Tuesday, April 25, 2023

Boethius’s First Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge

The commentary is divided into two books, with the first book providing an introduction to the dialogue and the theoretical and practical subdivisions and functions of philosophy. Boethius emphasizes the importance of logical reasoning and grammar in philosophy and explores Porphyry’s approach to the concepts of genera and species, definition, and predication. The second book focuses on the commonalities and distinctive features of genera, difference, species, accident, and property, and provides a detailed analysis of the implications of Porphyry’s work for the study of ontology and logic.

The setting for the commentary is in the Aurelian Mountains, where Boethius and his friend Fabius decided to review the works of the most learned men with some kind of introductory commentaries to shed light on the matters that are most obscure to the intellect. The purpose of the commentary is to provide a detailed analysis and explanation of Porphyry’s Isagoge, and to shed light on the theoretical and practical subdivisions and functions of philosophy.

All subheadings to Book One, and the first seven headings of Book Two, were written by me, to aid navigation, and were not in the original.

Book One

Introduction to the Dialogue Between the Speakers

[1.01] In the winter season, we had withdrawn to the Aurelian Mountains and there, when a stronger south wind had driven away the peaceful night and disturbed the quiet, we decided to review the works that the most learned men had published with some kind of introductory commentaries to shed light on the matters that are most obscure to the intellect. Fabius started this, and when he saw me lying on my bed and thinking and meditating about these matters, he encouraged me to share with him some instruction on this subject, as I had often promised. So, we agreed since at that time, greetings from friends and domestic business had ceased. When I asked him about which topics he wanted to clarify and explain, Fabius said, "Since time is available for study and this leisure can be turned into honorable business, I ask you to explain to me what Victorinus, the most learned orator of his time, is said to have translated from Porphyry through the Isagoge, that is, the introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. And first, teach me some didactic techniques that expositors or commentators use to make their students' minds more receptive."

Then I said, “There are six things that a Master usually goes through in any exposition. First, they explain the intention of the work, which is called ‘skopos’ in Greek; second, the usefulness, which the Greeks call ‘chreusimon’; third, the order, which they call ‘taxis’; fourth, whether the work is genuine and belongs to the author it is attributed to, which they usually translate as ‘gnesion’; fifth, the title of the work, which the Greeks call ‘epigraphe’. In this matter, because some were less skilled in interpreting the intention of each book, there has been uncertainty about the title of the work. The sixth is to say to which part of philosophy the intention of any book is directed, which in Greek is called ‘eis poion meros philosophias anagestai’. So, all these things should be sought and explained in any book on philosophy.”

Purpose of Porphyry’s Work and Its Usefulness

[1.02] Then Fabius asked what the purpose of the introduction was. And I said: Aristotle, for whom the introduction serves as a bridge, cannot be understood properly unless we prepare ourselves to comprehend the very subjects he is going to discuss. Porphyry, seeing that in all things there were certain primary elements of nature, from which everything flowed as from a source, and that these primary elements were both substances and called by the term ‘genus’; furthermore, a genus could never exist unless other things were subordinated to it, and those things that were subordinated were called ‘species’; and moreover, a genus could never be a genus to just one species but to several; and several species could not be multiple unless some distinction separated them – if they were not dissimilar to each other, they would appear as one species, not multiple; therefore, this division and dissimilarity of species is called ‘difference’, and all things that differ from one another can only be so because they are marked by certain unique and individual natures.

And up to this point – seeing that all disparity among everything was divided into two fundamental principles of things, into substance and accident, so that neither could an accident exist without a substance nor a substance without an accident – for an accident cannot exist without some foundation of substance, and a substance itself cannot exist without an added accident in any way. For color, which is an accident, will be in a body, which is a substance. Furthermore, when you see a body, that is, a substance, you will observe it marked with an accident, that is, some color.

Therefore, neither can substance exist apart from an accident nor can an accident be separated from a substance; for where there is a substance, an accident soon follows – Porphyry then contemplated these two things, that is, accident and substance, and concluded that genera, species, their unique characteristics, and differences revolve around them and that, by themselves, they are genera for the underlying and subordinated species, which are marked by differences and unique traits. He primarily decided to discuss genus, species, difference, and unique traits. And since this treatise will be useful in definitions, as we will show later, if someone were to place an accident in a general definition, it would be clear that they are not defining correctly, which will be addressed in its proper place. He decided to briefly touch upon accidents. For the most prudent teacher instructed us in such a way that we may gain full knowledge of any definitions, when what is useful has been stated and what is not useful has been set aside. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to discuss genus, species, differences, unique traits, and accidents.

Theoretical and Practical Philosophy: Their Subdivisions and Functions

[1.03] Here, Fabius said: “You have explained the intention; now explain the usefulness.” I replied, "Various and multiple benefits and uses are found in this body of work. First of all, it is very helpful for understanding Aristotle’s Categories. How it helps will be discussed when we address the title of his book, but for now, let’s briefly touch on other areas where it is useful, once we have made a division of philosophy itself. First, we must consider what philosophy is. Philosophy is a love, pursuit, and friendship, in a way, of wisdom; not the kind of wisdom found in certain arts and crafts or some technical knowledge, but the wisdom that, needing nothing, is a living mind and the sole primordial reason for things. This love of wisdom is an illumination of the understanding soul by that pure wisdom, and a kind of retraction and invocation of it to itself, so that the pursuit of wisdom seems to be a pursuit of divinity and a friendship with that pure mind. This wisdom, therefore, imposes the merit of its divinity on every kind of soul and leads them back to their own natural power and purity. From this arises the truth of speculations and thoughts, and the holy and pure chastity of actions. This matter is turned into the division and section of philosophy itself. Philosophy is a genus, with two species: one is called theoretical, the other practical, that is, speculative and active. There will be as many species of speculative philosophy as there are things in which the right speculation and consideration can be found, and as many varieties of actions, so many species and varieties of virtues. Therefore, there is a threefold diversity of theoretical, or contemplative or speculative, philosophy, and this part of philosophy is divided into three species. One part of the theoretical philosophy deals with the intelligible, another with the intellectual, and another with the natural.

Then Fabius interrupted and wondered what this new term was, that I had named one part of speculative philosophy as intelligible. I noted that since I had never found it said in Latin, I called it intelligible with my own word composition. For something is intelligible when it is one and the same in itself, always remaining in its own divinity, and is grasped not by any senses but only by the mind and intellect. This matter is included in the speculation of God and in the consideration of the incorporeality of the soul and the inquiry of true philosophy: which part the Greeks call theology. The second part is intellectual, which grasps the first intelligible part through thought and understanding. This is about all celestial things, divine works, and everything that exists below the lunar sphere with a more blessed and purer substance. Lastly, it deals with human souls, which, when they were once of the intelligible substance, degenerated from the intelligible to the intellectual due to contact with bodies, so that they are no longer understood themselves than they understand, and they are happier in the purity of understanding when they apply themselves to the intelligible. The third species of theoretical philosophy deals with bodies and their knowledge and cognition: this is physiology, which explains the natures and passions of bodies. The second part, the substance of the intellectual, is rightly placed in the middle because it has both the animation of bodies and, in a way, their vivification, and the consideration and cognition of the intelligible.

Indeed, there is a threefold division of practical philosophy, which has been shown to be called active above. The first is the one that, taking care of itself, raises itself up, adorns and increases itself with virtues, admitting nothing in life that it does not enjoy, doing nothing to regret. The second is the one that, taking on the care of the state, heals the well-being of all with the skill of its providence, the balance of justice, the stability of courage, and the patience of moderation. The third is the one that distributes the duties of family matters with a moderate arrangement. There are also other subdivisions of these, which it is now necessary to pass over.

The Importance of Logical Reasoning and Grammar in Philosophy

[1.04] In order for these things to be possible and for the higher things to be understood, the most necessary and abundant fruit is the art of what the Greeks call “logikhun,” and we can call “rational.” This means that by the correct reasoning of speech, one is not deceived by any turn or bypath of error, in determining what is true and what is fitting. Some have judged this art to be a part of philosophy, while others have considered it not a part but an instrument and a kind of equipment. The reason why both have been led to believe this will be mentioned in another work. However, the discussion of genus, species, differences, proper attributes, and accidents prepares a kind of path for us in all our knowledge of philosophy. For when we are taught what a genus is, what a species is, we understand that philosophy is a genus, and theoretical and practical philosophy are undoubtedly species.

Concerning logic, whether it is a species, we can ponder this in the same way. Knowledge of differences is useful for knowing the differences between the species of philosophy. Knowledge of proper attributes is useful for understanding what unique nature seems innate to each difference of philosophy. Knowledge of accidents is useful for discerning what is principally in things and what comes in a secondary and contingent place. Thus, the knowledge of these five things extends through various branches and multifaceted paths into all parts of philosophy.

The use of grammar is no less important in this matter, since we measure the genus through speech, and the eight parts of speech through genera, species, differences, and proper attributes. Indeed, the knowledge of this matter is very closely connected to and friendly with rhetoric. For we can separate rhetoric into three genera of causes and dissect them in their respective constitutions.

The Significance of Definitions and Their Components in Philosophy

Moreover, the great, useful, and abundant knowledge of definitions, which pertains to logic, is important. You will never put an end to definitions unless you have dealt with them through genera, species, differences, and properties. For if you define something, you must first say from which genus it is, and in this way, the genus and species are completed. For whatever genus of a thing you mention, you make a species of that thing to which you have applied it, such as if you define what a human is, you say that a human is an animal. Therefore, since you have fitted the animal to a human, you have declared the genus to be an animal and the human to be a species.

But it is not enough to demonstrate only the genus in a definition. For if you say that man is only an animal, you have not defined man more than an ox or a horse by the definition. Therefore, it is also useful to apply differences, through which what you define is separated from other species, so that you say that man is a rational animal. And since under the same difference, multiple species are often found, such as god and man under the rational, the use of properties is most useful, so that you say what only the species you define retains as its own property. Therefore, this kind of definition of man is made: man is an animal, that is, a genus, but man is a species; rational, which is the difference; capable of laughter, which is the property. But there is no use of accidents in definitions. Therefore, it is useful to know these five things in definitions; so that you do not omit what is useful and do not add what provides no advantage.

In division, however, it is only useful in such a way that nothing can be properly distributed and divided without the knowledge of these things. For what will be the correct distribution or division of genera or species, where we are guided by no knowledge of the things themselves by which they are divided? The truth of proofs lies mainly in this, that through what you divide, you prove what you divide or something else. For Marcus Tullius, in the first book of his Rhetoric, because he was making a proper and orderly division of the genera of causes, arranged that the proof of this matter should be through species and genera, saying that the same things can be superposed on some and subposed on others, but cannot be both subject and superposed. We have believed that these things should be said about utility for the time being.

The Order of Syllogisms and Aristotle’s Analytics

[1.05] Then Fabius said, “I wonder why you have presented me with such a subtle and well-practiced matter at the beginning. But tell me, please, what was your plan?” I will tell you: the listener’s mind must be trained and imbued with moderate subtlety so that when they have first exercised themselves in the wrestling arena of the intellect, they can, in a way, grapple with what follows without any effort. But you may ask, “What remains?” And Fabius replied, “I believe the order remains, if I remember correctly.” Indeed, I said, this order is closely connected with the title. For if you know one, you know both. However, the order is what all those who followed Porphyry in entering logic first handed down through this little book, which initially guides one to the simplicity of thinness so that those proceeding on this path are prepared. For Aristotle, wanting to hand down the order and knowledge of dialectical and apodictic disciplines to posterity, saw that the power of apodictic and dialectical reasoning was contained in a single order of syllogism. So he wrote the Prior Analytics, which the Greeks call “Ἀναλυτικὰ Πρότερα,” to be read before anyone approached the art of dialectics or apodictics. In the Prior Analytics, the order, combination, and figures of syllogisms are discussed. And since a syllogism is a genus of apodictic and dialectical syllogisms, Aristotle exercised dialectics in his Topics and ordered apodictics in the Posterior Analytics. The discipline that he had previously gathered in demonstrating syllogisms is also read earlier in the studies. Thus, the Prior Analytics, which are about the general class of syllogisms, are received before the Posterior Analytics, which are about apodictic syllogisms, or the Topics, which are about dialectical syllogisms.

Aristotle, therefore, drew dialectical and apodictic knowledge together and united them in the analytic disputation of syllogisms. But since a syllogism necessarily consists of propositions, he annotated the book titled “Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας,” or “On Interpretation,” about propositions. However, all propositions are made up of words that signify something. So he wrote the book about the ten categories, which the Greeks call “κατηγορίαι,” about the primary names and meanings of things. Aristotle saw the infinite variety and disparity of things and words and, to find their order, collected whatever that could be in ten primary words signifying the primary genera of things, whether things or words. But this is as far as Aristotle goes. Porphyry, on the other hand, pondered whether the categories are genera of things, and whether the diversity of things and words should be marked by species, differences, and properties. He also saw the great force of accidents in the categories – for Aristotle first divided all things into two parts, accidents and substance, and dispersed accidents into nine parts, saying that any given thing is either substance or, if it is an accident, it is either a quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, or passion. Therefore, Porphyry gives us a foretaste of the true knowledge of these things in this treatise on genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents.

Thus, when apodictic and dialectical syllogistic matters are taught before, the first effort lies in propositions before syllogistics, and before propositions, a few things are learned in categories, and before categories that are thought to consist of genera, species, differences, proper attributes, and accidents, it is proper to briefly taste these very matters. Therefore, rightly, and by some thread of order, this first book of Porphyry is a foretaste and, in a way, an initiator for those studying. If what has been said is enough in this matter, we have also finished the matter of the title. For by what other name could this book be better called than an introduction? For it is an entrance to Aristotle’s Categories and, in a way, a door that admits those who come.

[1.06] Then Fabius said: "Please go on, and if this is his own and genuine work, gather it. This, I say, is undoubted, for the style here agrees with all of Porphyry’s books. And it is Porphyry’s custom that, in those matters that are most obscure, he runs ahead introducing and giving a taste, as he did in some other book on categorical syllogisms and on many other things which are important and illustrious in philosophy. And this is undoubted among the ancients, whose disbelief in us is due to ignorance. Then Fabius said: “It remains that you explain to which part of philosophy it leads.” I will tell you. Since categories are suited for propositions, syllogisms are composed of propositions, and apodictic or dialectical syllogisms are part of the discipline of the art of logic, it is also clear that categories, which pertain to propositions and syllogisms, are connected to the science of logic. Therefore, the introduction to categories will also be suitably adapted to logical science. Since I have explained the things that are predicated, let the reasoning and order of the text itself be seen now. Then Fahius said: “Before the explanation of the meaning proceeds, I wish to know why, when he could have said ‘since it is necessary,’ he put the words in reverse order, saying 'it is necessary since.’”

And I said: “Since there is no accident that does not rely on the foundation of substance. Furthermore, whatever is for the firmness of any subject, it must have existed before the subject itself. For just as in houses, unless you first put foundations, there will never be any structure; likewise, unless the foundations of substance exist first, no accidents will ever be superimposed. For something must exist first, so that it can take on the form of quality, as ‘necessary’ is a quality. Therefore, he did not absurdly put ‘to be’ first, and then ‘necessary,’ that is, he adapted the name of quality after the substance.”

Aristotle’s Categorization and Equivocal/Univocal Terms

[1.07] Here Fabius said, “You have explained this very subtly and clearly, but now let’s examine the order and structure of the work itself.”

“As it is necessary, Menantius, for understanding Aristotle’s Categories or the discipline of definition, to know what a genus is, and what a species, what a difference, what a property, and what an accident, I will briefly attempt to explain these things to you. Indeed, these subjects have been deeply and magnificently discussed by the ancients; I will explain them to you in simple language and with some conjecture, moderately applying them to other matters.”

Then I (Boethius) said, "We have indeed mentioned a few things above, but I do not think it absurd to either add some things to these or to repeat these same points. The overall meaning is as follows. Writing to Menantius about the usefulness of the book, he briefly mentioned a few points so that the listener’s mind might be better prepared and more practiced to grasp these things. He says that it is useful for Aristotle’s Categories because, when he divided the sum total of diverse things signified by our words into substance and accident, he separated all things into these two categories and further divided accidents into nine parts, as I have shown above. He called these the most general genera, that is, ‘genikwutata,’ since no other genera can be found above them. Therefore, if there are genera, they cannot be without species. If species are placed under these, they will not be without differences. And if they retain differences, they will need properties. There are nine categories of accident. Therefore, it was not absurd for an introduction to the Categories to be composed, which would deal with genera, species, differences, and properties, since these things seem inseparably inserted into the Categories themselves. Moreover, because the subtlety of Aristotle’s thought dealt with equivocal and univocal terms before arriving at the order of the categories, he defined equivocal terms in this way:

“Equivocal terms are those with only a common name, but the rationale of the substance according to the name is different.”

