Firstly, he wanted to demonstrate that whatever things are said about the possible, the same can also most truthfully be said about the contingent, and therefore he says: “Those which are possible to be” have as a consequence those which state something happens. And so that nothing contradictory would seem to be in these, he added, saying: “And this is converted to them”, so that we would understand that it was possible for this to happen and for what happened to be possible. Therefore, what is converted to each other, those are equal and the same. Therefore, whatever can be said in the possible, the same is predicted in the contingent. Therefore, he said these, that is the possible and the contingent, follow those propositions which state it is not impossible to be and those which deny the necessary, that is, proclaim it is not necessary for something to be. For he says:

“Those which are possible to be, those which happen to be, and this is converted to them, and those which are not impossible to be and not necessary to be,”

as if he was saying: and the possible follows the contingencies and these two are converted to each other but these follow it is not impossible to be and not necessary to be. How correctly this is said is clear to no one. For what is possible to be and happens to be, is not impossible. For if it were impossible, it would not be said to be able to be, which the reason of impossibility would constrain not to be. Therefore, what can be is not impossible to be. Similarly, it is not necessary to be that which is said to be able to be. This however happens, because that which we proclaim possible can easily turn to either part. For it can both be and not be. But necessity and impossibility are constrained in one or the other part. For what is impossible to be can never be. Moreover, what is necessary not to be can never be. Therefore, we make that which we deny to be impossible agree with the possibility. But what we deny to be necessary, again we impose on the same nature the force of possibility [so to say in this way] and to speak more truly, it must be said: what is possible can both be and not be, again what is impossible to be cannot be, what is necessary not to be cannot be.

Therefore, if we break the statement of impossibility by adding a denial, saying it is not impossible to be, we add to it the part of possibility in which something is said to be able to be, but if we lessen the rigidity of the necessary proposition by denial, saying it is not necessary to be, it happens that we apply the necessary proposition to that part which is in the possibility, so it can not be. Therefore, not being impossible follows possibility, therefore, because what is possible can happen. Again, the proposition which says it is not necessary to be, follows the same possibility, therefore, because what is possible can both be and not be. We say the same thing in another way: what is possible it is not true to say, because it is impossible, because it can happen again what is possible it is not true to say, because it is necessary to be. For what is possible to be can also not be. Therefore, if about possibility impossibility and necessity cannot be correctly said, their denials agree with the possibility, which are it is not impossible to be and it is not necessary to be. But we must remember that the same reason always applies in all things about the contingent and about the possible, about that possible specifically which although it does not yet exist, can still either be or not be. He states another inference in this way:

“Those which are possible not to be and happen not to be are those which are not necessary not to be and not impossible not to be.”

For the same reason, he also said these are consequential. For those which are possible not to be and those which happen not to be, he says agree with those which say it is not necessary not to be and not impossible not to be. This however is because what can not be can also be and again what happens not to be, happens also to be. But what is necessary not to be, that cannot be, but what is impossible not to be, that cannot not be. Therefore, both differ from the possible. For because the possibility promises something can be, it disagrees with that which says it is necessary not to be.

Again, because possibility carries a force, such that what can be can also not be, it differs greatly from that which says it is impossible not to be. Now, if the proposition which claims it is necessary not to be and again the one that says it is impossible not to be, diverge from possibility, rightly then, it is believed that their negations agree with possibility. But I call propositions of possibility, those that either in affirmation or in negation show some possibility without blocking the other side, such as the one saying it is possible for something to be, it is not blocked from this by which it can be said it is possible not to be, or if someone says it is possible for something not to be, from this it is again not blocked, so that it can be possible and therefore I call the affirmation that predicts the possibility to be possible, and no less the one that says something can not be. And in these propositions that Aristotle sets forth, in which he says it is possible not to be, it should not seem that he says this as if he announces it in this way, that he intends to assert something to be impossible when he says it is possible not to be. For thus he states this proposition, not in that he removes that possibility but in that he says it is possible for something to be such that it is not. For it should be understood and added to the possible word that is to be, as when he says it is possible not to be we understand it is possible to be not to be, that is, it is possible to be such that it is not.

He puts forth the third consequence in which he agrees with “that which is not possible to be and is not contingent to be” and “that which says it is necessary not to be and is impossible to be”. This is so full that it needs no explanation. For what is not possible, this cannot happen, what cannot happen, it is necessary that it not be, but what is necessary that it not be, is impossible to be. So rightly is it said that the proposition which says something cannot be and that which says it is not contingent to be follows those that deny being necessary and affirm impossibility [it is not contingent to be and not necessary to be].

The remaining consequence, in which those propositions that would say “it is not possible for something not to be” and “it is not contingent not to be” follow those that propose “it is necessary to be” and “it is impossible not to be”, has no obscurity. For what is not possible to be, this is impossible not to be. For what we say is impossible, the same applies as if we were to say it is not possible. For what the negation does in that interpretation where we say it is not possible, the same does the privation in that where we say it is impossible. And that it is impossible not to be is widely apparent, because it is necessary to be. Therefore, also that it is not possible not to be is clear since it is necessary to be. The same must also be said about the contingent. However, he describes them in this way, that they are not only captured by mind and reason but are also easier to understand when placed before the eyes.

For us, however, for the sake of a clearer explanation, we make two orders of these. And in the first, we proposed those that precede, in the second, however, those that follow, so that there is ample opportunity for those who do not understand their reasons in themselves, yet, looking at the description, they recognize which they follow.

PRECEDING: FOLLOWING:
Possible to be Not impossible to be
Contingent to be Not necessary to be
Possible not to be Not necessary not to be
Contingent not to be Not impossible not to be
Not possible to be Necessary not to be
Not contingent to be Impossible to be
Not possible not to be Necessary to be
Not contingent not to be Impossible not to be

Therefore, with this description made, what Aristotle has generally discussed about propositions universally, appears not ambiguous to any diligent observer. But the remaining things which he disputed one by one about their consequences, since we do not wish to weary the readers, the sixth volume will explain.

Book 6

On Interpretation, Book 13 (ctd)

INTRODUCTION

This sixth book puts an end to the long commentary, which has consisted of great labor and delay of time. For many thoughts have been gathered into one, and we have consumed nearly two years of constant commentary sweat. Nor do I think it will seem praiseworthy to certain malicious interpreters, that what could be said briefly we stretched out with a display of knowledge not for the readers' understanding but more for boredom through prolixity. To whom I would like to answer, they would not think these things so falsely, if they had read the brevity of the previous commentary. For neither could the cramped obscurity of the words be explained more briefly and it is recognized how much is missing for the full understanding of this book. But what usefulness each work will offer to the readers, it seems to me can be most easily weighed from this, that when anyone first takes this second edition in hand, they are confused by the spacious variety of the matters themselves, so that one who cannot focus their mind on the larger matters desires the brevity and simplicity of the first edition.

But if anyone has come correctly to the two books of the prior edition, they will perhaps think they have acquired something for knowledge but when they have known this second edition at last, they acknowledge how much they did not know in the first. Nor should the labor deter people from reading a long work, since it did not impede us from writing. But lest the introduction itself also seem to be drawn out longer, let us return to Aristotle’s sequence and to those things which he diligently pursues concerning the consequence of propositions.

Those things which are generally and universally observable about all propositions and their mutual implications were organized in the previous description of the propositions themselves. Now, however, he pursues with diligent investigation those things which occur individually to each one. For he says thus:

“Therefore, the impossible and the not impossible follow what is contingent and possible and not contingent and not possible. Indeed, they follow in a contradictory but reciprocal way. For that which is possible is the denial of the impossible, while the denial is an affirmation; that which is not possible is the impossible. Indeed, an affirmation is the impossible, while the not impossible is a denial.”

The consequences of propositions (as the previous description teaches) are made according to the possible and the necessary. This thing also followed, that about contingent and impossible propositions and consequences would be spoken. For when the contingent agrees with the possible in a straight way, the impossible is necessary in a reverse order, as we will teach shortly. Therefore, he speculates about the possible, the contingent, and the impossible, how they relate to each other, or what consequences they have, and he establishes this by saying: the impossible and the not impossible indeed follow the possible and the not possible in a contradictory way, but reciprocally. This is of this type: we know that the private affirmation is that which says it is impossible, while its denial is not impossible, again the possible affirmation is that which says it is possible, its denial proposes it is not possible. Therefore, the denial of impossibility follows the possible affirmation. For what is possible is the same as not impossible. Otherwise, if what is said is not impossible does not follow the possible, it follows its affirmation, that is it is impossible. Therefore, what is possible would be impossible, which cannot happen. But if impossibility does not follow possibility, not being impossible follows being possible. But indeed, the affirmation of impossibility follows the denial of possibility. For what is not possible is impossible. For denial has the same force in propositions as privation. And in the same way about the contingent. For what is contingent is not impossible. For if the contingent and the possible follow each other, and the possible and not impossible agree, the contingent and not impossible indicate the same thing. Again, the not contingent and the impossible will seem the same to the perceptive, indeed the not contingent and the not possible have the same meaning. But the not possible agrees with impossibility. Therefore, also the not contingent announces something to be impossible. Therefore, it happens that the affirmation of impossibility follows the contradiction of possibility, but not that the affirmation follows the affirmation, nor that the denial follows the denial, but conversely, that is that the affirmation agrees with the denial, but the denial indeed agrees with the affirmation. For the affirmation that is possible to be follows the denial of impossibility that says it is not impossible to be, indeed the denial of possibility that is not possible to be follows the affirmation of impossibility that proposes it is impossible to be.

The same thing must also be said about the contingent. For the affirmation of the contingent follows the denial of impossibility, indeed the denial of the contingent follows the affirmation of impossibility. For indeed whatever is proposed about possibility is judged the same about contingents. Therefore, they are organized in this way: first indeed is the affirmation of impossibility, against it is the denial of impossibility, and under the affirmation of impossibility are those of the contingent and possible, which impossibility itself follows, under the denial of impossibility indeed are those possible and contingent propositions, which the denial of impossibility agrees with, in this way:

Affirmation Contradiction Denial
Impossible to be Not impossible to be
Denial Contradiction Affirmation
Not possible to be Possible to be
Not contingent to be Contingent to be

It is therefore clear that contradictions indeed agree with other contradictions. In which thing it is also clear that affirmations agree with denials, and denials indeed with affirmations. Therefore, the whole sense is such, but the discourse’s reason is this: “Impossible, he says, and not impossible”, indeed what is contradiction, follows two contradictions, that is, “what is contingent and possible and not contingent and not possible follows indeed contradictorily” (for one contradiction of impossibility follows two contradictions, that is, contingent and not contingent, possible and not possible) but although one contradiction follows another contradiction, they reciprocally agree. For “what is possible to be follows the denial of the impossible”, as the previous description teaches, indeed the “denial” of the possible, namely the impossible. For what is not possible agrees with what is impossible. It is indeed the affirmation of impossibility that which says it is impossible to be. And although the discourse’s reason is convoluted, yet if anyone according to the previous explanation returns to the previous statements of Aristotle and compensates what is lacking in them from our explanation, the sense most plain from reason does not lack.

“How, however, the necessary must be considered is manifest. Because not in the same way but contrary they follow, but contradictory ones are outside. For it is not a denial of what is necessary not to be, not necessary to be, indeed it happens to be true in both at the same time; for what is necessary not to be, is not necessary to be.”

We learned a long time ago from comparison of the impossible and the possible, that the impossible denial would follow the possible affirmation, again the impossible affirmation would agree with the possible denial.

