Boethius’s first commentary on Aristotle’s “On Interpretation” aims to provide a deeper understanding of the book’s complex content and make it more accessible to readers. Boethius acknowledges the high regard that Aristotle’s work holds within the Peripatetic school, particularly in its meticulous examination of simple propositions. However, he also recognizes that the text presents difficulties and intricate judgments, making it challenging to comprehend easily. To address these challenges, Boethius has added two layers of commentary to supplement the interpretation of the book. By unraveling the concise and cryptic discourse, Boethius aims to bring clarity to the fundamental concepts of sentences. While some aspects require a deeper level of insight, which will be addressed in a subsequent series, Boethius assures readers that they can expect to grasp the material gradually by following the order of the text and the flow of the speech. Overall, Boethius’s first commentary intends to facilitate a step-by-step understanding of the content hidden within the brevity of Aristotle’s work.
Book One
On Interpretation (Introduction)
[INTRODUCTION]
The authority of this book indeed enjoys great esteem in the Peripatetic school, for Aristotle here meticulously examines the nature of simple propositions. However, its sequence is obstructed by a difficult path, and burdened by subtle judgments, it does not leave an easy approach to understanding. Therefore, we have supplemented the interpretation of this book with two layers of commentary, and what brief and obscure discourse conceals the simple concepts of sentences, we have unfolded by the treatment of this work. But what demands a deeper level of insight will be resolved in the second series of the edition. Now, from me, the reader should only expect as much as he can grasp, step by step and bit by bit, following the order of the text and the flow of the speech, what the brevity hides.
And first, it must be briefly shown what is the intention of this work. For the book is titled in Greek PERIHERMENEIAS which in Latin signifies “On interpretation”. What interpretation is, I will explain in a few words. Interpretation is a meaningful voice signifying something by itself. Whether it is a noun, which signifies something by itself, as in “man”; or a verb, as in “run”; or what grammarians call a participle, or a pronoun, or a sentence made up of these, as in “Man runs”, or any other way a noun or a verb or a sentence combined signifies something by itself, it is called interpretation. Therefore, since there are certain things in the parts of speech that do not signify anything by themselves, but denote something when connected to others, such as conjunctions or prepositions, we do not call these interpretations. For interpretation, whether it is simple, like a noun and a verb, or composed, like a sentence joined and coupled from these, should either signify something by itself, if it is simple, or be connected with those that signify something by itself, if it is composed. Therefore, interpretation is a voice signifying something by itself. But since words and names are interpretations, every sentence that is joined from the categories that signify something by themselves is also called interpretation, and there are many interpretations, among which is also the sentence, in which truth or falsity can be found, that is, declarative, which is to be treated in this book. Therefore, Aristotle wrote the title of the book about the common name and containing concept. For interpretation is both a name and a verb, interpretation is also a sentence of this kind:
Every man is an animal
But in this, the listener understands true and false. For this sentence, which says:
Every man is an animal
is either true or false. Interpretation is also a sentence of this kind:
Give me the book
in which no one finds truth or falsity. Indeed, “give me the book” can neither be true nor false. Therefore, since he is about to discuss only these sentences in which truth and falsity are found, which we call statements or propositions, which are interpretations, and since he has to say about those names and verbs, what they are and how much force they retain in signification, he properly titled the book “On Interpretation”.
And let not this disturb us, that there are certain interpretations, about which he does not treat in this book. For just as if someone disputing about man had placed the title of the work “On animal”, although not about every animal, yet since he would be about to dispute about some, he would rightly impose the name of the book “On animal”: so now, although he does not treat about every interpretation, yet since he had to speak about one which is a declaration and about names and verbs, which are simple interpretations, he composed the name of the book “On Interpretation” from a common and general term.
His intention, however, is to discuss simple declarative sentences. Now, a simple declarative sentence is one in which, whether it is true or false, it is set forth in such a way that the entire order of the sentence is proposed without conjunction, like:
Man is
Man is an animal
Man runs
Man runs scared
For these propositions are set forth without conjunction and these are called predicative, those indeed which are of this kind:
If the sun is above the earth, it is day
are called dual, hypothetical and also conditional. For it is put that if this is, this is - that is if the sun is, it is day. Therefore, these are not simple; “The sun is” and “It is day” are two propositions, which a single conjunction which is ‘if’, binds and composes. But there will be no treatment of these in this book. Therefore, since he is about to treat about simple declarative sentences, that is about simple affirmation and simple negation, and since affirmations and negations are joined with verbs and names, as in that which is “man runs” affirmation, “man” is a name, “runs” is a verb, and again “man does not run” negation is joined with the same name and verb: rightly, first about to dispute about simple affirmation and about simple negation and indeed about simple declaration, since every simple declaration is joined with verbs and names, he instituted the first disputation about names and verbs. For by coming to knowledge of these first, the entire nature of speech is most easily revealed. About those things however, which he is to say in the whole book, he himself prefaces in the beginning.
On Interpretation, Book 1
First, it is necessary to establish what a noun and a verb are, then what denial and affirmation are, and finally what a proposition and a sentence are.
At the beginning of this discourse, which deals with propositions, he says, we need to define or establish what a noun is, what a verb is. For these, as has been stated, can combine all speech. This type of speech is different from other types of speech. There are however five principal distinctions of speech. The first type of speech is supplicative, for example:
“Almighty Jupiter, if any prayers can move you”
The second type is imperative, for example:
“Hand me the weapons”
The third type is interrogative, for example:
“Where are you going, Moeris, on foot?”
The fourth type is vocative, for example:
“Come here, oh Meliboeus!”
The fifth type is declarative, in which the true and the false can be discerned.
Of this type there are two species, one is affirmation, the other is denial. An affirmation is like:
“Man is an animal”
A denial is like:
“Man is not an animal”
Therefore, sentences are made up of words and nouns. The proposition is a type of sentence, and the proposition consists of affirmation and denial.
Therefore, there are certain elements that combine speech, words and nouns, and it is about these that he first disputes, afterwards he takes the last two species of proposition and says that he will talk about affirmation and denial, after these he sets forth their kind, that is, the proposition, and finally, which is the greatest of these, the sentence. But the order is in a way reversed, starting from the species and reaching up to their first kinds. For by progressing from affirmation and denial to proposition, which is a kind, there is an ascent, from proposition to the kind of proposition, which is sentence, he has lightened the proposition of the work; but he disputes in a different way about all. For he first speaks about the sentence, then about the proposition, then affirmation, and finally he discusses the definition of denial, in a reversed order. But this will become clearer later. But it doesn’t matter that he first proposed denial and afterwards affirmation, since all species are equal to themselves and are subordinated equally to one kind.
Therefore, if affirmation and denial are species of proposition, it is correct to propose any of them indiscriminately first. But how affirmation and denial are species of proposition and this is their kind, is to be shown in the second edition.
So, he says:
“Therefore, the things which are in speech are signs of the passions which are in the soul and those which are written are of the things which are in speech. And just as not all letters are the same to everyone, so neither are the voices the same. But of those things which these are the first signs of, the same passions of the soul are for everyone, and of these the likenesses, the things are also the same.”
Since he will soon propose that a noun and a verb are signifying things in their definitions, he first explains what kind of things all that signifies, that is, which denote the very noun and verb. But the whole reasoning of this sort is as follows: there are three things from which all conversation and dispute is accomplished: things, understanding, and voices. Things are what we perceive with the reason of the soul and distinguish with understanding, understanding is by which we learn the things themselves, voices are by which we signify what we understand.
Besides these three, there is something else that signifies voices, these are letters, for their writing is the signification of voices. Therefore, when these are four: things, understanding, voice, letter, understanding conceives the thing, but voices denote understanding, and letters signify the voices themselves.
Understanding is a certain passion of the soul. For unless the reason of the soul suffers some likeness of the thing which someone understands, there is no understanding. For when I see a circle or a square, I conceive its figure with the mind and its likeness is formed for me in the reason of the soul, and the soul suffers the likeness of the understood thing, whence it happens that understanding is both the likeness of the thing and the passion of the soul.
And of these four again, two are natural, two are according to human position. For voices and letters are according to position, but understanding and things are naturally. This is proved by the fact that different peoples use different voices and letters, therefore, because they themselves composed for themselves voices to use and letters to write. But no one posited understanding and things but they are naturally. For the thing that is “horse” among the Romans is not “deer” among the barbarians but the same nature of things is among different peoples. Furthermore, it’s not that what we understand to be a horse, the barbarians think is a dog but the same reason of substances and understandings is established among the most diverse peoples. Therefore two of these are according to human position, that is, voices and letters, two are according to nature: things and understanding.
Now therefore he says this, since indeed voices signify understanding, but letters signify the voices themselves. But understandings are passions of the soul and voices and letters are not natural. For just as the voice is not the same among all, so neither are the letters. But understandings and things are the same among all, however different the peoples. And this is what he says: “Therefore, the things which are in voice are signs of those passions which are in the soul”, that is, the voices themselves, he says, signify the understandings which are passions of the soul and of these they are signifying; therefore those things which are in voice signify those and of these are the signs which are passions of the soul. But the passions of the soul are understandings. Therefore, those things which are in voice are signs of the understandings which are passions of the soul and these they signify, since by these, that is, by voices all understanding and conception of the mind is signified. But indeed what he added to these: “and those which are written are of the things which are in voice”, amounts to the same as if he had said: letters are signs of those things which are written, of words and nouns which are in voice.
Therefore he has shown that voices are signifying of understandings and letters of voices. Now he treats their nature saying: “And just as not all letters are the same to everyone, so neither are the voices the same”. This is to show that voices and letters are established by position, not by nature. For indeed different voices and letters are found among different peoples, and just as letters are not found to be the same among all people, so neither are voices. Therefore these are according to position, which he kept silent about as obvious. For it is clear that what is changed among each of the peoples is not established by nature but by position. But what he added: “But of those things which these are the first signs of, the same passions of the soul are for everyone, and of these the likenesses, the things are also the same” pertains to this, that he declares things and understandings to be natural. For the same (as has been said) understandings are indeed passions of the soul, but likenesses of things. Therefore now he says this: of those things which these, that is, voices, of which he had said above: “so neither are the voices the same”, of those things therefore which these voices are signifying of, that is, passions of the soul, these are the same among everyone. But voices signify those things which are in understandings: therefore understanding is a passion of the soul not diverse among all people.
Therefore the conception of the mind and the passion of the soul, of which the things which are in voices are signs, are natural among all people. It is also taught that things, of which understandings are likenesses, and passions of the soul, are not established by position but naturally, because those things, of which understandings are likenesses, which understandings are passions of the soul, are the same among everyone. For this is what he says “and of these the likenesses” namely passions of the soul which are likenesses of things, “the things are also the same”, as if he had said: of those things of which understandings are likenesses which understandings are passions of the soul, that is, things are the same among everyone.
But that he has put it thus: “but of those things which these are the first signs of”, he means this: for he says about voices, that of those things of which voices are the first signs, there are the same passions of the soul among everyone. For a voice both signifies the understanding of a thing and the thing itself. As when I say “Stone” it signifies both the understanding of a stone and the stone itself (that is the very substance) – but it signifies the understanding first, in the second place it signifies the thing. Therefore not everything which a voice signifies are passions of the soul but only those things which are first; for it first signifies understanding, in the second place things.
But understandings are passions of the soul, and therefore those of which the primary indications are voices, these same are passions of the soul in all men. There is another text, having this character: “But of these things which are primarily indicated, these are passions of the soul for all, and these are also the realities that are likenesses of these things.” If it is written this way, it seems to say this: for it shows of what the indications are voices, and in turn of what they are passions of the soul, as if it were to say: the things which voices signify and of which they are indications, these are passions of the soul and in turn of what these are likenesses, which are passions of the soul, these are things; as if it were to again say: of what these are likenesses, which are in understandings and passions of the soul, these are things. But he does not wish to carry the argument further on these points. For he says: “Indeed, this has been spoken of in the matters that have been spoken of the soul, for it is another’s business.” For indeed, it is one thing to principally dispute about understandings of the soul, another to only undertake as much argument as might pertain to knowledge of logic. Therefore, it is another’s business to principally dispute about passions of the soul.
Now, just as in the soul sometimes there is understanding without true or false, but at other times there is one of them which necessarily exists, so also in speech; for with respect to composition and division, there is falseness and truth.
About to speak about assertion, in which truth and falseness are found, he properly first proposes to show, in which utterance of words one or the other, that is, either truth or falseness, can be found. But every voice signifies sensations of the soul, therefore, whatever has happened from understandings of the soul is judged by voices. Therefore now he says this: there is, he says, a certain similarity between understandings and voices: for just as there are some simple things which are conceived by reason of the soul and are established by the understanding of the mind, in which neither any truth nor any falseness is found, so also it is with voices. For simple understanding, for instance, of a man or of a horse, retains neither any falseness nor truth. For when I understand simply a man, the very substance, I retain nothing true or false in thought. But if I have again considered the course by thought of the soul, the very thought, because it holds the intuition of a simple thing, is excluded from truth and falseness. But when I have joined the course and the man and have made something from these by my understanding (and if I utter this by voice, it will be of this kind “A man runs”), then from this composition and conjunction of substance and accident, such understanding is made, in which either falseness or truth can be.
Therefore, just as in understanding there are sometimes certain simple things lacking in true and false, but at other times when it is already necessary for either truth to be in understanding or falseness, so it is also in voice. For if voice expresses a simple understanding, and lacking in true and false, it itself also will be left aside from truth and falseness. But if it expresses such understanding, which contains within itself true and false, it itself also retains the meaning of true and false.
And he taught through this what he said: “For indeed, with respect to composition and division, there is falseness and truth” – in which utterance of voice we can find assertions. For whenever we join and compose substance with accident or understanding with understanding, so that a proposition can be made in thought, then the same thing happens in voice. And now there is an affirmation such as:
A man runs
for indeed, I have composed and joined a man and a course and from this an affirmation was born, containing either truth or a lie, now indeed a negation, if I join a negative adverb to it and divide and separate substance from accident, as is:
A man does not run
not what is a negative adverb, separated and divided a man from a course and from this a negation was made again, signifying either truth or falseness. Therefore, it has been rightly said that the nature of truth and falseness consists around what is affirmation, which is composition, or what is negation, which is division.
Therefore, the very names and words are similar without composition or division to understanding, like a man or white, when nothing is added; for neither is it yet true or false.
Now he pursues in orderly continuation what is understanding without true or false. For those things, he says, which are said simply, are similar to simple understandings, which are grasped by the pure intuition of the mind without any composition or division. For when a man or white are indeed simple and signify something, nevertheless they designate nothing either true or false. For every simple name or word is excluded from truth and falseness. And therefore, because (as was said) whatever things are in voices signify passions of the soul, simple voices and without composition or division are similar to these understandings which simple understanding conceives without composition and division.
For in these and in such things, no truth or falseness is found. Unless something is added, so that you either constitute what you simply understand to be by itself or you join something to it according to being, there will be no truth and falseness in these. For when I simply say “a man”, if I do not add something, as a verb is, so that this kind of composition may be made:
A man is
or something of this kind, as:
A man lives
which is equivalent as if we were to say:
A living man is
therefore, unless something of this kind has been joined, which may constitute by itself the thing understood to be, as:
A man is
when I say, I have designated the man to be by itself, or something such that this same thing which is to be signifies is applied with the accident joined, as is:
A man lives
for life is joined to a man and lives designates the same thing as is living, no truth or falseness can be understood. But he shows this by a very suitable example.
And the sign of this is this: For a goatstag indeed signifies something but not yet true or false, if either to be or not to be is not added, either simply or according to time.
The subtlety of this example has great force. For not only those names or words are separated from truth and a lie, whatever are simple but also those whatever are composed, if they are simply said. For a goatstag is a composed name signifying a goat and a deer but unless either to be or not to be is added to it, so that we say:
A goatstag is
or:
A goatstag is not
no understanding of true or false will be able to arise from this. For it itself, although it is composed, nevertheless, when said simply, it is not close to truth and falseness. For if someone says only goatstag, he says nothing. But if he says nothing, something composed signifying a name, the listener understands aside from truth and falseness.
But what he says “EITHER SIMPLY OR ACCORDING TO TIME,” is worth this, so that we would not think that an enunciation is made only from a name, when present tense is added to it, as when we say:
A goatstag is
or:
A goatstag is not
in these now there is either truth or falseness. But not only if a proposition designates present tense but also if past, as if someone were to say:
A goatstag was
or future, as if someone were to say:
A goatstag will be
he makes an enunciation. Therefore, what he says “EITHER SIMPLY OR ACCORDING TO TIME,” is of this kind: for an enunciation made simply is according to the present. For indeed, what we say is present is not time but the limit of times, however, time is future or past.
Therefore, neither truth nor falseness can be found in that which is a goatstag, unless either to be or not to be is added to it, either signifying the present, which is simply, or time, which is past or future. For if someone says thus:
A goatstag is
he has said simply that is according to the present, but if someone:
A goatstag will be (or was)
according to time, that is, future (and past).
Therefore, having said beforehand these things which were useful, he intends the course of the dispute to the definition of a name.
On Interpretation, Book 2
Therefore, a name is a signifying word according to convention, without reference to time, of which no part signifies anything when separated.
Every definition is accomplished by genus and differentiae. Thus, he has taken for the definition of the term ‘name’ the genus ‘word’, and the rest, which he has brought together, as the differentiae. The interpretation of this term is as follows: He says, a name is a word. But some words signify, others signify nothing. However, a name signifies that which it names. Therefore, a name is a signifying word. Some words are naturally signifying, others are not. Naturally signifying is the word that naturally demonstrates pains or joys, and those words that we say exist by position are not naturally signifying. However, those are by position which humans have set for themselves, as when someone first said who gave names to things: this substance is called gold, this stone, this water, and other similar things. Therefore, these words by position are human, and thus according to position, as it pleased the very humans by whom those names were formed.
Therefore, such words, which are according to position, are according to the will of the setters. But a name does not signify naturally. Among different nations, there are different names. But those things that are different among the different are not naturally so, but according to the will of those who set them and the setters of position. Otherwise, if they were natural, as those things which are sweet among the Romans are not the same as bitter or sour among the Scythians but are sweet also among them and in the same way among all nations: so also all names if they were natural, all people would use the same. Therefore, since names are not natural nor do they signify naturally, they are ACCORDING TO THE WILL, namely, of those who set and authorized them and by whom these very names were impressed upon things. Therefore, a name is a SIGNIFYING WORD ACCORDING TO CONVENTION.
Moreover, among the signifying words according to convention and position, some carry time with them to signify, others are predicated beyond times. They carry time with them, as is “I run” and “I read” or “I have run” or “I have read” and all verbs. For every verb is with time, but names are without time. For when I say “Socrates” or “whiteness” or something of this kind, they lack times. Therefore, a name is a SIGNIFYING WORD ACCORDING TO CONVENTION, WITHOUT TIME. Among the signifying words according to convention without time, some are of which parts signify externally, others of which parts do not signify anything externally. For this word which is:
Socrates, with Plato and other disciples
which is a sentence, and is signifying and according to convention, for its parts, which are names, are according to convention, and without time, for not even an imagination of time is found in it, but it has this, that its parts signify externally.
The whole sentence is:
Socrates, with Plato and other disciples
but its part, Socrates, if it is separated from the whole sentence, signifies something. However, the part of a name signifies nothing externally; for the parts of the very name that is Socrates, which signifies when separated from the whole connection, do not designate anything externally. Neither ‘So’ nor ‘cra’ nor ‘tes’ signify anything beyond the whole name. Therefore, it is most correctly determined by definition: a name is a word according to convention, designating without time, of which parts do not signify anything externally. This he teaches with the proposed examples.
For indeed, in the name “equiferus” (wild horse), “ferus” (wild) signifies nothing by itself, as in the phrase “equus ferus” (wild horse).
For if there’s a phrase saying “wild horse”, it signifies two things: a horse and its wildness. Each of them is one thing, one is a substance, the other a quality. But the one who says “equiferus” is using one name and one subject is signified by it. For this reason, this mixture also signifies one thing. But if the whole mixture signifies one thing, a part separated from it signifies nothing additional. For in the whole name “equiferus”, “ferus” is signified along with it, but by itself it signifies nothing. And if by itself, what we call “ferus” is judged to signify something, it will no longer be part of the name, but it will be a full name in itself and will have parts: “fe” and “rus”. For this reason, since one subject is signified by the name and the whole name signifies one thing, whether it be equivocal or not (for “canis” (dog), being equivocal, once signifies the whole as barking, a second time the whole as marine): therefore, since any name signifies one thing as a whole, its separated part and as if removed from the whole composition, in which it was signifying something as one, signifies nothing additional. However, it gives the differences of simple names and composite ones. For it says:
But not as in simple names, so it is also in composites. For in the former in no way is part signifying, but in these indeed it wants to, but none separated, as in “equiferus ferus” (wild horse).
He says, a simple name, since it does not consist of others, its parts do not even suggest anything of the signification, as in that name which is “homo” (man), neither “ho” nor “mo” signify anything nor are thought to signify anything, therefore, because it is a simple name. But in those that are composite, since they are reduced from two signifying things into one signification, indeed the part wants to signify something but it signifies nothing separated. For in “equiferus”, it indeed gives some imagination of signification and is thought to signify “ferus” (wild) (for this is what he said: IT WANTS TO) but it signifies nothing separated and additional. For if this very “ferus” is spoken of as part of the name, it is called a half of the name “equiferus”, but half a name signifies nothing. Therefore, what we call “ferus”, together with the other part of the name which is “equi” (horse), signifies as one “equiferus”, but when separated it signifies nothing additional. But if the name itself is put externally, not as part of another name, it signifies as a name. Therefore, there is not the same signification in simple names and composite parts but indeed the parts of simple names neither signify themselves nor are thought to signify, whereas parts of composites do indeed want to signify something and give an imagination of signification and are thought to signify something, but they retain no signification when separated.
However, according to the convention, since there is nothing natural of names but when they become known. For they designate and are unlettered sounds, as of wild beasts, of which there is no name.
He had said earlier in defining that a name is according to convention, not by nature. But now he is showing this more carefully saying there is nothing natural of names. And that’s why it is not enough for him for the definition, which is a signifying voice, unless he also added that the voice signifying is according to convention. Otherwise, many unlettered sounds signify, as hissing sometimes designates something.
We also perceive that the voices of mute and wild animals are sometimes endowed with some signification. For a certain voice of dogs signifies anger, and the neighing of horses often seeks the company of another horse. But these signify naturally and therefore are not names. Therefore, that which signifies naturally is not a name. And thus far.
Now let’s see how the definition was made. When he said that a name is a ‘voice’, he drew a definition from a kind; when he subsequently added that it is ‘significant’, he separated the name from non-significant voices; when he said ‘according to pleasure’, he divided the nature of the name from naturally significant voices; when he said ‘without time’, he looked at the discrepancy of verbs; when he said that ‘none of its parts signify something outside’ the purpose was said so that the name would seem to stand apart from speeches.
So far, indeed, the whole definition of a name has been discussed and it has been clarified by which differences it may stand apart from other voices. However, now he inquires more carefully whether those things that seem to fall into the definition of a name are names.
‘Not a man’, indeed, is not a name. But indeed, there is also no established name, by which it must be called. For it is not a speech or a negation, but it is an infinite name.
Now he discusses what kinds of things should be considered to be, which, although they fall under the definition of a name, still do not seem to be whole names. Therefore, when these are very carefully distributed, the most complete definition of a name is concluded. For indeed, it is ambiguous what we say ‘not a man’ is. For it is not a speech. For every speech is joined with verbs and names. But this thing that we say ‘not a man’ consists of indeed two parts but retains one name in itself, but it does not have a verb. For the negative particle, which is ‘not’, is neither a name nor a verb. Again, it is not a negation. For every negation signifies true or false. But ‘not a man’, which we say, is neither true nor false. Unless indeed (as he says above) something which is closest to that which is being is added, no account of truth or falsity is accomplished in any composition of parts of a speech. But indeed, it is not a name. For every name signifies one definite thing, as when we say ‘man’, it signifies a substance, and not just any, but rational and mortal. In the same way and other names. But he who says ‘not a man’ indeed removes man, but what he wants to show with that signification, he does not define. For he can be that which man is not and horse is and dog and stone and whatever other things have not been man. Therefore, since the negative particle removes in it that which can signify definitely, but indeed does not say what it should signify definitely but every listener understands many and infinite things: let it be said, he says, an infinite name. For this thing that we say ‘not a man’ signifies as many things as there are things which disagree with the definition of man.
But Aristotle found this term, when he called an infinite name, as a new discovery. For indeed, among the ancients, there was this doubt but there was no term coined for this difference, by which a definite name differs from this kind of name which is proposed with negation, as he himself testifies saying: But indeed, there is also no established name, by which it must be called. For no one coined a term, by which it must be called that which we say ‘not a man’ but Aristotle perspicaciously thought that this kind of predicament should be called an infinite name.
But ‘of Cato’ or ‘to Cato’ and whatever such things there are, are not names but cases of a name.
Everyone, he says, is the case of another case. Therefore, it happens that whatever case it is, it seems to be the inflection of another. Therefore, what we say, of this ‘Cato’ or to this ‘Cato’ or other such things we call cases, therefore it happens that these cases are also called inflections. But every inflection is the inflection of something. But what is inflected is prior to that by which inflection happens. Therefore, since that which we say Cato is a name and is primary, it stands apart from its inflections. But the inflection of the nominative is the genitive and others. For no one will rightly say that names are cases. For if that which we say Cato is a case of something, it is necessary to show of what case it can be. But before that which we say Cato, no case is predicated: therefore, since Cato as a name is the inflection of nothing, it is not a case at all. But the other cases which are called are formed by the inflection of the nominative: of Cato and to Cato and Cato as a direct object. Therefore, if those things which are born from inflection stand apart from those things which are inflected, then all these cases also stand apart, which are of Cato, to Cato, Cato as a direct object, from that which is Cato, that is from the principal name. But this Cato is a name, therefore cases are not names. For the case itself is one thing, another thing is of what it is the case. Therefore, if all these things are cases of a name, these are not names. And therefore, the ancients wisely called all cases genitive, dative, accusative, vocative, ablative by their own and diverse names, the first indeed they sometimes called straight, as if inflected by nothing, sometimes by the name of the name itself they called it nominative. Therefore, now Aristotle carries this out, because the cases of names seem not to be names but only inflections of names, that is, cases.