For example, if there are things that share a name but have different substances, and univocal terms, which are contained under the same name and the same substance. Therefore, every genus can be predicated univocally of the species placed under it. Furthermore, whatever is predicated equivocally of any things, in these the only difference is that the genus and species are not interchangeable. For ‘animal’ and ‘human’ are univocal terms. ‘Animal’ is called by the name of ‘animal,’ and moreover, the name ‘animal’ is also suitable for the name, so that it may be called an ‘animal.’ Therefore, both human and animal are called by the same name of ‘animal.’ The definition of ‘animal,’ however, is ‘an animate, sensible substance’: if you turn this to ‘human,’ you will have done nothing absurd, for a human can be an animate, sensible substance, but ‘animal’ is a genus and ‘human’ is a species. Therefore, genus and species are predicated univocally. But equivocal terms, since they differ in their definitions and those whose definitions are different also have different substances, and those with different substances are also entirely different genera, are not suitable for either genus or species. For example, if someone calls a marble man and a living man by the name of ‘human,’ they have made the same name for the substance, but the difference and definition are dissimilar. Furthermore, a man and a statue are not of the same kind; a statue is inanimate, while a man is animate. Therefore, it is clear that things that are equivocally predicated are never contained under the same genera. You will never discern this force unless you first acquire knowledge and understanding of genera, species, properties, and differences.

Aristotle also says what the primary substances and secondary substances are. He says that primary substances are individual bodies and single entities, such as Cicero, Plato, or Socrates, while he calls the species the secondary substances, like man, or the genera that contain the species, like animal. Therefore, these things cannot be known unless preceded by a knowledge of genus and species. Aristotle also states that one substance cannot be distinguished from another substance in terms of being a substance, without any difference. He also looks for properties of substances, so that, as if by some impressed sign, we can more easily discover and understand what a substance is. And he does the same with accidents. For he collected the properties of quantity, quality, and relation to something, and this can be seen with great care and diligence in Aristotle. Do you see how the force of these five things intertwines itself in the categories and is inseparably connected with the powers of predication? Therefore, Porphyry did not deceive us when he promised the usefulness of these five things in the Categories.

Definition and Derivation of Definition

[1.08] As we mentioned earlier, the discipline of definition cannot be dealt with apart from genera, species, differences, and properties. But since there are some genera that cannot have a genus, such as substance or other things that Aristotle established in his predicaments, someone might say that knowing these things is of no use at all. The fact that definition cannot be derived from a genus in which a genus cannot be found, and that if something did not have a genus, it would not be a species; given this, the definition of the most general genera would have no utility from genera and species. This is a laughable and absurd proposition! For who can know those most general genera more without the knowledge of genera and species, since if this knowledge is lost, nothing about genera and species can be known? Therefore, in those things in which no higher genus can be found, no limit of definition will ever be adapted, and genera and species will cease in the definition itself, and only the differences and properties of that thing will inform the limit of definition. For when you have separated what you say from all other things by attaching differences and have shown its form and shape with proper characteristics, you will not be able to find a genus. Do not labor to seek it. But in those things where a genus cannot be found, because they are the most general genera themselves, genera and species are not required. Moreover, in those things that have a genus, if the definition is not derived from the genus, the end of that definition is gathered by a flawed conclusion.

It is undoubted that accidents are of no use in definitions. For a definition desires to inform a substance, while an accident does not designate a substance. Therefore, an accident is of no use in a definition. Thus, it is necessary to have knowledge of genus and species, so that if someone is going to define something that is not the most general, they derive the definition from the genus, but if they are the most general, they do not labor to seek a genus that cannot be found. For it is equally flawed to seek genera in the most general things or to refrain from deriving a definition from genera in subordinate genera.

Indeed, differences and properties, whether they are more general or subordinate, retain great utility. And since some things have been said that pertain to definitions, we will also gather a few things more reasonably and subtly about these very matters. Let the genus be animal, let the species be human, let the difference be rational or mortal, let the property be laughter; but since accidents are useful for definitions, let us omit them. Therefore, whoever defines a species, separates it from other genera by means of the genus, as if someone asks ‘what is a human?’ they say ‘animal.’ For by saying animal, one separates humans from all genera that are not animals. If someone, however, states the difference and adapts it to the species, they have separated things under the same genera by differences. For when you say that a human is a rational animal, a human, as well as an ox and a horse, are species of animals, yet the addition of rationality to humans separates and distinguishes the human species from other species under the same genus. But when you give properties, you separate things that are under the same differences. For when you say neighing or laughter, the former is a property of a horse, the latter of a human. And since a horse, ox, and dog are under the same difference, being all irrational, the addition of neighing separates the horse from the other species under the same difference. Both humans and gods are under the same difference, namely rational, as both are rational beings, although humans and gods are separated by the added difference of mortality, yet by the property of laughter, which only humans have, they are more naturally and substantially separated. This can be better understood in other things where no such difference separates species. For instance, under the same difference of irrationality are a horse, ox, and dog, and there is no other substantial difference that separates them – there can be accidental differences that separate them, such as forms – but the added property of neighing separates the horse from the other species under the same difference by the separation of its property.

It must therefore be repeated from the beginning that genera in definitions separate from other genera, differences from the species themselves which are placed under the same genera, and properties from species which are subordinated under the same differences.

The Force and Subtlety of Proof or Division

[1.09] But since the matter of definition has been fully dealt with, let us discuss the force and subtlety of proof or division. However, every division is twofold, either when you separate the whole body into diverse parts or when you distribute genera through species. If anyone, therefore, less skilled in these five matters, wishes to make divisions of things, there is no doubt that they often dissolve them from species into genera through ignorance, which is most foul to do. This happened to Hermagoras in the first disputation of Rhetoric. For he fell into such clouds of error that he subordinated two genera under an equal part of a genus. But if he had seen the force and truth of divisions and had taken up the discipline of genera, species, properties, and differences, he would never have been so vividly blamed for the error of such foolish divisions by Marcus Tullius. In proofs, however, the fruit of this work is so great that proof of anything else can never be produced. For how can you adequately demonstrate something if you do not know its differences, and thus cannot know what it is like? How can you properly execute something if you do not know its genus, and therefore ignore the source from which it flows? Or how can you show something logically in proofs if you do not know its species, and thus cannot recognize what it is you want to prove? If you neglect proper characteristics, you will never be able to confine things within the proper limits of proof. But if you do not discern the power and nature of accidents, you will mix the empty name of an accident equally in definitions and proofs when discussing each substance. Thus, with these things known, division and definition will remain whole and stable, but with them unknown, proof will be weak, wavering, and truncated.

Porphyry’s Approach

[1.10] Therefore, it is Porphyry, not Victorinus, who promises to explain these matters briefly and moderately. For he would not be acting as an introduction if he were to lay the foundation for us from the beginning for that to which this clear introduction is being prepared. He maintains the mode of introduction with a most learned restraint in arguing, so that he might temper the path of those entering into the darkest obscurities of things with some light of teaching. He says that among the ancients, the matters he now briefly and moderately puts together were discussed in a deep and magnificent manner. However, he briefly touches on and passes by what the ancient philosophers debated about these matters. Then Fabius said: What is that? And I said: This is what he claims to entirely omit – the genera and species themselves, whether they truly exist or are held only by the intellect and mind, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separate or joined to the sensible things. He promised to be silent about these things since the discussion would be too deep, but let us, with the aid of a moderating bridle, touch upon each of these matters moderately. The first question, then, of those he promises to pass over and omit is whether the genera and species truly exist or are imagined as bare and empty in the intellect alone. This question is of the following kind. Since the human mind is diverse, it understands things subject to the senses through the quality of the senses, and from these, by a certain speculative conception, it establishes a path for itself to understand incorporeal things, so that when I see individual people, I also know that I have seen them and, because they are people, I profess to have understood them.

Hence, with understanding derived from and strengthened by the knowledge of sensible things, the intellect raises itself to higher contemplation, and now it suspects that it encompasses the very form of man, which is placed under the category of animal, and each individual man, and understands that incorporeal thing which previously it had assumed to be bodily in each individual man, both in sensing and understanding. For we cannot say that the specific man, who contains all of us within the scope of his name, is corporeal, since we conceive of him with the mind and intellect alone. Thus, the mind is elevated by an incomparable higher intelligence based on the first principles of things. Therefore, the soul is not only the artisan of understanding incorporeal things through the senses but also of devising and even lying to itself. For example, it was the intellect that combined the form of a horse or a man to create the false image of a centaur. The Greeks call these mental contemplations, which proceed from the perception of things to understanding or are certainly invented, “phantasia,” which can be called “vision” by us.

Whether Genera and Species Exist

So now they inquire about genera, species, and other matters, whether they are truly subsistent and understood as having a kind of essence and constancy, as we understand the genuinely and wholly derived form of man from individual corporeal things, or whether they are certainly devised by some mental imagination, as in that verse of Horace:

If a painter wished to join a human head to a horse’s neck

which neither is nor can be, but is painted only by a false mental contemplation. You ask a very keen and subtle question, which will greatly benefit the matter! For we must know whether they truly are or whether there is a dispute and consideration about them if they do not exist. But if you weigh the truth and integrity of things, there is no doubt that they truly are. For since all things that truly are cannot exist without these five things, do not doubt that these five things are truly understood to exist. Moreover, they are glued together in all things and are somehow joined and compacted. For why would Aristotle dispute about the first ten categories that signify the genera of things, or collect their differences and properties, and primarily discuss accidents, unless he had seen these things intimately and somehow united in things? If this is the case, there is no doubt that they truly are and are held by a certain mental consideration. This is also proven by Porphyry’s agreement. For he does not hesitate to bring up another question as if it were already proven and known that these things truly subsist, when he says: whether these things are corporeal or incorporeal. This would be an excessively frivolous and absurd question, whether they were corporeal, unless it was first established that they exist. This inquiry, which is not insignificant in its usefulness, is resolved in this way: incorporeal things are those which indeed cannot be grasped by any senses, but their qualities become clear through the consideration of the mind. For because the primary nature of incorporeal things exists, an incorporeal thing can somehow be the parent of a corporeal thing. But corporeal things cannot preside over incorporeal things because, since substance is a genus, and corporeal and incorporeal are species of substance, this demonstrates that the corporeal cannot be a genus, as incorporeal is subordinate to substance, that is, to the genus. If the corporeal were a genus, an incorporeal species would never be placed under it.

Observe, then, most attentively, as you have never observed before. Since a genus has species, and species are distinguished by differences and informed by properties, and because certain species are found that have contrary positions within a divided genus, such as rational and irrational under the category of animal, and mortal and immortal under rational, and these are also contrary; it is asked whether an animal, by solitary understanding, is neither rational nor irrational, and where these differences have arisen in the species, which were not previously in the genus. But if the genus, that is, animal, has both things in itself, so that it is both rational and irrational, two contraries occur in the same thing, which is impossible. I will, therefore, briefly address the question and say that it is not the genus that is both, that is, rational or irrational, or anything else by which species are divided through contrarieties, but it is the power and nature of the genus that contains this, and yet the genus itself is none of these things. So, the genus is such that it is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but it can produce both from itself, which will be better explained in the second book.

Whether the Predicables Are Corporeal

Species are sometimes corporeal, sometimes incorporeal. For if you place man under substance, you have placed a corporeal species; but if you place God, an incorporeal one. In the same way, differences also apply. For if corporeal or incorporeal species are divided, some will be incorporeal, while others will be corporeal, such as when you say ‘quadruped’ in relation to ‘biped,’ which is a corporeal difference; but ‘rational’ in relation to ‘irrational’ is an incorporeal difference. Properties follow the same pattern. For if it is proper to a species, it will be either corporeal or incorporeal. Accidents also work in the same way. For if something happens to incorporeal entities, it is clearly incorporeal, as knowledge is an accident in the soul, which is incorporeal. However, what happens to corporeal entities is evidently corporeal, such as when someone says that they have curly hair as an accident. Therefore, if a genus is neither corporeal nor incorporeal in itself but can produce both from itself, species, differences, properties, and accidents will be called either corporeal or incorporeal depending on the contrary species they belong to.

However, some may find this explanation incomplete and argue that only incorporeal things should be defined. Those who say this do not consider the nature of each thing but only what the genus is. So if substance is a genus, it is not considered in what substance is but in what species it contains. Likewise, if a species is both corporeal and incorporeal, it is not considered as being God or human, but as being under the genus. In the same way, differences are not considered in whether they are biped or quadruped, but in being a difference. For quadruped is not a difference in itself unless there is a biped from which it differs. Therefore, it is not the quadruped or biped that is considered but what is in between them, that is, the difference. The same applies to properties. For what is proper to each thing is considered as proper only to the species it belongs to. For example, ‘laughable’ is not proper to humans because of laughter but because only humans can laugh. These are clearly incorporeal things. Then, accidents are as they are to the things they happen to, as previously mentioned.

However, these seem to be proven by the very opinion of Porphyry himself, who, as if it had already been proven that they are incorporeal, says: “And whether separate or connected to sensible things”, which, if these had ever been corporeal, it would be absurd to ask whether incorporeal things were separated or connected to sensible things since sensible things themselves are bodies. Such a question, however, is as follows: since there are some incorporeal things which do not allow for bodies at all, such as the mind or God, and others that cannot exist without bodies, like the first incorporeal entities beyond the limits, and still others that are in bodies and allow themselves to exist beyond bodies, like the soul – it is therefore asked of these five things from which kind of incorporeality they belong, whether those that are entirely separate from the body, or those that cannot be separated from bodies, or those that are sometimes connected and sometimes separated. It seems, however, that they can be both separated and connected. For when the division of corporeal things into genera and species is made and their properties and differences are named, it is not doubtful that these are about sensible things, that is, corporeal things; but when discussions are held about incorporeal things and they are divided by those things that lack a body, they deal with incorporeal things. If this is so, there is no doubt that these five things are of the same kind, both being able to be separated from bodies and to be connected to bodies, but in such a way that if they are connected to bodies, they are inseparable from bodies, and if they are incorporeal, they never separate from incorporeal things and contain both powers in themselves. For if they are connected to bodies, they are such as that first incorporeality beyond the limits, which never departs from the body; but if they are incorporeal, they are such as the mind, which never attaches to the body.

Porphyry’s Silence

[1.11] Therefore, Porphyry promises to remain silent on these matters and briefly and moderately discuss them, considering other things or conjectures, which is similar to saying: since these things pertain to categories, definitions, divisions, and proofs, I will assume and discuss them only insofar as they advance the aforementioned matters, not insofar as they can be discussed in themselves concerning genera, species, and other things. “For these are, as he himself says, matters of more serious treatment;” which doctrine he confesses to have “received from the Peripatetics,” that is, from the Aristotelians. For the Stoics, who also wanted to discuss these matters, are not wholly taken up by Porphyry, and therefore he says he accepts the method of argument from the Peripatetics. Then Fabius questioned me thus: “What is it,” he said, “that you were saying earlier, when you were talking about incorporeal things, that there are certain incorporealities which always exist around a body, such as the primary incorporealities beyond the limits? What is this incorporeality or what limits are you talking about? I don’t understand.” And I replied: “It is a long discussion and will not help us in the matter we are investigating. But briefly, I said that by limits I meant the extremities of the figures in geometry, and as for the incorporeality that exists around these limits, if you take up the first book of Macrobii Theodosii, a very learned man, which he composed on the Dream of Scipio, you will learn more fully and abundantly. But now let us move on to the following.”

Genus and Species

[1.12] Then Fabius said: “As you please,” and began as follows:

“It seems that neither genus nor species are simply called, that is, in one way. For genus is said to be the collection of certain things that have something in common, by which the Dardanidae are called a genus. Again, genus is said to be the origin of each person’s birth, either from the generator or from the one in which someone is born.”

“The rest,” he said, “are mostly well-known.” Then I replied: "If you first consider the force of equivocation, you will carefully recognize the division of the genus. For it pleases to name equivocal things with the name of the genus and its subjects. Equivocal things are those which, though they have one name, are far apart and distinct in substance, reason, and definition, as if someone, for example, were to call this statue of Venus ‘Venus’. Therefore, Venus herself and the statue of Venus agree in the single name of the word, which is the name of Venus for both. But if someone were to define each one, they would establish a completely different reason and definition for Venus and for the stone. Thus, it will become clear, I think, that those things are equivocal in species that are called by a single name, but are constituted by different definitions, as seen in the participation of the genus which Porphyry made, not Victorinus. For everything that is derived from a genus into species is univocal, not equivocal. Univocal is that which can be called by the same name and constituted by the same definition, as the genus is animal, and the species is human, but the same human is also an animal. Therefore, genus and species, that is, animal and human, can be called by the name of one animal, so that both are called animals, but they do not differ in their definitions. For if you render the definition of an animal, you would say that that is an animal which is a living, sensible substance; if you turn this definition to a human, it would not be absurd to say that a human is a living, sensible substance just like an animal, as has been said before.

For if univocal things are those which are constituted by one name and the same definition, and equivocal things are those which have one name but are not one in definition of substance, whatever is univocal is involved in genus and species, and whatever is equivocal does not have such participation, so that they are considered by species and genera. For what will be the knowledge of genus and species in those things in which the definition of substance and the most complete reason are separated? Thus, Porphyry divides the name of genus into three forms, but as equivocal, not as univocal, that is, these forms are contained under one genus name, but they disagree due to their distinct properties. But Porphyry divides the name of genus in this way into three parts, saying that genus is called once from the collection of many things among themselves, which draw the name of genus from one thing, as Romans are said to be of the same genus because they trace their origin from Romulus. In the second place, he affirms that genus is called, as of whatever nation’s beginning, either from the one who generates or from the place in which someone is born, as we say Aeneas is from Anchises and of the Trojan genus.