Therefore, he now inquires how the consequences of possible and necessary propositions can be established. He claims that this does not occur in the same way as it does in those propositions that arise from comparisons of possible and impossible conditions. For in these latter, opposed contradictions followed each other reciprocally, so that an affirmation was followed by a negation, a negation by an affirmation. But this is not the same in necessary and possible propositions; instead, the contraries follow each other, while the contradictory and opposed ones are external and do not follow. First, let’s arrange what are contrary and what are contradictory. For a proposition that says it is necessary for the things it proposes to be, the contradictory is that it is not necessary for them to be, but the contrary is that it is necessary for them not to be. As if someone says that it is necessary for the sun to move, the contradictory opposite to this is that it is not necessary for the sun to move, but the contrary is that it is necessary for the sun not to move. Therefore, a possible proposition is followed by a contradiction of necessity, but a necessary condition does not follow the contradiction of a possible proposition (which would happen if these opposites followed each other), but rather that which is contrary to necessity. For a proposition that says it is possible to be, let us see which of the necessary propositions agrees with it. That which says it is necessary to be cannot agree with it. For what is possible to be can also not be, but what must be cannot not be. Therefore, if necessity does not follow possibility, the contradiction of necessity follows it. Therefore, the proposition that says it is possible to be is not necessarily followed by that which proposes it to be necessary: therefore, the contradiction of necessity follows the possible proposition which proposes it is not necessary to be. But necessity does not agree with the contradiction of a possible condition. Nor indeed can we say that the proposition which says it is not possible to be is followed by that which proposes it is necessary to be, but rather the contrary to the necessary, that which says it is necessary not to be. For when it is not possible, it is necessary not to be. Let us arrange these, namely those that follow each other, and under these, the necessary and what is contradiction, and what is contrary.

Possible | Not possible — | — Not necessary to be | Necessary not to be Contradiction | Contrariness Necessary to be

Therefore, there is no doubt that the affirmation of the possible is followed by the negation of the necessary, but the negation of the possible is not followed by the necessary but rather by the contrariness of the necessary. For since the possible to be is followed by the contradiction of necessity, which is not necessary to be, the contradiction of the possible which says it is not possible to be is not followed by necessity itself but rather by the contrary, that which proposes it is necessary not to be. The sense of this is as follows, and this is the order of the words: “But the necessary, how,” he says, “that is, what consequences it has, must be considered.” First, he defines, saying, “It is clear that not in the same way,” where it should be understood: “as in those which are possible and impossible, but the contraries follow each other, but the contradictions are outside and do not follow.” For the contradiction of the possible was followed by not the contradiction but (as we have shown above) the contrariness of the necessary. For the contradiction did not agree with the contradiction in this consequence of the necessary. For that which is not necessary followed the possibility, but that proposition which said it was necessary not to be, not to be necessary, followed the not possible.

But again, it is not necessary to be and it is not necessary to be are not contradictions but not necessary to be is indeed a negation of the necessary, but that which says it is necessary not to be is contrary to the necessary. However, they are not contradictory to each other. For they can be found at the same time in the same thing. This is what he says, having said:

It happens that both can be true in the same case. For what is necessary not to be, is not necessary to be.

as since it is necessary that man is not a quadruped, it is not necessary that man is a quadruped. For if this is false, it will be necessary that man is a quadruped, since it is necessary that he is not. Therefore, it is clear that the propositions of not necessary to be and again necessary not to be can sometimes be found simultaneously. Since this is the case, they are not contradictions. But giving the reason why, when according to the comparison of the possible to the contradictions the consequence is rendered, it could not happen in the same way in the necessary, he says:

But the reason why it does not follow in the same way with the rest is that the contrary necessarily makes the impossible the same in value. For if it is impossible to be, it is necessary for this not to be but not to be; but if it is impossible not to be, this is necessary to be. Therefore, if the former is similarly possible and not, this is the contrary: for the necessary and the impossible signify the same but (as has been said) in a contrary way.

The reason, he says, why the consequence in the necessary is rendered in this way, is that the necessary always agrees with the impossible in a contrary way. For what is impossible to be, this necessarily is not to be, and again what is necessary to be, this is impossible not to be. Thus, a certain contrariness occurs. For when impossibility has to be, necessity has not to be, and when necessity has to be, impossibility has not to be. Therefore, impossibility and necessity have the same value, not rendered in the same way but if necessity according to being, impossibility according to not being, and if impossibility according to being, according to not being, necessity. Therefore, this agreement happens in a contrary way. For where there is impossibility to be, there is necessity not to be, but impossibility to be and not possible to be agree: therefore not possible to be and necessary not to be agree.

Therefore, no one should doubt that it is necessary for the negation of the possible not to follow, since the impossibility which follows the negation of the possible agrees with what is stated as necessary not to be. This is because impossibility and necessity have the same value (as I have said) if they are put forward contradictorily. Therefore, what is stated in this way is:

“The reason why,” he says, “the rest do not follow similarly,” that is, what is made possible and impossible, “is because the contrary impossible is necessarily rendered the same in value,” that is, the impossibility expressed and declared in a contrary manner is equivalent to necessity. “For if it is impossible to be, it is necessary that this does not exist but it is necessary not to exist,” this is what is impossible to be.

No one, therefore, should say that it is necessary to exist, but rather that it is necessary not to exist, as if he had said: for if it is impossible to be, it is necessary that this does not exist, but it should not be thought that it is impossible to be, this is what it is necessary to be. But if it is again impossible not to exist, this must exist. Conversely, and contradictorily, the impossibility gives the same value to necessity [that is, expressed and declared in a contrary way, the impossibility is equivalent to necessity]. But if impossibility renders consequence to the possible by a similar contradiction and conversion of contradictions, and impossibility and necessity have the same value when predicated in a contrary way, no one should doubt that here the contraries and not the opposites were the consequence.

Or is it certainly to be explained this way: since in the consequence of the impossible and non-impossible to those which proposed possible and non-possible, that which is non-possible followed what is said to be impossible, but conversely, the impossible has the same value as the necessary, it is clear that if it behaves in a similar way, that is, in the way it was said, the impossible for the consequence of the possible and non-possible, the impossible should agree with what is non-possible, which has the same value as the contrary, that is, it is necessary not to be, to follow that proposition which also impossibility followed. However, the contrary has the same value as the impossibility, that which is necessary not to exist, and impossibility follows the proposition which is non-possible to exist: and therefore necessary not to exist follows what is non-possible to exist, so the meaning is this: since the impossible can necessarily be the same from the contrary, it similarly behaves, that is, in the way it was said, the impossible consequence to those which are possible and not possible.

[Smith: Lacuna as Meiser thinks]

Is it certainly impossible to establish necessary contradictions in this way? For what is necessary to be, it is possible to be. For if not, a denial will follow; for it is necessary either to affirm or deny. Therefore, if it is not possible to be, it is impossible to be: thus, it is impossible for what must exist to exist, which is inconvenient. But indeed, from what is possible to be, it does not follow that it is impossible to be, but rather that it is not necessary to be. Therefore, it happens that what is necessary to be is not necessary to be, which is inconvenient. But indeed, neither does it follow from what is necessary to be that it is possible to be, nor does it follow from what is necessary not to be; for both of these can happen to the former, but if either of these were true, the latter would not be true. For it is possible both to be and not to be at the same time; but if it is necessary either to be or not to be, both cannot be possible. Therefore, it remains that it is not necessary not to be, following possible to be. For this is true and also for necessary to be. For this is a contradiction of what follows that it is not possible to be; for the latter leads to impossible to be and necessary not to be, whose denial is not necessary not to be. Therefore, these contradictions also follow according to the previously mentioned way, and nothing impossible happens with these assumptions.

Earlier, indeed, a conversion of propositions was made so that the negation of what is necessary would follow a possible proposition. And with these set in this way, it does not happen that a contradiction follows a contradiction nor that it follows in a reversed way, which specifically happened in those where the sequence of possible and impossible things was being considered, because the contradiction of what is necessary, which is specifically not necessary to be, followed a possible proposition, but the necessity did not follow the contradiction of what is possible but the opposite of necessity. Wanting to change this, he intends to establish consequences in such a way that a contradiction agrees with a contradiction in the same way, but conversely. But he arranges this for this reason. For he says: perhaps I erred because I started the sequence of what is necessary and possible from what is possible and not from what is necessary, to measure this agreement of his. For he set the precedent of possible to be and to it, as agreeing, not necessary to be. And these things indeed are earlier. But now he turns and says: perhaps, he says, we have slipped into error by setting these consequences so that we would first posit possible to be, and to this we would add, as if consequent, the negation of what is necessary, which would say not necessary to be? And rather, the truth is this: if first posited, does the possibility agreeing with necessity follow what is necessary? For it seems that every necessary proposition is followed by a possibility. If someone denies this, they must confess, because the denial of what is possible follows what is necessary. For in all things either an affirmation or a denial is. Therefore, if a possible does not follow a necessary proposition, the negation of possibility follows. Therefore, the correct sequence thus says: what is necessary to be, is not possible to be. But it has been said for a while that to the proposition that proposed not possible to be, impossibility would agree. But not possible to be follows what is necessary, and therefore impossibility follows what is necessary. The correct sequence of propositions will therefore be: if it is necessary to be, it is impossible to be. But this cannot happen. Therefore, if impossibility does not follow what is necessary, but the proposition which declares something not able to be, follows an impossible proposition, the negation of possibility which is not possible to be does not agree with a necessary proposition. But if this does not agree with a necessary declaration, an affirmation will agree. Therefore, a possibility follows necessity. Therefore, the correct sequence of propositions will be this way: if it is necessary to be, it is possible to be.

But again, other obstacles arise from these things for us. For if someone says that a possible proposition agrees with what is necessary because a proposition that says not impossible to be and again the one that declares not necessary to be agrees with a possibility, which the previous order taught, it will be that the one which says not necessary to be agrees with a necessary proposition. Therefore, the correct sequence will be: if it is necessary to be, it is not necessary to be. But this again is impossible. But if this is so, something in the consequences of possible propositions must be changed so that the reasoning itself can agree with itself. Therefore, either that was inconveniently said first, that the negation of what is necessary would follow an affirmation of what is possible, so that what is not necessary to be would follow what says possible to be or indeed, we did not rightly understand that what is necessary agrees with a possible proposition. Because this is absurd (for no one would say that possibility is contrary to what is necessary: for it happens that “what is necessary, this cannot happen”) and this is a correct sequence: if it is necessary, it is possible, it happens that rather the negation of what is necessary does not follow a possible proposition. But when these things are said, it is pleasing to understand this, that a possibility follows what is necessary, so that what is necessary, this is said to be possible, but what is possible per se is not necessary in all ways. For if it is necessary, it cannot happen that it is not, but what is possible, can also not be. Therefore, what is possible is not necessary.

I say, however, that neither does that proposition follow a possibility, which is entirely contrary to what is necessary. For the contrary to a necessary proposition is the one that says it is necessary not to be. No one will force this to agree with a possibility. For what is necessary not to be, this cannot be, but what is possible, can both be and not be. Therefore, the necessity of a proposition that is predicted according to being does not follow a possibility because a possibility indeed can also not be, but the necessity which is according to being cannot not be. Again, the necessity that is predicted according to not being differs from a possibility and does not follow it, because the necessity that is said according to not being cannot be, but what is possible can both be and not be.

