Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories is a comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s original work, aiming to provide a clear and moderate explanation without burdening or confusing the reader. It is divided into four books. Book One covers equivocal terms, univocal things, denominatives, and substance; Book Two discusses quantity and relatives; Book Three focuses on quality, action and passion, situation and position, where and when, and having; and Book Four covers opposites, priority and simultaneity, species of motion, and ways of having. Boethius believes his work is crucial to the intellectual development of his fellow citizens, emphasizing the importance of Greek wisdom in enriching the customs of his city. Despite his duties as a consul, he finds it necessary to contribute to the study and understanding of Aristotle’s Categories, emphasizing its significance in shaping the knowledge and values of his society. Ultimately, Boethius aims to make Aristotle’s complex ideas more accessible to a wider audience, fostering appreciation for philosophy and promoting intellectual growth in his contemporaries.
Book One
Introduction
Having completed those things related to the Categories of Aristotle as arranged in the instruction of Porphyry, I have also pursued these commentaries on the Categories by following a moderate style. I have mixed nothing about the treatment of other questions, but have observed a clear and moderate explanation, neither wanting to burden the reader with brevity nor to confuse them with expansion. Therefore, it seems that the purpose of this work must first be briefly revealed, which is as follows: With things existing beforehand and remaining principally in their proper natural constitution, only the human species emerged that could assign names to things. Hence, it happened that, individually following everything, the human mind adapted individual words to things.
And indeed, for example, the human called this a body, that a stone, another wood, and another color. And again, whoever would generate another from themselves, they named with the title of father. They also determined the measure of magnitude by the proper form of the word, saying that it was bipedal, or tripedal, and in other cases similarly. Therefore, with all names organized, they returned to the properties and figures of the words themselves, and called the form of a word that could be inflected by cases ‘noun’; and that which could be distributed by tenses, ‘verb’.
The first position of names, therefore, was through which either it would designate things subject to the intellect or to the senses. The second consideration was that they would observe the individual properties and figures of names, so that the first name would be the word of the thing itself: as, for example, when any thing is called a human. However, that same word, that is, human, is called a noun, not referring to the meaning of the name itself but to its figure, because it can be inflected by cases. Therefore, the first position of the name was made according to the meaning of the word, while the second according to the figure: and the first position was for names to be assigned to things, and the second for names to be designated by other names. For when the word human is of the subject substance, what is called human is the name of the human, which is the appellation of the name itself. For we say, “What kind of word is human?” and it is properly answered: noun.
In this work, therefore, the intention is to discuss the first names of things and the words signifying things, not in that they are formed according to some property and figure, but in that they are significant. For whatever is said to do or to suffer about substance is not treated in such a way as if one of them could be inflected by cases, and the other changed by tenses, but as if it signifies either a human, or a horse, or some individual, or a species or genus.
Therefore, it is the intention of this work to discuss words signifying things in that they are significant. This is indeed the opinion suitable for the time of introduction and simple explanation, which we have now followed Porphyry in, as it seemed more straightforward and clearer. However, it is in mind to discuss the intention, usefulness, and order in three questions, namely in another commentary which I have proposed to compose on the same categories for the more learned, of which one is the intention of the categories, and there, having enumerated the various opinions, we will teach which judgment you also should approach, which no one should wonder at opposing this present opinion, since they see how much higher that one is, whose minds of those not too deeply entering could not have been capable, to whom we have written these things for moderately imbuing. Therefore, for affecting and somehow disposing with a moderate explanation are in the very doors of this discipline, those whom we are preparing to admit to this knowledge. Let the reader recognize this reason for the change of opinion in both works, that there the opinion is adapted to the perfect Pythagorean science and doctrine, here to the simple introduction of motions of exposition.
But now let us return to the proposed subject, and let the intention of the categories, which has been grasped above, be for the present, that is, to discuss the first words signifying the first genera of things insofar as they are significant. And since things are infinite, it is also necessary that there be infinite words that signify them. But there is no knowledge of the infinite, for the infinite cannot be grasped by the mind. What cannot be encompassed by the mind’s reason is not concluded by any science; therefore, there is no science of the infinite. But here Aristotle does not deal with the infinite significations of things, but, by establishing ten categories, he determined that the infinite multitude of significant words should be referred to them, so that, for example, when I say man, wood, stone, horse, animal, lead, tin, silver, gold, and other things of this kind, which are undoubtedly infinite, all these are reduced to the name of substance. For although there are other things which are certain, the infinite words include one name of substance. Again, when I say bipedal, tripedal, six, four, ten, line, surface, solidity, and whatever other things there are of the same kind, which are infinite, they are contained under one name of quantity, so that all these are placed under quantity. Again, when I say white, or knowledge, or good, or evil, or other things of this kind, and whatever else is infinite in this as well as any other kind, one name enclosing all of quality occurs, and likewise of other things. So he concludes the indeterminate and infinite multitude of different things with the very few numbers of the ten categories, so that those things which could not fall under knowledge as infinite are defined by ten proper genera and are enclosed in the comprehension of knowledge. Therefore, the ten categories that we speak of are genera of infinite significations in words, but since every signification of words is about things, which are signified by voice insofar as they are significant, they will necessarily signify genera of things. In order to conclude the intention, it must be said that in this book the discussion is arranged about the first words signifying the first genera of things insofar as they are significant.
But since the intention has been spoken of, the usefulness of this work must be briefly explained. For since things are infinite and are signified by infinite words, and (as has been said) they cannot come under knowledge, by this definition, by which the division of the ten categories is made, we acquire the discipline of all things and significant words. Hence, this book is the first to be read by those striving for logic, for the very reason that, since all logic is constituted by the reasoning of syllogisms, and syllogisms are joined by propositions, and propositions consist of statements, the first usefulness is to know what each statement signifies by the definition of its proper science.
This examination of the ten categories is also very useful for us in understanding Aristotle’s Physics and moral philosophy, as it will become clearer as we go through each one. The same reasoning applies to the order of this book. Since simple things are by nature prior to composite things, for composite things are composed of simple ones. Here, since the discussion is about simple words signifying things, the first book of Aristotle is learned according to the principle of simplicity. It is hardly doubtful to which part of philosophy the intention of this book is directed since whoever deals with significant words will also deal somewhat with things. For things and their signification are connected, but the discussion of words will be more important, followed by that which is formed from the reason of things. Therefore, since all logical art is about speech, and in this work, words are primarily discussed (although this book relates to other parts of philosophy as well), it is mainly referred to logic, whose simple elements, that is, words, are primarily discussed in it. This book is indeed Aristotle’s and no one else’s, because in every philosophy he agrees with himself on the discussion of this work, and the brevity and subtlety do not differ from Aristotle; otherwise, he would seem to have published an interrupted and incomplete work who would write about syllogisms if he had omitted propositions or the treatise on primary words, which contain the propositions themselves.
Although there is another book by Aristotle on the same subject, containing almost the same content, it is different in style; but this book began the calculation of properties. Archytas also composed two books which he titled “Kathulous logous”, in the first of which he arranged these ten categories. Therefore, some later thinkers suspected that Aristotle was not the inventor of this division, because a Pythagorean man had written the same thing, in which opinion the not insignificant philosopher Iamblichus is, to whom Themistius does not agree, nor does he concede that it was Archytas, who was Pythagorean and from Tarentum, and who lived with Plato for a while but was a Peripatetic Archytas, who would give authority to a new work by the antiquity of his name. But more on this later.
What remains is the inscription, which was varied. For some inscribed it “On Things,” others “On the Genera of Things,” whom the same and similar error confounded. For (as we have taught), not about the genera of things, nor about things, but about the words signifying the genera of things is the discussion held in this work; and Aristotle himself declares this when he says: Of those things which are said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity. If he were making a division of things, he would not have said “signifies”; for a thing is signified, not itself signifying. It is also a very strong argument that Aristotle does not speculate about things but about words signifying things when he says: Therefore, each of the things which have been said, is indeed said by itself in no affirmation, but an affirmation is made of them when they are combined with each other. For if things are joined, they in no way complete an affirmation, for an affirmation is in speech. Therefore, since the categories joined make an affirmation (but an affirmation is only in speech, and the things joined to make an affirmation are the words signifying things), the discussion of the categories is not about things but about words; therefore they inscribed it wrongly, either “On Things” or “On the Genera of Things.”
Others note that this book should be read before the Topics, which is quite absurd. Why not rather before Physics? As if this book has less use in Physics, when the first Analytics are read before the Topics, and before the first Analytics, the book of Interpretation comes to the knowledge of the beginner, why not rather have they inscribed this book either before the Interpretation or before the Analytics? Therefore, the very idea of this inscription must be rejected, and it must be said: Since there are ten primary categories of things, it was necessary for there to be ten simple words that would be said about the subjects: for everything that signifies something about that thing is said about what it signifies, therefore the book must be inscribed about the ten Categories.
But perhaps someone might say, if the discussion is about the words that signify things, why does it discuss the things themselves? It must be said that things are always connected with their proper signification, and whatever comes into things is found in the words of things: therefore, rightly discussing words, the author assumes the property of the signifying words from those things which they signified, that is, from things.
There may be another question as well: Why did he divide the speech into ten categories here, while in the book of Interpretation, he only made a division into two parts, namely, verb and noun? But the difference is that there he divides the forms of words, while here he deals with significations, so he is not contradicting himself. In the book of Interpretation, he considers the things that are according to a certain form of the word, which can be inflected by cases or varied through time. Here, however, he discusses not according to these forms, but in the fact that the words are signifying: therefore, by making different divisions in different things and treatises, no contradiction will be noted, nor does he now divide speech but distributes the names themselves according to the multitude of genera. Since there are ten genera of things, he divides words not according to speech, but according to the signification of things into ten categories, and he deals with these. And so it was necessary for the discussion of things to be somehow mixed in, so that (as was said) the properties of words would not appear unless they were drawn from things, and so he does not properly deal with things, but with the categories, that is, with the signifying words themselves insofar as they are signifying, he begins the series of discussion. But why, if he discusses the categories, is the first treatment about equivocal, univocal, or denominative? The reason is, of course, that some things are always put forward by those who discuss, which, once established, make the teaching of the following easier: just as in geometry, terms are put forward first, and then the order of the theorems is established. In the same way, here, whatever could be useful for the discussion of the categories, he explained before coming to the categories themselves. Therefore, since I have explained what was to be explained, let us now come to the series and structure of the discussion itself. What utility equivocal, univocal, or denominative words have will be dealt with according to their individual reasons and definitions.
On Equivocal Terms
Equivocal terms are those whose name alone is common, but the underlying nature of the substance is different, as in the case of “animal” referring to both a human and a painted figure. For these, only the name is common, but the nature of the substance is different according to the name. If someone were to assign what each of them is insofar as they are animals, they would assign a unique characteristic for each.
Every thing is shown either by its name or by its definition: for we call the subject matter either by its proper name or we show what it is by its definition. For example, we call a certain substance by the name of “human,” and we provide the definition of the same by saying that a human is a rational, mortal animal. Therefore, since every thing is either explained by its definition or by its name, from these two, namely name and definition, four types of distinctions are generated. For all things are either joined by the same name and the same definition, like “human” and “animal,” for both can be called animals and both are joined by a single definition. For an animal is a living, sensible substance, and a human is also a living, sensible substance, and these are called univocal. Others, which are neither joined by names nor by definitions, like fire, stone, color, and those that have distinct natures of their own substances, these are called diversivocal. Others, which are called by different names, and are subject to a single definition and designation, like “sword” and “blade”; these have many names, but what they signify is shown by a single definition, and this is called multivocal. Others, which agree in name but differ in definitions, like a living human and a painted human, for both are called either animals or humans. But if someone wishes to define a painting and a human, they will apply different definitions to each, and these are called equivocal. Since what equivocal terms are has been explained, let us pursue the individual statements of the Aristotelian definition.
Equivocal, he says, refers to things that are not equivocal in themselves unless they are predicated by a single name: therefore, since they become equivocal by having a common term, he rightly says that they are called equivocal. For they are not equivocal but are called so. Equivocation occurs not only in nouns but also in verbs: as when I say “I embrace you” and “I am embraced by you.” In these meanings, since the name “embrace” is the same, the manner of doing and suffering is different, and so equivocation is also present here: the single name “embrace” is determined by different definitions of doing and suffering. Equivocation is also frequently found in prepositions and conjunctions, and so when he says: “whose name alone is common,” ‘name’ should be taken as the significance of all things through speech, that is, every term not only proper or appellative, which only applies to that name which can be inflected in cases but also to the name of the significance of things, with which we predicate the imposed terms of things.
Alone is said in two ways: once when we say that something is one, as if we say the world is alone, that is, one; in another way when we say to a certain division from another, as if someone says I have only a tunic, that is, not also a toga, evidently in the division of the toga. Here, Aristotle placed it saying, only the name is common, as if he wanted this to be understood, not even the definition, for equivocal things are joined by name but disagree in definition. Also, the word common is said in many ways. It is said to be common that which is divided into parts, and the whole is no longer common, but its parts are unique to each individual, such as a house. It is called common that which is not divided into parts but rather is shared in use by those who possess it, such as a shared servant or horse. It is also called common that which becomes the property of each person by use, but after use, it is returned to the common, such as a theater, for when I use it, it is mine; when I leave, I have returned it to the common. It is also called common that which, undivided into any parts, comes to each individual at the same time, as a voice or speech reaches the ears of many people at once, whole and complete. According to this last meaning of common, Aristotle thinks that equivocal things have a common name. For in both the painted man and the living man, the whole term animal is said.
But according to the name of substance, the reason is different, he prefaces this meaning so that if definitions are given otherwise than according to the name, the whole definition will falter and waver. First, we must discuss the property of definition. For those definitions are certain which can be converted, such as if you say, “What is a man? A rational mortal animal” – this is true. “What is a rational mortal animal? A man” – this too is true. But if someone says, “What is a man? An animated sensible substance” – this is true; “What is an animated sensible substance? A man” – this is not true in all respects, because a horse is also an animated sensible substance, but a man is not. Therefore, it is clear that those are complete definitions which can be converted. But this happens in those things that are not about the common but only about one thing, such as when definitions are given about the name of man, for example: Animal is a common name; if someone says, “A man is an animated sensible substance,” he proceeds: if it is not converted, it is because the definition was given about the common name; but if it is given about one name, then the definition must be made about that name; however, it must be made correctly, so that the definition of man is a rational mortal animal, not an animated sensible substance, for the former is given according to the name of man, the latter according to the name of animal. The same also applies to those names that are commonly predicated of two things, if the reason for the name of substance is not given, it can sometimes happen that equivocal things become univocal and univocal things become equivocal; for man and horse, since they are univocal according to the name of animal, can be equivocal if they are not defined according to the name. For man and horse are called animals by a common name, so if someone gives the definition of man, saying, “a rational mortal animal,” and of a horse, “an irrational neighing animal,” he has given different definitions, and univocal things will have been changed into equivocal things. This, however, happens because the definitions were not given according to the name of animal, which is their common name, but according to the names of man and horse. For if the definition were given according to the common name, which is animal, it would be doneas follows: a human is a sensible, animated substance, based on the name of animal; and again, a horse is a sensible, animated substance, based on the name of animal once more, for the same term ‘animal’ is predicated univocally of both horse and human. Moreover, equivocal terms become univocal in this way: if someone says that Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, and Pyrrhus the Epirote are univocal because they are both called Pyrrhus and are rational, mortal animals. In this case, by providing a definition based on the name ‘human’, equivocal terms become univocal. However, if a definition based on the name Pyrrhus were provided by either their parents or their homeland, they would need to be distinguished by separate definitions. Therefore, it is fittingly added ‘according to the name,’ for if a definition is made otherwise, it cannot remain stable and frequently leads to various errors.
The term ‘ratio’ is also used in multiple ways. There is a ratio of the soul, a ratio of calculation, a ratio of nature (which is the very likeness of things that come into being), and a ratio that is given in definitions or descriptions. Since the most general categories lack a genus, and individuals do not differ by any substantial difference, and definitions are derived from genus and difference, no definition can be found for either the most general categories or individuals. However, definitions can exist for subalternate categories since they have both differences and genera. For those categories that cannot be defined, they are only delimited by descriptions. A description is something that designates any thing by a certain specific property. Therefore, whether it is a definition or a description, both designate the nature of a substance. Hence, when one speaks of the nature of a substance, both the name of definition and description are included.
Equivocal terms are divided into those that occur by chance and those that occur by design. Chance occurrences include Alexander, son of Priam, and Alexander the Great. It is by chance that the same name was given to both. By design, however, are those terms that are established by human will. Among these terms, some are equivocal due to similarity, as in the case of a painted man and a real man, which Aristotle uses as an example; others are equivocal due to proportion, such as unity being the principle in numbers and the point being the principle in lines. This type of equivocation is said to occur due to proportion. Furthermore, there are equivocal terms that derive from a single source, such as medicinal tools and medicinal pigments, which both stem from the concept of medicine. There are also terms that refer to a single concept, such as a healthy journey and healthy food, which are equivocal because they both refer to the concept of health.
Why does Aristotle discuss equivocal terms before univocal terms? It is because the ten categories, although they are different in their definitions, are all called by a single term of predication; for we call them all categories, and since the categories themselves are kinds of things, they are predicated univocally of the subjects. Every genus is said univocally of its proper species, so it is appropriate to first discuss the common term for all categories, as if to later clarify how each individual category is predicated of its proper species. However, if (as has been said) the intention of this book is not about things but about names, why does Aristotle discuss equivocal terms and not equivocation? For equivocal things are the objects, while equivocation refers to the term itself. Therefore, since the name itself retains nothing of equivocation, unless there are different things about which that term is predicated. Hence, the substance of equivocation itself is derived from these things, and it is more appropriate to begin with them.
It seems, however, that there is another kind of equivocation that Aristotle does not accept at all. For just as the foot of a man is called, so is the foot of a ship, and the foot of a mountain, all of which are said in this way by means of a metaphor. But metaphor has no property of its own. Therefore, equivocal things are never metaphorical, unless the proper and unchangeable subjects are called by words. But there is such a universal examination of them. For not every metaphor is separated from equivocation, but only when it is applied to things having a certain position in the name, from another thing already named, for the sake of ornament, as because someone is already called a charioteer, a helmsman is also called, if someone, for the sake of ornament, calls a helmsman a charioteer, the name charioteer will not be equivocal, although it signifies different things, that is, the driver of a chariot and a ship. But whenever a thing needs a name, but takes it from another thing which has the name, then this metaphor retains the property of equivocation, as the name of a man has been applied from a living man to a painting.
And so much for equivocal things; now let us treat univocal things.
On Univocal Things
Univocal things are those whose name is common and whose substance is the same according to the name, such as animal, human, and ox. For both are called animals by a common name, and the same substance is present; for if anyone assigns the reason for both being animals, he will assign the same reason.
After defining equivocal things, he made the transition to univocal terms, in which nothing else differs except that equivocal things are separated by definition, univocal things are joined by the term itself but all other things whatsoever are said in the definition of equivocal things, also agree in this designation of univocal things. For just as in equivocal things the definition was made according to the name of equivocal things, so also in univocal things the reason for the substance will be assigned according to the name. Univocal things are either genera to species or species to species, genera to species, such as animal and human. For since the genus of man is animal, man is called an animal, therefore both animal and man are called animals. Therefore, if you define both according to the common name, you say that an animal is a living and sensible substance, and man, too, according to what makes him an animal, if you say a living and sensible substance, you will find nothing false in this. Species, on the other hand, are univocal to species which are contained in one and the same genus, such as man, horse, and ox; the common genus for these is animal, and they are called animals by a common name. Therefore, according to the one name that is common to them as animals, one definition of that reason will be suitable for them, for all are living and sensible substances. Therefore, according to the latter designation of univocation, Aristotle took the example of species that are univocal to species, such as man and ox, which are under the same genus.
On Denominatives
Denominatives are any words that derive their name from another, with only a difference in case, according to the noun, such as grammaticus from grammatica and fortis from fortitudo.
This definition also has nothing obscure. For the ancients called cases some transformations of nouns, such as iustus from iustitia, fortis from fortitudine, etc. Therefore, this transformation of the noun was called a case by the ancients. And so, whenever one thing participates in another, it acquires not only the thing but also the name through this participation, such as a person, who participates in iustitia, acquires both the thing and the name from it, and is called iustus. Therefore, denominatives are any words that differ from the principal noun only in case, that is, only in transformation. For when the principal noun is iustitia, the transformed noun iustus is made from it. Therefore, denominatives are any words that differ from the principal noun only in case, that is, only in the transformation of the noun, according to the principal noun.
There are, however, three necessary conditions for denominative words to be constituted: first, that it participates in the thing; second, that it participates in the name; and third, that there is some transformation of the noun, such as when someone is called fortis from fortitudine. For there is some fortitudo in which the fortis participates, and it also has a participation in the name, for it is called fortis. But there is also some transformation, for fortis and fortitudo do not end with the same syllables. If, however, there is something that does not participate in the thing, it cannot participate in the name either. Therefore, whatever does not participate in the thing cannot be denominative.
Furthermore, those things that indeed participate in the thing but not in the name are also separated from the nature of denominatives, such as when someone, though they possess virtue, participates in the virtue itself but is called wise with no other name than sapiens. But virtue and wisdom are distinct in name itself, so here the person participates in the thing but not in the name. Therefore, sapiens is not said to be derived from virtue but from wisdom, which the person both participates in and is joined by the name, and is distinct by the transformation. Conversely, if there is no transformation, such as a woman called musica, who indeed participates in the discipline of music and is called musica. This designation, therefore, is not denominative but equivocal, for with one name both the discipline and the woman herself are called musica. Since, therefore, there is a similar ending of syllables, and the name is similar, and there is no transformation, they cannot be denominative. Therefore, whatever is said to be denominative will participate in both the thing and the name, and will be distinguished by some transformation of the word.
These, then, are the necessary distinctions that he believed should be made for the categories. He rejects both multivocals and diversivocals, as he did not consider them useful for the present discussion. However, both should be defined briefly. Multivocals are words with multiple names but one definition, such as scutum and clypeus, for they have multiple names but one definition; and Marcus Porcius Cato, for one thing is referred to by many names. Diversivocals are words with neither the same name nor the same definition, such as homo, color, and quid. Quid is entirely distinct from both the naming and the defining.
Of the things that are said, some are indeed spoken in relation to a combination, while others are spoken without combination. And those which are said according to combination are like “man runs,” “man wins”; while those which are without combination are like “man,” “ox,” “runs,” “wins.”
After sufficiently explaining the conjunction of definitions and names as far as the present work is concerned, because a division must be made about the primary names signifying the first genera of things, which are not separated by name but by genus, he now shows what is the utterance of any word made without combination. For words are said without combination when they are pronounced according to the simple sound of the name, like “man,” “horse”: for nothing is added to these. According to combination, they are said when they are joined by some conjunction, like “either Socrates or Plato,” or when they are joined according to some accident. For example, because walking applies to Socrates, we say: “Socrates walks,” and this utterance is according to combination because when I say:
Socrates walks
I have embraced Socrates with walking. But when he says: of the things that are said, he wants to demonstrate nothing else but that he has arranged the discussion of the primary words of things in this book. For the words of things are what are said, for we properly name them.
Of those things which are said, some are spoken of a certain subject, but are in no subject, like man is spoken of a certain man, but is in no subject.
Here, Aristotle collects the multitude of all speech into the smallest division. For as he distributed the words of things into ten categories, no greater division can be found, for nothing can be added as an eleventh to this division. For every thing is either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or action, or passion, or time, or place, or possession, or position; therefore, there will also be as many speeches signifying these, and this is the greatest division to which nothing can be added further: but the smallest is that which is made into four, into substance and accident, and universal and particular. For every thing is either substance, or accident, or universal, or particular. So just as nothing could be added to the ten above, so nothing can be taken away from these four. For neither can any division be made smaller than these four, nor greater than if the categories are enclosed by the limit of ten. However, when the division is made into these four, I will explain briefly.
First of all, the division of all things is into substance and accident. But since substance cannot be expressed unless it is understood either universally or particularly: for when I say “man,” I have said a universal thing, because this name is predicated of many individuals: but when I say “Socrates” or “Plato,” I have said a particular thing; because Socrates is spoken of a bare subject: and accident also in the same way; for when I say “knowledge,” I have brought forth a universal thing, because knowledge is predicated of grammar and rhetoric, and of all other things placed under it; but if I say “Plato’s knowledge,” since every accident that comes to an individual becomes individual, I say particular knowledge, for Plato’s knowledge, like Plato himself, is particular: therefore, since neither substance nor accident can be expressed in any way, unless in its name it takes on the force of universality or particularity, the division is rightly made into four, so that every thing is either substance or accident, and of these either universal or particular.
From these four, then, combinations are formed. For when universality comes into substance, it forms a universal substance, such as man or animal. The universal is that which is suitable to be predicated of many, while the particular is that which is not predicated of any subject. Therefore, there is one combination of universality and substance, so that there is a universal substance. But if it is joined to particular substance, it forms a particular substance, such as Socrates or Plato, and whatever individual is found in substance. Now, when universality is mixed with accident, it forms a universal accident, such as knowledge, which, although it is an accident and cannot exist apart from the soul to which it belongs, is still universal because it can be predicated of the subject grammar or other species. But when particularity is joined to accident, it forms a particular accident, such as Plato’s or Aristotle’s knowledge. Thus, four combinations are formed: universal substance, particular substance, universal accident, and particular accident. However, it is in no way possible for an accident to pass into the nature of substance, or for substance to pass into an accident; the accident indeed comes into substance but not so that it becomes substance, for color, which is an accident, does not become substance because it comes into substance. Nor does substance take on color so that color becomes substance. Therefore, neither does substance pass into the nature of accidents, nor does accident pass into the nature of substances. Moreover, neither particularity nor universality passes into each other. For universality can be predicated of particularity, as animal can be predicated of Socrates or Plato, and particularity can take on the predication of universality but not so that universality becomes particularity, nor again so that what is particular becomes universal. Therefore, Aristotle, desiring to arrange these four combinations, universal substance, universal accident, particular substance, and particular accident, did not assign their names but descriptions.
And because he could not find the definitions of the most general genera, he used these descriptions, saying that substance is that which is not in a subject, but accident is that which is in a subject. For every accident is in a subject, such as color in a body, knowledge in a soul, and every accident has a subject substance. For if someone removes substance, there will be no accident. Therefore, substance is a certain place where the nature of accidents can stand. Substance itself, however, stands by itself, and therefore it is called substance, and it relies on no other subject but is substance for all. Otherwise, if substance could be in any subject, it would be an accident. For every accident is in a subject, and whatever is in a subject is an accident. But if substance were in some subject, it would immediately become an accident, but substance cannot be an accident, as we have shown above. Therefore, since accident is in a subject, and substance is not an accident, substance is not in a subject.
The description of universality, however, is: to be predicated of a subject. For every universality is predicated of particular subjects, for since animal is universal, or man, it is predicated of Socrates and Plato. For it is said that Socrates is an animal and a man. And since knowledge is a universal accident, it is said of the subject grammar, for grammar is knowledge. Particularity, however, since it is the ultimate of things and nothing is subject to it, is not predicated of any subject; for since universality is predicated of a subject, and particularity is not universality, particularity will not be predicated of a subject. For when things are different, their definitions will also differ; so too in these matters, since substance and accident are different, their definitions will differ as well. As the accident is in a subject, so the substance is not in a subject. And since universality is predicated of a subject, and particularity is distinct from universality, it is not predicated of a subject. Therefore, Aristotle mixed these descriptions in this way, saying: THOSE THINGS THAT ARE SAID OF SOME SUBJECT, BUT ARE IN NO SUBJECT, intending to demonstrate universal substance. For what he said is said of a subject, it is universal; but what he said is in no subject, it is substance; therefore, what he said is said of some subject, but is in no subject, he contends to demonstrate universal substance: for, as has often been said, what is said of a subject is universal; what is in no subject is substance. These joined together, that is, to be said of some subject and to be in no subject, demonstrate universal substance.
After universal substance, he placed particular accident, saying:
But other things are in a subject, but are said of no subject (and I say that to be in a subject is that, when it is in something not as a certain part, it is impossible to be without that in which it is), as a certain grammar is in a subject in the soul, but is said of no subject, and a certain white is in a subject in the body (for every color is in a body).
For what he says are in a subject shows the accident, but what he added, but are said of no subject, shows the particular. For an accident is in a subject, and particularity is not predicated of any subject. Therefore, whatever thing itself is in a subject but is not predicated of any subject is a particular accident, as is a certain grammar, that is, of Aristarchus, or of some individual person’s grammar: for since it is of an individual person, it has also become individual and particular; therefore, since a certain grammar is in the soul, it is an accident, and since it is said of no subject, it is particular; for just as Aristarchus himself is not said of any subject, so too his grammar is not predicated of any subject. But he does not say that grammar itself is particular, but rather that a certain grammar, that is, the individual grammar of some person, which the particular person retains by their own knowledge. And since he placed an incorporeal accident that occurs to the soul, that is, grammar, which would be in the soul; he also places another example of a corporeal accident; for he says, and a certain white is in a subject in the body (for every color is in a body): here too he does not say that all white is particular, but rather that it comes to an individual body as white. It is also proven that particular white is in a subject in this way, for the color, which is the genus of white or some white, is in the body and is in a subject. Therefore, if its genus is in a subject, it is also in a subject. For all species or individual properties are contained by the genus and have the same nature.
Since “to be in something” is said in many ways, I will briefly explain the three ways that Aristotle wants to show to be in a subject. For something is said to be in something in nine ways: we say that something is in a place, as in a forum or a theater. We also say that something exists in another, like in a container, such as wheat in a measure. We also say that something exists in another as a part in a whole, like a hand in a body. We say that something exists in another like a whole in its parts, like a body in all its parts. Again, like a species in a genus, such as man in the animal kingdom, or a genus in its species. We also say that something exists in another as if it were at its end, like happiness being the end of a good life, if someone is happy; they are at the end, namely of a good life. We also say that something exists in another as in any powerful being, like the government of a city in an emperor. We also say, like a form in matter, like the likeness of Achilles in bronze or marble.
Therefore, something is said to exist in another in nine ways: in a place, in a container, as a part in a whole, as a whole in its parts, as a species in a genus, as a genus in its species, at the end, in the emperors, and as a form in matter. Of these, Aristotle only mentions three, but two are combined, and one is separate. He says: I say that something exists in a subject when it exists in another, not as a part, and it is impossible for it to exist without that in which it exists. The sense of this is as follows: I call something an accident that exists in a subject, that is, it exists in another such that it is not a part of it and cannot exist without some subject, like color, which exists in a body but is not a part of the body. If the color is separated from the body, it is nowhere. Every color exists only in a body. Therefore, an accident is something that always exists in a subject in such a way that it is not a part of it, and when separated from that subject, it is reduced to nothing, as it cannot exist on its own without another subject.
When he says not as a part, he wanted to differentiate the meaning of existing in something from the way parts exist in a whole, because an accident is not a part of its subject. When he says it is impossible for it to exist without that in which it exists, he distinguishes the meaning of something existing in a container or in a place; for what exists in a container or place can be separated from the container or place, like wheat in a measure, or a person leaving a theater: but an accident cannot be separated from that in which it exists.
Therefore, he establishes only three meanings: according to which something exists in a container, in a place, and as a part in a whole. But he distributes the meaning of existing in a container and in a place into one sentence, saying it is impossible for it to exist without that in which it exists.
But perhaps someone may say that it is not a true definition, that those things exist in a subject which exist in another such that they are not parts and cannot exist without that in which they exist, for Socrates or any man, although not an accident, is always in a place and cannot exist without a place. To these objections, it must be replied that Socrates can change places and exist apart from the place in which he was. Finally, if we understand intelligence, it exists in itself; accidents, on the other hand, do not exist on their own.
But if someone objects that accidents can also change places, for example, if a bad smell is held in the hand, the hand becomes filled with the bad odor, and so the odor, which is an accident, can transfer to another subject. However, this is not what Aristotle is saying, because an accident cannot change places, and he did not say that it is impossible to exist without that in which it was, but without that in which it is. This means that it can change places, but it cannot exist without some subject.
Therefore, the correct and complete definition of what is in a subject is that it exists in another not as a part, and it is impossible for it to exist without that in which it is. This is also the meaning of what was said about the form existing in matter. For if a form exists in matter, it cannot exist by itself in any way. After showing what a particular accident is, saying that it is in a subject and not predicated of a subject, and giving the definition of something existing in a subject, he says: that which is in something not as a certain part, and which cannot exist without that in which it is.
He then returns to the discussion of the universal accident, defining it this way:
But other things are both said of a subject and are in a subject, such as knowledge which is in the subject, that is, in the soul, and is said of the subject, that is, of grammar; other things neither are in a subject nor are said of a subject, such as some particular man or some particular horse; for none of these is either in a subject or said of a subject.