“Thirdly,” he says, “genus is that to which species is subordinated.” However, Victorinus reduces the two previous genera into one. For he declares that both the congruence of a multitude among themselves through the same genus name and the line of descent and place in which someone is born are designated by one genus term. He adds something that may be appropriate only for the Latin language: he says that genus is called in a second way, as in the genus of honorable cause. The Greeks do not consider these types of causes as genera in the rhetorical art but call them schumata, that is, figures, and they only accept the main genera: demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial. They themselves call these ei[dh rIhtorikh`", that is, species of rhetoric, and genera of causes. The third genus is what Porphyry posits, that is, under which differentiated species are subordinated. But since he will deal with the third genus, let us treat Victorinus’s fault or, if it happens, his correction as fair and good.

Victorinus on Genus

[1.13] Now, therefore, let us return to the former meaning of “genus” in Victorinus and take his words to be untangled and clarified. “For genus,” he says, “is called a collection of certain things related to something in some way.” Here, he shows both the relationship among the multitude and the line of descent. For when he says that genus is a collection of certain things related to one another in some way, that is, connected by some relationship, and he adds “related to something,” he signifies the line of the genus, which individuals touching and joining themselves to one by the application of their own generation are more closely connected and related, so that the order is this: a genus is said to be a certain collection of things that somehow relate to something, that is, a line extending through the genus to those things, so as to demonstrate their kinship through the collection and, through their relationship, somehow connect the line of the genus and its course.

He therefore follows and more clearly and brightly explains it when he says: “A GENUS IS ALSO SAID TO BE THE BEGINNING OF ANY BIRTH, EITHER FROM THE ONE WHO BEGETS OR FROM THE ONE IN WHICH SOMEONE IS BORN.” He elaborates more broadly on what he had previously bound with a tight and obscure bond of brevity. For he says that a genus is also called either from the one who begets or from the place in which someone is born. But if the particle ‘also’ is connected to what he says, ‘from the one in which someone is born,’ understanding does not waver, so that the order is: a genus is said to be the beginning of any birth, either from the one who begets or also from the one in which someone is born. Or certainly, there will be a simpler explanation. If we take the first meaning of genus, that is, a collection of certain things somehow related to something, to apply only to the kinship of a multitude, and distribute the course of the line and the place of generation in a lower meaning, so that one meaning of genus somehow signifies both the kinship of a multitude and the line from the one who begets and the birthplace. For all these things are discussed about the nation alone. Therefore, it is not absurd that all these things pertaining to the birth of anyone are contained in one meaning of genus. However, the most proper and simple explanation is that Victorinus established four meanings of genus, adding one to Porphyry’s three, the genus of the cause, so that these are the four meanings: kinship of a multitude, course of a line, genus of causes, genus of species.

The second division of genus according to Victorinus follows, THAT THERE IS A GENUS OF CAUSES: which the Greeks, as has been said, do not call genera but schemas. As for the third meaning of genus, the method is A GENUS IS SAID TO BE THAT WHICH UNDERLIES SPECIES, that is, that genus from which species are derived, which he says is perhaps arranged according to the likeness and fairness of the higher ones. For in this way, a genus is the beginning of its species, just as Romulus is to those who are related and joined to him as Romans, and in the same way, the name Romulus contains all Romans, just as the name of a genus contains species. For just as from Dardanus the Dardanids receive the name of the earlier Dardani in themselves and their descendants, so too, when for example, the animal has the species man and horse, both the horse and man receive the animal’s name in themselves, so that they do not refuse to be called animals. Therefore, species are contained under genera in the same way as relatives are contained under the one from whom they perhaps derive their kinship. For a genus is both the beginning of species and a collective of many species in itself. Again, the first concept of kinship and the principle of generation itself is the beginning, and in the diversity of the human vocabulary alone, it is collected through the participation of the word and the genus. This is what he says with these words:

“A genus is said differently, to which species are subordinated, according to the similarity of perhaps higher appellations. For a genus is a certain principle to those things which are under it and seems to contain the multitude of all things that are beneath it.”

But “seems” has been added very cautiously. For if all these things were not different, there would be a single meaning of the genus that is poured into the species and that which is divided in kinship. But there is such diversity among these genera that the genera of those species which have other species under them are equally genera to their coeval species. For man and horse, which are under the genus ‘animal,’ we cannot say that one is prior to the other in time and beginning of birth. For if one thing is prior, the other is later, and anyone who wishes to adapt them under the name of each genus will not be able; for the genus is equally a genus to its species. But if the genus is equally a genus to its species, the species of that order are considered to be of equal time and origin among themselves. However, in the genera that produce kinships, it is not so. For whoever was Capis, the father who founded Capua, if he only begot one son, Capin, and from one of the Capuans, all kinship and union flowed, it differs from the genus to which species are subordinated, for the genus can never be a genus to one species alone, but to several. Since that genus is suitable, that is, the principle of kinships, to collect and gather kinship even from one son, a genus led through species cannot do this unless multiple species are subordinated. It is clear that the genus that collects kinship differs in this from the one from which species are divided. Moreover, it can differ in this, too, that the genus, that is, the principle of kinship, can have under it two not equally timed offspring, but one of later birth and the other of earlier, which does not apply to genera and species. For, as has been said earlier, species cannot be placed under a genus unless they are equal to each other, not by merit but by nature.

Having dealt with these matters, he continues:

“Thus, there is so often a debate among philosophers concerning the ultimate signification of ‘genus,’ as they define it in this way –”

When he says “thus,” he wants to demonstrate this for the third time, and this has been admitted for the sake of the clear sequence of the work, so that, since genus is the name for many things, its primary signification would be stated first, so that the one to be debated, having rejected the others, would be chosen. He says this in this way: since genus is mentioned so often, that is, for the third time, among philosophers, that is, where he himself is going to deal with it, the debate and consideration focus on the ultimate signification of genus that he mentioned, that is, on that genus which has species beneath it. But in truth, regarding the higher genera, that is, concerning kinship and the place in which someone was born, the examination belongs to historians or poets; for the second genus, it belongs to rhetoricians; for the third, to philosophers.

There is also an order here in the debates, because when matters arise that can be named by many terms and treated and discussed concerning each of these words, it is necessary to state everything in order first, so that what is chosen and rejected can be distinguished. But those things which are to be rejected and dismissed should be mentioned first, and that which is to be discussed and treated, taken up and named later, as here that later signification of genus is positioned, which he, taking up for discussion, first undertook to define and to circumscribe within a certain boundary, and to demonstrate. For every matter, unless it is first established what it is, its treatment will be conducted in a vacant manner of speculation. He therefore defines in this way: genus is that which is predicated with respect to many differences in what something is, differing in species, such as ‘animal.’ The definition is like this: everything that is distant has some difference between them by which they appear to be distant and to differ. But if there is to be a genus and species are supposed under it, it is necessary that two or more species be placed under a genus, since a genus cannot be of a single species. But if there are many species, they must be divided by some difference, otherwise they cannot be many. For if they do not differ at all, they will not be many species and the name of genus perishes. It is agreed, then, that those species placed under a genus are composed of divisions by their differences, distributed by their differences and more numerous in number.

Therefore, since it was said earlier that in all definitions the beginning is to be drawn from the genus of the definition, if you want to define any species, you must first name the genus and apply the name of the genus itself to that species which you are defining. And by doing this, you primarily say that it is that, which is that genus under which the very species you are defining is placed. Afterwards, you exclude it from others by its own differences and by a certain circumscription of the definition. For if you say that a human is an animal, ‘animal’ is the genus, while ‘human’ is the species. Therefore, you have predicated the name ‘animal,’ that is, of the genus, of ‘human,’ that is, of the species, when you said that a human is an animal. If you could use the name of the genus in definitions for just one species, you would predicate the name of the genus on it. But as species are equally related to their genera, there is nothing to prevent, indeed it is always necessary for whatever genera there are, to be predicated in definitions or in any questions about the species subject to them.

But since a genus is predicated of species, it is necessary to understand how it is predicated. For if you say: what is a human? And someone answers ‘animal’, they seem to have answered correctly and completely, and certainly. For when you asked what a human is, they answered ‘animal’, namely predicating the genus of the species by explaining what the species is. For you asked what the species is, and they applied the name ‘animal’, that is, of the genus, to what the species is that you asked about. Thus, a complete and proper definition of the genus has been made: ‘this is the genus that is called upon in explaining what something is, in relation to many widely differing species, such as animal’; for ‘animal’ is called upon in relation to humans, horses, cows, crows, snakes, and many other things that differ by species and differences. But whether they had said that a genus is what is predicated in relation to many species with distant differences, or, as they said, ‘a genus is what is predicated in relation to many widely differing species’, it makes no difference. For whether the differences are wide apart by species or the species are wide apart by differences, both are the same. For whether rational and irrational, which are differences, are wide apart by species from, for example, humans and horses, or species such as humans and horses are divided and set apart by rational and irrational differences, it makes no difference. Therefore, a complete and perfect definition of the genus has been made.

Porphyry’s Definition of Genus

[1.15] But definitions are made in two ways. One definition is drawn from the genus, as has been said. But since there are some things that are more general and cannot have another genus above them, such as the ten categories that Aristotle established, what definition can be had for those whose genus cannot be found, since they are the genera of all that exists? So we can call these, which the Greeks call “υπογραφικούς λόγους,” “subscriptive accounts” in Latin. Subscriptive accounts are demonstrative and somewhat indicative of the property of that thing, which, being the most general, has no genus that can be found, yet it is necessary to define it. And Aristotle, wanting to define substance as the most general genus and being unable to find any genus for it, said that a certain property and demonstration and subscriptive account of the thing itself is the subject. For substance is subject to all things. An accident, which is divided into nine parts, cannot exist without substance. And so, all things that must be defined, if they do not have a genus, must have some subscriptive and demonstrative account given of them. Thus, in this case, since he thought the genus itself needed defining, he did not derive a definition from the genus but provided a certain demonstration and property of the genus.

I say that Porphyry, for either the subaltern genera or those which are the most general, has given this definition and, in a way, a demonstration and subscription. For if any genus has another genus and likewise this very one has another and likewise another, if there will be no genus above which does not have a genus, the reasoning goes on infinitely. But if it does not have one, it is also necessary that this definition aptly and orderly fits. I say that the genus is not the animal for man and horse, but that by which the animal itself is the genus for man and horse. For the animal itself is not, by itself, a genus for anything, nor is man himself, by itself, a species for anything, nor is the horse itself, by itself, a species for anything, but they are genera and species in relation to another’s participation. For since the horse and man are under the animal, the animal is not a genus for itself but for the horse and man. And likewise, the species which are called, namely man and horse, are not species for the horse and man but for the animal. I say therefore that the genus and species are not the substances themselves in which the genus and species are, but the participation itself of the prior to the inferior and of the inferior to the prior. So this participation, since it is one and the same both in the more general genera and in the more general species and in the subaltern genera and in the subaltern species, the genus of this participation could not be found. This definition of the genus which was made, was not derived from the genus but was a subscriptive and demonstrative reason and, in a way, it was given as a designation of the genus.

Primary Division of All Things; Examples of Predicables

[1.16] Here, Fabius says: “You have explained it quite subtly, indeed, and in a way we have rarely heard before. But please continue, for now, the stars are somehow vying with each other, and the night is overcome by the light.” Then I (Boethius) reply: Next comes the brief and primary division of all things. For he (Porphyry) says:

‘Of the things that are spoken of, some are said in reference to unity, like all individuals, such as Socrates and this and that; others are said in reference to a multitude, such as genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents. These are common, not specific to one particular name.’

As previously mentioned, this is a brief and distinct division. For everything is either the name of one thing or of many things, and this is what he says: of the things that are spoken of, some are said in reference to unity, like all individuals. What this means, however, must be briefly explained. Every genus, since it has species under it, and the species are distinguished by differences and defined by properties – accidents occur in species in a secondary way, but primarily in the individuals that are under the species. What this means, however, will be discussed later – thus, genera are spoken of in relation to species, differences, which distribute the species themselves, and properties, which compose the species. And also of those accidents which, though they primarily exist in individuals, are said to be in species. Let us illustrate this with examples. Let our genus be ‘animal,’ let our species be ‘human,’ let our difference be ‘rational,’ let our property be ‘capable of laughter,’ let our accident be ‘standing,’ ‘walking,’ or something in the measure of the body, such as ‘three feet tall.’ The animal, which is a genus, is spoken of in relation to the species, that is, to humans; for you say that a human is an animal. Moreover, you also say the genus in relation to the difference of the species: for you say that a rational being is an animal. Nothing, however, prevents you from also saying the genus in relation to the property. For if you say, ‘What is capable of laughter?’ it is not absurd to name an animal. Accidents, however, are primarily in individuals, and secondarily in species. For if someone says that each individual human, such as Cicero, is sitting, standing, or whatever else, it is necessary that the same also applies to the species ‘human.’ For if Cicero sits, then a human sits; if Cicero walks, then a human walks. Therefore, if any accidents come from individuals and are considered in relation to species, the genus can also be said of those accidents. For if someone asks, ‘What is a walking being?’ an animal is rightly called. For nothing but an animal can walk. Moreover, individuals are under species, such as Cicero and Virgil under ‘human,’ and the genus of the species can be predicated of an individual. For if you ask, ‘What is Cicero?’ you rightly say, ‘an animal.’ Thus, the genus is named in relation to species, differences, accidents, properties, and individuals.

Furthermore, a species is now called not from a genus nor from differences, but only from its own properties and the individual subjects, in those, that is, individuals, because it remains. In its own properties, because it is equal. Let us see what this means. All genera are superior to and abound in their species. We say that genera abound in species because they have more power than species. For man, which is a species, is only a man, but an animal, which is a genus, is not only a man but also a horse or an ox or any other animal you choose to substitute. Thus, the greater power of a genus is rightly predicated on the lesser and the subject species. However, there are other things that are equal to themselves, such as properties and species. The species is man, and the property is the ability to laugh. Therefore, whatever is capable of laughter is a man, and whatever is a man is capable of laughter.

So neither the ability to laugh in a man nor the man capable of laughter surpasses their power, but they can be predicated of each other equally, so you could say: what is a man? Capable of laughter; what is capable of laughter? A man. Thus, whatever is superior is predicated of those that are inferior, and whatever is equal is predicated of each other equally. Those that are inferior and lesser, however, cannot be predicated of the superior and abundant ones, such as genera and species – for genera are abundant, and species are lesser – you can never rightly predicate a species of a genus. Thus, a species is predicated of a property as an equal, but since individuals are under species individually – and we call individuals those that can no longer be divided into any species or any other parts, such as Cato or Plato or Cicero and any single person; for you cannot divide these into any parts, as an animal into species, namely a man and a horse, a man himself encompassing specific individuals such as Cato, Plato, Virgil, and all men distributed individually; but we cannot distribute a single man, that is Cicero, into any others, and therefore he is called an indivisible, that is, an individual – a species, which is predicated equally with respect to its properties, is predicated with respect to individuals because the species of man is greater than any individual, so that it is predicated as superior to that which is inferior. For Cicero alone is Cicero, but a man is not only Cicero. If it is predicated of individuals, it will also be predicated of the accidents of individuals. Thus, a species is not predicated of a genus because it is superior, nor of a difference, because a difference, as we will now show, is above a species, but it is predicated of a property, to which it is equal, or of an individual, to which it is superior.

Indeed, the difference is predicated both of species and of properties and of individuals. For the rational, which is the difference, is predicated of man, which is a species. Likewise, the rational, that is, the difference, is predicated of the laughable, that is, the property. For it is said that the laughable is that which is rational. For if man is rational and man is laughable, it is clear that what is laughable can also be called rational. But if the difference is said of species, and species are predicated of individuals, it is necessary that the difference is also predicated of individuals. For you say: what kind of person is Cicero? Rational. But if the difference is predicated of individuals, and accidents happen in individuals, it is necessary for differences to be predicated of accidents as well. As for the property, since it is always the property of one species, it is predicated of that species alone, to which it is proper. For the laughable, which is a property, is predicated of the human species alone. But if it is predicated of the human species, and species are predicated of individuals, there is no doubt that properties are also predicated of individuals. For if man is a laughable animal, then Cicero and Virgil are rightly called laughable animals. But if the property is rightly predicated of individuals, it is also rightly predicated of accidents that happen in those individuals. But accidents themselves are predicated of species and all other things, and especially of individuals. For both a white horse and a white man are said to be, and again a black horse and a black Ethiopian. If this is so, an animal is also called black. Rational black and irrational black are also said, if both the horse and the Ethiopian man are black. Laughable black is also said, when a man is black. An individual black is also said, when one man from Ethiopia is named. Since this is the case, it is clear that the genus is predicated of many things, that is, species, differences, accidents, properties, and individuals; and likewise, the difference is predicated of many things, that is, species, properties, individuals, and accidents; and the property of many things, that is, species, individuals, and accidents; and the species of many things, that is, properties, individuals, and accidents; and the accident is predicated of the genus, the species, the property, the difference, and the individuals. If this is so, it is clear that these five things are predicated of many things.