The reasoning, however, is the same among other things, but it differs because when it is, or was, or will be, it is neither true nor false, but a noun always is; such as Cato is or is not; for it does not yet either speak the truth or lie.
“Reason,” he says, "that is, the definition of a noun and the case of a noun are the same. For just as a noun is a significant voice according to agreement, without time, so that no part of it signifies outside, so too is a case. For a voice is both designative according to agreement and whose separated parts signify nothing. Therefore, the same definition and reason is for the noun and the case of the noun but one difference is added to these, that every noun with what is said is either joined or makes an affirmative or negative statement, such as:
Socrates is
or:
Socrates is not
For here, since truth or falsehood occurs, there must be a statement; but in cases, even if you add ‘is’ or ‘is not’, no affirmation or denial is made from it. For no truth or falsehood falls on these. For if someone says:
Socrates’s is
or:
Socrates’s is not
or:
Cato’s is
or:
Cato’s is not
without appending what is or is not, joining ‘is’ or ‘is not’ with a simple case will make an incomplete sentence disconnected from truth and falsehood. Therefore, there is no statement. Therefore, a noun differs from a case, because a noun indeed makes either truth or falsehood when ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is joined, but a case neither tells the truth nor lies. Indeed, without anything else added, it is a truncated and incomplete sentence. But why is that? So that the definition of a noun could be most completely filled. Indeed, now the definition of a noun is in this way: a noun is a significant voice according to agreement: without time, none of its parts are significant when separated, indicating a certain thing, making a statement when ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is joined. But we have said enough about the noun, now he defines the verb with the most careful definition."
On Interpretation, Book 3
A word, however, is that which signifies time, no part of which signifies anything externally.
The distinction between a word and a noun is this alone: a noun is without time, as has already been said above, a word draws the strength of time in its significations. And indeed, there would be a full definition of a word, if all other things in it which are put in a noun were included, with this alone being different, that a word signifies time, and the definition would be this: a word is a significant voice according to agreement with time, no part of which is significant externally. But since these things are common to a noun and a word, and the characteristic of a word is to signify time, he wanted to define a word from the property of the defined. He carefully, however, says “it signifies”. For nouns signify time, such as day or year, these indeed are the names of times; a word, however, signifies time. It primarily designates either suffering or action, as when I say “I accuse” or “I am accused” but with the very signification of action and suffering it also brings with it the force of time, so that that action or suffering could not be either past or future or what is between these.
He continues: and it is always a characteristic of those things that are said of another. The sense of this is: every word, he says, signifies some accident, which accident is always predicated of another. For if every word designates either action or suffering, but action and suffering are numbered among accidents, every word signifies the force of an accident. But an accident is always predicated of that which is its subject, such as white of a body and hard of iron. Therefore, all words designate something of this kind, which are always predicated of another, which he indeed said by this, that he said a word is a characteristic that is, the signification of those things which are predicated of another, which has the same force as if he were to say: a word always signifies accidents, the nature of which is always to be predicated of another; for whatever thing is characteristic of any thing, it designates that very thing which is characteristic.
But I say that it signifies time, as “course” is indeed a noun, but “runs” is a word, for it signifies now to be.
Above in the definition, he proposed that a noun is without time, which now also shows this by example and indeed most diligently. For the same category related to a noun is shown without the signification of time, but to a word, it seems to be with time. For “course” simply said as a noun and as a proper thing is without time, but if it is led into action, which is always of a word, it immediately assumes the property of a word and the signification of time. For “runs” is a word and it signifies action and with it shows time, for it shows to be now that is present time. But it is said to “signify” for this reason, because what we say “runs” indeed signifies a certain action, but with that very action in the very signification of the word present time is introduced. And for this reason, he diligently says “it signifies”. And this subtlety of words in Aristotle is wonderful.
And always those which are spoken of another are known, like those that are of the subject or in the subject.
“He always says,” says the text, "that a word signifies those things which are predicated of another. However brief these might be, he nevertheless shows them. For it is the habit of Aristotle to say that those things which are accidents are in the subject and also to predicate the very same accidents of the subject, for the reason that all accidents whatsoever are either denominatively or in any other way both predicated of the subject and are in the subject. Now, therefore, he says this: the word signifies such a thing as is always an accident, which accident is always either in the subject or predicated of the subject. There is also another explanation in this way: the genus is always said of the subject to the species. Therefore, those which are accidents, some are individual, others are general. And indeed those which are individual are only in the subject, such as any accident in a particular body, but other accidents are general, which are predicated of other accidents as of subjects, such as color. For color is predicated of whiteness and blackness and others. Therefore, now every word, he says, signifies something that is predicated of another. But this will be of such a kind that it is either particular and is only in the subject, such as ‘runs’ (for ‘running’ is predicated of no other subject, it is only in the subject), or that accident will be general and universal, such as is predicated of another accident as of a subject, such as if I say ‘moves’. For this that we say ‘moves’ is predicated of the subject ‘run’, for he who runs moves. Therefore, a word signifies either a particular accident, which is only in the subject, or a universal, which is predicated of another accident as if it were a subject. So far he has divided the definition of a word.
Now indeed, as in the case of a name, those things which could happen to a word and not be words, he separates from the nature and property of a word.
But i do not call ‘does not run’ or ‘does not work’ a word. it does indeed signify time and is always of something, but no name has been given to this distinction; let it be an infinitive word.
As he did in the case of a name, so also in a word, he strives for the full definition and property of a word. For he says ‘does not run’ is not a word and for this reason that every word denotes something finite, but how ‘does not run’ is infinite will be demonstrated shortly. This is not a sentence either. For in this phrase ‘does not run’ there are neither two words nor two names nor a name and a word, which alone can join a sentence.
But indeed, negation is not, for the whole sentence is imperfect. But neither has a word been given to this, he says, by the ancients. For this distinction which is ‘does not run’ and ‘does not work’, which differs from a pure and simple word, no difference has been called by a word among the ancients. He called a distinction, however, what is said ‘does not run’ and ‘does not work’ from that which is ‘runs’ and ‘works’. But since no name has been imposed on these by the ancients, Aristotle himself established a name, saying: let it be an infinitive word. Otherwise, the greatest doubt is made of this category, which category itself is a voice signifying by agreement and is predicated of another and signifies time, the same, namely, as the word that is ‘runs’. But this is seen to differ only in this, that that is a finite word, this is infinite. Why it is infinite, he pursues in the continuous discourse.
Because it is similarly in everything, either that which is or that which is not.
“The word is infinite,” he says, "because while it always predicates of something else (as in ‘it does not run’ is said of something else), it can equally be predicated of a subsisting thing or a non-subsisting thing, as in the case of ‘the man does not run.’ Man is a subsisting thing: therefore, ‘that which is does not run’ is said of man, that is, of a subsisting thing. Again, we say ‘the chimera does not run.’ But the chimera is not and does not subsist at all, and it can be truthfully said of it, because it does not run. For what does not exist at all, also does not run. Therefore ‘that which is does not run’ is said both of the thing that subsists and is among things, and of the thing that neither is nor can be; hence the word is called infinite. And not only this, but also the fact that whoever says ‘runs’ signifies a definite action that someone is doing, but when he says:
‘Does not run’
he seems to deny the act of running but does not specify whether he sits, lies, walks, or does something else. Therefore, since both things that are and things that are not are infinite and are predicated of all these, and since what removes is finite, but what places is infinite, for these reasons the word is called infinite.
However, ‘runs’ or ‘was running’ is not a word, but a case of a word. It differs from a word, in that the latter signifies present time, the former encompasses it.
Just as in the name ‘he did,’ when the case is distinguished from the names, so also the case of verbs now differs from the logic of verbs—for ‘will run,’ which is in the future, or ‘was running,’ which retains part of the past, or ‘ran,’ which is entirely and perfectly in the past, are not words but cases of words. For the present either awaits the future or leaves the past. And so the future tends towards the present, the past starts from the present. Hence, the verb primarily contains what is present, so that the word signifies the present completely. But these things, which are beyond the present in some sense, are not words but cases of words.
Here too, as he did in the case of the name, he reveals the difference between verbs and cases. For he says: every word signifies present time, but the case of words signifies that time which is around the present and encompasses it. They encompass what is present and around it are future and past time; between both times, the present is located. Therefore, whatever signifies either future or past time, which times are around and encompass the present, are called not words but cases of words. So the complete definition of a word is: a word is a voice signifying according to agreement with time, none of whose parts is separately signifying anything, signifying something defined, holding the signification of the present. Because no part of a word signifies anything extra, from this it is clear that not even a part of a name signifies anything extra.
Words themselves, as spoken, are names and signify something. For the speaker establishes understanding and the listener rests; but whether it is or is not, it does not yet signify.
This indeed enters into the most subtle sense, but is of the following kind: “Every word,” he says, "uttered by itself and without the conjunction of another, holds somewhat the nature of a noun and truly is a noun. For when I say:
A man runs
then that which I said, ‘runs’, referring it to the man, I made a complete verb, because undoubtedly it always is predicated of another. But if I indeed say by itself:
Runs
I somewhat make it a thing of its own, joining this ‘runs’ with no other, and it becomes a noun for me. Hence the Greeks also often add prepositive articles to these words said by themselves, as it is:
to trekein
tou trekein
If someone says:
Running is faster than walking
in this case, he joined the nominative article saying ‘that which is running’, and in the other the ablative saying ‘than that which is walking’; as if someone in the case of a noun says: ‘That which is a stool is lighter than that which is a door’, what we said ‘that which is a stool’, we joined an article prepositive to the stool itself, as if we were saying ‘this stool’, and what again we said ‘than that which is a door’, as if we were saying ‘than this door’: so also when we say:
Running is faster than walking
what we say ‘that which is running’ we put it as if we say ‘this running’, and again ‘than that which is walking’, as if we said in the ablative manner ‘than this walking’, as if it was transferred to a noun and said ‘than this manner of walking’. Hence, words said by themselves are nouns.
And there is a proof of this matter which Aristotle himself puts forth. For when we say a simple noun, the understanding of the listener begins with our utterance and while we speak, the voice of the speaker follows and then rests, when that noun has been completed. For when I say ‘hippocentaur’, the understanding of the listener enters from the first syllable and does not rest until the end of the whole noun. But when he hears the final syllable, soon the listener understands what has been said and his understanding rests. Thus also with the verb. When we say ‘to run’, the understanding of the listener also goes through those syllables which are ‘run’ and again ‘run’, but when he hears the final syllable, soon taking the meaning of the whole verb the understanding rests.
Therefore, a word said by itself is similar to a noun and is in a way a noun. For just as in a noun, the one who speaks settles the understanding of the listener by the utterance of the final syllable and the completion of the whole noun and the one who listens rests and his understanding does not progress further: thus also a word, if said by itself, settles the understanding of the listener. But if it is joined with another, the whole understanding of the listener is not yet established. For when I say:
Socrates walks
in the word ‘walks’ alone, which is a verb, a perfect sentence does not exist except in the whole, which is:
Socrates walks
Again when I say:
To walk is to move
the sentence is not established in each of these words, but the listener rests in the whole sentence, therefore because, if the word is predicated about another subject, the listener adds the meaning of both words and does not consider the word itself which is said but refers it to another, such as:
To walk is to move
he refers walking to movement, or:
Socrates walks
he refers walking to Socrates. Therefore, it becomes a complete verb, when it is referred to another. But if simply predicated, the word is a noun, therefore because, just as the noun is said, thus also the word settles the understanding of the listener.
“But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify; for to be is not a sign of a thing or not to be.”
However, he says, although a name is a word and signifies something definite when said by itself, it alone will not make a proposition nor will it establish anything as true or false. This is what he means when he says, “But if it is or is not, it does not yet signify,” referring the affirmative to “But if it is” and the negative to “or not to be.” For neither of these by itself signifies the utterance of a predicate. For when I say “it runs”, this “it runs” indeed signifies something, “but if it is or is not, it does not yet signify; for to be is not a sign of a thing or not to be.” This carries as much weight as if I were to say: the thing I say “runs” does not signify the running itself to be or not to be. If it did signify, it would be said thus: running is or running is not. But now “it runs” does not signify the thing itself to be or not to be. It is indeed said and there is some understanding of it, but it signifies neither affirmation nor negation, because it neither asserts the thing to be nor destroys it. He showed this when he said, “for to be is not a sign of a thing or not to be,” that is, not every word is predicated in such a way as to be a sign of the thing of which it is predicated, because it is or because it is not.
“Nor if you say this very ‘is’ in isolation. It is indeed nothing, but it conveys a certain composition, which cannot be understood without composites.”
The word ‘is’ when used with another word or name usually makes a proposition, such as:
A man is
or
Running is
But if this very ‘is’ is said in isolation, he says, it is neither true nor false, from which nearly all simple propositions are made. Therefore, even if you say this very ‘is’ in isolation, it does not signify to be something or not to be, that is, it neither affirms nor denies, because it is simply said “it is nothing”, not that it signifies absolutely nothing but that it has neither truth nor falsity, that is, it is not nothing as to signification but as to the signification of truth and falsity, about which we will now speak.
Why it shows neither truth nor falsity, he explains. ‘Is’ is said in two ways to signify true or false: either when it constitutes any one thing by its own composition, as when I say:
A man is
‘Is’ joined with ‘man’ and composed together makes ‘a man is’, and hence a proposition is made; or again when two things are joined and united by the composition and conjunction of the word itself, as is:
A man is an animal
For ‘man’ and ‘animal’ are joined and united by what is said ‘a man is an animal’. Therefore if every signification of true and false in a proposition of what is said is in the composition of ‘is’, when it either constitutes something to be by its own composition or joins and composes two things, its force, which is shown in propositions and statements in the designation of true and false, is none beyond these compositions, in which it is accustomed to do this. And this is what he says: “But it conveys a certain composition, which cannot be understood without composites.” For when I say “is”, I have signified nothing of what is or is not. But if I make a proposition, I must compose, as ‘a man is’ or as ‘a man is an animal’. Therefore if all its force in the proposition of true and false is referred to composition, when it is said beyond composition, what it can signify in composition, it does not signify beyond composition, but it can show true and false in a proposition once composed. Thus no one can understand these things without composites in the word ‘is’. It is therefore rightly said to convey a certain composition, which could not be understood without composites.
On Interpretation, Book 4
“However, speech is a significant sound, of which parts have some significant meaning separately, as a term, but not as an assertion.”
Everything that is composed takes on its nature from those things from which the whole body of the composition is formed. Therefore, since speech is made up of verbs and nouns, which are meaningful, it is rightly defined that speech is also significant. But speech differs from those things from which it is made, namely words and nouns, in that their parts indicate nothing beyond themselves, but a part of speech signifies something separately. For if a noun and a verb are parts of speech, and these in themselves signify, there is no doubt that separate parts of speeches signify. However, the way in which they signify, Aristotle showed in the following definition. Therefore, parts of speeches signify “as a term” always, but not always “as an assertion.”
Now he calls a term the simple utterance of a verb or noun. For there are certain speeches, whose parts signify as if making an assertion, as in the speech that is:
“If it is day, there is light.”
What we say, “There is light,” is part of the whole speech and is significant as if it were an assertion. But not every speech has an assertion as a part. For this very one that says “There is light,” has among its parts what we say is light and again what we say is, but neither of them is an assertion, but only a simple term. Therefore, every speech has a term as a part, but not every speech has an assertion. Thus, Aristotle rightly said that parts of speech signify “as a term,” but not “as an assertion.” What a term is, he himself will demonstrate more clearly later.
“AS A TERM, BUT NOT AS AN ASSERTION. HOWEVER, AS A MAN SIGNIFIES SOMETHING BUT NOT BECAUSE IT IS OR IS NOT, BUT IT WILL BE AN ASSERTION OR DENIAL, IF SOMETHING IS ADDED.”
What he proposed above, saying that parts of speech signify “as a term,” but not “as an assertion,” he showed this with a suitable example: man, he says, is a term and is part of speech, if placed in the whole speech, such as:
“A man is an animal.”
Therefore, what we say, man, is a certain term but it is not an assertion. Therefore, when this noun, that is man, is a part of speech and is not an assertion, it is taught to be true that the parts of speech signify “as a term,” but not “as an assertion.” It also teaches that this noun is not an assertion, because in an assertion there is always truth or falsity, but a simply spoken noun is neither true nor false. Therefore, this noun, that is, man, does not signify as an assertion but denotes something simple, so it signifies something “as a term.” However, this term, if something is added to it, such as a verb or any other word that can create a statement, will become an assertion. If indeed someone says:
“Man is”
or:
“Man lives”
it becomes an assertion.
And this is what he says: but there will be an affirmation or negation, if something is added. For if something is added in such a way or negated in such a way that a proposition can be established, an affirmation is completed by a negation. For if someone says:
A man lives
it is an affirmation;
A man does not live
it is a negation. He also teaches that a term is a word signifying in itself by position through what he says: “but not one syllable of a man”. Indeed, one syllable of a man is not a term, because it signifies nothing separately in itself, like ‘ho’. For if someone removes from the term ‘man’ a syllable such as ‘ho’ and ‘mo’ and in other cases that we have shown above, any part of this kind that signifies nothing in itself is not a term but only something posited and co-signified in the whole name, as in what he himself puts as an example:
“In that which is sorex, rex does not signify but is a mere sound now. In compounds, however, it indeed signifies but not in itself, as has been said.”
In that which is sorex, he says, rex seems to signify something, but it co-signifies more with the whole name rather than designating anything by itself, as has already been said above. For he has taught above that parts of the name signify absolutely nothing when separated. So when he says “but not in itself”, that means in that which is sorex, rex signifies nothing by itself but only something co-signified, which it designates with the whole composition of the name, when both the syllable ‘so’ and ‘rex’ joined into one signify that which is sorex in the whole conjunction of syllables.
“Every speech indeed signifies, not as an instrument, but, as has been said, according to agreement.”
Plato establishes that names are natural and argues from this that some things are a sort of furniture and in a way an instrument for revealing senses. But the furniture of natural things are natural: as eyes are indeed instruments of seeing, which sight is a natural thing, therefore eyes must also be natural: so also speech is the furniture and instrument of natural things, that is of sentences, therefore it too is natural. Aristotle, however, says that speech is not according to nature but according to agreement. Hence, he also denies that speech is a natural instrument. For when he says “not as an instrument”, he does not say not by this instrument senses are expressed but only that speech is a thing according to position, by which we demonstrate our own sentences. For of which thing the parts are according to agreement, that too is according to agreement. But the parts of speech are the noun and the verb, these however are according to agreement, not by nature: therefore speech itself is according to agreement and position but it is not naturally constituted. The complete definition of speech is this: speech is a sound signifying according to agreement, whose parts signify something outside.
“A proposition indeed, but not all, but in which truth or falsity is present. But not in all, as a prayer is indeed speech but neither true nor false.”
There are (as we have already said above) many types of speech. For there is firstly optative speech, like:
Would that the immortal gods give you this mindset!
secondly vocative, like:
Hey, you
thirdly imperative, like:
Take, give this to Dorcius
fourthly deprecatory, like:
Almighty Jupiter and the rest
fifthly propositional, like:
It is day
It is not day
But truth and falsity are present in this alone type of speech, and in those others not at all. Wishing to show that there are many speeches and not every speech is propositional, Aristotle added this: “A prayer is indeed speech but neither true nor false”. Indeed, a prayer is included in the types of speech but no nature of truth and falsity is recognized in it.
“But let the rest be left aside; for their consideration is more appropriate to rhetoric or poetry; the propositional, however, is the subject of the present investigation.”
Leave aside, he says, the deprecatory and optative and vocative and imperative for poets and orators. For these other types of speech are adopted by them either for imitation or for stirring emotions. But we philosophers, for whom the distinction of truth and falsity is a concern, discuss only that type of speech in which either of these can be recognized. In a proposition, either truth is present or falsity. Therefore, let us also discuss propositions.
On Interpretation, Book 5
There is a primary enunciative sentence: affirmation, then negation; others, however, are one by conjunction.
Some enunciative sentences are one by themselves, as in:
Man is an animal
Others are one by conjunction, as in:
If man is, animal is
“For man is” and “Animal is” are two, but added with a conjunction, which is “if”, it becomes one. Of those that are one without conjunction, the first is affirmation, the second negation. For negation takes away what affirmation previously established, and negation divides what the former joined, therefore, of enunciative sentences, those that are one by themselves, the first is affirmation, then negation. Others are not one by themselves, but when there are many, they naturally become one by conjunction.
However, every enunciative sentence must be from a verb or case. Indeed, the reason of man, if “is” or “will be” or “was” or something of this kind is not added, is not yet an enunciative sentence.
Aristotle’s Greek text does not have it as we above put, but in this way: "Indeed, of man, if ‘is’ or ‘will be’ or ‘was’, etc.", leaving the philosopher to understand that he was speaking about the reason, that is, the definition which the Greeks call logos. But when he had previously treated of the sentence, which is called logos in the same way among them, when he wanted to speak about the reason of man, that is, the definition, because it does not signify true or false, unless “is” or “was” is added to it, using the commonality of the term, he referred back to the logos about which he had previously treated, so that we would not understand sentence but rather reason. We satisfy those on this matter now, if some experts of the Greek language perhaps will blame us, why we have added to our translation what was not there. Indeed, for easier understanding, we added this to serve the Latin language, because when speaking about a sentence, understanding could not be transferred to reason, unless it was added.
But everything that he says is of this kind: if enunciative sentences are simple, these words constitute them. For an enunciation is not made from two names alone, but it is made from a name and a verb, as in:
Man lives
It also comes about from verbs alone, as in:
Walking is moving
It also happens by the case of a verb, as in:
Socrates was
or:
The day will be
For “will be” and “was” are cases of verbs. Therefore, only words primarily constitute a simple enunciative sentence. And he gives an example of this, in which, although there are many names, yet without a verb added, it does not come into the property and significance of an enunciation, as is the definition of man. For the reason of man is the definition of the human species. To which if “is” or “is not” or something of this kind is not added, it cannot be an enunciation. For if someone says “rational mortal animal”, neither falsity nor truth is yet understood in it. But if “is” is added, so that it is “rational mortal animal is”, without any doubt the enunciation is completed. Therefore, only a verb contains a simple enunciative sentence.
“Why, however, is a bipedal, walking animal one thing and not many? It won’t be one just because the words are said in close proximity. This is someone else’s business to discuss.”
When he was talking about simple and singular statements, he inserted a definition of a man. He is now saying about this definition: it is indeed put forward as if it were a single statement. “Why is it a single statement? At this moment,” he says, “we will omit.” It’s not thought to be one simply because it’s said continuously and closely together as a bipedal, walking animal. This could seem to make one statement because of the continuous utterance under one heading, but Aristotle denies this. Indeed, it is not one statement because it is said in close and continuous proximity. “Why it is one, however, is someone else’s business to discuss.” And he argues about this in the books he titled Metaphysics, which is the philosopher’s primary work. However, it is our job to show this in the second edition.
“A declarative statement is one which signifies one thing or is a conjunction. There are multiple statements that signify many things and are not one, or are not conjoined.”
He declares there are two ways of having one or many statements. A statement is one either when it signifies one thing or when it is a conjunction, like the one that says:
A rational, mortal animal is a man
Nobody could separate the meaning of this statement into many significations, but it signifies one thing and is beyond conjunction. Another statement is one, which is a conjunction, like:
If it is day, it is light
Therefore, there is a statement which either signifies one thing or is joined by a conjunction. However, there are multiple ones that signify many things, like:
A dog is moving
For this, the listener can refer to a barking dog, a marine dog, or a celestial one, and therefore, since it signifies many things, it is not one statement but many. There are also multiple statements in themselves, both in number and signification, which are not joined by any conjunction, like if someone says:
The sun is, there will be peace, it is night, the sky is turning
Even though these signify many things, they are not joined by any conjunction, and so they are called multiple statements. In summary, therefore, some single statements are single in signification, others by conjunction; non-single statements, on the other hand, are multiple in signification, others because they are not joined by any conjunction.
“Therefore, let a noun and a verb be the only form of speech, for it is not to say something signified by voice as to state, either when someone asks or not, but when the person himself utters it.”
Through this sentence, he explains what a simple form of speech is. For he says that a verb and a noun seem to be the only forms of speech, not also affirmations, and he adds the reason for this sentence. For this reason, words and names are only forms of speech, because when they are said simply, whether by someone uttering or speaking freely, or by someone else asking a question and someone responding, neither truth nor falsehood can be understood from these. If someone by himself says “Socrates” or in turn by himself simply “walks,” he makes neither truth nor falsehood. But if someone else asks if Socrates is walking and he responds that he is walking, if you want to pay attention to this very word by itself that he said he is walking, there is no statement. But if he connects it with the previous question, then a statement is born from the connection of the question and the response. But neither someone saying something and uttering it spontaneously nor someone responding can say that a statement has been made. And the meaning of this type is as follows, but the order of the words is like this: “Let a noun and a verb, therefore, be the only form of speech, for it is not to say something signified by voice,” that is, someone uttering a noun or verb simply “as to state.” For we cannot say that he who uttered a simple noun or a simple word, either when someone else asks or does not ask but he himself utters it spontaneously, makes a statement.
“However, one of these is a simple statement, like something about something or something from something, and this one is joined from these like a certain already composed speech.”