What then, so that neither the opposing negation of the necessary follows the possibility, which proposes that it is not necessary to be, nor the very necessity of affirming which says it is necessary to be, nor the contrary to this which says it is necessary not to be? But these four aspects will seem apparent. For there is a necessary affirmation that says it is necessary to be, opposed to this is that which is predicated as not necessary to be, again the contrary to the necessity of affirmation is that which says it is necessary not to be, opposed to this is that which proposes it is not necessary not to be, which the following table explains:

Necessary to be	Not necessary to be
Necessary not to be	Not necessary not to be

Therefore, neither that which says it is necessary to be, nor its opposite which proposes it is not necessary to be, nor the contrary to necessity, whose sentiment is because it is necessary not to be, agrees with possibility. It remains that the fourth which says it is not necessary not to be, agrees with it, and this fourth to some extent also agrees with necessity itself, but necessity least of all agrees with possibility. For everything that is necessary to be and possible to be and not to be is not necessary. Therefore, this proposition which says it is not necessary not to be agrees with necessity, because contrary to necessity is that which says it is necessary not to be, but this is opposed to this proposition which says it is necessary not to be, that is, that which proposes it is not necessary not to be: hence the proposition that is contrary to the opposed affirmation will agree with it.

Now, if anyone inspects this more closely and completely reverts to the above text, they easily recognize this. Therefore, if it is possible (as has been said) follows that proposition which says it is not necessary not to be, the negation of the possible follows its opposite which says it is necessary not to be and thus such a consequence will be: if it is possible, it is not necessary not to be, again if it is not possible, it is necessary not to be.

Therefore, that consequence is reversed which indeed was made contradictorily but conversely, just as has been said above about the possible. For here, the possible affirmation is followed by the negation which indeed destroys the necessary but that which posits not to be, that is, that which says it is not necessary not to be, again the negation of the possible is followed by the necessary affirmation which according to not being is posited. Therefore, there is also here the same conversion, that indeed contradiction follows contradiction but conversely, that affirmation suits negation, but negation suits affirmation. We believed this would be clearer if it fell under the eyes and therefore the very clear sentiment of the subject matter warns us about the arrangement.

Possible Affirmation	Opposing Possible Negation
According to being: Possible to be	According to being: Not possible to be
Necessary Negation	Necessary Affirmation
According to not being: Not necessary not to be	According to not being: Necessary not to be

Indeed every sentiment is such, but the order of these words is as follows: after he spoke about the consequence of the possible and impossible, that indeed contradictions suit contradictions but conversely, that is, that affirmation suits negation, but negation agrees with affirmation, he says these same consequences as they occur in the necessary must be examined. Therefore, having observed also the necessary, he did not find the same thing. For when he had said the negation of the necessary agrees with the possibility, the necessary affirmation did not agree with the negation of possibility.

In presenting the reasons for the same matter, he argues that the impossibility would have the same strength as the necessity, if given the contrary position. Wanting to correct this issue, he said: “Is it certain,” he said, “that it is impossible to posit contradictions of necessity?” As if we would agree that the negation of necessity corresponds to possibility.

However, he adds a certain doubt, which presents itself thus. “For what is,” he says, “necessary to be, is without doubt possible to be. For if not, that is if what is necessary is not possible, the negation of possibility follows. For it is necessary in all things to either say, that is affirm, or surely to deny.” For in all things either the affirmation is true or the denial. “Therefore, if it is not possible to be, that is if it is not possible to be [which is impossible, it becomes that] which is necessary to be, but the proposition follows which says it is not possible to be that which proposes it is impossible to be, something impossible happens to be said: therefore, it is impossible for what is necessary to be. But this is inconvenient.” Thus he taught that possibility would follow necessity. Now he adds another point: since he had said above that the negation of a necessary affirmation corresponds to a possible proposition, now he repeats the same point with doubt, saying:

“But indeed that which is possible to be does not follow that it is impossible to be.”

For what is possible, is not impossible but what is not impossible to be is not necessarily to be. Therefore, if the non-impossibility follows the possibility, but the non-impossibility does not follow that which is said to be not necessary, and the possible proposition follows what we say is not necessary to be, there is no doubt that if possibility follows necessity, the negation of necessary affirmation will follow. “Therefore, it happens that what is necessary to be, is not necessary to be. This is inconvenient.” It is thus clear that the possible affirmation does not follow the opposite negation to necessary affirmation, therefore it must be removed: or, as we said above, so that the possible affirmation does not follow the negation of necessity, or that possibility does not follow necessity. Because this cannot happen in any way, that is what needs to be removed, so that the negation opposite to possibility does not follow necessity.

Therefore, what is said to be not necessary does not follow possibility. And since he had left all these things unspoken in the middle, he adds to the above: “But indeed neither does what is necessary to be follow that which is possible to be,” that is, expressing the opinion that the necessary does not agree with the possible, not only this but also “nor that which we say is not necessary to be.” He shows this more plainly himself. “For to the possible,” that is, both can happen to it, to be and not to be, “but to these,” that is, to the necessary according to being and to the necessary according to not being, “whatever may be true, those will not be true.” He explains this himself. For about the possible he says this: “For it is possible both to be and not to be (so this is what he says: ‘to it, both can happen’); but if, he says, it is necessary to be or not to be,” that is, if it cannot not be and it cannot be, “both will not be possible,” that is, if it is necessary to be, it will not be able not to be or if it is necessary not to be, it will not be able to be.

So the three propositions, that it is not necessary to be, that it is necessary to be, that it is necessary not to be, do not follow possibility. “What remains, then,” that is, as the fourth proposition, which opposes necessary according to not being, is affirmed, follows possibility, that is, “that it is not necessary not to be follows it is possible to be.” But since the possible agrees with the necessary, this also necessarily agrees. For this is what he said: “For this is true also of necessary to be.” For what is necessary, is not necessary that it is not. So this proposition which says it is not necessary not to be is the contradiction of its affirmation which follows the negation of possibility, namely, the one which says it is not possible to be. For since the affirmation that it is possible to be follows the negation of the necessary according to not being, which proposes that it is not necessary not to be, the negation of the possible, namely, the one which proposes that it is not possible to be, follows the necessary affirmation according to not being, which says it is necessary not to be, which is the same as proposing that it is not possible to be, which is the negation of possibility, the impossible affirmation follows, which proposes it is impossible to be. So this is what he says: “For this is the contradiction of that which follows what is not possible to be.” For since the possible affirmation follows the necessary negation according to not being which says it is not necessary not to be, this necessary negation according to not being is the contradiction of that which follows the negation of possibility. “For that,” that is, the negation of possibility, “follows what is impossible.” For since the negation of possibility is what says it is not possible to be, it is followed by what says it is impossible to be, to which agrees what says it is necessary not to be. Therefore, what says it is necessary not to be follows the negation of the possible proposition, the contradiction of which is what says it is not necessary not to be.

So it happens here also that the contradiction follows the contradiction but conversely. What he said through this when he said: “Therefore, these contradictions follow according to the forementioned way,” namely, that affirmation follows negation, but negation indeed follows affirmation, and nothing will be either inconvenient or impossible with these consequences put this way, that indeed the negation of the necessary according to not being follows the possible affirmation, but the necessary affirmation according to not being agrees to the negation of the possible. Having clarified these, he adds other doubts again.

Indeed, he arranged the consequences so that possibility follows necessary precedence, but now he questions the same issue. For whether someone posits that necessary and possible agree, or whether they deny it, both seem to be incongruous. Because if someone denies that possibility corresponds with necessity, they are saying that the denial of possibility will suit a necessary proposition. For if someone refuses a proposition that says something must necessarily be, that agrees with the one proposing it is possible, they cannot deny that, because the denial of possibility agrees with necessity, and the whole consequence will be complete: if it is necessary to be, it is not possible to be, considering that the consequence that says: if it is necessary to be, it is possible to be, is false. But if this cannot be done, such that the denial of possibility agrees with a necessary assertion, then it is true that a possible assertion corresponds to a necessary one.

But in this also, a greater difficulty lies. For everything that can possibly be, can also possibly not be. But if possibility follows necessity, what is necessary could be possible and could also not be possible according to the nature of possibility, which suits necessity. But this is impossible: therefore, possibility does not follow necessity. But if possibility does not follow necessity, the denial of possibility follows, namely that which is not possible to be, and then the same inconveniences will arise, which we expressed when we were dealing with that topic earlier. But if someone does not want the denial of possibility to be that which says it is not possible to be, but rather that which says it is possible not to be, although they do not arrange the assertion in the correct order for the denial, and as was stated above, when propositions are said according to the modes, it is more appropriate to position the denial rather than the words, we must give in, so that even with this concession, which might seem useful for some to defend, we have broken the false opinion of the argument, and truth is more deeply and fully established.

Let this therefore be the denial of possibility that they want, that is, that which says it is possible not to be, but this also does not suit necessity. For if someone says that it is possible that necessary does not follow, then the contradiction of the possible immediately follows the necessity. But if someone posits the contradiction of the possible, that which says it is possible not to be, and that is thought to agree with necessity, according to them the right consequence is: if it is necessary to be, it is possible not to be, but this cannot be done. For what is necessary to be cannot not be. If, therefore, possibility does not follow necessity (for what is necessary will be contingent, because possible and contingent are the same), denials of possibility, whether that which says it is not possible to be, or that whose meaning is it is possible not to be, will suit necessity. But both are impossible. But if these do not follow, what follows is their assertion, that is, possibility. But this also cannot be done, as I have often shown above. This kind of question is therefore resolved by him in the following order.

Now since the sense of the question stated above is such, let the very words and order of the speeches be seen. For he says thus: “Someone will indeed doubt,” he says, “if that which is necessary to be follows that it is possible to be,” that is, if possibility agrees with necessity. “For if it does not follow,” that is, if someone denies that possibility follows necessity, “contradiction follows,” namely the contradiction of possibility. For that which does not follow possibility, the contradiction of possibility follows, that is, that which says it is not possible to be. And he omitted that from these it would be impossible. But this is such that if possibility does not follow necessity and the contradiction of possibility agrees, there is a correct consequence: if it is necessary to be, it is not possible to be, which is inconvenient. “And if anyone does not say this is the contradiction,” that is, if someone denies that the contradiction of possibility is that which says it is not possible to be, certainly that person must say that the contradiction of possibility is that which says it is possible not to be. “But both are false about what is necessary to be.” For what is necessary, it cannot happen that it is not possible, and again what is necessary, it cannot happen that it is possible not to be.

“Again, the same seems possible to be cut and not be cut.”

For possibility is common to both assertion and denial. For both to be and not to be can happen to what is said to be possible.

“But this is false,”

that is, it is predicated of necessity. For if what is necessary is, it will not be able not to be; if it is not, it happens in no way. But if someone says that possibility follows necessity, the same possibility agrees with the contingent and

“it will be necessary to happen not to be,”

that is, what is predicated to be necessary will be contingent. For if what is possible can not be, and what can not be happens not to be, there is no doubt that if possibility follows necessity, contingency also follows it. But we can say contingent in denial, as in it happens not to be: therefore, what is necessary to be happens contingently not to be.

“But this is false.”

And indeed, this is the order of the speeches, as in almost all other perplexed and narrow ones: for sometimes the likeness of statements, sometimes what is missing, renders the implicit and obscure sentence. But if someone attaches our series of explanations to Aristotle’s words and disperses what is there confused due to similarity through the distinction and separation of our exposition, and compensates from here what is less in Aristotle’s speeches, the rationale of the entire sentence will become clear.

Now therefore, since he proposed the question, he continually pursues it with these words:

“However, it is evident that not every potentiality to be or to walk, and their opposites, are possible, but there are those in which this is not true. And first indeed, this applies to those things that cannot happen according to reason, such as a fire that can heat, and possesses irrational power. Thus, according to reason, states themselves remain the same for many even contradictory things. But not all irrational things, but rather as has been said, it is not possible for fire to both heat and not heat, nor for whatever other things always act. However, some things can, and according to irrational powers, certain opposites at the same time. But this has been said because not every power of opposites exists, nor whichever are said according to the same kind.”