Indeed, since the individual has nothing beneath it, it is predicated to a certain singularity and unity. For Cicero is one, and this name is suitable for one. Thus, individuals, which are said to be united, are subordinate to all higher categories such as genus, species, difference, property, or accidents, although they can be said to each other, yet they are equally predicated to individuals, as previously demonstrated. However, since individuals have nothing beneath them where they can be divided and distributed, they are predicated to nothing other than themselves, which are singular and united. And this is what Porphyry says:

“Of the things that are spoken, some are said in relation to unity, such as all individuals, like Socrates and this or that, others in relation to multitude, such as genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents. For these are common, not belonging to one specific designation.”

This is similar to saying: for these things are commonly predicated to many, not to unity like individuals. And he provides examples of what genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents are, saying: “For genus is, for example, ‘animal,’ species is ‘human’ - which we placed a while ago under ‘animal’ along with other living beings - difference is ‘rational’ - by which the human species, of course, differs from the irrational animal - property is ‘capable of laughter,’ which no other animal, neither rational nor irrational, possesses. No animal laughs except humans alone. Therefore, since some celestial powers are rational animals, their property is not laughter, as they do not laugh. So it is rightly said that the capacity to laugh is a property specific to humans alone. Accident is ‘white,’ ‘black,’ and ‘sitting’: because these are not in the substance of humans, they are rightly called accidents. For if what we call an accident were inherent in the substance of any species, with the removal of the accident, the substance of that species to which it belonged would also perish. For since rationality is in the substance of humans, if rationality were abolished, the substance of humans would necessarily perish as well, because it is rooted in the nature and substance of the species itself. But if you remove black and white, or any other accidents, the species itself in which they occurred remains. For not every human is white, nor is every human black, and if either is absent, the species does not perish. And for this reason, these accidents, as if not innate in the substance but coming from outside, have been rightly named.”

Distinctive Features of Genus

[1.17] Now then, since he has shown what a genus is and distinguished it from those things which are said of one, he has also separated and distributed it from those things which are predicated of many. He explains the differences of genus either from those things which are said of one or from those which are appropriate to plurality, that is, from difference, species, property, and accident. He says that a genus differs from those things which are predicated only of individuals, that is, of one thing, in that a genus is predicated of many things, but individuals are predicated of single things. But since this difference of genus was common to individuals, differences, species, properties, and accidents, he divides and separates genus from those other differences themselves. He demonstrates this as follows:

“From those things, therefore, which are said of one, a genus differs in that a genus is what is predicated of many things. But from the other remaining things, a genus differs, first from species, because although a species is predicated of many, it is not predicated of things differing in species but in number.”

And first, he shows the difference between genus and species, which is closer to genus. For although difference is above species, the most specific difference is placed above the most specific species. For although the difference of being rational is placed above man, which is the most specific species, nevertheless, before the most specific species, the difference itself is a species of its genus, to which the most specific species is subordinated; for under “animal” rational is placed before “man.” Therefore, since both genus and species are predicated of many things, a genus is indeed predicated of many species in what it is, but a species is no longer predicated of many species, but of many individuals. There are, however, some most general genera, as has been said, above which no other genus can be found. But there are species under which no other species can be found, and a complete species is called that which is never a genus, that is, under which there are no species. For if there were species under it, it could also be a genus. A species, therefore, which is truly a species, will not have other species under it, as is the case with “human.” For since “human” is a species, individual humans who are under it are not called its species but individuals. For if “human” were the genus of individual humans, and a genus, as has been said, is predicated of many things differing in species in what it is, then “human,” that is, the species, if predicated as a genus, would have individual humans differing in species from each other. But since individual humans do not differ in species, whatever is predicated of them without differing in species is not predicated as a genus to species, that is, “human” is not predicated of individual humans as a genus to many things differing in species. What then? To many things differing in number; for individual humans differ from one another only in number, not in species.

And therefore, since the genus is predicated in relation to its subjects in such a way that it is predicated of many things that are different in species, and the species is predicated in relation to its subjects in such a way that it is predicated of many things that are different in number, the genus is distinguished from the species in this respect: the genus is predicated of many things that are different in species, whereas the species is predicated of many things that are different in number. Thus, the genus and species are in agreement in that both are predicated of many things and both concern the question of what something is. For if you ask, “What is Cicero?” The answer is “an animal,” that is, the genus. And if you ask, “What is Cicero?” The answer is “a man,” that is, the species. They differ, however, in that although both are predicated of many things and concern the question of what something is, the genus is predicated of things that are different in species, whereas the species is predicated of things that are different only in number, as Porphyry demonstrates:

“From these, however, the genus differs from the remaining things that are predicated of many, first from the species, since although the species is predicated of many, it is not predicated of things different in species but in number. For ‘man,’ being a species, is predicated of Socrates, Plato, and Cicero, who do not differ in species but in number, whereas ‘animal,’ which is a genus, is predicated of both oxen and horses, which also differ in species from one another, not just in number.”

This is similar to saying that the genus has one more difference from the species. For the genera are in agreement with the species in that both are predicated of the question of what something is, as was said. Also, both genus and species are in agreement in that both are predicated of many things. Furthermore, the genus is in agreement with the species in that both are predicated of things that are different in number. For individual humans are separate from one another in terms of number, just as a human is separate from a horse or an ox or a crow or any other living creatures. But the genus differs from the species in that the genus is predicated of many things that are different in species, which the species does not have. The author does not consider there to be any difference between saying ‘one thing is predicated of another’ and ‘one thing is predicated about another.’ For both expressions have the same understanding. For if ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘human,’ ‘animal’ is also predicated about ‘human.’ For when you ask, “What is a human?” you answer the question about a human by saying that a human is an animal.

Distinction of Property From Genus

[1.18] But now we must consider what follows. So, what comes next?

“However, a property differs from a genus in that a property is called proper to the species it belongs to and according to the individuals that are under the species; for example, being capable of laughter is unique to humans and to individual humans. A genus, on the other hand, does not apply to just one species but always to several different species.”

Therefore, it seems that he is saying here that every property, if it belongs to only one species, is truly a property. For if it does not belong to just one species but to two or more, then it is not a property but will be common in the sense of substance. It is clear, then, that a property adheres solely and uniquely to the species it belongs to. Hence, since the human species is the only one that laughs, the property of being capable of laughter is attributed properly and uniquely to humans. A property is always applied to one species. Therefore, a property differs from a genus in that a genus is always attributed to several species, whereas a property only to one species to which it belongs. For if you say “capable of laughter,” it refers only to the human species. However, a genus agrees with a property in this respect: both genus and property are attributed to multiple things. For a genus is attributed to several species and is also attributed to the individuals that are under the species. For if both humans and horses are animals, then Cicero is an animal, and any individual horse is also called an animal. Similarly, a property is also said of many things. For it is attributed to each species and to the individual things that are under the species. For if humans are capable of laughter, then so are Cicero and Virgil, and whoever else is named individually, they are capable of laughter. They also agree in that both genus and property are predicated in what something is. For a genus is predicated of a species in what it is. For if you say: what is a human? You will call it an animal. Likewise, a property is predicated in what something is. For if you say: what is a human? You will rightly call it capable of laughter. They also agree in that both genus and property are predicated of many numerically different things. For individual animals, such as humans, horses, and crows, and others, differ from one another as much as individual humans do in terms of number. However, a property differs from a genus in that a genus is predicated of several species, whereas a property is attributed only to the one species to which it belongs. But the difference between a genus and a property is not the same as that between a species and a genus. For a species is predicated of no species at all, while a property, although not of several, will always be suitable for the one species to which it belongs.

Distinction of Difference and Accident From Genus

[1.19] After this, he discusses the distinction of difference and accident from genus, saying:

“Difference and accident differ from genus, because although they too are predicated of multiple species with different qualities, namely differences and accidents which occur commonly, they are not predicated in the sense of what something is, but rather in response to questions about the qualities. For they show more of what sort of thing it is.”

He reserves difference and accident for later discussion because he will describe one distinction and distance for both of them. Difference and accident demonstrate the quality of any species. The former, difference, shows the quality of substance, while the latter, accident, shows the quality of non-substance. Thus, since genus is above species and species is subordinated to genus, genus shows what the species is, and species shows what the individual is. Furthermore, only species can separate differences, which, by showing substantial qualities, i.e., substances, divide and distinguish them. For when the animal is a genus and human or horse is a species, the separation of differences shows what kind of species each is: we can say that the species of human is rational, while the species of horse is irrational. If someone asks, “What is a human?” The answer is “animal.” But if someone asks, “What kind of human?” The answer is “rational.” In this way, difference is always related not to what something is, but to what sort of thing it is. Regarding accident, there is no doubt, since its quality is composed of parts of accidents. For among the nine parts of accident in the categories, quality is also named. For example, if someone asks what kind of species a crow is, the immediate answer is “black.”

Therefore, genera coincide with differences and accidents because they are predicated of multiple species. Just as a genus has multiple species under it, so does difference. We call both god and human “rational.” Again, accident is also predicated of multiple species. We call both human and horse, crow and ebony, and many other species “black.” Furthermore, genus coincides with difference because, like genus, difference is equally predicated of the individual. If Cicero is an animal, which is a genus, he is also a rational animal, which is a difference. They also coincide in that they are predicated of a number of different things, as was shown earlier for other entities. They differ, however, because genus is called in the sense of what something is, while difference or accident are predicated in the sense of what sort of thing it is. If you ask, “What is a human?” You will call upon the genus and say that a human is an animal. But if you ask what kind of human it is, you will answer with difference, “rational,” or with accident, “black” or “white” or whatever quality the subject of the question has. With these distinctions established, he again starts from the beginning to discuss the distances themselves, saying:

“Thus, genus, which is predicated of multiple things, is distinct from those which are predicated of single entities, i.e., individuals; it is also distinct from species and properties, because it is predicated of species with different qualities; and it is distinct from differences and common accidents, because these two reveal what sort of thing something is.”

He says that genus is distinct from individuals because genus is predicated of multiple things, as mentioned earlier. He also combines and unifies the differences of species and properties. Since species is predicated of multiple things that differ not by species but by number, and property is predicated of only one species and the individuals under that species, although it is predicated of one species, it still shares an equal difference with species from genus in not being predicated of multiple species that are different. Neither species nor property can be predicated of some species since property is not predicated of multiple species but only of the one species it belongs to. If this is the case, then species and properties are separated from genus by a single difference, while accidents and differences are also separated from genus by the same single difference. Genus is expressed in terms of “what it is,” while differences and accidents are described in terms of their qualities.

Definition of Genus Unchanged

[1.20] In establishing the nature of genus, Porphyry brings together the differences as sparingly as possible and later will prove the differences in many ways. However, for now, he states that he has neither diminished nor added to the nature of genus, saying:

“If this is so, the definition of genus has been accomplished neither less nor more.”

He claims to have created a perfect and complete definition of genus because the definition has been made neither more nor less, but equally composed for the genus. To demonstrate this, we must proceed as follows: We know that some things that are predicated of others exceed those of which they are predicated, such as genera and species. For example, “animal,” which is a genus, is greater than “human,” which is a species, because the term “genus” can also be applied to a horse, a cow, and other things. So, if someone creates a definition for any abundant thing that is larger than the thing itself, it will not be a complete and proper definition since it encompasses not only the thing being defined but also any other things that the definition’s term may exceed. Thus, the definition of greater predicaments will be larger, while that of lesser ones will be smaller. For example, “animal,” which is greater, is defined as “an animated, sensible substance,” while “human,” which is lesser, is defined as “a rational, mortal animal capable of laughter and understanding.” Since “animal” is greater than “human,” the definition of “animal” will also be greater than that of “human.” It is more accurate to say “an animated, sensible substance” than “a rational and mortal animal.” For “an animated, sensible substance,” like the term “animal” itself, encompasses not only humans but also horses, cows, and other similar species. Therefore, if someone applies a larger definition to a human, such as the definition of an animal: “a human is an animated, sensible substance,” it is not a complete definition, as a horse and a cow can also be animated and sensible substances, which are not species of humans. Conversely, if someone applies a smaller definition to a larger thing, they will create a somewhat curtailed and diminished account. For instance, if someone wants to define an animal and says, “an animal is a rational thing capable of laughter and understanding,” it will not be a complete definition, as some animals can escape and evade this definition. A cow is an animal, but it is neither rational nor capable of laughter. Thus, the only proper definitions are those that are equal. We can discover an equal definition as follows: whatever the categories may be, if a greater category is predicated of a lesser one, it cannot be converted so that the lesser is predicated of the greater. For greater things are always predicated of lesser things, never lesser things of greater ones. For if someone says that a human is an animal, they cannot convert it to say that an animal is a human. For a human is nothing else, as far as genus is concerned, than an animal; an animal, as far as species is concerned, can also be a non-human. But equal categories always convert to one another. For since “capable of laughter” belongs only to humans, when “capable of laughter” is predicated of a human, it can also be converted so that a human is predicated of “capable of laughter” – it is said: what is a human? Capable of laughter. What is capable of laughter? A human.

Therefore, any definitions you can convert are true and equal, but any you cannot convert are either greater or lesser, and equal ones cannot be found. For if you say that a human is a living, sensible substance, it is true. Likewise, if you convert it and say that a living, sensible substance is a human, you will not have said something entirely true – for a substance can be both living and sensible and not be a human. Again, if you say that a rational, mortal thing capable of laughter and learning is an animal, you will have said something true. But if you say and convert it to say that an animal is a rational, mortal thing capable of perceiving laughter and learning, you will not have said something entirely true. For an animal can exist without being rational and capable of laughter. Therefore, as often as the definition is greater than what is defined, if what is defined is said first and the greater definition is used afterward, the definition can be true. For if you first say “human,” the lesser thing, and then afterward apply the greater definition to it, so that you first say “a human is,” and then add “a living, sensible substance,” it is true. For a human is necessarily a living, sensible substance. But if you first say the definition and then say what you are defining, it cannot be entirely true. For if you first say the greater definition, saying “a living, sensible substance,” and then introduce the lesser thing, so that you say “a human is,” so that it is “a living, sensible substance is a human,” it is not entirely true. For a substance can be living and sensible without being a human.

However, if the definition is lesser than the thing itself that is being defined, if the definition is said first, it is true; if it is said afterward, it is false. For if you say the definition which is lesser, “a rational, mortal thing capable of laughter and learning,” and then introduce “an animal is,” so that it is “a rational, mortal thing capable of laughter and learning is an animal,” it is true. For every thing that is rational and mortal and capable of laughter and learning is necessarily an animal. But if you convert it and first say the greater thing and then apply the lesser definition afterward, it cannot be entirely true. For if you first say “an animal is,” and then join “a rational, mortal thing capable of perceiving laughter and learning,” it is not entirely true. For an animal can exist without being rational or mortal. So, if the definition is greater than the thing, if you first say the thing and then introduce the definition, it is true; but if you first say the definition and then introduce the thing, it is false. In lesser definitions and greater things, the opposite is true. For if you first say the definition, and then add the thing, it is true; but if you first say the thing, and then add the definition, it cannot be entirely true. However, in equal definitions, they can be converted equally. For since this is the definition of man alone, ‘a rational, mortal animal, capable of laughter and receptive to discipline’, this definition is equal to man, as it cannot be applied to anything else. Therefore, if you first say the thing and then introduce the definition, it will be true, as in ‘man is a rational, mortal animal, capable of laughter and receptive to discipline’; but if you turn it around and first say the definition, then the thing, as in ‘an animal that is rational, mortal, capable of laughter and receptive to discipline is a man’, this is also true. Thus, in order for definitions to be true, neither more nor less should be applied to them, but they should be arranged equally and appropriately. Porphyry, evidently aware of this, says that he made neither more nor less of the definition of a genus.

Definitions of Species

[1.21] And Fabius said, “Next, I believe, you will discuss species. Tell me, what follows?” And Fabius said, "Here, I think, is the order:

Species is also said in many ways. for the form of each individual human being is called a species. again, the beauty of the face, from which we call the most beautiful people attractive. species is also said of that which is subordinate to a genus, thence we call animal a species, while animal itself is a genus, and white a species of color.

Then I said: Consider the term species as equivocal, just like the term genus. For this too is meant to be called in various ways. For, he says, species is called the shape of the body and perhaps other things as well. Since there was no discussion about these, they were rightly omitted. However, it seems that Victorinus made a mistake here, because when the same species applies to every human being and face, he repeated the beauty of the face as another name for species, as if the beauty of the face were not as much the whole species as it was; for if someone is beautiful throughout their whole body, they are also beautiful in their face. But leaving these aside, let us come to the species which is placed under a genus and constitutes the genus. For, as was said, substances themselves are not considered by any name of species or genus, unless they are somehow compared and composed with each other. For what is animal is not a genus because it is an animal, but because it has the species of man, horse, and other animals under it. And for this reason, he says: THENCE WE CALL ANIMAL A SPECIES, WHILE ANIMAL ITSELF IS A GENUS; for man would not be called a species if the name of animal were not predicated above it. But to demonstrate that not only in individual substances are genera and species present, but also in the names of all the predicaments, he not only gives an example of substance but also of what remained, namely, accident. For what does he say about the species of the color white, which are in the division of accidents under the category of quality? But since there is a certain connection between them, and such a comparison and relation that genera and species cannot exist apart from their relation to one another - for nothing can be concluded in their definitions unless they are named in relation to one another; for if the genus is perfected by the species being placed under it and the species by the genus being placed over it and by being predicated of it, there is no doubt that when we have to define the genus, it is necessary to predicate the species, and when the species, it is necessary for us to predicate the genus - therefore this distinction is also preserved in the subscription of the genus, when the definition of the genus is given.