Now, he clarifies what a simple and composed speech is. A simple speech is that which consists of two terms. The terms, however, are nouns and verbs, which we predicate in a simple proposition, like in the one that says:
Socrates is arguing
“Socrates” and “is arguing” are terms. And the smaller term that is proposed in the statement, like Socrates, is called a subject and is placed first; the larger one, however, is predicated and placed last, like “is arguing.” Therefore, whatever proposition is made from one subject and one predicate is called a simple statement. And this is what he says: “Of these, that is, of declarative ones, a simple statement is like something about something,” like one predicate which is “something” about one subject which is “from something.”
This pertains to affirmation, like to predicate “something” about “something”. To negation, however, like to disjoin one thing from one something by predicating, like in the one that says:
Socrates is not arguing
I have disjoined arguing, one term, from Socrates, another term, by predicating.
There are other declarative speeches, which are called composed, which are composed from simple speeches, like:
If it is day, it is light
“It is day” and “It is light” are two simple declarative speeches, for the reason that they consist of two terms; from two simple speeches, however, the whole of this speech is made, which says:
If it is day, it is light
For this is what he says: “This one is joined from these,” that is, from simple declarative speeches “like a certain already composed speech”; indeed, their whole body is joined from these, which I have already taught to be simple above.
“And a simple declarative statement is a significant voice of something that is or is not, as the times are divided.”
After dealing with composed and simple speeches, he enters into the definition of a declarative statement. He says: a declarative statement is a voice signifying affirmation or negation, either in the past, present, or future tense. For when he said “of that which is,” he referred to affirmation; when he added “or is not,” he referred to negation; what followed “as the times are divided,” he referred to the nature of each of the tenses. For whether someone says:
Socrates lives
Socrates does not live
or:
Socrates lived
Socrates did not live
or like this:
Socrates will live
Socrates will not live
since it is an affirmation or a negation, and since each of them is in one of the times which are divided into future, present, and past, it retains the full nature of a simple declarative statement.
On Interpretation, Book 6
Indeed, an affirmation is a statement of something about something, and a negation is a statement of something apart from something.
For defining affirmation and negation, he took the term “statement” as if it were generic. An affirmation happens when we predicate something about something along with what is, as when we say:
Man is an animal
We have predicated ‘animal’ of ‘man’; but when we disjoin something from something by predicating, it’s a negation, like:
Man is not a stone
Indeed, we have disjoined ‘stone’ from ‘man’. Therefore, a right definition of affirmation and negation has been made.
Because it is to state both that what is, is not and what is not, is and what is, is and what is not, is not, and similarly for those things that are beyond the present time, every possible affirmation and denial arises. Therefore, it is clear that every affirmation has an opposite denial and every denial, an affirmation. Let this be called a contradiction, opposite affirmation and denial.
Now he divides the statements, or what can be said about things that are or about things that are not, whether in affirmation or denial. For he says, sometimes it is to say that what is, is not, as if someone says:
No man is an animal
Indeed, he proposed that what is, is not. This is a false denial. And that what is not, is, as if someone says:
Every stone is an animal
Indeed, he established what is not as being and this is a false affirmation. And that what is, is, as if someone says:
Every man is an animal
Indeed, he confirmed what is as being and this is a true affirmation. And that what is not, is not, as if someone says:
No stone is an animal
Indeed, he proposed what is not as not being and this is a true denial. And not only this in the present time but also those things which are beyond the present time. This amounts to saying: not only at the present time can it be stated in such a way that there can be both a true and a false denial and again a true and false affirmation but also in the past and future, which are beyond the present time. For similarly every possible affirmation and denial arises. If to every truth a falsehood is opposed, and it is possible to make false both an affirmation and a denial, it is clear that to every denial an affirmation is opposed, and to every affirmation a denial.
From this, then, what is meant by ‘contradiction’ is made clear. For a contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and denial. For when one person affirms what another denies, the conflict of both propositions is called a contradiction. And this is what he says: “Let this be called a contradiction, opposite affirmation and denial.” For when an affirmation is opposed to a denial, it is a contradiction. But what affirmation is opposed to what denial, or what the opposition of these propositions is, will appear later. For not every denial is opposed to every affirmation, but only those he will define next. Therefore, a contradiction will be opposite affirmation and denial. However, what are opposed will be sewn together in the order of explanation that follows.
I say that what is opposed is of the same about the same, not equivocally, and whatever else we define against sophistic importunities.
He demonstrates that opposition occurs in affirmations and denials, when the same subject and the same predicate in the denial are what someone has proposed in the affirmation. For it is always necessary, if an affirmation is opposed to a denial, for one to be true, the other false. If both are false or both true, they are not opposed. For they do not destroy each other. But if one is false, the other true, then the true destroys the false, and if that one is true, the other immediately departs from truth. But if in any affirmation the subject or predicate is equivocal, they are not opposed. For if someone says:
Alexander kidnapped Helen
and this is denied:
Alexander did not kidnap Helen
sometimes ‘Alexander’ is an equivocal name, it could be that both are true, both the denial, if it speaks about Alexander the Great, and the affirmation, if it proposes Alexander of Troy.
Therefore, these are not opposed. But he says that those are opposed which have the opposition of the same predicate about the same subject, so that no equivocation is the cause of diversity. For this is what he says: “I say that what is opposed is of the same about the same, not equivocally”, so that the opposition is of the same predicate in the denial that was in the affirmation, and the denial is made about the same subject about which the affirmation was made before.
But he discussed this more carefully in the book he inscribed as Sophistical Refutations. For there he distinguished the arguments of sophists, whom we can call deceptive arguers in Latin, who from propositions like these which do not divide true and false between them, collect fallacious syllogisms, arguments they use to ensnare and bind the respondent.
Therefore, he now says that even those things which have been defined against the importunity of arguers must be observed. But what those things are, let the text of the second edition await to be spoken by me.
On Interpretation, Book 7
Yet there are universal and singular things in the world. By universal, I mean that which is naturally predicated of many, and by singular, I mean that which is not.
Every proposition shows how it is made. Indeed, the nature of the proposition is seen according to the things that are signified. However, some things are universal, others are particular. The universal is that which is predicated of many, such as ‘human’ is said of many and is universal. Singular, however, is like any individual thing, of which no predication applies to the subjects under it, like Plato or Socrates. The nature of these is taught by examples. For it says: “as man is universal, but Plato is among those things that are singular.” For if this is universal, which is predicated of many, man is universal, for it is said of many individuals. But if this again is singular, which is predicated of no other, Plato is singular. For individuals are not predicated of any others. Therefore, since there are some universal things, others singular, it is clear, since every affirmation or denial is established through these.
But it is necessary to declare that something is inherent or not, sometimes in those things that are universal, and sometimes in those things that are singular.
For every proposition has either a singular or a universal subject, whether it agrees with an affirmation or denies with a negation. For if someone says:
A man is an animal
A man is not an animal
they have proposed that the universal thing, that is, man, is or is not an animal. And this is what it says: “but it is necessary to declare that something is inherent or not, sometimes in those things that are universal.” For since man is universal, the affirmation that said “a man is an animal” proposed that an animal is inherent to him, and the negation that said “a man is not an animal” proposed that an animal is not inherent to him.
But if someone says:
Socrates argues
Socrates does not argue
they have joined being and not being to one of those things that are singular. And this is what it says: “sometimes in those things that are singular.” For since Socrates is something singular, an argument is joined to him by affirmation but separated from him by negation.
Therefore, if one universally declares in universals that it is or is not, there will be contrary assertions. But I call a universal assertion in universal terms, like “every man is white,” “no man is white.” But when not universally in universals, they are not contrary, but those signified are to be contrary.
Every affirmation and every negation is either universal or particular or indefinite. An affirmation is universal, as if someone says:
Every man is an animal
For since the subject ‘man’ is universal (for it can be predicated of many others), it is universally predicated. For we said: “every man is an animal” and we put not only man, which is universal, but also every, and we added the universal, that is, every, to the universal, that is, man, and this is a universal affirmation. But if he says:
Not any man is an animal
he has again added a universal determination, that which is said to be none, to man, the universal thing. Therefore, whether in affirmation or in negation, if someone puts them forth universally, they will propose a universal in a universal. But they will not propose a universal in a universal as often as they say:
A man is an animal
A man is not an animal
For since a man is a universal thing, he made an affirmation or negation without the addition of universality, which is none or every. Therefore, it must be repeated: a universal affirmation is, in which the universal is universally predicated affirmatively, and a universal negation, in which again the universal is universally predicated negatively. But these are of such a kind that they are contrary. For it cannot happen that where a universal affirmation is true, there also a universal negation is true but, on the contrary, it can happen that both may be found to be false, as in:
Every man is just
No man is just
For here both are false; and that indeed one may be found true, the other false, as in that which is:
Every man is an animal
No man is an animal
One is true, the other false; but that both may be true, it cannot happen. Therefore, since both are found to be false, they are not opposed but are contrary. Why they are called contrary, we will have to say elsewhere.
But particular propositions are of this kind:
Some man is an animal
Some man is not an animal
These are called subaltern. For a particular affirmation is subaltern under a universal affirmation. Again, in the same way, a particular negation is subaltern under a universal negation. But these either can both be true or one true, the other false; but they cannot both be found to be false: as in that which is:
Some man is just
Some man is not just
Both are true. But when we say:
Some man is an animal
Some man is not an animal
One is true, the other false. And a particular affirmation and negation are called subcontrary. Therefore, nor are these called opposed, for this reason, because sometimes both are found to be true. But let the description of these be as follows:
[FIGURE]
Therefore, neither the superior universals nor the inferior particulars are opposed, for this reason, because the inferiors can both be true, the superiors can both be false. But they are opposed as contradictions (as he himself says) if one looks at the corners, as if one compares a universal affirmation to a particular negation, as is:
Every man is just
Some man is not just
For these can neither be found to be both true nor false but always in all one is true, the other false. And again, if a universal negation is compared to a particular affirmation, they are found to be opposed, as is:
No man is just
Some man is just
Always one is true, the other false. And you will see this in whichever terms: the reason will not differ. But let the most complete description be in this way:
[FIGURE]
Therefore, the determinations of the universal are indeed every and none, of the particular, some. But those propositions which neither have a universal added nor a particular are called indefinite and are similar to particulars, as is:
A man is just
A man is not just
For both can be true, as in this very example that we have said; one can be true, the other false, as in:
A man is an animal
A man is not an animal
But both cannot be found to be false. And these (as it has been said) are called indefinite. Besides these, all are singular, in which contradiction can occur, as in that which is:
Socrates is an animal
Socrates is not an animal
Socrates is just
Socrates is not just
For if no equivocation of the predicate or the subject or another time or something of those things which are determined individually impedes them, always one is true, the other false. Therefore, since we have reflected upon all in common and as much as brevity allowed, we expressed what each thing is, let us now return to the text, since it is time.
“So if,” he says, “one universally asserts in the universal that something is or is not, there will be contrary statements.” A person makes a universal assertion in the universal whenever they make a universal affirmation or a universal negation. For example, when they say:
Every man is an animal
they have universally declared the man to be universal by adding ‘every’; but if they again say:
No man is an animal
they likewise universally declare the man to be universal by saying ‘no’: and these are contrary.
What he means by contrary, he makes clear by example: by a universal assertion in the universal, I mean:
Every man is white
No man is white
One is indeed a universal affirmation, the other a universal negation, which we taught to be contrary in the above description. However, when not universally stated in universals, they are not contrary. “Whenever,” he says, "the propositions are indefinite and the universal is not proposed universally, they are not contrary. For the affirmation that says:
A man is just
is not contrary to the one saying:
A man is not just
Because both can be true at the same time and in the same person, which is impossible with contraries.
What he added: “However, those that are signified can be contrary,” means this: the propositions themselves are not contrary, but they can sometimes signify contraries. For if someone says:
A man is white
and another denies:
A man is not white
the propositions themselves are not contrary, but the phrase “A man is not white” can in some way signify the contrary. For this phrase “A man is not white” denotes the man as being red, pale, or brown, it also denotes black, which is the contrary to white. Thus, what is not white can be black. Therefore, even though the propositions themselves are not contrary, something contrary can sometimes be signified to the prior affirmation, as in the examples we mentioned. For if what is said “Not a white man” were to designate blackness, since someone who is black is not white, the propositions themselves are not contrary, since they both can be true, but what they signify can sometimes turn out to be contrary. What these types of propositions are, he showed by giving examples.
I say however, that one does not assert universally in those things that are universal, such as “A white man,” “Not a white man.”
And what he means by universally asserting in the universal, he very clearly showed saying:
For when the man is universal, he does not use a universal assertion. For ‘every’ is not universal but because it universally signifies.
For what is referred to as ‘every’ collects and brings together into one entity that to which it is attributed, such as when it is said:
Every man is just
It does not exempt any man but collects all humanity and makes a universal predicate of the universal thing, man, when we say ‘every man’. For since man is a universal, this universal ‘every’ adds universal significance to it, and a universal thing is universally asserted.
However, it is not true to universally predicate in that which is universally predicated.
This statement instructs us where to correctly place the determination of universality. For he teaches that this universality, which we call universal determination, should always be placed at the subject term, never at the predicate. For if someone says this:
Every man is an animal
they have correctly spoken, placing ‘every’ at the subject, that is, at man. But if they say:
Every man is every animal
They would have spoken falsely. Therefore, he is now saying: “However, in that which is universally predicated,” such as ‘animal’ concerning ‘man’ (for ‘animal’ is universal, as it is predicated of every man), “it is not true to universally predicate this universal, which is ‘animal’, as if to say that every animal is a human.” Not only in these instances, but he does not concede it to be correct in any affirmation. For he says:
No affirmation will be, in which a universal is predicated universally.
Why this happens, I will briefly demonstrate. The predicate is always larger than or equal to the subject. It’s larger, as when I say:
A man is an animal
‘Animal’ is predicated, ‘man’ is the subject, but ‘animal’ is larger than ‘man’, since it is predicated of more things than ‘man’ is. Again, it is equal, as when we say:
Man is risible
‘Man’ is the subject, ‘risible’ is the predicate, but ‘man’ and ‘risible’ are equal, since it is proper to man that he is risible. However, the predicate cannot be found to be less than the subject. Therefore, whether the predicate is larger, it is false to add a universal to the predicate, as in the example he provided “every man is every animal,” or if it is equal, it is superfluous, if someone says “every man is every risible.” Therefore, it is not necessary to universally predicate a universal predicate.
But to oppose an affirmation to a negation, I say, is contradictory, which signifies the universal to the same because not universally, such as “every man is white,” “not every man is white,” “no man is white,” “some man is white.”
He then proceeds to explain what contradiction properly is. He says that propositions are opposed contradictorily whenever a particular negation denies a universal affirmation and whenever a particular affirmation has refuted a universal negation. For when it is said:
Every man is white
The negation that says:
Not every man is white
Does not universally remove from the same man what the universal affirmation had established. For it posits that every man is white, it says not every man, as if it concedes some but only takes away its universality. This is what he means when he says “which signifies the universal to the same because not universally.” For just as the affirmation signifies the universal by saying man, so too does the negation signify the universal, for it also has man, but the same universal, he teaches, is not universally, that is, not every man is white, which the affirmation had universally set down by proposing every man to be white.
The same also applies to negation. Those which we above positioned as angular and contradictory in description, he now calls the same opposites contradictorily. However, that he opposed a particular negation to the universal affirmation, which is “every man is white,” that is:
Not every man is white
Is as much as if he said:
Some man is not white
For if not every man is white, some man is not white.
However, contrary to the universal affirmation and the universal negation.
He fully pursues all and says the universal affirmation and the universal negation are contrary. For we also described these above. But now he shows the same to be opposed contrary. He also added that it is impossible for them to be known as true at the same time in the same thing. For just as the nature of contraries cannot be found in the same thing, for something cannot be black and white at the same time, so too it cannot be that both the contraries are true at the same time. However, what he added with “but these opposites happen in the same thing,” he designates the particular affirmation and the particular negation. For a particular affirmation is opposed to a universal negation contradictorily, and a particular negation is opposed to a universal affirmation. Therefore, opposites of contraries can sometimes be found to be true in the same thing, that is, it can happen that a particular affirmation and a particular negation are true in some cases, as is:
Some man is white
Some man is not white
Both are true.
Therefore, whatever contradictions of universals there are, it is necessary for one to be true or false universally, and whatever there are in singulars, such as “Socrates is white, Socrates is not white.”
He speaks of contradictory opposites and of singular propositions, for it is always necessary to find one true, the other always false. For he says: “Contradictions,” he says, “of those things that are universally universally predicated, one is always true, the other false. But contradictions of universally universally predicated are contradictions of universally particularly predicated. For universal affirmation or denial are predicated universally universally. Of these, the contradictory particulars are affirmations or denials, if they are compared to each other angularly. Therefore, of these contradictions, which are universally universally predicated, one is always true, the other always found false. The same is true for singulars. For if no variation of equivocation, as said, impedes and the same predicate and the same subject to the same time to the same part to the same related in the same way, one is always true, the other false and they share among themselves the nature of truth and lies.”
“However, in universals not universally, this is not always true, that indeed false.”
“But those which are,” he says, "indefinite, so as not to have either universal or particular determination which he kept silent, not always one is true, the other false but sometimes both are found to be true. In universals, however, something is not universally predicated in this way:
A man is white A man is not white
in which at one and the same time both can happen to be true. For here, since the universal is man, the noun is not universally predicated. But neither particularly. For neither some, nor none, nor every is added. However, he teaches that propositions of this kind do not divide truth and falsehood among themselves in this way:
“It is indeed true to say that there is a white man and there is not a white man, and there is a handsome man and there is not a handsome man. If indeed ugly, and not handsome; and if something happens, and it is not.”
Such a saying is proof that indefinite affirmation and denial can both be found true. For it is true to say:
There is a white man
and:
There is not a white man
The proof of this thing is. For if it is true to say there is a black man and there is a white man at the same time, and he who is black is not white, it is true to say at the same time that there is a white man and there is not a white man. Again if it is true to say that there is a handsome man and there is an ugly man at the same time, and he who is ugly is not handsome, it is true to say at the same time that there is a handsome man and there is not a handsome man. But it is manifestly true to say that a man is handsome and a man is ugly at the same time. For when Achilles was handsome, Thersites was ugly and lame. Again, it is true to say there is a white man and again at the same time a man becomes white and no contradiction forbids that there be a white man and again a man becomes white. But he who becomes white is not yet white: “It is true to say therefore that there is a white man and there is not a white man. For this is what he says: and if something happens, and it is not: for when it happens, it is not; but it can be said that there is a white man and a man becomes white, so that both are truly said: therefore both can truly be said there is a white man and there is not a white man.”
It might seem suddenly inconsistent, therefore, because it appears to mean “a man is not white,” as well as “no man is white”. However, this neither signifies the same thing nor is it necessarily simultaneous.
He silently responds to people’s doubts. For what we say:
A man is white
and:
A man is not white
to both be true seems occasionally inconsistent. If it is true to say “a man is white,” how can it also be true to say “a man is not white”? This appears to be so because it seems to some that when we say “a man is not white”, we mean as if we were saying “no man is white”; but this is not true. For it is not the same thing to say:
A man is not white
and:
No man is white
and although when we say:
No man is white
we also imply that a man is not white, these two statements do not necessarily signify the same thing. When we say:
A man is not white
it is not necessary to understand that we also mean “no man is white.” For it is not always the case that “a man is not white” and “no man is white” are synonymous. For sometimes they are, specifically when the universal negation is expressed first; but when the indefinite is stated first, the universal negation is not simultaneous with the indefinite negation.
For if I say:
No man is white
I have said simultaneously that a man is not white. But if I say:
A man is not white
the universal negation, which is “no man is white,” is not said simultaneously because it is possible for someone to be not white, about whom it may be said “a man is not white”, yet not all are not white. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that:
A man is not white
and:
No man is white
are simultaneous.
It is clear that a negation corresponds to an affirmation; for one ought to negate the same thing that the affirmation has affirmed, and about the same thing.
This argument also shows that indefinite and universal negations do not signify the same thing and are distinct from one another. For if there is a negation for each affirmation, the affirmation that corresponds to the negation:
A man is not white
is the one that says:
A man is white
and the affirmation that corresponds to the negation:
No man is white
is the one that says:
Some man is white
But these affirmations are different (that is, “A man is white” and “Some man is white”): therefore, the negations that correspond to them are also different. Therefore, the negation that says:
No man is white
is different from the one that says:
A man is not white
He teaches us that there is a negation for each affirmation and he demonstrates this with this reasoning: for the negation must deny the same predicate that the affirmation has predicated, and the negation must remove the predicate about the same subject to which the affirmation previously linked it. If this happens, there is no doubt that there is a negation for each affirmation. Whether this is done universally, whether it is done universally or indefinitely and not universally, or whether it is done singularly, the nature of the propositions is the same, so that there is naturally only one negation for each affirmation. This he proves with an induction.
I mean, as Socrates is white, Socrates is not white.
In this proposition, the subject is the same, the predicate is the same. And he added an example in the middle:
However, if something else or the same about something else, it will not be opposite but will be different from it.
The sense of this is as follows: however, if the negation predicates something else than what the affirmation predicates, or if the negation predicates the same thing about a different subject as was predicated in the affirmation, they are not opposed to each other but are merely different from each other. For if someone says:
Socrates is arguing
and another responds:
Socrates is not walking
a different predicate is asserted, and the propositions are different, not opposed. And this is what he said: “if however something else”, for the negation predicated something else than the affirmation had predicated. But if someone says this way:
Socrates is arguing
and another responds:
Plato is not arguing
the same thing has been predicated about a different subject, and the propositions are different, not opposed, and this will be what he said “or about a different subject, the same thing”. But if both things are different, much more so the propositions become different. With these premises set forth, he again resorts to the proposed examples and opposes to one affirmation one negation statement, opposing and comparing angles to angles, affirmative to negatives, particulars to universals, undefined to undefined.
And after this, he concludes the sentence saying it is clear that to one affirmation there is one opposite negation. He also briefly revisits, since some are contrary, others contradictory, and says that he has shown in more detail in the previous argument, what these are, so that also not every opposition of affirmation and negation, which he now commonly and improperly calls contradiction, is true or false. And when they are true or false and why he reminds himself he has explained.
On Interpretation, Book 8
However, an affirmation and a denial are one, signifying one thing about one thing, whether it be universally in a universal sense or not likewise.
What a single affirmation is, we have already spoken of above, and we also do not weary of teaching the same now, as Aristotle himself revisits the same topic. For a single affirmation is one which signifies one thing about one thing—that is, it has such a predicate and such a subject that each signifies single things. For if a predicate signifies one thing, it is simple and singular. If, again, a subject signifies one thing and not multiple, it is again simple and singular. Hence, if one predicate is of one subject, both will signify single things and not multiple, and thus the meaning of the proposition is not manifold and what signifies one thing is one. The same also must be true in universally predicated universals and in particulars, which must be opposed to universals. He also gives examples of these. For he says that one proposition is:
Every man is white
and its opposite again is one negation:
Not every man is white
“If ‘white’ signifies one thing,” he says. But if it signifies many, it is not one affirmation nor one negation. This also applies to the subject, namely that the simple signification of the subject too should be preserved. He teaches that it is not one proposition, if the predicate or any word in the proposition signifies many things, in this way:
But if one name has been put for two, from which there is not one, there is not one affirmation.
There are certain things which indeed signify many, from all of which combined one thing can be made. The name of man indeed signifies animal, signifies mortal, and also designates rational, but these combined make one thing, which is a rational mortal animal. For all these things fill up one man. There are also others which signify two or more things of this kind, from which combined one thing cannot be, such as “liber.” For Dionysus is called Liber, “liber” is also said of a freeborn, but freeborn and Dionysus combined make nothing. Therefore, if there is any such thing, he says, either a subject or a predicate which signifies many things, from which one thing cannot be, that is not one affirmation nor one negation. And he confirms this by the reason of a hypothetical example.
For it is said, he says, a horse and a man are a tunic and let them have this name, for example - if someone says:
The tunic is white
Since the tunic designates a horse and a man, it seems to say that the horse and man are white. But this is such as if he says:
The horse is white and the man is white
But these are two propositions, not one; therefore, that proposition is also double:
The man and the horse are white
Hence, that which says:
The tunic is white
is also double. Indeed, the dual meaning of this subject, that is, the tunic, made the propositions multiple. But if someone says “The tunic is white” signifies one thing, because it signifies “The man and the horse are white”, it is impossible. For neither from a man and a horse is one thing made, that this proposition might signify one thing. Therefore, either this proposition signifies many things or, if not many, it signifies nothing at all. For a horseman is nothing, to be spoken and understood at the same time. This is what he says: “if therefore these signify many and there are many, it is clear that the first one”, that is, the one that says:
The tunic is white
“Signifies many or nothing.” However, nothing for this reason because, if a proposition whose any term is ambiguous does not signify many, when those things signified by an ambiguous name have been joined and do not come together into one substance, there will be no understanding of such a combination, which joins things unconnected in themselves, as in the one that is:
The tunic is white
It cannot be one in any other way, if tunic signifies a horse and a man, unless if a horse and a man coated make one thing. But these terms are such that this proposition must either be multiple or signify nothing. For if a man and a horse are joined, it makes nothing. For there is no such thing as a horseman. This he showed by what he said: “for there is no such thing as a horseman.”
But why he now proposed this, he clearly demonstrated. For when he was speaking about these propositions, which divide the truth and falsehood between them, he added this, because even those which have either an ambiguous predicate or subject do not divide true and false. For both can be true, as those which say:
The man is free
if you refer to being born free, and:
The man is not free
if referring to Dionysus. Thus, it was rightly said:
“Therefore, neither in these is it necessary for this contradiction to be true, the other indeed false.”