When he doubted about the consequence of possibility and necessity, and whether if possibility would agree with necessity – which would be inconvenient – or if possibility would again follow necessity, the very necessity to which possibility would agree would both exist and not exist. Now, he resolves this inconsistent ambiguity with reasonable argumentation, saying, "That fear isn’t true, that possibility following necessity would break the very nature of necessity and its rigidity, so that what is necessary would be changed into something contingent. Indeed, he says, not everything that is possible to exist is also possible not to exist. For there are many things that contain only one power and are in no way apt for negation, as in those possibilities which irrational action effects. For while it is possible for fire to heat, it is not possible for it not to heat. Therefore, this power cannot have opposites. For if any power can have opposites, it can both exist and not exist, and do and not do. But that which cannot have opposites, can only do one thing, which gives only affirmation, and rejects negation.

So if someone were to assume that possibility agrees with necessity, it is not necessary from this point for necessity itself to be turned into something contingent, to which possibility, of course, agrees. Indeed, he says, not every possibility can do both, that is, both be possible and not be possible, and therefore not every possibility agrees with contingency. He teaches this in these ways: “In those,” he says, "that cannot happen according to reason, the possibility that is said to exist cannot have opposites, like the heating of fire is irrational. There is no reason why fire should heat: for there is no reason for anything that happens naturally. Therefore, those things whose power is irrational cannot have opposites, like fire cannot both heat and not heat. For if they could do both, they could have opposites. For heating and not heating are opposites. Therefore, since irrational powers do not have the capacity for opposites and for acting, those things that happen according to reason can be retained for the action of opposites, so that anything conceived out of will and reason can do both, like it is possible for me to practice medicine and it is possible not to, or again to walk. For what anyone wants through reason or desire, this is said to come from reason. And in all these things, there is that power which can do both, that is, both for affirmation and for negation, that is, to be and not to be. But in those things which are irrational, although it can happen in only one way, that this power which is called possibility can also not have opposites, yet not every irrational power that cannot have opposites, like water is both cold and moist: therefore, it can easily both cool and moisten, but the same changed into heat can lose the power of cooling, while it cannot lose the power of moistening, as long as it is water. Therefore, not every power can have opposites, but indeed the power of opposites exists that can according to rational movements, but that power which cannot have opposites is found only in irrational things, although not in all. For there are irrational powers which can do both, like what was said about the coldness of water.

And indeed, the whole force of the sentence is such, now the order of the words is explained. “It is evident,” he says, “that not every possibility to be or to walk, and their opposites, are possible.” It is manifest that this has been said, not that we might think that everything that can walk or that can exist cannot have opposites, that is, cannot not exist: for this seems to show the text but no one should understand it this way rather it seems to have been said this way: it is evident that not every possibility, as we often use possibility, when we say it is possible to walk, can have opposites. Nor indeed that every power agrees with affirmation and negation, but there are some that can only do one thing, as we have already said above. And this is understood more clearly if we say: however, it is evident that not every possibility and their opposites are possible, since indeed we often predicate possibility about both being and walking.

Thinking about this, it is easier for someone to recognize what the words of the text themselves denote, when someone also has to assist obscure senses with patience and consent, that they should wait for the speaker’s sentence, even if the order of the words does not have it this way. So, it being established this way, it is manifest that not all powers can have opposites but there are some “in which it is not true” to say that opposites are possible, and an example is given: in those things indeed which can irrationally, that is not according to some reason, of which powers indeed a reason cannot be given, because it is their nature, like because fire is capable of heating, therefore a reason cannot be given about it: for this is naturally present to it. And indeed this power of fire cannot have opposites, since it is irrational, but those which are rational and according to rational power “are the same for many even contradictory things.” For to those over which reason rules, their nature is apt for both opposites, so that the same powers are those of many things which are contrary, like if it is possible for me to walk, since this happens from reason and will, it is possible not to walk and this power is not of one but of many and those things that are contrary. For although affirmation and negation are in some way to walk and not to walk, yet now by Aristotle they are arranged in place of the contrary.

Indeed, it is clear in all rational powers that they are of many contraries and have the ability to act oppositely. However, this is not the case for those which are not according to reason. Although there are some which can act oppositely, not all of them can. For example, water has the power to cool, which is irrational, but it also has the power to heat when it is itself heated. Yet, this cannot be found in all irrational powers. Fire, as stated, seems to have only the power to heat. This is what Aristotle means when he says,

“Not all irrational powers, that is, they can act oppositely, but as it has been said, it is not possible for fire to both heat and not heat.”

There is a rule given in all things which are not possible of contraries, namely, those things which always contain one thing in actuality, like fire is always hot, the sun is always moving, and other things of this kind. This is expressed by Aristotle’s phrase,

“And not all things that always act.”

However, some irrational powers can act in contrary ways, as was mentioned with the case of water. But this was said in order to demonstrate that no contrary occurrences happen if someone were to say that possibility necessarily agrees. For not all possibilities can act contrarily, those that agree with necessity do not act contrarily but always act one way. This is what Aristotle is saying when he states,

“But this has been said because not all power is of opposites, nor are all things called possible according to the same kind.”

Aristotle’s phrase,

“Nor are all things called possible according to the same kind”

means that not all things which are called possible are capable of acting contrarily, and even those under the same category, some cannot act contrarily, like those which are irrational. For although all irrational things have one kind in the fact that they are irrational, it is still not possible to find in all of them the same power of contraries, like the previously mentioned example of fire. Since its power is irrational, it does not transfer to contraries. It was therefore rightly said that not all things under the same category can have all powers of contraries. For although the power of fire is of the same kind with all other irrational powers, it is not capable of acting contrarily.

This, what it may attempt to question entirely, it predicted not to dissolve most validly. However, Aristotle continues his speech adding, stating the most significant direction of doubt and establishing ambiguity:

“But some powers are equivocal. For ‘possible’ is not said simply but it is said for this reason that it is true as it is in act, like it is possible to walk because he walks, and it is altogether possible to be because it is already in act what is said to be possible, but that which may perhaps act, like it is possible to walk because he will walk. And this indeed is in things capable of motion alone, but the other is also in things incapable of motion. But it is true to say in both that it is not impossible to walk or to be, and that which already walks and acts and is walkable. So, it is not true to simply say of necessary that it is possible, but the other is true. Therefore, since it follows the universal part, that which is out of necessity follows that it can be but not altogether.”

What this sentence from Aristotle contains, which he now proposes, we diligently expressed in the fifth book and now we briefly carry it out. For the sake of explanation and teaching, we undertook this labor according to the explanation, not to increase tediousness with verbosity. So, the whole sentence is this: ‘possible’, which we frequently say in things, is not said simply and therefore because ‘possible’ is drawn from ‘power’, the power itself is also equivocal. This is evident from this: that some possibilities are said not because they are acted but because nothing prevents them from being acted, like if it is said of a healthy body that it is possible for him to walk, not because he is walking but because nothing at all prevents him from walking. But some powers are said in this way because they are already in act and are acted, like if someone says of a walking man that it is possible for him to walk. And therefore that possibility which is not said according to some act but according to what it could act, because it is not prevented from acting, is called possibility from power. But that which already acts and is in act, is called possibility from act.

Therefore, there are two meanings of possibility: one designates that possibility which is from power, which is not in act, and the other signifies that possibility which is already in act. But this possibility which is already in act either transitions from power to act or was always naturally in act, like when a man transitions from sitting to walking, he can walk and therefore turns from power to act. But the sun, when it moves, never turns from power to act (for it never did not have this motion) nor does fire to now be hot, it was never not hot. Therefore, again that possibility which is said according to some act contains within itself two kinds: one which designates such an act of possibility, which it is not permissible not to be, and this is called necessary and never turns from power to act but naturally remained in act; the other indeed, which it is permissible to not be, namely, it migrated from power to act, and this is not necessary, since it is in act. And this kind of power, which turns from power to act, is only in things capable of motion, that is, which can be moved, and these are physical. We will discuss shortly by what reasons it is established that incorporeal things cannot be moved. But those which always remained in act due to their own natural quality, are found both in things capable of motion, like heat to fire which is always in act and was never in power, and in things which are immobile, and these are incorporeal and divine. Therefore, that power which migrated from power to act is only of corruptible and physical things, but that which was always in act is common to divine and physical things.

Therefore, to briefly summarize the whole point, it should be said as follows: possibility is equivocal and signifies many things. There is one possibility that, although it is not in act, it can nevertheless exist and therefore is called a possibility. But there is another which already is in act. The power that already is in act, however, is not equivocal but a genus. It contains under it the species of that power which indeed is in act but has moved from potentiality, and another which is in act but has not moved from potentiality. The one that has not moved from potentiality is itself called necessary, one that will never leave its subject. But the one that has moved from potentiality to act is undoubtedly called not necessary, because it can at some point leave its subject. But concerning these two possibilities, namely, which are said to be either in potentiality or in act, a common predication can be made, if we say that both are not impossible. For it is true to say of both the one who can walk, when he is not walking, and the one who is already walking, that it is not impossible for them to do what they can do or are doing. However, under the meaning of possibility there are two things: one possibility that is not in act, another that is in act. That possibility which is said to be according to potentiality cannot be accommodated to necessity nor will it ever be able to agree with necessity. Therefore, necessity should be placed under that possibility which is in act. But it also has a species through which it moves from potentiality to act, which is not necessary: therefore, necessity cannot be placed even in this.

Therefore, it remains that since no one denies that what is necessary to be, is possible, under possible there is also that which is said to be by power but necessity is not placed, nor under that power which is in act and can leave the subject, it should be placed under that act which cannot leave the subject, so that necessity is a possibility which is in act and will never leave the subject, because it has not come to act from potentiality. Therefore, some species will be the necessity of possibility, if indeed it is placed there, where there is that possibility which always is in act. But since the genus follows the species and where the species is the genus cannot be absent, it follows its species, that is necessity, its own genus, that is possibility but not every possibility. However, that possibility does not follow necessity, which is only in potentiality, not also in act, nor that which, although it is in act, can leave the subject, but only that which, although it is in act, will never be able to depart from the subject.

Therefore, possibility follows necessity and nothing impossible happens but that, as has been said, which is in act and never ceases to exist in the subject by nature. The whole sense is indeed like this, but the reason of the words will be as follows:

“Some powers,” he says, “are equivocal.”

This has been said because not every power is equivocal. For there is a power that, as it is a genus, is predicated according to act. But how some powers are equivocal follows when he says:

“The possible is not simply said, and this is divided: but this indeed because it is true that it is in act, as it is possible to walk, because he walks, and it is entirely possible to be, because what is said to be possible already is in act.”

Nothing can demonstrate more clearly that he is speaking of that which is possible, which is already happening. If someone denies that this is possible, he says that what is impossible is happening and being and this surpasses all measure of irrationality. He says the other part of the meaning of possibility is this:

“But that which perhaps will act,”

and he gives an example of this,

“as it is possible to walk, because he will walk.”

Therefore, not what he is already doing but “what he perhaps will do”, that is, what nothing prevents him from doing.

“And this power,” he says, “is in moving things alone,”

namely, this possibility which is said to be by power not according to act. Moving things, as has been said, he calls bodies alone.

“But those, that is, which are in act, and in immovable things,” that is, divine.

And therefore he added this when he says “and in immovable things”, so that we do not suspect that the possibility of act is in divine things alone but also in mortals and bodily things.

“In both, however, it is true to say that it is not impossible to walk or to be, and what is now walking and what is doing and walkable.”

“In both,” he says, "meanings one predication can be agreed, to say that it is not impossible either to walk what is already walking or to walk what can walk and is not walking, which he says by saying “walkable”. For walkable is that which is not indeed walking, but can nevertheless walk.

He adds:

“So it is not true to say of the necessary simply that it is possible,”

that is, it is not true to say of the necessary simply and universally and altogether that it is possible in such a way as possibility is predicated equivocally, that is, not every possible agrees with necessity.