For it was said then that the genus is what is said in relation to distant species, but now it must be said that the species is what is placed under the genus. However, its definition can be given in multiple ways. For it can again be said that the species is that to which the genus is predicated in its ‘whatness’. Both of these points indicate that the species is placed under the genus. For the first definition clearly designates this, while the second is as follows: since lesser things are always placed under greater things, it is not in doubt that the genus is greater than that to which it is predicated in its ‘whatness’. And if this is the case, there is no obscurity or error in the fact that the species, which is lesser, is placed under its greater genus. Therefore, this second meaning of the definition does not differ from the first; for if the species were not placed under the genus, the genus would not be predicated of the species in its ‘whatness’.

[1.22] The third definition of species is derived from a complete reasoning and demonstrates the power and nature of the species itself. For it says that the species is that which is predicated in its ‘whatness’ of many things with numerical differences. This definition should also have been very clear from the higher genus, but I will now explain as much as my corrected brevity allows. But first, a few things must be said about genera and species themselves. Since there are some genera that have species and can themselves be species of other genera, there is no doubt that they function with a dual comparative relationship, being named species in relation to some things and genera in relation to others. But if we were to investigate in a single thread and order, and whatever genus of a thing is found, we were to seek another genus for it, and again another and another, if there is nothing that can be established by the intellect, the explanation will be inextricable and endless. But since there are no foundations of knowledge in those things that proceed to infinity without any consideration of the mind, it must necessarily be said that we can ascend to something such that, although it is a genus to others, we cannot find another genus for it, which is called the first genus, the more genus, and the most general. But if this happens in the genus, so that we come to rest somewhere while ascending, there is no doubt that, descending again through species, we will come to a halt at some kind of boundary that we encounter.

Therefore, when we descend through species until we reach that species which has no species below it, we shall call that species the ultimate species, more of a species, and the most specific. But since a species contains some things, if a species containing differences were a species of certain things, it would not be called a species but rather a genus. However, since it contains and does not contain things differing by species, it must necessarily contain pluralities similar to itself. But if it contains plurality and that which contains is always greater than that which is contained, that species will be predicated of plurality. Therefore, the species will be called upon multiple things that differ in number in what they are. For when a species is called upon lower things, it declares a higher species and substance; for when we say: What is Cicero? Human is immediately answered.

Since the definition of species is made in three ways, the first two are not only species but also subaltern species, which are themselves genus. The most general substance and under it, the animated body, under the animated body, the animal, under the animal, the human, and under the human, the individual. But we will pursue this division more fully later; for now, this is enough for us. Therefore, substance is more of a genus, human is more of a species, so that neither substance can ever be a species nor human a genus. However, an animated body or an animal are called species in relation to higher things, and genera in relation to lower things.

So if someone wants to express an animated body, an animal, or a human, and says, “A species is what is placed under a genus and to which a genus is predicated in what it is,” this definition contains both more of a species, that is, human, and a subaltern species, that is, an animated body or an animal. For an animated body, an animal, and a human are placed under a genus, and to all of them in what they are, it is called, as has been said. But if someone wants to show with a definition that species which is truly a species, that is, the most specific species, which is only a species, never a genus, they will define it in this way: a species is what is predicated to many things that differ in number in what they are. But this definition will never suit subaltern species. For those which are subaltern species can also be taken as genera, if they are predicated to subjects. And if they can be taken as genera, when they are accepted as genera, they will not only be predicated to many things that differ in number but also to many things that differ in species since they are genera. But since this does not happen in more specific species, that they are sometimes predicated of species-different things, this latter definition is the definition of the more specific species alone, and the other subaltern species exclude and reject it. Porphyry demonstrates this in the following way:

But this definition is of that species which is called more of a species, while other definitions will also be of those which are not more species.

Whether Genus and Species Admit of More and Less

[1.23] Therefore, he promises to explain the subscription and demonstration of these matters more clearly when he says:

This will become clearer as we proceed in the following manner. In all categories, there are some things that are more of a genus and more of a species, and others that are mixed. More genuses are those above which no other genus can be found; more species, on the other hand, are those under which no other species can be discovered. The intervals they possess, both genera and species, are each compared with those above and below them so that one may be called a genus and the other a species.

He says that there are some things whose genera cannot be found, and these are rightly called more genera, because nothing greater than them can be discovered. For if these are genera, and a genus is greater than all things beneath it, then for those things that have no genus, nothing greater can be found. And those whose genus cannot be found are rightly called more genera. There are also some other things that are called more species, under which no other species are placed. For a thing seems to be more of a species, and a truer species, if it is never a genus, than if it can sometimes be a genus. And if the truer species is one that is solely a species and never a genus, it is rightly called more species. Therefore, the interval between more species and more genus is filled by subalternate genera and subalternate species. For we call those subalternate that are taken as species with respect to those above them, and as genera with respect to those below them, because if you gather all things to the lower levels, they are genera; if to the higher levels, species; and if you bring the same things to both the higher and lower levels, they are found to be both genera and species.

And for this reason, subalternate genera and species are named, because they are arranged in a certain sequence and order, recognizing genera in relation to lower things and species in relation to higher things. But these can be genera and species in such a way that what is a genus is not, in turn, also considered a species. For if, as shown earlier, a genus is greater than its species, there is no doubt that a greater thing cannot be placed beneath a lesser one. And so he says that one may be called a genus and the other a species, because it would not be suitable for the same thing to be both a genus and a species. He thus gives an example of this matter, so that what he says may be more easily understood. He makes the following division: He posits substance as more genus, and beneath substance, he places body and incorporeal; beneath body, he places animate and inanimate body; beneath animate body, he places sentient and insentient animals – such as oysters, shells, sea urchins, trees, and other similar things that possess the life force but not the ability to sense – beneath animals, he places rational and irrational animals; beneath rational animals, he places mortal and immortal beings; beneath mortal beings, he places humans, and beneath humans, he places individual humans, that is, individual bodies like Cicero, Virgil, and those who are distinct individuals. Therefore, substance, which is prior, is taken as more genus; for it is only a genus, not also a species, since no higher genus is ever found for it. Man, however, is solely a species, as it does not contain any other species beneath it; for individual humans differ not in species, as previously mentioned, but in number. Body, which we had previously placed under the category of genus, that is, substance, is considered a species with respect to substance, and a genus with respect to animate body. Animate body, however, is a species with respect to body, and a genus with respect to animals. Animals are seen as a species with respect to animate body and a genus with respect to rational animals. Similarly, a rational mortal animal is considered a genus and a species of animal. Mortal is a genus of human, a species of rational animal. Human, which is above individual beings, has not received anything from the nature of genus, but is only called a species.

[1.24] But if we wish to apply and adapt this division to other things, it should be considered in such a way that whatever cannot have its genus found should rather be called a genus, and whatever has no species should be placed above individual beings and considered more a species. For if something is a genus, it must be placed above different species, but if it is more a species, it is not placed above different species, and it can never be called a genus properly. Therefore, just as a higher genus has no genus above it and is more of a genus, so too is a species that has no species below it, but only individuals, rightfully called more of a species. Those things that are placed in the middle, however, do not have the same relationship. For since they can be species, they are not more of genera, and since they can be genera, they are never more of species. For those things above them, they are species, and for those things below them, they are placed in the position of genus.

Therefore, since there are two forms of all things, either to be placed as genera or to be placed as species, the highest points, that is the most general genus and the most specific species, contain only single relationships: the former so that it is only a genus and never seen as a species, and the latter so that it is only a species and never called a genus. The subordinate ones, which are in the middle, have two forms, that is, both. For as has been often emphasized, they have received both a kind of relationship to the genus and a derivation of the species. Nor should it perhaps disturb us that the most specific species has something below it. For since human is more of a species, it has individual humans below it. For although it is above individuals, it never changes the form of specificity. For since it has individuals below it, it is called the species of those things that it contains, which are under one species and do not differ in any property of substance. Thus, human is called both an animal species because it is contained, and the species of individual humans because it contains those who will never differ in any species. The definition, therefore, of more general and more specific categories is as follows: a more general category is said to be one that is always a genus and never a species, and above which there is no higher genus; in turn, a more specific category is one that is always a species, never a genus, and again, one that is never divided into species and which has the greatest number of differences in what it is predicated.

There is No Single Highest Genus

Indeed, this point must be considered very carefully: that in widely separated nations, in that kind of relationship where some kinship is derived from blood, the family of diverse relationships can be traced back to a single origin of the race. For since the Romans come from Romulus, Romulus from Mars, and Mars from Jupiter, the Roman people can be traced back to Jupiter. Similarly, since the Athenians come from Minerva, Minerva from Jupiter, the Athenian people can also be traced back to the same Jupiter. Likewise, since the Persians come from the Sun, and the Sun from Jupiter, the Persians too can be traced back to the same Jupiter as their proper origin. Thus, very different nations can be connected through the kinship of one, which does not happen in the case of species and genera. For diverse genera can never be accommodated under one genus. Aristotle established ten categories for the first genera, which, like some fountain, have somehow given birth and lineage to everything that comes after them.

Since these ten genera are the most general and no genus can be found above them, they cannot be reduced to a single genus. And if the ten primary genera cannot be reduced to one genus, neither can those that are under these genera, that is, the subordinate species and genera, ever be applied to a single genus. For if their primary genera cannot be led to a higher one, there is no doubt that those which are under them will not allow themselves to be constrained and contained by one genus. For if substance, quality, and quantity, and the rest cannot be placed under another common genus, because they are genera themselves, neither can whatever is under substance, that is, under the same genus, like animal or human, nor under quality or quantity, apply themselves to any common genus. For no genus can ever be found that can contain these ten genera within itself as species with a solitary and proper understanding.

But someone may say that if these ten genera truly exist, they can in some way be called beings. For this expression is a bending from that which is to be, and has been drawn into the misuse of the participle due to the constraints of the Latin language and its compression. Therefore, as has been said, they can be called beings, and this very thing, that is, being, may perhaps seem to be their genus. But this is false. For all things that are named equivocally among themselves never share the same containment of a genus, since their substance differs, there is no doubt that the definition of the genus itself will also differ; and these things are named as beings not univocally but equivocally. For since substance is a being, and quality is also a being, but if someone were to express the reason and definition of quality, the same nature could not apply to both, there is no doubt that substance and quality are predicated not univocally but equivocally. And if they are predicated equivocally, they cannot be placed under the source of the same genus. Therefore, there is no single genus in genera and species that can constrain diverse kinds of things.

More Species Than Genera, More Genera Than Individuals

Then Fabius said, “You have covered these topics quite thoroughly, and they have been frequently emphasized. But please continue to the next section.” “I will,” I replied. "For I think the following passages come next:

Therefore, Aristotle established ten categories in the Predicaments, which are more general, but those which are more specific are always in a great number, yet not infinite. However, the individual things that fall under the more specific categories are always infinite.

What he means to say is that there are far more species than genera, for a genus has many species under it. And since there are ten primary genera of all things, the most specific species are not only ten, but more, though not infinite. However, the individual things that fall under the more specific categories are infinite, and their understanding can never be fully grasped. For whatever is infinite cannot be contained within the limits of knowledge. Therefore, all division and knowledge for us should proceed from the more general categories through the subordinate categories, down to the more specific species. For in doing so, we can acquire and retain a complete understanding of what is above.

If someone wishes to comprehend individual things through knowledge and discipline, they labor in vain. Instead, we are instructed to move from the more general categories to the more specific species through intermediate intervals. By using specific differences, we divide the subordinate categories and descend from the more general categories to the more specific species. Specific differences are those that define any given species. A species is defined by differences in this way:

For example, if one says “substance”, and places “body” under substance, “animate body” under body, “animal” under animate body, “rational being” under animal, and “mortal” under rational being, then all these species, which are of substance, will be identified by their differences, namely the species of human. For an animate body is differentiated from an inanimate body, and an animal from a non-sentient being, a rational being from an irrational one, and a mortal from an immortal. When you combine all of these, you define a single species: human. For when you say “animate body, rational animal, and mortal”, which are differences placed in a subordinate order, you have demonstrated a human.

There are other differences, such as if you were to say “animal skilled in rhetoric,” which implies that only a human can be a skilled rhetorician. But this difference is not a specific difference, and it does not complete the substance and nature of a human being. Instead, it merely recommends a certain art or knowledge. Therefore, in divisions, those differences and species are useful from which the so-called more specific species is informed, and this is called the specific difference which can make a more specific species. So when we have descended to the more specific species through these means, we should leave the individuals under the more specific categories and not seek any knowledge of them. For not only are they infinite, but whatever they contain within themselves also becomes infinite.

Rhetoric, for example, is a species, but when it comes to individual people, it is divided among single and infinite individuals, making it both single and infinite. For if all rhetoricians who have ever existed were to be counted, there would never be an end to this enumeration, especially since individual humans can become rhetoricians in the infinite future.

[1.26] Here, Fabius said: "So, this is what he meant when he said:

Furthermore, when the arts or disciplines begin to exist individually through each person, they are absolutely unable to have or receive any method of understanding."

And I said: This means that ‘when arts or disciplines, which were previously unified within their own category, become individualized,’ that is, when they are dispersed among an infinite and countless multitude of people; this occurs because this is the same reason that Porphyry himself did not neglect to mention. For the genus, while being one, is the origin of many species; indeed, under one genus, multiple species are found. Therefore, the species are derived from the genus and are separated and dispersed into many parts. The genus, however, gathers together many things, just as it is divided by many species. For example, a human, a crow, and a horse, which are species, are all equally animals with respect to the genus ‘animal.’ Thus, the name ‘animal’ contains all its species within itself.

If ‘animal’ applies to humans, crows, and horses, there is no doubt that the genus which contains these under itself divides and multiplies the species among themselves. So, the genus collects the species within itself, while the species, by their very nature, separate the genus. Therefore, the genus is a collector and unifier of its species, while the species are dividers and multipliers of the genus. Therefore, whoever ascends to higher-level genera gathers and unifies the multitude of species through these genera. However, when one descends from higher-level genera to more specific species, the unity of the higher-level genera will be separated into multifaceted and branched species.

When he says that the multitude must be understood, it is the same as if he said ‘the multitude must be made’; for when you divide the genus into species, you perceive these same species to be many, which you have also made. The species also do not differ from this unification and collection of the genus. For they too bring the infinite individuals back to one form. The species of individual humans, which is ‘human,’ is collective in this way. For, regarding the human species, we are all individual humans as one human, that is, the primary species that contains and holds us together. However, this very species is divided and split among us as many. For everything that is singular and individual divides what it originates from, while everything that is not singular and individual but can be divided does not divide the more specific aspects more than it gathers them together.

Predication of Genera and Species

[1.27] Having dealt with these matters, it is clear that a genus is a category encompassing many species, and a species encompasses many individual instances under it. For if there are subordinate categories, those that are higher up divide and disperse them into a multitude, and so there is no doubt that the higher categories are always fewer in number than the lower ones. The ways in which categories are predicated of one another, or twisted together, are as follows. For every thing will either be greater, smaller, or equal to another. Everything that is greater can be predicated of the smaller; for instance, since ‘animal’ is greater than ‘human,’ ‘animal’ can be predicated of ‘human.’ However, the smaller is not predicated of the greater; for since ‘animal’ includes both ‘human’ and ‘horse,’ if you wanted to predicate ‘human’ of ‘animal,’ this predication would only be appropriate insofar as ‘animal’ is a part that is above ‘human.’

For consider, if you turn it around and say that this is an animal that is a human, then to the extent that there is a part of the animal category that contains the human species, that is the extent to which a human is an animal. However, in those other parts of the animal category that contain something other than the human species, the term ‘human’ does not apply. For if you say ‘this animal is what a human is,’ in that part where a horse or a crow is an animal, this type of predication does not fit, and therefore they do not universally convert. For if you say ‘every human is an animal,’ that is true, but if you say ‘every animal is a human,’ that is false.

Now, if greater categories are predicated of lesser ones because they contain the lesser ones within themselves, and lesser categories are not predicated of greater ones because the greater ones surpass the definition of the lesser ones and in some way exceed them, then there is no doubt that those categories that are equal to one another can be converted. Equal categories are those that are neither smaller nor greater, that is, if they are applied to any species, they are present in every instance of that species and in no others; for every human is capable of laughter, and no other species can properly be called capable of laughter, and therefore since they are equal, they are converted. For you say, what is a human? Capable of laughter. What is capable of laughter? A human. And likewise: what is capable of neighing? A horse. What is a horse? Capable of neighing.

Now, if the greater categories are always predicated of the lesser ones, it is necessary that the higher categories are the genera and that all the subordinate categories become lesser. And if all the subordinate categories are lesser, there is no doubt that if someone proceeds through subdivision down to the ultimate species, any genus will be predicated of those categories that are neighboring to it and also of those that are subordinate to it. For substance has as its neighboring category in the lower direction the genus of body, and in relation to itself the species of body; therefore, substance is predicated of body. For if someone asks, what is a body? It is said to be a substance. Below body, there is animate body, and below that, animal; therefore, since substance is predicated of body because it is higher, it is necessary that substance is also higher for those categories for which body is higher. For if body is predicated of animate body and of animal, substance will also be predicated of animate body and of animal. Thus, whatever categories are higher are predicated not only of the categories that are immediately below them, but also of those far below. For if they are greater than the species that are adjacent to them, they will be even greater than those species which are more extensive.