For when it signifies many, multiple signification in denial and affirmation does not destroy each other. But if there is one affirmation, one negation, since both cannot exist in the same, one always has to be true, the other false.
On Interpretation, Book 9
Therefore, “in things that exist and things that have happened, it is necessary for an affirmation or denial to be either true or false”. In universals, it always holds universally: this one is true, that one false. And in things that are singular, as has been stated.
Regarding present and past matters, Aristotle definitively says that contradictory statements — one must always be true, the other always false. For instance, if someone says:
All the Fabii who advanced against the Veientes in a private conspiracy have perished
If this is denied in the following manner:
Not all the Fabii who advanced against the Veientes in a private conspiracy have perished
Certainly, one must be true, the other false, but the affirmation is definitively true, the denial definitively false. For when something that has occurred is stated to have happened, it is definitively true; if it is denied that it has happened, it is definitively false.
Therefore, whether the contradiction in universally predicated universals is made by the opposition of particularity, or in singulars, as in the case of Socrates and other individuals, one of the statements about past events is always true, the other false, as in:
Socrates was killed by poison
Socrates was not killed by poison
The affirmation is definitively true and thus again the denial is false. The same must be the case with present matters. If, for example, while Socrates is arguing, someone says:
Socrates is arguing
And another person denies this, since Socrates arguing is defined by the present time, the affirmation definitively holds the truth, the denial definitively a falsehood. The same holds for universals, whether affirmative or negative, in which either a particular affirmation or a particular denial is opposed.
For Aristotle is saying that “in things that exist and things that have happened,” that is, in present and past events, one is always definitively true, the other definitively false, whether one is universal and the other particular. This is shown when he says, “in universals, it always holds universally: this one is true, that one false,” whether in singular and individual predicaments, which is signified by what he added: “and in things that are singular.”
But after he has spoken about contradictions, he added that in things which are undefined, it is not necessary for one to always be true, the other false, signifying what he said: “In those things that are not universally asserted in universals, it is not necessary.” For it is not necessary to posit one as true, the other as false in these things; it is possible that both could be true if they are undefined.
However, “in singulars and future events, it is not the same.”
Some propositions simply signify the presence of something, as if someone said while Socrates was alive:
Socrates is bald
and another person denies it:
Socrates is not bald
The first assertion attributed baldness to Socrates, the second separated Socrates from baldness.
Then there are necessary propositions, such as if someone says:
It is necessary that the sun return to Aries every year
By stating something necessary and bound to occur, the speaker has made the proposition necessary.
However, there are also contingent propositions, which, although they are not currently true, it is still possible for them to come to pass in the future, as if someone says:
Alexander is going to have lunch today
Alexander is not going to have lunch today
Indeed, when these things are said, since it is not yet the case that Alexander has had lunch, it is still possible that he might, and it could happen that he has lunch today, so we call these contingent. It is possible for something to occur that has not yet occurred. But these are not currently true, as stated, for they pertain to the future. Those things which are not present but could be are not necessary, for they retain the nature of being such that they can either exist or not. Indeed, it could happen that Alexander has lunch today, and again, it could happen that he does not. We call this possibility of either happening or not happening “contingent”. For in such matters, either affirmation or denial can occur, and it is not necessary that either affirmation or denial be made. Since the affirmation is not necessary, it is not precluded that a denial might occur. Again, since the denial is not necessary, it sometimes happens that an affirmation might occur. Therefore, we call this power of either happening or not happening “contingent,” because in these cases either - that is, either affirmations or denials - can occur.
Now then, Aristotle is arguing with the most robust reasoning to show that just as in the past and in the present, it is necessary not only that one of an affirmation and a denial be true and the other false, but indeed one is definitively true, the other definitively assumes falsehood. This is not the case with what are called contingent. For it is necessary that either the affirmation or the denial be true, but not that each of them is definitively true, the other definitively false. For instance, when we say:
Alexander needs to bathe
and if someone else denies this and says:
Alexander does not need to bathe
Inevitably, one of these will occur, either he will bathe or not, and it is necessary that one of these is true, the other false, either the affirmation, if he bathes, or the denial if he does not bathe. But it is not necessary for the affirmation to be definitively true, because in such cases, a denial may occur. Nor is it ever determined that the denial is true, the affirmation false, because a denial may not occur. Therefore, in every contradiction, it is necessary that one is true, the other false, but that one is definitively true, the other definitively false, just as in past and present events, is impossible for any reason.
But Aristotle first establishes this in the propositions of single categories, and afterwards teaches that it should be understood the same way in universals. This is why he says “in singulars and futures, things are not alike”. That is, in singular propositions, which he first discusses, and in futures — i.e., contingents — the way of true and false propositions is not the same as in past and present ones. At times, in past and present propositions, the whole body of contradiction is divided into truth and falsity and there is a definite truth, so that someone certain and knowing can say from these whether an affirmation is true, or conversely at times, a negation; or if no one has said this, there is still a certain reason for the past or present according to its nature, a certain outcome is assured. However, in those things in which the future is contingent, that is, changeable and unstable, the whole body of contradiction indeed divides truth and falsity, but this truth and falsity is undetermined and changeable. For no one can say that an affirmation is true: for it is not necessary for an affirmation to be true, therefore because it is possible for a negation to occur, nor conversely a negation, because it is not impossible for an affirmation to occur, and finally because either of them can occur, therefore one of them cannot naturally be true definitely and certain. But how he follows this up with arguments, will be clear in this way:
For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, and everything must either be or not be. For if this one says something will happen, but that one does not say this same thing…
If whatever is proposed in affirmations and negations is definitely true or false, it follows that what those negations and affirmations signify must necessarily occur or not occur. This is what he means: “for if every affirmation or negation is true or false”: definitely. This is why he added “every”. For in those things that are future or contingent, he argues that affirmations and negations are not definitely true or false. For if one person says something will happen, another denies it, both cannot occur. For who would say, when one person says “Socrates will have dinner” and another “Socrates will not have dinner”, that both can be true in the same event? So this cannot happen. Therefore, one of them will tell the truth, the other will lie. Let one of them definitely be true or false: if, therefore, every affirmation and negation is definitely true or false and both the denier and the affirmer cannot be telling the truth in contradictions, one must be telling the truth, the other a lie and one definitely true, the other definitely false. If this is the case in all affirmations and negations, so that one is definitely false, the other definitely true, whatever is said to be true must necessarily happen, whatever is said not to happen must not happen. This is what he means: “it is clear that one of them must speak the truth”. For it cannot be that an affirmation and a negation agree in such matters, that is, in the opposition of contradictions. But it is necessary for whatever a definite true affirmation speaks of to happen, and for what a definite true negation professes not to happen, not to happen. He proves this thus:
For if it is true to say, that it is white or not white, it must be white or not white, and if it is white or not white, it is true to affirm or deny.
He draws an example from the present so that judgment can be made about the future. He says that this is the consequence of things, that the truth of the proposition follows the existing thing, the essence of the thing about which the proposition speaks accompanies the truth of the proposition. For if this stone or whatever else is white, it is true to say about it “it is white”, and this is convertible. For if it is true to say about it “it is white”, without doubt it is white and it must be white. Thus, it comes about that the thing follows the truth and the truth the thing about which it is proposed. Again, if this stone is not white, it is true to say about it “it is not white” and if it is true to say about it “it is not white”, it cannot happen to be white, since it is truly said “it is not white”. The same also holds true in lies. For if something does not exist, and someone proposed that it exists, he will be lying. And if someone lies about something, that thing about which the lie is made does not exist, as if someone says that something is white when it is not white, he has lied, therefore it is also necessary that that thing about which he lied does not exist. So therefore, the truth of a thing that exists and the thing that exists are convertible to the truth, and the falsity of a thing that does not exist and the thing that does not exist are convertible to falsity.
But if this is the case in all things and whatever is said with truth or falsity is convertible to the thing that exists or does not exist, whether it is a negation or an affirmation, and one must always be true, the other false, if one is definitely true: something impossible will happen from this position. For it will happen that everything that is or occurs happens out of necessity and nothing happens by chance or there is nothing possible that can exist and also be possible not to exist. Nothing will also be left to the governance of free will, but everything that happens will be from necessity. For if it is definitely true to say about any thing “it will be”, that thing must without doubt necessarily be in the future and it cannot happen not to occur. For it is true to say about it “it will be in the future” and it could not have been truly said about it “it will be in the future”, unless it was necessary for it to be. Therefore, if in every affirmation and negation either the affirmation or the negation is definitely true or false about the future, it is necessary for what is said either by the true definite affirmation or by the negation to occur. In falsity, the cause is similar. For it is false to say about something that will not be “it will be” and what it is false to say “it will be” will necessarily not be.
Also, it is false to say that something that will be, at some point will not be, and what is false to say will at some point not necessarily be. Therefore, as the true propositions necessarily follow events so that what is said is done, so too, the false propositions necessarily follow events so that what is not said by the false proposition is not done. Now if every future affirmation or denial always divide truth and falsehood, there will be a necessary outcome of the things predicted, and everything will necessarily either happen or not happen. Thus chance, possibility, and free will are lost. A syllogism of this sort is: if every true affirmation or denial is definite, and likewise a denial, then everything will happen by an inevitable reason of necessity. But if this is the case, free will is lost; but this is impossible: therefore, it is not true that every affirmation or denial is definitely true or false. Everything happening out of necessity, if these are definitely true or false, such a syllogism shows: every definite truth or falsehood in the future determines whether something will or will not happen out of necessity. But all future propositions are definitely true or false: therefore there is a necessity in all things to happen or not to happen. In support of this conclusion, Aristotle presented the point where he says:
“Therefore nothing is or becomes, nor from chance nor either way, nor will be nor will not be, but all things are from necessity.”
For both chance and the either way are extinguished, and free will is also taken away, if all things that will happen are from necessity. And he proves the above conclusion, which says that all things happen from necessity, by this that he says: Either the one who says it is telling the truth, or the one who denies it. Therefore, if the truth of things is converted to necessity, and either the one who denies it is telling the truth or the one who affirms it, it is necessary that all things happen from necessity. For if they will not be from necessity, they will not be definitely true, which he added himself:
“For similarly either it would happen or it would not happen; for either way, nothing more so is or will be this way or not this way.”
For he explains what the nature of the contingent is, when he has explained what the either way is. The either way is whose undetermined outcome is that it equally may be or may not be. This is indeed what he says “for similarly either it would happen or it would not happen”. For indeed it does not have a single, necessary path either to affirmation or to denial but nothing is more so this way or not this way. And the either way is that which maintains an equal course both to happening and to not happening. For nothing is more so this way or not this way, that is, it is equally possible to be and not to be. For nothing more so is in a condition to happen than not to happen.
“Furthermore, it is white to him now, it was true to say in the beginning that it will be white, therefore it was always true to say any of those things which have been made, that it will be.”
He himself presents a very strong force of argument, by which he may show affirmations and denials to be definitely true or false. And he says it needs to be provided that it may not be necessary to suspect that what has already been done could be truthfully said before it was done to be done, such as if Socrates ate dinner last night, it was true yesterday morning to say that he will dine: therefore it also definitely would have been true, if it was predicted. Therefore all those things which will be done could definitely have been predicted truthfully. This is indeed what he says: “If it is white now, it was true to say in the first place that it will be white.” For if anything is now white, it was true to say before that it will be white, therefore it also definitely was any of those things which have been done to predict truthfully. But the outcome of the matter itself confirmed this.
To this objection, he returns again through the same line of argument. For he who says this, though it allows him to escape the snare of the former argumentation, is again surrounded by the same difficulties and again pressed by the same troubles.
If it is always true to say that it is or will be, this cannot fail to be or not to be in the future.
In a remarkable way, he returns to the same difficulty of the former argumentation saying: if it is true that all things that have been done could be predicted definitively and truly, because the necessity of the event follows the truth of the proposition, what was truly and definitively predicted could not fail to occur. But if it could not fail to occur, it was impossible not to occur. What is impossible not to happen, must happen. Therefore, the event follows out of necessity.
So, nothing will happen either by chance or accident; for if it could happen by chance, it will not necessarily be in the future; but if it is not necessarily going to be, it is not impossible not to happen; if it is not impossible not to happen, it can fail to happen; if it can fail to happen, it cannot be definitely and truly predicted. For what is definitely and truly predicted must happen by necessity: but what happens by chance does not necessarily happen.
But neither is it possible to say that neither is true, such as that it will neither be nor not be.
The diversity of future contingencies consists in four differences. For either what is affirmed and denied in the future will both be true or both false, or one true, the other false definitely, or one true, the other false indefinitely. That the affirmation and negation cannot both be true in these propositions, which propose things about contingent matters in the future time, he demonstrated earlier, when he said:
It is clear that it is necessary to speak the truth about one of them, if every affirmation is either true or false. For both will not be true at the same time in such cases.
Indeed, it cannot happen that in the opposition of contradictory propositions, anyone can find both to be true. But now he shows that not even can both be false. He says: but neither is this the case for us, that neither is true – that is, neither the affirmation nor the denial. Both would indeed be false, the affirmation and the denial, if neither what the affirmation said would be, nor what the denial said would not be, was true. In this way, neither would be what the affirmation claimed to be, nor would not be what the denial claimed not to be. If anyone therefore says this, first, he says, it is inconvenient and impossible that in the opposition of contradictories, when the affirmation is false, the denial is not true and again, when the denial is false, the affirmation is also false. For this happened only in contraries, not also in contradictory dispositions. In this, one must always be true, the other always false.
Furthermore, if it is true to say that it is white and large, both must be the case.
He also added another point, which makes what he says seem more incongruous. For everything that is predicted for the future, if it is truly predicted, will be. If someone says at the present time: this animal is white or has a large body and pronounces this truly, the animal must be white and large. Similarly in the future, if someone truly says, this animal will become white and larger tomorrow, it is necessary that both occur tomorrow, that it becomes white and larger in body. But if something is falsely predicted, it is necessary that what is said does not exist, if the affirmation is false: if someone falsely affirms that there will be a naval battle, it is necessary that what is predicted by the false affirmation does not occur. But if the denial is false, it is necessary that what the false denial predicted not to happen does occur. But if both are false, it is not necessary for what is said to happen, because the affirmation is definitively false, nor is it necessary for what is said not to happen, because the denial is definitively false. Hence it happens that either of the things that exist are entirely removed. For both are necessary and occur from necessity and the necessity itself is impossible. For if someone says that there will be a naval battle tomorrow and another denies and pronounces it will not be, if both are false, it will indeed be necessary for there not to be a naval battle tomorrow, because the affirmation, which says it will happen, is false; again it is necessary that there is a naval battle tomorrow, because the denial which says it will not be tomorrow, is also lying. Therefore, it will be necessary for the naval battle both to be and not to be, which is impossible and beyond the common nature of thought. Therefore, it is not true that both at the same time, that is, the affirmation and the denial, are lying.
“Therefore,” he says, “the resulting absurdities are these, and others like them.”
If anyone asserts that in propositions that are universal and universally predicated, or in those that express singulars, one is necessarily true definitively, the other false definitively, then such inconveniences, he says, will follow, along with similar others. This is said specifically about the preceding arguments in which he showed that all things happen by necessity if someone were to claim one as definitively true, the other as definitively false. Now, as to what other absurdities and impossibilities he claims occur for those who propose one as definitively true, they are as follows: for if someone proposes one as true, the other as false, he eliminates (as said above) the possibility of either in things, and he posits that all things either exist or happen out of necessity, with nothing left to chance or free will. Consequently, it would not be useful to engage in deliberation or take action, as all these are managed by the reasoning of counsel: indeed, counsel itself would be superfluous since everything that will occur must necessarily happen. Why would anyone say: “If I do this, that will happen to me, and if I do that, this other thing will happen”? For nothing stops anyone from asserting that something must be done, while another person denies it, given that everything occurs due to the force of necessity. For if someone were to have accurately predicted everything that happens now, who would doubt that these events occurred due to the immutable force of necessity? This is what he means when he says:
Therefore, it was necessary to say that each of these was true.
But it might seem incongruous that we indicate the outcome of things not from their nature, but from the truth and falsity of propositions. He resolves this objection himself by saying:
But indeed, it makes no difference whether someone has stated a contradiction or not.
For in order to undermine and destroy counsel, to assert that humans need not counsel at all, it is insufficient to predict something. For whether something is predicted or not, whatever could have been accurately predicted, even if not predicted, must happen. It is indeed accurately predicted because it can be predicted accurately; it can be predicted accurately because it is unchangeably going to happen. Hence, it is going to happen if it is predicted accurately, and not only if it is predicted but also if it can be predicted accurately, whether it is predicted or not, whatever can be accurately predicted, this must happen by necessity.
It is clear, he says, that things are such that whether one person affirms them and another denies them, or not: if it is going to happen, the denial does nothing to prevent it; if it is not going to happen, the affirmation does not help. For, he says, it will not happen or not happen because it is denied or affirmed, nor will the force of nature change with time. For things that are believed to happen after a thousand years will happen in the same way as those that are going to happen after any amount of time by necessity. Hence, if at all times all things are such that one can be said to be definitely true, and the other definitely false, everything that has happened or will happen must occur due to the unchangeable order of things.
This is what he means when he says: It was necessary for this to happen, and for each of the things that happen to be such that it occurred by necessity. And he confirms this with the earlier argument by saying:
When someone accurately predicts that something will happen, it cannot not happen, for the necessity of the event follows the truth, and it was always true to say of what has happened that it will happen, for the truth of propositions comes from the necessary outcomes of things.
If these things are not possible, for we see that there is a principle of future events and from it we counsel and do something.
This is a long hyperbaton, which we first explain, then continue. It is clear that we are the principle of certain things, such as our actions. If anyone does something by counsel, whatever he accomplishes by counsel, he himself is the principle of that thing. For whatever counsel provides, it begins from the counselor. There are certain things that are not actual but potential, and this potentiality does not come about by necessity, that is, it may be possible, but not necessary: like it is possible to cut this or any tunic with a knife, but it is not necessary. Perhaps by using it, it will wear out and loosen due to daily friction. Therefore, it can indeed be cut, but perhaps it will not be cut and before it can be cut, it will wear out. Again, it is possible that it will not be cut, for it would not be possible to wear it out unless it were first possible not to cut it. Therefore, certain things can happen, but if they happen by chance, they might not happen. Therefore, some things are possible but not necessary. And the same reasoning applies to other things that happen. For everything that happens by any counsel, the counselor himself is the principle of that thing, not necessity. And whatever things are possible will occur changeably. For things that are spoken of according to some possibility do not happen according to necessity. Hence, it is clear that not all things either are or happen by necessity, but there are some things that equally either happen or do not happen. And this is what it means for either to occur.
However, certain things happen in many cases but do not occur in fewer cases. They happen and do not happen equally, like seeing a friend as they leave the house. This can both happen and not happen with equal frequency. Yet, some things happen more frequently than they do not, such as a person in their sixties turning gray; it happens more often than it does not, but it’s not impossible for it not to happen. This is what he means when he says:
“However, one thing happens more frequently and in more cases, such as graying among those in their sixties compared to not graying but it also happens the other way around”, namely, that they do not turn gray, “but the latter is less common”, namely that they do gray.
The sentence structure here is a hyperbaton (a figure of speech in which words are transposed from the usual order): if we consider these possibilities, we are the principle in some of these cases and any possibilities can either happen or not happen; if it is possible for things to both exist and not exist, it is evident that “not everything happens out of necessity”, but some things happen with equal probability, while others happen more frequently in most cases, and less frequently in fewer cases, but it is not necessary for them not to happen.
“Therefore, what exists must exist when it exists, and what does not exist must not exist when it does not exist.”
Now he describes what he means by temporal necessity. He says: every thing, when it exists, undoubtedly has to exist. For it cannot happen that when it exists, it does not exist. And again, a thing that does not exist when it does not exist has to not exist. For it cannot happen that when it does not exist, it does exist. But if, when it exists, it must exist, this is not because it exists simply and without describing the present time out of necessity. For instance, when I am sitting, it cannot happen that I am not sitting and it is necessary for me to sit when I am sitting but sitting is not a necessity for me, for I can stand up. Again, when I am not sitting, then it is necessary for me not to be sitting but not sitting is not a necessity for me, for I can sit down. Therefore, what exists, when it exists, is necessary, and what does not exist, when it does not exist, cannot exist. However, not all things that exist or do not exist are necessarily so, regardless of the description of the present time, or do not necessarily not exist without any mention of the present time. Hence, he says, it is not the same thing to exist with temporal necessity, like when I am sitting, and to exist simply out of necessity, like mortality for humans. Nor is it the same thing to not exist with necessity when it does not exist, like when I am not sitting it is not necessary for me to sit, and what I do not have simply out of necessity, like having three eyes or immortality. And this is what he says:
“Similarly, this applies to what does not exist.”
He explains why he said this next:
“In contradiction, the reasoning is the same. Every being must either exist or not exist, and it is necessary for the future to either be or not be.”
He says, the reasoning is similar in the case of contingent contradictions and in those things that are, when they exist, temporally necessary. However, those that are temporally necessary are not simply necessary. For in future and contingent contradictions, although it is necessary for the contradiction as a whole to have one true part and one false part, such as if someone affirms that there will be a naval battle tomorrow (this is therefore not necessary), and again if someone denies that it will not happen, it is indeed necessary for it to either be or not be, but it is not necessary for it to be, nor is it necessary for it not to be, but only for it to either be or not be. Therefore, the whole contradiction will have one true part and one false part, but one of them will not be definitely true, and the other one definitely false. In past instances, for example, we say:
“Romulus founded Rome
Romulus did not found Rome”
One of these is true, the other false, but in these instances, the affirmation is definitely true, the denial definitely false. Since once something has happened, it cannot happen that it has not happened, thus the contradiction about the past is definitely true or false.
However, the situation is not the same in future propositions, namely, those that signify contingencies. For instance, if I say:
“Philoxenus will have dinner
Philoxenus will not have dinner”
In the whole contradiction, one is true, the other false, but no one can distinguish and say that the affirmation is definitely true or the negation. For before he dines, it is indefinite and variable whether he will dine, but after he has dined, the past is determined. Therefore, something must either be or not be in future contradictions, but it is not necessary for one to happen and not the other. So where is the similarity between the contingent contradiction and the temporal one, and not with simple necessity? It lies in this, that just as it is necessary for what exists, when it exists, to exist, but not necessary simply and without the addition of time, so in the contingent contradiction, it is necessary for the affirmation or the denial to be true, but not necessary for the affirmation to be simply and definitely true or the denial, but either could be, and the event will determine which is truly the case.
“Why once speeches are true just as things are, it is clear that whatever things stand thus, that either might be and the opposites of them are possible, it is necessary that their contradiction stands in the same manner.”
He says, things have some kind of relationship with those that signify them through their proper signification. Thus, the speech, which signifies and designates the thing, will be the same as the thing itself is. Therefore, if the thing does not exist, the speech is false; if the thing exists, the speech is true; and if the speech is either true or false, what is said either will be or will not be, so that things and speech are interchangeable. Therefore, if a thing is not definitely established or necessarily emerging, neither is the speech that signifies the very thing of a defined truth. So, in matters where it is possible for something not only to exist but also not to exist, the affirmation and denial can go either way, and just as it is possible for the thing itself both to be and not to be, so too will the contradiction both true and false arise indefinitely. But in which cases this happens, he himself explains. For he says:
“In those things which are not always, and are not always not.”
For they alone can both exist and not exist, those which are not always and are not always not. For if they were always, their condition could not change, and hence they would necessarily exist; but if they were always non-existent, they would have to not exist. For just as the nature of things happening is variable, so too does the other part of the contradiction have variable truth. And it is indeed always either true or false, but not definitively one, such that this is definitely true, or that, but either, as the condition of things itself is mutable, so too is the truth or falsity of propositions doubtful, and it happens that one is more frequently true in some cases, but not always, and that one is less often true, but it does not have to be false. He demonstrated this by saying: “And indeed one is more often true, but not now true or false.”
Therefore, he concludes the entire question about future and contingent propositions, and says: it is clear that it is not necessary for all affirmations and negations to be definitively true (but DEFINITE is missing, hence it must be understood). For of those which are contingent and future, one is never definitively true, the other false. “For indeed,” he says, “just as in those things that are, so it is also in those things that are not, but are possible to be or not to be, as has been said.” For those things that are of the present time, just as their existence is defined, so too is the truth and falsity of their propositions defined. But those things that indeed do not exist, can nevertheless be and not be and are thus future, that they do not emerge from necessity but can be such that they can also not be, in these the contradiction will stand in this way as has been said. But it has been said that “It is necessary for everything to either be or not be, and for it to be future or not necessary”, but not now divisively and definitively is it necessary for one of them to exist.
However, there were four distinctions: either both were true, which he eliminated by saying “Indeed, both will not be at the same time in such cases”; or both were false, which he overturned by saying: “But indeed, because neither is true, it is possible to say”; or one was definitely true, one was definitely false, which he destroyed by that argument, by which he taught that all things happen out of necessity, if this were admitted. But if those things are not at all, it is clear that one is indeed true, the other however in contradiction is false; but as the things themselves are mutable and indefinite future, so too will statements with a variable and not defined truth and falsity be pronounced.
Book Two
On Interpretation, Book 10
However, an affirmation about something signifies something, and this is either a noun or an in-noun.
After discussing the truth and falsehood of the past and present, as well as future time, he now outlines the power of a simple and predicative proposition, saying that a simple affirmation signifies one thing about one thing - that is, it predicates one thing about one subject. This subject is either a noun or what was, among the ancients, unnamed, but what Aristotle called an infinite noun. For it was said before that “man” is a noun, while “non-man” was unnamed among the ancients but is now an infinite noun. Therefore, since it is clear that a simple proposition predicates one thing about one, every simple proposition will either be from a noun and verb or from an infinite noun and verb. What he said:
“I do not say that ‘non-man’ is indeed a noun but an infinite noun”
is like this: A noun, he says, signifies all things defined, but “non-man”, although it can designate any one of those things which are not human, what it designates is infinite and uncertain. For since there are many things which are not human and it can signify any one of those things, what it signifies is unknown: just as “not running” is not a verb simply, but an infinite verb, so nouns with negation are not nouns but infinite nouns. Therefore, in propositions, the subjects will be either nouns or infinite nouns.