“But the other,” that is, the possible, “is true,”

that is, to predicate of the necessary, that which is specifically said to be immutable.

“Therefore, since it follows its part,” that is, species, “what is universal,” that is, genus, “that which is from necessity,” that is, what is the species of possibility, “follows to be able to be,” that is, possibility “but not,” he says, “altogether.”

For that possibility, which is predicated in act and can leave the subject, does not follow necessity but only that, which, although it is in act, neither turns from potentiality to act nor can leave the subject.

And these things which Aristotle said are like this, but those which we have postponed, to teach that immovable things are divine, moving things alone are called bodies, should be demonstrated most briefly. It is clear that there are six species of motion, as Aristotle arranged in the book on categories, although he changed this in the physics.

But now let’s assume as if there are indeed six forms of motion. If reason has demonstrated that divine and incorporeal things cannot move in any kind of motion, it follows in sequence that the divine does not move. Therefore, they neither generate nor decay, neither increase nor decrease, nor do they move from one place to another, being completely present everywhere by the fullness of their own nature. It is neither permissible to understand anything about God, nor are they, in turn, altered by certain passions. Therefore, if according to none of these types of motion the nature of divine things is changeable, it is clear that they are absolutely immovable and these six motions occur only in bodies. And let this suffice for having polished this matter with numerous reasons and arguments that could be put forth about this topic.

Now, since Aristotle has necessarily taught that not all possibility agrees with him and he has specified what does agree with him, he again addresses the issue of their consequence and what should be placed first, what should be placed later, and he suggests from memory saying:

“Perhaps it is indeed a principle that what is necessary and what is not necessary, either to be or not to be, of all things, and other things like these consequences must be considered. It is clear, however, from the things that have been said, that what is necessary is in act, so if the first things are eternal, and those things that are in potential are prior in act. And these things are indeed in act without potential, like the primary substances, others, however, are with potential, which are prior by nature, but later in time, others are never in act but only in potential.”

After having laid out what seemed to him about the consequence of the possible and the necessary, he puts forth these things to amend in a way the previous order, so that since previously he reduced all the other propositions, starting from the possible, to the possible and contingent and to their agreement, now he reasonably changes this, so that it should not rather start from the possibility but from the necessity. For if anyone notices the previous description more carefully, the possible and contingent were placed first, and to the same, the agreement of all was related.

But now this seems to be changed. For he says perhaps it is more correct, so that the consequence of the propositions should rather start from the necessary ones. The entire sense, however, is of this sort: “since,” he says, “necessary things are eternal, but the things that are eternal are the principle of all the other things that are not eternal, it is necessary that what is necessary should seem to be prior to all the others.”

Therefore, the consequences should also be made in the same way, so that first necessity, then possibility, and the others should be proposed, and the consequences should be in this way:

Necessary to be Not necessary to be
Not possible not to be Possible not to be
Necessary not to be Not necessary not to be
Not possible to be Possible to be

Do you see, therefore, that first, the necessary to be and not necessary to be is proposed, but in the second place, the others were related to the agreement and consequence of the necessity? Therefore, this is what he said that perhaps the principle of all to be or not to be would be necessary, so that the principle of the propositions to be considered should be taken from the necessary, which would establish the being or not being of the other propositions according to the agreement and consequence. And since it was first placed necessary to be, this agrees with that which says not possible not to be. Therefore, the principle of this proposition which says that it is not possible for it not to be, which indeed denies being (for it removes the possible, which is a mode), is necessity, which agrees with it without any doubt. And again, since that which says not necessary to be agrees with that which says it is possible not to be, of this proposition, which establishes something to be, that is, possible, the principle is that proposition which says it is not necessary.

Therefore, whether necessity is proposed affirmatively or negatively, see that some principle should be of the others and the others should be judged as agreeing with these, that is, the necessary. And this is what he says: “and others must be considered like these consequences.” Why this happens, he shows in sequence saying: because those things that are necessary are in act, as has been frequently shown above, but those things which are necessary are eternal, but those things which are eternal are prior to these things which have such powers which are not yet in act, it is clear that both what are in act and what do not come into act by potential are prior.

But we are speaking of that act, which did not come from potential into act but has always remained in act by the constitution of its own nature, like when fire heats or the sun moves and others like these are such, that they have never left act nor has act ever left them nor have they come from potential into this act. Therefore, because such things were as to always be, but what things are always, these are prior to all, they will also be prior by their own nature according to potential. But what things are always prior, are eternal and again the same necessary, they are in act and it is necessary, so that those things which are in act are prior to those things which are potential.

After these things, Aristotle makes a division of things in this way: some things are always in act, which did not come from potential, and these are those of which there are no potentials but they are always in act. Others, however, which have moved into act from potential, of which indeed the substance and act according to time is later by potential, but prior by nature. For in all things, that which is in act is prior and more noble than that which is in potential. For that which is in potential is still hastening into act and therefore indeed act is perfection, potential, however, is still something imperfect, which is perfected when it has sometime arrived into act. But what is perfect is more noble and prior to what is imperfect. For if things which have come into their act from potential were prior in potential, but later in act, therefore the act of these things is later in potential, if we refer to time, but prior in the same potential, if we refer to nature.

And this is what he says: there are things which, with possibility, exist and actually exist but their actuality, though later in time, is naturally prior; there are also things in which there is only possibility, never actuality, such as an infinite number. For a number can potentially grow to infinity, but whatever number is declared, be it one hundred or a thousand or ten thousand and so on, it must be finite. Therefore, a number is never infinite in actuality, but because it can potentially grow to infinity, it is therefore only potentially infinite. The same is also true for time. For however much time you declare, it is finite, but because time can potentially grow to infinity, we say that time is infinite, that it is potentially infinite, not actually. For nothing can be infinite in actuality.

What he said above about things that are always actual being the primary substances should not be taken to mean primary substances in the way they are described in the Categories, where he talks about individual primary substances. Here, however, he names primary substances as those which are always actual because, as has been said, things that are always actual are the principal among all other things, and therefore it is necessary for these to be the primary substances.

On Interpretation, Book 14

“Whether the contrary to an affirmation is a negation and to a proposition that states that every man is just is one that states that no man is just, or is every man is just to every man is unjust? Is Callias just, is Callias not just, is Callias unjust: which of these is contrary?”

After discussing the consequences of propositions and arranging them with fine inquiry, there arises the task of investigating a topic that carries in itself so much utility that the power of its usefulness is immediately apparent to the reader. For it is clear that the negation opposed to an affirmation always challenges it, especially when a universal negation destroys a universal affirmation and it is not unknown that an affirmation that asserts the contrary also destroys the contrary proposition. The question arises as to which destroys and challenges the affirmative more, whether it is the universal negation or the affirmation of the contrary or of privation. Let it be posited that this is the affirmation that proposes “every man is just”. This affirmation is then destroyed by two propositions, namely the universal negation that says “no man is just” and the one that predicates the privation of justice by affirming, namely, the one that says “every man is unjust”. So the affirmation that proposes:

Every man is just

is destroyed both by the proper universal negation that says:

No man is just

and by the privative affirmation that proposes:

Every man is unjust

Therefore, since it is destroyed by both, that which is destroyed seems to be contrary to that which destroys it. And since it is destroyed by two, as said, and two cannot be contrary to one, which of the two propositions we have mentioned above, that is, the universal negation and the privative affirmative, is contrary to the universal affirmation understood above? No one is ignorant of how useful this question is, who considers that if this had not been questioned and elucidated by Aristotle, there would be great doubt whether it would be accepted that two could be contrary to one, which clearly cannot happen. For since two destroy one thing, who would doubt that either one thing is opposed to two or that one thing destroyed by two should be sought, which of the two would seem more contrary? We now say contrary not according to the way that Aristotle explained in the Categories but only as it concerns a thing that destroys a thing or a proposition that destroys a proposition, as if the question were posed in this way: the universal affirmation is destroyed more according to which, whether it is according to the universal negation or according to the one that predicates privation or whatever else that, from its opposition, represents the power of the contrary?

Hence, it should not be hidden that there should be no doubt between a universal affirmative proposition and a universal negative one that would be contrarily opposite. For it has already been stated above that the universal negative is contrary to the universal affirmative, but here, as has been said, this is not what is being said, but rather which one destroys the matter more thoroughly. For the one that destroys more thoroughly will seem more contrary. Therefore, he not only proposed universal propositions but added particulars so that no one would suspect that he was talking about that contrariness he discussed in his categories or previously when talking about universal affirmation and negation, to which affirmation and negation did not have a contrary opposition. For if we rightly recall what was comprehended earlier, a universal affirmation and a universal negation were said to be contrary. Not only this, but he also established the question according to the just and unjust, because disposition and privation are more prevalent than any contrariness. Therefore, as we said, it must be understood that the question now is which proposition most directly and effectively destroys and annihilates another proposition. The way of investigating this matter will emerge as follows:

“For if what is in speech follows what is in the mind, and there contrariness is the opinion of contraries, as ‘every man is just’ is to ‘every man is unjust,’ then it is also necessary for affirmations in speech to behave similarly. But if neither there is the opinion of contraries contrary, nor will an affirmation be contrary to an affirmation but the negation that has been said. Therefore, it must be considered which opinion is contrary to the false opinion, whether it is of negation or certainly that which considers it to be contrary. But I say this way. There is a certain true opinion of the good because it is good, another because it is not good is false, another because it is bad. Which then of these is contrary to the true? And if it is one, according to which is it contrary?”

This investigation, which is more contrary to the universal affirmation, whether the universal privative affirmation or the universal negation, is drawn from this, that nearly every property that must come in words comes from the opinions which the words themselves signify. Therefore, what is to be sought in words is first to be understood in opinions. For it is not possible that, since the signification of words comes from opinions, which the words themselves signify, the properties of words are not first found in opinions. Therefore, we must ask how these things situated in opinions behave, so that what has been found in these may reasonably be transferred to words.

Therefore, let it first be sought in opinions this way: if the opinion of the universal privative affirmation is more contrary to the opinion of the simple universal affirmation than the opinion of the universal negation, it is clear that the universal privative affirmation destroys the simple universal affirmation more than the universal negation. But if reason has found more that the opinion of the universal negation destroys the opinion of the universal affirmation more rather than the opinion of the privative affirmation destroys the opinion of the universal affirmation, it is clear that the universal negation is more contrary to the universal affirmation rather than the privative affirmation. However, to find this, it must be done this way: let there be a certain true opinion, against it two false ones, of which one is a privative affirmation, the other a universal negation. Of the two false ones therefore, whichever reason finds to be more false, we say is more contrary to the true opinion. Therefore, let there be three opinions, one true, two false, and let the true one indeed be this which judges what is good to be good, that is, what Aristotle calls the opinion of the good because it is good; let one of the false ones be that which judges what is good to be not good, what Aristotle calls the false opinion of the good because it is not good; the remaining one that judges what is good to be bad is what Aristotle calls the opinion of the good because it is bad.

Of these three therefore, one true, two false, it must be asked which is more contrary to the true. But since it often happens that both negation and privation signify one thing, especially in contraries in which no middle is found, he adds: “And if there is one, according to which is it contrary?” This, however, is such a kind: in these contraries in which there is no middle, negation is as valid as privation, but in those in which there is a certain middle, privative affirmation and negation are not of the same signification. For indeed let there be contraries of this kind which are immediate: being born and being unborn. Therefore, in immediate contraries, privative affirmation is as valid as negation, but in those that have a middle, they are not the same. For it is not fair to say that anyone is bad and again not good. For when the good is denied, the listener’s mind can suspect something medium; but when the bad is put forward, the whole suspicion of the listener is rejected to the contrary, and therefore they do not signify the same. But since often (as has been said) privation or contrariness agrees with negation, as often as certain propositions are found, in which privative affirmation is not separated by negation, it must be asked, as it seems to Aristotle, according to which utterance or opinion does a contrary proposition or opinion to a true affirmation or opinion occur. For although sometimes they signify the same thing, they use the propositions in a different way. For the one who posits negation says what is, is not, but the one who posits privation says what is not, is.