Thus, whenever a species is predicated, the genus of that species will also be predicated of them. For if some species is greater than something else, the genus of that species will be much greater than the thing by which the species is greater. And in this way, it will be predicated just as the species itself was predicated before. If this is the case, there is no doubt that the genus of the genus that could be predicated to that which the species was predicated can also be predicated. For if someone says that Cicero is a man, since “animal” is the genus of man, it will not be absurd for Cicero to be predicated as an animal. And since the substance of the animal itself is a genus, it will not be inappropriate for Cicero to be predicated as a substance, since the higher things are predicated of the lower ones and those that are lower, if they have any other things even lower, will have that first genus and will not be inconveniently predicated of them. Therefore, the species is predicated of the individual as something greater, while the genus is more predicated of all subalterns and of the species itself. For in an equal manner, both body is called substance and animated body is called substance and sensible body is called substance and rational animal is called substance and mortal is called substance and man is called substance. And of them, even the greater genus is predicated of individuals. For Cicero can be called a substance, but the species alone is predicated of nothing other than individuals, as has been said, and individuals themselves are predicated of nothing else but themselves, that is, singulars. The nature of individuals, however, is such that the properties of individuals exist in single individuals alone and are not transferred to any others, and therefore are not predicated of any others. For the property of Cicero, of whatever kind it may be, will never apply to Cato, nor Brutus, nor Catulus. But the properties of man, which are the same as being rational, mortal, sensible, and capable of laughter, can apply to many and all individuals and singulars. For every man and each individual is both rational and mortal and sensible and capable of laughter. And therefore, those things whose properties can apply to others can be predicated of others, but those things whose property does not apply to others, can only be predicated of themselves singularly, and not of others apart from themselves.

It must be repeated, then, that every individual is contained within a species. But the species itself is constrained by the genus, and the genus is, as it were, the body of all things and is never a part; the individual, on the other hand, is always a part and never a whole. However, the species is rightly called both a part and a whole, for it is a part in relation to the genus and a whole in relation to individuals: it divides the genus, as has been said, and gathers individuals. But the species is a part of something else, namely the genus, and the whole is not of a part but of parts. For the genus is one thing, and there are several species of one thing, that is, the species of one genus is a part. And since there are many and infinite individuals under one species, which gathers those individuals, that species is not the whole of one thing, that is, it is not the whole of a part but of many, that is, of parts; for under it there are many parts of individuals, of which the whole is called a species, that is, a human.

But enough has been said about genus and species. And since they are calling for morning greetings, let us transfer what remains to the future vigils of the night.

Book Two

[2.01] Nature has granted us many gifts that are more distinguished and extraordinary than those given to other living creatures. This kind and skillful architect of humanity has shaped us in such a way that first, she bestowed upon us the ability to reason and to reflect, and then, once reason was discovered, she granted us the ability to speak and commanded us to be distinguished from animals not by bodily senses, but by the divine essence of the mind. When we join with this divine essence and do not separate from its lively nature, we become eternal beings, and our fame and glorious life extend to unending times. However, if we allow ourselves to be corrupted and destroyed by the wicked desires of the body, we will follow the nature of the body. For nothing of that lively essence remains after the body for those whose every effort and pursuit are focused on bodily things and directed towards the body. Therefore, we must strive to make ourselves better and more diligent caretakers, not by the means by which we cannot be distinguished from animals, but by emulating the celestial virtues and earning the glory of eternity through our noble deeds and words. But let us discuss this matter another time, and now return to the matter at hand.

So, when the customary studies and wakefulness of another night had come, I believe that Fabius, captivated by the subtlety of yesterday’s discussion or driven by his own passion for learning and listening, rose more eagerly than ever before and came to me. After greeting me, he asked for the continuation of the work that I had promised. “I will do it gladly,” I said, “for there is nothing better for me to do in life, and your enthusiasm increases my enjoyment, which is most pleasing to me.” It was therefore agreed that, since yesterday’s discussion had explained the concept of species, the beginning of the other explanation should be taken from the following difference. At this point, Fabius said, “You have given a very thorough explanation of genera and species during last night’s wakefulness. However, as I understand, the discussion of differences is more subtle and delicate.” “Not without reason,” I replied. For differences, which have various meanings, will also have various powers. There will be, after all, some that are genera, others that are species, and others that are differences. But this will be demonstrated later. For now, I believe the text is as follows:

Definitions of Difference

Every difference is called common, particular, and more particular.

Moreover, he indicates that difference is called in many ways. He says, however, that difference is made in these three ways, which are either common, proper, or more proper. Common are those by which we all differ from others or from ourselves. For sitting, walking, or standing is a difference; for if you walk and I sit, we differ in the very place and walking. And likewise, as I sit now, but if I walk afterward, I will be separated from myself by a common difference. Proper differences are those which depict the form of each individual with some natural property, such as someone being blind or having curly hair; indeed, these are the proper qualities of each single person that are somehow born with them. More proper differences are those which persist in the substance itself and transform the whole species by their differentiating and descriptive power, such as the difference of being rational or mortal in humans.

Now, these common and proper differences make individuals differ from one another under the same species, some by their proper differences, some by common ones. More proper differences, however, change the nature and substance of each species and separate and disconnect them from other species. Therefore, since common and proper differences do not change the species but somehow only make the form and disposition differ, they are said to make something altered, that is, not wholly different, that is, not completely transformed, but somehow creating separation and distance, and for this reason they are not called those that make something different, that is, transforming, but rather altered, that is, not wholly making something different. But that third type, that is, the more proper, since it is substantial and inserted into the nature of the species itself, makes something different. For since man and horse, as far as they were animals, had one substance, the coming of rationality entirely separated the species and made it completely different. Thus, common and proper differences are called those that make something altered, more proper differences are those that make something different.

It is therefore clear that some differences make something different, others make something altered. Those that make something different are substantial and change the nature and species of all things, and are called specific; for they can establish any species, separate it from all others, and compose its form and nature. For if you say mortal and rational differences and place them under the animal, there is no doubt that you make the species of man, and these differences are perfecting this species. And for this reason, they are called specific, because they change the nature and constitute the very substance of each species. But those other differences do nothing more than make something altered, since one differs from another either by some property of form or by some condition and arrangement of doing something. Therefore, only that more proper difference, which we call specific, can be suitable in the division of a genus. For the others do not contribute to the substance but are placed for a certain, somehow, separation and distance of similarity. For you can find nothing in them but difference alone, since they do not constitute species but rather distinguish those already constituted and made by their more proper qualities.

Division of Differences Into Separable and Inseparable

[2.02] Regarding what he says:

“Now we must repeat from the previous discussion that some differences are separable, while others are inseparable.”

This means that another division is now assumed here. For when he first separated the difference into three parts and then later collected those three into only two types and quantities, saying that some create another, while others alter, a third division is made among the three. He says that some are separable, while others are inseparable, and just as in the previous division, the two types that create another were common and proper. The one that remained as more proper made another. Now, in the same way, in separable and inseparable differences, there is only a common separable difference, while the other differences, such as blindness of the eyes, yellow hair, or the height of the body, which are proper differences, or certainly rationality or mortality, which are more proper differences, can never be separated from the human species. However, sitting or running, which are common, are separated from individuals and likewise added again.

Of those that are inseparable, some come by themselves, while others come by accident. Those that come by themselves stem from the more proper ones, and those that come by accident are derived from the proper ones alone. An inseparable accident is anything that happens to a particular species through an inseparable proper difference. But although proper and more proper differences are inseparable, they never change that higher form and nature. For more proper differences always create another, while proper differences only ever produce an altered state.

Moreover, inseparable proper differences can occur to some in greater or lesser degrees, but inseparable more proper differences neither increase with a greater intensity nor decrease with a lesser one. For one person can be born taller, another darker, one with thinner hair, and another with lighter hair – which are inseparable proper differences. However, the more proper differences, that is, rationality, admit neither more nor less. For all humans, insofar as they are humans, are equally rational and mortal. For if a genus could be more or less a genus for someone, then differences could also grow in intensity or decrease with relaxation. Since “animal” is no more for a human than for a horse, and no more for a horse than for others, and it is equally a genus for all subjects, so the differences of species, which we call specific, do not admit more or less.

For if the definition of a human is a rational, mortal animal and is nonetheless for individual humans, there is no doubt that this definition will always be equally suited to all individual humans, and it will neither be more nor less fitting for anyone. And if this is the case, the parts of the whole definition, which are differences, will also be such that they neither fit more nor less but always equally and suitably for everyone. But the parts of this definition are rationality and mortality. Therefore, rationality and mortality, which are more proper differences, do not admit more or less.

Divisions of Genera

[2.03] From this point, that is, from the division of separable and inseparable differences, we examine differences in three ways: either they are separable or inseparable, and of the inseparable, they either come by themselves or by accident. Those that come by themselves, some are those that divide the genus, others are those that inform and constitute the species. But we have spoken about the former earlier; now let us discuss those that divide the genus and constitute the species. Every division of genera into species, if a subdivision of those species is made and if one proceeds from the more general genera through the subordinate genera down to the more specific species, will have a twofold and dual division. For if you consider the contrary differences of the species, it is a division of the genera; if you consider the subordinate genera, it is a constitution of the species.

If we divide the genus, that is, substance, as has already been discussed in the debate on species, and let there be substance, after substance there is animate body and inanimate body, under animate body there is sensible and insensible, under sensible, that is, animal, there is rational and irrational, under rational there is mortal and immortal. These differences, therefore, are the same species, if they regard themselves in the division. And they divide the genus in this way. For since we placed animate body and inanimate body under substance, if you consider animate body against inanimate body, you have divided substance. But if you look at the subordinate genera within the differences, you will constitute the species. For if you consider animate body and the sensible body beneath it, you have looked at the animal.

Likewise, if you take the rational difference against the irrational, you have divided the genus of both, that is, animal. But if, under the same order, you take the rational difference and the mortal, you have undoubtedly demonstrated the species of man. Thus, these differences, taken in another way, become divisible by genus, that is, dividing the genera; in another way, they become constitutive of species, that is, declaring and constituting the species. For if you look at the contrary differences, you will divide the genus; but if you look at the subordinate ones, you will constitute the species. Therefore, the power of differences, both separable and inseparable, holds the other three things, that is, genus, species, and accident, in such a way that, with a changed comparison, these very things are also changed through them. For if you look at the rational and mortal differences against the irrational and immortal, they are divisible and differences of the genus; but if you compare the same rational and mortal to the higher ones, they will be species of the animal that contains them. But if you consider the rational and mortal in relation to the subject man, you will contemplate its genera and constitutive differences. However, concerning the other inseparable ones, that is, the proper ones, there fall the differences of the inseparable accident. The inseparable accident is blindness of the eyes, curvature of the nose, and other things of this kind. And the same applies to separable accidents, that is, common ones. For the separable accident is being awake, sleeping, running, or sitting. And what he says:

“Thus, let substance be composed above all things, and let its divisible differences be animate and inanimate.”

This shows the contrary differences in species. But what he says:

“This difference, animate and sensible, joined with substance, will complete the animal.”

This shows the constitutive differences of the species. Thus, in various ways they are accepted, they have obtained various powers and forms. But both divisible and constitutive are called specific, and only they are useful in the division of genera and definitions, while the others, which are inseparable by accident, are useless. Moreover, those that are formed by separable differences and distinctions are much more useless.

[2.04] Those who have dealt with the definition of specific differences declare that these are the differences by which species are distinguished from their genus. A brief explanation of what this means is necessary. The debate is whether the genus has within itself the differences of its species or not, for example: the genus ‘animal’ has under it the species ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, that is, human and, for instance, horse; therefore, the genus ‘animal’ either has both rationality and irrationality, the differences by which the species under it differ, or it does not. For if the genus ‘animal’, which is neither rational nor irrational, the species that are positioned under it will not have these differences. For if the genus does not have these differences, where will the differences for the species come from, by which they differ from themselves? But if someone says these differences are in the genus, as the species would not have them unless the genus had them first, a greater problem arises. For since the species that are placed under a genus are equal, and human and horse are placed under the genus ‘animal’ equally, neither is prior, but both are equally called animated species.

Therefore, if rational and irrational are equally under the same genus, they will also exist at the same time. If they exist at the same time and the genus has these differences, then the genus by its own nature, that is, the animal, will be both rational and irrational, there is no doubt that the same thing will retain two contrarieties within itself at the same time. This is not possible. What then? We must say that the genus indeed does not have these differences in actuality, which the Greeks call energeia, but it does not lack them in potentiality from these very differences, which it pours into its species. As for actuality and potentiality, they need a more precise explanation. There is as much difference between actuality and potentiality as there is between a laughing person and one who can laugh but does not. The former performs the action, while the latter only has the capacity but does not perform it. Thus it is with the animal. The human is actually rational, for a human is always rational and nothing else; and the horse is always irrational, and its irrationality is placed in actuality. However, the animal itself, whether rational or irrational, does not perform this itself nor is it placed in their actuality but in potentiality. For it can pour out from itself both rationality and irrationality. Therefore, since species contain differences in actuality, and the genus in potentiality, species are rightly said to abound with differences from the genus, because what the genus can do, that is, create differences, the species not only can do but also perform; for the differences are placed and informed in the species themselves.

[2.05] There is another definition of difference, which says that difference is what is predicated about many species in regard to their quality. Difference can be said of many things, as ‘rational’ is said of humans – for a human is rational – and it is also said of God; for God is called rational not in the sense of what it is, but in the sense of its quality. For if you ask what kind of human it is, ‘rational’ will be answered immediately; if you ask what kind of God it is, you would not be wrong to say ‘rational’. In the same way, irrationality is also applicable. For it is said of a horse, an ox, a fish, and a bird, all of which, if asked what kind of beings they are, are predicated as irrational. Therefore, this definition is good and correct, that is:

“Difference is what is predicated in regard to the quality of many things that are distant in species.”

And the same reasoning applies to mortal and other differences.

Genus and Species in Relation to Matter and Form

[2.06] What follows is a very difficult passage, but its obscurity is more due to Victorinus' translation than to Porphyry’s original presentation, and it goes like this: He says that every corporeal thing, whatever it may be, is composed of matter and form. For example, if you mention a statue, the statue is made up of bronze, let’s say, and the shape that its maker has given it, and the material it is made of is bronze, while the shape, that is, the form, is the way the bronze itself is shaped. For if you were to fashion a human out of bronze, the human form would be the form, and the bronze would be the material. In the same way, this also applies to genus. For the genus is taken in the manner of matter, while difference is taken in the manner of form. Indeed, just as any given thing consists of matter and form, so too does every species consist of genus and difference. For the genus of a human being is like the bronze of a statue, while the difference of a human being is like the form by which the bronze is shaped. For just as from some form which is made from the material of bronze, the species of any given statue comes into being, so too when difference, that is, rationality, comes into the genus, that is, the animal, the species of human is formed. These things, therefore, are proportional to each other. Proportion, however, is the comparison of any similar thing to some related thing, such as when you compare two to four, it is a double proportion, or when you compare twenty to forty, it is the same double proportion. So, under the same proportion are four to two, as forty to twenty, since in both cases there is a doubling of numbers in the comparison. Therefore, just as the proportion, that is, the comparison of matter and form, is the same as the proportion of genus and difference, and these four things are proportional to each other. For in the same way that the species of any given creation is made from matter and form, so too is the species of any living or non-living thing formed from genus and differences. This, however, Victorinus seems to have understood less clearly. For what Porphyry said was ‘analogous,’ that is, proportional, he took as if he were saying ‘irrational.’ And so, in the place where he has written in this way:

“For all things consist of form and matter, and the form itself is irrational.”

The word ‘irrational’ should be removed and replaced with ‘proportional.’ And a little further down, where he has:

“Indeed, every genus is like matter and consists irrationally.”

The word ‘irrational’ should be removed and replaced with ‘proportional,’ so it reads “and consists proportionally.” For the proportion of form to matter in the making of any bodily creation is the same as the proportion of difference to genus in the making of any species of animate and inanimate beings.

Difference As Genus Divider

[2.07] Following this, there is another definition, which is as follows. They say that a difference is something that can separate whatever is under the same genus, and they are right to say so. For while both man and horse are under the same genus, since both are animals, when the terms rational or irrational come into play, they divide and distinguish between the man and the horse, which are under the same genus. Therefore, those differences that can separate things under the same genus are the ones we are talking about. There is also another definition: differences are the things by which one thing is distinct from another. For example, man and horse are distinguished by the difference of rational and irrational, even though they belong to the same genus. And this is what Porphyry says:

“Difference is that by which individual things differ, because through itself, genus is both those things that are rational, namely us, and those that are irrational. Indeed, man, horse, and bird are all one genus, that is, animal. For animal is the genus of all these things.”