“Apart from a verb, there is no affirmation or negation.”
He has made it very clear which part of speech in a simple proposition holds the principle. For if a simple proposition cannot be made apart from a verb, it is clear that all the power of a simple proposition is contained in verbs. Now every proposition will have something either to be, to have been, or to be in the future, or something like this. For he who says “runs” is saying “is running”, and he who says “ran” is proposing “was running”, and he who will run is “will be running”. Therefore, if every proposition retains either to be, to have been, or to be in the future, or something like this, to be an enunciation, it is clear that there cannot be anything apart from a verb. For these words are verbs, that is, “was”, “is”, or “will be”, so that we can understand the points previously put and acknowledged, when we said that verbs are those which signify time. Indeed, “is”, “was”, and the rest carry with them the signification of time.
“Therefore, the primary affirmation and negation is ‘man’, ‘is not man’, then ‘is non-man’, ‘is not non-man’; again ‘is every man’, ‘is not every man’, ‘is every non-man’, ‘is not every non-man’. And the same principle applies in times external to the present.”
He has provided examples of simple propositions. As we have said above, simple propositions are those that are joined by two terms. Therefore, since every defined thing is prior to the infinite, and “non-man” is not a noun but an infinite noun, while “man” is finite, he rightly first pronounced those propositions that are from a defined noun in their examples. For he says: "Therefore, the primary affirmation and negation is ‘is man’, ‘is not man’. Then he added the affirmations and negations of the infinite noun, saying ‘is non-man’, ‘is not non-man’. And then by joining universality, he again repeats these propositions. And he first proposes those that are from a finite noun, and in the second place those that are proposed by an infinite noun. Hence it is necessary to understand that those quantities which determine universal and particular are not held in terms. For since only a two-term proposition is simple, he counts among simple propositions the one that says:
Is every man
even though there are three parts of speech. Therefore, determinations are not counted in terms.
In the same way, he says that simple propositions are made in times external to the present with the same reason, such as:
Was man
Was not man
Was non-man
Was not non-man
And the same method applies in other times as well. He calls times external to the present those that are apart from the present, that is, past and future. But he has spoken of only those propositions which have one subject and one predicate.
Now he will discuss those which have one subject and two predicates. Whether these are also simple will be said in the explanation of the second edition. But for now, let us understand that they are simple beyond demonstration.
When, however, a third adjacent is predicated, the oppositions are said in two ways.
He mentions how one subject and two predicates can exist in a proposition. For if it is in this way, as we say:
A man is just
‘is’ and ‘just’ are predicated, but ‘man’ is the subject. Now, let’s not look at what was said first or last, but since ‘being just’ is more universal than ‘being a man’ (for one can be just who is not a man, like God, and also, something can simply exist that is not a man), for this reason ‘is’ and ‘just’, although at first said in what exists:
A man is just
yet, because they are more universal, ‘man’ is not predicated of them but these are predicated of ‘man’ and ‘man’ is the subject to them. Therefore, he says that from these, a dual opposition can be made and four propositions, of which he subsequently added examples, saying:
“But I say that it will either be adjacent to the just or the non-just.”
For if someone were to say in this way, making two affirmations:
A man is just
A man is not just
These two affirmations will have two negations. For if the verb ‘is’ in this proposition which says:
A man is just
we have placed next to ‘just’, and in this next proposition which says:
A man is not just
we have again joined the same verb ‘is’ to ‘not just’: since the opposition of negation is made when the negation ‘non’ is joined to the verb ‘is’, it is clear that what is said not to be must be added again to ‘just’ and to ‘not just’, in order that such negations may be made:
A man is not just
A man is not non-just
Therefore, he rightly said: “Therefore, if it will be adjacent to the just and the non-just, also the negation will be adjacent to the just and the non-just.” There are, however, four propositions which he says are these:
A man is just
In this, we have joined the verb ‘is’ to ‘just’; its negation:
A man is not just
In this too we have again joined the negation which says ‘is not’ to ‘just’. Again:
A man is non-just
In this ‘is’ is joined to ‘non-just’; its negation is:
A man is not non-just
Also in this too the negation which says ‘is not’ is placed next to ‘non-just’. Now, when he says: “But I say that, as ‘a man is just’, a third, I say, will be adjacent either a noun or a verb in affirmation,” it is like this: “a third,” he says, "I say will be adjacent the verb ‘is’". For ‘man’ and ‘just’ are two things to which the verb ‘is’ is added. Now, he also said “noun or verb” because he has already taught above that the very words themselves are nouns: specifically in that place where he says “The very words in themselves, when spoken, are nouns.”
What follows contains a most difficult meaning, which he himself treated with customary brevity. For he added in the midst of the whole sentence:
“Therefore, there will be four of these, of which two will have themselves in affirmation and negation according to consequence as privations, two, however, not at all.”
The multiple interpretations of this sentence have been handed down by Alexander and Porphyry, Aspasius, and Herminus as well. We will discuss what Porphyry, the most excellent of expositors, said on another occasion. However, since Alexander’s explanation seems simpler, we have added it now for the sake of brevity.
Privative propositions are any that predicate privation. Privation, however, is, as if someone says unjust, for it deprives of justice. Therefore, the affirmative privative is that which says:
A man is unjust
The negative privative again is:
A man is not unjust
But neither is that in full signification an affirmation (for it takes away something), but a privative affirmation, since it indeed holds the form of an affirmation but predicates privation and separates something from that to which it couples the privation, as in the proposition:
An unjust man exists
it separates justice from man, nor again is this a pure negation. For avoiding privation, as in that which is:
A man is not unjust
it retains habit, that is, justice, but since what the affirmation predicated, this the negation takes away, although such a negation seems to have the meaning of restoring habit, nevertheless, because it subtracts the very privation, it is called a privative negation.
Therefore, now he says: “Since there are,” he says, "four propositions, of which two are from finite nouns, as:
A man is just
A man is not just
two from infinite nouns, as:
A man is non-just
A man is not non-just
“two,” he says, "of these, one is an affirmation having an infinite noun, as:
A man is non-just
and one is a negation having again an infinite noun, as:
A man is not non-just
so they have themselves in affirmation and negation, that is, they retain the same form of affirmation and negation and are similar to affirming or denying something to those which are privative. For just as the privative which says:
A man is unjust
is not only an affirmation but a privative affirmation, so also that which says:
A man is non-just
is not only an affirmation but an affirmation with an infinite noun and with some kind of privation. For the same value for understanding is what is said ‘unjust’, as if it were said ‘non-just’.
And again, just as:
A man is not unjust
is not only a negation but a privative negation, because although it gives habit it nevertheless denies privation, so also and that which is from an infinite noun:
A man is not non-just
is not only a negation but a negation made from an infinite noun denying the infinite. Because therefore it denies the infinite and deprives the subject by denying the infinite, it is similar to the privative. For if it is the same thing to be unjust and to be non-just, it will be the same thing not to be unjust and not to be non-just.
Therefore, these two which have an infinite noun, as much as regards the species and form of affirmation and negation, have themselves similarly to those which are privative affirmations and negations. But those two which predicate a simple and definite noun are cut off from all similarity with privations. For nothing is similar to that which says:
A man is just
to that which says:
A man is unjust
although both are affirmations, but the former is simple, the latter privative.
But truly that which says:
A man is not just
to that which says:
A man is not unjust
is joined by no reason of similarity, although both are negations, but the former is simple, the latter privative. Therefore, the two, which are from an infinite noun, have themselves similarly as privations do. For similar is the affirmation which says:
A man is non-just
to that which says:
A man is unjust
and again that which says:
A man is not non-just
to that which says:
A man is not unjust
But privations do not join with simple propositions and those. Which are made from finite nouns. For neither has anyone said that that which says:
A man is just
is comparable to that which says:
A man is unjust
nor truly that that which says:
A man is not just
can be compared with anything with that which says:
A man is not unjust
Therefore, it was correctly said of these four propositions, two have themselves in affirmation and in negation as privations are, but two are simple and beyond any similarity of privations.
What he means by “in consequence” should be understood as if he said “in likeness”. Indeed, things that are similar to each other do not diverge from themselves and consequently follow each other. Let us describe two simple propositions first, then two privative ones, and finally those composed of infinite names, so that affirmations may be constituted under affirmations and negations under negations.
Affirmation: Negation: “He is a just man” / “He is not a just man” “He is an unjust man” / “He is not an unjust man” “He is not a just man” / “He is not not a just man”
But, he says, these are so arranged and bear the same likeness to themselves, as has been said in the Analytics (that is, in the Resolutions). He wrote two resolutionary books on syllogism, in the first of which he discussed the consequence of propositions from a finite name and an infinite one. There is indeed a likeness of the simple affirmative from a finite name and the negative of it which has an infinite name. For that which says:
“He is a just man”
the affirmation is similar to the one which says:
“He is not not a just man”
the negation. Also, the simple negation of a finite name matches the affirmation of an infinite name. For that which says:
“He is not a just man”
is similar to the one which says:
“He is not a just man”
But how these are similar to each other and how they maintain their proper order in consequence, we have put off explaining for now, but let them be briefly described, so that some property of theirs may be shown. Let there be an affirmation of a finite name and beneath it a negation of an infinite name. Likewise, let there be a negation of a finite name and beneath it an affirmation of an infinite name.
Aff. Fin. “He is a just man” Neg. Fin. “He is not a just man” Neg. Inf. “He is not not a just man” Aff. Inf. “He is not a just man”
In this description then, a negation from an infinite name is placed under the affirmation of a finite name, and again the affirmation of an infinite name is placed under the negation of a finite one. All of these corners, because they are undefined, can simultaneously be true in all things, except only in those things which either naturally exist or cannot naturally exist. For example, if someone says:
“Man is an animal”
it can never be true together with the one which says:
“Man is not an animal”
which is a corner, therefore, because ‘animal’ is naturally seen to be inherent in the substance of ‘man’. Again, if someone says:
“Man is a stone” “Man is not a stone”
these too cannot simultaneously be true, because it is naturally impossible for a stone to be inherent in a man. But if there are things of this sort which do not naturally exist but can exist, as in the examples we proposed above, the corners are always true. For it can be true that both what says:
“He is a just man”
and what says:
“He is not a just man”
Again, it can be true that which says:
“He is not a just man”
if this is said about Sulla, and that which says:
“He is not not a just man”
if this is predicated about Cato. Therefore, in those things which are undefined, if the things that are predicated do not naturally exist and it is possible for them to exist, it always happens that the corners are simultaneously true. But if we put these sort of propositions together with a definition, it must be said:
“Every man is just”
its negation:
“Not every man is just”
again:
“Every man is not just”
its negation:
“Not every man is not just”
These are arranged in such a way that the negation is under the affirmation and the affirmation is under the negation.
Aff. “Every man is just” Neg. “Not every man is just” Neg. “Not every man is not just” Aff. “Every man is not just”
In these he shows some dissimilarity. For in undefined terms, if those things which are predicated do not naturally exist but could possibly exist in subjects, it was always without doubt possible for the corners to be simultaneously true. For both affirmations agreed with affirmations and negations with negations. But in these things which are spoken with a definition of quantity, the mode is not the same. For affirmations in no way connect with affirmations. For if it is true that which says:
“Every man is just”
it can never be true that which says:
“Every man is not just”
which is a corner. And this disparity will be found in every example. However, particular negations, which are corners to themselves, can simultaneously be true. For it can be true in those things which do not naturally exist but are possible to exist, as a particular negation agrees with a particular negation and to that corner, as that which is “not every man is just” agrees with the corner “not every man is not just”. But this is dissimilar in undefined terms.
For in those, both that which says:
“He is a just man”
agreed with the one which says:
“He is not a just man”
namely, the corner, and again that which says:
“He is not not a just man”
agreed with that which is “he is not a just man” positioned in the corner.
In these, however, that is, in those defined according to quantity, the two universal affirmations, which are “every man is just” and “every man is not just,” can never both be true at the same time. On the other hand, corner negations, which are particular, that is:
Every man is not just
and:
Every man is not unjust
in those things that both can and cannot be, they can be true at the same time. Therefore, in those that are indefinite, the corners do not agree with themselves as they do in those that are defined. This he proves when he says:
But it does not similarly happen that the corners are true.
For in those, both corners agree with themselves, but in these, the affirmative corners can never be true at the same time, but other corners, which are particular negations, sometimes can. This is what his own words declare, saying:
But it does not similarly happen that the corners are true. But sometimes it does.
Indeed, it does not similarly happen that they are true, because the universal corner affirmations are never true, which happened in those that are indefinite. However, he said “sometimes it happens,” when we make a comparison of the corners, which are particular negations, if the things that are being predicated are not natural to the subjects but still possible to be in them.
Therefore these two are opposed, but others add something to the non-man as a subject, such as the just non-man, the non-man is not just; the non-man is unjust, the non-man is not unjust. There will not be more oppositions than these. But these will be themselves apart from those others, using non-man as a name.
He again shows us that there are other propositions, of which some indeed do not have an infinite predicate but an infinite subject, some both. For if someone says:
A just non-man exists
sometimes a non-man is the subject and is an infinite name, it is called a proposition from an infinite subject. The same is true in the negation which is:
A just non-man does not exist
But indeed there are other propositions which seem to be from an infinite predicate and an infinite subject, as when we say:
An unjust non-man exists
An unjust non-man does not exist
In these, indeed, “unjust” is the predicate, “non-man” the subject; but both are infinite. Hence it happens that in these propositions, in which the third verb is the predicate, no more propositions can be found than those which have been said. For either they will be from both finite, namely the predicate and the subject, such as:
A just man exists
A just man does not exist
or they will only have an infinite predicate, such as:
An unjust man exists
An unjust man does not exist
or indeed the predicate will be finite, but the subject infinite, such as:
A just non-man exists
A just non-man does not exist
or both the predicate and subject are pronounced infinite, such as:
An unjust non-man exists
An unjust non-man does not exist
However, propositions, in which the third verb is the predicate, cannot be found beyond these. But these which have an infinite subject or both infinite are apart from those above, which either have an infinite predicate or both finite, and therefore they are said to be beyond them and maintain no consequence to them. And it is thus posited in the proposition which says:
A just non-man exists
The infinite name which is non-man, as if some finite name were put. And this is what he says AS USING THE NAME NON-MAN. For the infinite name is posited, as if a finite name were posited; for it holds the place of a name. Although even if it is not so posited, it is still a name: for an infinite name, although simply not a name, is yet a name when charged with the infinite.
But in those in which there is not, it does not agree, as in that which is to run or walk.
There are, he says, some propositions, which can be predicated with “is”, but others that we cannot predicate with the verb “is”, as in that which we say:
Man walks
Man runs
But in these it does not matter whether someone says it as it is said, that is “Man runs” and “Man walks”, or predicates them with the verb “is”. For it is the same to say man runs and man walks, as if it is said man is running, man is walking. Therefore it does not matter in such propositions whether they are put forward with the verb “is” or the act of the verb added apart from “is”. The same is also true in the universals. For when we say:
Every man runs
Every man does not run
and again:
Every non-man runs
Every non-man does not run
it is the same as if we say:
Every man is running
and:
Every man is not running
and again:
Every non-man is running
Every non-man is not running
But he also teaches that it makes a great difference, whether a negation is joined to the posited term, or indeed to the determination. For if it is said to the term of the subject, an infinite name is made, as is every non-man runs. But if to the determination, a negation is made, as is not every man runs. Hence it happens that, if the negation is not put to the universal determination but to the thing and term, it is an infinite name, as is non-man. But if not to the universal thing but to the universal determination, it is a negation. For when we say not every, every indeed is not universal but it signifies that, the thing about which it is said is said universally. As when we say every man, man indeed is universal itself, every however is not indeed universal but signifies that, the universal thing that is man is universally said.
Therefore, whenever a negation is placed in a demonstration that presents any universal thing as universally stated, it does not establish an infinite term but a negation. And this is what Aristotle says:
“It is not to be said ‘not every man’ but a negation should be added to ‘man’. For ‘not every’ signifies not a universal, but something stated universally.”
Indeed, ‘not’ is not a universal term, or even a term at all, but when added to a universal predicate, it causes that predicate to be universally stated. He proves that these are not universal terms but only universally signifying determinations in this way: when we say:
Man runs
Man does not run
Non-man runs
Non-man does not run
The subjects are universal in these propositions, but they are not universally predicated. These propositions differ from ones in which we say:
Every man runs
No man runs
because these latter propositions universally predicate the universal, while the former do not universally predicate the universal. Therefore, it is clear that ‘every’ and ‘no’ are not universals, but they cause that which is universally predicated to be stated universally.
Therefore, all the same things should be posited. For when we say:
Every man runs
if we want to create an infinite term, we do not say:
Not every man runs
but we add the negation, that is, ‘not’, to the term, keeping everything the same in the proposition, if we wish to make an affirmation from an infinite term. However, if we fit a negation to the determination of a universal thing, it results not in an affirmation of an infinite term but in a denial of a finite term proposition.
“Contrary to ‘every animal is just’ is ‘no animal is just’, which signifies that no animal is just.”
This was also said above, that contrary things cannot both be true at the same time or in the same subject. They can indeed be true alternately and at different times, but they cannot both be true at the same time. For example, if someone says that all men are just in the golden age, but no man is just in the iron age, both can be true but not at the same time. This is what Aristotle means when he says ‘not both true at the same time’, and following that ‘nor in the same subject’, specifically, as when we say:
Every living thing is just
if we refer it to heavenly powers, it is true;
No living thing is just
if we refer it to horses; both are true but not in the same subject, the former holds true in the divine, the latter in horses. However, opposites, that is, particulars, can be simultaneously true, when the higher universals are both false. What these are, Aristotle shows most clearly with an example saying “not every animal is just”, which is a particular negation, and “some animal is just”, which is a particular affirmation.
“Contrary to ‘no man is just’ is ‘every man is not just’.”
Aristotle demonstrated earlier that a universal affirmation and a universal negation, as they are contraries, cannot both be true at the same time. Now, however, he shows that a universal affirmation of an infinite term agrees with a universal negation of a finite term and a particular affirmation, which is opposite to a universal negation of a finite term, agrees with that which is opposite to a universal affirmation of an infinite term, namely a particular negation retaining an infinite predicate. And these are first described this way:
Neg. No man is just Aff. Some man is just
Aff. Every man is not just Neg. Not every man is not just
Therefore, the universal negation which says ‘no man is just’ is opposite and contradictory to the particular affirmation ‘some man is just’. Again, there is a universal affirmation with an infinite predicate that says:
Every man is not just
this contradicts a particular negation with an infinite predicate that says:
Not every man is not just
Therefore, these annihilate each other. But the universal affirmation of an infinite term, that is:
Every man is not just
follows the negation that says:
No man is just
For if it is true that no man is just, it is true that every man is not just. But those opposite to these agree with each other. For if it is true to say that some man is just, it is true to say not every man is not just. For if not every man is not just, then it is necessary that some man is just.
“However, it is clear that sometimes even in singulars, if it is true to deny when asked, it is sometimes also true to affirm.”
When someone, he says, asks about singular things and the one who is asked denies, then the one who asks correctly, by joining negation with a singular, will create an affirmation from an infinite term. For example, if someone asks:
Do you think Socrates is wise?
Another answers:
No
the correct conclusion is:
So, Socrates is not wise
Therefore, from the negation of the respondent, an affirmation is made from the infinite term ‘not wise’:
Socrates is not wise
And this indeed happens in singulars. However, if this is done in universals which are universally predicated, a negation is likely to occur rather than an affirmation. For example, if someone asks:
Do you think every man is wise?
And the respondent says:
No
it is not necessary to conclude:
Therefore, every man is not wise
For this is false and does not necessarily follow from the respondent’s answer, but rather this follows:
Not every man is wise
For when someone asks:
Do you think every man is wise?
If the respondent denies saying:
No
you should conclude:
Therefore, not every man is wise
For this necessarily follows from his response. But this conclusion is contrary to the question, that is, it is opposite. For you asked a universal affirmation saying:
Do you think every man is wise?
He replied:
No
you conclude a particular negation:
Not every man is wise
And this divides between truth and falsity. For if against the question through which you asked a universal affirmation, he denies, and you conclude the proposition which says:
Therefore, every man is not wise
you will not create a contrary but rather a contradictory. For the proposition:
Every man is not wise
agrees with the proposition:
No man is wise
Therefore, it makes no difference whether someone responds with an affirmation from an infinite term, or with a universal negation from a finite term, which does not divide truth from falsity with the universal affirmation you asked. But only those conclusions should be made in which one is true, the other false. Therefore, it should not be done in this way in universals, that asked with a universal affirmation, if another responds with a negation, a universal affirmation should be concluded from an infinite term, but rather a particular negation should be concluded from a finite term.
However, those terms or verbs that are infinitely opposed, such as in ‘not human’ or ‘not just’, may seem to be negations without a noun or verb but they are not.
While discussing propositions that consist of infinite terms, he only took into account the infinite terms themselves and elaborated on what they seem to be. He says, sentences that are opposite each other according to opposing names or verbs, as in when we say ‘human, not human’; ‘runs, does not run’, whenever the finite is compared with the infinite, they appear to be some kind of negation but this is not so. Every negation is either true or false: however, the one who says:
He does not run
and:
He does not work
and:
Not a human
neither states anything true nor false and perhaps indicates something less true or false than one who posits a finite term. For the one who establishes a finite term has not yet stated anything true or false but since they have posited something finite, this statement is closer to truth, which posits something finite, than a statement which posits something infinite, just as those that signify something are closer to making a statement than those which signify nothing.
Therefore, in those things that are infinite, less truth or falsity is discerned than in all those things that are finite and much more so, ‘not human’ or ‘does not run’ signifies nothing true or false yet, unless something is added that can make a statement. But what he said, “they will appear to be negations without a name or verb”, he added this because infinite names or verbs are neither simply names nor verbs and ‘not human’ and ‘does not run’ seem to be negations. If this is the case, they appear to be negations without a name or a verb. He also added:
“Nothing more about man was true or false, but even less.”
For the one who says ‘human’ establishes a thing, the one who says ‘not human’ indeed removes the thing but adds nothing. Therefore, he who said something infinite about a man stated far less about a man than he who said something finite.
“However, ‘every not-man is just’ signifies none of these same things nor opposite to this which is ‘not every not-man is just’.”
Those propositions in which infinite terms are subjects signify something far different, he says, and not the same as those propositions that are spoken according to finite or infinite predicates. For the one who says:
Every not-man is just
signifies nothing the same as the one who says:
Every man is just
or:
No man is just
or again:
Every man is not just
or:
No man is not just
For none of them is similar to the one who says:
Every not-man is just
Nor to this particular negation opposite to it that says:
Not every not-man is just
signifies the same as any of those described above or to any of those that are opposite to the ones described above. However, those which are constituted from two infinite terms are similar to those which are universal negations having an infinite subject: as the one who says:
Every not-just is not-man
signifies the same and agrees with the one who says:
No just is not-man
And the former indeed retains both infinite terms, but the latter has a finite predicate and an infinite subject. And the former is an affirmation from two infinities, but the latter is a universal negation from a finite predicate and an infinite subject.
“However, transposed names or verbs signify the same.”
Whenever, he says, names are interchanged and verbs, the same significations of propositions persist, but whenever a negation is interchanged, they are not the same. For if someone says:
It is not-man that is white
and:
It is not a white man
does not signify the same when the negation is indeed interchanged and transposed, but whenever it is said:
It is a white man
and again:
It is a man that is white
they signify the same when the words and names are transposed and they will be the same affirmations. For if someone denies this, it happens that there are two negations of one affirmation. But this has been shown above not to be possible but there always to be one negation of one affirmation.
For of that affirmation which says:
It is a white man
that is a negation which says:
It is not a white man
but of that which proposes:
It is a man that is white
if it is not the same as that affirmation which says:
It is a white man
and it is different from it, let it be a negation either of that which says:
It is not not-man that is white
or that which says:
It is not a white man
But that which proposes it is not not-man that is white has its affirmation to which it should be referred, namely that which says it is not-man that is white. But that which says:
It is not a white man
is a negation of that which proposes:
It is a man that is white
But if the affirmations of them are different, the negations will also be different. Therefore, if anyone says the affirmation which proposes:
It is a white man
is different from that affirmation which says:
It is a man that is white
he must also concede that the negations of them are different. However, the negation of that which says:
It is a white man
is that which proposes:
It is not a white man
Again of that which says:
It is a man that is white
the negation is:
It is not a white man
Therefore these two negations:
It is not a white man
and:
It is not a man that is white
are different from each other. Again when we say:
It is a white man
and it is denied:
It is not a man that is white
if they are said about the same man, one must be true, the other false: as if about Socrates it is said:
It is a white man
It is not a man that is white
Since this is so, it is necessary for that which says:
It is a white man
the negation to be that which says:
It is not a man that is white
But indeed the earlier posited negation which says:
It is not a white man
is of that affirmation which says:
It is a white man
but now we show also that which says:
It is not a man that is white
to be the negation of that affirmation which says:
It is a white man
For both indeed divide truth and falsity among themselves. Nor can it happen that, if about one and the same man it is said:
It is a white man
and:
It is not a man that is white
both are true. But if as they are now posited they sometimes agree in truth, this happens because they are indefinite, not because transpositions are made with words and names. Therefore it happens that there is a double negation of one affirmation. But what we have said in the lower description will be clearer.