For after defining what is in a subject and giving examples of particular accidents, he made the transition to the universal accident, saying that there are other things that are in a subject and are predicated of a subject, which signifies a universal accident: for since it is said of a subject, it is universal; since it is in a subject, it is an accident; therefore, being in a subject and being predicated of a subject indicates a universal accident. He also proposes examples that fit this combination: he says that knowledge is in a subject, that is, in the soul, for unless there is a soul in which knowledge exists, there is no knowledge, because knowledge is an act of the soul, and inanimate things know nothing.
From this, the proposition of a particular substance follows, which he explains as being neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, for what is not in a subject is a substance, and what is not predicated of a subject is particularity. Thus, both things not being predicated of a subject and not being in a subject indicate a particular substance.
Therefore, he combined the four things with their proper meanings, not according to their proper names but according to their proper reasons and definitions. For he put what is not in a subject and is predicated of a subject in place of the universal substance; he said that what is in a subject and not predicated of a subject is a particular accident. However, he indicated the universal accident by saying that it is both in a subject and is said of a subject; he interposed what is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject as a particular substance. Simply put, individual things and those that are singular in number are not said of any subject; however, there is nothing to prevent them from being in a subject, for some grammar is in a subject. Every particularity will either be a substance or an accident; for when I say Socrates, I signify an individual and particular
Every particularity or substance will be either a substance or an accident; for when I say “Socrates,” I signify an individual and particular substance; when I say “some grammar,” I have spoken of an individual and particular accident. Individuals, however, are those which cannot be divided into other species, nor into other individuals. For just as “animal” is divided into species, like “human” and “horse,” “human” is further divided into individual humans, such as Socrates and Plato, and so on. In the same way, Plato and Socrates are not divided into others. The same can be said of accidents: just as “knowledge” is divided into species, such as “grammar” and “rhetoric;” grammar itself is divided into particular grammars, which are known by particular people. Therefore, individuals are whatever is singular in number, and are not divided into other multitudes according to species or individuals.
Every individual, since it is particular, is not predicated of a subject; however, everything that is not predicated of a subject will either be a substance, like Plato, or an accident, like some grammar. From these particulars, namely substance and accident which are not predicated of a subject, a substance is not in a subject, while an accident is in a subject. Thus, those individuals which are substances cannot be in a subject, but other individuals which are said according to the nature of accidents can be in a subject without hindrance. And this is what is stated:
Simply put, those things that are individuals and singular in number are predicated of no subject, but nothing prevents them from being in a subject; for some grammar is in a subject.
This is what he preferred to demonstrate, and that particular substances and accidents have this in common, that they are not predicated of a subject. For he said: simply put, those things that are individuals and singular in number, are predicated of no subject – meaning whether they are substances or accidents, but not all individuals are not in a subject. For individual accidents, nothing prevents them from being in a subject.
Some grammar, since it is individual and not predicated of a subject, is nevertheless in a subject, that is, in the soul. To summarize, the meaning of this is that all things which are individuals are indeed predicated of no subject, but not all are not in a subject. For while a particular substance is not in a subject, like Plato, a particular accident is in a subject, like some grammar in the soul.
It is also important to note with great attention the order of this proposition. For since there are four combinations, made from four things, of which two are distinct by nature, such as substance and accident, and two by quantity, such as particularity and universality, when these four are combined and composed, he made a disposition with opposing sides. He first placed universal substance, saying that it is not in a subject and is predicated of a subject. After this first position, he added an entirely different thing, that is, particular accident, which would be in a subject, and not predicated of a subject. For when he said “accident,” he separated it from substance, and when he added “particular,” he separated it from universal. Again, on the other side, he arranged the division of universal accident, saying that it is in a subject, and is predicated of a subject; and lastly, he spoke of particular substance, contrary to the previous accident, which is neither in a subject, nor is it predicated of a subject, opposing
Again, from another side, he arranged a division of the universal accident, saying that it is in the subject and is predicated of the subject; and finally, he said the particular substance contrary to the previous accident, that neither is it in the subject nor is it predicated of the subject, opposing the particularity of the substance to the universality of the accident. But to make what we say clearer, we have provided a figure and description in which we have marked the upper side as substance and accident, and the remaining sides as particularity and universality, outlining the Aristotelian composition angularly and by the sides.
When one is predicated of the other as of the subject, whatever is said of that which is predicated, all of it will also be said of the subject, as man is predicated of a certain man, but animal of man, therefore animal will also be predicated of a certain man; for a certain man is both man and animal.
Having spoken earlier about those things that are in the subject (that is, accidents), he established a definition of the thing placed in the subject and existing in no way beyond the subject, in the middle of the discussion, saying that it is neither part of anything nor can it exist in any way without a subject. Having revealed, therefore, what it means to be in a subject, he now explains what it means to be predicated of a subject. For there are two ways in which predications are made, one according to accident, the other of the subject: for example, white is predicated of man, for we say a white man, and again, animal is predicated of the same man, for we say man is an animal. But the former predication, which is:
The man is white
is according to accident: for the accident, which is white, is predicated of the subject man but not in what it is, for since white is an accident and man is a substance, an accident cannot be predicated of a substance in what it is; therefore, this predication is said to be according to accident. To be predicated of the subject, however, is when one thing is predicated of another in its very substance, as animal of man; for since animal is both a substance and the genus of man, it is therefore predicated of man in what it is. Hence, only those things which are placed in the substance of any thing and in its definition are said to be predicated of the subject; so whenever there is a predication of this kind, as one is predicated of the other as of the subject, that is, it is said of its substance, as animal of man, it is necessary for this property to occur, that if something is said of that which is predicated as of the subject, that is, of its substance, it will necessarily be said of the subject of the predicate, as man is indeed predicated of Socrates in what it is. For when asked what Socrates is, we answer “man.” But in fact, animal is said of man in what it is, for animal is predicated of the substance of man, and so it happens that animal is predicated of man and man of Socrates in what it is as of the subject. Therefore, since this consequence follows, animal will also be predicated of Socrates in what it is. For it can be said when asked what Socrates is, “animal.” Therefore, it is evident that if any thing is predicated of another as of the subject, such as man of Socrates, and if another higher thing is again predicated of the same thing that is predicated, namely of man, as of the subject, such as animal, it will be necessary for this same thing to be predicated of the subject of which it is said, such as animal of Socrates, for Socrates is the subject of man, of which animal is predicated. Therefore, this kind of definition is established, which says: whenever one is predicated of the other as of the subject, if there is something that can be said of that which is predicated in what it is, the same thing can be predicated of what was the subject earlier.
But perhaps someone may say that what has been said is not entirely true, for when man is predicated of Socrates (for Socrates is a man), and species of man (for man is a species), Socrates is not said to be a species. And again, when animal is predicated of man, and genus of animal (for animal is a genus), man is devoid of the term genus: for man is not said to be a genus, for man is not a genus but only a species.
To this it must be said that they have paid less attention to the fact that this is a definition of the subject of predication, which would be predicated in what each thing is and in its substance, but now species is not predicated of man in what it is. For if someone gives the definition of man, he does not name the species, but it is merely a designative name, whether this name, which is man, is predicated of the different species or certainly only of the individuals. For since man is predicated only of individuals, it is therefore called a species, and since animal is said of different species, we therefore call animal a genus. And they are, in a way, names of names. Therefore, neither genus of animal, nor species of man, are predicated in what they are, but only designate how man and animal are predicated of their proper subjects (as has been said). Therefore, it is not surprising if their predication, which is said of the subject, cannot reach the subject of what is said of the subject, since it is not said of the subject.
Different genera and those not placed subalternately have different species and differences, such as animals and sciences; the differences of animals are, for example, walking and flying and bipedal, but none of these are of sciences; for a science does not differ from a science in that it is bipedal.
Since genus is spoken of in many ways, let us assume only that which is appropriate to discuss now. For a genus is said to be that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in what it is, such as animal is predicated of man, and of horse, and of dog, and of ox, and of the others, which are all distinct from one another in species. A species, on the other hand, is that which is predicated of many things differing in number, in what it is, such as man is predicated of Cato, Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Cicero, and of individual men, who do not differ in species but only in number. Difference, however, is that which distinguishes species placed under the same genus by their proper quality, for when horse and man are one with respect to genus (for both are animals), the difference between rational and irrational separates and distinguishes them. For by some quality of rationality and irrationality, they disagree with the definition of their own substance. Therefore, difference is what is predicated of many things differing in species in what they are like. For this very difference, which is irrationality, is predicated of many things differing in species, such as swan, horse, and fish, which all disagree with each other in species, but are connected by the quality of irrationality. However, not in all cases is difference predicated of many things differing in species. For there are some things which are predicated only of one species, such as heaviness of only earth, lightness of only fire, properly speaking. Furthermore, not always is species predicated of many things differing in number; for the species of the world is said of one world only, and the species of the phoenix of only one phoenix. But it is defined in this way so that difference is more frequently predicated of many things differing in species than of one. And in the same way, species is more often found to be predicated of many things differing in number than of only one thing and individual.
With these things in place, there are certain genera called most general, for which no genus can be found, and there are species for which no one will find other species subject to them. However, between these two are others called subalternate genera, which are indeed the species of the higher ones, but the genera of the lower ones, as substance is the most general genus, so that its genus cannot be found, and man is a species, so that another species of it cannot be found. Animal, indeed, is a species with respect to substance, but a genus with respect to man. Therefore, the significance of the ten predicaments demonstrates nothing else than the ten most general genera we call things. So whenever the most general genera differ, their species will also differ; and whenever the species differ, since they are separated and informed by differences, the differences of the different species will also differ. For animal and science, since animal is substance, and science is towards something, and since the genus of animal is substance, and the genus of science is towards something, all substance is distinct from them by reason, and the differences of science and animal are separated by all qualities. For the difference of animal is biped and quadruped, for an animal differs from another animal in that this one is biped, such as man or bird, and that one is quadruped, such as horse and ox; and that one is multiped, such as ant or bee. But science does not have differences of this kind, for a science does not differ from a science in that it is biped. Therefore, it is evident that whenever genera are different, the differences of species are also separated.
And this is what he says: DIFFERENT GENERA AND THOSE NOT PLACED SUBALTERNATELY HAVE DIFFERENT SPECIES AND DIFFERENCES. And he confirmed this by adding an example, saying that ANIMALS AND SCIENCES have different differences, for when biped is a difference of animal, it is not of science. And this has been said of different genera, that is, those that are not subalternate. But if the genera are subalternate, nothing prevents some differences from being the same, others different, such as bird is a species of animal, and again is a genus of crow, and is a subalternate genus, bird. But the differences of animal are rational and irrational, while the difference of bird is not rational. For no bird differs from another bird in being rational; therefore, in this case, the differences of subalternate genera are not the same. However, if someone says that these differences of the genus, that is, of animals, are such that some animals feed on herbs, others on seeds, and others on flesh, these differences apply to the subalternate genus, namely, in birds; for some birds feed on seeds, others on herbs, and others on flesh, such as vultures and kites; therefore, in subalternate genera, nothing prevents the same differences from being present and differing again. This occurs because what is said of the predicate can also be said of the subject.
Hence, what is said of the genus can also be said of the species, and this is what he says:
There is nothing to prevent the same differences in subalternate genera; for higher things are predicated of lower genera.
But when he said that nothing prevents the same differences, he somehow wanted to demonstrate that there are some same differences, while others can be different, which seems contrary to his point when he says:
Therefore, whatever differences there are of the predicate, the same will also be of the subject.
For when he said there, nothing prevents the same differences of subalternate genera, here he declares all to be the same, saying: whatever differences there are of the predicate, the same will also be of the subject; and this matter tied many to the greatest errors, so that they believed the place should be corrected not to be like this. Therefore, whatever differences there are of the predicate, the same will also be of the subject but in this way. Therefore, whatever differences there are of the subject, the same will also be of the predicate. But this must be added, for it is not possible for the predication of the latter to extend to the higher thing. For when it is said “whatever differences there are of the subject, the same will be of the predicate”, this is meant to signify that the predication of the subject returns to the predicate – which cannot be the case.
But it must be said that there are other differences called completive of the predicate and informing the species of any of them, which are commonly called ‘specific’. For when I say animate and sensible, if they are joined to substance, they immediately produce the definition and species of animal. For an animal is a living, sensible substance, and these differences are called specific and completive.
There are also others that do not complete anything nor yield any species but only divide the genus, such as rational and irrational: for these divide the genus, that is, animal; for animal is divided by the rational and irrational difference. Therefore, those that are divisive differences of the genus can sometimes be the same, and sometimes not the same, as with animal, because the divisible difference which is rational can be absent in bird, which is a subalternate genus. And again, it can have the same divisibles as we mentioned earlier. For when the differences dividing animal are those that feed on flesh, herbs, and seeds, they can be the same for the subalternate genus, that is, bird; therefore, these divisibles can also be different. But those that are completive and specific, sometimes cannot be predicated of the subject. For since animal has completive differences and those that are effective for its species, namely, sensible and animate, these differences cannot not be predicated of man, who is the subject of animal.
Indeed, in the substance of an animal, both are predicated, but the animal is predicated of the human as the subject. Therefore, it is necessary for animated and sensible to be predicated of the human as the subject. This is what was previously mentioned when he said:
When one is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever is said of that which is predicated, everything will also be said of the subject.
And this is rightly understood in all genera. Therefore, divisible differences can sometimes be common with subjects, and sometimes different; but specific and completive differences cannot be common with subjects. So when Aristotle says:
In subaltern genera, nothing prevents the same differences
We should understand that it does not prevent the same divisible differences, which can also be different. But when he says:
Whatever the differences of the predicate may be, the same will also be for the subject
It should be understood about the specifics: which, when informing the species of each, and predicating it of that which they inform, as of the subject, that which they inform as a subject will be predicated of whatever they inform as the subject, and they cannot not be predicated of it. Therefore, there is nothing in this theorem that should be amended in any way.
Of those which are said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or quality or relation or place or time or position or state or action or passion. And substance is, for example, man, horse; quantity, for example, two cubits, three cubits; quality, for example, white; relation, for example, double, greater; place, for example, in lyceum; time, for example, yesterday; position, for example, sitting, lying down; state, for example, shod, armed; action, for example, cutting, burning; passion, for example, being cut, being burned.
After briefly discussing the four divisions - substance, accident, universality, and particularity - now he will deal with the most significant division, which is made into ten. With this enumeration, no larger division can be found; indeed, neither eleven categories can be found nor can any category beyond ten be rightly conceived. Therefore, he presents this enumeration but not a division. Division is generally from genus to species; however, since the categories do not have a single genus, there cannot be a division but rather an enumeration.
Indeed, some argue that the enumeration is not properly arranged; some remove certain elements as superfluous, some add to the short work, and others change the order. It will be necessary to address those who do not rightly understand this in another work. He says: of those which are said without any combination. Indeed, he will deal with words and not things, as he says “are said.” Things are not properly said but rather words; and what he adds, each signifies either substance, clearly shows that he is discussing words; for it is not things but words that signify, and things are signified. Without combination, as has been said, whatever is expressed by a single understanding and word are said: according to combination, whatever is mixed with some conjunction or accidental copulation. But what is made from those which are said without any combination, he demonstrates when he says:
Therefore, each of the things mentioned are not in any affirmation by themselves, but when combined with one another, an affirmation is made. Indeed, every affirmation seems to be either false or true; however, for those things that are said without any combination, nothing is true or false, such as “man,” “white,” “runs.”
This therefore also means that those things said without any combination do not have the force of affirmation. If someone says “man,” “white,” “ten,” or anything else in a simple way, they will not find anything true or false in it, but every affirmation is either true or false. Therefore, it universally declares that predicaments are not entirely held by the reason of affirmation; but if these same things are joined with a certain combination, they necessarily become propositions, which contain truth or falsehood in themselves. However, not every combination makes a proposition, nor if I say:
Socrates in the forum
is it already a proposition; but if someone says:
Socrates is walking in the forum
then it becomes a proposition, which is either an affirmation or a negation. Affirmations and negations, indeed, seem to be either true or false; and for this reason, whatever is neither true nor false is not a proposition. Therefore, truth and falsehood are created by a certain combination from those things that are said without any combination. But now Aristotle has interposed only affirmation, because every affirmation is prior; for negation takes away what affirmation has established before: first, indeed, according to signification, but not according to genus, which will be clear elsewhere. Aristotle especially demonstrates that he will deal not with things but with words, for he says: “By the combination of these things with one another, affirmation is made.” For it is not by the combination of things that affirmation or negation is made, but of words, nor is truth and falsehood in things, but in intellects and opinions, and after these in words and discourses. And these things up to this point.
Therefore, according to combination are those things which are made from entire compositions, like:
Socrates walks
for both “Socrates” and “walks” are each entire speech, and when joined, they create an affirmation. But truly, if someone says “flame-haired,” “loud-sounding,” or “wave-wandering,” this utterance will not be according to combination because it is not made from entire elements.
Definitions of these ten predicaments cannot be found because they signify the most general things. For substance, quantity, and quality do not seem to be subject to any one genus. Therefore, since every definition is derived from a genus, a genus that is not subject to another genus is left without a definition.
But now, he has given examples of the agreement of all predicaments; later, there will be a more extensive treatment of each one. And since no definition can be found, they are informed by certain properties. Therefore, since these things have been fully discussed, let us proceed to the treatment of substance.
On Substance
Substance, however, is that which is properly, primarily, and most truly said, which is neither predicated of a subject nor is in a subject, such as some man or some horse. But secondary substances are said to be those in which the species of those things that are primarily called substances exist, and the genera of these species; as some man is in the species of man, and the genus of the species is animal; therefore, secondary substances are said to be, as is man and animal.
It is asked why he began the treatment of predicaments with substances, for since everything is either in a subject or not in a subject, whatever is in a subject needs a subject because it cannot exist in its own nature: and since substance is the subject for all things, nothing of those that are in a subject can remain besides substance. But that prior nature is the one without which other things cannot exist, so substance seems to be prior naturally; therefore, it is not unreasonable that in the discussion, what was prior by nature was taken up first. He could not indeed bring forth the definition of substance but after the previous example given, he offers a certain description by which we can recognize what substance itself is: and that is, not being in a subject, for substance is not in a subject.
He also makes a certain division of substances when he says that some are primary substances and others secondary: calling the primary substances individuals, and the secondary substances the species and genera of individuals. Therefore, since it is common to both primary and secondary substances not to be in a subject, by adding to the primary substances “not being predicated of subjects,” he separates primary substances from secondary substances; for individual substance, in that it is substance, is not in a subject: but what is individual is not predicated of a subject. So, the primary substances are those which are neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, such as Socrates or Plato. For since they are substances, they are in no subject. And since they are particular individuals, they are not predicated of any subject.
Secondary substances, however, are those which have in common with primary substances that they are not in a subject, but their unique feature is that they are predicated of a subject; these secondary substances are universals, such as man and animal. For man and animal are in no subject but are predicated of some subject. Therefore, primary substances are particular, secondary substances are universal.
He specifically calls individual substances “proper” because we gather the very species, man, and the genus, animal, only from the knowledge of individuals. Therefore, since generality is understood from the senses of individuals, it is fitting that individual and singular substances are called “proper substances.”
Moreover, individual substances are said to be primary because every accident first comes to the individual, and then to the secondary substances. For since Aristarchus is a grammarian, and man is Aristarchus, man is a grammarian: thus, every accident first comes to the individual, and in the second place, that accident is also thought to come to the species and genera of substances. Therefore, rightly, that which is the prior subject is primarily called substance.
Lastly, primary substance is said to be “most truly” substance, because that which is most subject to other things can be most truly called substance: and primary substance is most subject. For everything is said about primary substances or exists in primary substances, such as genera and species. For both genera and species are predicated of their proper individuals, like animal and man are predicated of Socrates, that is, secondary substances of primary substances. But if there are accidents, they are primarily in primary substances. Therefore, since accidents are primarily in primary substances, and secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, primary substances are subject to secondary substances and accidents. Therefore, since these substances are most subject both to the subsistence of accidents and the predication of secondary substances, they are called most truly substances.
The author argues that not every species nor every genus are secondary substances, but only those that contain primary substances, such as MAN AND ANIMAL; for man contains Socrates, that is, some individual substance. Animal, on the other hand, contains both the individual and the species, that is, man and some man. Therefore, genera and species that are predicated of primary substances are considered secondary substances; and he says it in this way:
Secondary substances are called those in which the species of those things which are principally called substances are, and the genera of these species.
and from here he sets out fitting examples, as if to say: I do not mean all genera nor all substances, but only those species in which those individuals, that is, the primary substances are, and of these species, that is, those containing primary substances, genera. This seems to have been said so that no one would consider color, which is a genus, or white, which is a species, as secondary substances, since they do not contain primary substances underneath.
But someone might ask how individual substances can be primary, since everything that comes first, when removed, takes away what comes later, while later things, when removed, do not destroy what comes first? For if man perishes, Socrates too will surely perish; but if Socrates dies, man will not immediately perish. Therefore, if genera and species are removed and individuals are destroyed, but individuals being removed, genera and species remain, it would be more fitting to call genera and species primary substances.
However, this way of understanding the nature of individuals is not correct. For not all of the substance of individuals is in one Socrates or in any single man, but in all individuals. For genera and species are not understood from a single individual, but from all individuals, conceived by the mind’s reasoning. Moreover, those things that are closer to the senses are also considered to be more properly named. For the first person to say ‘man’ did not conceive of the one composed of individual men, but rather thought of a certain individual and single person to whom he would apply the name of man. Therefore, if individual men are removed, man does not remain; and if individual animals are removed, animal will cease to exist. Consequently, since this book deals with the meanings of words, those things to which words were first applied are rightly called primary substances: and those words were applied first to those things which could first fall under the senses. But first individuals are presented to the senses, and so he placed them first in the division.
In the same way, the question is answered that asks: Since the primary intelligible substances are naturally God and the soul, why did he not call them primary substances? Since this work deals with names, and names were first applied to those things which were mainly subject to the senses, those things that pertain to incorporeal intelligibility are considered later when assigning names; therefore, since this work is primarily about names, and in a work about names, the first words were said about individual substances which are primarily subject to the senses, it is fitting that individual and sensible substances are placed as primary substances. However, there are three substances: matter, form, and the substance composed of both, combined and compacted on all sides; and here he speaks not only of form, nor only of matter, but of both mixed and combined. The parts of substance are the uncompounded and simple, from which the substance itself is composed, species and matter, which he names afterward, saying that the parts of substances are themselves substances.
So much for this. Now let us turn the course of exposition to the following matters.
It is evident from what has been said that when it comes to things that are said about a subject, it is necessary for both the name and the concept to be predicated of the subject. For example, “man” is said about some man as a subject, and the name is predicated; for you will predicate “man” of some man. Likewise, the concept of “man” will be predicated of some man; for someone is both a man and a man. Therefore, both the name and the concept will be predicated of the subject.
However, for things that are in a subject, in many cases neither the name nor the concept is predicated of the subject. In some cases, the name can be predicated without any problem, but it is impossible for the concept to be predicated. For example, “white” is in a body as a subject, and it is predicated of the subject (for we say “a white body”), but the concept of “white” will never be predicated of the body.
All other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or are present in those subjects. This is evident from individual instances; for example, “animal” is predicated of man, and therefore it will be predicated of some man; for if it were said of none of the individual men, it would not be predicated of man at all. Similarly, color is in the body; therefore, it is in some body; for if it were in none of the individual bodies, it would not be in the body at all. Therefore, all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or are present in those subjects.
If primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist. Every other thing is either in a subject or is predicated of a subject, but not all things that are in a subject are said of their proper subjects. For example, what is in a subject is predicated of its proper subject: “white” is predicated of the body, for we say “a white body.” But since secondary substances are either species or genera of primary substances (for the species of Socrates is man, and the genus is animal), the genus is predicated univocally of the species and individuals that are its subjects. Therefore, secondary substances are said of their proper subjects, which are the primary substances, in a univocal predication.
Now, of those things that are in a subject, sometimes neither the name itself is said of the subject. For example, virtue is in the soul, but virtue is not predicated of the soul. Sometimes, however, it is said denominatively, as “grammar” is said of a person who has it, for such a person is called “grammatical” denominatively from “grammar.”
Often, the name itself is predicated of the subject, as when “white” is in the body, the body is called “white.” But whether the name is not predicated, or is said denominatively, or the predication is made by the proper name, the definition of that which is in a subject will never be predicated of its proper subject – for example, although “white” is in the body as a subject and the name of “white” is predicated of the body, the definition of “white” will never be said of the body, because “white” and “body” cannot be defined by the same concept.
Furthermore, if every accident is in a subject and substance is a subject, then substance differs from accident, and the definition of substance and accident also differ, since the same definition cannot apply to both the subject and what is in the subject. This is what he says: of those things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the reason is predicated of the subject, such as virtue in the soul. He also adds: in some cases, however, there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated, and in some cases the predication is made denominationally, while in others it is made by the proper name. As for secondary substances, predication always extends to primary substances. For if a certain man is a man and an animal and so on, a single definition of animal will apply fittingly to both man and a certain man. However, he more significantly shows individual and particular substances to be the primary substances. For since every thing is either substance or accident, and substances are either primary or secondary, a threefold division is made, so that every thing is either accident or secondary substance or primary substance.
In order for us to make a division under the description of these, we say: every thing is either in a subject or not in a subject; of those which are in a subject, some are predicated of the subject while others are not; of those which are not in a subject, some are predicated of no subject while others are predicated. Therefore, every thing is either in a subject or not in a subject. Either it is in a subject and is predicated of the subject, or it is in a subject and is predicated of no subject, or it is not in a subject and is predicated of the subject, or it is not in a subject and is predicated of no subject.
Given these premises, if we separate the primary substances, we are left with secondary substances and accidents. But secondary substances are those which are not in a subject and are predicated of a subject. Therefore, they retain their existence only insofar as they are predicated of something. Secondary substances are predicated of primary substances; therefore, in order for them to be secondary substances, the predication of primary substances is the cause. For they would not be secondary substances unless they were predicated of primary substances, but those which are in a subject could not fully exist unless they were supported, in a way, by primary substances as a foundation. Therefore, everything that exists besides primary substances will be either secondary substances or accidents. But secondary substances are predicated of primary substances, and accidents are in primary substances. Consequently, everything is either predicated of primary substances, as secondary substances, or is in primary substances, as accidents, which Aristotle proposed in this way: All other things are either said of primary substances as subjects or are in these same subjects, and he also takes the most truthful examples here. For he says: If an accident were in no bodily subject, it would not be in a body at all. For if it were in none of the individual things, it would be said to be in nothing in general. And likewise, if “animal” were not predicated of individual and specific humans, it would not be predicated of “man” at all. Therefore, since secondary substances are predicated because they are primary, and accidents are something because they are subject to the same primary substances, if there were no primary substance, neither those which are predicated of them would remain, nor those which remain in these subjects.
Furthermore, secondary substances are more a species of substance than a genus; they are indeed closer to primary substances. For if someone were to assign what a primary substance is, they would more clearly and appropriately assign the species rather than the genus, as when speaking about a certain man, they would more clearly assign “man” than “animal”; for the former is more specific to an individual man, while the latter is more general. And when assigning some tree, they would more clearly assign the tree by naming it than by calling it a plant.
It is clear that individual primary substances are the most proper substances. However, secondary substances, that is, genera and species, do not equally distance themselves from primary substance and therefore are not equally substances. Since the species is closer to primary substance than the genus, the species is more of a substance than the genus itself, as “man” is closer to Socrates than “animal,” and therefore “man” is more of a substance. Although “animal” is also a substance, it is less so than “man”; this occurs because, in every definition of a fitting species, it is said to be closer to primary substance than the genus. For if someone wants to show what Socrates is, they will more closely indicate the substance and property of Socrates by saying he is a man rather than an animal. For being an animal is common to Socrates and other non-human beings, such as a horse or a cow. However, being a man is common to no other being except those who are under the same species of man. Therefore, the designation will be closer to the signification when the individual is given a species than when a generic term is predicated of it. Moreover, if someone wants to designate any individual tree by saying “tree,” they will more closely indicate what they have defined than if they call it a plant; “plant” is the genus of “tree,” as “plant” is also predicated of non-tree beings, such as stems and lettuces. Hence, it is clear that species are more substances because they are closer to primary and most proper substances. And in what is assigned as the essence, the species will assign more fittingly and evidently, while the genus is more distant and general.
Furthermore, primary substances are called the most proper substances because they underlie all other things, and everything else is either predicated of them or exists in them. Just as primary substances relate to all other things, species relate to genus; species indeed underlie the genus, for genera are predicated of species, but species are not predicated of genera in return. Therefore, from this, the species is more a substance than the genus.
The stronger argument that species are more substances is confirmed by a similarity, as it is declared to be so. Since all substances are either primary or secondary, and secondary substances are either genera or species, whatever of species and genera is found more similar to primary substances will rightly be considered more of a substance. But primary substances are called the greatest substances because they are subject to all other things in such a way that either other things exist in them as accidents or are predicated of them as secondary substances. Therefore, the same applies to species. For species underlie all accidents and genera are predicated of species, but species are not predicated of genera. Hence, genera do not underlie in the same way as species, for species are not predicated of genera. Thus, just as primary substances are subject to secondary substances and accidents, species are subject to accidents and genera. Although genera are subject to accidents, they do not underlie species themselves. Therefore, there is a greater similarity of species to primary substances than there is of genus. If the similarity of species to primary substances is greater, then species themselves are more substantially existent. However, let no one think that what is said about genera cannot be said about species as well; rather, insofar as they are genera, they cannot be species. For in the case of species, they are not predicated of higher categories, but in the case of genus, they are predicated of that which is of the same genus. Therefore, genera themselves, which are the genera of certain things, cannot be subject to those things, while species, which are the species of certain things, cannot be predicated of those things.
Indeed, among the species that are not genera, none is more or less substantially existent than another. Nothing more fitting will be offered if someone, speaking of a certain human, refers to them as a human rather than, speaking of a certain horse, refers to them as a horse. Similarly, in primary substances, none is more or less substantially existent than another; for a certain human is no more a substance than a certain ox.
Furthermore, as Porphyry clearly taught in his book on genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents, some things are only genera, of which no genus can be found, while others are only species, which cannot be divided into other species. These are the things that are predicated of multiple numerically distinct things in terms of what they are, such as “human” is said of individual humans, “horse” of individual horses, and “ox” of individual oxen, who, placed under their own species, do not deviate from their own specific nature. Therefore, such species as human and horse, which only preside over individuals and cannot be genera, are always equally substantial. For the name “horse” is offered as closely for any individual horse as the name “human” is for any individual human. Therefore, those species that are not genera are equally related to primary substances and will be considered equally substantial. This is not to say that all species are equally substantial, but rather those that are equally distant from primary substances.
In the case of the primary substances, it is not necessary for there to be a need for explanation that they are also equally substantially existent. For any human and any horse, being individuals, are primarily substantially existent, both in their own right and as the greatest substances. Therefore, in the greatest substances, neither less nor more substance can be found. Thus, individuals are equally substantially existent.
Rightly, then, after primary substances, only species and genera of all other things are called secondary substances. For they alone signify the primary substances in what they predicate. For if someone were to assign what a certain human is, they would more fittingly and clearly bring forth the species rather than the genus, and they would make it manifest by bringing forth “human” rather than “animal.” However, whatever else they might bring forth of the other things would be irrelevant, such as “white” or “running” or anything of this sort. Therefore, rightly, these alone are called substances apart from the others.
In order and appropriately after primary substances, that is, individuals, Aristotle demonstrates that genera and species are constituted as secondary substances. This is a strong and clear proof. For he says: rightly, genera and species are named as secondary substances after primary substances. In definitions where the substance of any thing is shown, nothing else shows the primary substances but the genus and species. For example, if someone asks what Socrates is, he is said to be a human or an animal, and in the question of what Socrates is, it is correct to answer that he is a man or an animal. Therefore, the primary substances show what the secondary substances are, for if someone should say anything about the primary substance in a question about what it is, apart from the secondary substances, they would be speaking very inappropriately, as if someone, when asked what Socrates is, answers “white” or “running” or something of this sort, which is not a secondary substance. Therefore, since nothing that is not a secondary substance declares what the primary substance is, and the secondary substances are the genera and species, it is rightly said that after the primary substances, the species and genera are the secondary substances.
Moreover, primary substances are called proper substances because they underlie all other things. Just as primary substances relate to all other things, so do the genera and species of primary substances relate to all other things. For from these, all other things are predicated: for example, you will call someone a grammarian, and so you will predicate both man and animal as grammarians; and in the same way in other things.