But if, in this passage where it is placed, you change “because through itself, genus is” to “because through themselves, they are animals,” the meaning will be fuller – for the word genus has been used here for animal – and the order will be like this: “difference is that by which individual things differ, because through themselves they are animals, and those that are rational animals, namely us, and those that are irrational animals.” If this were the case, there would be no error at all. However, now the genus that is mentioned should be understood as meaning animal. Moreover, gods and men, although both are rational, differ and are distinguished when the term mortality is added. Therefore, difference is that by which individual things differ, but we should think of these differences as those that contribute to the substance and to the being, and which can be part of the species. Such is the case when horse and man, both of which belong to the genus animal, differ from one another through rational and irrational qualities, and yet this rationality and irrationality exists in the substance of their species in this way. For neither can a horse exist without irrationality, nor a man without rationality. And for this reason, these differences contribute to the being of the species to which they are suited, and they are parts of the substance. For when a man consists of these differences, that is, being rational and mortal, rational and mortal alone, when placed together, make up part of the substance of man. For if both together form one man, there is no doubt that each of them seems to be part of the substance necessary for making a man. Therefore, those differences which do not contribute to the being and are not parts of the substance of any species are not called specific differences, even though one species alone has this characteristic. For if a man sails, he can be called a sailing animal, but sailing does not become part of the substance of man. For a man does not subsist because he sails, even though no other animal can have this characteristic, that is, no other animal can sail. The same is true for being a rhetorician or a grammarian. Thus, we do not consider these differences, which do not contribute to the being but only recall some art or knowledge, to be specific differences, even though each of them belongs to one animal species. Therefore, it should be considered that whenever we speak of the definition of difference as “difference is that by which individual things differ,” we should understand that the difference being signified is the one that contributes to the being and is part of the substance of some species. However, we do not include those differences which are not useful for existence in this category of differences, even though they may be specific to each individual thing.

Definitions of Property

[2.08] Having discussed difference, let us now explain property. Then Fabius said, "As I understand it, the following is the consequence:

A property is said to be in four ways. For a property is called that which happens to one species, even if not to all.

And I said, Therefore, properties are divided into four ways. There is a property that occurs to one, even if not to all, such as being a rhetorician, a geometer, or a grammarian. All these things indeed happen only to one species, that is, humans, but not to all of them. For not all humans are grammarians, rhetoricians, or geometers, and for that reason, this is called a property that belongs to one, even if not to all.

There is also another property which is for all, even if not only for one. For being bipedal happens to every human, for every human is bipedal, but it does not only happen to the human species but also to birds.

There is also a third property that happens to all, and only, and at some time, such as puberty and growing gray hair in old age. For this happens to all humans and to no other species but only to humans, and at some point in time; there is a fixed time for adolescents to mature or for the elderly to grow gray. For no one matures at six or seven years old, nor does anyone grow gray at twenty, unless some exceptional event occurs.

The fourth property is one that happens to one species, and to all individuals under the same species, and at all times. For being capable of laughter is a human trait and occurs only to one species, that is, humans, and to all individuals under the same species; for every single human laughs and at all times. There has never been a time when anyone could not laugh. But I mean laughter in capacity, not in action. For even if a person does not laugh, because they can laugh, they are called capable of laughter. And these properties are complete and true that exist in one, all, and at all times, for they can be converted to their species. For if you say: what is a human? You answer: capable of laughter. If you ask: what is capable of laughter? You will predicate a human.

However, the other properties, like being bipedal or a grammarian, are indeed properties but cannot be converted. For a grammarian is always human, but a human is not always a grammarian, and conversely, a human is always bipedal, but a bipedal is not always human. And likewise, being capable of neighing is more proper to a horse. For in the same way, this property can be converted to its species. For if you say: what is a horse? You will answer: capable of neighing. If you ask: what is capable of neighing? A horse will be predicated.

Definitions of Accident

[2.09] Since we have discussed properties, let us now consider accidents. Then Fabius said, Porphyry defines accident as follows:

An accident is that which can be present or absent without the destruction of the thing in which it is.

He seems to be saying that an accident is something that can exist or not exist without affecting the thing it belongs to. For example, if someone’s face becomes flushed by chance, the face remains unharmed when the flush goes away, just as it was unharmed when the flush appeared.

He therefore divides accidents into separable and inseparable. A separable accident is, for instance, when someone sits or walks, whereas an inseparable accident is, for example, when you say that a raven is black or a swan is white; these accidents cannot be separated from them.

However, a doubt arises whether this definition is true and encompasses all accidents. Since there are some, as he himself says, inseparable accidents, it seems that such a definition cannot apply to them. For if they cannot be separated, the definition stating that an accident is something that can be added or removed without destroying the thing it belongs to is not true for them. Since they are inseparable, they cannot be removed.

But this pressing question is resolved as follows: this definition of accidents is made with regard to their potentiality, not actuality, and by understanding, not truth; not because an Ethiopian or a raven lose their color, but because they can exist in our understanding without this color. For it is true that the black color never leaves an Ethiopian or a raven. But if someone understands that this color can be lost by an Ethiopian or a raven, only the color of the feathers in the raven will change, and it will become a white bird with the appearance and shape of a raven. If someone understands this, but in the case of a human, that is, an Ethiopian, when the black color is lost, their appearance becomes white, just like other humans. Therefore, it is said not because it happens, but because, if it could happen, the substance receiving this accident would not perish. He demonstrates this point as follows:

It can be understood, however, that both a white raven and an Ethiopian losing their color can exist without their destruction, in which the color was.

For nothing prevents the essence, if an Ethiopian or a raven loses their color, from remaining in their own natural substance. There is another definition, which is as follows:

An accident is that which can happen to something and can exist or not exist.

For we say that what does not turn into substance is an accident, that is, it is not inherent in the substance but comes from outside. Therefore, things that can exist or not exist are called accidents, because they are not included in the essence of the substance. If they were part of the essence of the substance, they would never cease to exist, and if they did not exist, they could never exist. For example, since reason is part of the substance of a human being, a human can never be irrational, because irrationality is not part of the human substance.

From this, another definition arises: an accident is that which is neither a genus, nor a species, nor a difference, nor a property. Since genus, species, difference, and property are part of the substance and indicate the substance of anything, whatever is not any of these is rightly called an accident.

On the Commonalities of Genus, Difference, Species, Accident, and Property

[2.10] Therefore, having made clear and explained the matters he proposed, that is, genus, species, properties, differences, and accidents, he now proceeds to treat those things that are common among all these or what differences there are. And first of all, he explains their mutual commonalities, then also of each one separately, and says that it is common for all of them to be predicated of many things. For the genus is predicated of species and individuals, in the same way, difference is predicated of species and individuals, and property is also predicated of species and individuals, but species is called only of individuals. For the genus is predicated of horses, humans, cows, and dogs, that is, species, and it is also predicated of those things that are contained as individuals under these species; for just as the species of dog, horse, or human are animals, so each horse or human is called an animal. Differences, on the other hand, are predicated of species and individuals in this way. For human and horse are species, but ‘rational’ is said, and the difference is predicated of the human species in the same way as it is of Cicero. For since he is an individual under the human species, he is also called rational. Property, however, is predicated of the species. When it is said of the species, ‘human’ is laughable, and when it is said of Cicero, ‘laughable’, which is an individual, it is shown that property is predicated of individuals. But species is predicated only of its individuals. For when one asks, “What is Cicero?” the answer is ‘human’. Accident, however, is first predicated of individuals and then of species. For if someone says, “a human sits,” which is a separable accident, when they see each individual human, that is, the individual sitting, then they also predicate it of the species, saying: “Since Cicero sits, and Cicero is a human, a human sits.” In the same way, the inseparable is predicated of species and individuals.

On the Commonalities of Genus and Difference

[2.11] Having settled all commonalities, he first explains the commonalities and differences of genus and difference. And first, he says that it is common to genus and difference that species are contained by both. For the genus, which is animal, contains the species of man and horse. Moreover, rational, which is a difference, contains both man and god, and irrational, which is a difference, contains horse, ox, and bird, but it contains them in such a way that genus always contains more species than difference contains. For genus also contains the differences themselves. For the genus, that is, animal, contains rational and irrational, and those species which are under rational; also those which are under irrational, the genus, that is, animal, contains. But the difference, that is, rational, does not contain rational, but only man and god. Therefore, genus contains more than difference. There is also another commonality. For if something is predicated to any genus in such a way that it is its genus, and of those species which are under that genus to which it is predicated, that genus is called and of the individuals which are under those species. For animal is the genus of man, and of animal is predicated as genus substance; for the genus is the substance of animal. Therefore, that substance which is predicated to the genus of man, that is, animal, as genus, is also predicated to man himself; for man is said to be a substance. Likewise, that genus is predicated of those things which are individuals under the species; for Cicero, who is an individual under the species of man, is called a substance. Difference works in the same way. For if any difference is said of another difference, so that the difference is understood, it will be predicated also to the species which is under that difference to which it is predicated, and of those individuals which are under the same species. For ‘using reason’ as a difference is predicated to the rational difference as a related difference, and rational is predicated to man: therefore, ‘using reason’ is also predicated to man. The same applies to ‘using reason’ being predicated to Cicero, which is an individual under that species to which that difference, that is, rational, was predicated, of which it was predicated as a related difference, that is, using reason. Therefore, there is this commonality of genus and difference, that those things which are predicated of the genus of a species as genus, and are predicated of the species under the same genus and of individuals, and those things which are predicated of difference as difference, and are predicated of the species under the same difference and of individuals. There is also another commonality, that just as species are destroyed with the destruction of genus, so too species under the same difference are destroyed with the destruction of difference. For if animal were to perish, man and horse would immediately be destroyed, but if difference, that is, rational, were to be destroyed, gods and men would perish, and there would be nothing of them that could use reason.

On the Properties of Genus and Difference

[2.12] After demonstrating the common properties, therefore, he indicates their differences and says that the first difference is that by which the genus differs not only by differences but also by species, properties, or accidents. For he says that the genus is predicated of many more things than the difference, species, accident, or property are predicated. For the genus is said, that is, animal, of quadrupeds, bipeds, reptiles, that is, snakes, or swimmers, that is, fish. Quadruped, however, which is a difference from biped, is said only of those that have four feet, that is, a horse or ox, and cannot be called the other ones, that is, biped, reptile, or swimmer, where the genus is equally predicated. Moreover, the genus is predicated more than species, because, while the human species is and is predicated only of individual humans, the same man is not predicated of a horse, ox, or dog. But indeed, animal, which is a genus, is predicated of multiple species, that is, of a human, a horse, a dog, an ox, and of all the individuals that are placed under them. The genus, however, abounds in its own predications because the property is always of one species and of the individuals under it, while the genus is predicated of many species, properties, and the individuals under them. Moreover, the genus is predicated of many more accidents, because, while being white may perhaps be an inseparable accident of one swan, animal is predicated not only of a swan but of all animals, even non-white ones, but the accident is only predicated of those to which it is inseparably or separably contained; for it is primarily said of individuals. Therefore, it is clear that the genus is predicated of many more things than accidents are predicated, because accidents are primarily predicated of individuals, while genera are predicated of individuals, species, and differences.

But now let us accept those differences by which the genus is divided, not by which the species are formed.

This, however, is such a thing. Since we have said that there are two forms of differences, so that some are divisible, others constitutive, we have called those constitutive which, being placed under the same thread and descending from subaltern genera, inform and produce a certain species, such as rational or mortal; which constitute the species of man, but others are divisible, which divide the genus, not inform the species, that is, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal. Now this treatise deals with those differences which divide the genus, not those which constitute the species. For those which divide the genus are accepted in the whole place of differences, while those which constitute the species are received in the substance of genera and species. For rational mortal is a genus, but mortal is the genus of man, and these constitute the species, but rational irrational is not a species or a genus, nor is mortal immortal either a genus or a species. And so, since those differences which can be neither genera nor species to each other retain their proper force, let us now accept those differences in which there is no community as to genus and species. There is also a difference of genus. For the genus is prior to its own differences. For if you remove the genus, you have removed all differences at once. For if you remove the animal, rational and irrational do not remain. But if you remove rational, the animal remains. But if you destroy both differences, that is, rational or irrational, something can still be understood, which is a sentient, animate substance, that is, an animal. Thus, the removed genus takes away all differences with it, the removed differences do not destroy the genus with themselves, because the genus can be understood apart from the differences, so that you only grasp its definition in your mind and say that it is an animate and sentient substance. But those things which, when they are destroyed, destroy others, and are not destroyed together with the others, are prior to those which can destroy. There is also another difference, that the genus is always predicated in what it is, as has been said, but the difference in what it is like. But this has been more frequently inculcated and therefore must be passed over by us. There is also another difference, that one genus always adapts to every species. For man has only one genus, to be called an animal, but many differences can be adapted to one species. For man is rational, which is a difference, and mortal, which is the same difference, and sentient, by which, of course, he differs from others. For he differs by all these, being sentient from insentient, rational from irrational, and mortal from immortal. There is also another difference, which has been said above. For the genus is to the species as the material, and the difference as the shape. For just as the shape coming into the material of air makes a statue, so the difference, that is, rational or irrational, coming to the animal, that is, the genus, makes the species of man or beast. What the commonalities or properties of the genus and difference have been, he has said so far. And perhaps there will be others, which, due to their brevity, should be skipped and omitted.

And therefore, genera are said to be prior to their species. And although all genera are predicated univocally of their species, the species themselves are never predicated of their genera. This, as I think, has already been said in yesterday’s discussion. For genera are always predicated univocally of their species. For man is both man and animal. Moreover, animal is the genus of man, and animal is predicated of man. Therefore, since animal is predicated of man, and man is called an animal, animal and man are named with one name of the animal. But a single definition will apply to these very things. For animal is a sentient, animate substance, which is not absurd to be said of man. For if man himself is called an animal, it will not be absurd to say of man “a sentient, animate substance.” Therefore, genus is predicated univocally of its species, which agrees with the same name and the same definition. But species not only are not predicated univocally of their genera, but they are not predicated at all; for no lesser thing can be predicated of a greater. And therefore, since species are lesser than their genera, they can neither be called univocally nor in any way by their genera.

Moreover, all genera abound with the combination of species placed under them, while the species themselves abound with the proper differences of their genera.

What he says, therefore, is as if he were saying: Everything that is a genus contains multiple species under itself, and everything that is a species has multiple differences within it. For the genus, that is, animal, abounds and remains in this man, that is, the species, because man is only man, while animal is not only man but also ox or bird or other things of this kind. Species, on the other hand, surpass their genera, because the differences that species have in actuality, their genera do not have. For, as said earlier, genera contain those differences that the species placed under them have, potentially but not in reality. And therefore, the species that is man, or another species such as horse, abound and surpass their genus, animal, in this respect, because the animal itself is neither rational nor irrational, but man or horse is rational, and that which is devoid of reason is irrational.

Furthermore, species never become more of a genus, and in turn, genus never becomes more of a species.

And so that we may know that this is not about subalternate species but rather about the more specific and most specific species, what does he say? That those things which are genera can never become more of a species, nor can more specific species ever become more of a genus. For a species is never a genus. For whatever is a species will not be a genus, and whatever is a genus will not be a species. Therefore, it is clear that he is dealing with species alone in these discussions, not with subalternate ones. For subalternate ones can also be genera. More specific species, however, as he himself says, can never be genera.

But after discussing the commonalities and differences of genera and species, he proceeded to proper genera and properties.

On the Common Features of Genus and Property

The common feature of genus and property is that they adhere to species and encompass them.

[2.15] Porphyry says that genus and property are similar in that every genus never departs from its species, and likewise for properties. For example, when you say “human”, you immediately name “animal” along with the human, which is the genus of the human species. Moreover, when you say “human”, you also immediately name the property specific to humans; for every human is capable of laughter. Thus, genus and property are always inseparable and, in a way, bound together with their species.

Similarly, genus is predicated of species, and property is predicated of those things that participate in it.

He adds that all species are equally subject to the same genus, and that genus is referred to them just as properties are predicated of things that can participate in them. For instance, the genus “animal” is equally said of humans, horses, cows, and other living beings, just as the property “capable of laughter” is said of Hortensius, Cicero, and each individual contained under the same species, to which the property, that is “capable of laughter”, can be predicated.

Moreover, it is common for them to be predicated univocally. For a genus is predicated univocally of its species, as mentioned earlier, and “capable of laughter” is predicated univocally of the species to which it is proper; for both humans and laughter are capable. Furthermore, if someone says that a human is a rational and mortal animal and that “capable of laughter” is a rational and mortal animal, they will not be mistaken. Therefore, both genus and property are predicated univocally of their species and of that species to which they are proper.

On the Specific Features of Genus and Property

[2.16] However, they differ in that genus is primary and secondary, while property is not. If a genus is primary with respect to a species, and a property adheres to only one species and is equal to it, there is no doubt that a genus, which is greater than a species, is also greater than a property. For example, being an animal is prior to being capable of laughter. For a species to be informed, the genus must first be present, where properties and differences come together, as has been emphasized more forcefully. Moreover, a genus is predicated of many species. For the genus “animal” is predicated of many, whereas the property “capable of laughter” is predicated of only the human species. Hence, properties can always be predicated conversely of their species, but species can never be predicated of their genera. For not everything that is an animal is a human, nor is everything that is an animal capable of laughter. For instance, a horse or a neighing being can also be called an animal. However, everything that is human is capable of laughter, and everything that is capable of laughter is human. Thus, properties and species can convert to themselves and be predicated reciprocally.