[Figure]
On Interpretation, Book 11
“But to affirm or deny one thing of many or many things of one, if they are not one of many, is not a single affirmation or denial.”
The Peripatetics have given much thought to distinguishing between propositions that are singular and those that are multiple. And for this reason, he now says this: “And if one thing is predicated of many in either affirmative or negative propositions, or again if many things are predicated of one, and if one name is given to these many things and one thing is predicated of one name signifying many, if there is not one thing resulting from all these things, it is not a single affirmation nor a single denial.”
For example, if someone says:
“A rational biped animal is a human,”
they have subordinated one human to many predicates. But these things, when spoken individually, are multiple; however, they inform one certain substance. For when ‘rational animal’ and ‘biped’ come together, they form one substance ‘rational biped animal,’ which is a human. And although these things, when spoken individually, are multiple (for if someone says ‘animal,’ and then ‘rational,’ and then ‘biped’ after some time, they signify multiple things separately), they nevertheless make one nature when joined into one. And this is what he means when he says:
“Perhaps a human is both an animal and a biped and tame, but these become one.”
It is as if he is saying: a human indeed signifies many things but only if the things that are signified are spoken separately. For it also signifies animal, biped, and tame. For we say a human is an animal, and tame, and biped. But these, when joined into one body, create a tame biped animal, which is a human. Therefore, although many things have been predicated of one, yet, because one thing results from all of them, from this comes a single affirmation and denial. But if there are two such things subordinate to which one thing is predicated, in such a way that one thing cannot become of them, there is not a single affirmation nor a single denial.
For example, if someone, speaking of some white walking man, says:
“A white and walking man is.”
‘White’ and ‘walking’ do not agree into one nature, nor does one thing result from both, in such a way that these two joined together form some substance. Therefore, whether they are affirmed or denied, whether they are subject or predicate, there is not a single affirmation or denial but there is one voice, however there are as many affirmations and denials in it as there are terms placed from which one thing does not result. And whether one term is predicated of many, or many are predicated of one, the mode is the same.
As if someone says:
“A human is a rational biped animal.”
Since one thing results from these, it is a single proposition; but if indeed someone says:
“A human is white and walking.”
Since nothing one results from these, it is not a single proposition. Further, also if one name is given to many things, from which when joined together no one nature is, and one any other thing is predicated of that one name, there is not a single affirmation nor a single denial. For both the sea dog and this barking one are called dogs by one word.
So if someone therefore says:
“A dog is an animal.”
Since nothing will result from the things signified by ‘dog’ when joined into one (since no single substance results from joining the barking dog and the sea dog), that proposition is multiple and signifies many things and is not one. Therefore, how to respond to propositions of this kind is taught, saying:
“If, therefore, dialectical questioning is a request for a response, either of the proposition or of the contradiction of another part.”
The sense of this is as follows: whoever asks, if he does not deviate from the art of dialectic, asks in order to be answered, and the response is either a full proposition or a particle of contradiction. If someone asks:
Is the soul immortal?
Then the respondent will either answer “It is” or “It is not”. This is one particle of the whole contradiction. The contradiction is indeed “the soul is immortal, the soul is not immortal”. Therefore, ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are particles of contradiction. But if someone asks:
Is the soul immortal or not?
Then the respondent will answer by expressing the entire proposition, either saying “It seems to me to be immortal” or “It seems to me not to be immortal”. Therefore, whoever asks, asks for a response such that the request for a response is either a request for a proposition or for one part of a contradiction. A proposition of a contradiction is such that every affirmation will have a negation and in two propositions, there will be a contradiction. Therefore, whoever states a proposition signifying multiple things, does not make a proposition to which there is one negation. Hence, to this kind of question, which signifies multiple things, even if it is true, there should not be a single response. If someone asks:
Is a dog a substance?
Even though it is true to say:
It is a substance
since both the barking dog and the sea dog are substances, there is not a single response to be made to this, but it must be specified which dog is being asked about. If he says about the sea dog or the barking dog, then, through the determiner and definition of the question, a proposition signifying one thing has been made, and a single response should be given. He recalls that this has been discussed in the Topics.
It is similarly clear that the question “What is dialectic?” is not a question.
He follows this up by discussing the proper method of a dialectic question. For he says: if someone asks:
What is an animal?
This is not a dialectic question. For a dialectic question must provide the respondent with an option, whether he wishes to affirm or deny what is said. As if someone asked:
Do you think good is contrary to evil?
Then the respondent is given the choice whether to affirm or deny. For he says either “It is” or “It is not”. But he who asks:
What is an animal?
has left him no place for either affirmation or denial. For what is he to say to someone asking:
What is an animal?
If he is to say “No”, that will be an inappropriate response. In the same way, if he says “It is an animal”, that still does not address the issue. Therefore, only that question is dialectic, in which the respondent is given the option from the question to choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes and to declare it either affirmatively or negatively. For the questioner must determine, for example, whether a human is an animal or not, so that from this question the respondent can choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes.
Because these are said to be composite, as if every category of those things that are said externally is one
After explaining about the unity of a proposition and defining what a dialectic proposition is, he now moves on to those things in which multiple true statements are often made about one thing singly, which when said together are sometimes true and sometimes false. For if someone says:
Marius is bad
it may be true. Again:
Marius is a leader
and this is true. When these are combined into one, they are in no way true, like if someone says:
Marius is a bad leader
for he is the best of all.
Again:
A human is an animal
is true, and:
A human is bipedal
is true, and these combined are true again. For if someone says:
A human is a bipedal animal
that is true. Therefore, he begins to give a rule for what the mode is or when those things that are said externally singly, combined are true or false.
And the sense of this is such, and the order of the words is such: because, he says, there are some things that are predicted about someone when combined, such that their predication is one and it corresponds to one form of those things that could be truly predicted externally (like in what is a bipedal animal: a bipedal animal is said about a human when combined and composed and it becomes a certain type of predication, when animal and bipedal can be predicted separately: we say for example:
A human is an animal
and again:
A human is bipedal
But there are others which are not in that way, which it is true to predict singly, but combined it is false: what the difference between these is or when this or that occurs needs to be said. And he teaches this with examples. FOR IT IS TRUE TO SAY ABOUT A HUMAN, he says, BOTH ANIMAL AND BIPEDAL AND AS ONE, so that a bipedal animal can be said about him.
Again, we can say about any human, such as Socrates:
He is a white human
again:
He is a human
and combining these into one we say:
He is a white human
But it sometimes happens that some human is unskilled in playing the cithara, but is a good person. And if it is said about him that he is a citharoedus, it is true, and because he is good, this too is true. But not because he is both a citharoedus and good, is he therefore a good citharoedus. Perhaps he is the most unskilled, but a good person.
Indeed, if someone asserts that since one or the other is said to be true, and both are also said to be true, this will lead to many inconsistencies.
If there is someone who says that all things, which are individually spoken as true, can also be spoken as true when joined together, many incongruities and impossibilities occur. This is what he means when he says:
Indeed, if someone asserts that since one or the other is said to be true, and both are also said to be true.
Indeed, if someone says that since one or the other is said truly separately, both can always be said truly together, there are many impossibilities that result from this combination. These impossibilities are as follows. For instance, we can say about a man that he is a man and then we can also say that he is white: therefore we say together about the man that he is a white man. [Then about a white man we can say that he is a man, we can say that he is white: therefore both are said together the man is a white white man. For if it is true to say about a man that he is a man and about a white that it is white, then it can all be said truly that is the man is a white white man.] And if it is true to say about this white man again that he is white and it is true to predicate white about him, and again all predication is true: therefore the man will be a white white white man. And again to predicate white about this is true: therefore he will be a white white white white man. And this proceeds to infinity.
And again if it is true to say about a man that he is a musician and again that he is white and that he is walking, and these are said together in one, the man is a white walking musician. Then he who is a white walking musician, is white and walking and a musician. Therefore these are again said together the man is a white white musician musician walking walking. And these complexities always create redundant speech. And the same thing also happens in individual cases. For if Socrates is Socrates and a man, he will be Socrates Socrates man, and if Socrates is Socrates and a man and bipedal, he will be Socrates Socrates man bipedal; and again if this same being is bipedal and a man, he will be Socrates Socrates man man bipedal bipedal. Everyone knows how inappropriate all this is.
Therefore, it should not be said that all things, which are individually predicated, can always be predicated together. Therefore, he explains what can be truly said when joined and what is false among those things, which were truly said individually and separately.
So far, it has only been demonstrated that if someone says that combinations are made absolutely and in every way, many incongruities necessarily arise: but how combinations are made needs to be discussed and treated.
Therefore, any of the things which are predicated and about which they are predicated, whatever are said according to accident either about the same or one about the other, these will not be one.
In the case of those things that are predicated and of those about which they are predicated, he says, there is a twofold reason. Either two accidents are said about one subject, as in:
Marius is bad
Marius is a leader
or one accident is predicated about one subject, and another accident is predicated about that predicated accident, as if someone says:
Cicero is bald
The bald man is an orator
For here, bald is predicated about the subject Cicero, orator is predicated about the bald man. This is what he means when he says:
Whatever are said according to accident either about the same or one about the other.
About the same, as if two accidents are predicated about one; one about the other, as if one accident is said about another accident, as the accident about which it is said is predicated again about another subject. If such predication is made, accidents cannot be united into one. Indeed, if someone says like this: the man is white, the man is a musician, these do not make one when joined together, as in a white musician. Or if a musician is predicated about a white man, as white is said about a man and it is predicated that this is a white musician, it is not the same as a white musician. Nor do they join into one substance, whatever can thus be truly predicated individually. Therefore, it seems that these can be predicated about each other, because they are predicated about one and the same subject, not that one thing is made from them. For both are accidents. Therefore, there will not be a white musician but sometimes a man who is white is the same as a musician, because both happen to one accidentally a white musician is predicated. Nor again if he is a citharist and good, can he therefore now be said to be a good citharist. For neither good nor citharist are such that one can be made from them but sometimes both happen to the same, therefore they are predicated about each other according to accident.
But perhaps more we can say: the man is an animal, the man is bipedal, so we say these joined together as bipedal animal. And with these joined together the predication is made according to substance not according to accident.
Moreover, whatever are in another. Therefore, neither white frequently nor man man animal or bipedal; for bipedal and animal are in man.
Whatever are individually predicated according to accident, he has shown that these cannot be predicated together. But now he also teaches that those which are predicated substantially are not always predicated together. And this reason applies both to accidents and substantial things. For whenever something is in a predicate and we want to predicate that thing externally and join two predicates together again into one, then there is an inappropriate predication. And this is sometimes perceived in the very utterance of the names, sometimes however in the power and understanding and in the containment of the term. For if there is a white man and about him it is said for example:
Callias is a white man
and again about him it is said:
Callias is white
if someone wants to join this, it will be most inconveniently predicated – for he says:
Callias is a white white man
– therefore because white was contained in the white man, which was previously predicated about Callias.
And this is what he says: Therefore, neither white frequently. But there are other things which do not have this in the utterance but in the nature. For if someone says like this:
Socrates is Socrates
and again:
Socrates is a man
and he joins these together and says:
Socrates is Socrates man
he has not made a correct predication. For man was in Socrates and again man was predicated about Socrates. So such is he who wants to predicate these joined, that is Socrates man, about Socrates, as if he says Socrates man man. For the nature of man is in Socrates. Or again if someone wants to predicate man about some man and again animal and says man man [is and] animal. For man is the same as animal. Therefore, he who composes these two joined, differs nothing as if he says man animal animal. For man is an animal.
In the same way, if someone predicates ‘man’ about a certain man and subsequently ‘biped’, and wishes to combine these statements, they will make an incongruous predication. For one who says ‘man is a bipedal man’ says nothing different than if they were to say ‘a bipedal man is a biped’. Indeed, man is bipedal in himself. Therefore, neither those things which in the very utterance exist in another, when they are predicated externally, are correctly combined, nor those which do not exist in the utterance but only in the nature and substance. However, if they are not accidents or one is not in the other and each are predicated individually, they are correctly combined. For if someone says of a man that he is an animal, they speak truthfully, and again if they say that he is bipedal, they also speak truthfully. If they combine these, they will make ‘man is a bipedal animal’; this is correctly predicated. For neither are they accidents nor is one inherent in the other. But only those things exist substantially in some things which are taken up in their definition. For instance, ‘animal’ is taken up in the definition of man and also ‘biped’ is taken up in the definition of man: therefore, ‘biped’ is also in man. Therefore, only those things which are neither accidents nor is one in the other, whether in the utterance or in nature, when predicated individually are correctly combined. And this will be made evident if we take the definition of one of these. For instance, if we ask whether ‘man’ and ‘biped’ can be predicated simultaneously of a man, ‘man’ must be defined and, if ‘biped’ appears in the definition of ‘man’, it must be said that ‘biped’ is in ‘man’ and both cannot be predicated of ‘man’ when combined.
But to speak truthfully about someone and simply, as to call a certain man a man or a certain white man white.
He asked earlier whether all things that were individually predicated truthfully would also be spoken of truthfully when combined, but now he considers and weighs whether everything, whatsoever things are spoken truthfully at the same time, are also predicated truthfully and simply. For we say that Socrates is a certain man and again we simply say that Socrates is a man. Again, for example, we say that Callias is a white man and about him we predicate ‘white’ simply. For we say, Callias is white.
He therefore asks whether this appears to be the case in all predicaments, that whatsoever it is true to predicate combined, it is also true to say simply. But this will not be the case in all situations. For if there be such a predication, in which something opposite is added to the very predication, apart from that opposite, the predication cannot be simply predicated. For if someone says about Socrates, now dead, that this body lying here is a dead man, they speak truthfully, but they cannot simply say this body lying here is a man, because what is added to the predicate, that is to ‘man’, is that which is opposite to ‘man’, that is ‘dead’. For it is said, this body lying here is a dead man. But ‘dead’ and ‘man’ are somewhat opposites. For if we take their definitions, we can easily understand this. For man is animate, but the dead are without life. And therefore there is a certain opposition according to privation and habit of man and the dead, and both are truthfully predicated at the same time, one of these, which is ‘man’, simply and apart from the dead, cannot be predicated of a corpse. And this is what he says:
But when in the added term some opposites exist which results in a contradiction.
Both of these, that is, the predicate and what is added to the predicate, from their very opposition a contradiction follows (for since ‘man’ and ‘dead’ are opposites, a certain contradiction follows and results from opposition: for we say: whoever is a man lives, whoever is dead does not live; and to live and not to live is a certain contradiction): therefore in such predications it is not true to predicate one simply. However, when such an opposition is not joined to what is predicated, it can be truthfully predicated simply. But not always, and that statement is more truthful which says that, when this opposition exists, it is never true to call something simply true of those things which are truly predicated combined, but when this opposition does not exist, not always something of those things which are spoken of truly combined, is truly predicated simply.
For if someone thus says:
Homer is a poet
They have spoken truthfully; but if they say:
Homer is
(Simply apart from being a poet), it is false. But yet ‘to be’ and ‘poet’ are not opposites. Therefore, not always, when an opposition is not in the predicates, is it true to predicate something simply, but when an opposition exists, it is always false to say simply and apart from the other one of the predicaments which are spoken of combined. For when we say about Homer that he is something, that is, that Homer is a poet, it is true. Is it then also to be said that he is per se, or rather, is ‘to be’ not predicated simply but according to accident about Homer? For not because he is but because he is a poet and because to him and to the poet ‘to be’ happens, therefore we also predicate Homer to be something, that is, a poet, we do not predicate ‘to be’ per se. He concludes therefore in this way: in whatever combined predications neither a contrariety nor any opposition exists, if their definitions are taken for words (for in some spoken names no opposition appears: but if it is defined, soon that opposition reveals itself, as in that which is ‘man’ and ‘dead’ the names themselves are not opposites but defined they are found to be opposites): in such compositions therefore or whenever something is not predicated according to accident, as ‘to be’ about Homer according to being a poet, namely that which happens to Homer, but per se and according to the subject itself, it is evident that whatever can be spoken of truly when combined, the same is spoken of truly and is simply predicated.
For example, if someone says of a certain man that this man is white, he may have spoken the truth, and if again, this man is white, this too is true to say, because he does not predicate white of him for the reason that he said him to be a man, as it is predicated of Homer because he is said to be a poet, but because he is white by itself. But this is not predicated accidentally but essentially. Therefore, it was correctly said that in these unimpeded predications where no opposition is inherent nor the predication itself is accidental, they also can be simply predicated.
“But what is not, is sometimes thinkable, not true to say it is something. For its opinion is not always but sometimes not.”
Some, wishing to demonstrate that what is not is in some way, used such a syllogism: what is thinkable, exists; but what is not, is thinkable; they concluded therefore what is not is thus proving that what should be known rather than what should be thought, while what is not is only subject to opinion, not being contained by any knowledge. Aristotle discusses this in this way: for he says: not for that reason is it thinkable because it is, but for that reason is it thinkable because it is not; but this what is not, is indeed something but is not something essentially but thinkable. And just as Homer is indeed something that is, a poet, but not by itself, so what is not, is indeed something that is thinkable or ignorable, but it is not by itself something in nature.
On Interpretation, Book 12
Having these decided, it is to be discerned how negations and affirmations are related to each other.
There are some propositions that are asserted without qualifications, others in which some manner is mixed in the statement. For if someone says:
“Socrates argues”
he has made a simple proposition; but if someone says:
“Socrates argues well”
he has added a manner to the proposition that he was asserting; for he added in what manner he argues, when he said well.
Now therefore, he contemplates how affirmations and negations of those propositions, which are asserted with some manner, are related: as if someone says it is possible for this to happen and again it is not possible for this to happen, how the nature of affirmation and negation holds in these. In the same way, also in that which is impossible to be and in that which is necessary to be and in that which is said to happen by chance to be and not to happen by chance to be: which of these are affirmations and which are negations or which affirmation someone can correctly oppose to which negation: it is necessary, he says, to discern all these, since those things that had to be said about combined predications and simple ones have been concluded. For there is a lot of argument about the oppositions of those propositions that are asserted with a manner. Which are the doubts or how the oppositions in these are to be found, he pursues by continuous argument.
“For if those which comprehend them are mutually opposed, they are contradictions, whatever are arranged according to being and not being.”
Every proposition is formed by the combination of words and names. Therefore, of the propositions, which comprehend and whose nature is in combination, only those, he says, are contradictions, whatever are posited according to being and not being: as in that proposition which says:
“There is a man”
there is not that negation of this affirmation which proposes:
“There is not a man”
but rather that which declares
“There is no man”
so that there may be an affirmation and negation:
“There is a man
There is no man”
But that which says:
“There is not a man”
is not a negation of that which declares:
“There is a man”
Again when we say there is a white man, that is not the negation of this affirmation which says:
“There is not a white man”
but rather that which says:
“There is no white man”
This is proved thus: for it is necessary in contradictions for one always to be true, the other false. Therefore, if of his affirmation which says:
“There is a white man”
the negation were:
“There is not a white man”
it would be clear that one is true, one is false. But now if someone says of wood “There is a white man”, he has spoken falsely; if however someone denies of the same wood saying “There is not a white man”, this also is false. For this proposition which says:
“There is not a white man”
understands that there indeed is a man but not a white one, which it is false to predicate of wood. Therefore both that which says:
“There is a white man”
and that which proposes:
“There is not a white man”
both are sometimes false, as in the case of wood. Therefore they are not opposed to each other. Therefore neither is that which says:
“There is not a white man”
the negation of that which says:
“There is a white man”
Therefore, that must be posited as the negation of this which says:
“There is no white man”
For in these one always is true, the other always false. But if this is so, the nature of contradiction is always made according to being and not being. For when I say:
“There is a man”
according to what is, the negation “there is no man” occurs. And when again I say:
“There is a white man”
according to what is, again the negation occurs:
“There is no white man”
The whole sense indeed is of this kind, but the speeches in the discourse appear somewhat obscure because of their resemblance, but it will be clearer to those who pronounce and listen in this way: “For if those things that they comprehend”, that is, of propositions whose nature is in combination, “those that are opposed to each other are contradictions, whatever is arranged according to being and not being,” like those which we have discussed above and of which he himself proposes examples:
“As of that which is to be a man, the negation is not to be a man,”
for this is the negation of the affirmation itself according to being and not being, “not,” and here it should be understood that the negation is through which it is said, “to be not a man,” so that the sense is: the negation of the affirmation which is to be a man is not to be a man, not that which says to be not a man. And this indeed is about simple [propositions].
Again, concerning those in which a third [element] is predicated, “of that which is to be a white man, not,” it should be understood here that it is the negation which says, “to be not a white man but,” here also it should be understood that which says, “not to be a white man,” so that here the sense is: the negation of the affirmation which is to be a white man is not that which says to be not a white man but rather that which proposes not to be a white man. And he proves this by induction. “For if,” he says, “concerning all, either the statement,” that is, affirmation "or the negation is true, since it is false to say that a piece of wood is a white man, it must be true to say of it that it is not a white man, if this negation is of the previous affirmation. But both are false. Therefore, this is not the negation of that affirmation. Therefore, contradictions always oppose themselves according to being and not being.
“Whatever this way, and however being is not added, it will do the same as is said for being.”
There are certain propositions in which being is not added, but what is stated in them is equivalent as if being were placed, as in that which is:
A man walks
which I say walks such is as if I say:
A walking man is
Therefore, also in these which do not have the verb “is” joined, if I join the negation to that verb which is posited for being, such a negation returns to me, such as would be if negation were posited to being. As in that which is:
A man walks
walks is posited for being. Therefore, of this affirmation:
A man walks
the negation is not that which says:
A non-walking man
but rather that which says:
A man does not walk
For in this, to that which is “walks,” the negation is joined, which for a man who walks is joined for that which is being. Such it is to say:
A man walks
as if someone says:
A walking man is
“Therefore, in this way in all, and of that which is possible to be, the negation is possible not to be but not, not possible to be.”
If in all, he says, contradiction is made according to being, in these also which are said to be possible, contradiction is to be made according to being and not being. For in that which we say can be, that will be the negation which says can not be, not that which is not possible to be. For if to that which is possible to be, that which is not possible to be is opposed, opposition is not made according to being and not being. Therefore, since he taught above that contradiction is made according to being and not being, it must be said that of that which is possible to be, that opposition is which says it is possible not to be.
But another thing comes up, which may lead us away from this opinion. Indeed, in all things either the affirmation is true or the negation is. But in these cases, both are true. For what is possible to be, is also possible not to be. For instance, because it is possible for a man to walk, it is possible for him not to walk, and what is possible to be seen, is possible not to be seen. Again, what is possible to be divided and not divided, is possible. Hence, both are true in the same way, it is possible to be and it is possible not to be. For when we say it is possible not to be, it is to be understood as if we were saying it is possible for it not to rain today, although it is possible that it might. Why this is so, he himself demonstrates saying:
However, the reason is that everything which is so possible is not always in actuality.
This is of the following kind: whatever things are possible in such a way that they are in actuality and action, they can in no way not be, like the heavens are always in actuality moving. Indeed, they always move and we say it is possible for the heavens to move, therefore at some time the movement of the heavens is in actuality, that is, it is happening, for it is indeed moving. Therefore, in this kind of possibility, such a proposition cannot apply, as to say that it is possible for the heavens not to move; for this is impossible. Therefore, in those things which are in actuality, these two propositions ‘it is possible to be’ and ‘it is possible not to be’ do not agree at all. However, in those things which are not always in actuality and are possible to be, the propositions can agree, that is, ‘it can be’ and ‘it can not be’. For it is not always in actuality raining and it is possible for it to be at some point, hence it is possible for it not to be at some point. Therefore, this is the reason why both are found to be true, that in these possibilities, which are not always in actuality, something can both be and not be. Hence, if the negation of ‘what is possible to be’ is that which says ‘it is possible not to be’, then in the same thing, both affirmation and negation will be true, and to which thing the affirmation applies, that it is possible to be, to the same thing the negation will also apply, that it is possible not to be. Hence, what is capable of walking, that is, what can walk, can also not walk, and what is visible, that is, what can be seen, can also not be seen. But it is impossible for opposite and contradictory expressions about the same thing to be simultaneously true. For in all things, either the affirmation is true or the negation.
Therefore, if negations are made according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ in things that are said in some way and both affirmation and negation are true, which cannot happen, then it is better to say, do not make negations according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ but rather according to mode. But if that is more impossible, that affirmation and negation are simultaneously true, it is more preferable that there should not be contradiction according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ but rather according to mode. But what he said:
If therefore this is more impossible, this is more preferable.
It was not said in this way because both are impossible and that affirmation and negation are true, and that contradiction should not be made according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’. For this one thing, that is, that contradiction can be true at the same time, is impossible. But it is not impossible that affirmation should not be made according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ and negation, he referred to this as ‘more impossible’, as if he were saying ‘less possible’. For it is less possible that opposite propositions in the same thing are true, than that negations are not placed according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’. Therefore, what is more possible should be chosen, that negations are made according to mode rather than according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’. This he explains more clearly saying:
Therefore, the negation of what is possible to be, is not possible to be.
For these cannot be found to be simultaneously true. For if something is possible to be, that the same thing is not possible to be cannot happen. Nor should this be contemplated only in possible things, but in all things, the same reason applies. For in that which is possible to happen, there is not that negation which says ‘it is possible not to happen’, for this agrees with what is possible to happen, but that which proposes ‘it does not happen’. For these two to be found true at the same time is impossible.
And similarly in other things, such as necessary and impossible. For just as in these, ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ propositions are made, but the subjects, this one is white, that one is a man.