This is also proof of the same thing, by which, after the primary substances, the genera and species are rightly established with the most truthful reasoning. For individuals are called primary substances because they underlie all other things. Since they are supposed for predication to secondary substances, and are called secondary substances about these, and since they are subjected to accidents so that they can be accidental, they are therefore primary substances. And just as primary substances underlie all accidents, so do secondary substances. For since a certain man is subject to accidents, both man and animal are supposed for an accident, and since there is a certain man who is a grammarian, that is, Aristarchus, there is a man who is a grammarian and also an animal who is a grammarian. Therefore, primary substances are primarily subjected to accidents, and secondary substances are in the second place. And just as primary substances are subject to both accidents and secondary substances, so secondary substances are supposed for accidents but are species and genera of secondary substances. Therefore, after the primary substances, he rightly proposed that the species and genera are the secondary substances.
It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. For the primary substance is neither said of a subject nor is it in a subject; and it is also evident that secondary substances are not in a subject. For man is indeed said of some subject, some man, but is not in any subject; for man is not in any man. Similarly, animal is indeed said of some subject, some man, but animal is not in any man.
After the enumeration of substances and the division in which some are proposed to be primary and others secondary, since no definition of substances has been given, therefore, because the most general genus is not held by definitions, he seeks to discover some property as a sign by which we can recognize substance, and first proposes what can happen to substances in common; then he seeks what is proper to them. But he does this so that he may arrive at the true property without any error, and say what is truly the ultimate property of substances. In three ways, property is signified. There is property which happens to some species wholly and not solely, as being biped is to man. For every man is biped, but not only man, for birds too are biped. Or solely and not wholly, as it happens to the same man to be a grammarian, but not to every man, for not every man is a grammarian. But indeed, the third definition of “property” refers to something that is found in every, only, and always, such as being capable of laughter. For every human is capable of laughter, and only humans among animals can laugh. Therefore, those first two definitions we mentioned, where a property is found in every instance but not exclusively, or exclusively but not in every instance, seem to be distinct from the true nature of properties. This third definition, however, which is present in every and only one instance, is truly a property, while the previous definitions are called consequences but are not truly properties. This last definition is truly a property. So, whatever properties Aristotle finds that either apply exclusively to certain substances but not all, or to all substances but not exclusively, he rejects as not being truly established in the nature of any given thing. On the other hand, he posits the ultimate property as that which applies to every substance and exclusively so. For these are properties that are convertible, such as if something is a human, it is capable of laughter, and if something is capable of laughter, it is a human. Only those properties that apply to every and only one instance can be converted, as they neither apply more nor less to any other instance. Therefore, let us proceed to the explanation and exposition of the passage itself.
What Aristotle says here is that it is common to all substances not to be in a subject. For primary substances, that is, individual entities, are not in a subject, which is most clearly demonstrated by this: a particular substance can never be an accident of something else. Secondary substances, however, have a certain semblance of being in a subject, as they seem to be in subjects, that is, in primary substances, but this is false. For secondary substances are only predicated of primary substances, not in them. For example, “animal” is said of a particular human being, but it does not exist in a human being as a subject. This is proven by the fact that everything that is in a subject has its individual instances in a subject as well; for example, color is in a subject (a body), and a particular color relies on a subject (a body). But since primary substances, that is, individual entities, are not in a subject, nor can their universals, that is, secondary substances, which are the genera and species, rely on any subject. Therefore, secondary substances have primary substances as subjects only for predication, not for being accidents of primary substances. Another strong argument that secondary substances are not in a subject is that everything that is in a subject can change, while the thing that is a subject does not change, such as color, which is in a body and can change (e.g., from white to black) while the body remains the same. However, with primary substances remaining the same, secondary substances do not change.
The proof Aristotle himself provided that secondary substances are not in a subject is as follows: he taught that the name of some things that are in a subject can be predicated of subjects, but their definition never can. For example, “white,” which is in a body, is said of the body and whiteness is predicated of the body, but the definition of whiteness is different from that of the body. On the other hand, secondary substances are both named and defined in relation to primary substances. For a certain human is an animal and a human, and that certain human is defined by the concepts of human and animal. And to conclude the argument most accurately, everything that is in a subject is said equivocally of the subject. However, secondary substances are named univocally, not equivocally, in relation to primary substances, precisely because (as has been said) they agree in both name and definition. Therefore, just as primary substances are not in a subject, so too will secondary substances lack a subject. Thus, it is common to all substances, both secondary and primary, not to be in a subject, and whatever substance there may be, it follows that it is in no subject.
But it is questioned whether this is unique to substances alone or also to others. For if it is unique to substances alone, since we have demonstrated that all substances do not exist in a subject, it is said to be a true property of substances, not to exist in a subject. For it has been said that this is most truly a property, which is present in all and only. But Aristotle confirms with a most truthful proof that this is not a property of substances, saying:
Furthermore, of those things that are in a subject, there is often nothing to prevent their name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for their rational account. However, of secondary substances, both the name and the rational account are predicated of the subjects; for you will predicate the rational account of both man and animal of some man. Therefore, the substance of those things which are in a subject will not be. But this is not a property of substance; rather, the difference is of those things which are not in a subject; for biped and walking on two feet are predicated of the subject man, but they are in no subject; for biped and walking on two feet are not in man. <191d> and the rational account of the difference is also said of that which the difference itself is predicated of, so that if walking on two feet is said of man, the rational account of walking on two feet will also be predicated of man; for man is walking on two feet.
He says that this is not a proper property of substance, because the same applies to differences, for no difference is in a subject. For we return to the point that if a difference were in a subject, it would be predicated of the subject in name only, not also in its rational account. However, a difference is predicated univocally of that which it is said of, so that if someone says that the difference of walking on two feet pertains to man, the definition of that difference will also fittingly apply to man. For walking on two feet is that which walks on the ground with its feet, and man is that which walks on the ground with its feet, so the rational account of the substance of the difference and that of which the difference itself is said can be joined in one, that is, in the naming and the determination of definition. But if the difference were in a subject, it could not be predicated univocally of the subject. Therefore, it is not a proper property of substance, which difference also retains, for difference is not substance. For it would be a proper property of substance not to be in a subject. But difference is not an accident, for it would be in a subject. Now, every thing is either an accident or a substance, that is, it is either in a subject or not in a subject, and accidents are those things that do not enter into the substance of the subject, and which, when changed, do not destroy the nature of the substance. But if, when destroyed, the subject is also destroyed, we do not properly call these things accidents. Difference, on the other hand, is what is predicated of many things that differ in species in terms of their quality. But difference is not substance, because if it were substance, it would not be predicated of the subject in terms of its quality but in terms of what it is. Quality, however, is not the only thing, for it would be an accident and in a subject. Is difference itself formed more from substance and quality, so that what it is predicated of, when the difference is destroyed, is also destroyed at the same time, as heat, when it is in water, with the destruction of heat, water can remain in its substance, and heat is in the subject water, which, when destroyed, the water does not perish. Yet the same heat is in fire, but when the heat is destroyed, the fire necessarily dies. Therefore, this quality of heat is substantially present in the fire and is its proper difference, that is, substantial. It must therefore be concluded that difference is neither only substance nor only quality, but that it is formed from both as a substantial quality that remains in the nature of the subject, and because it participates in substance, it is not an accident, and because it is quality, it is separated from substance. But it is a certain middle ground between substance and quality, which, since it is not in the subject and is not substance, is not the property of substance not to be in a subject. After this, he also says that we should not be disturbed, lest we be compelled to confess that the parts of substances, which are so in the whole as if in some subject, are not substances at some time. The parts of substances are in a subject, but not as accidents, for we see that some parts of substances are so in the whole as if they were in a subject, as the head is in the whole body, and the hand is in the whole body, and the form and the matter, which are parts of the composite substance, are in the composite substance itself. So, lest we be compelled at some time to suspect that the parts of substances, since they are in a subject, are not substances but accidents, he warns us by saying:
We should not be disturbed by the parts of substances which are so in the whole as if they were in a subject, lest we be forced to say that they are not substances; for they are not said to be those things that are in a subject as if they were parts.
For he brings this reason why someone should not suspect that these are accidents. For those things are defined as accidents in an object, which would not be as some part, for he said this earlier. I say that a bird is in a subject, which, although it is in something, is not as some part and it is impossible for it to be without that in which it is. Therefore, since accidents are so in a subject that they are not parts of the subject, but the parts of substances are so in the whole that they are not in a subject, no one can rightly suspect that the parts of substances are parts of accidents.
Moreover, in substances and their differences, everything is predicated univocally. Indeed, everything that comes from these categories is either predicated of individuals or of species. And of the first substance, there is no predication (for it is not said of any subject), but of the secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, and the genus is predicated of both the species and the individual. Similarly, the differences are predicated of both species and individuals. First substances also receive the rationale of species and genera, and species of genus (for whatever is said of the predicate will also be said of the subject). Likewise, the rationale of differences is received by both species and individuals. Univocal things have both a common name and a common rationale. Therefore, everything is predicated univocally from substances and their differences.
Since it has been demonstrated that substances and their differences have no common subject, he proposed another commonality between substances and differences. For, as some substances are primary and others secondary, and the primary substances are individual (since individual things cannot have a subject), there is no predication from individuals. However, secondary substances are predicated of individuals, that is, of the primary substances, and are univocally said of them. For the name of secondary substances is predicated of individuals and their rationale. And both the species and genus are predicated of the individual, as in the case of Plato, that is, of some man, both ‘man’ and ‘animal’ are said, for he is a certain man and an animal, and the rationale of both is predicated of the individual. We say that a certain man is a rational mortal animal, which is the definition of the species, that is, of man. And again, we say that a certain man is a sentient animated substance, which is the definition of the genus, that is, of an animal. Species, indeed, receive the definition and term of their genus; for ‘animal’ is predicated of man, for it is said that man is an animal, and the same man, in turn, receives the rationale of an animal. We say that man is a sentient animated substance. Therefore, it is clear that both genera and species are predicated univocally of individuals, and genera are predicated of species univocally, that is, in every predication of secondary substances, they are said univocally of their subjects, which is common to them with differences. For the difference is predicated univocally of the species of which it is said, and of its individual. For when ‘capable of walking’ is the difference predicated of some man, it is said that a certain man is capable of walking, like Plato and Cicero, but individuals also receive the definition of the difference of which that difference is predicated. For what is capable of walking can walk on the ground with its feet. And you can define a certain man according to the name of the difference, saying that Plato is capable of walking on the ground with his feet. And the same thing happens with the species of a certain man, that is, with man: for man, that is, the species itself, being capable of walking, can be defined. Man is what can walk on the ground with his feet. Therefore, differences are also said univocally of those things of which they are predicated. Therefore, since secondary substances are said to be equivocally predicated of both the subjects and the differences, any predication derived from substances or differences will also be univocally predicated of the subjects. The reason why secondary substances are univocally predicated of primary substances, as Aristotle previously taught us, is that everything that is said of the predicate will also be said of the subject. All specific differences of a genus are predicated of both the species and the individual; for example, since the differences that constitute an animal are animated and sensible, these differences will be predicated of both the species (i.e., humans) and the individual (i.e., a particular human). As mentioned earlier, we will now briefly discuss this.
Every substance seems to signify “this particular thing.” in the case of primary substances, this is undoubtedly and truly the case, since what is signified is an individual and a single entity by number. However, in secondary substances, it seems similarly to signify “this particular thing” in the form of a name, when someone says “human” or “animal”; but this is not true, rather it signifies a certain kind of thing (for there is not a single subject as there is in primary substance, but “human” and “animal” are said of many); and yet it does not simply signify quality, as “white” does (for “white” signifies nothing other than quality), but rather genus and species determine the quality of substance (for they signify a certain kind of substance). Moreover, determination is made more by genus than by species: for saying “animal” comprises more than saying “human.”
After previously discussing the two consequences of substance, namely that they do not exist in a subject and that everything is univocally predicated of them, and distinguishing them from the most proper substance because they also seem to have common differences, the author adds another point which is not common to every substance: that it does not exist in every substance. For just as quantity signifies “how much,” and quality signifies “what kind,” so too substance seems to signify “this particular thing.” For when I say “Socrates” or “Plato” or name any individual substance, I signify “this particular thing,” but this is not present in all substances. For individuals, since they are particular and numerically singular, it is true that “this particular thing” is signified by substances. However, in the case of secondary substances, this is not the same. For secondary substances are not one and numerically singular, but rather species contain many individuals within themselves, and a genus includes many species within itself. Therefore, when I say “human,” I do not signify “this particular thing,” for the name “human” is not singular, since it is predicated of multiple individuals, but rather I signify a certain kind of thing; for the kind of substance is shown when it is said “human.” This quality, however, is determined around substance, for just as individual qualities have species and genera of quality, and just as quantity encompasses individual quantities with species and genera, so too the species and genera of individual substances are secondary substances. Therefore, when I say “human,” I signify a certain kind of substance that is predicated of multiple numerically different individuals, and I signify a certain kind of substance when I say “human,” specifically, one that is named by individuals. The same is also true for the category of genus. For when I say “animal,” I signify a kind of substance that is predicated of multiple species. There is therefore a quality, like “white,” which is always present in substance but does not destroy the substance itself, because whiteness does not possess the property of substance.
Indeed, the quality that is spoken of concerning substances determines the quality of the substance, for it shows what kind of substance it is. For if a human is rational, the substance will be rational, but rationality is a quality. Therefore, secondary substances demonstrate what kind of substance it is. Consequently, it is not the property of substance to signify this individual thing. For secondary substances do not signify this individual thing but rather some kind of quality (as has been said), but they do so in such a way as to determine the quality concerning the substances. For the quality of secondary substances is present in individuals, and they are naturally predicated of them as the individual substances themselves are. Thus, the quality of secondary substances is determined concerning individuals, that is, those that are primary.
Determination, however, is greater when the term includes many things and smaller when it includes fewer. Therefore, a genus gathers many things, while a species gathers fewer. For when I say “animal,” I include humans, cows, and all other animals in this single name. But when I say “human,” I only include individual humans in the meaning of this name. Therefore, determination is greater through genus than through species, and determination concerns the quality of substance, either because the substantial quality is in the genus and species, or because it is spoken of according to a certain community of subjects. But quality by itself, like “white,” neither signifies any substance nor any community, as the genus signifies its species and the species signifies its individuals. Therefore, another property of substance must be sought.
Substances, however, have the property that nothing is contrary to them. For what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, to a certain human; for there is nothing contrary. But neither is there anything contrary to a human nor to an animal. However, this is not a property of substance alone but also of many other things, such as quantity; for there is nothing contrary to a length of two cubits, nor to ten or any such things, unless someone were to say that many are contrary to few or large to small; but there is no contrary to any determinate quantity.
He adds another property of substance, saying that there is nothing contrary to substance. He confirms this through an induction of specific examples. For a human is not contrary to another human or a horse or any other animal. But if someone perhaps says that fire and water are substances, and fire is contrary to water, they would be mistaken. For fire is not contrary to water, but the qualities of fire are opposed to the qualities of water. Heat and cold are contraries, and wetness and dryness, which are qualities that differ in fire and water, seem to make the substances themselves contrary, but they are not. This can be proven from all other substances, in which no one will be able to find anything contrary. But this is not the unique property of substance alone, for even a defined quantity lacks contraries. Neither two nor three are contrary, nor two and four, nor anything of this kind. For if we say that three is contrary to two, why don’t we also posit that four or five are contrary to two? No reason can be brought forth, since if three is contrary to two, why are four or five not contrary to two? If this is the case, then either four, or three, or five, or any numbers that are distant from two, become contrary to two, and there will be many contraries to one thing, which is impossible. Therefore, there is no contrary to quantity. But if someone says that large is contrary to small or many to few, although they confirm these as quantities, they are not definite quantities. For how large or how small is not defined by the speaker, in the same way, even for many and few. Therefore, if someone says these are quantities, they will admit that they are indeterminate and undefined. Aristotle, however, says that there is no contrary to determinate quantity, such as two or three, or lines or surfaces. If some quantities have contraries, while others do not, nothing at all prevents what is said from being proper to substance, since it is clear that certain quantities do not have contraries. If this happens even in quantities, not having a contrary is not a proper property of substances. And this is clear if someone places large or small in quantities (as he will show later) that these are not quantities but refer to something else, for large is said in relation to small. But when we come to those places, we will follow the order of the proposed topic more diligently.
Now it seems that substance does not receive more and less; I say this not because substance is not more substance from substance (for this has been said, since it exists) but because each substance itself, whatever it is, is not said to be more and less; for example, if the very substance is man, it will not be more and less man, neither from itself nor from another. For one is not more man than another, just as one white thing is more white than another, and one good thing is more good than another; and it is said to be more and less of itself, as a body that is white is said to be more so now than before, and heat is said to be more and less; but substance is not said to be (neither is a man said to be more a man now than he was before, nor any of the other things that are substances); therefore, substance does not receive more and less.
This property is not said to be simply but with some distinction: for he says that substances neither receive more nor less, not saying this because substance is not more from another substance. For a certain man, since he is a substance, is more of a substance from man, that is, from the species, and man from animal, that is, from the genus. Therefore, he does not say this because no substances are found that are more substance from substances: for this has been said because it exists, that is, because they are found. For indeed, it has been stated above that primary substances, that is, individuals, are most truly substances, and in secondary substances, species are more truly substances than genera. Therefore, it does not say that no substance is more a substance than another substance, but rather that any given substance is not more or less a substance in itself. For example, if a substance is a human being, it does not say that a human being is more or less a substance. Indeed, an individual human being is more of a substance, while a species is less so when compared to the primary, that is, the individual substance. But what it does say is that this very thing that is, for example, a human being, will not be more or less a human being. Therefore, it does not say that a human being is more or less a substance, but rather that a human being, as it exists, is not more or less a human being. For there is no human being who is more or less a human being, and this same principle applies when comparing one thing to itself. A human being is not more of a human being compared to itself, nor is it more of a human being when compared to another human being under the same conditions, such as comparing one individual human to another individual human. The species itself will not be more or less a human being either. This is clearly the case with substances, but in qualities, there can be more or less. For example, something white can become more white than itself and can take on more or less whiteness, so that it becomes more white and less white. It can also be more white compared to another white thing, like a lily to wool, and less white compared to another white thing, like wool to a lily, or a swan to snow, as well as in other qualities, like good and warm. These qualities can change over time, and can increase or decrease. Sometimes something good becomes better or worse, and something warm becomes hotter or cooler. However, a human being, which is a substance, will not be more of a human being now than it was before, nor will it be more or less of a human being later than it is now. Therefore, although a substance does not admit of more or less, this is not its unique property. But why this is not unique to substance, Aristotle himself remains silent, as if it were obvious; but we add, that not only substances do not admit more and less but also many other things; for a circle will not be more or less a circle by another circle, nor will double be more or less double; for a double is equally four compared to two, and ten compared to five, so since the same is true in other cases as well, this should not be considered the property of substance. But all these things, whatever they are in all substances, are not proper to substance, because they are also in others, and are called the consequences of substance. For all substances follow this, so that wherever there is substance, the things that have been said are found, that is, not to be in a subject, and predications from these to be made univocally, and that this signifies something, and that nothing is contrary to them, and that they do not admit more and less: but those things that are not in all substances are accidents of substances, and therefore they are not proper. And if they are not proper, they do not yet demonstrate what kind of substance it is. Therefore, in order to know the quality of substance properly, such a property must be sought that is both in substances alone and in all of them, and this is the kind that he himself proposed. 198B
Most of all, the property of substance seems to be that, while it is the same and one in number, it is susceptible to contraries. And in no other things can anyone have this to present which are not substance, that one in number will be susceptible to contraries; as color, which is one and the same in number, will not be white and black, nor will the same action and one in number be both bad and good; in the same way also in whatever things are not substance. But substance itself, while it is one and the same in number, is susceptible to contraries; as a certain man, one and the same when he is, sometimes becomes white and sometimes black, and hot and cold, and wicked and virtuous. In no other things, however, does anything like this seem to be, unless someone opposes speech and opinion, saying that these are of such kind; for the same speech seems to be both true and false, as, if the true speech is that someone is sitting, when he himself stands up the same speech will be false; in the same way also in opinion; for if someone will rightly think that someone is sitting, when he himself stands up, he will think falsely, keeping the same opinion about him. But if anyone also accepts this, it differs in manner; for the same things that are in substances themselves, being changed, are susceptible to contraries (for cold made from hot is changed, and black from white and virtuous from wicked, in the same way also in others, each of them receiving contraries by change), but speech and opinion themselves are always unchanging and remaining, but the contrariety around them is made by the thing changed; but if anyone also accepts this, it differs in the very manner itself; for the same things that are in substances themselves, being changed, are susceptible to contraries (for cold is made from hot, changed, and black from white, and virtuous from wicked, and similarly also in others, each of them receiving contraries by change), but speech and opinion themselves are always unchanging and remaining, but the contrariety around them is made by the thing changed; for speech remains the same, saying that someone is sitting, but by the thing changed, sometimes indeed it becomes true, sometimes false; similarly also in opinion. Therefore, in this way, it will be proper to substance that, according to its own change, it is susceptible to contraries – if anyone also accepts this, that opinion and speech are susceptible to contraries.
He says that the most proper characteristic of substance is that it is the same and one in number, and susceptible to contraries, saying nothing contrary to what was said before. For there he had said that substances are not contrary to substances, but here he says that substances are not contrary to substances, but that things themselves can receive contraries, such as one and the same man, who is now healthy, and at another time is sick, for sickness and health are contraries. Therefore, since it has been shown that substance can receive contraries, it must be demonstrated how this is inherent only in substances; for this is not found in any others, for in quality, one quality will not be the same, nor one in number susceptible to contraries, for the same thing and one in number will not be white and black, since when something is white and then turns black, the entire species of quality is changed, and what is contrary will not be one and the same in number but different.
But indeed, the same action and one in number will not be both good and bad, but perhaps one good, another bad, so that they are different, not the same in number; this is also found in other things. However, substance itself, being one and single in number, receives contraries, such as the same and one man who was fair and white, when touched by the sun, becomes dark, and white is converted into black, and is changed into its contrary, receiving both things in itself that are contraries. Therefore, no other things have this inherent in them, except for substances alone, as the previous points sufficiently demonstrate.
But if anyone objects that speech and opinion are one and the same, susceptible to contraries, because when I say Cicero is sitting, or I think he is sitting, when he is truly sitting, both the speech about him and the opinion that he is sitting are true; but when he has risen, the same opinion or speech that says or believes Cicero is sitting remains, but it is false because he is not sitting. It seems that opinion and speech, being one and the same in number, are now true, and now false, and receive contraries themselves, but this is false because speech and opinion do not receive contraries: for if anyone accepts that speech and opinion are susceptible to contraries, they are not in the same way as substance. For substance itself, receiving contraries, is changed; Cicero himself, receiving sickness, becomes sick from being healthy, and he himself changes, receiving contraries; but speech or opinion themselves indeed remain unchanged, but when the things they speak of change, they are found to be either false or true. And substance itself is changed along with the contraries it receives; but speech and opinion, because the things they speak of or think about change, themselves seem to be false or true. For when I say Cicero is sitting, if he has risen, the speech itself has not been affected, but the thing the speech was about has changed. For he who was sitting has risen, therefore the true speech has become false. Therefore, substance itself, receiving (as said) contraries, is changed; but speech or opinion is not changed, but by the thing changed around them, they themselves are true or false. So it will be thought that the characteristic of substance is to be susceptible to contraries in such a way that it receives contraries by being changed, not that, with the thing changed, it remains unchanged and unchangeable. And this has been said, if anyone thinks that speech and opinion are susceptible to contraries, but not that speech and opinion are susceptible to contraries. He adds again:
But this is not true; for speech and opinion are not said to be susceptible because they themselves receive something contrary, but because they are around some other change. For in the way that a thing is or is not, speech is said to be true or false, not because it is susceptible to the contrary. For in a simple manner, neither speech nor opinion moves, so they will not be susceptible to contraries since nothing is done in them. But substance, because it itself receives contraries, is said to be susceptible to contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and whiteness and blackness; and each such thing, itself receiving, is said to be susceptible to contraries. Therefore, it will be proper to substance, being the same and one in number, to be susceptible to contraries. And let these things be said about substance.
He says that speech and opinion themselves are not susceptible to any contrary, for neither falsity nor truth is inherent in speech or opinion, but they seem to be susceptible to contraries because (as he himself says) they are around some other change, that is, around the existence or non-existence of an opinion or speech. For around sitting and not sitting, which are contraries, there is the opinion or speech of someone sitting and not sitting, and therefore, since they are around other things that are contrary to each other, when those things change, they seem to be contrary, not because they themselves receive contraries but because they are around the contrary changes of things. For neither speech nor opinion changes, but only the things about which there is speech and opinion, that is, sitting and not sitting. Therefore, since speech and opinion themselves do not take on any passion, and nothing happens in them, and no contrary occurs, they do not seem to be capable of contraries. But because substance itself takes on a contrary, it is said to be capable of contraries. For Cicero, by taking on health, becomes healthy, and by taking on sickness, becomes sick. However, speech and opinion (as has been said) do not take on contraries. Therefore, it will be the unique property of substance to be capable of contraries. But if someone might ask why, when fire is hot, it never takes on cold, and why, when water is wet, it never takes on dryness. For with these opposites, it seems that not every substance is capable of contraries, and this unique property of substance will be weakened, as it is not in all substances. But it should be said that substances appear to take on those contraries that are not innate to their nature, otherwise they do not take on whatever is substantially present. For we say that something takes on external things, which are constituted beyond the substance: therefore, since heat is inherent in the substance of fire, fire does not take on heat; therefore, fire is not capable of heat, nor of cold. It indeed does not take on heat, because it is inseparably adhered to its nature and substance. For it does not take on cold, since the nature of fire itself spontaneously rejects the contrary of heat. Therefore, if there is something that fire takes on, it must be external, and it must also necessarily take on its contrary, remaining one and singular. The same must be said about water: for just as fire does not take on heat, so water does not take on wetness, but wetness is in some way naturally inherent to it; and therefore the heat of fire or the wetness of water are not only called qualities but also substantial qualities of fire and water; for since water has neither cold nor heat substantially within it, it is said to be capable of both cold and heat. Therefore, it does not speak of those contraries that are substantially inherent, but those that any substance can take on, that is, what can be externally applied: and this is evident in all substances: for since Cicero is both healthy and sick, a human is both healthy and sick; and if a human is both healthy and sick, an animal is both healthy and sickly. But since animals and humans are considered in two ways, one in which they are predicated of many, and the other in which they are substances, in that which they are predicated of many, they are not capable of contraries: as an animal in the sense that it is said of species, is neither wise nor foolish, and a human in the sense that it is said of individuals, is neither healthy nor sick; but in the sense that they are substances, and that they preside over individual substances, they are capable of contraries. Therefore, this will be the sole unique property of substance: to be capable of contraries.
Let these things said about substance suffice. The sequence of the second volume will begin with an exposition of quantity.
Book Two
Introduction
Although our concern with consular duties prevents us from devoting all our leisure time and full attention to these studies, it still seems relevant to the care of the state to instruct citizens in the elaborated knowledge of this subject. I will not be undeserving of my fellow citizens if, when the ancient virtues of men have transferred the rule and empire of other cities to our republic alone, I at least adorn the customs of our city with the arts of Greek wisdom. Therefore, it is not even exempt from a consul’s duties, since it has always been the custom of the Romans to honor more and more by imitation whatever is beautiful and praiseworthy among all nations. I will therefore undertake and interweave the thought and order of the proposed work.
On Quantity
Quantity is of two types: continuous and discrete, and another consists of parts that have a position in relation to one another, and another that does not have a position. Discrete quantity is like number and speech, while continuous quantity is like a line, surface, body, and in addition, time and place. For the parts of a number, there is no common boundary where the parts themselves join together; for example, in the case of the number ten consisting of five and five, there is no common boundary that connects the two fives, and they remain separated. Similarly, three and seven are not joined by any common boundary; indeed, no number will have a common boundary for its parts, but they are always discrete. Therefore, the number is discrete. Likewise, speech is discrete; (since quantity is speech, it is clear; for long and short syllables are measured; and I mean the speech that is made with voice); for its parts are not joined to any common boundary; for there is no common boundary where syllables join together, but each is discrete in itself.
After the discussion of substance, the reason why he proposed to deal with quantity rather than quality is that all things that exist fall into a number as soon as they exist. For every thing is either one or many: but one or many are collected by the knowledge of quantity. But not every thing, as soon as it exists, takes on some quality; for matter itself falls under the principle of quantity, since it is one, but not under quality; for it is free from all qualities, and when a form is added, it acquires a quality. However, in itself it is one in number, but no quality; therefore, if every thing falls into a number as soon as it exists, but not every thing immediately takes on a quality as soon as it exists, it is correct that he first proposed quantity. Another reason why he deals with quantity first is that every body, in order to exist, consists of three dimensions: length, width, and height. But for a body to exist with quality, it will then be either white, black, or something else. And since it is prior for a body to exist, and later for a body to be white, it will be prior for a body to consist of three dimensions than to be white. But the three dimensions are quantities in terms of both number and continuous space. For length, width, and height are counted in quantities, while white is a quality; therefore, if it is prior for a body to consist of three dimensions than to be white, quantity is prior to quality, and thus it is correct that the discussion of quantity is proposed. Another reason is that quantity has more similarities to substance: for just as there is nothing contrary to substance, and substance does not admit more or less, so too with quantity: for there is nothing contrary to quantity, nor does quantity admit more or less, as we will teach shortly; but quality admits contraries, such as white and black, and more and less, such as whiter and blacker, and the whitest and blackest; for that takes intention which can take diminution. If quantity is more similar to substance, it is rightly placed after substance in the discussion of quantity. Aristotle says there are two differences of quantity: for some quantity is discrete and separate, while others are continuous. After this division, he further divides quantity in another way: he says some quantity consists of parts having a position relative to each other, while others do not have a position. It is clear that one thing can be divided in different ways, as if someone divides an animal by saying: Some animals are rational, others irrational; and again, dividing the same thing in another way, as in: Some animals are walking, others not walking, and of these animals again, some feed on flesh, others on plants, others on seeds. Here, the same thing is divided in different orders and ways. So Aristotle has divided the same name of quantity differently, namely in those that are discrete, and those that are continuous, and in those that have a position of parts, and those that do not have it. But the second division will be discussed later, now let’s deal with the first.
He speaks of the first division in this way: Some quantity is continuous, while others are discrete. Discrete is that whose parts are not joined by any common boundary. Continuous, on the other hand, is that whose parts have some common boundary, to which they seem to be joined. He gives examples and species of discrete quantities. Speech, for instance, is a discrete quantity, and similarly number, and no one doubts that number is a quantity. Discrete, however, is because a number like ten, which consists of five and five, cannot find what unites the two sets of five to form a complete ten. For if someone says three and seven, no common boundary can be found where three and seven are joined to form a whole ten, and this can be observed in every number. No number has parts in such a way that some common boundary joins them, but the parts are always separate and discrete, and this is called discrete quantity. Therefore, number is a discrete quantity, and he says that speech is a quantity, because every speech consists of a noun and a verb, but these are made up of syllables.
Every syllable is either long or short. Long or short, without any doubt, is a quantity; therefore, who would doubt that what consists of quantities is a quantity? But speech itself, being a quantity, is also discrete. For when I say Cicero, which is a part of speech, the parts of this name, ci and ce and ro, are not joined by any common boundary. For we will not find a common boundary by which the ci syllable is joined to the ce syllable or the ce syllable to the ro syllable. Therefore, speech also seems to be a discrete quantity. But if someone perhaps says that this is their common boundary, by which they are joined so as to signify something, as in this name Cicero, the common boundary of the syllables is the meaning itself. For if the syllable ce, which is in the middle, is placed first, and ro, which is last, is placed in the middle, and ci, which is first, is placed last, the name that was previously Cicero, with the syllables transposed, will not mean anything. To these people it must be said that since everything that is uttered in a certain speech, whether it means something or nothing, has no common limit for the syllables. For if someone says that by transposing the syllables of Cicero, it becomes ceroci and loses its meaning, the syllables still do not join to a common limit. But if someone thinks that this very speech itself signifies something, just as Cicero itself signifies something, a meaning is indeed added, but no limit is applied to the syllables. Therefore, whether a name means something or nothing, its parts are separate and disjointed, and are not joined by any common limit; and since the Greek speech also calls the mental thought and internal reasoning a logos, the logos is also called speech, so that no one would think that Aristotle, when he said logon, that is, speech, was a discrete quantity, would be speaking about that which each person arranges as logon, that is, reason, in their own thought. I am talking about the speech that is made with the voice. For in the Roman language, the words of speech and reason are separate. But Greek speech calls both reason and speech logon. Therefore, so that nothing in the translation would be blamed as false, I have also added this: I am talking about the speech that is made with the voice, for among the Romans there is no other speech except this one alone which is made with the voice. Among the Greeks, however, there is another logos that takes place in mental thought. For this reason, so that nothing would be missing, I have also translated this, which would be less suitable for Latin speech. Why I have done this, I have made clear with this explanation, and let this suffice concerning discrete quantity. Continuous quantity, however, is (as has been said) that whose parts have a common limit, such as a line, a surface, a body, and besides these, time and place, which Aristotle himself indicates with these words:
The line is continuous; for it is to take a common limit to which its parts join, and this is the point, and the line for the surface (for the parts of the surface join to a certain common limit). Similarly, also in the body, someone will take a common limit, either a line or a surface, to which the parts of the body join.