Given that there is a distinct starting point and focus to some extent in propositions of the same meaning, and which among them is more contrary to a true proposition, and according to what motion of the mind a true proposition is destroyed, needs to be sought. This is what he means when he says:

“And if there is one, according to what is it contrary?”

He does not say that negation and privation are the same in all respects, but in those instances where they are the same – that is, in immediate contraries, and when they signify the same thing – because they do not express the same meaning according to one motion of the mind, those who posit the contrary or privation and those who posit negation, according to which proposition is more contrary, whether it is according to that which posits privation or that which posits negation? After this, he sets out the nature of contrariety.

“For to think that contrary opinions are defined by what they are of contraries, is false. Perhaps the same is true of the good, because it is good, and of the bad, because it is bad, whether there are many or one. But these are contrary, not because they are of contraries, but rather because they are contrary.”

The sense is briefly explained, but it is woven together with the highest truth of reasoning. When he is discussing contraries, he sets out first and foremost how contrary opinions might be possible. For some people think that there are contrary opinions which suppose something about contraries but this is shown to be false. For even if good and evil are contrary and someone has an opinion about good and evil, it does not immediately follow that contrariety must follow. Suppose someone believes that what is good is good and likewise believes that what is evil is evil. So when they have the same opinion about good and evil – the one that it is good, the other that it is evil – these are not contrary opinions. For it is not contrary to believe that what is good is good and that what is evil is evil. Both of these are true, but contrariety in opinions is recognized in falsehood.

But how can such opinions, which proceed from the same mental state, be contrary? That is, opinions that know what is true? Therefore, just because someone has an opinion about contraries and judges something about contraries, it is not immediately necessary for contrariety to follow in opinions. Therefore, there is no contrariety in opinions in that judgment which is of contraries or which is had about contraries but rather, contrariety arises in opinions whenever someone holds contrary views about the same thing. For example, let any good thing be proposed: if someone forms an opposite opinion about it, believing that it is good, and then believes that the same thing is evil, the opinion that considers what is good to be good is true, while the other, which considers what is good to be evil, is false. And true and false are contrary. Therefore, we rightly say that these opinions, which truth and falsehood separate, are contrary, and they are not of contraries, but are drawn from one and the same thing through contrariety.

Therefore, it has been rightly said that contrary opinions should not be defined by what they are of contraries, but rather by what they suspect about the same thing in a contrary manner. But the order of the words is as follows: “For to think,” he says, “that contrary opinions are defined by what they are of contraries”, that is, by what some people think about contraries, “is false.” But he himself declares how this is false. “For the opinion that what is good is good and what is bad is bad is perhaps the same”, that is, these opinions are not contrary to each other but both are the same. How they are the same he added by saying “and true.” For they are the same because they are true, and contrariety, as has been said, is located in truth and falsehood. In what they agree, they will seem to be the same in truth and falsehood. And this does not prevent plurality. “Whether there are many or one,” insofar as they are true, they are the same. “But these,” he says, “are contrary,” that is, those which are about opinions.

“But not because they are of contraries, or because they judge about contraries, are contrary opinions found, but their contrariety arises from the fact that they have contrary opinions about the same thing. This is what he means when he says: but rather because they are contrary.” For here, ‘contrary’ is placed as an adverb, as if he were saying: but rather they are contrary because they have contrary opinions, and we understand that it is about one and the same thing. For if they do not have contrary opinions about one thing but about many things, they might not be contrary. This can easily and cautiously be found by anyone who observes.

“If there is an opinion that what is good is good, and there is an opinion that it is not good, and indeed that it is something else which is not and cannot be, no other should be posited, nor any that think that what is not is, nor any that think that what is, is not (for both are infinite, and any that think that what is not, is, and any that think that what is, is not) but in those where there is a fallacy. But these are from which the generations are. From the opposites indeed are the generations, therefore also the fallacy.”

He has closed his powerful statement with the shortest sentences, the power of which, to put it briefly, is this: He who seeks to understand the contrariety of propositions, should first determine what is not an infinite number of propositions and then apply this to the nature of contrariety. For in all contraries, one thing is contrary to one thing. But if there is some infinite number in propositions, then that. An entire infinite number of propositions cannot be contrary to one proposition.

By taking this up, he enters into the whole argument of the text and says that not only should it be expected in propositions that a false proposition is contrary to a true one, but that among all false propositions, that false proposition which is one and not infinite should reasonably be posited as contrary to a true one. There can be infinite and false propositions, and there can also be one finite and also false proposition, which should reasonably be posited as contrary to a true one.

Therefore, wishing to establish that negation is more contrary to affirmation than is that affirmation which posits the contrary, he says: there can, he says, be an opinion which believes that what exists in any given thing is true. There is also another which believes that what does not exist in any given thing is true. There is another which believes that what is not in any given thing is in that thing. There is yet another which believes that what is in a thing itself is not in that thing.

However, to illuminate this generally by an example, he has taken up a proposition about which someone might form an opinion about what is good. If someone therefore believes that what is good is good, they will have a true opinion. Again, if someone thinks that what is good is not good, they will have a false opinion: as if someone believes that what is good is harmful, or is useless, or that what is good is unjust, they will have opinions about what is good which are not true, and this is false.

Again, whoever thinks that he does not have the good that he inherently possesses, will form the opinion in this manner: the good is not beneficial, the good is not just, the good is not desirable, and he too is deceived. But if there is anyone who believes that this very thing which is good is not good, so that he doesn’t think that neither good nor evil exist, that is what does not exist, nor is it desirable, that is what it has in itself but that which is the good itself is not, he thinks that the good is not good. Therefore, all other opinions are infinite. For we can gather many falsehoods which, even though they are not about a particular thing, we still say they exist, as in that very good I can say, because it is evil, because it is disgraceful, because it is unjust, because it is avoidable, because it is dangerous, and whatever else no one will find in the good and these are infinite. Again, I can say that what the good has is not in the good, as if I say the good is not beneficial, the good is not desirable, the good is not that which grows, and these indeed are infinite again. But when opinion takes away what a thing is, it cannot do this more than once. For I can’t bring about something through this, if he believes that what is good is not good.

Therefore, all the other opinions, which either think that what is not good is good, or that what has goodness in itself is not good, are false but infinite. However, ‘good’ is now used as if it were saying ‘goodness’. If anyone, however, believes that goodness itself is not good, he is both false and definitely false. But among the false things that are definite and one in number, these seem more and closer to being contrary to the truth. For one thing is always contrary to one thing. Therefore, this is more contrary which denies what is, rather than that which denies either what it has in itself or affirms what it does not have. But to show this, he did not use straightforward speech but turned his discourse to something else, which caused no small confusion. For having said that we should not place those things which are infinite as contrary to true opinion, he added what he said: “but in which there is deception”. This, however, is from those things from which existences are. This, however, concludes such an opinion: he says that opinions contrary to true opinions should be opposed, in which the beginning is deception. Deceptions, however, arise from those things from which existences also arise, and existences are found in opposites. This, however, is such a thing: every existence arises from the alteration of what was. Unless what was ceases to exist, there can’t be existence. For everything that comes into being is transformed in some way into a different form of substance.

Therefore, when what was no longer is, it comes into being and is something other than it was and whoever is deceived believes that any thing is not what it is. For he who believes that what is good is evil is deceived but it cannot be otherwise so that it is evil, unless it is not good and in other things the same way. Therefore, deception is and the principle of deception is, that someone believes that what is something is not that thing. This, however, is a deception from those things from which existences are. For every existence, as I said, will arise from detriment, as what becomes sweet does not become so from white but from non-sweet, and again what becomes white does not become so from hard but from non-white, and the other existences rather proceed from negations and this is the first deception from them. But if where the first deception [from which existences are], there is the most complete falsehood and closest to true opinion, but these are found in opposites, that is in affirmations and negations, there is no doubt that the opinion of negation is more contrary to that opinion which confirms something contrary in judgment.

And indeed, the sense of this is such, while the words behave as follows: “If, therefore, it is good because it is good,” he says, which is evidently true, “and it is because it is not good,” which is false and definite, “and it is true because something else is what is not and cannot be,” that is to say, that which ascribes being to what is not, “of all others, none should be considered,” he says, “neither whichever thinks that what is not is, that is, which thinks that the proposed thing is what is not, nor whichever thinks that what is, is not,” that is, nor the one which denies that what the proposed thing has is in opinions.

But why should these not be considered contrary? He teaches us in this way: “Both are infinite,” he says, "both which think that what is not is, and which think that what is, is not. But which is more to be considered? “In those that deceive,” he says, that is, in those in which the principle of fallacy lies. And from where does the principle of fallacy come? It comes from those from which generations are. And where do generations come from? From opposites. For every generation, as has been said, is from that because it is not what it was, that which tends towards negation. Therefore, he says, fallacy and the principle of fallacy are also found in opposites, where generations also are, from which is the fallacy itself.

“So if what is good is both good and not bad, and this indeed in itself, and the latter accidentally (for it happens to it not to be evil), but in each thing, what is true in itself is more true, even false, if indeed also true. Therefore, that which is because it is not good, that which is good is false to what is in itself, but that which is because it is evil is to what is accidental. So the opinion of negation will be more false about the good than that of the contrary.”

Although we have explained all this very diligently in the second commentary of the first edition, so that the exposition of this book may not seem brief, we will also explain the same things here by repeating them. The entrance into this argument is as follows: if, he says, given a true proposition, there are many false ones that destroy it, that among them which is more false will be more contrary to the true proposition.

Therefore, it must be asked which among many false propositions is more false, so that it may seem more contrary to the true proposition. This must be said through truth. For when something can truly be said both in itself and accidentally, yet that holds the nature of truth more which is said according to the thing itself rather than what comes accidentally. So if someone thinks that it is good because it is good, he has a true opinion according to the thing itself, but if indeed someone assumes that it is good because it is useful, he will indeed think the truth, but this truth about the good happens accidentally. For it happens to the good that it is also useful. Therefore, that which thinks that the good is good is true in itself, that is, it is true according to the thing itself, but that which thinks that what is good is useful is true accidentally about the good. So closer to the nature of goodness is that which thinks that what is good is good rather than that which thinks that what is good is useful. If this is so, truer is that which is true according to the thing itself rather than that which seems to be accidental.

So with these things established, the same should be said about falsehood. For a false proposition, which is contrary to what is in itself, is more false than that which destroys what is true, which is accidentally true. For if what is more true is that which thinks something true about the nature of the thing, that will be more false which destroys what is more true. But if that, although true, is less so, which pronounces about the accident of the thing, less too will that be false which destroys what is less true.

So, with these things established, let us now see how they hold themselves in these opinions or propositions about which we are now dealing. Therefore, let the example be the same: as said above, what is good is both good and not evil but what is good is according to the thing itself, but what is not evil happens to it. For what is good is naturally good, but what is not evil is in the second place and as if accidentally. Therefore, the opinion about the good because it is good will be truer and closer to nature than the opinion that is about the good because it is not evil. So if this is so and that which destroys the truer opinion is more false than that which destroys that which, although true, is yet less true, it is evident that negation is more false than the affirmation which posits the contrary.