Furthermore, whatever is proper to a species belongs to each and every individual of that species. For example, being capable of laughter is proper to all humans and only occurs in the human species. However, being an animal, which is a genus, is present in one species but not exclusively. For being an animal is present in every human, but not only in humans, as it is also present in cattle and other living beings. But here it is necessary to understand those proper things which are more proper, that is, which are called entirely proper; and these are such that they are present in both one species and all individuals within that species. Thus, genera and proper things also differ in this, that proper things are present in both one species and all individuals within that species, whereas genera are indeed present in all individuals within that species under the same genus, but not in only one species, since a genus is always predicated of many things. Hence it happens that, when proper things are removed, they do not remove the genus, but when genera are removed, the proper things themselves are also removed. For if you remove the proper thing, that is, the laughable, the neighing remains, the swimming remains. But if you remove the genus, you have also removed the species at the same time; if you have removed the species, the proper things which belong to the species will also perish at once. Therefore, when you remove the genera, you remove the proper things, but when you remove the proper things, the genera are not removed at the same time.

On the Commonalities of Genus and Accident

[2.17] Having completed the discussion of the differences between proper genera and proper accidents, he now turns to the commonalities or properties of both genera and accidents and mentions one commonality between them, which is that they are predicated of many things. For just as a genus is predicated of many species, so too is a separable accident or an inseparable accident called upon many species. For example, black is said of both the crow and the Ethiopian man, and movement is said of both the horse and the human, which is an inseparable accident, while the other is separable. And because they are farther apart from each other, he therefore only mentioned one commonality between them and left it to others to inquire further if there were more.

What is Between Genus and Accident

[2.18] Genus differs from accident in that genus is prior to species, while accidents come after species. It has already been shown that genera are always above species and are greater than them. For the animal is prior to the human, and therefore when the animal is destroyed, it also destroys the species; but when the species is destroyed, it does not destroy the genera. On the other hand, it is necessary that accidents come after the species themselves. For there must be something first to which an accident can happen. For no accident can exist apart from that to which it happens. Therefore, there will be something prior to the accident where it happens. Thus, it is necessary that every accident is found after the species and even more so after the individuals to which it primarily happens. In addition, those participating in a genus participate equally. Just as every genus is equally a genus to its species, as has been said many times, and all species participate equally in their genus. For both the horse and the human are equally animals, neither the horse more than the human nor the human more than the horse. But accidents do not participate equally, for when movement, which is a separable accident, is a shared accident, some species may participate in it more slowly or more quickly than others. The same applies to inseparable accidents. For some may have blacker eyes and others, although black, may have purple ones. Therefore, an accident also receives both intensification and remission. For what is called white is also said to be more or less, and other things of this kind. So, these two things are different because those that participate in a genus participate equally, but perhaps not equally in an accident. In addition, genera are not only prior to individuals but also prior to species, while accidents come not only after species but also after individuals; for they primarily happen to them, as has been said. There is also a difference, which has already been mentioned above. For genus is predicated in what something is, while accident is in what kind of thing it is or how it is. For if you ask what Socrates is, ‘man’ and ‘animal’ will be answered; but if you ask what kind of thing he is, perhaps ‘bald’ or ‘snub-nosed’ will be answered, which are inseparable accidents. But if you ask how he is, either ‘lying down’, ‘sitting’, or doing something else will be answered.

[2.19] Therefore, since the substance is divided from the genus to the species and difference, to the property and accident, now it pursues the latter. There are twenty differences in all. For since there are five things, and each of them has four differences to the other four, five times four makes twenty differences. For if genus differs from species, property, difference, and accident, four differences are made. But if species differs from genus, property, difference, and accident, again four; which, joined with the previous ones, make eight. And if difference is separate from species, property, genus, and accident, another four are added; which, joined with the previous eight, make twelve. But if the property differs from genus, species, difference, and accident, with another four differences placed above twelve, all sixteen differences are made. And if you also lead the differences of accident to the remaining four, with four growing over sixteen, all twenty differences are completed. Of these twenty, only ten differences are counted for a sufficient sum of teaching. For as it has been said that genus differs from difference, species, property, and accident, there were four differences. But if we say that difference differs from species, property, and accident, it is superfluous to mention the differences between difference and genus, since we have already mentioned them when we talked about the differences between genus and difference. For, as I believe, difference differs from genus by the same things by which genus differed from difference. Therefore, this difference by which difference is separate from genus must be left aside since it has already been mentioned above when it was said that genus was separate from difference. Thus, there remain three differences by which difference itself is separate from species, property, and accident. And since there were four differences of the higher genus to the other four, but now there seem to be three distances of difference to the other three, these seven distances are made. But what species is separate from genus was already said when it was said what genus was separate from species. And what it was separate from in difference was demonstrated when we said in what difference was discerned from species. Therefore, there remain two differences of species, that is, with property and accident, which, joined with the previous seven, make nine differences. Thus, one difference remains to be mentioned between property and accident. For what is separate from genus has been said when it was said what genus was separate from property; moreover, what is separate from species was said long ago when it was said what species was separate from property; furthermore, what is separate from difference has also been said when difference was separated from property.

But now let us see how difference is discerned from species, property, and accident.

On the Commonalities of Difference and Species

[2.20] And there is a communion of difference and species in that species equally allows individuals under itself and individuals equally participate in the species itself; for all men are equally men and participate equally in the participation of man. In the same way also with difference; for all men are equally rational and all who participate in reason participate equally in rationality, which is the difference. There is also another commonality. Just as a species never abandons those things of which it is the species and to which it stands above, so difference never abandons those things which it makes distinct from others. For since Socrates is under the species of man, he is never abandoned by the species of man; for Socrates is always a man. But indeed difference never abandons Socrates, since Socrates is rational; for Socrates is always a rational animal.

On the Distinctive Features of Difference and Species

[2.21] Species and difference, however, differ from each other in that difference is always predicated in what is of such a kind – for it is said what kind of animal Socrates is, so that rational may be answered. But species is predicated in what it is; for it is said what Socrates is, so that man may be answered. For the quality of man is rational. But not simply. For that quality is taken as a difference, which, coming in the genus, constitutes a species and, having been made from substantial quality, has become a substantial and specific difference. Therefore, such a quality is called difference and it is predicated in what is of such a kind to man. This is also the case in their differences. For difference is frequently considered in several species. For the difference of quadruped is in the species of ox, horse, and dog, and the difference of rational is in man and god. But species never presides over anything other than the individuals under itself alone. For never is anything else a man except what is an individual, such as Socrates, Plato, and Cicero. Hence, it happens that when difference is removed, species is also removed. For if you remove rational, you remove man. But if you remove the species, the difference remains. For if you remove man, the rational difference of god will remain. There is also this difference, that difference can be joined with another difference, so that some species may be informed by them. For the difference of rational and mortal, when joined, have rendered the species of one man, but joined species will never constitute any species from themselves. For if you join man to ox, no species will be informed by them. But perhaps someone will say: a mule is born from the conjunction of a donkey and a horse. But it is not so: for something individual is born from the conjunction of individuals. But if you simply join the species of donkey and horse themselves, no species will ever be constituted from them. For even if individuals can intermingle, it does not follow that the species of individuals pass into another substance. And therefore, it is clear that joined species cannot compose a single species, because the joined differences are constitutive of one species. So after these things have been dealt with, let us come to the commonalities of difference and property.

On the Commonalities Between Difference and Property

[2.22] Both difference and property share the commonality that what has a difference and from which this difference is participated in is equally participated in, just as what has a property and this property itself is participated in. For since the difference of being rational belongs to humans and all humans participate in the rational difference, there is no doubt that all humans are equally rational and participate equally in rationality. But the property of being laughable belongs equally to all humans; for all humans are equally laughable. This too is their commonality: just as one is called laughable in potential even if they do not laugh, so too one is called two-footed in potential even if one is missing a foot. For it is not what is, but what can be; for since one can laugh, they are called laughable, and since one can have two feet, they are called two-footed. And therefore, property and difference never depart from those in which they are seated. For a human is always laughable, even if they do not laugh, and always two-footed, even if they are missing a foot. For in these differences and properties, as has been said, what can potentially be, not what truly is, is considered.

On the Distinctiveness of Difference and Property

[2.23] However, they differ in that difference is predicated of multiple species, while property is predicated of only one. For the difference that is mortal is predicated of humans, cattle, horses, and other animals, and rational is predicated of both gods and humans, but laughable is predicated only of the single species of humans. Hence it happens that every difference, since it contains multiple species, is greater than its species, and therefore it can be predicated of species. But species cannot be predicated of it, nor can the converse be maintained. For since a human is called rational, it is not conversely said, ‘what is rational is human’; for it can also be not human but a god. But property, since it always equally and solely pertains to one species, is converted with equal force and appellation. For it is said: what is human? laughable; what is laughable? human. Having dealt with these, the discussion has moved on to difference and accident.

On the Commonalities Between Difference and Accident

[2.24] Both difference and accident share the commonality of being predicated of multiple things. For difference is said of both humans and gods, since both are rational, and accident is said of humans and horses, as a black Ethiopian human and a black horse. There is also this connection: that an inseparable accident, whatever species it may belong to, is present inseparably and to all, just like difference. For the inseparable accident that is black to a crow occurs inseparably to the crow and to all crows. In the same way, so does difference. For since it happens that a human is two-footed, it is always and for all humans to be two-footed.

On the Distinctiveness of Difference and Accident

[2.25] However, they differ in that every difference contains species, but it is not contained by species in return. For if a difference has multiple species under it, as has been said, it will be greater than the species placed under it, and if it is greater, no species can contain it; for the greater is never contained by the lesser. For what is rational contains humans and gods, but humans do not contain the rational. Accidents, on the other hand, sometimes contain and are sometimes contained. For they contain, since frequently one accident has two species under it. For example, black has the Ethiopian and the crow, but they are also contained. Since one species has two or three or any number of accidents. For if someone is blue-eyed or curly-haired or fair-skinned or tall, all these accidents are encompassed and contained by the one to whom they are attributed. And therefore, that species which contains the individual, and that individual has received several accidents within itself, is comprehensive of that accident.

“Then, difference is never intensified nor relaxed.”

What he says means this: the rational is neither more nor less in any species. For no human is more rational than another human in substance, nor less. But an accident is both intensified and relaxed. For someone is said to be taller, faster, or curlier, all of which are undoubtedly accidents.

“Moreover, contrary differences are always unmixed.”

Unmixed, he says, that is, unmixable, which cannot be mixed. For the rational cannot be mixed with the irrational, nor can they agree within one species. But it is clear that contrary accidents can agree within one species. For black or white can agree not only in one species but also in one individual. For any person, though they may be fair-skinned, can still have black hair.

Therefore, since we have discussed how the species differs from the genus or difference, when we spoke of the distance from genus to species and from difference to species, we will now discuss, what remains, concerning the common features of species and property.

On the Commonalities of Species and Property

[2.26] And there is one commonality between them, that they are predicated of each other. For since they are equal to themselves, neither does the species of man belong to any other property than “capable of laughter,” nor does “capable of laughter” belong to any other species than man. And therefore it is said: what is man? That which is capable of laughter; what is capable of laughter? That which is man. It is also common that every property is equally predicated of those under it, for all humans are equally capable of laughter, and the species is equally predicated of those under it, for all individual humans are equally called humans by one name.

On the Distinctiveness of Species and Property

However, they differ from each other, since a species can also be a genus to another, but a property cannot be. But let us understand here that species which is subordinate, not that which is more of a species and can never be a genus. And therefore, we should only understand that subordinate species which can also be a genus: for since “mortal” is a species of the rational genus, it is the genus of man, but “capable of laughter” can never be predicated of any other species nor be the property of any other, as it is of man. For those are always, as has been said, properties that are suited only to one species.

Then the species precedes and the property follows.

What he says is such. In order for every species to have a property, it must first exist and be established. For man must exist first, in order to be capable of laughter, not first be capable of laughter, in order to be a man. For since it is called a property, a property does not exist on its own, unless it belongs to a species. And therefore, that to which the property belongs must exist before the property exists.

To this, it is added that the species is always understood in the work of any subject. For the species is always in actuality, not only in potentiality. A human is truly and in work and in actuality a human, that is, he can never not be a human. But “capable of laughter,” which is a property, is said to be only in potentiality, even if it is not in actuality. For anyone can not laugh, yet because they can laugh, they are called capable of laughter. They differ, therefore, in this, that the species is always in actuality and in work, while the property is sometimes in potentiality.

Next, if their definitions are different, then they themselves are also necessarily different. Every definition defines a substance. Therefore, if they are of the same substance, they are shown by the same definition; if they are of the same definition, they are predicated of the same substance. But if they differ in definitions, they also differ in substances, and those that differ in substances are far from each other. Now, since the definitions of property and species are different, the species and property also differ from each other. The definition of species is to be under a genus and to be predicated of many things by the difference in what it is, but the property is to be in only one species and to be predicated of all individuals under it. But since their definitions also differ, the species itself will be distinct from the property.

On the Commonalities of Species and Accidents

After this, he shifted the discussion to the commonalities of species and accidents and says that there are few other commonalities besides these alone, because they are predicated of many. For they seem to be far apart from each other in the substance of themselves and in the power to suffer and to do what happens to something and what it happens to. For that which it happens to is, as it were, a foundation of the accident, but that which happens cannot exist in its own substance apart from that which it happens to.

On the Distinctive Features of Species and Accidents

[2.29] The distinctive features of each are these: species is predicated in what something is, while accident is predicated in what it is like and in a certain way how it is. For if someone asks: what is Socrates? he is called a man; if someone asks, what is he like, he is called bald or flat-nosed; if someone asks, how he is, he is called sitting or lying down. Also, every substance has one species. For the substance of a man has only one species of man, and the substance of a horse has only one species of horse. But one substance often contains many accidents. For in the same horse, one part is often black, another white, and there is tallness, height, an aquiline head, and other things of this sort. The same substance also has not only an inseparable accident but also a separable one. For perhaps someone is swift and the same person is also strong in body, and the same person is also an archer, and so on. It is added that species are known beforehand, that is, they are understood before accidents. And something will exist where an accident occurs before that which occurs. And since the species is the subject of the accident where the accident happens, therefore the species is understood to exist before the accident. Accidents, however, are external, that is, they come from outside and are foreign to any substance, even if they are inseparable. This is also their separation: everything that participates in a species participates equally; for Socrates, Cicero, and Plato are equally men. But those that participate in an accident, even if the accident is inseparable, do not participate equally. For although it is an inseparable accident for Ethiopians to be black, yet there is someone among them who is blacker, and not all participate equally in that blackness.

It remains, therefore, to discuss the commonalities of the distinctive features and accidents; for what sets apart a distinctive feature from species, genus, or difference has been shown above.

On the Commonalities of Distinctive Features and Accidents

[2.30] Distinctive features and inseparable accidents have in common that without them, those things which participate in them and in which they are considered can never exist. For neither does a man lose his ability to laugh, nor does an Ethiopian or a raven lose their blackness. Therefore, without these things, that is, distinctive features and accidents, those that participate in them cannot exist, lest this commonality seems to go against the previous definition of an accident - for it was defined as such: an accident is what is added and removed without the destruction of the thing it is in - which now seems to be said that they cannot exist without them, when previously they were said to be removable without their destruction. But it is said in this way, not that, if this inseparable accident is removed, that which it happens to perishes, but because it cannot be separated, therefore it cannot exist without it. There is also another

There is also another connection between inseparable accidents and properties, in that just as a property always and universally belongs to that which it belongs, that is, to man – for every man and always is laughable – so too every inseparable accident is always and universally an inseparable accident; for every crow and always is black. However, this connection is only with separable accidents, in that just as a property is predicated of many individuals, so too an accident can be predicated of many individuals. Many run, many walk, which are, of course, separable accidents, just as many can be laughable.

Of the Properties of Accidents and Properties

[2.31] However, these differ in that a property always belongs to one species, while an accident belongs to multiple. For an accident happens to multiple species, both animate and inanimate, such as black for ebony, black for the crow, black for the Ethiopian man, while laughable belongs to none but man alone. And so, conversely, a property is predicated because it is exclusive to one species and is equal to that species alone, but an accident cannot be predicated conversely because it has many species under it. For you cannot say that something is black because it is ebony, when you say that this is ebony because it is black; for it can be black and not be ebony. Then, every property equally gives itself to the things that are under it and is equally participated in by them – for Socrates, Cicero, and Virgil equally participate in being laughable and are equally laughable – but an accident is not always equal; for one can be taller and another faster, which is, of course, that separable accident, that inseparable one.

And perhaps there seem to be other properties or connections of these, but now this is enough for the introduction, let these suffice.

[2.32] But now, my Fabius, everything that pertains to Porphyry’s Introduction has been discussed more fully and abundantly. After this, if you ever need my help, especially for your studies, which have never lacked any honesty, I will gladly and encouragingly comply with the same desires. Fabius said: You promise me these things with a fatherly spirit, but I will never give up these studies, especially with you as a teacher, from whom I may perhaps learn the whole of Aristotle’s logic, if life permits. And I: I will do it, I said, most willingly. But since the morning sun, as Petronius says, has smiled upon the roofs, let us rise, and if there is anything more, it will be dealt with more diligently later.

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