After explaining discrete quantities, he moves on to the types of continuous quantity. Continuous quantities are (as has been said) those whose parts have a certain common limit, like a line. For if someone divides a line, which is length without width, they make two lines in each division, and single points are rendered at the ends of each line resulting from the division. For the limits of a line are points. Therefore, since the points that appear after the division at the ends of both lines were together before the line was divided, they are understood to be separate in the division. It is thus understood that the common limit of the parts of the line is a point, that is, something very small that cannot be divided or cut into parts: A surface also, which is width without depth, has a common limit in its parts, a line; and a solid body, a surface. In the same way, when a surface is divided, it produces two lines for each part, just as when a line is divided, two points are produced on either side. When a solid body is divided, two surfaces are created in each part of the division. These surfaces, when joined and undivided, show that the common boundary of the line parts is a point. The line is the common boundary of surfaces, and the surface is the common boundary of solid bodies. A sign of a continuous body is that if one part moves, the entire body moves; and if the whole body moves, other nearby parts will move simultaneously. For example, if a rod made of air, wood, or any other metal is lying down and someone moves one end or any part of it, the entire rod moves at once. This happens because its parts are joined by a common boundary, and this common boundary moves the other parts when one part moves. This is not the case with discrete quantities. In a set of ten numbers, if I move one, the others do not move; the nine remain motionless. Even if a bushel is full of wheat, moving one grain does not cause all the grains to move at once, because the multitude is discrete, and no grain seems to be connected to another by a common boundary. However, if one part of the grain itself moves, the entire body of the grain must move. It is not said now that a line consists of points, a surface of lines, or a solid body of surfaces, but that the boundaries of a line are points, of a surface lines, and of a solid body surfaces; and no thing is composed of its boundaries. Therefore, a point is not part of a line but the common boundary of its parts. A line of a surface and a surface of a solid body are not parts but common boundaries of the parts. It is thus clear that a line, a surface, and the thickness of a solid body are continuous quantities. He then adds other examples.
Temporal and spatial quantities are also continuous; for the present is the common boundary to which the past and future join. Furthermore, space is continuous; for the parts of a body hold a certain place, which join to a common boundary. Therefore, the parts of space, which individual body parts occupy, join to the same boundary that the body parts were joined to; therefore, space is continuous, for its parts join to a single common boundary.
He also states that time and space are continuous quantities. The fact that time is a quantity is demonstrated by it being considered in terms of length and brevity. That it is continuous is shown by the fact that the parts of time have a common boundary and midpoint, to which the extremes are joined. Since the past and future are parts of time, the present time is their common boundary; the end of one and the beginning of the other. Space is also continuous. We call a place whatever holds the parts of a body, whether it is above, to the side, or below. If all parts of a body occupy a certain place, and the space around the body extends throughout the body and its parts, all parts of the body will be occupied by parts of space. If this is the case, the common boundary that connects the parts of the body also connects those places which are the parts of the body, and space is continuous in the same way as a body. A common boundary is found in the parts of space just as it is in the parts of a body because the space of a body extends throughout the body. When he said: there are also temporal and spatial quantities of this kind, since he was speaking earlier about continuous quantities, he also added time and space to continuous quantities, saying: there are also temporal and spatial quantities of this kind, that is, continuous, but after the division of continuous and discrete quantities, he begins another discussion from the beginning.
Furthermore, there are other quantities that consist of parts that have a position relative to each other; for example, the parts of a line have a position relative to each other (each one lies somewhere, and you can recognize and indicate where each part lies on the surface and to which other parts they are joined); similarly, the parts of a surface have a position (each one can be indicated where it lies, and which others they join to). Also, the same applies to solidity and place.
He then classifies the differences in quantities. There are quantities that consist of parts that have a position relative to each other, and others that have no position for their parts. Quantities are said to retain the position of their parts when they have a triple nature: first, that their parts are somewhere; second, that they do not perish; and third, that the parts themselves join and hold each other by their proper arrangement, as in a line. When a line is placed on a surface, you can recognize where its parts are: the head of the line is on the right, the middle in the center, and the end on the left; and these parts are said to remain, as the parts of a line do not perish but remain in the place where they are. You can also show which part of the line is connected to which other part, that is, to which part the head of one part and the end of the other are joined, as you will say this part, for example, the middle, of the line ends here, showing the place where it ends, and another part of the whole line begins here. Therefore, a line placed on any surface has its parts retaining a certain place, and the parts themselves do not perish, and anyone can recognize where the extremities of the parts are joined, and where they are connected to each other. The same is true for surfaces, as the parts of a surface are in some place, and they too do not perish, and where one part is joined to another is shown. The same applies to solidity, and the parts of space are continuous with those parts to which the body parts are continuous with each other, as has already been said. Therefore, space will be of the same nature as the whole solidity. Thus, space is of the same type of quantity as solidity, that is, consisting of parts that have a position relative to each other. Therefore, space itself consists of parts that have a position relative to each other. Therefore, these three things (as mentioned above) must be considered so that the parts seem to have a position relative to each other: the place where the parts themselves are placed, so that those parts do not perish, and there is containment and continuation of the parts. If someone says that this thing is absent from space because it is not in a place, for everything is in a place, but space itself cannot be in a place. It must be said that surfaces, solidity, and lines are said to have the position of their parts because they are in a place, and their parts remain and are continuous. Therefore, space itself, whose parts neither perish nor are perpetually and continuously joined, is said to have the position of its parts. Having discussed quantities that consist of parts that have a position relative to each other, he then adds those that do not have a position.
In numbers, however, no one can see how the parts have a position relative to each other or where they lie or which parts are joined to which; nor can they in time; for nothing remains of the parts of time, and what does not remain, how can it have any position? But rather, you would say that they retain a certain order because this part of time is before that part, and that part is afterwards. And in numbers too, because one is counted before two, and two before three; and thus, they will have some order, but position is not much of a concern. And speech is similar; for none of its parts remain, but what is said is gone, and nothing is left to take from it, therefore there will be no position of its parts, of which nothing remains. Thus, some quantities consist of parts that have a position relative to each other, and others do not.
These quantities do not retain any position of their parts relative to each other because it is clear that they lack some of the aforementioned properties. For a number itself is discrete, and its parts do not join each other but are entirely separate. Therefore, it is not among those that have some position of their parts relative to each other, nor can you show which number lies in which place. To have a position, as mentioned earlier, it must be placed somewhere, and that position is maintained by the remaining parts, joined and connected to each other so that you can indicate where they lie and which part is connected to which; however, none of this applies to numbers. They are not demonstrated to be in any place, nor are their parts joined. Therefore, numbers lack two of the three properties we mentioned: the position of the place and the continuation of the parts. Time, although its parts are continuous, is not said to have the position of its parts because they do not remain but are always in motion and constantly passing. Time is always driven by rapid motion and, like the flow of water, never stops in any station. Since its parts do not remain, it is not said to consist of parts that have a position relative to each other. However, although these quantities cannot have a position in their parts, they still retain a certain order, which they hold in addition to the position of their parts. We say that the number two is before the number three and that the number three is before the number four, and the same order occurs in time. For indeed, the future will follow the present, and the present will follow the past. Therefore, even if these things do not have a position of parts, they still retain an order. What he says, however, “you will not receive much position,” is as if he were saying, “you will not receive it at all.” For “much” seems to be added as a synonym for “entirely,” as if he were saying “you will not receive position at all,” because the very continuity gives an image that it may have some position of parts, but this is not the case, because although they are continuous quantities, they still lack one of those things mentioned above and cannot have a position of parts. For water that a pipe spews, while it falls, it retains position; but when the waves are already mixed, it loses the position of parts: and also a river when it flows into the sea, it seems to have a position of parts and be continuous when the surface of the river has not yet been mixed with the sea water; but when the end of the river touches the marine inundation, it undoubtedly seems to lose the entire position.
Speech also behaves similarly; for it is not placed in any location, nor are its parts joined to any, but they are separate from each other, and when its parts are spoken, they do not remain, and this is what he says. But it has been said, and there is nothing beyond this to be taken. For speech is spoken immediately, then it passes, and it cannot remain by any reasoning, so as soon as something has been said, its parts cannot be shown and taken by demonstration. Therefore, it is clear that speech also belongs to those things which do not have a position of parts, but about the order, there is doubt. For if any speech signifies something, such as “Cicero,” there is a certain order in it, as “ci” is pronounced first, then “ce,” and finally “ro,” and it takes its order more from its meaning; but if it does not signify anything, it is not said to have order, such as “scindapsus” which signifies nothing; whether you place the second syllable first or the last first, or however you mix the order and sequence of syllables, it will be the same: for in meaningful words, it is said to be so, because when the order is changed, the force of meaning is overturned, but here, where there is no meaning, it does not matter how the parts lie. Therefore, speech has an order of parts in some cases, but in others, the order itself cannot be found.
Perhaps speech cannot be said which signifies nothing, and there is no speech that does not have an order? Therefore, according to the previous division of quantity, where it was said that some quantities are continuous and others discrete, there are five continuous and two discrete. The continuous are the line, surface, solid, place, and time. The discrete are number and speech. In this second division, where he says that some quantities consist of parts that have position in relation to each other, there are four that retain position, that is the line, surface, body, and place; and there are three that do not have position, but of these two always retain order, namely time and number. Speech, however, if it signifies something, has order; but if it signifies nothing, it is disordered; if, however, speech signifying nothing can be said, he concludes these statements by saying: Therefore, some consist of parts that have position in relation to each other, others do not have position. Having finished this division, he moves on to other matters, showing what are properly called quantities and what are called quantities accidentally.
Only these quantities that we have mentioned are properly so called, and all others are called quantities accidentally; for we call them quantities with reference to these, such as a large white object because it has a large surface, and a long action because it takes a long time, and much motion; for none of these are called quantities in themselves; if someone were to determine how large the action is, they would define it in terms of time, saying it lasts a year or in some other way, and if they were to determine how large the white object is, they would define it in terms of surface (for however large the surface is, that is how large they would say the white object is); therefore, only those quantities that have been mentioned are properly and in themselves called quantities, while all others are not in themselves, but accidentally, if at all.
Something is said to be principally in itself when it is such by its nature. But something is said to be accidentally so when it is not such in itself, but through another thing, as color belongs to whiteness by its nature: for in the nature of white, color is called whiteness; but when a man is said to be colored, he is not called so in himself because a man is not a color insofar as he is a man, but because he has a color, he is called colored. Therefore, just as white is called a color in itself because color is a natural kind, and a man is called colored because he has a color, so it is said that white is a color in itself and principally, but a man is colored accidentally. The same goes for quantities; for all those that have been mentioned, that is, line, surface, body, number, ratio, and time, are called quantities in themselves and according to their own nature. If any others are called quantities in reference to some quantity, they are not called so in themselves, but accidentally: as a white object is said to be large, not because whiteness is a quantity, but because it has a large surface in which that white object is. For if there is a large space in which the white object is, the white object will be large; and so, not because whiteness itself has a quantity in itself, but because it is situated in some quantity, that is, on a surface, it is called large according to the surface, which is a quantity, and indeed large in itself; therefore, white is not called large in itself or principally, but accidentally.
An action is also called long because it takes a long time; we say there is much illness if it lasts a long time; and we say there is much motion because it takes a long time, as if someone runs for a long time. However, if someone calls a very fast run a long one, they are not using language appropriately. For speed is not a quantity but rather a quality, as we are called fast, not large, according to it. “Much” is said according to quantity, and this is shown by the very definition of things. For if someone wishes to show a great amount of “white” and includes it within a proper term of reason, it must be said that “white” is abundant when it lies on a large surface, and that a motion or action is abundant when it takes a long time to be completed. Therefore, since we look to proper quantities and refer other things to them, we call them quantities, such as “white” in relation to the surface, which is a true quantity, and a course, and a certain motion and action to time, which is itself truly a quantity. These are not quantities in themselves, but are named through those which are properly called quantities. Thus, since what is not in itself is by accident, it is correct to say that all other things, apart from those which have been counted as quantities above, are by accident and not in themselves quantities. Therefore, only those which are properly and in themselves are called quantities, such as those which have been previously mentioned. Others, however, are not quantities in themselves, but (as he says) perhaps by accident. So after the division of continuous and discrete, having and not having the position of parts, and what is principally and by accident quantities, he enters the usual path of finding the properties of quantities.
As for quantity, nothing is contrary (for in these defined things it is clear that there is no contrary, such as in a two-cubit or three-cubit length, or a surface or anything like that, for there is no contrary). Only “many” may be said to be contrary to “few,” or “great” to “small.” but none of these are quantities in themselves, but rather in relation to something else. For nothing is called “large” or “small” by itself, but rather in relation to something else. For a mountain is called small, while a grain is called large because the former is smaller within its own kind, while the latter is larger within its own kind. Therefore, their relation is to something else. For if “small” or “large” were said by themselves, a mountain would never be called small, nor a grain large. Again, in a village we say that there are more people, but in a city, fewer, even though the number of people is greater, and in a house there are many, but in a theater, few, even though there are more. Furthermore, a two-cubit or three-cubit length and each such thing signify a quantity, but “large” or “small” do not signify a quantity, but rather in relation to something else. Since “large” and “small” are considered in relation to something else, it is clear that they are relative. Moreover, whether someone posits them as quantities or not, nothing will be contrary to them. For what does not exist in itself but only in relation to something else, how can there be anything contrary to it? Furthermore, if “large” and “small” are contraries, it happens that the same thing simultaneously takes on contrary qualities, and these qualities are contrary to themselves. For it is possible for the same thing to be both small and large at the same time (for it is small in relation to one thing, but large in relation to another); therefore, the same thing can be both small and large at the same time, and thus it will simultaneously take on contrary qualities. But there is nothing that seems able to simultaneously take on contrary qualities; as in the case of substance, which appears to be capable of receiving contraries, but no one is simultaneously healthy and sick, nor simultaneously white and black; and nothing else simultaneously takes on contrary qualities. And the same thing happens to be contrary to itself; for if “large” and “small” are contraries, and the same thing is simultaneously small and large, it will be contrary to itself; but it is impossible for something to be contrary to itself. Therefore, “large” is not contrary to “small,” nor “many” to “few”; so if someone says that these are not relative, quantity still has no contrary.
A definite quantity is one that is constrained by a numerical limit, such as two or three, and those that are spoken of in this way, as if you were to say two-cubit, three-cubit, and so on. And those that are defined by their own proper signification, such as surface and volume, are recognized as quantities. Therefore, since they are defined, none of them have a contrary; for a two-cubit length is not contrary to a three-cubit length, just as no number is contrary to any other number, nor is a surface contrary to a volume, nor anything else like that. But because some undefined things show a certain image of quantity, such as “large” and “small,” which appear to be contraries, Aristotle argues that these are not quantities but rather relative to something else, which we deduce from his words.
But it is not unique to quantity to have no contraries. Not every quantity is without contraries, but rather it is necessary for us to consider, as we go through each particular species of quantity, which ones have no contraries and which ones do. For example, a line has no contrary; for one line is not contrary to another line. But if someone says that a straight line is contrary to a curved line, they are mistaken. For it is not insofar as it is a line that a curved line is contrary to a straight line, but insofar as it is curved. And in this respect, it is not the lines themselves that seem to be contrary, but rather the straightness and curvature. Therefore, it is not insofar as they are quantities that a curved line is contrary to a straight line, but rather insofar as they are qualitatively different. For since curvature and straightness are contraries, they take on contrariety insofar as they are curved and straight lines, not insofar as they are lines. Therefore, a line, insofar as it is a line, lacks a contrary. Moreover, neither is a surface contrary to another surface.
But perhaps someone may say that a white surface is contrary to a black surface; to which it must be similarly objected that they are not contrary insofar as they are surfaces, but insofar as they possess whiteness and blackness, which are indeed contrary qualities. Similarly, if someone claims that a smooth and a rough surface are contraries, they can be refuted, since the surfaces hold contrariness not in terms of their quantity but in terms of the qualities of roughness and smoothness. Moreover, no kind of contrariety is opposed to a body in any way. If someone claims that incorporeal is contrary to corporeal, they can be refuted, since all contrariety is expressed by proper names, such as good and evil, white and black; whereas corporeal and incorporeal are not expressed in terms of contrariety but in terms of privation and possession. For incorporeal is the privation of a body. Nor is there anything contrary to time, but if night appears to be opposed to day, it is not insofar as it is time, but insofar as day is bright air and night is dark air. But air is neither time nor quantity, and light and darkness are qualities, not quantities.
Speech, although it may seem to have a contrary, does not actually have a contrary opposition. It may also seem that there is true speech and false speech, which are contraries, but true and false speech lies in their meaning. For when speech signifies what is, it is true; but when it designates what is not, then it is false. However, speech is not measured in quantity according to what it signifies, but according to what it expresses. For the speech we utter is composed of long and short syllables, which measure all speech not according to what it signifies, but according to what pertains to its pronunciation.
It is also clear that there are no contraries in numbers, for two is not contrary to three, nor three to four, nor is any one number contrary to any other number.
Place, however, has some contrariety, for “up” and “down” are contraries. But some people think that “up” and “down” are not quantities but rather relations, which the Greeks call skeseis. For we call the part that is towards our head “up,” and the part that is under our feet “down.” Therefore, we predicate “up” and “down” according to a certain relation, in some way related to ourselves. Herminius also says that “up” and “down” are not places but rather a kind of position of a place. For there is an “up” and a “down” in things, but it is not the same thing to be a place and to have a place; for the position of a place is in a place, but the place itself is not a position. But if someone looks at the entire shape of the world, and how the sphere encompasses the form of all things, and the earth is at the center, and in a sphere there is nothing ultimate except that which has obtained the same boundary of the middle, whatever is at the extremity of the convexity of the heavens will be called “up,” and whatever is in the middle will be called “down.” Therefore, “up” and “down” are contraries according to place, with “up” being in the heavens and “down” on earth, because they are far apart from each other, which is why they are also defined as contraries in this way. Contraries are those things that are farthest apart from each other: hence the definition is drawn from the fact that since heaven and earth are distant, they seemed to be very far apart, and that one is “up” and the other “down.” Indeed, “up” and “down” are called contraries for no other reason than that they are far apart from each other, and contrariness is defined as being very distant, as Aristotle states in this way.
The greatest contrariety in terms of quantity seems to be found in relation to place; for they consider “up” to be contrary to “down,” calling the middle region “down” because there is a great distance from the middle to the limits of the world. They also seem to derive the definition of other contraries from these; for they define those things that are far apart from each other in the same category as contraries.
In every sphere, the earth is at the center, which the ordered rotation of the stars demonstrates. Aristotle also added the reason why places of this kind are called contraries: because there is a great distance from the center to the limits of the world. He refers to the limits of the world as the ultimate convexity of the heavens. From this contrariety of place, he demonstrates that other things are defined as contraries as well. They also seem to derive the definition of other contraries from these, as they define those things that are distant from each other in the same category as contraries. But since we didn’t want the order of contrariety in terms of quantity to be disrupted, we therefore added these contrarieties of place to the previous ones, in which we were saying that nothing is contrary to individual quantities. Some things in the middle were omitted; let’s return to the previous points so that the order of the exposition may maintain itself. For he previously said, when proposing that nothing is contrary to quantity, that nothing can be contrary to two cubits, three cubits, a surface, or anything like these. For these defined quantities seem to have no contrary, such as two or three, but since they are indefinite, they do not appear to be quantities and contraries. He adds these points again. Unless someone says that many are contrary to few, or large to small. However, none of these are quantities but rather relations; for nothing is called large or small in itself but is referred to something else. For a mountain is indeed called small, while a millet seed is called large, because this is larger in its own kind, while that is smaller in its own kind. Therefore, their relation is to something else, for if it were called small or large in itself, a mountain would never be called small, and a millet seed would never be called large. Again, in a village, we say there are more people, while in a city there are fewer, although there are actually many more of them; and in a house there are many, while in a theater there are few, although there are more. Furthermore, two cubits and three cubits, and anything like these, signify a quantity, but large and small do not signify a quantity but rather a relation, since large and small are considered in relation to something else; therefore, it is clear that these are relations. Just as defined quantities are not subject to contraries, as he previously proved by saying that nothing is contrary to two cubits or a surface, indefinite ones, such as large and small, many and few, give an appearance of contrariety. But it is objected that these are not quantities. Indeed, every quantity is expressed in itself, for example, two cubits, three cubits, two, three, and a surface refer to nothing else. However, ‘large’ or ‘small’ cannot be said without reference to others. For when you say ‘large,’ it refers to a comparison and equality with something else. The same is true for ‘small,’ which is proven by the Aristotelian induction. If ‘large’ and ‘small’ were said in themselves without relation to another, we would never say a mountain is small or a grain is large. For if ‘large’ and ‘small’ were not said in relation to another, a mountain would always be large and a grain always small.
However, when we compare a hill to the height of Mount Atlas, we call it a small mountain, and similarly, when we compare a grain to other smaller grains, we call it a large grain. Simply put, whatever is called large or small is referred to a similar type, comparing a mountain to a mountain, a grain to a grain, and so on.
Many and few are said in the same way. For example, if there are a hundred people in a village, we say there are many people. But if they are in a city, we say there are few, now referring to the smallness of villages and the largeness of cities. Furthermore, if there are fifty people in a house, they are many, but if they are in a theater, they are few because we say there are few people in a theater when we compare them to the number that should be in the theater.
Moreover, since ‘large’ and ‘small’ always refer to something else, we name individual quantities without comparing them to anything else, as their own and proper names, such as three, two, four, line, surface. ‘Large’ and ‘small,’ many and few, are separated from the division of quantity. For these are not quantities, but rather relative terms. Furthermore, whether someone considers them to be quantities or not, nothing will be contrary to them. For what does not exist in itself but only in relation to another, how can it have something contrary to it?
This is also proven by a very strong argument that there is nothing contrary to these aforementioned quantities, except perhaps location. For if someone places ‘large’ and ‘small,’ or ‘many’ and ‘few’ within quantities, even if this is granted, since they always refer to something else, they are not subject to contraries. For every contrary exists in itself, not bringing it into comparison and relation to another, as good is not said to be the good of evil, nor again is evil the evil of good, but it exists in its own nature and utterance. Whatever things are contrary, they are in the same way. But ‘large’ and ‘small,’ since they do not exist in themselves but are referred to another’s relation, cannot be contrary.
Moreover, if ‘large’ and ‘small’ are contrary, it happens that the same thing simultaneously takes on contraries and that they are contrary to themselves. For it is possible for the same thing to be both small and large at the same time. For something is small compared to one thing, but large compared to another. Therefore, it is possible for the same thing to be both small and large at the same time, so it would take on contraries simultaneously. But there is nothing that seems to be able to take on contraries simultaneously, as substance appears to be susceptible to contraries but does not take them on at the same time. For no one is simultaneously healthy and sick, nor white and black at the same time, and nothing else takes on contraries simultaneously.
And the same thing can be contrary to itself. For if large is contrary to small, and the same thing is simultaneously small and large, it will be contrary to itself. But it is impossible for something to be contrary to itself. Therefore, large is not contrary to small. It is clear and unchangeable in its proper reasoning that the same thing at the same time cannot take on contraries, as a substance is indeed susceptible to contraries. For a human being, being a substance, can take on sickness and health but not at the same time, and can take on whiteness and blackness at different times, but it cannot take on both contraries at the same time. If someone places large as contrary to small, something impossible will occur, as the same thing at the same time will take on both contraries, and the same thing can be contrary to itself. Let’s assume that large is contrary to small, but the same thing at the same time can be large and small, as if there is a ten-foot measurement compared to a two-foot magnitude, it is large, but compared to a one hundred cubits magnitude and duration, it is small. Therefore, the same thing can be susceptible to both magnitude and smallness at the same time. For the same thing, at the same time compared to a larger and smaller thing, is both large and small. If large is contrary to small, and the same thing at the same time takes on both magnitude and smallness, it occurs that the same thing simultaneously takes on both contraries, but this is impossible. Therefore, since the same thing is not susceptible to contraries at the same time but can take on both magnitude and smallness, magnitude and smallness are not contraries. However, if someone places large as contrary to small, they argue that the same thing is contrary to itself. For if small is contrary to large, and the same thing (as I have shown) can be both small and large when compared to different things, then the thing that is both small and large can be contrary to itself, as small and large have been said to be contrary, but this is impossible. Therefore, small and large are not contraries.
After discussing the argumentation of contrariety and location in this way, which we have already mentioned earlier, it is to be passed over, so that repetition of the exposition does not lead to annoyance rather than instruction.
However, it does not seem that quantity admits of more and less, as in two cubits (for there is no one thing more two cubits than another); nor in number, as in three compared to five (for nothing will be said to be more three, nor three more than three); nor is one time said to be more time than another; nor in the things that have been said is anything said to be more or less at all. Therefore, quantity does not admit of more and less.
He added another characteristic, which, although not proper to quantity, he did not explain why; but it is for us to demonstrate. What he says is this: quantity does not admit of more and less, for no number is more or less a number than another number. For if a triad is compared to a pentad, it is neither more nor less a number, and again, the three compared to themselves are neither more nor less than three. Time also does not have more or less, so that one time is more than another time; a longer time can indeed exist than another time, but it cannot be said that one time is more or less than another. This has also been demonstrated in substance, for a human being is not more or less human than another human being. The same thing also happens in quantity. Since this is also true in substance, it is not specific to quantity, but quantity does have this characteristic, as shown in the following order. Therefore, since he had previously discussed this regarding substance, and now he has proposed the same thing regarding quantity, he neglected to mention that this is not specific to quantity. For whose property would it be not to admit more and less, he then said when he was discussing substance. For he says that substance never admits more or less, therefore he returned to the most proper customary reasoning for establishing properties.
The most proper characteristic of quantity, however, is that it is called equal and unequal. For each of the quantities mentioned is called both equal and unequal, as a body can be equal and unequal, and a number can be called equal and unequal, and time can be equal and unequal. Similarly, in the other things mentioned, each is called equal and unequal. In the rest of the things that are not of quantity, equal and unequal will not seem to be said much, for arrangement is not often called equal and unequal, but rather similar, and white is not often called equal and unequal but similar. Therefore, it is proper to quantity to be called equal and unequal.
The clearest characteristic of quantity is that equality and inequality are named according to quantity. For each quantity is said to be equal and unequal, such as an equal line to a line, and again unequal; and an equal surface to a surface is said to be equal and unequal, and a body is called equal and unequal. Number, time, and place are also called equal and unequal. However, in other things that are not quantities, it is not easy for equality or inequality to be named. Therefore, dispositions, which are called affections, are not called equal or unequal but rather similar and dissimilar. Disposition or affection is an adaptation and application to something, as if someone reading grammar, who has not yet learned it perfectly, has some disposition towards it, that is, is affected by it, and has something adapted and close. Two things can also be similarly disposed and affected, but they can hardly be equal, as two things can be similarly white, but not equal. For if someone says that two similarly white things are equally white, they are not using the correct naming convention. For all equal and unequal things are completed in measurement and quantity. Similarly and dissimilarly, however, are not said about quantity, nor about any other thing except for quantity; equality and inequality are rightly named. Therefore, it is proper for quantity to be called equal and unequal.
But since we have spoken of quantity, let us move on to the order of relatives. After discussing quantity, I enter the third category of relatives and define relatives in this way.
On Relatives
Such things are called relative that, in any way, are said to be of others or somehow related to something else, as “greater” is said to be related to something else (for it is called greater than something), and “double” is said to be related to something else as it is (for it is called the double of something). Similarly, all other such things are considered relative.
The reason why he discusses those things that are relative, while temporarily leaving out the discussion of quality, is that when quantity is established, it is necessary for there to be more or less. Therefore, since quantity immediately leads to something relative, the series of relatives is rightly ordered after quantity. Another reason is that, when discussing quantity earlier, mention was made of relatives when talking about large and small, so in order to maintain continuity and avoid interrupting the distinction of the work, he proposed the discussion of relations after finishing with quantity. When he says, “Such things are called relative,” he demonstrates that unlike quantity, which can be understood individually and separately, or substance and quality, and each of the other categories, which are clearly understood as individual and separate, a relative concept cannot be grasped individually and separately, so that we say it is a single relative thing. For whatever is recognized as a relative in nature, it must be considered in relation to something else; when I say “master,” it means nothing by itself unless I say “slave.” Therefore, since the naming of one relative immediately involves another relative thing, it cannot be a single thing by itself, and so Aristotle does not say, “A single thing is called relative,” but rather, in plural number, “Such things are called relative,” showing that the understanding of relatives consists not in simplicity but in plurality.
Aristotle himself shows that there is no separate nature of relatives without some connection to another existing thing, for he says that those things are relatives which, as they are, are said to be of others. For he teaches that relatives are formed by some connection to another, for they are said to be of others. What is a master, is said to be of another, that is, of a slave. Whether we call them relatives or related to something else, it makes no difference. A thing is said to be related to something else because, although it is nothing by itself, it is established when related to something else, as a master. If the thing it relates to is absent, for example, the slave, it does not exist, for it is said to be related to the slave. Therefore, it is evident that if the slave is absent, the master cannot be called, so the master is said to be related to something else, that is, to the slave. Relatives are also called such because their naming always refers to something else, as the master’s to the slave, so it makes no difference how they are called.
Such a definition is believed to be that of Plato, which is later corrected by Aristotle. Some relatives are referred to with the same grammatical cases, some with different cases, and some are not related to any case. He added this to show what he meant, “or in any other way related to something else.” The meaning of this is almost explained in the text itself. For when I say “the master of the slave,” I have rendered the nominative case to the genitive case, and again, if I reverse it, I say “the slave of the master,” and here too the nominative is related to the genitive. In the same way, “the father of the son” and “the son of the father,” “the teacher of the student” and “the student of the teacher” are similarly said to be of others. For they are said to be of others according to the genitive case. Some relatives do not follow the same case, for example, sense is related to something else, for the sense is of the sensible thing. For what is sensible can be sensed, and what can be sensed is sensible, and now indeed the sense of the sensible thing is accommodated in the genitive case. It is said to be of the sensible thing, but if you reverse it, it becomes, “The sensible thing is sensed by the sense.” But in this relation, which says the sensible thing is sensed by the sense, the nominative is rendered to the seventh (ablative) case, not in the same case as mentioned earlier. For we say “the sense of the sensible thing is the sense,” and here the nominative is rendered to the genitive. This relation does not adapt itself to the seventh case.
We also say “knowledge of the knowable thing is knowledge,” if indeed what is known can be known and what can be known is knowable, but not in the same way or the same case does this relation convert. For we say “the knowable thing is known by knowledge.” The first relation is to the genitive, the second conversion to the seventh. This relation also converts according to the same cases when we say “the greater is greater than the lesser” and “the lesser is lesser than the greater.” Double and half are also relatives but are converted in the same cases. For double is the double of half, and half is the half of double. There are also other relatives which he added in this way:
Indeed, there are also these things that are relative, such as habit, affection, knowledge, sense, and position; for all these things that have been said are said to be of others and not otherwise. For a habit is the habit of someone, and knowledge is the knowledge of someone, and position is the position of someone, and other things are similarly relative.
Regarding sense and knowledge, it has been said earlier, now it is necessary to discuss habit, disposition, and position. Disposition is the flexible application to something, as if someone stands close to a flame, they are said to be disposed to heat, that is, having some application and connection to the heat. Affection is the same as disposition, so that no confusion arises from a new name: and therefore, since disposition is a certain connection to another thing or an affection from another, it is easily changeable and quickly mutable. Habit, on the other hand, is a firm and not easily changeable accession of disposition or affection, as if someone walking in the sun becomes darker, they are said to be disposed to blackness and affected by blackness. But if that blackness has strongly and unchangeably infected the body, it is called a habit; therefore, habit is an ingrained affection. Hence, every habit is a disposition or affection, but not every disposition or affection is a habit. To avoid going into too much detail, it is also clear in habit and disposition that habit is an unchangeable passion, while disposition is not the same, but rather a certain affection, and a connection to something that can easily change. Position, on the other hand, is the placement of something, such as standing, sitting, leaning, reclining, and other things of this kind. For those who stand are said to be positioned and placed in a certain way, as are those who sit, recline, and are positioned according to other positions. Therefore, standing, sitting, and reclining will be positions. But since what they are has been said, now let us see if they are relative, as habit is proven to be relative by the same thing that was proof for other things being relative, such as in sense and knowledge. For it was said that the sense of the sensible thing is the sense because the sensible thing is that which can be sensed; therefore, the habit of the able thing is the habit. For an able thing is that which can be had, and the habit of that thing is that which can be had. Therefore, the habit of the able thing will be the habit, but the able thing will also be able by habit, for we have the thing itself that can be had.