For negation says that what is good is not good, but affirmation says that what is good is evil: negation, which is that it is not good what is good, destroys the true opinion in itself which says that what is good is good, but the contrary affirmation, which is that what is good is evil, destroys the true opinion which is about the good accidentally, that is, that what is good is not evil. Therefore, it is agreed that the opinion is more false which says that what is good is not good rather than that which thinks that what is good is evil. But if this is more false, it is more contrary: therefore, the opinion of negation is more contrary than the contrary of affirmation.

Therefore, having clarified the meaning, we must dissect the words themselves. “If, therefore, what is good is good and is not evil, and this in itself,” that is, that what is good is good, “but according to accident,” that is, that what is good is not evil (for it happens to be not evil), “moreover, in each thing what is true according to itself is more true”, for what is according to the nature of each thing is closer to that thing by nature: therefore, also, the truth according to the thing, because it is closest to the thing, is truer than that which is according to accident (for this is what he says: “moreover, in each thing what is true according to itself is more true”): but if this is so, “also false,” that is, even that falseness is more false which destroys the opinion or proposition which is true according to itself, indeed, that which is more truly true according to the nature of the thing than that which is true according to accident, for this is what he said: “indeed, also true.”

Therefore, arranging this he confirms with an example: “Therefore, that which is because it is not good that what is good is false according to itself,” that is, that which holds the opinion contrary to the opinion which was true according to itself. For these words demonstrate this, what he said: “Therefore, that which is because it is not good that what is good is false according to itself,” that is, what denies that the good is good is false according to the true proposition, that is, the opposite. For falseness opposes truth. “But that which is because it is evil according to accident,” that is, that opinion which judges what is good to be evil is false and is appropriate to the proposition which is true according to accident, that is, which thought that the good is not evil. “Therefore, the opinion of denial about the good will be more false than that of the contrary,” that is, denial is more contrary than the affirmation of the contrary, indeed, since both are predicated about the good, denial is found to be more false. But what he said happens to the good, that it is not evil, is not to be understood in the way we usually say something happens to a substance. For it cannot happen, but here it is understood to be said in second place. For primarily what is good is said to be good, in the second place it is said not to be evil. This however is drawn from the similarity of substance and accident. For each substance is primarily indeed substance, secondly either white or bipedal or lying or whatever can happen to substances.

“But more false about each thing is he who has the contrary opinion; for the contrary are those things which differ most about the same thing. But if one of these is contrary to the other, but more contrary of contradiction, it is manifest because this will be contrary.”

The entire force of the argumentation, to put it as briefly as possible, is as follows: every truth is either true according to itself or true according to accident, therefore it is necessary that also every falsehood is either false according to itself or false accidentally. But it is clear that that truth is more true which is true according to itself rather than that which is true accidentally. But he who has a contrary opinion about something than the thing itself is, necessarily must be mostly false. For contrary are the opinions, whenever they are about one and the same thing and are farthest from each other. Therefore what is more false will also be the contrary false. For that which is farther from the truth, this is more false. In opinions however which differ most from each other, these are contrary therefore in opinions the contrary is that which is most false. But there is, as has been said, that most false, which is false according to itself, that is, which destroys that proposition which is true according to itself. Therefore (for this is denial) denial is contrary to affirmation rather than that affirmation which posits the contrary.

Therefore, this meaning is included in these words: “But more false,” he says, “about each thing is he who has the contrary opinion.” For although anyone can be false, even if he does not have a contrary opinion about the same thing, yet he errs more who thinks something contrary. But he says why this happens: “For the contrary are those things which differ most about the same thing.” Therefore, they think the contrary things most false, because contrariety is found only in things which differ most. “But if one of these is contrary to the other,” that is, that if one of these propositions, which is false according to itself or which is accidentally, it is necessary that one be contrary, “but more contrary of contradiction,” that is, but more false is denial (for this is what he says: “but more contrary,” this he meant as if he had said: but more false is of contradiction, that is, but more false is denial), he concludes: if these, as was said above, are so, “it is manifest that this,” that is, of contradiction, “will be contrary.”

“But that which is because it is evil that what is good is implicit; for because it is not good it is necessary to think almost the same thing.”

After, therefore, having shown that denial is rather contrary, because this would be more false than that which would affirm the contrary, and having taught by distinguishing falseness that the contrary is the proposition and opinion which denies the proposed thing, he now strives to prove the same from simple and implicit propositions and opinions. For he says that the affirmation which posits the contrary is implicit and not simple. But it is implicit, because he who thinks that what is good is evil must also necessarily think that what is good is not good. For it cannot otherwise be evil, unless it is not good. Therefore he who thinks that what is good is evil, thinks both that the good thing is evil and that the same is not good. Therefore, this opinion about the good, because it is evil, is not simple. For it contains within it that, because it is not good. But he who thinks that what is good is not good, it is not also necessary for him to think that it is evil. For something can both not be good and not be evil. And indeed he leans on this in those things in which some mean can be found. He also added this very cautiously.

Given these premises, since the opinion of contraries is not simple, but the negation is simple, it is necessary that against the simple opinion, the contrary seems to be simpler. Now, the simple opinion of the good that the good is, is true, but the simple opinion of the good that it is not good is false. Therefore, the simple contrary to the opinion of the good that the good is, will be a negation, namely, that the good is not good. The whole force of this argument is drawn from here: whenever a certain proposition is true and there are two that can destroy it, if one of them, needing nothing from the other, destroys the true proposition, but the remaining one cannot destroy the same true proposition without the other, that which can destroy the proposed proposition sufficient in itself and without the need of the other, should be called more contrary. However, only that which believes that what is good is not good can destroy the true proposition about the good that the good is and is itself sufficient for the truth’s destruction. But that which thinks evil is, will not be sufficient for itself, unless it is also assisted by that which believes what is good is not good. It removes the contrary precisely because it carries negation with it. It is clear that this, which is sufficient in itself for the destruction of the true proposition, rightly seems more contrary than that which is not sufficient for itself, unless the force of the negative proposition is added to it.

“Furthermore, if it must be the same in other cases as well, then this will seem to be well said; for either everywhere there is contradiction or nowhere. But those things that do not have a contrary, the one that opposes the true is false, like the one who does not think a man is a man is false. So if these are contrary, the others are contradictory.”

What we say about these propositions, he says, if this is found in all, what we say should be firm. For it is not likely that in some propositions negations are contrary, and in others affirmations that posit the contrary. But if this is found in all propositions and contradictions, that the contradiction is more likely to be the contrary, that is, the negation, than that which has the contrary, there is no doubt that this reason will hold in all: but if in others that which posits the contrary is more contrary than the negation, it is also obvious that it does not hold here. For where there is contrariety, there is doubt as to which is the contrary, whether it is the one that affirms the contrary or the one that negates what is proposed.

Therefore, in those in which there is no doubt, this is to be considered. There is no doubt, however, in those in which there is no contrariety, as in substances. For here only negations are contrary. Therefore, if to this opinion, which is of the man that the man is, is opposed that which is of the man that the man is not, it is obvious that in others also in which contrariety is found, the negation holds the place of contrariety. [For if in those in which there is contrariety, as in good and evil, it is evident that the one that denies the good is more contrary than the one that opposes evil to that which judges what is good to be good, it should not be the contrary in those in which there is no contrariety.] For what does it matter when we say of man, which has no contrary, that there is contrary negation, but when we say of the good, which has a contrary, that there is not, but rather that which posits the contrary? For whatever is converted from negation should maintain its force in all things.

What Aristotle says, then, to briefly explain, is as follows: if negation is the contrary in other cases, it is also clear here that negation is the contrary. But if not in others, then also not in those that he mentioned earlier. But in all other things in which contrariety is not found, contradiction holds the place of contrariety, and therefore in those in which there is some contrariety, it will hold the same place and no other. This he explained in these words:

“Furthermore, if it must also be the same in other cases, then this will seem to have been well said.”

For if it must be this way in all other cases, and in those things that have been mentioned above, it is this way, and what has been said will seem to have been very well said.

“For either everywhere it is the case of contradiction…”

[Smith: Meiser notes a possible lacuna here.]

Indeed, we find opposites in some cases, but not at all in others. “For those which have no opposite”, such as in substances where no opposition exists (this is something we have learned, if we remember well, from the categories), “from these is false that which is the opposite of the true”, that is, in these we find the false opinion opposite to the true one. But what this is, is clear. For where there is no opposition, it is clear that there is the opposition of contradiction.

“He who does not believe that a man is a man is false.”

For this is the only opposition found in a true proposition. “So, if these are opposites”, and those others which are of “contradiction”, that is, if in those things which do not have opposition the denials are opposites (for it is necessary for some to be opposites), in all other things also in which there is some opposition, like good and evil, the denial has the place of opposition.

“Moreover, in the same way, it is good because it is good and not good because it is not good, and beyond these, it is of the good because it is not good and not of the good because it is good. Therefore, what is the opposite of the true opinion that it is not good because it is not good? It is not the one that says that it is evil; for at the same time, it will sometimes be true, but a true opinion is never the opposite of the true; for there is something not good that is evil, so it happens that both can be true at the same time. However, nor is it that which is not evil; for these too will exist at the same time. Therefore, it remains that the opposite to that which is not good because it is not good is that which is not good because it is good, so also the one that is of the good because it is not good is to the one that is of the good because it is good.”

All the above statements are further confirmed by a more robust argumentation through proportion. Proportion, however, is the similarity of things to each other. Therefore, if four things have been established, of which two are preceding, the rest are following, and thus the first has a relationship to the second in the same way as the third to the fourth, it is necessary that the first has a relationship to the third as the second to the fourth. For we recognize this same thing briefly and most easily with numbers. Let the first number be II, the second VI, and starting again, the third IIII, the fourth XII.

II VI
IIII XII

Therefore, in these, the preceding are indeed two and four, but the following are six and twelve. However, as two is to six, so four is to twelve. For as two is a third part of six, so four is a third part of twelve. Therefore, as the four is related to its following, so will the other preceding be related to the other following; as the preceding is to the preceding, so the following is to the following. But two to four, which are preceding, is a half, and therefore six to twelve is a half. Therefore, in every proportion, this must be considered, that if out of four proposed things as the first is to the second, so is the third to the fourth, it will be as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth. Therefore, this proportion of numbers is transferred to the power and nature of propositions. Let there be two first propositions, one of which precedes, the other follows, and another two, one of which precedes, the other similarly follows, and in these, there is some similarity. Let the first be of the good because it is good, this is followed by of the good because it is not good. Again, let the third precede, not of the good because it is not good, this one is followed by the fourth, not of the good because it is good.

I II
Of the good because it is good Of the good because it is not good
III IIII
Not of the good because it is not good Not of the good because it is good

Therefore, let us foresee in these what is the similarity of proportion. For as the first of the good because it is good is to the second of the good because it is not good, so is the third not of the good because it is not good to the fourth not of the good because it is good. For just as of the good because it is good is a true proposition, but false is of the good because it is not good, so too not of the good because it is not good is a true proposition, but false is not of the good because it is good. But if this is the case, and in the same way, the opinion of the good because it is good has itself to the opinion that is of the good because it is not good, as the opinion also of not of the good because it is not good has itself to the opinion of not of the good because it is good, and as the first has itself to the third, so the second will have itself to the fourth. Therefore, as of the good because it is good is related to that which is not of the good because it is not good, when both are true, so the opinion of the good because it is not good is related to the opinion of not of the good because it is good, which are also both false. For as those are simultaneously true, so these are simultaneously false. Therefore, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth.

Having demonstrated this proportion, let the same things be arranged in an altered order. But let the previous opinion be the one that is not of the good because it is not good and let this be followed by of the good because it is good and beneath these, the preceding third, not of the good because it is good, the following fourth, of the good because it is not good.