“And in all other cases,” he says, “the same must be done. For according to the mode, the negation should be placed, so that if it is contingent, it is joined to contingency, if possible to possibility, if impossible to impossibility, if necessary to necessity. Just as,” he says, "in those things that are beyond some mode and propose that something indeed exists and does not exist - these are certain juxtapositions, that is, predications, but the subjects themselves - like in that which is:
Man exists
and:
Man does not exist
man, which is the subject, exists, but a certain juxtaposition and predication is ‘exists’ and ‘does not exist’; or in that which is said:
It is white
and:
It is not white
‘White’ indeed is the subject, but ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are juxtaposed and predicated - so also in those things which are said according to some mode, the subject indeed exists like a certain thing, but the mode is predicated of existence. For when we say:
Today, it is possible for it to rain
We have made ‘to exist’ the subject, ‘possible’ the predicate. And just as the whole force in propositions is held by the predication in simple and beyond-mode instances whenever we predicate that something exists, like when we say:
Man exists
The verb ‘exists’ contains the whole force of the proposition: so also in those things which are said according to mode, because the mode contains the whole proposition either possible or contingent or impossible or necessary, these are predicated, but other things are said to be the subjects. For this is what he says:
In the same way, here, ‘to be’ indeed becomes the subject, but ‘to be able’ and ‘to happen’ are determining juxtapositions, just like ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ in those.
For just as in simple cases, if negations are made to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’, one is always true, the other always false, so also in those things which are said according to mode, if the enunciation of negation is adapted to the mode itself like to certain juxtapositions and predications, truth in juxtapositions and falseness are divided in a determined way. And this is what he says:
Likewise, these also in ‘possible to be’ and ‘not possible to be’.
‘Likewise’, according to ‘possible’ and ‘not possible’, opposition determines truth and falsity, as in simple and beyond-mode propositions according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ negation. Hence, in all modal affirmations, he sorts out opposing negations. For he says:
However, the negation of ‘it is possible not to be’ is ‘it is not possible not to be’.
To show that what says ‘it is possible not to be’ is not only not the negation of ‘it is possible to be’, but not a negation at all, he finds another negation for this. For of ‘it is possible not to be’, which he placed in the place of affirmation, a negation is found, which says ‘it is not possible not to be’, adding a negation, of course, according to mode. Therefore, it comes about," he says, “that what says ‘it is possible to be’ and what proposes ‘it is possible not to be’ follow each other. For the same thing is possible to be that is possible not to be. But the reason why they can follow each other is this, because they are not opposites. For if they were opposites, they would rather destroy each other than follow each other, and disagree more than agree, as is in ‘it is possible to be’ and ‘it is not possible to be’. For these are so separated from each other, that they cannot exist at the same time. But this happens because they are opposites. Therefore, always according to mode the negation should be placed, if the complete nature of opposition is to be made. Which he fully carries out by fitting negations to each mode of proposition and naturally making complete oppositions.”
“But indeed,” he says, "that which is possible not to be and that which says it is not possible not to be, cannot exist at the same time. For it is clear that they are opposites, since the negation of these is posed in the manner of what is possible to be. However, it should not be said that the negation of that which is necessary to be, is that through which it is said it is necessary not to be (for another negation of this can be found, because there is a certain affirmation; however, its negation is that which says it is not necessary not to be), but rather, to that which says it is necessary to be, should be opposed that which says it is not necessary to be. For to that which says it is necessary not to be, is opposed (as said) that which says it is not necessary not to be. Also, it should not be said that the negation of that which is impossible to be is that through which we say it is impossible not to be, but rather, that which proposes it is not impossible to be. For there is a certain affirmation that is impossible not to be. Indeed, its negation is found, which is that it is not impossible not to be.
"And universally indeed, as has been said, it is necessary to set ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ as subjects.
He gives a universal rule, saying: this is to be done universally in all things, what we have already said above, that ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ should be set as the subject, while we should make affirmations and negations themselves as the modes. For this is what he means when he says that these make the negation and affirmation. Arranging the modes themselves, that is possible and contingent and the rest, as affirmations, and those joined with a negative adverb as negations, we should append either to what we say is, or to what we say is not. As, in the same way that ‘is a man’ is a verb for one thing, ‘is not’ is a certain predicate in those propositions that are beyond the mode, as in that through which we say ‘man is,’ so in these propositions which are with mode, we should place ‘is’ or ‘not is’ as the subjects, but make the modes themselves either an affirmation, if they are said simply, or a negation, if they are placed with a negation, towards the subject, which we have arranged according to ‘to be’ and ‘not to be,’ let us predicate, so that we may consider these to be opposing expressions and negations, which have been made according to the modes. However, all their negations and affirmations should be arranged in contrast.
AFFIRMATION ACCORDING TO BEING — NEGATION ACCORDING TO MODES
It is possible to be — It is not possible to be
It is contingent to be — It is not contingent to be
It is impossible to be — It is not impossible to be
It is necessary to be — It is not necessary to be
AFFIRMATION ACCORDING TO NOT-BEING — NEGATION ACCORDING TO MODES
It is possible not to be — It is not possible not to be
It is contingent not to be — It is not contingent not to be
It is impossible not to be — It is not impossible not to be
It is necessary not to be — It is not necessary not to be
However, what he added, “verum non verum” (true not true), applies to the demonstration of all modes. For if someone says:
It is true
its negation is not:
It is not true
but rather:
It is untrue
otherwise, what it is:
It is not true
On Interpretation, Book 13
And indeed, consequences are made in order by those who propose them.
Having explained everything that was debated about the opposition of modes, it turns to consequences. For he says, which propositions are followed by which propositions of the aforementioned modes and which they agree with. However, we made four orders and arranged the consequences of propositions in one series. But first noting this, what is said by Aristotle is more easily understood by the reader.
[FIGURE]
But he arranges the consequences previously described. However, we must briefly give a reason why these propositions follow one another. What can exist, sometimes happens to exist, and this is it happens to exist; but what happens to exist, is not impossible to exist, and what is not impossible to exist, is not thereby necessarily existent. For it is not impossible for it to rain today, but it is not necessary because of this. Therefore, what is not impossible, is not necessarily existent. And here is one order of consequences.
Again, the second order of propositions has such a consequence: what can not exist, can happen not to exist, therefore sometimes it happens not to exist, and what can not exist, happens not to exist; but what happens not to exist, can happen not to exist but what can happen not to exist, it is not impossible for it not to exist: therefore what happens not to exist, it is not impossible for it not to exist; but what is not impossible not to exist, does not thereby mean that it must not exist. For it is not impossible for it not to rain today, for it can be, but it does not necessarily mean that it is not raining today. Therefore, what is not impossible not to exist, is not necessary not to exist. And this second order is held in this way.
Now let’s move on to the third. What cannot be, cannot happen, but what cannot happen, that sometimes it is, does not happen: therefore what cannot be, the same thing does not happen to be; but what does not happen to be, must not be; what never happens, can never be, what can never be, must not be: therefore what does not happen to be, the same thing must not be; but what must not be, this cannot happen, what cannot happen, is impossible to happen: therefore what must not be, is impossible to be.
The fourth order is also in this way: what cannot not be, cannot happen not to be; what cannot happen not to be, does not happen not to be, as since it is not possible for motion not to exist in the sky, it does not happen for the sky not to move; therefore what cannot not be, the same does not happen not to be; but what does not happen not to be, must be, as with the sky, for the sky must move, for it does not happen for the sky not to move; but what must be, that it cannot happen not to be: therefore what must be, it is impossible not to be. And this is indeed the orderly consequence of propositions by Aristotle, which he argued a little more broadly.
Therefore, impossible and not impossible, that which is contingent and possible and not contingent and not possible, indeed follows contradictorily but conversely.
He discusses some of the rationale for the previous consequences. For in the previous descriptions of what follows each other, the possible affirmation was followed by the impossible negation, again the possible negation was followed by the impossible affirmation, and in the same way about the contingent. For the affirmation of the possible saying it is possible to be was followed by the negation of the impossible saying it is not impossible to be. Again when the possible was denied by what was said to be not possible, this affirmation of the impossible followed it, namely that which says it is impossible to be. And the same thing about the contingent. For the affirmation of the impossible, which is it is impossible to be, followed the negation of the contingent, which is it does not happen to be. However, the negation of the impossible, that which says it is not impossible to be, followed the affirmation of the contingent, that which says it happens to be.
Therefore, these propositions follow each other, but conversely. For an affirmation of the impossible and contingent follows the negation of the possible, and the negation of the impossible follows the affirmation of the possible and contingent, as the description below illustrates.
Affirmation — Negation
Impossible to be — Not impossible to be
Negation of affirmation: Not possible to be — Possible to be
Negation — Affirmation: Does not happen to be — Happens to be
For this reason, he says, “Contradictions indeed follow, but conversely” - all contradictions are placed contrarily. For contradiction is: impossible to be and not impossible to be, and contingent to be and not contingent to be, and possible to be and not possible to be. But they follow each other conversely, since an affirmation does not follow an affirmation and a negation does not follow a negation, but rather an affirmation follows negations, and a negation indeed follows affirmations, as is clearer for those returning to the written description above. So the meaning here is, and the order and sequence of the speeches thus holds: “Therefore,” he says, “the contradiction which is impossible and not impossible, that which is contingent and possible,” - which are two affirmations and they follow each other, “and not contingent and not possible,” - which are two negations, “contradictions indeed follow,” - so that contradictions are led to the contrary, “but conversely,” - so that an affirmation follows a negation, a negation follows an affirmation. An explanation for this is given: “For that which is possible to be,” namely that which is an affirmation, follows “the negation of the impossible.” The negation of the impossible is, however, not impossible to be: so that which is possible to be follows not impossible to be. But the negation of the possible follows the affirmation of the impossible. “For that which is not possible to be,” follows the affirmation which is impossible to be. Indeed the affirmation is impossible to be, not impossible to be is the negation. And in contingents the same way. And so far, this has been said about the consequence of the possible and impossible. Now he deals with the consequence of the necessary and possible.
“But how the necessary follows, must be considered. It is clear that they do not follow in the same way, but rather the contrary follow, but the contradictions are outside.”
What he says of this kind is: in those propositions which were impossible and not impossible, it was fitting for the not possible to agree with that which is impossible, and the possible agreed with that which is not impossible, namely the contradiction of the impossible followed the contradiction of the possible in the opposite order. But in those, which affirm the necessary either affirmatively or negatively, and which follow the possible proposition, the contradiction of that which agrees with the possible does not follow the contradiction of the possible, but rather the contrary. Now I am saying the necessary propositions are those which, although they do not signify necessity, nevertheless affirm the necessary either affirmatively or negatively. So the meaning here is: if any of those which affirm the necessary agrees with the possible proposition, the contradiction of that which affirms the necessary does not follow the contradiction of the possible, but rather the contrary of the contradiction of that which affirms the necessary agrees with the contradiction of the possible proposition. However, first we must arrange what are the contradictions and what are the contraries. For of that which says it is necessary to be, the contradiction is it is not necessary to be, but the contrary is it is necessary not to be; and again of that which is it is necessary not to be, the contradiction is it is not necessary not to be, the contrary is it is necessary to be. Therefore, they should be described and both the contrary and contradictory arranged around one and the same, so that what must be said by us, may be clearer.
Negation of the contradiction — Affirmation — Contrary affirmation
It is not necessary to be — It is necessary to be — It is necessary not to be
It is not necessary not to be — It is necessary not to be — It is necessary to be
Having thus briefly and conveniently described these, it must be shown what way may arise in their consequence to possible propositions. For that which is possible to be follows that which is not necessary to be; for what is possible to be, is not necessary to be. For what is possible to be, is possible also not to be; but what is possible not to be, is not necessary to be.
Therefore, it rightly follows that what is possible to be is not necessary to be. But the negation of that which says it is possible to be, that is, it is not possible to be, does not follow the affirmation of that which says it is not necessary to be, which is namely it is necessary to be; for this is the contradiction of the necessary affirmation; for it cannot be said to agree, the propositions which say it is not possible to be and it is necessary to be, but rather the contrary of this follows. For that which is not possible to be is accompanied by that which says it is necessary not to be. But it is necessary not to be is not the contradiction of that which is it is not necessary to be; for both can be found true in the same at the same time. For since it is necessary not to be a cold fire, it is not necessary for a fire to be cold.
Therefore, these are not contradictions but it is contrary to that which says it is necessary to be, that which says it is necessary not to be; that which is necessary to be is the contradiction of that which is put forward as it is not necessary to be. Therefore, the contradiction of that which says it is possible to be, namely that which proposes it is not possible to be, does not follow the contradiction of that which is it is not necessary to be, but rather that which is it is necessary not to be, which namely is contrary to that which is it is necessary to be, which this very thing is the contradiction of that which proposes it is not necessary to be. But this will be better clarified by the description.
Affirmation — Contradiction — Negation
Possible to be — — Not possible to be
Negation — Affirmation — Affirmation
Contradiction. Contrary
It is not necessary to be — It is necessary to be — It is necessary not to be
Therefore, since there is a contradiction between it is possible to be and it is not possible to be, and it follows that it is possible to be it is not necessary to be, however, the contradiction of that which is it is necessary to be does not follow the contradiction of that which is it is possible to be, but the contrary to the contradiction of that which is it is not necessary to be. For if there is a contradiction it is not necessary to be of that which is it is necessary to be, the contrary of the same is it is necessary to be that which says it is necessary not to be, and it follows it is necessary not to be that which is not possible to be, which is the contradiction of that which is it is possible to be, which it follows is not necessary to be: it is rightly said that indeed contradictions are outside, but the contrary agree with the contradictions.
For it is possible to be and not possible to be, which are contradictions, they follow it is not necessary to be and it is necessary not to be, which are not contradictions, which in the same both can be found to be true. But if a contradiction followed, just as that which is it is not necessary to be follows that which is it is possible to be, so would that which is not possible to be would be followed by it is necessary to be.
But this is inappropriate. Therefore, since this does not follow that, the contrary of this follows. For the contrary to that which proposes it is necessary to be is that which says it is necessary not to be. In the same way also in that which is it is possible not to be, whose contradiction is it is not possible not to be, which Aristotle remained silent about. For it follows that which is it is possible not to be, that which says it is not necessary not to be, but the negation of that which is not possible not to be, of its affirmation which is it is possible not to be, does not follow the affirmation of that which is it is not necessary not to be, of the negation that which is it is necessary not to be (for the negation of that which says it is necessary not to be, is that which says it is not necessary not to be), but the contrary of this, namely the affirmation that which is it is necessary not to be, namely that which is it is necessary to be follows the negation that which is it is not possible not to be. This too should have such a description:
Affirmation — Contradiction — Negation
It is possible not to be — — It is not possible not to be
Negation — Affirmation — Affirmation
Contradiction. Contrary
It is not necessary not to be — It is necessary not to be — It is necessary to be
Therefore, a different way occurs than what was happening before in those which were possible and those which were impossible. For there indeed a contradiction followed a contradiction, but in reverse order, so that an affirmation would follow a negation, and a negation would follow an affirmation. Here the method is not the same. For when the previous ones are contradictions and the lower negation follows an affirmation, the negation does not follow the contradictory affirmation, but rather the contrary of that affirmation. Which if anyone reads more attentively, they will perceive that it is fully described by reason. But why this occurs, he reveals the cause.
The reason why the same consequence does not apply to others is because what is impossible in a contradictory sense necessarily results in the same value.
The reason why the consequence according to the contradiction of the proposition does not occur in the same way as in those things which are possible and impossible is this: every necessary thing is impossible in a contrary way. For what is impossible to be, it is necessary not to be. For it is not necessary to be what is impossible to be; for no one will say that it is necessary to be what is impossible to be. Therefore, it is not necessary to be but rather it is necessary not to be what is impossible to be. Therefore, what is necessary can similarly be impossible. For what makes it impossible in conjunction with being, makes it necessary in conjunction with what is not being: therefore what is impossible to be, it is necessary not to be. Again, what is impossible not to be, it is necessary to be, as it is impossible for fire not to have heat, therefore it is necessary for it to have heat.
Therefore, here too the same thing is converted, as what makes it impossible according to not being enables the same thing to be necessary according to being. Therefore, in a contrary way, what is necessary and impossible can be the same. But if in a contrary way what is impossible and necessary has the same value, it is clear why the same consequence does not follow for necessary and possible, and not possible propositions, just as it followed for the same themselves, that is possible and not possible propositions impossible and not impossible. For if, in a reversed order, what is necessary and impossible has the same value, according to contrariety, the consequence of necessary and possible is not the same as that which was possible and impossible. For since it is not impossible to be follows from possible to be, and this again, that is, the same possible to be is accompanied by not necessary to be.
Again, what is impossible to be sometimes follows from not possible to be, but necessary has the same value as impossible in a reversed order, it follows that what is impossible to be is necessary not to be and for this reason also what is not possible to be follows what is necessary not to be. Again, since what is not impossible not to be agrees with what is possible not to be, and this agrees with not necessary not to be; and since what is said to be impossible not to be is associated with what is not possible not to be, but to what is impossible not to be, rendered in a contrary way, necessary has the same value, it follows that what is impossible not to be we say is necessary to be, and necessary to be follows and what we propose not possible not to be. This is shown by the description.
Figure
Therefore, the cause of the different consequences lies in the conversion of impossible and necessary propositions in a contrary way. But having speculated in this way about these things, he somehow rebukes himself and turned to a more proper consequence of the dispute.
Can the contradictions of the necessary be set in this way as impossible?
Perhaps, he says, we have erred by placing the consequences in this way. For now we have arranged it so that what would be possible would follow what is not necessary, so that according to the precedence of possible we would place the negation of necessary following. But now he says this should be changed and we should not start from possible and subject to it the negation of necessary but rather first necessary should be put, second place possible. For that proposition which contains necessary seems also to contain possibility. For what is necessary is also possible. For what is necessary to be, it is the same to be possible. For if anyone denies this and says that what is necessary does not follow possibility, the negation of possibility will accompany what is necessary. For if it is false to say that what is necessary to be is possible to be, it is true to say that it is not possible to be.
In all things either there is affirmation, that is, or negation, so that if the one is true, the other is false, if the one is not, the other must immediately be. But we said that it is not possible to be follows what is impossible to be: therefore what is said to be necessary is impossible to be. But this is inconvenient. Therefore, it is not true that what is necessary to be agrees with what is not possible to be. Therefore, possibility follows what is necessary.
But indeed, what is possible to be not impossible to be follows, but this indeed what is not necessary to be.
We said that what is necessary to be agrees with the proposition that says it is possible to be but this again seems false to those thinking and perceiving, since what is possible to be agrees and fits with the proposition that says it is not impossible to be, but this indeed what is said not impossible to be follows what we propose not necessary to be. But we proposed that it is possible to be agrees with the one that says it is necessary to be and follows it: therefore it follows that what is not necessary to be is what says it is necessary to be and agrees with it, which is impossible. So what should be determined in these doubts? It is indeed not possible not to agree with possible to be to what is necessary to be. Otherwise, the proposition necessary to be will follow what is impossible to be. But if what is necessary to be agrees with what is possible to be, again it becomes that what is necessary is not necessary but this is false. But how this will be explained a little later. But now changing our previous opinion we say this, that what is possible to be cannot follow what is not necessary to be nor do these propositions agree possible to be and not necessary to be. Which Aristotle proposes in this way:
But indeed neither necessary to be follows possible to be nor necessary not to be. For both of these happen to occur, but if either of these is true, they will not be true.
He teaches that what is possible does not agree with what is necessary to be nor again with what is necessary not to be. For what is necessary to be cannot not be, but what is necessary not to be cannot be. But what we say is possible to be, we say it as if both to be and not to be is possible. Therefore, what we say is possible to be has both natures, that it can be and that it can not be. But who says it is necessary to be, removes not to be and who says it is necessary not to be, removes to be. So if these are true, that is necessary to be or again necessary not to be, both those are false which say it can be and it can not be. For that which proposes it is necessary to be subverts the possibility of not being, that again which says it is necessary not to be subverts the possibility of being. Therefore, neither follows the proposition which says it is possible to be: neither the one that says it is necessary to be nor the one that says it is necessary not to be.
The sense of the matter is this, but the structure of the sentences goes as follows: “But indeed,” he says, "neither does that which is necessary follow from the proposition that posits it is possible, nor conversely does that which claims it is necessary not to be. For the possible, both may occur, that is, both it may be and it may not be (for what can be can also not be), but for either of those that claim it is necessary to be or that it is necessary not to be, if either of these is true, those will not be true, that is, both it may be and it may not be: for what is possible to be can also be possible not to be. Therefore, if neither necessary being nor necessary non-being follows the proposition which posits it is possible to be, it remains that it must agree with that which says it is not necessary not to be. For this indeed follows the proposition that posits it is possible to be. For whatever is possible to be, it is not necessary not to be: thus because it is possible for a man to walk, it is not necessary for him not to walk.
“For this indeed is true,” he says, “even concerning that which is necessary not to be,” that is, this proposition which says it is not necessary not to be is true in order to be opposed contradictorily to that which says it is necessary not to be. From this it follows: “For this is a contradiction to that which follows it is not possible to be.” Thus, the description to be made is as follows:
Affirmation — contradiction — Negation
It is impossible to be — It is not impossible to be
Negation — contradiction — Affirmation
It is not possible to be — It is possible to be
Affirmation — contradiction — Negation
It is necessary not to be
It is not necessary not to be
“It is not necessary not to be” is a contradiction of that which proposes “it is necessary not to be”, which follows and agrees with that which is “it is not possible to be”, which agrees with that which says “it is impossible to be”, which in turn is followed by that which is the last, that is “it is necessary not to be”, whose contradiction is “it is not necessary not to be”; for the affirmation is “it is necessary not to be”, the negation is “it is not necessary not to be”. Therefore, according to this contradiction, this consequence also follows. For “it is impossible to be” and “it is not impossible to be” are contradictory, therefore, the affirmation that is “it is impossible to be” follows the negation “it is not possible to be”, but the negation that is “it is not impossible to be” follows the affirmation “it is possible to be”. But “it is not possible to be” and “it is possible to be” are contradictory. But the negation of the possible that is “it is not possible to be” follows “it is necessary not to be” as affirmation, the affirmation of the possible that is “it is possible to be” follows “it is not necessary not to be” as negation. Therefore, with these conditions, nothing impossible occurs but everything agrees and according to the higher mode of the possible and the impossible, affirmations and negations follow in reversed order contradictorily.
The entire sense of the matter is such, but the order of words goes like this: because, he says, to that which is possible to be, neither that which is necessary to be nor that which is necessary not to be agrees, it remains that that which is not necessary not to be follows the possible to be.
“For this which is said ‘it is not necessary not to be’ is true to say of ‘it is necessary not to be’” and we understand because it is its contradiction. "For this which says ‘It is not necessary not to be’ is a contradiction to that which follows the negation of the possible that is ‘it is not possible to be’".
But this is that which says it is necessary not to be.
"For that which is ‘it is not possible to be’ follows both of these, both that which is ‘it is impossible to be’ and that which is ‘it is necessary not to be’. The negation of this affirmation that is ‘it is necessary not to be’ is ‘it is not necessary not to be’.
But this follows ‘it is not impossible to be’ and ‘it is possible to be’.
“Therefore, these contradictions also follow each other in the aforementioned way”, namely contradictorily but conversely. And with these conditions in place and thus arranged, nothing impossible occurs.
“But someone will doubt whether that which is necessary to be follows the possible to be.”
He returns to the previous question of the possible and necessary consequence. For he says it can be doubted whether that which is possible to be agrees with the proposition, which is it is necessary to be. For whether it is said to agree or not to agree, something impossible and incongruous occurs in both ways. For if someone says that that which is said to be possible does not agree with that which is necessary to be, the negation of the possible, that which is it is not possible to be, will agree. But if this agrees, that which is necessary to be will be the same as that which is not possible to be. But if someone denies this again and says it is not the negation of that proposition which is possible to be that which says it is not possible to be, but rather that which proposes it is possible not to be, although it is false, yet even this cannot agree with that which is necessary to be. Let the negation of that which is possible to be be that which says it is possible not to be, if the affirmation that is possible to be does not follow the affirmation which says it is necessary to be, the negation follows that which is it is possible not to be.
But it is false to say that what necessarily exists can at some point possibly not exist. Why is that? Because what is necessary cannot be said to possibly not exist, but rather, it cannot possibly not exist. Now, if someone says that what is necessary follows and agrees with what is possible, something inconsistent will be found in this as well. For what is possible to exist, can also possibly not exist: therefore, what necessarily exists can possibly not exist and what is necessary becomes contingent. For possibility and contingency can easily swing both ways, towards existence and non-existence, but what is necessary has its outcome closed off towards its contradiction: if it is necessary to exist, it cannot possibly not exist, and if it is necessary not to exist, it is impossible to exist. Therefore, anyone who says that what is possible agrees with what is necessary, since what is possible can also possibly not exist and this is contingent, claims that what necessarily exists can possibly not exist and is contingent, which is inconsistent. Thus, resolving this doubt follows as such:
“However, it is clear that not all that is possible either exists or does not.”
There are, he says, many things that can only be what they are, not something else that they are not. Indeed, there are many things that do not change from what they are, but others that can change: like the sky can only do one thing, that is, move, but it cannot do the opposite, that is, not move. Therefore, “not everything that exists can either exist or not exist”, that is, not everything about which any possibility is predicated “can also do the opposite”, that both can be done and do what it does and the opposite, that is, not do what it does. But there are some things about which powers can be predicated, so that it is not true to say of these things that both and the opposites can occur, as it is in things that are capable beyond a certain reason, like fire. For the fire is hot beyond a certain reason; for there is no reason why the fire is hot, for it is naturally hot, and while it can be hot, it cannot do the opposite, that is, it cannot not be hot, which is the opposite, namely, that it is to be hot.
“Therefore, according to reason, the very same powers belong to many and even to contraries.”
The powers, he says, that are according to reason, that is, in which there is some reason, are not the possibilities of one thing but of many and even of opposites, like the possibility of medicine is to heal; which, when according to reason it happens that you heal as a doctor, and there is a reasonable power for the doctor to heal, can not only heal but also not heal and can do more than one thing and what it can do is the opposite, that is, not heal. For the opposite to healing is called not healing, which are opposites he called contraries. For affirmation and denial are distinguished by contraries.