Disposition also works in the same way. For the disposition of the disposed thing is the disposition, and the disposed thing is disposed by the disposition. For the disposition of heat is that of the heated, that is, the disposition of those disposed to heat. In the same way, one disposed to heat is disposed by the disposition of heat: just as if it had been said in this way, every affection is the affection of the affected, and everything affected is affected by the affection. And the heat of the heated becomes heat, and the heated by heat becomes hot. Position is also relative, for the position of the positioned thing is the position, and the positioned thing is positioned by the position, and this should be understood according to the previous mode of habit and disposition. That thing also proves that position is relative because its species are relative; for the standing of the standing thing is the standing, and the one who stands stands by standing; and the same can be said about sitting and reclining.
Therefore, both habit and disposition or affection, and position are relative, and all these things, whether similar or dissimilar, are converted in suitable yet predicative cases. However, among those that are converted according to cases, some are predicated with the same name, while others are predicated with different names: for when I say similar is similar to similar, and equal is equal to equal, and dissimilar is dissimilar to dissimilar, the entire predication is made with the same words and the same names. But when I say double of the middle is double, or greater is greater than the lesser, the predication is made with different words. Since the definition of relatives was proposed in such a way that it said: such things are said to be relative which, because they are of others, are said in any way, otherwise to another; we have already said what it means that they are said to be of others, now we will address what it means when it says, or in any way otherwise to another.
Aristotle proves this with appropriate examples in sequence; he says:
Things are relative whenever they are said to be of others or in any way otherwise to another; for example, a mountain is called large in relation to another mountain (for large is said relative to something), and something similar is called similar to another, and all such things are similarly said to be relative to something. And reclining, standing, and sitting are certain positions, but position is relative; however, lying down, standing, or sitting themselves are not positions, but rather, they are denominatively named from the positions that have been mentioned.
Since reclining, standing, and sitting are called positions, and since every position is relative, it has been sufficiently understood earlier. Now we will explain what he means when he says, or in any way otherwise to another. In the relationship through which we say a son is the son of the father, no mixed connection is present, only the force of cases alone connects the members of this predication. However, when I say a large mountain, referring to a smaller one, I propose in this way: a large mountain, in relation to a small mountain, and a small mountain in relation to a large one. Here, there is no force of cases: although the accusative seems to be mixed in, it does not hold the force of this relationship but rather the preposition given to the accusative; for when I say, a large mountain in relation to a small mountain, the preposition alone contains the force of this relationship, as if someone says a large mountain, a small mountain, it signifies nothing definite. Therefore, although the accusative case is in this proposition, it does not hold the force of the case but rather the preposition; and this is what he means when he says, or in any way otherwise to another, since he had earlier said that relationships occur according to cases. However, some relationships were not held by any cases, so he added this, or in any way otherwise to another, as if he were saying: Every relationship either occurs through cases, which he demonstrated by saying, whatever they are, are said of others, or they are outside cases, which this sentence teaches, or in any way otherwise to another, and this concludes our discussion so far.
However, since position is relative and its species are also relative (for sitting and standing are relative), sitting and standing themselves have no relation. Indeed, standing and sitting are denominatively called from standing and sitting positions. However, every denomination is not the same as the thing from which it is named, as in the case of a grammarian, for it is not the same as the grammar from which he is named. Therefore, if sitting is denominative of sitting position, and standing is denominative of standing position, while sitting and standing positions are relative, sitting and standing, which are denominative from relatives, do not belong to the category of relatives. And universally, whatever is named from any positions can be reduced not to relatives but to the predication called situation.
Moreover, there is contrariety in relation as well, as virtue is contrary to vice, since both are relative, and knowledge is contrary to ignorance. However, not all relatives have contrariety; for example, nothing is contrary to double or triple, or any such things.
Just as he investigated whether it is peculiar to substances or quantities to receive contraries, he now also considers contrariety in relatives, whether it is peculiar to relatives to be able to receive contraries. And since both virtue and vice are habits, for virtue is an affection of the mind towards good and is difficult to change, vice is an affection towards evil, also difficult to change and enduring for a long time: since then both vice and virtue are habits, and every habit has been shown to be relative (for habit is the disposition of a thing), virtue and vice will be relatives, but these are contraries; therefore, relatives do not refuse to receive contraries. But if someone asks: what is the reason that virtue and vice, and even habit itself, are soon numbered among the qualities? However, nothing prevents one thing from being placed in different categories with a different signification; for Socrates, as he is Socrates, is a substance, but as a father or son, he is relative; thus, being led to another and another predication, nothing prevents the same thing from being placed under a different category. The same applies to habit, virtue, and vice. Habit can be placed in quality because from it, people are called by what kind of men they are; we say “having” when someone retains the disposition of a thing. Virtue is also a quality because, from it, people are called good and according to that quality, that is, goodness, we call them good men; similarly, vice. Habit itself becomes relative again when referred to another predication: for since habit is the disposition of a capable thing, it is relative; and since it is someone’s virtue, it is relative, and since it is someone’s vice, it is relative as well. Therefore, nothing prevents the same things from being replaced by different predications when turned to another and another.
However, we cannot understand relative itself apart from any other category, as we consider father and son, master and slave according to substance. For both the one who is a master and the one who is a slave are substances. Double and triple are considered according to quantity, for they consist in quantity; knowledge and ignorance, however, are considered according to quality. For according to these, we are called knowledgeable or ignorant. Therefore, since no one will understand relative by itself apart from another category, it is said that relatives can receive contraries according to those categories in which relation is understood: for example, Socrates himself is a substance but substance does not receive contraries. However, the father and son are predicated according to substance, for there is no father and son unless they exist in substance. Therefore, since it is said according to substance, it lacks contrariety.
Again, double or half is said according to quantity, but quantity has been shown not to have contraries; therefore, neither double nor half are in conflict with contraries. However, quality accepts contrariety; for good and evil are opposed according to quality, so good and evil do not lack contraries. Therefore, according to which categories relatives are said, if they accept contraries, relation also accepts them. But if they first reject contrariety, neither does the relative, which is said according to them, ever become divided by any contrariety. Therefore, having contraries is not peculiar to relation, for it is not in relation alone (for quality also has this), nor can it be considered in all relatives. For those things that are said to be relative according to such categories that do not receive contrariety, such as father and son according to substance, or double and medium according to quantity, in such relatives, contraries are in no way found. But what is neither in one alone nor in all is not peculiar; therefore, it is not peculiar to relation to have contraries.
However, relatives seem to receive more and less; for similar is said more and less, and unequal is said more and less, since both are relative (for similar is said similar to something and unequal is said unequal to something). But not all things receive more and less; for double is not said more and less double, nor anything of the sort.
Now the question is whether it is peculiar to relation to receive more and less; but in this, the same rule is followed, as was said in the case of contraries. For whatever is said according to those things that do not receive contraries, they also lack contraries. But since equal and unequal are said according to quantity, they also receive more and less. For more equal and less equal are said. In the same way, similar is also said, more similar and less similar.
But if someone should perhaps ask: why, since it is proper to quantity to say equal and unequal, and quantity does not receive more and less, do equal and unequal increase in intensity and decrease in remission? It should be said that just as substance itself is not peculiar in that it is substance, yet it is peculiar to it to be able to receive contraries, so it is considered in quantity, for it is peculiar not to this itself of which it is peculiar, but to some other quality and affection from outside. For affection is a quality, and a certain quality can be said equal and unequal: since it is not the same peculiarity as that of which it is peculiar, and equal or unequal can be said, it is not the quantity of which it is peculiar but a certain quality and affection of quantity.
However, this is said in relation to something, for it is said about that which is of another, for we say equal is equal to an equal, and similarly, similar is similar to a similar. But not all relatives accept more and less. For no one can say that more and less double is something: for whether a ten-unit coin is compared to a five-unit coin, or a four-unit coin to a two-unit coin, each is equally double, and each is equally half. Quality also accepts more and less, for we say more white and less white. Therefore, since receiving more and less is neither in all relations nor in relation alone, and relation receives both more and less through quality, it is not peculiar to relation to receive more and less.
However, all relatives are said with respect to things that can be converted, as a slave is called the slave of the master and the master is called the master of the slave, and double is called double of half and half is called half of double, and greater is called greater than the lesser and lesser is called lesser than the greater; similarly, in other cases. But sometimes it differs according to the expression used, as knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable thing, and knowable is called knowable by knowledge, and sensation is called sensation of the sensible, and sensible is called sensible by sensation.
This is a clear and unambiguous statement of the proposer. For he says that all relatives are said with respect to things that can be converted, which he himself has made clear with specific examples. For every relative is predicated in such a way with respect to another thing that the thing to which it is predicated seems to be able to be converted, and this is what he says: all relatives are said with respect to things that can be converted. To be converted means that if the first thing is said with respect to the second, the second is in turn said with respect to the first. Let the first be father, the second be son, and let it be said in this way, the father is the father of the son; this can be converted again, so that we first put the son, and the predication is like this, the son is the son of the father. Therefore, the father is said to be such, that is, to the son who is converted: and the son who is said with respect to the father, is said to be such a thing that it can also be converted, to be predicated of the son. And all relatives are like this, for every relative is predicated with respect to something that can itself be converted in predication. But not all things are said according to the same mode of expression. Some are those which are converted in the same cases, as was said, the father is the father of the son, and the son is the son of the father. Others, however, are not the same, as knowledge is the knowledge of the knowable thing: here the genitive is in the middle. But the knowable is knowable by knowledge: here the seventh case holds the predication. Others, however, are not connected in any case (as was said above) and are converted to each other, as a great mountain is said with respect to a small one, and a small one with respect to a great one. Therefore, all relatives are said with respect to things that can be converted, even though they are not converted in the same cases, which he himself says by stating: but sometimes it differs according to the expression used. What he added is indeed very carefully added.
However, sometimes it may not seem to be convertible unless it is appropriately assigned to that which it is said, but the one who assigns it is at fault; for example, if a wing is assigned to a bird, it is not converted so that the bird is of the wing; for the wing is not appropriately assigned to the bird in the first place; for the wing is not said in relation to the bird being a bird, but in relation to it being winged (for there are many other winged things which are not birds); therefore, if it is assigned appropriately, it is also converted; as the wing is the wing of the winged thing, and the winged thing is of the winged thing. Sometimes, however, it may be necessary to invent names if there is no existing name to which it can be appropriately assigned; for example, if an oar is assigned to a ship, it will not be an appropriate assignment (for the oar is not said in relation to the ship being a ship; there are ships which do not have oars); therefore, it is not converted; for the ship is not said to be of the oar. But perhaps a more appropriate assignment will be if it is assigned in some way like this, the oar is the oar of the oar-propelled thing, or somehow else said (for the name is not established); and it is converted if it is assigned appropriately (for the oar-propelled thing is of the oar-propelled thing by the oar). Similarly, in other cases, the head will be more appropriately assigned to a headed thing than if it is assigned to an animal; for not in every animal does the head exist (for there are many animals that do not have heads).
Above, the author already proposed the conversion of relatives and said that whatever is relative, whether in the same cases or in different ones, is still said with respect to things that can be converted: this happens because every relative derives its essence from the relationship and comparison to another thing; if both are opposites according to the relative, they are called relatives that have equal force and naming. For if both the father and the son are relatives, if the father is predicated with respect to the son, because it is relative, the son, because it is relative, will also be predicated with respect to something else, but the son belongs to no one but the father. Therefore, these names take their origin from the naming of each other. Consequently, those that give substance to each other are rightly predicated of each other, and this is understood to be the case in all relatives. However, such a conversion cannot be done in one way or any way; for unless each of those things is appropriately predicated with respect to what is said, such a conversion is not converted by any reasoning. For when it is said that the head is the head of an animal, it cannot be said that the animal is the animal of the head. Therefore, the conversion thus made is not reasonable. And this is what he says, that it will not seem to be convertible in all relatives unless it is appropriately assigned to what is said. For if the one who assigns is at fault and does not make an appropriate predication, the conversion does not proceed; however, the appropriateness by which relatives can always be converted is of this kind. For when I say the wing of the bird is the wing, it is not converted so that the bird is the bird of the wing, because the predication is not made appropriately: for the wing is not in the bird being a bird; for there are many things that have wings, yet are not called birds, such as bees and bats, and whatever else is of that kind; indeed, we say they have wings, but we do not call them birds. Therefore, the wing is not in the bird being a bird, but in it being winged; for it has a wing because it is winged: and whatever is winged, will have wings. Therefore, the predication made in this way retains and preserves that conversion, for the wing is the wing of the winged thing, and the winged thing is the winged thing of the wing.
In the same way, regarding the head: if someone says the head of the animal is the head, they will not appropriately apply the force of predication; for the head is not in the animal being an animal, for there are many animals that lack a head, such as oysters, shellfish, and other things of this kind. Therefore, it must be said that the head is the head of a headed thing, and the headed thing is the headed thing of the head. Do you see how the appropriate predication has rendered the eternal conversion and reversion of the term within itself?
In the same way, we must also consider the other example that the author himself proposed. For if the oar is said to be the oar of the ship, it cannot be converted in any way so that the ship is called the ship of the oar. There are, indeed, some ships that do not use oars at all, such as boats that are propelled solely by a pole, and therefore it is not converted. Therefore, it must be said that the oar is the oar of the oar-propelled thing, and the oar-propelled thing is the oar-propelled thing of the oar. It will also be necessary to invent a name if one is not established: for just as the son is the son of the father, and the father is the father of the son, they are predicated by reciprocal conversion, and both names are in use, so if a name is lacking, you will have to invent something yourself, as in the wing is the wing of the winged thing; for the term winged is newly created and never previously mentioned. However, the method by which we can invent these names, since we have established it as necessary, we will demonstrate in the following order of composition. But this must be done if I first clear up what some, in their eagerness to criticize, bring against Aristotle. They say that it is not only in the case of relatives that conversion is said to occur. For if someone says: when the sun is above the earth, it is day, and when it is day above the earth, the sun is there, these statements also admit conversion, which, admittedly, are excluded from the definition of relatives. Therefore, they argue, this conversion does not occur only in relatives.
Iamblichus offered two solutions to this issue, one somewhat superficial and the other quite solid. He says that it does not hinder Aristotle’s opinion if other things are also convertible; for Aristotle does not say that this is only the case for relatives, but rather that all relatives possess this quality, and it cannot be denied in any way. Thus, since Aristotle did not say that this only applies to relatives, the question of those critics does not affect the great philosopher’s opinion. However, this is more of an incidental point rather than a fundamental one, and it seems to rely more on a different kind of refuge than a defense based on Aristotle’s own authority.
Iamblichus also provided another truly significant reason: he says that this property is peculiar to relatives, not in terms of their naming but in terms of a certain relationship, to be converted in the same way. For when someone says that when the sun is above the earth, it is day, and when it is day, the sun is above the earth, they are not showing any relationship but merely demonstrating a consequence. For it follows that the sun is above the earth when it is day, and when the sun traverses above the earth, it is day. But when someone says that the son is the son of the father, and the father is the father of the son, they reveal a relationship, a comparison, and in a way, the containment of both. This can also be observed in any other relation. Therefore, since all things are said to be relative to something according to a certain relationship and containment with respect to one another, their conversion must also be made according to this containment and relationship. In this matter, we too concede to the weighty authority of Iamblichus’s statement. Now, it seems appropriate to discuss the art of inventing names when they are lacking, which Aristotle himself conveys in these words:
In this way, it might be easier to create names for those which have not been established, if names are derived from those things that are primary and from those to which they are converted, as in the winged thing from the wing, and the oar-propelled thing from the oar. Therefore, everything that is said to be relative to something, if assigned appropriately, is said to be convertible.
Since there are things that are said to be relative to something in such a way that, unless they are appropriately adjusted, there is no conversion, and since it is necessary to expect conversion in all relatives, Aristotle demonstrates what this appropriateness is and how relationships should be assigned. For if something is said to be relative to something that cannot be converted, if a denomination is made from the thing that is said, it is immediately converted: for example, the wing is called the wing of the bird, and this predication is correct but inappropriate to the nature of the relationship. Now, since it cannot be said that the bird is the bird of the wing, but it can be said that the wing is the wing of the bird, if a denomination is made from the predication that is relative to another thing, the usual conversion of relatives is immediately restored. For when it is said that the wing is the wing of the bird, to say that the bird is the bird of the wing is inappropriate; but if a denomination is made from the wing, so that it is called the winged thing, then the conversion remains. For we say that the winged thing is the winged thing of the wing, just as the wing is the wing of the winged thing. The same applies to the oar. For since the oar is called the oar of the ship, and the oar’s ship can be converted in some way, if a denomination is made from the oar, the conversion immediately follows as usual. We say that the oar is the oar of the oar-propelled thing, and this is converted to the other. For the oar-propelled thing is oar-propelled by the oar. Therefore, a name must be invented from what was first said, just as from the wing, since it is not first said to the bird, because the bird is not convertible to the wing. A denomination was made, so that it would be called winged. And this is what he says, if names are placed from those things that are primary to those which they are converted. For the first predication is from the wing. We say the wing of the bird, and we seek this so that the predication can be converted to the wing. Thus, from what is first said, a name must be invented for that to which it is converted, so that what is first said as the wing, a name must be invented for the thing to which it is converted in such a way that it is appropriately adjusted, the name winged, which is itself denominated from the wing. And the same can be understood in other relatives.
For if they are assigned to any other thing and not said to that thing, they are not converted. I say that neither in those things which are confessedly said conversely and in which a name is established is anything converted if it is assigned to one of those things that are accidental and not said to that thing; as a slave, if not assigned to a master but to a human or a biped or any such thing, it is not converted (for the assignment will not be appropriate).
He also gave another argument: if relations are not appropriately rendered, they cannot be converted. Perhaps someone might say that the wing and the head are not relative to anything. But if someone concedes this, no one can deny that a slave or a son are always predicated of something else. Therefore, in this case as well, the proper conversion of the relation is lost if it is not appropriately assigned to that which it is properly said. For since a slave is relative to something, if it is not rendered as a slave of the master, that is, to that to which it is appropriately said, there is no conversion in this case. Let it be said, therefore, that a slave is a slave of a human, or a slave of a biped, but it is not converted so that someone would say that the biped is the biped of the slave, or the human is the human of the slave. The same applies to the son. Therefore, whatever is external, if what is relative to something is predicated to them, there is no conversion.
What he says about accidentals does not mean that a human is an accident or a biped, or that the difference between a human and an accidental is incidentally inherent. Instead, it is sometimes the custom of Aristotelian discourse to say that what is predicated in the second place and externally is predicated accidentally. For the slave is primarily a slave of the human and secondarily a slave of the human. It is because the master is a human that the slave is said to be a slave of the human. And because the master is bipedal, the servant is said to be related to the biped. Therefore, Aristotle spoke of these as accidental properties, wanting to show that if someone were to relate a servant to a human or a biped instead of to a master, the relationship would be extraneous and not fitting. It is clear, then, that in these cases, which involve confessed relations and which have established names, the name of the servant and the master are in use, unlike in the case of the oar or the wing, where neither the name “winged” nor “oared” existed unless Aristotle himself coined them. Therefore, it is clear that if these relations are not properly adjusted, the conversion in predication will not hold.
Furthermore, if a relation is properly attributed to that which it refers to, while all other accidental properties are excluded, leaving only that to which it is attributed, it will always be said to refer to that thing. For example, if a servant is said to be related to a master, while all other accidental properties of the master, such as being bipedal or capable of acquiring knowledge or being human, are excluded, and only the fact that he is a master remains, the servant will always be said to be related to that. For the servant is said to be the servant of the master. However, if the relation is not properly attributed to that which it refers to, with all others excluded, leaving only that to which it is attributed, it will not be said to refer to that thing. For the servant will be attributed to the human and the wing to the bird, and the fact that the human is a master will be excluded. For then the servant will no longer be said to be related to the human (for without the master, there is no servant); and likewise with the wing, if the fact that it is winged is excluded, there will no longer be a relation (for without being winged, the wing will not belong to anything). Therefore, it is necessary to attribute the relation to that which it properly refers to; and if there is an established name for it, the attribution will be easy; but if there is not, it may be necessary to coin a name. If relations are treated in this way, it is clear that all relative terms are mutually convertible.
Aristotle also added another strong argument that in every predication that is relative, the only requirement is the proper attribution of the relation. For if that attribution remains constant while all other properties disappear, the predication of relative terms holds, and if that attribution disappears while all other properties remain, the predication of relative terms does not hold. This shows that the proper attribution of a relative term is to that which it most fittingly refers. For the master is the same as the human, the biped, and the one capable of acquiring knowledge. Therefore, the servant will not be predicated of any of these things if the master is not present; and if the master is present, even if all other properties disappear, nothing prevents the predication. For the servant can be predicated of the master, and all other properties can be removed from him. For if everything that makes him human, bipedal, and capable of knowledge were to disappear, with only the aspect of being a master remaining, the servant would still be referred to in relation to the master, but not to the human. For when the title of master disappears, there is no longer any predication of a servant to a human. And if a servant is not referred to as belonging to a master, and the title of master disappears while everything else remains, there will be no predication. For if the master is removed and only the human, biped, and capable of knowledge remain, it is impossible to call someone a servant of a human or a servant of a biped. For without a master remaining, the servant ceases to exist. Therefore, as long as the master to whom the servant is appropriately related remains, and everything else disappears, predication remains. But if the master is removed, to whom the predication is appropriate, and everything else remains, there is no predication. The same applies to a wing; for unless it is referred to something winged, with everything else remaining, there is no complete predication.
As a result, not only is there no conversion, but there is also no predication unless the relation is assigned to that which is appropriately described. At the same time, this is also an art and method of knowing, as there are many things in nature to which a relation can primarily be predicated. For when there is a master, who is also a human, an animal, capable of knowledge, and biped, the same applies to a servant, and it is shown to which of these the name of master or servant can be referred. For when one thing remains and the others are removed, predication is valid, and when one thing is removed and the others remain, predication is interrupted, and the relation is most rightly predicated to that thing.
With these points established, the entire force and conclusion of the argument is that everything that is relative can be converted with equal predication. For whatever things are equally predicated of one another, and are turned back upon themselves when the conversion is made, are founded on an equal nature and dimension, like properties and species. For relatives to be converted, they must be equal. For if one thing is greater and another is lesser, they do not have conversion. For example, a wing is less than a bird, as there are many things that have wings but are not birds, and so conversion does not occur. Similarly, in the case of an oar and a ship, the ship is greater than the oar, as there are many ships without oars; therefore, there can be no conversion in these cases.
However, if they are equal, like a son and a father, conversion does not fail. For a son is never without a father, and a father is never without a son. Therefore, whatever things are predicated in relation to something else must be equal. If there is a given name for these things, it is appropriate to use the given names. But if there is no given name, it is necessary to create a name from the things in the primary predication, as previously stated. If these things are rendered so that everything is related in a fitting manner to what it is predicated, there will be an equal predication, and the reciprocal nature of conversion will immediately follow. It is therefore evident that all relatives are said to be convertible. To these, another unique feature is added.
However, it seems that there is a simultaneous nature in relation to something. This is true in many cases; for example, double and half exist together - when there is a half, there is a double, and when there is a servant, there is a master. Similarly, there are other cases like these. But these things also remove each other simultaneously; for if there is no double, there is no half, and if there is no half, there is no double. The same applies to other things that are like this.
Things are said to exist simultaneously when they are such that, with one thing being posited, the other necessarily follows, and with one thing being removed, the other is entirely destroyed. For example, father and son: when there is a father, there must also be a son; when there is a son, there is a father. Again, if the son perishes, it is evident that the father also perishes, not because the very substance perishes, as when Hector dies and Priam perishes, but the relation itself perishes. Therefore, since when the father’s name is removed, the son’s name perishes, and when the son’s name is removed, the father’s name perishes, and when the father’s name is posited and established in substance, the son’s name is also inferred, and when the son’s name is posited, it follows the father’s and is never separated from the father’s name. Therefore, father and son are said to exist simultaneously. So, things that either destroy or infer each other exist simultaneously, and he deals with these matters later.
Now, he has also explained that this is present in relatives, saying that relatives also exist simultaneously; for when there is a double, there is a half, and when there is a half, there is a double. The argument for this is that when the double is destroyed, the half perishes. Again, when the double is established, the half is also established. Therefore, since double and half are relatives, and these exist simultaneously by nature, that is, in their essence, it is also evident that this happens to relatives, so they seem to exist simultaneously by nature. The same is true for servant and master. For since, when one is destroyed, both perish, and when one is established, both subsist, it is clear that servant and master, being relatives, exist simultaneously by nature. However, this is the case only in relatives but does not apply to all things that are relative. There are some relatives in which one is naturally prior, which he adds later.
It does not seem to be true in all relatives that they exist simultaneously by nature. For example, it seems that knowledge is prior to what is knowable. For we acquire knowledge in many existing things, but in few or no cases will anyone perceive that knowledge is created simultaneously with the knowable.
He proposed that not all relatives have this property of appearing to exist simultaneously by nature. He proves this by arguing that since knowledge is relative (for the knowledge of a thing is said to be knowable), knowledge cannot exist unless there is something that can be known. This must be the first thing, as in the discipline of mathematics. For we know that a triangle has three interior angles equal to two right angles. Therefore, it is necessary that there was something knowable first, and then knowledge fitting this thing came afterward. This is what he means when he says, “For in many existing things, we acquire knowledge.” For the reason of knowledge follows established things, and they are, as it were, placed before it. Therefore, it is not the case that all relatives exist simultaneously by nature. For when knowledge and the knowable are relative, the knowable is older than knowledge. He added that in very few or no cases, one would perceive knowledge coming into existence simultaneously with the knowable. For the mind creates certain things for itself, like the chimera, the centaur, or other things of this kind, which are known when the mind has formed them. They begin to exist when they first appear in opinion. So, they are known when they have appeared in opinion, and these things have both existence and knowledge at the same time. Since they are born in opinion, they begin to exist immediately, but when they are in reason, their knowledge is captured. Therefore, as soon as they exist, they are known, and their knowledge is connected with their essence. For before the chimera was imagined, just as it had not been in any opinion, so too its knowledge did not exist. But after it was established by the imagination of the soul, its knowledge also followed with the imagination: and so he says that in a few cases, one can perceive that the knowable exists simultaneously with knowledge, as in the chimera, which is knowable and born with knowledge. But since nothing that does not persist in substance or consist in truth can be known (for knowledge is the comprehension of the truth of existing things), and whatever the mind invents or finds by imagination, since it is not established in substance and truth, it is not said to be knowable, and so there is no knowledge of those things that exist only in imagination. Therefore, he said doubtfully, “in very few or no cases.” For one will find these few things in such a way that if they strive for true reasoning and examination, they will consider none of them to exist. But if anyone says that there is some knowledge of the chimera, which does not exist, although this is false, even granting this, there will be few cases in which knowledge exists simultaneously with the knowable by nature. For knowledge is born after many things have been established and constituted. Therefore, it is not true in all relatives that they are said to exist simultaneously by nature: and just as it is false that this exists in no relatives, so it is false again that it exists in all. But he pursued this topic at greater length.
Moreover, the removal of the knowable simultaneously takes away knowledge, but knowledge does not simultaneously take away the knowable; for if there is no knowable, there is no knowledge, but if there is no knowledge, nothing prevents the knowable from existing; as in the squaring of the circle, if it is knowable, its knowledge is not yet present, but it is still knowable. We said that those things exist simultaneously, which, with one or the other being established, or one or the other being removed, both are established or destroyed simultaneously. For when it is established that there is a father, it is also established that there is a son, and the father simultaneously implies the substance of the son. In the same way, the son simultaneously implies the name of the father, for there is no son without a father. In the same way, with one removed, both must necessarily perish; but one is said to be prior to the other in many ways. What we are now investigating is of this kind. For the former are said to be those things that, when removed, take away others but when they are introduced and established, they do not simultaneously introduce other things, as in the case of one and two. For when one is removed, two also perish. For how can one be doubled in two if one perishes? But when one is established and placed, two are not yet present. For the doubling of one has not yet been made. Therefore, those things are said to be prior which, while they do not introduce others when simultaneously introduced, destroy others when removed. Therefore, the fact that the knowable and knowledge do not exist simultaneously is proven by the fact that if someone removes a knowable thing, they also remove knowledge. For no knowledge can persist if the thing that can be known perishes. But if you establish that something is knowable, knowledge does not necessarily follow. For when we were infants, the things we now know existed and persisted in their natural substance, but their knowledge was not present in us. There are also many arts that we can see exist in their natural reason, but their neglect has removed knowledge. And I greatly fear that this may very truly be said about all liberal studies. Therefore, if the removal of knowledge destroys the knowable and the introduction of the knowable does not introduce nor establish knowledge, the knowable is prior to that which can be comprehended and embraced by knowledge.
He himself provided a very obscure example for this matter. For in geometry, there is usually a proposition of this kind. We are ordered to construct an equal triangle from a given four-sided space, and we do it in this way. Let the four-sided space be a b; therefore, we must construct a triangle equal to the space a b, and let the space c d e f be double the space a b. Draw the angle c t; I say that the triangle c d f is equal to the space a b, because the space c d e f is double the space a b: therefore, half of the space c d e f is a b, for the angle f c divides the whole space c d e f in half. Things that are halves of the same thing are equal to each other; therefore, the triangle c d t and c e f are equal to the space a b. So, with the given space a b, the equal triangle c d f is constructed, as needed to be done. In the same way, it was asked if it is possible to make a square equal to a given circle. A square, then, is a figure that has all four angles equal, that is, right angles, and equal sides; and it seems that it was not discovered in the time of Aristotle. However, it was found later, and since its demonstration is long, it must be skipped. And this is what he says: LIKE THE SQUARING OF A CIRCLE; for just as, with the square remaining, a line drawn through the diagonal produces a triangular figure; so, with the circle unchanged and angles placed around it, which are directed equally to the sides of the circle itself, the form of the square arises, which we have depicted as best we could by conjecture. For when a square equal to a certain circle is established, the measure of that circle is reduced to the squaring. Now, therefore, this is what he says: LIKE THE SQUARING OF A CIRCLE, that is, the constitution of an equal square to the circle if it can be done, and if it is a thing that can be known, its knowledge has not yet been discovered. For no one had established an equal square to the circle under Aristotle. But if there is any knowledge of it which has not yet been found, certainly the knowable is prior and knowledge comes later. For although the squaring of the circle could be known while Aristotle was alive, no knowledge of it had yet been discovered, and so the knowable was prior to any knowledge of the matter itself.
Furthermore, with animals removed, there is no knowledge, but many knowables can occur.
He adds another stronger argument, that the knowable is prior to knowledge. For it is known that if a discipline perishes through neglect, knowledge indeed perishes but the knowable remains. By knowable, I mean that which can be known. But if there were no living beings at all, since there would be no one who could know, knowledge itself would utterly perish; nevertheless, nothing would prevent the existence of those things that, while living beings exist, can be embraced by the inquiring mind through the reason of knowledge.
Similarly, these things apply to what is in the senses; for the sensible seems to be prior to sense; for the removal of the sensible simultaneously takes away sense, but sense does not simultaneously take away the sensible. For senses are about the body and in the body; therefore, with the sensible removed, the body is taken away (for the sensible is also body), but when the body is not present, sense is removed; therefore, the sensible simultaneously takes away sense. But sense does not simultaneously take away the sensible; for when an animal is removed, sense is removed, but the sensible remains, such as the body, warmth, sweetness, bitterness, and all other things that are sensible.
For he proposes that these things are found in the senses. For he says that the sensible is prior to sense, which he establishes as probable by the common definition of priority. For it has been said that those things are prior which, while they destroy others when simultaneously removed, do not themselves perish when others are removed, as we say that the sun’s orb is prior to its own light. For when the orb is removed, the light that comes from it will not remain; but when the sun’s light is removed, the orb will remain. So also, he proposed that this is the case in sensibles and in sense itself; when what can be sensed is removed, sense is entirely removed. For there can be no sense when what can be sensed is not found. But if sense entirely perishes, the sensible remains; and he confirms this with evident examples. For since things that exist are either incorporeal or certainly corporeal, and whatever can be referred to the matter of the body is subject to the variety of the senses, whatever is related to incorporeal things is held by the reason and speculation of the intellect. Since all senses are in the body, if the body perishes, since there is no body at all, because incorporeal things cannot be sensed and what could be sensed has been removed, sense is entirely overturned. But if sense is removed, the sensibles remain: and since sense is effective in animals, the loss of both is equal; for whether you remove an animal, sense will perish, or if senses are overturned, animals are also removed. But with animals and their proper senses destroyed and removed, bodies that do not use a soul remain. Therefore, if with animals removed and senses destroyed, inanimate bodies persist, since bodies are things that can be sensed, and animals that can sense are removed, the remaining sensibles have overthrown the senses. Thus, as the destruction of the sensible does not destroy the senses, so the destruction of the senses is not accompanied by the extinction of the sensibles. This will also be proven by this argument: before we actually sense something, there is no sense. For before we taste something sweet, the taste of sweetness itself does not exist; but what can be tasted, that is, honey or any other thing, exists by the reason of its own nature. Therefore, Aristotle asserts that what can be sensed is prior, and sense comes after.