I TRUE II TRUE
Not of the good because it is not good Of the good because it is good
III FALSE IIII FALSE
Not of the good because it is good Of the good because it is not good

Therefore, as was demonstrated earlier, so is the opinion of not of the good because it is not good related to that opinion which is of the good because it is good, as not of the good because it is good is related to that which is of the good because it is not good. For as those are simultaneously true, so are these simultaneously false and the proportion is the same. Therefore, as the first which is not of the good because it is not good is to the third, which is not of the good because it is good, so will be the second, of the good because it is good, to the fourth, of the good because it is not good. Therefore, it is required to be seen how here and now the first is related to the third, so that from this we may infer how the second is related to the fourth.

For I say that the opinion which believes something that is not good to be good is opposed to that opinion which thinks something that is not good is not good. Go ahead, if possible, and position against that opinion which holds that something that is not good is not good, the belief that something that is not good is bad. But this cannot be done. For contrary opinions can never be true at the same time, but these opinions can simultaneously be true. For if someone believes parricide, which is not good, to not be good and, the same person also believes parricide, which by nature is not good, to be bad, they are correct in both beliefs. Therefore, the opinion which thinks that something that is not good is bad is not contrary to that which believes that something that is not good is not good.

Again, let us place against the same opinion about something not being good because it is not good, the belief that something that is not good is not bad. This can also happen sometimes. For it can happen that something that is not good is also not bad. For not all things that are not good are immediately bad but are such that they are indeed not good, but they are not bad either. For if someone believes a useless stone, which is not good in itself, to not be good, they would be correct. The same person, if they believe the stone, which is not good in itself, to not be bad, does not contradict the truth of their belief. Hence, because the belief of something not being good because it is not good, and with it the belief of something not being good because it is bad, and also the belief of something not being good because it is not bad, can sometimes be found to be true, it is contrary to neither.

Therefore, it remains that the opinion which thinks that something that is not good is good, is contrary to the opinion that something not good is not good; this, however, is the belief that something that is not good is good. Therefore, the belief that something that is not good is good is contrary to the belief that something that is not good is not good. But the belief that something that is not good is good, related to the belief that something that is not good is not good, as the belief that something good is good relates to the belief that something that is good is not good. But the first and third are opposites, thus without any doubt, the second and fourth, in proportionate similarity, are opposites. However, this can also be understood in a simpler way: if the belief that something is good because it is good and the belief that something is not good because it is not good are similar in truth, and the belief that something good is not good and again, the belief that something not good is good, are also similar in falseness, if one of the false beliefs is found to be contrary to one of the true beliefs, the remaining false will be contrary to the remaining true, which is achieved by similarity alone. It is shown that one false is contrary to one true, as we explained above, that is, the one which says that something that is not good is good is contrary to the one that believes that something that is not good is not good.

Therefore, it remains that the opinion which thinks that something that is good is not good is contrary to the one that believes that something that is good is good. In this matter, it is inferred that rather than putting forth a contrary, a negation is contrary to a true affirmation.

The perplexing statement is therefore clarified in the ways we have described, but the order of the discourse is as follows: “Furthermore,” he says, “similarly, it is the case for the good because it is good and not good because it is not good,” both of which are true, “and above these, good because it is not good and not good because it is good,” both of which are false. “So, what is contrary to the true belief that it is not good because it is not good?” This is stated as if in a questioning manner. “For it is not the one that says it is bad,” because it can sometimes be true at the same time. This, however, cannot be found in the contrary cases. “For the true is never contrary to the true.” But how can they both be true at the same time? Since “something that is not good is bad, it happens that both are true at the same time.” But also “nor is the one that is not bad; for they will be at the same time,” that is, they can sometimes be true at the same time, especially in matters that are between good and bad. “So, the one that is not good because it is not good,” which is certainly true, “is opposed by the one that is not good because it is good,” which is false and cannot be found to be true at the same time. “Why,” by analogy with the proportion stated above, he returns to say “that the one that is good because it is not good is contrary to the one that is good because it is good.” But if anyone carefully considers what has been said above, they are not mistaken in the overall structure of the sentence or anything in the order.

However, it is “clear that there is no difference, even if we universally posit an affirmation; for the contrary of this will be a universal denial, so that the belief that believes that everything that is good is good is contrary to the one that is because nothing of the things that are good is good.”

In the preceding argument, he explained everything about indefinite propositions, but because perhaps someone might suspect that the same reason cannot apply in these definite propositions and that there might be some difference, whether the same demonstration would occur in these indefinite ones, he adds that it makes no difference, whether anyone applies the same demonstration that he himself made above in indefinite propositions, to universals, which are now undoubtedly definite. For if anyone arranges definite propositions according to the previous disposition of indefinite propositions and examines them in the aforementioned way, they will find no other opinion contrary to the opinion of universal affirmation than the one which is the opinion of universal denial. For there is no difference between indefinite and definite propositions, except that the indefinite ones are without determination, while the definite ones are with an increase of determination, either of universality or particularity. This is what he means when he says: “there is no difference, even if the affirmation is posited universally.” For the contrary to a universal affirmation will be a universal denial, “to the belief that believes that everything that is good is good, which is of course the universal affirmation, is contrary to the one that is because nothing of the things that are good is good,” that is, the opinion of universal denial. But he shows why this is the case.

For “that which is of a cow because it is good, if universally it is good, is the same as the one that believes that whatever is good is good. It differs nothing from that which is everything that is good is good. Similarly also in the non-good.”

He gradually led the indefinite proposition to the likeness of the universal. He says, however, that whatever the indefinite proposition may be, if what we commonly say in speech, whatever, is added to it, it becomes universal, so that it does not differ at all from the one that predicates everything in affirmation. For that opinion or proposition which is about good because it is good, namely, believes that good is good, if whatever is added to it, so that we say: whatever is good is good, it does not differ from the one that believes every good is good. Therefore, the same force is in the above demonstration in indefinite propositions, which is also in universals, which are slightly different, which refers not to the quality or force of the proposition but to the quantity. For universality is posited of quantity. And the sense of this kind is, but the words are so. He had proposed above that there is no difference, whether the proposition is indefinite or universal.

But why there is no difference he says in this way: “For that which is of good because it is good,” that is, the indefinite affirmation, “if universally it is good,” that is, if good is universally stated, “is the same as the one that believes that whatever is good is good,” that is, it does not differ from the opinion that believes that whatever is good is good. And this kind of opinion “differs nothing from that,” which is openly proposed universally, which is “everything that is good is good. Similarly also in the non-good,” that is, we also say non-good in the same way. For that proposition or opinion which believes that it is not good because it is not good, if universality is added to it, it does not differ from the one that says whatever is not good is not good. But this one differs nothing from the one, which is openly proposed universally, which is all that is not good is not good.

Therefore, “if in the opinion it is so, and these are in the voice affirmations and denials signs of those that are in the soul, it is clear that the contrary indeed to the affirmation about the same is the universal denial, like to the one that is because every good is good or because every man is good is the one that is because none or no one, but contradictorily either not every or not all.”

He collects all the previous arguments to one point and brings them back to the conclusion of all the strength of the question. For he had said above that denials and affirmations and their contrarieties should be weighed in opinions, but now, since he has found that contrary in opinions, which would be the universal denial, he refers the same to propositions, which are clear, because they are voices and significative, designate passions of the soul.

In the beginning of the book, he truly taught that meaningful words show the passions of the soul, now he seems to prove this: since in opinions, that which was found contrary to universal affirmation was rather universal negation than that which would affirm the contrary to universal affirmation, he also thinks the same happens in words, that is, the contrary to universal affirmation does not put a contrary affirmation in place but is rather a universal negation, but those which are contradictory are those where, if there was a universal affirmation, a particular negation would be found.

And this indeed has been very clearly stated and there is no error in the words but we, leaving nothing ambiguous as to the rest, will also follow the order of these words. For he says: “So if it holds in opinion in this way,” that is, that the opinion of negation is found contrary to the opinion of affirmation rather than the affirmation putting the contrary, “but these are affirmations and negations in voice, markers of those which are in the soul” (for just as there is affirmation and negation in voice, so also in opinion, when the mind itself in its thought affirms or denies something, which we will explain more diligently elsewhere): therefore since affirmations and negations which are in voice are markers of those affirmations or negations which are in the soul, “it is clear that the negation is contrary to the affirmation around the same universal.” He added “around the same,” so that we would not call separate affirmations and negations contrary but that affirmation and negation about one and the same thing, the one would affirm universally, the other would deny universally. Examples of these are: “so to that which is, for all good is good, or for every man is good, is that which is no,” that is, no good is good, which is contrary, “or none,” that is, because no man is good. “But contradictory is either not every,” that is, not every man is good against the one that says:

Every man is good

“Or not every,” that is, not every good is good against the one that says that every good is good.

It is therefore clear in these propositions that he proposed above that the one that is more contrary to the affirmation that says:

Every man is just

is the one that says:

No man is just

rather than the one that says:

Every man is unjust

“However, it is clear that a truth cannot be contrary to a truth, nor an opinion, nor a contradiction. For the contraries are those which are around opposites, but around the same it happens to speak the truth to the same; at the same time, however, the opposites cannot be in the same.”

After these things, he expounds on the end of the book in that speculation and demonstration, through which, although it is true and clear to everyone that two true propositions cannot be contrary, he nevertheless strives to demonstrate this very thing. However, the entry of this argument is of this kind: those which are contrary are opposites, but opposites cannot simultaneously be in the same: therefore contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same. But about those which something true can simultaneously be said, those can be simultaneously in the same, but those which cannot be simultaneously in the same, about these, true propositions, affirmation and negation, cannot be. But contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same: therefore those which say something true simultaneously are not contraries, therefore since about those both affirmation and negation can be true simultaneously, those are simultaneously in the same. Therefore those which are true simultaneously are not contraries.

The sense here is, but the words are so established: “However, it is clear,” he says, “that a truth cannot be contrary to a truth,” that is, two true propositions cannot be contrary? “Neither an opinion nor a contradiction”: if an opinion is not true contrary to truth, much more neither a contradiction which comes from opinions. But here he put contradiction for contrariety: for that was not being dealt with. “For the contraries are those which are around opposites,” that is, every contrary is opposite. “But around the same it happens to speak the truth,” therefore that only about these, both negation and affirmation can be true simultaneously, which can be in the same simultaneously, “but at the same time, the opposites cannot be in the same,” so that it can be concluded: since about those both affirmation and negation are true simultaneously, those can be in the same simultaneously, but contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same, those which are true simultaneously cannot be contrary.

Our work also now has settled in a tranquil harbor. For nothing, as I judge, has been left which would pertain to the full understanding of this book. Therefore if we have accomplished the proposed matter with diligence and carefulness, it will be very useful to those who will be held by the desire to comprehend the knowledge of these things: but if indeed we have thrown out less that which was proposed to us, that we would untangle the most obscure sentences of the book, our labor neither hurts others, and if it does not help, it censures.

Thiago’s Translations Blog

Friday, June 30, 2023

Boethius’s Second Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation

Book 1

On Interpretation, Book 1

On Interpretation, Book 2

On Interpretation, Book 3

Book 2

On Interpretation, Book 3 (ctd)

On Interpretation, Book 4

On Interpretation, Book 5

On Interpretation, Book 6

On Interpretation, Book 7

On Interpretation, Book 8

On Interpretation, Book 9

Book 3

On Interpretation, Book 9 (ctd)

Book 4

[Introduction]

On Interpretation, Book 10

Book 5

On Interpretation, Book 10 (ctd)

On Interpretation, Book 11

On Interpretation, Book 12

On Interpretation, Book 13

Book 6

On Interpretation, Book 13 (ctd)

On Interpretation, Book 14

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