“But not all irrational ones, as has been said, it is not possible for fire to heat and not.”
Every power, he says, according to reason can also do the opposite, but not all power of the irrational is of this kind, so that it may not be able to do the opposite. For when it is an irrational power for iron to get hot (for it does not get hot from reason, because it does not have reason), it can also not get hot, but for fire, while it is an irrational power to heat, it cannot also not heat. Therefore, it is correctly said that not all irrational powers can do the opposite but only some, like fire, which, while it is heatable, is not unheatable. As for the irrational things that have only one power, not also the opposite, he shows this by saying:
“Nor whatever else always acts.”
For fire cannot do the opposite, but not only fire but all those things that can do one thing and not many nor opposites, whatever things are always in act, like the sun is always actually shining, therefore it cannot not shine, and snow is always actually cold and therefore it can never be not cold. Therefore, “whatever always acts,” that is, things that are always in act, it is clear, because just as fire does not catch cold, so neither can those things do the opposite. That is why fire also cannot do the opposite, because it always actually has its own power; it is always hot. But not all irrational things (as has been said) have only one power, so that they cannot do the opposite, but there are some irrational powers, which can do both, like in the case of a skin being cut or not being cut. For a skin can be cut, and it can also not be cut, but these are opposites. Therefore, according to irrational powers too, some things can do the opposite.
But for this reason the previous points were stated, he says, by which we showed that fire and whatever things are always in act cannot be opposites, so we could demonstrate that not every power of opposites is potentiality but that some powers of this kind would be in act and could only be one thing, and would depart from the power of opposites. This, however, is not only the case for those things that are powers in accordance with reason but also for that kind that is said to be irrational. For there are certain things among those said to be of irrational power, which can not only be what they are but also the opposite, while others can only be one thing. For example, skin can be cut and not cut, and therefore it can be opposites, but fire, because it is hot, cannot be cold, and therefore it has no power of opposites.
Some powers, however, are equivocal. For ‘possible’ is not said in a simple manner.
A brief division of possibility must be made. For ‘possible’ is said in two ways. There is one possible thing that although it does not exist, can exist, like a man who while sitting is indeed not walking but can walk. Another is possible that although it exists, it can exist, as because fire heats, it can be hot, and because a man sits, he can sit. Now there are two types of this possibility, one is such that although it exists, it can also not exist, like if someone is sitting, they indeed can sit such that they could also not sit, the other is such that although it exists, it cannot not exist, like fire is hot but cannot be not hot.
And this is what he means when he says:
Some powers, however, are equivocal, for ‘possible’ is not simply said but this indeed because it is true, as in act, that is what is and becomes what is said to be possible, as in act it is possible to walk, because he is now walking and is in act, and altogether it is possible to be whatever is in act, that however which perhaps will do, that is what does not indeed exist but can exist, as it is possible to walk, not because he is indeed walking now but because someone will walk. These however are whatever things are not said according to act but according to power only, which do not indeed exist in act yet, but can exist.
And indeed this power is only in mobile things, but that other power is also in immobile things.
He calls mobile whatever things are natural and in generation and corruption. For whatever things are generated and can be corrupted, these are always in motion, for generation itself is a kind of motion and so is corruption. Therefore in such things, whatever things are generated and mortal, in these is true that power, which is not said according to act but according to that which does not indeed exist but can exist. For such a power happens nowhere except in those things which are born and meet death. But those things which are immobile, that is, those which are so fixed and constituted in their nature that they cannot be changed or moved, that is, divine things, they alone have that power which is said according to act, like the sun immobile indeed as to substance, although it is mobile as to place. Since therefore it is immobile as to substance and is not changed or moved from it, it has in itself light, which it can have in such a way that it cannot not have it.
But in both these, whether mobile or immobile, it is true what is said about them: it is not impossible to exist. For even that which does not indeed exist in act, can still possibly exist, like a man who is not walking, still retains the power to walk, it is not impossible for him to walk, and it is not impossible for the sun to have light, which it retains in act eternally. Therefore, in both mobile and immobile things, it is true that it is not impossible to exist. For both of the one acting and of the one that can act, the same is truly said of both, that it is not impossible to exist. For it is not impossible for the one who is walking to walk and for the one that is walkable, that is, the one who can walk, it is not impossible for him to walk.
But since we have said that the power which exists in action has two species, one indeed when it is in action and can never not be, like fire actually is hot and it can never not be hot, the other one according to what we say to indeed be in action, but can nevertheless not be, like when someone is sitting they can indeed sit but they can also not sit: this kind of possible according to action is in no way predicated of the necessary, for what is in action and necessary to be, indeed is but it is such that it cannot not be. This is indeed what he says:
Thus, the possible, that is, what while it is in action can nevertheless not be, it is not simply true to say of the necessary, but the other is true.
For that which is in such a way in action, that it cannot not be, and is always in action, this is rightly predicated of the necessary. For what must be, indeed is but it cannot not be.
Therefore, since the universal follows part, that which is of necessity follows the possible, but not entirely.
For always, he says, the species follows the genus and the part follows universality (for if man is, then animal is, that is if part and species is, then universality and genus must be): if it is thus, then it follows that the proposition which says it is necessary is that proposition which says it is possible and it agrees with it, but not all signification of possibility follows the necessary. For those things which can be such that they are not indeed, can nevertheless be, in no way are predicated of the necessary. Necessary not only must be but also is. This is indeed what he says, but not entirely. Indeed, that which already is necessary cannot have the possible predicated of it, which is not yet indeed but may be.
And indeed, perhaps the principle is that which is necessary and that which is not necessary, of all either being or not being, and other things as consequences of these should be considered.
The principle, he says, is perhaps of finding the consequences of these propositions, if someone first posits the necessary and not necessary, secondly however the possible and the rest. For naturally, what is necessary is prior. For if the necessary are those things which are always in action, and those things which are always in action are eternal, and the eternal things are the principles of all things, rightly the beginning also of speculating, what the consequence of these propositions is, we will take from these things which are necessary, and besides these from the negations of the necessary, that is, from the not necessary. Therefore, the principles of finding these consequences should be taken from the necessary and not necessary. For those, that is, the possible and the contingent and the rest, follow the necessary and not necessary as if nature herself precedes. And for this reason he says:
And other things, that is the possible and the contingent, should be considered as consequences of these.
This is how these should be considered, as if what is necessary and not necessary precede, while the possible and the contingent and the rest follow.
However, it is evident from the things which have been said, that what is of necessity is according to action.
It is clear, he says, and obvious that all things which are according to necessity are always according to action, for indeed fire is necessarily hot, it is also always in action as hot. Therefore, if those things which are eternal are prior to all things which are not eternal, even those which are always in action are prior to those which are in potential. But he makes a division of all these: there are indeed, he says, other things which are beyond power, only in action, like the sun does not move by power but in action, and it does not have that power of moving, which is not indeed but can be, but it has only action, it is left by the power which is usually beyond action. The primary substances indeed are in action, but never in potential. But he calls the primary substances divine and eternal, not those which he showed to be primary in the categories, that is, individuals.
For then he was talking about those primaries, which are first to us, now about those which are first by nature, which are divine and eternal. Other things, he says, are in action with potential, that is, they both have action and at some time had potential, like a house now built at some time could be built and first had potential according to time, but afterwards action. But by nature, action is prior to potential, while art itself anticipates action in thought and first designs the form of the house to itself and makes it. Therefore, by nature action is prior to potential, potential is prior to action in time. Other things, he says, are never in action, but always are in potential, like an infinite number indeed is, because you can always increase it to infinity but it is not actually infinite. For whatever number you take, it is actually finite; for whatever number you say, finite numerosity must encompass it, like ten or a hundred. Infinite, however, is potential, because you can make it increase to infinity, but not as any action is the number infinite.
On Interpretation, Book 14
The question at hand is whether the statement that contradicts “Every man is just” is “No man is just” or “Every man is unjust”.
The proposition of the question is as follows: It is asking, given that this proposition that says:
Every man is just
seems to be opposed by the one that asserts:
No man is just
and also by the one that says:
Every man is unjust
which of these is more contrary to the above affirmation, which states:
Every man is just
Is a universal affirmation contrary to the one by which we propose:
Every man is unjust
or is it indeed the universal negation which is:
No man is just
Similarly, for this proposition that is:
Callias is just
is the proposition that proposes:
Callias is unjust
or the one that says:
Callias is not just
contrary to it? About which matter he enters this path of argument: “If those things that are in speech”, he says, "serve those things that are in the mind and agree with them in signification, it is necessary that what is found in the opinions of the mind seems to also occur in speech. If there in the mind the opinion that thinks every man is just is opposed and is most contrary to the opinion that thinks every man is unjust, then also in words the affirmation which is:
Every man is just
is more contrary to the affirmation which says:
Every man is unjust
If in opinions this one is not more opposed than the one which says:
No man is just
then also in words the universal negation appears to be contrary, not the affirmation which says:
Every man is unjust
Thus, these will be contrary:
Every man is just
and:
No man is just
What he said: “But if neither there is contrary opinion contrary”, it means: for ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ to exist, even though it is predicated according to habit and privation, yet the latter, that is, ‘unjust’, is now taken for its contrary. Therefore, if in contrary opinions, that is, the assertion of injustice is not contrary, there will be no contrary assertion in words either, but rather the negation which is ‘no man is just’. “Therefore,” he says, “it must be considered” to which false opinion the true opinion is contrary. For if something is good, it is true to say of it, because it is good, against which proposition it is false to say, because it is bad, also false because it is not good. But it must be seen which of these is more contrary to the true affirmation, which says that what is good is good: is it that contrary which says that what is good is bad or that which says that what is good is not good? And this is what he says:
I say it in this way. There is a certain true opinion of the good because it is good, another false because it is not good, another because it is bad. So which of these is contrary to the true?
That is, is it the one that denies what is, or the one that asserts what is not? Which of these seems to be more contrary to the one that says that what is, is, must be sought. But what he added:
And if there is one, according to which contrary?
This means: of contraries, some have a middle, others do not. And of those that have, if someone denies one contrary, it is not necessary to understand that other contrary through that denial. For since there is something between white and black, if someone says:
It is not white
he did not thereby show that it is black. For it could be red and whatever else is situated in the middle of such contraries. But in those contraries that lack a middle, there is no difference between denying the proposed thing or affirming the contrary. For there is no difference between saying it is not day and saying it is night. For it is the same to not be day as it is to be night. For there is nothing between night and day. Therefore, in these, the affirmation of the contrary is equivalent to the denial of the proposed thing.
Therefore, he says this now: even if in some cases, he says, such propositions are found, so that the denial of the proposed thing and the affirmation of its contrary hold the same value and have the same meaning, it is to be sought which proposition is more contrary, according to the one that says it is not day or according to the one that proposes it is night. Therefore, it must be investigated which of these, although they both signify one and the same, is more contrary to the one that says it is day. For this is what he says:
Even if there is one, according to which is it contrary?
That is, even if sometimes the denial of the thing and the affirmation of its contrary will signify one thing, according to which of these is the proposition more contrary to the previously proposed statement?
For to suppose that contrary opinions are defined by what belongs to contraries is false.
He who deals with contrary propositions should first correctly determine the nature of contraries. For some people think that contrary opinions are those of contrary things, which Aristotle denies. He says that the definition, which determines that those are contrary opinions which belong to contrary things, is false. For while the good is contrary to the bad, we can have an opinion about the good because it is good, and this is true; we can again believe that what is bad is bad, and this again is true. The opinions of the good because it is good and of the bad because it is bad belong to contrary things, but both are true, yet both contraries cannot be true. Therefore, it has been falsely defined that those are contrary opinions which belong to contrary things. But what he says:
For the opinion of the good because it is good and the bad because it is bad is perhaps the same and true,
Or what he said is the same refers to what followed, being true, for insofar as they are true, they are the same, or certainly that it would be of the same opinion to believe that what is good is good and what is bad is bad. Whether they are the same or more, they cannot be contrary, therefore because they are simultaneously true.
But these things are contrary. But they are not contrary because they belong to contraries but rather because they are contrary.
But these, he says, namely those that are contrary in opinions, are not contrary when they are of contraries but rather when they suspect the same thing in different and contrary ways. For this is what he says:
But these things are contrary,
namely, those things that are proposed in the thoughts of the soul, whose propositions are contrary, not because they are of contraries but rather because they suspect the same subject in a contrary way: such as if someone suspects that the good is good and then another suspects the same good because it is bad, these are contrary, which cannot be true simultaneously, and of the same thing, that is, the good is now rightly suspected, now wrongly, that is, in a contrary way.
Therefore, if there is an opinion of the good because it is good, but there is also an opinion that it is not good because it is something else which is not and cannot be, no other opinion should be assumed, neither those which think that what is not is, nor those which think that what is, is not.
The principle of this argument is that, which he uses as confessed and proven, that there cannot be multiple and infinite contraries of one thing: therefore, there will be one contrary to one thing. Therefore, there is an opinion of the good because it is good, and this is true; there is again an opinion of the good because it is not good, and this is false. There can also be one which believes that what is not is good, as if someone were to say that what is good is bad, or that it is a quantity, or that it belongs to something that does not exist.
However, the things that can be said about the good, which itself is not good, are infinite. Again, we can think of many things that are not good, which actually are. For instance, we can say that the good that is honorable is not honorable, we can say it is not useful, we can also say it is not desirable and many other things. Therefore, the things that we can think of about the good, because it is something that is not itself good, and the things that we think are not good which actually are, are also infinite. Hence, neither those things which opinion thinks are good but are not, nor those which it thinks are not good but are, should be considered contrary to the opinion that considers what is good to be good. This is indeed what he means when he says:
“In no case should we consider those things that opinion believes to be what they are not, like if we say about the good that it is bad or useless or dishonorable, nor should we consider those things which opinion believes are not what they are, like if we say about the same good that it is not desirable, that it is not honorable.”
“Both are infinite, and those things that opinion thinks are not what they are, and those things that opinion thinks are what they are not.”
Therefore, these should be rejected and should not be assumed as a contrary opposition, because they are infinite, while the opposition of contraries is always finite. The contrary opinions that should be adopted, he says, follows this principle:
“But in those things where there is fallacy. These indeed are from those things from which generations come. But generations come from opposites, therefore fallacy also.”
He states, that the only contrary that should be posed to the opinion that the good is good, is that in which the first fallacy is found. He shows where the first fallacy is found, through what he said: “From those things from which generations come,” fallacy is most easily found. For generation always comes from opposites. Whenever something becomes white, it does not become from sweet, nor hard, nor liquid, but from not white. And when something becomes sweet, it does not become from hot nor cold, nor black nor from any other quality except its opposite, that is, from not sweet. The same also applies to other things. Every generation comes from what it was not, like sweet from not sweet, white from not white, hot from not hot. Therefore, if generations are from opposites, and fallacy is in those things from which generations come, the first fallacy will be in opposites. The first fallacy, indeed, is to not think that something is what it is, the second is to think that something is what it is not: like in what is good, the first fallacy is to think that it is not good, the second is to consider bad what is good. Therefore, the contradiction must primarily be placed where the first fallacy is, and the first fallacy is in those things from which generations arise (by generations, I mean those things that are made from those things which they were not), but generations come from opposites: therefore, the first fallacy is in opposites. But in those things where the first fallacy is, those are the contraries that should be primarily posed: therefore, opposites are primarily contraries. But to be good and to not be good are opposites: therefore, not being good is contrary to being good, not being bad. He confirms this with a stronger argument.
“Therefore, if what is good is good and not bad, and the former according to itself, but the latter by accident (for it happens to the bad not to be), in each thing, what is according to itself is truer, even if false, if indeed also true.”
The subtle argument formed in this way is as follows: the good is both good and not bad, one of which is according to itself, and primarily and naturally so, this is, that it is good, the other however, is by accident, that is, that it is not bad. For it happens to that which is good, that it is not bad. Therefore, what is good has being good more naturally than not being bad. For the former is in it according to itself, the latter (as it was said) by accident. If this is so, the proposition which affirms what is according to itself is truer than that which affirms what is by accident. But it is according to itself for the good to be good, and it is by accident for the good not to be bad: it is therefore truer and closer to say about the good that it is good, than to say about the good that it is not bad. If this is so, even the opinion which is false according to itself will justly appear more deceptive than that which lies according to accident. For if the one which is true according to itself is closer to truth, the one which is false according to itself will be closer to falsehood. For this is what he says: “In each thing, what is according to itself is truer, even if false, if indeed also true”: if the one which is true according to itself is truer, rightly the one which is false according to itself is called more false, that is, that denies what is true according to itself.
“Therefore, the one which is because it is not good that it is good, is false according to itself.”
He follows up the entire preceding argument with continuous discussion. For it was previously stated that the opinion which believes the good to be good is true according to itself: therefore the opinion which says that the good is not good is false, and is false about that thing which is true according to itself. For the opinion which thinks the good to be good is true according to itself, and the one which believes the good to not be good intercepts the truth of the opinion which is true according to itself. For whoever believes that the good is good has an opinion according to the nature of the good itself and for that reason such opinions are called true according to themselves: therefore this will also be false according to itself, since it seems to deviate from the proposition which is true according to itself. The same good is not bad by accident and it is true to say this about the good, because it is not bad but it is so by accident, for it happens to the good not to be bad. But the one which believes the good to be bad removes the not bad from that which is good and destroys the truth which is true according to accident.
Indeed, it is the opinion which says that what is good is not evil but is so accidentally. Therefore, accidentally, what is false is what says that what is good is evil. For it destroys the proposition which is true accidentally. So since what is in itself comes before what is accidental, the falseness of what is in itself will be more deceptive than the falseness which is accidental. But what thinks that what is good is not good is peremptory in truth itself, but what says that what is good is evil is peremptory in that which is not evil but good, in the accidental case of the true thing. Therefore, what says that what is good is not good is more false than what says that what is good is evil.
“A person is more wrong about particulars who holds the opposite opinion; for opposites differ the most about the same thing.”
The question was whether the affirmation of the contrary or the denial of the proposed thing can be more contrary to the affirmation of the proposed thing itself. But now it says that what is false are the most contrary things. For contrary things are those which differ the most about the same thing, such as white and black in the case of color. Therefore, since what are most false and most true differ the most from each other, and the most true is the assertion of a thing consistent in itself, and the most false is the peremptory denial of a truth consistent in itself, it is necessary that one of the affirmation of the contrary and the denial of the proposed thing be more contrary: the more false and more contrary is the opinion which contemplates a contradiction, such as that which is not good what is good, than the opinion which has that it is evil what is good. And since the opinions follow what is in the words, in a similar way the denial of what is ‘every good is good’, namely that which says:
No good is good
is more contrary than that which proposes:
Every good is evil
Therefore, also in other cases, like in that which is ‘every man is just’, the more contrary is that which says:
No man is just
than that which says:
Every man is unjust
“And what is because what is good is evil is implicit.”
He adds to the previous demonstration an argument showing that the one which denies is more contrary than the one which affirms the contrary: the affirmation of the contrary is implicit, he says. For whoever thinks that what is good is evil, it cannot be otherwise, unless he also thinks that it is not good. Therefore, the proposition which says that what is good is evil is in a way double. For it also contains within itself that good is not. But the proposition that what is good is good is simple, and a simple one can be more contrary to a simple one, and the denial that what is good is not good is simple: this one, then, is more contrary.
“Furthermore, if in other cases it also has to be in a similar way, here it will seem to be rightly said. Either everywhere what is the contradiction or nowhere.”
Either in all cases, he says, it is truly said that contradiction is more contrary than the affirmation of the contrary or nowhere. For either the same must happen in other cases too, or even here it is not true that the one which is the contradiction, i.e., the denial, is more contrary than the affirmation of the contrary. Let us speculate about this, he says, in those which do not have a contrary, such as man. For if someone thinks that a man is a man, it is true; but if someone thinks that a man is not a man, it is false. But if someone thinks that a man is a horse, no one will say that this one is more contrary, which thinks that a man is a horse, than the one who thinks that a man is not a man. Therefore, if in those which do not have contraries, that one is contrary which is formed by contradiction, in those too which have contraries, not the affirmation of the contrary but the proposition of denial is more contrary.
“Furthermore, it is similar for the good because it is good and for the not good because it is not good, and for these the good because it is not good and the not good because it is good.”
By similarity and proportion of contrariness, he tries to investigate the force of the propositions. But let’s first arrange these, and then as briefly as possible carry out the force of the Aristotelian argument.
TRUE
good because it is good
FALSE
good because it is not good
TRUE
not good because it is not good
FALSE
not good because it is good
Of these four opinions, two are true, two are false. That which is good because it is good is true, but that which is good because it is not good is false; again, that which is not good because it is not good is true, but that which is not good because it is good is false. Therefore, this is the similarity and proportion of these four propositions. For just as the opinion of good because it is good is related to the opinion which is good because it is not good, in the same way the opinion which is not good because it is not good is related to that which is not good because it is good. For just as there, one is true, the other false, so also here one is true, the other false.
He takes an example first from that which is not good because it is not good. For this, he says, being true, what shall we say is contrary to it? That which says it is evil? But it is not contrary. For it can simultaneously be true that which says what is not good is not good and that which says that what is not good is evil. For there are some things which are not good which are evil. Therefore, they are not contrary, in which it is proposed that what is not good is not good and that what is not good is evil. For contrary truths cannot be found at the same time, and a truth is never contrary to a truth. But neither can that be contrary to this, which says that what is not good is not evil. For there can be some things which are indeed not good, but not evil, such as breaking a branch from a tree for no purpose, if the tree is not damaged, it is neither evil nor good. Therefore, both can be true at the same time, those which think that what is is not good because it is not good and what is is not good because it is not evil. Therefore, these are not contrary either.
Therefore, the opinion that asserts something is not good because it is not good should be contrasted with the opinion that something is not good because it is good. If the similarity among these four propositions, which we have previously outlined, is upheld, and just as the opinion that something is not good because it is not good corresponds to the opinion that something is not good because it is good, so too does the opinion that something is good because it is good correspond to the opinion that something is good because it is not good. Moreover, the opinion that something is not good because it is not good is opposed to the opinion that something is not good because it is good: thus, the opinion that something is good because it is good will be opposed to the opinion that something is good because it is not good.
It is clear, then, that it makes no difference, nor if we make the statement universally; for to this the universal negation will be contrary.
He also rightly notes that there is no difference in opinions that are contrary to each other, not universally established, and those which universally oppose each other. For just as in the opinion that believes every good thing to be good, there is an opposing belief that no good thing is good. For when we say that a thing is good because it is good, if this is universally affirmed in belief, it should be thought of as: whatever is good is good. However, this makes no difference, as if we say: every good thing is good. Since this belief is true, it opposes the one that says whatever is good is not good. And this is no different, as if we were to think that no good thing is good. And also in the case of the not-good, the same principle applies, as if we say: everything that is not good is not good and again, everything that is not good is good, these are mutually contrary in the same way, so that one is true, the other false, which is most commonly found in contraries. Therefore, the entire argument and inquiry concludes as follows: for if the principles that are in the mind are certain of those which are signified in speech, and speech is a certain mark of the affections of the soul, whatever happens in the soul, the same must also occur in speech. If a universal affirmation and a universal denial are contrary in opinion, they will also be so in words, that is, the contrary will not be that which affirms the contrary but that which denies what was proposed before by means of the opposition of universality, as is the case with every good thing is good or every man is good, the contrary of these is no good thing is good, no man is good. For this is what he means when he says: OR BECAUSE NO OR NONE, NO referring to that proposition which says:
Every good thing is good
NONE on the other hand opposes the one which says:
Every man is good
so that they are in this manner:
Every good thing is good
its contrary:
No good thing is good
and again:
Every man is good
its contrary:
No man is good
However, he calls those contradictory which he previously proposed, when he was speaking about universals and particulars, those namely which are cornerstones. For it was shown that a universal affirmation is opposed to a particular denial and a particular affirmation to a universal denial by contradiction.
It is clear, then, that neither can a truth be contrary to a truth, nor a belief, nor a contradiction.
From what has been said above, he also deduces that neither can those things which are contrary be true at the same time nor can those things which are true be contrary to each other, and this not only in beliefs themselves, so that a true belief cannot be contrary to a true belief, but also in propositions. For it cannot happen that two contraries can be true at the same time. And he concludes this through a syllogism of this kind: all contraries are opposites, but what are opposites cannot coexist in the same thing: therefore, nature does not allow contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, if two truths can be predicated of the same thing, and two contraries cannot coexist in the same thing, nature does not permit that which is contrary to be true. For this is what he means when he says: FOR THOSE ARE CONTRARY WHICH ARE ABOUT OPPOSITES, that is, every contrary is opposite and it cannot happen that those things which are contrary are not contained in opposites; just as he taught in the categories, the genus of contraries is a certain kind of opposition.
But it happens to say the truth about the same things to the same person
that is, two truths can coexist and be truly predicated of the same thing at the same time, as when we say something is not good and is bad, both can be said to be true at the same time. For there can be certain things [that] while they are not good, they are nonetheless bad, such as ugliness which is not good, yet it is bad. Therefore, it can happen that those things which are true are at the same time truly predicated and that they coexist in the same thing.
However, it does not happen that contraries coexist in the same thing.
Therefore, if truths can coexist in the same thing, and contraries cannot coexist in the same thing, those things which are contrary cannot be true at the same time. Therefore, he concludes: nor can those things which are true be contrary at the same time. Therefore, it cannot happen, either in beliefs or in propositions, that someone can correctly suspect those things which are true to be contrary.
We have expressed these matters to the extent that the brevity of the explanation allowed: what the deeper teaching of this book will demonstrate will be explained in the series of the second edition.
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