Furthermore, sense occurs simultaneously with the sensate (for an animal and sense come into being at the same time), but the sensible exists before there is sense (for fire, water, and other such things, from which the animal itself is made up, exist before there is an animal or sense at all); therefore, the sensible seems to be prior to sense.
In composite things and those joined from others, the components are prior to the substance they compose. For when an animal’s body is made of fire, air, water, and earth, these elements must be prior to the animal itself that they join. This is also evident in other things; for when a book is made of verses, the nature of the verses is prior to the book. And since a verse consists of words, names, and other parts of speech as called by grammarians, these components of the verse must be prior to the verse itself. Therefore, sense also comes after the composite animals. For when an animal consists of four elements, and since sense always accompanies the nature of animals, sense must be generated and born along with animals. But if sense is born with animals, that is, composite things, just as the elements composing the animal are proper to the animal, so too are the sensibles prior to the sense that is born with the animal and from which the animal’s nature is joined. The animal is, however, joined and composed of four elements. Therefore, the four elements are prior to sense, but the four elements are bodies, and every body is sensible. Thus, the sensible is prior to sense. For sense is born with the composite thing, and those that compose it are both sensible and prior to the composite itself. In general, if any two things are simultaneous, since each of the things is prior to the other, they will both be prior, as the animal and sense, since both are simultaneous and born together. Since the four elements, which are sensibles, are prior to the animal, they must also be prior to sense. Therefore, he concluded by saying: therefore, the sensible seems to be prior to sense.
However, some people, among whom Porphyry is one, argue that in all cases, it is true for relatives that they exist simultaneously in nature, such as sensibles and knowables do not precede sense and knowledge, but exist simultaneously. Since this argument is brief, I will not hesitate to present it. He says: If knowledge of anything does not exist, the thing itself, which can exist on its own, cannot be knowable. For example, if knowledge of forms were to disappear, the forms themselves might remain and exist in their prior nature, but they would not be knowable. For when the knowledge that can comprehend them does not exist, the thing itself cannot be known. For every thing is known through knowledge, which if it does not exist, cannot be known. Furthermore, a thing that cannot be known is not knowable. The same applies to the sense of taste; if taste disappears, honey may remain, but it will not be tasteable. Similarly, if all senses were to disappear, things that could be sensed might exist, but they would not be sensible due to the absence of senses. And perhaps neither knowledge nor sense should be considered according to those who experience them, but according to the very nature that can be comprehended by sense. For any thing that is sensible by nature must also have in its nature its own proper sense by which it can be sensed. And whatever can be known by nature can never be learned unless some knowledge of it exists in nature. This is what Porphyry says. But let us return to Aristotle’s order and text. For he also added other questions.
He also raises the doubt whether any substance is said to be of something, as it seems, or whether this happens only according to certain secondary substances. For in the primary substances, it is true; for neither whole nor parts are said to be of something; for some man is not said to be of some man, nor some cow of some cow. Similarly, for the parts; for some hand is not said to be of some hand but of someone’s hand, and some head is not said to be of some head but of someone’s head. The same applies to secondary substances, and this is true for most of them; for example, a man is not said to be of a man, nor a cow of a cow, nor wood of wood, but of someone’s possession. And in this case, it is clear that it is not of something. However, in some secondary substances, there is some doubt; for example, a head is said to be of a head, and a hand is said to be of a hand, and similarly for other things of this kind; therefore, these things may seem to be of something.
Against the issues discussed above, he raises this kind of knot of questions: since the first definition of relatives was that they are relatives because they are said to be of others, according to this definition, some substances may seem to be relative. If this is the case, substances would fall under the definition of accidents. For since there are relative accidents, if we admit that there are relative substances, we will consider them to be among accidents. But this is contradictory. For if a substance is not in a subject, and an accident is in a subject, how can it be that something is both in a subject and not in a subject? Whether a substance can assume the nature of accidents should be investigated in this way. For primary substances themselves are not said to be of something, nor are the parts of primary substances, which we also count among primary substances. For Socrates is not said to be of some Socrates, nor a man of some man, nor a cow of some cow, nor the parts of primary substances, which are also primary substances themselves. For a head is not said to be of some head but only of someone’s head, and a hand is not said to be of some hand but only of someone’s hand. Therefore, neither primary substances nor the parts of primary substances can be said to have a relation.
But if we also consider secondary substances, they too will not be said to be of something. For an animal is not said to be of some animal, nor a man of some man. But if someone says that an animal can be of someone, such as my horse or anything else, it is not said to be of someone insofar as it is an animal, but insofar as it is a possession, and so it is not said to be of someone’s animal but the possession of an animal, someone’s possession. Therefore, neither primary substances, nor parts of primary substances, nor secondary substances are said to be of something. However, the parts of secondary substances are said to be of something insofar as they exist. For a head is said to be of someone’s head, if indeed we call the head a head of headship, and a hand of someone’s hand. If indeed we want to create a name from the hand to which the hand can be referred, just as the head to headship, and in other things in the same way. But if the parts of secondary substances are accidents, then the secondary substances themselves will be accidents, or if this is not acceptable, the secondary substances will consist of accidental parts, which cannot happen.
What, then, should we say? Either the definition of relatives should be criticized, or the doubt should be resolved in another way. But with the first definition established, which says that those things are relative which are said to be of others because of what they are, this knot of questions cannot be solved, as Aristotle himself attests with this addition.
Therefore, if a sufficient definition of those things which are relative has been assigned, it will be either very difficult or impossible to solve, since no substance is said to be among those things which are relative. But if it is not sufficient, and there are relative things whose very existence is in some way to have a relation to something else, perhaps something will be said against this. The previous definition indeed follows all relatives, but this is not because they are of something else which is said to be of others.
Thus, with the first definition of relatives proposed and established, it will be difficult to defend, or perhaps never possible, that some substances are not relatives. For if those things are relative which are said to be of others because of what they are, like the head is said to be of headship, then the substance which is the head will have a relation to something, and thus it will be a relative substance and an accident, which is impossible. Therefore, since with the first definition established, this inconvenience follows in its arrangement, so that it is clear that the definition is not complete, the assignment must be changed. For he says that the definition given above is not complete, nor are those things more relative which are said to be of others because of what they are, than those whose very existence is in some way to have a relation to something else.
But perhaps it may seem to some careless readers and those who do not consider it deeply, that what should have been defined has been assumed in the definition, which is a grave error. For if a definition is taken so that the thing in question may be assigned, which is a clearer definition, if it uses the very thing it defines in the assignment of the definition? For a definition is given so that the thing about whose existence we are in doubt may be made clear by the definition. But if it brings forth the very thing it defines in the definition, the definition will be no clearer, as if someone wanting to define a human says that a human is that which is a human. In the same way, to those who do not consider it deeply, Aristotle seems to have given the definition of relatives. For he says that they are relative whose very existence is in some way to have a relation to something else, as if he were saying: Those things are relative which have themselves relative in some way. However, for those who examine more closely and carefully, the full force of the definition will quickly and accurately become apparent; for we do not consider something to be relative in what it is called, but in what it is to be. Indeed, those things are relative that we consider in a certain comparison and relational disposition, such as the number four, and this very thing that is called being, that is, four, and something else, that is, double, as if compared to the binary number. But what we say about the number four, refers to the nature of the number four itself. However, as for double, it does not belong to the four but to the two to which it is called double, and to which it has its proper relation as double. The binary number too is both binary and a half, binary according to its own nature, and half according to the relation to the number four. Therefore, we examine those things that are relative in a certain comparison and disposition; for the number four, in that it is four, is not called relative to something, but in that it is double, it is relative to the binary number, that is, compared to it. The binary number, in that it is two, does not refer to something else but in that it is a half, that is, compared to the number four. So, for the number four to be double, it needs not two but a half, and if the half is a binary number, it does not require the number four but the double. Do you see how things, retaining one aspect in their nature, nevertheless relate to one another in a certain comparison and disposition? And they borrow this, not from their own nature but from one another, for the double number draws from the middle, and the half from the double, and this happens to those things that are relative beyond themselves, and therefore, without anything suffering or being changed in those things that are referred to something else, they themselves become relative, for without anything being changed in the number four, it is double in relation to the binary number, and without anything being changed in the binary number, it is half when referred to the number four. Therefore, the essence of relatives, that is, their nature and substance, is to be referred to something else, that is, not only to be called referred but also to be referred. And this is what Aristotle says, that things are relative to which this very being is to have a certain relation, as if he were saying that their substance is to be referred to something else, and they are such that they themselves, in what they are, are referred to something else, and their being is to be referred to something else, but not everything that is called related and borrows its being from something else. For the earlier definition, which is broader, goes beyond the definition of relatives, as it includes those things that are not relatives as well. Just as when I say “human,” it is necessary that I mean “mortal,” but when I say “mortal,” it is not necessary that I mean “human.” Similarly, those things which derive their being from something else and have their existence in relation to another also refer to another in their naming. However, those things which are said to be related to something else are not necessarily related in their existence to something else, so that they would adopt the later definition. And this statement can be briefly summed up as follows: whatever things have taken up this definition, that their very existence is somehow related to something else, also possess that other definition, which is that relatives are whatever things are called in relation to others. But those things that have this definition do not necessarily have that other definition, so that things which are related to something else may also be called related to something else. But those things which are called related to something else are not entirely related to something else. If this later definition is accepted, which says that things are related to something else when their very existence is somehow related to something else, the earlier doubt can be resolved, as we can say what has been followed in the later discussion. As for what he says: the earlier definition indeed follows all relatives, but it is not their existence to be related to something else, which are those things that are called related to others. This means that something is not called a relative simply because it is said to exist in relation to something else. But then, a thing will rightly be contained under the name of relation whenever it is not only said to be related to something else, but also its very existence is somehow related to something else. Therefore, he adds what this definition properly entails.
From these considerations, it is clear that if anyone knows something of those things which are related to something else in a definite way, they will also know that to which it is related in a definite way. If this is evident even from the thing itself; for if someone knows that this is one of those things which are related to something else, and that the existence of relatives is to somehow have something in relation to something else, they also know that to which this somehow has something.
According to the definition mentioned earlier, it is confirmed that the characteristic of relatives is that if someone knows what is related to something else in a definite way because it is relative, they will also know in a definite way what it can be referred to. For relatives are those things whose existence is somehow related to something else, just as the number four derives its being double from the number two. If someone knows that the number four is double, they will necessarily know that the number two is half, to which the number four is made double; for there is no way that someone can know that a thing is a relative in a definite way without also knowing, in a definite way, that to which the thing is said to be related. The proof of this matter comes from the definition itself. For those things which are defined to be related to something else have their substance in such a way that they are somehow related to something else. If I know that the number four is double because it is somehow connected to the number two, no one can know that the number four is double without knowing that half is the number two. And this should be considered in all cases. For if someone does not know to what something is related among those things which are relatives, they will also be ignorant of whether it is related to something at all, which Aristotle says in these words:
For if one is completely ignorant of what something is related to in some way, they will not know if it is related to something in any way. This becomes clear in particular cases, such as if someone knows that something is definitely double, and they know to what it is double (for if they do not know definitely to what it is double, they will not know if it is double at all); similarly, if someone knows that something is better, they must necessarily know in relation to what it is better, due to the very things that have been said (but not infinitely, for if something is better than something worse, it is an opinion of this sort, not knowledge; for they will not know completely that it is better than something worse; for perhaps nothing is worse than it). Therefore, it is evident that it is necessary for anyone who knows of things that are relative in a definite way to also know definitely to what they are related.
Aristotle proceeds with examples by saying: If we know that something is double in relation to something else, we also know to what it is double; for if we do not know to what it is double, and it is double due to it having a half, we cannot know the very thing that is doubled, whether it is doubled or not. Therefore, if we definitely know that any given thing is double, it is also necessary for us to know definitely to what it is double. For example, if someone definitely knows that Anchises is the father of Aeneas, they will also acknowledge Aeneas as the son; or if they know indefinitely that he is a father, they will know indefinitely that he is a father to a son. And again, if someone knows indefinitely that Aeneas is a son, they will also know indefinitely that he is the son of a father. It is evident, then, that when things that are relative are known to be related to something in a definite way, what they are related to must also be known definitely. This is not the case with substances, as Aristotle proves by concluding this discussion.
As for the head, the hand, and each of their individual substances, it is possible to know definitely that they exist, but it is not necessary to know to what they are related; for we cannot definitely say whose head or hand this is. Therefore, these things are not among those that are relative; and if they are not among the things that are relative, it will be true that no substance is relative.
In the case of the head, he says, and the hand, and other substances, it is not true that if someone knows something is related to another in a definite way, they will therefore know definitely to what it is related. For if someone, with their head covered and all their limbs hidden, were to extend their hand outward, it is clear that the hand belongs to someone, but whose hand it is cannot be definitely stated. Likewise, with the eyes covered and the face veiled, if you were to look at anyone’s head, you would not doubt that it is someone’s head, but you would not be able to say definitely whose head it is. Therefore, since these things are such that if someone definitely knows they belong to someone, they cannot definitely know to whom they belong, they are separated from the definition of relatives, which requires that if any one thing is definitely known to be related to something, that thing to which it is related is also definitely known. However, it should be added that it is not necessary to include the thing being defined in the definition. For many things are expressed and defined in one way and understood in another, as if someone says that white is a color contrary to black, this can be understood both in terms of color and in terms of body; for white is called a color, and a body that participates in whiteness is also called white. Therefore, lest anyone think that such a white is defined in relation to the participation of whiteness and the body, it should be said: White is that which, when it is in something, is a color contrary to black. And so, we take the thing itself in its definition, which Aristotle, that is, the thing itself, which is defined in the definition, should not be taken among the probable arguments of topics. Now, however, after the discussion of relatives, the diligent teacher encourages us to a more extensive treatment of these matters, saying:
Perhaps it may be difficult to confidently declare about such things unless they have been thoroughly examined; but to doubt individual cases will not be useless.
He would never say this unless he called us back to greater exercise and consideration of acuteness. Since this is his exhortation, we too will not be reluctant to set forth doubts and solutions concerning these matters in other instances.
Book Three
Introduction
A common question at the beginning is why, after the category of relation, he undertook the discussion of quality, which is overly curious. For it would have been remarkable if he had started with quality right after the order of quantity, but since he mixed some aspects of relation with quantity, and continued the discussion on relation, it is therefore not surprising that he returned to the order of quality after the completed interposition of relation, although even from this the sequence is correct. For after great and small, immediately follows proportion and a certain comparison to something else, so that it is either greater or smaller, or equal or unequal, which are relative. After these, passions must necessarily arise, which do not differ from the nature of quality, such as white, or black, or hot or cold, or whatever is similar to these, which the predication of quality includes. The title of this topic is about the quale and the quality. The question is why it was not enough for him to have said either about the quale or about the quality, which is resolved in this way. We say quale in one way, and quality simply. For we say quale both for the quality itself and for the thing that participates in that quality, such as whiteness is a quality, but whoever participates in whiteness is called white. But we also commonly call whiteness itself quale, that is, the quality itself, and we say white as quale, namely, that which participates in the previously mentioned quality. So, we commonly call both the quality itself and the thing that participates in the quality quale, but quality is simply said. For the thing itself that can be participated in is called quality alone. The thing that participates, however, is not held by the term quality, as whiteness is indeed a quality, but white is not a quality. Therefore, what we call quale and quality differ in that the former is called in two ways, and the latter simply. As a result, although some deny that this title is Aristotle’s, and the same is confirmed by later additions, we nevertheless say that, for the sake of demonstrating a certain similarity of names, he placed both so that it seems to make no difference whether quale or quality is called the appropriate category; for quale sometimes signifies both the thing itself (as we have said) and the quality. So let the definition of quality be taken from things. But as for the term definition, which I use here and earlier in the other categories, let no one think that I wanted to signify a general definition, but rather take the name of definition to mean the description of the thing. For in those things that are the most general kinds, a definition should not be sought but rather a description of nature, for a definition of that thing which itself is a genus and has no genus cannot be found. Therefore, with these things proposed and previously established, we must begin with quality.
On Quality
Indeed, I say that quality is according to which we are called qualified.
Here it is asked why the most learned in discussion included quality in such a blameworthy term of definition. For when we want to know what quality is, the answer is: quality is according to which some are called qualified. Indeed, nothing will be more obscure and unknowable than what he says: according to which the qualified are called, than if he had spoken of quality alone. For if those are qualified who have quality, so that they may be known as qualified, quality must be known first. Moreover, it makes no difference to have said that quality is according to which some are indeed called qualified, as if he were saying that it is the quality which is quality. For in this way, wishing to define quality, he says: according to which some are qualified. Again, if someone wanted to define qualified individuals, they could say in the same way, those who retain some quality within themselves. But if what quality is, is shown through the quale, and what the quale is, is shown by the aforementioned quality, it makes no difference to say that quality is quality, than to say that quality is according to which qualified are called. But if an orderly general definition could have been placed in this most general kind, it would rightly seem blameworthy. Now, however, it is argued in vain, since he has already (as has often been said) added this term in the place of a description rather than of a definition. Therefore, if it is only a certain designation and, in a way, an outline of the thing about which the question is, and not a definition, it is an absurd accusation to blame one who proves less known things by better-known things without first examining the rationale of the description. But who would doubt that those who are qualified are better known than that very quality from which they are called qualified, so that any white thing is better known than whiteness itself? For if whiteness is a quality, and white is derived from whiteness, that is, from quality, white will be called qualified from the quality of whiteness. But if, as has been said, white is better known than whiteness, the qualified will be better known than quality, just as the grammarian is also better known than grammar. The grammarian is also called qualified, namely, from the quality of grammar. For all things that are subject to the senses are better known to us than those which are not held by the senses. Therefore, nothing prevents the one describing and, in a way, designating the nature of the thing about which the question is, from proving less known things by better-known things.
Quality, however, is of those things that are said in many ways. And one species of quality is called habit and affection. Habit differs from affection in that it is more permanent and long-lasting; such are knowledge or virtues; for knowledge seems to be of permanent things and those that are difficult to move, if someone even modestly acquires knowledge, unless perhaps a great change has been made either from sickness or from something of this kind; similarly, virtue, and justice or chastity and each of such things do not seem to be easily moved nor easily changed. Indeed, affections are said to be those which are easily moved and quickly changeable, such as heat, cooling, sickness, health, and other things of this kind; for a person is in a way affected by these, and quickly changes so that they become cold from hot and sick from healthy; similarly, also in others, unless perhaps in these too it happens that through the length of time they are translated into the nature of each and become incurable or difficult to move, which now everyone calls habit.
He proposes that quality is said in many ways, which has led some into error, as they become suspicious that Aristotle believed quality to be named equivocally. For if all equivocation is said in many ways, and quality according to Aristotle is also called in many ways, then according to Aristotle, the name of quality is equivocal. We, however, defend that being said in many ways does not mean being named with only one meaning. For something is said to be said in many ways when it is said equivocally, and when it is predicated in various ways about its species. And the multiple designation is common, even in those names which are said like genera about species, or like equivocal about subjects. For an animal is also said in many ways. For if there are many species subject to an animal, it is also denominated in some multiple way. But Aristotle referred to this multiplication not for equivocation, but rather to propose quality as a genus, as that which says, and indeed one species of quality is called habit and affection. For who, saying that habit and affection are species of quality, would doubt that he considers quality to have the force of a genus? But why he says there is one species of quality, when he has proposed two, namely habit and affection, is inquired. For if habit and affection are one and the same, the repeated proposition of the same thing is superfluous, but if they differ, why they differ must be investigated. That they do not differ in genus is prevented by the fact that he places both under quality. It remains, therefore, that they either differ in species or in number; but if they differ in species, they would not be placed as one species by Aristotle. It remains, therefore, that they differ neither in genus nor in species, but only in number. For habit is the same disposition according to species, but they disagree only in number and their own proper quality. I call disposition indiscriminately the same as affection. For just as Socrates differs from Plato in nothing according to the very species of humanity, but only by their own proper quality of person, so also disposition and habit, or rather they differ in this way; but just as Socrates himself, while he was a little child, and later an adolescent, was different from himself, in the same way also habit and disposition: for habit is a firm disposition, affection is a weak habit, as the difference between white color and white color, if in painting indeed this one remains, but that one will perish immediately, except that he who is more permanent, is in habit, but he who is easily perishable, is in affection, so there is no other difference between habit and disposition. For although habit is more permanent and disposition is easily moved, they differ only in the duration of remaining. Whence it happens that habit does not differ from disposition in genus and species. Therefore, rightly those which were separated only by number, not by species, are proposed by Aristotle under the name of one species. But their own proper difference is that habits are the most lasting dispositions. Disposition, however, is an easily moved habit. But if we seek examples of these, they can be found. Habits are like arts, disciplines, virtues. For art does not seem easily moved and remains for a very long time. For art itself contemplates that it does not perish through use and practice. For who is there that has knowingly lost the proper understanding of grammar without the intervention of a stronger passion? For it is said that a certain great orator, weakened by sickness and fevers, lost all knowledge of letters but remained sound and consistent in other matters and vigorous in everything. Discipline itself is also difficult to change. For who, knowing that a triangle has two right angles, has lost this knowledge except by the force (as was said) of a stronger passion?
Virtues should also be placed in the same category. For virtue is not easily changeable, for one who judges justly once is not just, nor is one who commits adultery once an adulterer, but when this will and thought remain. Aristotle, in his Ethics, does not consider virtues to be sciences, as Socrates does, but habits. Therefore, it is clear that habits are stably lasting and difficult to change, with this one exception, that no greater force drives and destroys them by any change. Species of affections, however, are such as warming and rubbing, and sickness and health, as a person is in a way disposed and affected by them, but not unchangeably having the quality of heat or cold, as neither being perpetually healthy nor perpetually sick. Moreover, if there are things that become unchangeably hardened in bodies due to a long period of sickness, as if they have now in some way passed into the nature of each body, such as when someone struck makes an incurable scar, a habit is made from that disposition and affection. Therefore, it is rightly said that ingrained dispositions create habits. For when any disposition becomes lasting and difficult to move, it is no longer called a disposition or affection, but rather a habit.
It is clear, however, that they want to call these habits, which are more lasting and difficult to move; for they say that in disciplines, those who retain little and are easily moved do not have a habit, although they are disposed to the discipline for better or worse. Therefore, habit differs from affection in that affection is easily moved, while habit is more lasting and difficult to move.
Habit is confirmed to be difficult to move and lasting qualities with this argument: we do not say that those to whom any science is taught retain the habit of the thing they learn if they do not learn it strongly. For example, someone learning letters who has not yet mastered the flow of speech and reads somewhat syllable by syllable and haltingly due to inexperience, we say they are indeed disposed and affected towards the knowledge of letters, but not yet retaining the habit. The same is true in other matters. For all those who are disposed to something, with which they are in some way affected, do not have a lasting reception within themselves; we consider them indeed to be disposed to that thing, but we do not say they have a habit. Therefore, habit is rightly proposed by Aristotle as more lasting and more permanent, while disposition is easily moved and less durable.
However, there are habits that are also affections, but not all affections are necessarily habits. For those who retain a habit and are in some way affected by it, for better or worse, but those who are affected do not necessarily retain a habit.
It is true that every person who has a habit also has a disposition in the same habit. But if someone has a disposition, it is not necessary for them to retain the habit as well. Habit is derived from the word “to have.” It refers to something that is unchangeable or difficult to change, such as blue eyes, a hooked nose, or knowledge and skill in some art or discipline. If someone has these, they are also said to be disposed towards them. But if someone is disposed towards something, it is not necessary for them to also have the habit, such as when someone who is negligently covered shivers from cold, they are indeed disposed towards the cold, but do not yet retain the habit of it. The same similarity seems to be present in the genus. For a genus is more widely predicated, and wherever there is a species, the name of the genus is also present. But where there is a genus, the name of the species does not necessarily follow, as if someone is a human, it is necessary for them to be an animal. If someone is an animal, they are not immediately called a human. Therefore, since whatever is a habit is also a disposition, and whatever is a disposition is not entirely a habit, habit seems to be a certain genus of disposition. However, this is more accurate where there is an intention and relaxation; it cannot be a genus of intention without relaxation. Just as in the case of white and more white, the genus of more white cannot be white itself, for white and more white are the same thing, unless perhaps they differ only by intention, in that more white grows and extends by some intention and increase, so too habit and disposition are the same thing, and they differ only by intention, in that habit is somehow more lasting, stronger and firmer than disposition; therefore, disposition is not the genus of habit, and in the same way, habit is not the species of disposition. But now there is a certain habit that has not grown through disposition, nor has it reached a perfect state through some not yet durable quality, such as the curvature of the nose or blindness of the eyes if it happens suddenly. For these began from the habit itself with no preceding disposition; for perhaps someone has never been disposed towards these things, who still does not have them. Other habits are formed by intention and the hardening of disposition, such as those that are involved in arts and disciplines. For one is first disposed towards them, and later acquires the habit. Other things come to habit not by intention but by a certain change, such as milk that solidifies and thickens from a liquid into cheese, and wine that changes from a sweet and pleasant taste to a sour taste and flavor; for it is no more wine then than it was before when it was sweet, but it has crossed over with a certain change into another quality and habit. And this is enough to say about the first species of quality.
The second type of quality, however, is insofar as we call boxers, runners, healthy or unhealthy, and simply whatever is called according to natural power or impotence. Indeed, not because they are affected in some way, each of these is called such, but because they have a natural power to either easily do something or not suffer at all; as boxers or runners are called not because they are affected but because they have the power to easily do this, and healthy things are called so because they have a natural power to not suffer anything from any accidents, while unhealthy things are called so because they have the impotence of not suffering. Similarly, hard and soft are also related; hard is said to have the power not to be cut quickly, and soft is said to have the impotence of the same.
Furthermore, he mentions the second type of quality, which comes from a certain natural power and impotence; this is like when we look at people with strong bodies who are not yet boxers and have not yet been trained in the art of boxing, but we call them potential boxers, not because they are already boxers but because they can be, and if we look at people with light bodies and small legs, we think they can move easily and be fast runners, although they have not yet aspired to compete in running and are not yet runners, but we call them potential runners, not because they are already running but because they can run. In the same way, we call people healthy or unhealthy, whom we believe to have strong bodies or weak bodies, or who are suited for health or prone to sickness. Thus, we can call some sick people healthy and some healthy people unhealthy: not because they are currently healthy or sick, but because they can be healthy for a long time or become sick. But the question is why, when the subject of the types of quality was proposed, he said the second type of quality and not species; for he says: The other type of quality is according to which we call boxers or runners, or healthy and unhealthy. But those who ask this seem to ignore that it is only a genus that does not have another genus above it. That is only a species that does not contain any species below it, but those that are between the most general genera and the most specific species can be called by the common name of genus and species. Therefore, since Aristotle is dealing with that species of quality which is not yet the most specific species but rather the first species of the genus, and this species can be both a genus and a species, there is nothing absurd in placing it in the position of both species and genus. But just as there are certain qualities, from which any such thing is named by a certain denomination, as from whiteness white, or from luxury luxurious, or whatever is of this kind, in those which are according to natural power it is not so. For the art of boxing itself is not proposed, from which we call boxers. Boxers are not called because they practice the art of boxing but because they are inclined to it according to their natural power; so those whom we call boxers are not called from boxing, nor can they be named from it, but rather they are called boxers from the art of boxing. For a boxer is one who uses the art of boxing, and this can be seen in other things as well. Therefore, in these things there is no certain quality from which the others are named. But if any such quality must be found and expressed, it is such as Aristotle himself describes as having the potential to do something or the impotence to suffer something. For example, we call people boxers and runners because they have the power to perform certain actions, such as running and boxing. We also call people healthy because they have some form of impotence to suffer; those who suffer less from external incidents are secure in their health, and those who are secure in their health can truly be called healthy. On the other hand, there is a quality that is said to have an impotence to suffer nothing, like those we call unhealthy; they have an impotence to suffer nothing because they have the potential to suffer something harmful quickly. If someone is easily affected by external incidents, they are powerful in their susceptibility to illness, and we call them unhealthy even if they are actually healthy. In the same way, we describe things as hard and soft. Hard is something that has the potential to not be easily cut, as it is difficult to divide something hard through cutting. Soft, on the other hand, has an impotence to be cut with difficulty since it is easily cut; we call it soft due to this impotence to be cut with difficulty. This is the second type of quality. Now let us move on to the third.
The third category of quality is passible qualities and passions. These include sweetness or bitterness and all related qualities, as well as heat and cold, whiteness and blackness. These are clearly qualities, as whatever takes on these qualities is called such according to them; for example, honey is called sweet because it has taken on sweetness, and a white body is called white because it has taken on whiteness. This also applies to the other qualities mentioned.
The third type of quality proposed is passible qualities and passions, which we classify as part of quality and species. These differ greatly from each other, but since both are qualities, the author first explains their similarities and then discusses the differences between them. To explain what passible qualities are, the author provides examples such as sweetness or bitterness, heat and cold, blackness and whiteness, and other related qualities. These qualities are confirmed as such by the reason given at the beginning of the discussion on the nature of quality itself. The author had previously defined quality as that by which we are called “such.” If we are called “such” according to the quality, then something is called bitter or sweet due to bitterness or sweetness, and black or white due to blackness or whiteness. Who would doubt that these are qualities in which the definition of quality applies? For things are always believed to be of the same nature if they fall within the boundaries of the same description, such as a rational mortal animal being called a human. Therefore, if these passible qualities or passions take on the definition of quality because they are called “such” when they take on these qualities, it is clear that they are indeed qualities.
Passible qualities are called such not because the things that take on these qualities suffer something; indeed, honey is not called sweet because it has suffered something, nor is any other thing of this kind. In the same way, heat and cold are called passible not because the things that take on these qualities suffer something, but because each of the aforementioned qualities is a perfecting quality of the senses, according to the passions they evoke. Sweetness, for example, creates a certain sensation in taste, and heat creates a sensation in touch; similarly for other qualities.
The author had provided examples of passible qualities such as sweetness or bitterness, cold and heat, whiteness and blackness, which are passible qualities but not in the same way. The reasons why all these qualities are called passible differ greatly. Sweetness or bitterness, heat and cold are called passible qualities not because sweet or bitter things suffer something from outside but because they acquire their rough or bitter taste from a certain sensation. Honey, for example, has not suffered something for sweetness to be in its nature, nor has wormwood been infected with the horror of bitterness by any external sensation. Therefore, these and similar qualities are called passible not because they themselves have suffered something, but because they give rise to certain sensations in the senses. From sweet honey, a certain sweetness is left in the taste, and heat and cold also create some sensation in the senses. We experience sweetness when we taste something sweet and, at the same time, according to the quality of heat and cold, we undergo the sensation of such senses. Therefore, heat and cold, bitterness and sweetness are called passible qualities because they create some sensation in us according to the quality of the senses, not because they themselves suffer something from outside.
However, whiteness and blackness, and other colors, are not called passible qualities in the same way as the aforementioned qualities, but because they themselves are born from certain sensations.
Since passible qualities are also said to include colors, that is, whiteness and blackness, they are not called passible qualities in the same way as bitterness and sweetness, heat and cold. The author now explains the possible differences between them. Bitterness and sweetness were called passible qualities not because they themselves suffer something from outside but because they create sensations, while whiteness and blackness are the opposite. They are not called passible qualities because they bring sensations to the senses, but because they are born from certain other sensations. Aristotle seems to have considered this in a way when he proposed the following:
Therefore, since many color changes occur due to some sensation, it is clear; for when someone blushes, they become red, and when they are afraid, they become pale, and each such occurrence.
This, however, is transferred from the sensations of a short duration to passible qualities and those that last a very long time, with the sharpest consideration, for a likelihood of reason is made in this way. It is shown that the qualities of colors are born from sensations, because when there is a feeling of shame, a blush arises, and when fear is considered a sensation, it causes the face and mouth of the frightened person to become pale. Therefore, since these colors seem to be born from a certain sensation, it is probable that the same reasoning applies to natural color. For when the blood rushes to the face due to shame, trying to cover the wrongdoing, a blush is formed from the blood’s progression and its outward flow. If this happens due to an unnatural sensation, the face is naturally flushed with red. However, paleness occurs when blood from the face retreats to the inner regions of the heart. If this also occurs due to a natural sensation, it is likely that the same warmth infects the person.
Therefore, whether someone naturally suffers from any of these sensations, they must have a similar color; for the sensation that now occurs in relation to shame around the body, and according to the natural constitution, the same sensation occurs, so a similar color naturally occurs.
For whether someone not yet born suffers something that causes blood to leave their face, or in any other way blood migrates from the infant’s face to the inner parts, the face is infected with a natural paleness. These non-natural sensations and dispositions, such as when these colors infect the face or the whole body, if they happen naturally to them, the face will be marked with the same, similar colors. Now, when the heat on the surface of the face has cooked the blood, the blackness of the burnt blood returns the color red. If the same thing happens to the face of an unborn child due to some sensation, it is likely that the same affection of color will infect the receiving body. Therefore, colors are called passible qualities not because they themselves suffer something but because they come from certain sensations in anyone’s body and face.
So, whatever of these cases has taken its beginning from certain sensations that are difficult to move and permanent, they are called qualities; for whether pallor or blackness has occurred according to the natural substance, it is called a quality (for we are called such according to them), or due to long sickness or heat, blackness or paleness occurs and does not easily pass away and remains in life, they are also called qualities (for we are called such according to them as well).
The author gives a certain sign by which we can recognize which of all the aforementioned qualities should be called qualities. For if these qualities have occurred either by chance or by nature, and their exit is slow and change is difficult, they are called qualities. If someone becomes pale either through illness or by nature, and the paleness remains in their body, then it is called a quality. This is found not only in bodily defects but also in the affections of the soul. If someone, either by nature or by any other subsequent chance, takes pleasure in constant feasting, and this somehow remains in the dissolution of the mind and is difficult to remove from it, a passible quality has been created, because we are called such according to those to whom it has come. The person is called black in whom blackness has remained; a feaster, to whom the perpetual pleasure of feasting is. Therefore, the sign in passible qualities is that they are immobile and permanent. But as for those which are easily changed and are of a temporary state, this seems to be Aristotle’s opinion on them.
However, those which are easily dissolved and quickly pass away are called sensations; for we are not called such according to them; nor is the one who has become red due to shame called red, nor the one who has become pale due to fear called pale, but rather because they have suffered something; therefore, they are called sensations of this kind, but not qualities at all. Similarly, passible qualities and sensations are also called according to the soul. For whatever is caused by certain sensations immediately upon birth, they are called qualities, such as madness or anger or others of this kind; for we are called such according to them, that is, angry and mad. Similarly, whatever alienations have been made not naturally but by other chance occurrences, difficult to pass away and completely immobile, they are also of this kind of qualities; for we are called such according to them. Whatever is caused by those which pass away more quickly, they are called sensations, as if someone saddened becomes angrier; for the one who is angrier in such a sensation is not called angry but rather something suffered; therefore, these sensations are indeed called sensations, but not qualities at all.
What the author would judge about these affections, which cling to the soul or body for a present moment, he has made clear in no obscure speech. For while he first pronounced those to be passible qualities which are generated from certain sensations and yet immutably remain in their subjects, now he calls those affections which are in their subjects in such a way that they quickly pass away, not qualities but sensations. If someone is reddened due to shame, since the redness does not remain, they are not called red; if they were to be discerned as red, that redness itself would be a passible quality since it would remain for a very long time in the subject’s body. But now, since in no way is someone called red who has become red due to shame, and qualities are those according to which we are called such, the redness of shame is not a quality but a certain sensation; for if it were a quality, they would be called red from that redness, that is, such, but this is not the case. Therefore, these affections, which do not last for a long time, are not called qualities but rather sensations. For someone is said to have suffered something who becomes red due to shame. The same reasoning also applies to the passions of the soul. For if someone is angry for a moment, it does not mean that someone can rightfully call them irritable, but if such a disposition constantly clings to anyone’s soul. For if someone is injured by nature or illness in their body, so that they either have constant madness or incur immovable anger, they are called mad or irritable. And whatever alienations (as he says) have been permanent either according to nature or by chance, they are counted as passible qualities because we are called such according to them. However, those which (as has been said) do not remain but easily pass away, we call them not qualities but only sensations. But since he has enumerated three species of quality, one according to which habits and dispositions would be called, another according to which the natural power or impotence to do or suffer something would shape the natures of the subjects, a third according to which passible qualities would be called, and he divided this with such a double distinction, so that on one hand, he would say that they are passible qualities because they generate some sensations, and on the other hand, because they are born from some sensations themselves. One might ask how these passible qualities differ from the first category of qualities, which is related to habit and disposition. For instance, if someone experiences heat and cold, they indeed possess a passible quality, but it still pertains to their disposition and affection; for they are disposed towards the same heat and cold they have experienced and acquired. Aristotle himself, recognizing this, included heat and cold in both categories, calling them both dispositions and passible qualities.
The answer to this question is that there is nothing preventing the same thing from being assigned to two different categories of its species, depending on different causes. Just as Socrates, in being a father, is related to something, and in being a man, is a substance, so heat and cold are counted as dispositions insofar as one appears to be disposed according to them, and they are called passible qualities insofar as they arise from certain passions. Passible qualities, however, differ from habits in that habits are mostly acquired through arts and sciences, and are thus perfected in a certain order and sequence, while passible qualities are not.
How these passible qualities differ from the second category of qualities, which is related to natural power or impotence, is a fairly straightforward distinction. We say that something is called a quality according to the natural power category, not according to the present act, but according to what it can be; however, heat and cold, sweetness or bitterness, are considered according to what they are now, not according to what they could be. Therefore, this third category of qualities differs from the second in that the second category is about possibility, while the third is about the actual act.
As for what we previously called passions interchangeably with affections, this is a separate question. For we will find that passions seem to differ from affections. If certain bodies are heated to the point that they can emit heat themselves, they are said to be affected by heat. However, if they only momentarily receive heat, we call them passions and distinguish them from affections. Passions can be amplified into affections, and amplified affections can become habits. This should suffice regarding the third category of qualities.
The fourth category of quality is form and the constant shape of something. Rightness or curvature, and anything similar to these, also belong to this category, for according to each of these, something is said to be of a certain quality. For instance, something that is triangular or square is said to have a certain quality, as well as something that is straight or curved. And according to their shape, each thing is said to have a certain quality.
The fourth category of quality is discerned according to each form and shape. A shape, like a triangle or square, is a certain quality of the form itself, while the form of a triangle or square is a quality. This is why we also call people “handsome.” A shape that is more beautiful, mediocre, or arranged in some other way is called a quality and form. No one doubts that these are qualities, as a shaped object is called “shaped” and a beautiful object is called “beautiful.” Furthermore, a triangle is named after its triangular shape, and a square after its square shape. If these are qualities by which something is called a certain way, there is no doubt that form and shape are qualities, since everything that participates in these is named as having certain qualities. But since both the triangle and the surface are listed in the species of continuous quantity, the surface itself is indeed a quantity, but the composition of the surface is a quality, for it is a shape (as geometers define) which is contained under one or more limits. Under one limit, for example, is a circle, and under several limits are triangles and squares. Therefore, the space itself, which is contained by the aforementioned lines, is called a surface, which is a quantity. The surface, because it consists of a certain extension and space, is a quantity, but the composition of the surface is a quality. For when three lines are joined together at their ends, they enclose a space with three angles contained by three lines; this very space which they enclose can be referred to as a quantity, but what is enclosed by the three lines is a quality, for the shape is triangular. The same can also be said about a line: since it is a length or width, it is called a quantity, but whether it is straight or curved, it is referred to as a quality.
Indeed, dense and sparse, rough and smooth may seem to signify a quality, but they appear to be unrelated to the division of qualities. Both, in a way, seem to demonstrate a certain arrangement of parts: dense because its parts are close to each other, sparse because they are distant from each other; smooth because its parts lie in a straight line, and rough when one part is higher than the other. Perhaps other modes of quality may also appear, but these are the most commonly mentioned.
These, therefore, are the qualities that have been mentioned, and the qualitative things that are denominated according to these or in any way from them.
There are some things that seem to be qualities because some denominative terms come from them, such as smooth because it is called smoothness, and rough because it is called roughness. Dense and sparse are also named from density and sparsity; therefore, these too seem to be able to be counted among qualities. However, for those who examine the matter with sound reasoning, not only by what is said but also by the mind and spirit, it is clear that these should not be placed in the category of qualities. For what we call sparse is a certain arrangement of parts, not a quality. Since the parts are so separated and distant from each other that a foreign body can be admitted between them, it is called sparse, as in the case of sponges and pumice stones, because a twig or something else can be inserted into their cavities, so that it is between the gaps of the parts; therefore, it is called sparse. Dense, on the other hand, is when the parts are so close and tight to each other that no other body can penetrate between them, and therefore it is called dense, as in the case of iron or diamond.
So, a certain arrangement of parts is inherent in these, not a quality, nor does smoothness differ from this. For since the parts are so arranged that neither is higher nor lower but joined with equal extremities, a certain smoothness exists, as when a hand is drawn over a surface and senses smoothness due to the equality of the joined parts, as in the case of silver. Roughness, on the other hand, is the uneven arrangement of parts, with some parts protruding and others being lower, as in the case of a file whose parts protrude and are depressed. Therefore, according
Moreover, roughness is an unequal position of parts, with some parts being prominent and others depressed, like a file whose parts are alternately prominent and depressed. Therefore, according to the position of each part, whether it be rarity, density, roughness, or smoothness, these qualities exist in bodies. Consequently, these qualities are not determined by their quality but rather by their position. Position, however, has been named as a type of relation. Therefore, these are not qualities but rather relative properties, and Aristotle concludes his enumeration of the species of quality here.
Nevertheless, one should not think that the qualities mentioned above are the only ones. Aristotle himself testifies that there are also other qualities which he did not list for various reasons. Firstly, this book serves as an introduction to the subject and does not provide complete knowledge; it merely opens the door and provides a bridge for entering deeper into the world of philosophy. Thus, it was necessary to only mention as much as would be useful for beginners without overwhelming them with complex doctrine and subtlety. The missing qualities can be found in the books titled “Meta ta physika.” The knowledge in those books is prepared for more advanced learners. Another reason for this omission is to encourage us to explore other qualities, not only those discovered by prior scholars but also our own discoveries.
Therefore, he concludes that the qualities he mentioned are the main ones, and things are said to be qualia according to these qualities. However, since he added that these can be derived from any mode, the meaning of this proposition will be explained using the previously mentioned words of Aristotle.
In most cases, and almost in all, they are said to be denominatively, as from whiteness comes “white” and from grammar “grammarian,” and from justice “just,” likewise in other cases. However, in some cases, it is impossible to be said denominatively from these qualities because the names are not given to the qualities, such as a runner or a fighter when referred to according to their natural potential; they are not said to be denominatively from any quality since no name is given to those powers. Just as in disciplines where fighters or wrestlers are said to be according to their disposition (for there is a fighting discipline and a wrestling discipline, and those who are inclined to them are said to be denominatively so).
Sometimes, even when there is a given name, it is not said denominatively according to that quality, such as “upright” from virtue; for someone with virtue is called “upright,” but not denominatively from virtue. However, this does not occur in many cases. Therefore, qualia are said to be whatever is derived denominatively from these qualities or in any other way from them.
Aristotle states that there are many qualities by which other things are said to be denominatively, as exemplified by the most obvious examples he provided. For example, when the name of a quality is “whiteness,” from it comes the word “white.” In the same way, grammar is the name of a thing, and from it come those who are called grammarians. This is true in many cases, where a name is given, and something is said to be qualia according to these qualities, and the name is derived from these qualities. However, there are other qualities that, although they do not have a specific name, are still considered qualities. These qualities are said to participate in another quality, but they are not defined by that quality. Instead, they could be identified by a name if it were assigned to them, such as the quality described as natural potential. For those who are named according to this potential, even though they are considered to have qualities, they are not called by a specific name. For example, those who are called boxers because of their boxing art are called boxers because they are somehow affected by the same boxing art. These boxers are thus characterized by the boxing art. However, those who are not yet boxers but have the potential to be are not called boxers according to the art itself, but rather according to the potential of the boxing art; they are called potential boxers. But there is no specific name assigned to this potential.
Just as runners are called runners from running, wrestlers from wrestling, and boxers from boxing, with distinct quality names, it is not the same for the natural potential of each thing. The natural potential of running, according to which we call runners, and the potential to box or wrestle, is not distinguished by its own name. Why is someone called a runner if we ask about someone who is not yet a runner? We say it is according to their natural potential. Why a wrestler? We respond in the same way: natural potential. Therefore, a potential boxer who is not yet boxing is named according to the same natural potential. If this natural potential had its own name, it would be called with distinct names, just as in those qualities where a specific name is assigned, such as running, wrestling, and the art of boxing.
In some cases, however, because names have not been assigned to certain qualities, it is impossible for something to be called denominationally from them. For example, to demonstrate that a runner who is already running is called a runner from running, but a runner who is said to have the potential to run is not called a runner from running but only from potential, which does not have a specific name assigned to it. Therefore, all things that are said according to natural potential are not denominated from any quality. This is because the qualities from which they can be denominated lack specific names. However, those that are not said according to potential but rather according to some kind of affection are called denominationally from the qualities to which they somehow relate. Aristotle presented this by saying that it is not the same according to natural potential as it is in disciplines according to which potential boxers or wrestlers are called according to affection. The boxing discipline is called boxing, and wrestling is called wrestling, but those who are denominated from these and are connected to them are also called accordingly. He thus taught that all things that were thought to be called from certain qualities were not truly predicated from qualities, as in those qualities where there is no specific name. He also showed that this occurs in many cases, where denominative qualities are called from proposed qualities.
It remains, therefore, to discuss certain qualities which, while having a specific name, are not denominationally said of those things that participate in them, such as virtue. For virtue is indeed a quality (it is a certain habit, and every habit is a quality). Therefore, whoever participates in virtue is not said denominationally according to it. In denomination, it is necessary that the name always remains the same. However, for those who participate in virtue, there is no denomination of virtue, as those who participate in goodness are called good, those who participate in justice are called just, and so on. But those who participate in virtue are called either honest or wise; however, neither honest nor wise are denominationally derived from virtue, because each name is quite different from virtue. Aristotle himself states: “Sometimes, when a name is assigned, what is said to be a certain quality according to it is not said denominationally.” He did not omit to give an example of this, but it cannot be found in many cases, for there are few (as he himself says) in which, with a quality’s name assigned, those who participate in them are not called qualities according to the superior quality.
He assigns a plurality to these qualities from which the qualities are named for those who participate in them. For (as he himself said earlier) in most cases and almost all, they are called denominationally. Therefore, the definition is correct and properly ordered. At the beginning, it was only said that there is a quality according to which things are called qualities. But since there are some whose qualities themselves lack specific names, and those who participate in them are called by their own names, such as in natural potential. And again, there are some that have specific names in qualities, but for those who would be affected by these qualities, no denomination would be made from the proposed qualities. He added that all qualities are either called denominationally from the qualities that participate in them or in any other way, that is, whether the name of the quality is not said about those who participate in it, as in the case of virtue, or whether the name is not assigned to the quality itself, as in the case of natural potential. Therefore, since in these two cases of qualities, in which either the name is assigned but not according to the name things are called denominationally, or the name is not assigned to the qualities themselves, neither of their predications is made denominationally. To conclude the entire range of qualities, he says that qualities are either called denominationally from the qualities or in any other way, so as not to be denominative but sometimes according to potential, and sometimes according to the same quality of virtue; for the same quality is that of virtue and wisdom. Therefore, he concludes that qualities are said in any way that they would be called denominationally from these qualities or in any other way from them.
Having first arranged all the qualities in order and found their conclusion, the usual order is followed to investigate each property.
Contrariety also exists according to quality, as justice is contrary to injustice, whiteness is contrary to blackness, and so on; and according to those qualities that are said, as just is contrary to unjust, and white is contrary to black. However, this is not the case in all instances; for example, with red, pale, and similar colors, there is no contrary, even though they are qualities.
He says that in qualities some things are contrary, and he proves this with examples. For instance, whiteness and blackness are contrary, as well as anything that participates in whiteness or blackness; this is what he means when he says, “and according to those qualities which are said”; just as whiteness is contrary to blackness, so too is white contrary to black. However, this is not a property exclusive to qualities, for red and pale are also qualities, as are other colors of this kind, but they have no contrary; no one claims that something is contrary to red or pale. Since white and black are certain extremes of colors and are very distant from each other, they are contrary, but the middle colors do not have contraries. If someone claims that red is contrary to black, and contraries are at the greatest distance from each other, then blackness will be very far from redness, and again, whiteness is very far from blackness; thus, both redness and whiteness are contrary to blackness, and two contraries are found for the same thing, which cannot happen. Therefore, redness is not contrary to blackness. In the same way, we will show that the middle colors also do not have contraries. Therefore, if colors like these have no contraries, not every quality will have contrariety; if this is the case, receiving contraries is not a property of qualities. Furthermore, contrariety is not even found in forms that are clearly qualities; for neither is a circle contrary to a square, nor a square to a triangle, nor can any figure be contrary to any other figure. Therefore, it is clear that receiving a contrary is not a property of qualities.
However, since there are some things in quality that seem to be contrary to themselves, such as justice and injustice, a certain question usually arises. Some people say that injustice is not contrary to justice, for they think that what is called injustice is a privation of justice, not a contrariety. Contraries are named by their own names, not by the privation of the contrary, such as white and black, yet justice does have some contrariety, the proper name of which has not yet been found, which is entirely false. Many relationships are expressed by the term privation, such as illiberality and imprudence, which would never be opposed to virtues, which are habits, unless they themselves were also habits and remained unchangeably in the souls of those who possess them. But it is also not true that all privations are expressed by negation. For deafness, which is a privation of hearing, is expressed without negation; likewise, blindness. No one says inaudition or invisibility, nor anything like this, but only deafness and blindness are called by their proper names, although the former are habits of sight and hearing, and the latter are to be placed in privation. Therefore, justice is contrary to injustice. He thus provides a rule that things which are contrary should be suitably placed under the same category, and he prescribes this rule with these words:
Furthermore, if one of the contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This is clear to anyone who considers all the other categories, for if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality; for no other category applies to injustice, neither quantity nor relation nor place nor anything else of this kind, except quality alone; similarly, also in other contraries according to quality.
He says that if it is clear that one of two contraries is placed under the category of quality, it will also be clear that its contrary should also be suitably placed under the category of quality, and at the same time, he demonstrates that injustice is a quality. For if justice is clearly a quality because it is neither a quality, nor a relation, nor a place, nor a time, nor any other category, and it cannot be placed under any other category except quality alone, and if injustice is contrary to it, there is no doubt that injustice should also be connected to the category of quality. Since he has explained this more clearly, using examples to illuminate it, we must move on to another topic.
Qualities accept more and less; for white is said to be more or less than another, and justice is said to be more in one than another. And the same thing itself takes on intensity (for when something is white, it can become whiter); however, this is not the case in all things but in many; for someone may doubt whether justice is said to be more just; similarly, in other affections. However, some people doubt this; they say that justice is not said to be more or less than justice, nor is health more or less than health; but they say that one has less health than another and that one has less justice than another, and the same goes for grammar and other disciplines. But according to the qualities that are called, they undoubtedly accept more and less; for one is said to be more grammatical than another, and more just and healthier, and in other things similarly.
He also presented another characteristic, which, when considered, excluded it from the complete property of quality. He says that qualities can either be intensified or diminished. For he says that one thing can be called more white than another, such as snow compared to silver, and those marbles that are even whiter, and we say that one thing is more or less just than another. For something can be done more justly, and there can also be the most just action. In cases where comparisons exist, it is clear that more and less can be said; in this way, not only does white itself or another quality grow in intensity when compared to another of the same species and decrease in relaxation, but it also receives comparison from itself: For it is said that silver is now whiter than it was before when it has been cleaned. However, since this is the case, receiving more and less is not a property of quality; for not only does quality receive more and less, but this intention and relaxation is also found in those things that are related, such as in that which is equal and unequal, we can say more equal or less equal, and in other things of this kind; nor do all qualities receive more and less, which he presents like this: However, this is not the case in all things, but in many. For someone may doubt whether justice is said to be more just, and similarly, in other affections.
Indeed, some people doubt this: they say that justice is not said to be more or less than justice itself, nor is health said to be more or less than health itself; but they say that one has less health than another, and that one has less justice than another. In this, there were three opinions. Some, in fact, said that more and less could be found in all things according to the relationship of the matter. For it is proper for matter and bodies to grow in intention and decrease in relaxation, which was the opinion of some Platonists. On the other hand, they said that more and less should not be spoken of in terms of the most certain and true arts and virtues, but that they could be spoken of in terms of the intermediate ones, such as grammar and justice themselves, which are not said to be more grammatical or more just. However, there are some other intermediate arts in which this could happen. The third is what Aristotle talks about: he thinks that the habits themselves do not grow through any intention nor decrease through any diminution, but that those who participate in them can come under the examination of composition so that more or less is said of them. For health itself and justice, one is not more or less than the other. For no one says that one health is more than another health. But we can only say that someone has more health, that is, is healthier, and more healthy, and less healthy. Therefore, we say that the qualities themselves do not receive more and less. However, those who are called such according to these qualities fall under comparison, such as more just, healthier, and more grammatical. For grammar itself, that is, literature, does not receive more and less, for no one says that one is more grammatical than another, but the one who participates in grammar itself. We say “literate,” which we denominate from literature, and the literate person receives more and less, such as Donatus, the grammarian, who was more advanced in age as a grammarian, that is, a literate person, than when he first came to this kind of study. But although these things are so, we still find some qualities in which comparison undoubtedly cannot be found, such as those he mentioned.
However, a triangle and a square do not seem to receive more, nor do any other shapes.
For these things, which are said to be from the fourth type of quality, receive more or less in no way, for no one says that one circle is more than another, nor that one triangle is more than another, and perhaps they say “larger,” but they do not say “more.” The reason for this is that when there is a definition of a triangle, a figure that is contained under three straight lines, if there are any that accept this definition in themselves, so that they too are contained under three straight lines, they are properly triangular forms. In the same way, a circle is defined like this: A circle is a flat figure that is contained under one line, to which from one point that is within it, all the lines that are drawn from it are equal to each other. Again, the definition of a square is as follows: A square is that which is contained by four equal lines and four right angles. Therefore, whatever things accept the definition of either a circle or a square are equally either circular or square forms; but if they do not accept it, they are in no way such. If, however, there are things that accept neither the definition of a square nor that of a circle, they are neither squares nor circles, like a figure that is said to be longer on one side. For it is defined as follows: A longer-on-one-side figure is one that is contained under four lines and right angles, but the four lines are not equal to each other, while the opposite pairs are equal to each other. Therefore, since a figure of this kind accepts neither the definition of a circle nor that of a square equally, it is neither a circle nor a square. For if any forms accept the definition of any kind, they are entirely the same. As a circle is a circle, a square is a square, a triangle is a triangle, a longer-on-one-side figure is longer on one side, and so on in other cases. But if they do not accept it, like a triangle, which does not accept the definition of a circle and is not a circle at all, nor can it be said to be between a square and a triangle, because neither of them accepts the definition of a circle, a square is indeed more a circle than a triangle, but the triangle is less; for both are entirely separated from the nature of a circle, which is treated by Aristotle in these words:
For whatever things accept the definition of a triangle and a circle, all are similarly triangles or circles; but of those things that do not accept it, nothing is said to be more one than the other; for nothing is a square more than a longer-on-one-side figure a circle; for neither of them accepts the nature of a circle. However, simply, if neither accepts the nature of the proposed thing, one is not said to be more than the other. Therefore, not all qualities receive more and less. From these things that have been said, nothing is a property of quality.
For if a definition does this, that it demonstrates the nature of each substance, whatever things differ in definition, they will also differ in the very nature of the substance. Rightly then, if any things do not accept the definition of any proposed thing, whether a triangle or a square, they are separated from the nature of the same. Therefore, neither a triangle nor a square nor a circle nor anything of these things receives more and less. But since these are qualities, not all qualities equally receive more or less. But if neither in every quality does intention and diminution occur, nor in any single one, and if you find the same thing in relation, it is not a property of quality to receive more or less. What then should be said to be the proper property of quality, he himself very clearly suggests:
Similar and dissimilar are said according to qualities alone; for one thing is not similar to another according to anything else except according to that which is a quality. Therefore, it will be proper for quality to be called similar and dissimilar according to it.
Similar, he says, and dissimilar are retained by qualities alone. For although something may be similar to another thing, yet we do not say “similar” except for that which is a quality. For if the same quality is in two things, those in which it is present are similar, and there is no other category according to which similar and dissimilar can be said, and it is known about all other things because it is not said about any of them. But if someone affirms that similar and dissimilar can be said according to quantity, it has been shown that not similar and dissimilar, but equal and unequal are predicated according to quantity. Therefore, since by going through each thing and in all things, the same is found in qualities, and in no other category is it seen, he rightly established this as a proper property of quality. But since when dealing with things that are related to something, he counted affections and habits among those that are related to something, now he also assigns them to quality, he himself raises a question for himself: why, if he previously placed these things under those that are related to something, he now places the very same things under qualities. For he previously showed that things which are different from each other cannot have the same species, when he says that different genera and those not placed subalternatively have different species and differences. Therefore, since relation and quality are different genera, it is not appropriate for the same species to be assigned to both; for this is what he says:
But indeed, it is not becoming to be confused lest someone say that we, making a proposition about quality, have inserted many things about relatives; for we have said that habits and affections are of those things that are related to something. For almost all those things which are in all these genera are said to be related to something, but of those things which are individually, nothing; for knowledge, which is a genus, is said to be of another (for it is called someone’s knowledge), but of individual things, nothing is said to be of another, such as grammar is not called someone’s grammar, nor music someone’s music, but if perhaps according to their own genus, they are also called someone’s; as grammar is called someone’s knowledge, not someone’s grammar, and music someone’s knowledge, not someone’s music; therefore, individual things are not relative.
He resolves this question with a very strong argument, namely with these words: For almost all those things which are in all these genera are said to be related to something. But of those things which are individually, that is, species, none of them are of this kind. For this is the argument which the Greeks call epicheirema. In such affections and habits, which are among these genera, only those can be reduced to something related, but the species of those genera can be counted not among relatives but among qualities, as knowledge, which is a habit, has under it other habits, such as grammar and geometry. In this, therefore, knowledge itself, which is a genus, is always related to something; for we say that it is someone’s knowledge. But grammar, which is its species, nobody says that it is someone’s grammar; for it is said, if it can be done, that grammar is Aristarchus’s grammar. But all those things that are said to be related to something are convertible. Therefore, it is also said that Aristarchus is Aristarchus of grammar, which cannot be done. Therefore, grammar is not Aristarchus’s, as it is said to be related to something. There is also the argument that not species but such genera are called related to something, as when the species themselves are not said to be related to something, as grammar is not called someone’s grammar; if ever it is that a species is referred to something, it is not according to itself but according to its genus, as grammar, since it is a genus of knowledge which is relative, if someone contends to refer grammar to something, he cannot predicate it to be related to something according to grammar itself, but according to knowledge, that is, according to its genus. For it is not said that grammar is someone’s grammar but perhaps grammar is someone’s knowledge. Therefore, grammar is not said to be related to something according to grammar but according to knowledge. And this is what he says, as grammar is not called someone’s grammar, nor music, but perhaps according to their own genus, they are called someone’s, as grammar is called someone’s knowledge, not someone’s grammar. Therefore, there is nothing of individual species that is predicated with any relation. But the genera of these species are relatives, which I said a little earlier; for when he says: For almost in all qualities, genera are said to be related to something, but not something of those which are individual, he wanted to demonstrate this, that the genera themselves of habits and dispositions are relatives, but the species of the genera, which he said were individually, are in no way predicated as related to something. Therefore, he called them individually because grammar is one, and again music is one; but knowledge is not one. Therefore, he rightly called the species of knowledge individually. It is therefore clear that such genera are said to express habits related to something, but the species are referred to nothing else by proper predication. Therefore, since he demonstrated that such species are not relatives, now what remains is that he confirms they are qualities.
We are said to be qualified according to individual things; for we have these and we are called knowing because we have individual knowledges. Therefore, these will also be qualities, which are individual, according to which we are called qualified; but these are not of those things that are related to something.
It has been confirmed above that these are qualities from which someone is called qualified; however, we are called grammarians not because we have universal knowledge but because we have grammar itself, and this is rightly said. Therefore, we are called knowledgeable because we are grammarians, rather than being called grammarians because we retain some knowledge. For no one is called a grammarian or knowledgeable from general knowledge, but rather one is considered knowledgeable and a grammarian from individual knowledge. Therefore, since we are called qualified from these habit species, the species themselves must be counted in quality. But when someone participates in grammar, he is also said to be of its genus, and according to it, he is not only connected to grammar but also to knowledge. For he is called knowledgeable for that reason. Therefore, since having grammar, being knowledgeable, and being a grammarian are said, one cannot participate in any knowledge who has not had individual ones. For he who lacks all species must also lack the genus itself. Therefore, since we have these species and are called qualified according to them, we are called knowledgeable and grammarians from grammar, and it has been shown that these very species are not referred to something related. Therefore, it is right that such habits, which are species in another’s relatives, are counted in quality. But if someone also reluctantly accepts this, he adds another thing by which the whole bond of the question will be solved; for he says:
Furthermore, if it happens that the same thing is both qualified and relative, there is nothing inconvenient in counting it among both these genera.
For although it is true that one and the same thing cannot be assumed to belong to two different genera, it is nevertheless fitting that according to one thing and another, one and the same species can be connected to two genera, as in what has already been said above: since Socrates is a substance, and father is related to something, and since substance and relation are distinct, there is nothing inconvenient in the same Socrates being attributed to substance insofar as he is a man, and to relation insofar as he has a son. Therefore, if according to one thing and another, the same thing, whatever it is, is attributed to two very different genera, nothing inconvenient arises. In the same way, habits are placed in relation insofar as they are habits of something, and they are counted in quality insofar as something is said to be qualified according to them. Therefore, there is nothing inconvenient in attributing one and the same thing, according to different natures, to its powers, to both genera and, if it happens, to several genera. Therefore, since quality has been treated, let us also turn the course of our speech to the remaining categories.
On Action and Passion
Action and passion also admit of contrariety and of more and less; for to heat and to cool are contrary, and to be heated and to be cooled, and to be delighted and to be saddened; therefore, action and passion admit of contrariety. And they also admit of more and less; for there is to heat and to cool more and less, and to be heated and to be cooled more and less, and to be saddened. Therefore, action and passion admit of more and less. And these things have been said about them.
After discussing the four categories that seemed to require some question and consideration, he briefly touches upon the rest. And concerning action and passion, nothing in this book has been debated by Aristotle except that they admit contraries, and that they have the intention and diminution, while in his other works, these subjects have been fully and perfectly treated. For example, action and passion are discussed in his books titled “On Generation and Corruption,” and no less discussion has been given to the other categories in his other works, such as “where” and “when” in the Physics, and all of them more deeply and subtly in the books he called “Metaphysics.”
And concerning action and passion, he very clearly stated that they can admit contrarieties. For we say that fire heats and cools, which refers to its action. We say that water is heated and cooled, which leads to the category of passion. He also shows that they admit more and less with very clear examples. For indeed, there is more and less heating and cooling, and more and less being heated and cooled. And these things have been stated thus far, for he himself stated them very clearly. The description of these things is such that in action, some act is considered to come from anything into another thing, whereas in passion, that act is considered to come into the thing. For act and passion have been shown to exist together in Physics. And concerning action and passion, these things said up to now should suffice.
It has also been said about situation among relatives, as it is denominated from positions. Concerning the rest, that is, when and where and to have, since they are evident, nothing further is said about them than what has been said at the beginning, that “to have” signifies being shod or armed, and “where” in Lycia or any other such things that have been said.
Therefore, enough has been said about these categories that we proposed.
On Situation and Position
Position indeed, since it is of something, is numbered among those things that are related; but since everything that is denominated from another is other than that from which it is denominated, as the grammarian is other than grammar, although the grammarian is denominated from grammar. So, although position is relative, whatever is denominated from positions is not held in this category of relatives. Position itself is relative, but what is positioned is denominated from position. For the station is of something. However, standing, since it is denominated from the station, is not placed in that category in which the station was. Therefore, this category is not found under relation. But since there is nothing to which we can reduce and adapt this category, it must be said to be its own category. As lying down is from lying, standing from the station, and the rest that Aristotle denies following for himself because they are very clear; for he says: “Concerning the rest, that is, when, where, and to have; since they are evident, nothing further is said about them than what has been said at the beginning,” and he sets forth the aforementioned examples.
On Where and When
We should briefly speak about the predication that is where and when. Just as something related cannot exist by itself unless it draws its nature from something else, so too when and where cannot exist unless there is a place and time. For place accompanies where, and time accompanies when. However, time is not the same as when, nor is place the same as where, but if something is placed in a place that has been proposed, it is said to be where. Again, if a certain thing is in time, it is said to be when, as the Apollinarian games, since they are in time, we say they are when. These categories also have their own unique differences; where, indeed, is sometimes said infinitely. For we say that someone, like Socrates, is somewhere, and sometimes we say definitively, like in the Lyceum or the Academy. Where also has some contrarieties according to the place in which it is; for it is said to be where when it is up and down. It is also evident that the variations of time exist in the category that is when. For future, present, and past events come under the category of when. We say that Scipio was once a Roman consul, that the current emperor of the East, who is now called Anastasius, exists now, and that someone will be in the future, which are predications according to the category of when.
On Having
Having, however, is something that comes from outside and is not innate to the one who has it, and it retains something different from what it is itself, as being armed or dressed. For having is holding clothes and weapons, which are not born with the one who has them, nor are they joined to the one who has them with any common nature and property. But since Aristotle was silent about these things, we too must now omit a more extended discussion of them.
Book Four
Introduction
With all the categories explained, many have asked why Aristotle went beyond the scope of his work and entered into the discussion of opposites. Andronicus, however, does not believe that this addition is by Aristotle, and at the same time, he thinks that perhaps the addition of opposites, as well as those that exist simultaneously, and those that are prior, as well as motion and equivocation, were not made by Aristotle because he wrote this book before the Topics, and he might have thought that these topics were not necessary for this work, just as the Categories themselves can relate to the Topics. Andronicus is not unaware that in the Topics, as far as arguments are concerned, there was a sufficient exposition of all these things that have been added, as well as the categories themselves. But this is Andronicus’ opinion.
Porphyry, on the other hand, does not believe that this addition lacks and is devoid of reason. He provides this explanation for it. Just as many things that suggest their existence through common mental conceptions were predicted by Aristotle at the beginning of this book, such as equivocal and univocal terms, denominatives, and everything that was predicted for the usefulness and understanding of the categories themselves up to the discussion of substance, there were also some things that, while they indeed exist in common senses, required a more subtle division. These matters were diligently laid out so that their proper nature could be grasped, and the mind would not be misled by false opinions. The proper order and the rational arrangement of the titles, Porphyry says, show that this addition was highly useful and necessary. First, the discussion is on opposites, then on those that exist simultaneously, and on those that are posterior. Afterwards, it deals with motion, and finally, speaking of equivocation in having, it concludes the sequence of the book. The reason for this is that in all categories, Aristotle inquired whether they could have contraries. In the category of relatives, he said that large and small cannot be contrary but opposite. However, he omitted to define what being opposite means, so as not to break the continuous order of the discussion. Therefore, he rightly taught here what he had omitted earlier. In the category of relatives, he also briefly touched on those that are prior and those that are generated simultaneously by nature, which he now explains diligently.
The categories of doing and undergoing involve a kind of motion and agitation; therefore, it was necessary to discuss motion in order to show the nature of doing and undergoing. Moreover, who would doubt that demonstrating the equivocation of any discourse is very useful? Therefore, since having is also a category, it was neither inappropriate nor superfluous to discuss the equivocation of having.
On Opposites
It is necessary to discuss how often things are opposed to one another. One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: either as a relative, as contraries, as possession and privation, or as affirmation and negation. Each of these is opposed, so to speak, figuratively: as relatives, like double to half; as contraries, like good to evil; as possession and privation, like blindness and sight; as affirmation and negation, like sitting and not sitting.
It is also questioned whether the term “opposite” is predicated equivocally. We say that things are opposed in four ways: either as contraries, as relatives, as possession and privation, or as affirmation and negation. Here, it is debated whether there is a certain equivocation surrounding these four distinctions or whether the term “opposite” is predicated in the way of a genus, making it univocal. However, there were different opinions among the Stoics and the Peripatetics, and even among the Peripatetics themselves. Since the Stoics’ opinion is lengthy, let’s skip it; other Peripatetics believe that the term “opposite” is predicated equivocally about the subjects, asserting that Aristotle said so: “It must be discussed how often things are opposed to one another,” that is, how often it pertains to the multiplicity of equivocation. But those who judged better claim that the term “opposition” should be predicated in the place of a genus because when the term “opposition” is predicated about the subjects of the four types of opposition, the definition is not hindered by them. Opposites are things that, in the same respect, at the same time, and concerning the same thing, cannot exist simultaneously, and this is found in each of the individual opposites as we go through them. For white and black, which are contraries, cannot exist at the same time and in the same place in one body or part of a body, nor can a slave and master be the same person at the same time; neither can possession and privation coexist. For who would say that sight and blindness can exist in the same eye at the same time? Moreover, it is clear to everyone how contradictory affirmation and negation are and how they cannot exist simultaneously. Therefore, if the things placed under opposition receive the name and definition of opposition, why should there be any doubt that opposition is not predicated equivocally? With these points established, let’s move on to their distinctions and differences.
Whatever things are opposed as relatives, they are called the very things that are opposite, or in some other way related to them; for example, double is called double with respect to half, and knowledge of a knowable thing is opposed as a relative, and it is called knowledge, which is the very thing that is knowable; and the knowable thing is called opposite, namely, knowledge (for a knowable thing is called knowable by some knowledge).
Whatever things are opposed as relatives, they are called the very things that are opposite or in any other way related to each other.
Indeed, the things of this opposition that are said according to relation are, in themselves, clear and common and already known from the previous discussion of relations. For they are relative, whatever things are said to be what they are in relation to others or in any other way to them, like a slave is called a master’s slave, and a master is called a slave’s master, and something large is called large in relation to something small, and vice versa, something small is referred to as small in relation to something large. If this is found in all relatives, there is no doubt that it can also be detected in those things that are opposed according to relation, so that they are called what they are in relation to their opposites or in any other way to their opposites, like if a slave is opposed to a master, the master is called the slave’s master, that is, of his opposite, and vice versa, if a master is opposed to a slave, the master’s slave is called. Small, indeed, is in relation to large, and large to small, that is, to its opposite. And indeed, this must be found in all oppositions according to relation. Therefore, this is the property of those things that are opposed according to relation: that they are referred to their opposites and are said to be of them.
With these things established beforehand, the text teaches the difference by which those things that are said according to contrariety or those that are said according to relation differ and disagree with one another. It says:
But those things that are opposed as contraries, they themselves are in no way called with respect to each other, but rather they are called contrary to each other. For good is not called the good of evil, but the contrary; nor is white called the white of black, but the contrary. Therefore, these oppositions differ from one another.
It has been said in those things that are opposed according to relation that they are called what they are with respect to what is opposite to them. However, contraries are indeed opposed to each other, but they are not called what they are with respect to their opposites, rather they are called contraries. This is how it is: we say that good is contrary to evil, and vice versa, evil to good. We also think that black is contrary to white, and likewise, white to black. But when we think this, we do not say that they are what they are in relation to their opposites. For if we were to say that what is good is the good of its opposite, it would not be said that good is contrary to evil, but that good is the good of evil. Nor would anyone predicate that black is contrary to white, but that black is the black of white. For this is what it means for black to be called in relation to its opposite, if someone says that black is the black of white; but since this is not said, the things themselves are not called the opposites, that is, those things that seem to be opposed to each other as contraries. But because we say that good is contrary to evil and black is contrary to white, although they are not called what they are in relation to their opposites, they are nevertheless named as contraries with respect to their opposites. And this is what it says: They themselves, indeed, are in no way called with respect to each other. But they are called contrary to each other. For good is not called the good of evil, for this is to predicate the opposite, but we say that good is contrary to evil. Therefore, there is a difference between those things that are similarly opposed to something and those that are opposed to each other according to contrariety. In the case of those things that are opposed according to relation, they are said to be the opposites of what they are. However, those things that are contrary are not called by the name of their opposites, but are only predicated as contraries, such as when we say that good is contrary to its opposite, not good. For we say that good is contrary to evil, but we do not say that good is the good of evil. But since the difference between opposition according to relation and contrariety has been shown, he now pursues the difference and discrepancy between contraries themselves.
For any contraries that are such that it is necessary for one of them to be present in the things they are born to exist in and of which they are predicated, there is no middle ground between them (for those in which it is not necessary for one to be present, there is always a middle ground); for example, sickness and health are born to exist in the body of an animal, and it is necessary for either sickness or health to be present in the animal’s body; and even and odd are predicated of a number, and it is necessary for either even or odd to be present in a number; and there is no middle ground between either sickness or health, or even or odd. However, for those contraries in which it is not necessary for one to be present, there is a middle ground; for example, white and black are born to exist in a body, and it is not necessary for either of them to be present in the body (for not every body is either white or black); and good and bad are indeed said of a man and many other things, but it is not necessary for either of them to be present in those of which they are predicated; for not all things are either good or bad. And there is a middle ground for these, such as between white and black, there are various colors like blue or pale, and between ugly and beautiful, there is that which is neither beautiful nor ugly. In some cases, middle grounds have names, such as blue and pale for white and black; in others, the middle ground cannot be assigned a name, but is defined by the negation of both, such as neither good nor evil, neither just nor unjust.
A brief division of contraries can be made in this way: some contraries have a middle ground, while others do not, and of those that have a middle ground, there are more middle grounds in some cases, and only one middle ground in others. In some cases, the middle grounds are called by their own names, while in others, they lack their own names and are indicated by the negation of the contraries. But let’s demonstrate this with examples, starting from the beginning. Those contraries that lack a middle ground are such that it is necessary for one of them to be present in its own subject, such as sickness and health. For every body in which sickness and health are present is either sick or healthy. And so, since sickness and health lack a middle ground, one of them will be present in the subject in which both are born to exist and of which they are predicated. For since health and sickness are born to exist in the body of an animal, that is, it usually happens that way, and thus every animal is born to be either healthy or sick. And since either healthy or sick is predicated of an animal’s body, it is necessary that since these lack a middle ground, either sickness or health must be present in every animal’s body. Therefore, for those things that lack a middle ground, it is necessary for one of them to be present in the subject, and for whatever things are such that it is necessary for one of them to be present in the subject, there is no middle ground between them. However, those contraries in which there is some middle ground are not such that it is necessary for one of them to be present in the subject. For in those things that lack a middle ground, it is necessary for one or the other to be present in the subject precisely because there is no middle ground that can exist between them in the subject’s substance, such as in the case of evenness and oddness in numbers, which have no middle ground (for every number is either even or odd and there is nothing that can exist in numbers for this reason), therefore every number is either even or odd. In those things, however, that include some middle ground between them, it is not always necessary for one of the contraries to be present. For a middle ground can be present, as in the case of color, since white and black are diverse by virtue of contrariety, but they have a middle ground, which is red or pale, and therefore not every body is either white or black, since a middle ground between white and black can sometimes be found in the subjects of bodies. For we see a red body, such as a rose and many other flowers, which are brought forth by the mildness of springtime. It has been rightly said, therefore, that in those things that have no middle ground, one of them is always present in the subjects, and in those where it is necessary for one to be present, it is impossible for there to be no middle ground.
In the same way, those things that have middle grounds do not necessarily have one or the other present in the subjects, and in those where it is not necessary for one or the other to be present in the subjects, there is no doubt that there can be some middle ground, but in some cases there are several middle grounds, while in others there is only one, as in the case of color, where there are several middle grounds between white and black. For there is (as mentioned) red, and also pale, and similarly, blue, and many other colors of this kind. In hot and cold, however, there is only one middle ground, which is called warmth. Among those that have one middle ground, in some cases a name is given, while in others it is not. A name is given, for example, between hot and cold, as we predicate this middle ground to be warmth. However, there is no name given in the case of what Aristotle himself said: “Between the dishonest and the honest, there is that which is neither honest nor dishonest.” For since good and evil are contrary to each other, and it is not necessary for everything that is susceptible to good or evil to be either good or evil, he said that good and evil, being contraries, have a certain middle ground, which does not have a name assigned to it, but nevertheless, one will find it between these contrary natures. For what has been said by later thinkers, that between good and evil there are those things called indifferent, which lie between virtue and vice, both of which are contrary to each other, such as wealth and beauty, which (as the Stoics believe) are neither evil nor good, and for this reason they called them indifferent. However, this very term “indifferent” was not a name among the earlier thinkers and was invented by later ones.
Aristotle, who never used this term, says that there is indeed some middle ground between the honest and the dishonest, but it is not called by any name, and he defined it as a kind of negotiation between the two contraries. He says that the middle ground between the honest and the dishonest is that which is neither honest nor dishonest, just as the middle ground between the just and the unjust is that which is neither just nor unjust. But lest it seem inappropriate to define something by negations, he himself says: “In some cases, there is no name to assign to the middle ground, but it is defined by the negation of both contraries.” For where there is one middle ground, if both contraries are removed, only the middle ground remains, as in the case of good and evil, since there is one middle ground between them, and when good and evil are removed, only that which is neither good nor evil remains. Therefore, the whole division must be briefly resumed. In those things which are contraries and it is always necessary for one of them to be present in those in which they happen to be present according to their own nature, they retain no middle ground between them, such as health and sickness in the body, and evenness and oddness in numbers. However, those things which, when present in subjects, are not such that it is necessary for one of them to be present, embrace some quality of a middle ground between them, such as whiteness and blackness, redness, coldness, and warmth. Of these, some have only one middle ground, while others have many, and many, for example, between white and black, there are pale and blue, which are middle grounds. Between hot and cold, there is only one middle ground, which is warmth. Among those that have one middle ground, in some cases names have been given, as in the case of heat and cold. For warmth is the middle ground between heat and cold. In some cases, however, no name has been given, such as in the case of good and evil, just and unjust. In these cases, the middle ground does not have a name assigned to it but is defined by the negations of both contraries, so we say that it is the middle ground of good and evil, which is neither good nor evil, and that it is the middle ground between just and unjust, which, when both contrarieties are removed, is left by the negation of both, as is neither just nor unjust.
Privation and habit, on the other hand, are said to be about the same thing, as vision and blindness are about the eye. However, to speak universally, where a habit is born, both of them are said to be about that thing.
The third type of opposition discussed in order is that which is said to be according to habit and privation, and in this Aristotle placed one similarity which is connected with contrariety. For just as things that are contrary are always about the same thing, such as white, which is always in a body, and black, which is also always in a body, and justice, which is always embedded in the soul, and injustice, which is also a vice of the mind, so too, those things that are said to be according to privation and habit must always be found in the same thing. For since sight is a habit (for we have sight) and sight is in the eyes and around the eye, blindness, which is the privation of sight, cannot be outside of the eye. Hearing, which is a habit, since it is about the ears, and its privation, which is called deafness, does not depart from the ears; and in the same way, the privation of a habit is considered to be about the same thing as the habit itself. From this, Aristotle provides a general rule, saying that the privation occurs in the thing where the habit is.
But what it means to be deprived, he added in a continuous explanation:
We say that each of the things capable of having a habit is deprived when it does not have it in the thing where it is naturally present, or when it does not have it in any way when it is naturally possible to have it.
Aristotle concluded the definition of privation in this way. For not everything that does not have sight is called blind, nor is everything that does not perceive hearing called deaf. For no one would call a wall blind or a stone deaf, or anything of this kind. But we say that those things alone are deprived of a habit which either had the habit and lost it or could have it and do not have it. We do not call a wall blind, because sight could not naturally come to it. However, we would not properly call very young puppies blind, which do not have sight. For at that time, they cannot yet naturally have sight. But if, after the days have passed when their eyes can naturally open and receive light, they do not have sight, it is clear that they are blind. In the same way, oysters are not called toothless, since they naturally do not have teeth, nor do we call infants, who are not yet of the age to have teeth, toothless. But if someone who had teeth before loses them or does not have teeth at a time when they should naturally have them, such as if a child has not grown any teeth by the age of seven, we rightly call them toothless, and this is what Aristotle says:
We call someone toothless, not because they do not have teeth, nor blind because they do not have sight, but because they do not have it when it is possible for them to have it (for many things from birth neither have teeth nor sight but are not called toothless nor blind).
That is, we do not call everything that does not see blind, nor everything that does not have teeth toothless. There are many things that either cannot have these things at all or at a certain time naturally, but privation occurs whenever something does not have a habit that it could naturally have, and at a time when the habit could already be present by nature. Or if someone has and retains a habit and loses it due to any event, such as in already grown-up children who do not have teeth. For since they are humans, they can have teeth; if they had teeth and lost them, they are called toothless; but if their teeth did not grow at all, because it could naturally happen that even children who are grown up could have teeth, due to some accident or illness that has occurred, we call them toothless and deprived of having teeth.
However, being deprived and having a habit is not the same as the habit and the privation; for the habit is sight, while the privation is blindness, but having sight is not sight, nor is being blind blindness (for blindness is a certain privation, but being blind is being deprived, not the privation itself).
Here, with the most accurate reasoning, it is shown whether those things that fall under privation and habit are privations and habits or not: for since the habit is sight, and the privation is blindness, having sight is under the habit, and being blind is under the privation. To those looking closely, having something is different from the thing that is had. For there are three things in the one in which there is a habit: the one who has it, the thing that is had, and the act of having it, as there is the one who sees, the sight itself, and this very act that comes from both, that is, seeing. However, seeing differs from the one who sees, and this very act of seeing differs again from sight. For the thing that is done is different from the one who does it. The one who sees performs the act of seeing, so seeing is different from the one who sees. Moreover, seeing also differs from sight, for the thing that is done is different from the thing through which something is carried out, and seeing is done through sight. Therefore, seeing differs from that very thing (which makes seeing possible) sight, but to see is to have sight, and to have sight is to retain a habit, and sight is a habit. Therefore, the habit is not the same as what is under the habit, that is, retaining any habit.
In the same way, also in privation, there are also three things there: the one who is deprived, the very act that is done, that is, being deprived, and the very thing by which someone is deprived, that is, the privation itself. If the one who has a habit differs from the very act of having a habit, the one who is deprived also differs from the act of being deprived. And if having a habit also differs from the very habit that is had, the act of being deprived necessarily differs from that very privation by which someone is deprived. Therefore, neither what is under the habit can be called a habit nor what is under the privation can be called a privation. It has been rightly said that having a habit is not a habit and being deprived is not a privation: to this matter, a somewhat stronger force of argumentation is added, which Aristotle pronounces in this way:
For if blindness were the same as being blind, both would be predicated of the same thing; but now, they certainly are not, for a human is indeed called blind, but blindness is in no way called so.
He says, “If being blind were the same as blindness, then wherever ‘being blind’ is said, ‘blindness’ would also be predicated of it. But we say that a human is blind, yet no one says that the human is blindness. Therefore, since the predication is different in both cases, and where blindness is spoken of, it is not said to be blind, and where being blind is predicated, it cannot be said to be blindness. There is no doubt that being blind is different from blindness, that is, privation is different from being deprived.” However, although they are different, they serve an equal function of opposition, as he himself says:
These things also seem to be opposed, namely being deprived and having a habit, just as privation and habit are; for the mode of opposition is the same.
For privation and habit are opposed to each other in equal proportion, as well as the things that are enclosed under privation and habit. For if privation and habit, that is, sight and blindness, are opposed to each other, why should not seeing and being blind also oppose each other in the same way? Therefore, although these things are different, the mode of opposition among them is equal.
However, neither what is under affirmation or negation is negation or affirmation; for affirmation is an affirmative statement and negation is a negative statement, but nothing that is under affirmation or negation is a statement. But these things are also said to be opposed to each other, like affirmation and negation; for the mode of opposition is the same in these cases as well. Just as affirmation is opposed to negation, such as sitting - not sitting, so the thing that is under both is opposed to itself, sitting and not sitting.
He moves on to the fourth kind of opposition, which is said to be according to affirmation and negation. Affirmation is a statement that joins some thing to another by a certain participation, while negation is a statement that separates one thing from another by a certain separation, such as:
Every human is an animal.
For this statement joins the animal to the human. Indeed, the human participates in its proper genus, namely, animal. On the other hand, negation:
A human is not a stone.
For this separates the nature of a stone from humanity by denying it. But much has to be said about these things in the book on interpretation. Therefore, let the fuller discussion of these things be deferred to another time.
Aristotle, however, most simply and almost carelessly marked the definitions of affirmation and negation for the sake of those who are being educated, saying that negation and affirmation are affirmative and negative statements. If he had defined it more carefully and subtly, he would not define affirmation through an affirmative statement. For if it is doubtful what affirmation is, it is no clearer or more evident what an affirmative statement is. Therefore, if someone does not know what affirmation is, they will undoubtedly not know what an affirmative statement is. But he was more lenient here because, in the book Perihermeneias, he fitted the true and full force of the definition for both.
The same reasoning applies to those things that are under affirmation and negation as was applied to those things placed under privation and habit. For just as having a habit and being deprived is not the same as habit and privation, so being under affirmation and negation is not the same as affirmation and negation. Affirmation is, for example, “Socrates is sitting,” while negation is, “Socrates is not sitting.” Under affirmation, however, is this very act of Socrates sitting, that is, the act that is said to be done under affirmation. Under negation, on the other hand, is Socrates not sitting, that is, not doing what the negation removes. But this is proved in such a way that every affirmation and every negation are statements, as their aforementioned definition and determination showed. However, sitting and not sitting, that is, doing and not doing, are not statements. Therefore, if affirmation and negation are statements, it is said that what is under affirmation and negation is distinct from the affirmation and negation themselves. But in this, they also maintain that similarity in that those very things are opposed to one another, which are said according to affirmation and negation. For just as the affirmation itself that says “Socrates is sitting” and that which says “Socrates is not sitting,” so too the very act of Socrates sitting and not sitting are opposed to each other by a certain similarity.
Since four types of opposition have been discussed, let us now follow Aristotle’s footsteps and gather their differences, which are six in number: for if there are four things, and we want them to differ from one another and be apart, we find only six differences. For when we first place the first to differ from the second, third, and fourth, there are three differences. Likewise, to show and demonstrate the second thing to differ from the first thing is superfluous. For when we collected the distance from the first thing to the second, we taught what the second differed from the first. Therefore, having left the difference of the first thing to the second, the differences of the second and third, and likewise of the second and fourth will be shown, which are two, and joined to the three previous ones, make up five differences. The distance between the third and fourth things remains. For the discrepancy of the first to the second and third has been demonstrated, when the first was shown to be apart from the second, and in the same way from the third.
This is proven by examples. For when the opposition that is according to something is proposed to be apart from those oppositions that are according to contrariety, privation and habit, and affirmation and negation, there are three differences. However, when the opposition that is according to privation and habit is separate from contraries and from affirmation and negation, there are two differences, which when joined with the previous ones, make up five. Therefore, we have passed over what the difference is between habit and privation in relation to the opposition that is relative since we previously showed how the relative opposition differs from habit and privation. For there is no doubt that the difference is equal in both cases since one differs from the other. There remains only one difference, which is that of contraries to affirmation and negation. For the difference of contraries has been passed over, concerning the relative and according to habit and privation opposition, what this is above that separates it from contrariety has been shown. Therefore, since the number of these differences is known, let us proceed to the order of the following work. 273B
It is clear that privation and habit are not opposed in the way that is according to something; for it is not said that this very thing is opposite; sight, for instance, is not the sight of blindness, nor is it said in any other way to it; similarly, neither is blindness called the blindness of sight, but the privation of sight is called blindness <...>. Furthermore, all things that are said to be according to something are said conversely, therefore blindness also, if it were among those things that are according to something, would be converted to that to which it is said; but they are not converted; for sight is not said to be of blindness.
And the rest of the differences have been clearly set forth above in the relative opposition concerning the difference of contraries. For he said that there is one difference between contraries and relatives, in that contraries are not converted in the way that those things which are according to something are. For no one says that wickedness is the wickedness of goodness, nor that goodness is the goodness of wickedness, just as a son is not called the son of a father and, conversely, a father the father of a son. The same difference is also said in those things that are according to privation and habit. For just as those things that are opposed according to something are rendered against themselves, and all things are predicated of their opposites, it is not the same way in habit and privation. For no one says that blindness is sight, nor conversely that sight is blindness. Therefore, if those things that are relative are predicated of their opposites, and are said conversely – for since the father is opposite to the son, the father is called the father of the son, that is, according to the opposite, and conversely, it is converted so that the son is called the son of the father – since this is not said in those things that are according to privation and habit. For when sight is opposed to blindness, sight is not said to be of blindness according to privation and habit, that is, nothing is ever predicated of the opposite nor converted according to this opposition, for blindness is not called sight, and rightly privation and habit are not counted in the same category as relatives but in another. 274A
However, since those things that are said according to privation and habit are not opposed as contraries, this is evident from these reasons. For in those contraries where there is no middle, it is necessary that in those things that are naturally subject to them or about which they can be predicated, one of them must always be present. For there was no middle in these, of which it was necessary for one to be present in their subject, such as in sickness and health, and in the unequal and the equal. But in those things for which there is a middle, it is never necessary for one of the extremes to be present in every subject; for it is not necessary for everything to be either white or black, nor cold or hot (for nothing prevents some of them from having a middle state); there was also a middle in these things, of which it was not necessary for one of the extremes to be present in their subject, unless perhaps it naturally happens for one of them to be present, such as heat in fire and whiteness in snow (in these cases it is necessary for one of the extremes to be definitely present, and not this or that; for fire cannot be cold nor snow be black); therefore, it is not necessary for one of these extremes to be present in all of their subjects, but only in those for which one naturally is present, and definitely one of them, not this or that.
I have shortened the length of the text because the same things have already been said above, and a longer arrangement might create some displeasure, which we have separated in this division of the text. First, he sets forth all the differences of contraries among themselves, which I will briefly recount as much as I can; he says that in contraries that lack a middle, one of the extremes must always be present in the subject that can receive these contrarieties, such as sickness and health, because they are always found in the body of an animal, and they exist without any middle against their opposite. Therefore, every animal body is always either sick or healthy, and either health or sickness is always present in that which receives these contrarieties. But in those contraries that have a middle, it is not necessary for one of the extremes to always be present in the subject to which they happen, such as white and black, since they are both contrary and have a middle, like red. When they occur in bodies, it is not necessary for every body to be either white or black, because it can sometimes happen that the middle of these extremes occurs in any body. And this is so in those things that do not lack a middle, which we call mediated, except in those cases where one contrariety is naturally inherent, such as snow being white and fire being hot. In these cases, it is always necessary for one, not another, nor either, but definitely one, to occur. For it does not happen that fire is sometimes hot, sometimes cold, and sometimes lukewarm, which is the middle of these, but it is always ignited with natural heat; nor does snow sometimes become black, nor red again, nor change to any other colors, but it is always white. Since this is the case, if it has been shown that those things which are opposed according to habit and privation are distinct from those contraries that lack a middle, and from those that include some middle quality within themselves, and from those that, although mediated, are nevertheless definitely inherent in something, it has been perfectly demonstrated that those things which are according to habit and privation are distinct from contraries. Therefore, let us hold what they differ according to Aristotle’s authority.
In privation and habit, however, neither of the things that have been said is true; for it is not always necessary for one of them to be present in their subject. For something that is not yet born with sight is said to be neither blind nor having sight, <...> having sight is said; and of these, not definitely one but either this or that (for it is not necessary for it to be either blind or having sight, but either this or that); but in contraries with a middle, it is never necessary for one of the extremes to be present in all subjects, but only in some, and definitely one of them. Therefore, it is clear that, according to neither of the ways in which contraries are opposed, are those things which are opposed according to privation and habit opposed to each other.
First, he gives the differences by which those things that are opposed according to habit and privation are distinct from those that are immediate contraries. For in these contraries that do not have a middle, it is always necessary for one of them to be present in the subject of these very things. However, in habit and privation, it is not so. For not every thing always has either habit or privation, but there is a time when it has neither, such as puppies whose eyes are not yet open by nature. For we say that they neither have habit, because they do not see, nor are they deprived of sight, because as infants they cannot yet have sight by nature. Therefore, one of these things which are opposed to each other according to privation and habit is not always present in their subject. But in those that are immediate contraries, that is, lacking a middle, one of them is always present in the subject. Therefore, the opposition according to habit and privation is distinct from those that are considered to be opposed according to contraries.
But since there are certain contraries that are naturally inherent in something, such as whiteness in snow, heat in fire, and blackness in a raven, even the opposition of privation and habit is distinct from these. For those things that are naturally inherent are definite and cannot be changed in any way, such as whiteness in snow. For snow is not either white or black, but only white, and a raven is not either white or black, but only black. However, in privation and habit, a thing cannot be definite but always either privation or habit occurs, and this is what he says, and not definitely one of these but either this or that. For it is not necessary for it to be either blind or having sight, definitely implied, for a puppy that does not yet see by nature will either have habit, that is, sight, or be deprived of it, so as to be blind, but not definitely one but either this or that indefinitely occurs. Therefore, this opposition is distinct from those contraries that happen to some things by nature immutably.
Therefore, it remains for us to show that this opposition is different from those contraries that have a middle. For in those contraries, it is not always necessary for them to be present in the subject, because the middle states of these can happen to substances, such as white or black, which is not inherent in something by nature but only accidentally. Both of these can be absent in bodies, as red or pale, which are the middle states of these, occur in them. However, this is not the case in privation and habit. For when something can have habit by nature, it cannot lack both of these that receive it. For example, when a puppy can see by nature, it is said to have habit and is seeing, or privation, if it is blind. Thus, always from the time when either of these is granted to them by nature, they will retain one or the other, that is, either retain privation or habit. Therefore, if in these contraries that have a middle, it can happen that both contraries are not present in the subject, but in privation and habit, from the time when it can retain either by nature, it cannot happen unless it has one of them, these middle contraries are also different from those that are opposed according to the power of privation and habit. But it has been shown earlier that this opposition is dissimilar to those contraries that are by nature and those that lack a middle. Therefore, it has been rightly posited that the opposition of privation and habit is distinct from those that are opposed as contraries.
Furthermore, in contraries, when there is a subject, an alternate change can occur, except for those things that have one quality naturally inherent in them, such as heat in fire. For something healthy can become sick, white can turn black, cold can become hot, a good person can turn bad, and a bad person can become good (for a bad person, when led to better habits and speech, will at least give themselves a little improvement; but if they take up even the slightest intention once, it is clear that either they will change completely or take up a great intention; for they always become more inclined towards virtue if they take up any intention from the beginning, so it is possible for them to take up a greater intention; and having done this repeatedly, they will perfectly settle into the opposite disposition unless prevented by time). However, in privation and habit, it is impossible for a change to take place between them; for a change takes place from habit to privation, but from privation to habit, it is impossible; for no one who has become blind can see again, nor can someone who has become bald grow hair again, nor can a toothless person grow teeth.
He sets forth another discrepancy between contraries and this opposition which is said to be according to habit and privation. For those things that are contraries can change alternately in various ways. What is hot can become cold, and what is cold can change into the quality of heat. However, this is true only for those (as has been said) in which one of the contraries is not naturally inherent. In those cases, an alternate change cannot occur; but in those that happen accidentally and not by nature in subjects, there is always a change into contraries, such as a healthy body becoming sick, and a sick body becoming healthy again in an animal.
Now, it is true that the path from good to bad always seems easier, and the change from virtue to vice is the easiest, as demonstrated in the example by Terence:
From work, the inclination to desire is easy.
But although the transition from the disgrace of vices to virtues is difficult, Aristotle nevertheless confirms that this transition is possible. For the opinion of this philosopher is that virtues are not sciences, as Socrates says, nor are they naturally inherent as the Stoics claim, but rather they are learnable and ingrained in people’s minds through good habits. Therefore, if someone is liable to any vices, if they are exposed to better discourse and become refined through the company and conversation of wise people, they will correct some of the allurements of their previous vices, and they will gradually shed them, and proceed somewhat more freely towards better things. Thus, at first, they become less bad, then not bad at all, and eventually somewhat good. If this kind of intention is repeated very often and is not hindered by a short amount of time or the approach of death, there is no doubt that they will change from being the worst person to having a perfect disposition of virtue through good habits and conversations with wise people. Therefore, there is a change from good to bad and from bad to good again, and this indeed occurs in contraries. However, this does not happen in habit and privation, for there is a change, but only one, which in no way turns back on itself; for he says: The change is from habit to privation, but from privation to habit, it is impossible. And he demonstrates this most clearly with examples. For who has ever become seeing after being blind? Who has ever become hairy after being bald? For whom have teeth grown back after losing them due to age? Therefore, if there is an alternate change in contraries, but not in privation and habit, this opposition is different from the opposition that occurs according to contrary qualities.
Now, as for those things that are opposed as affirmation and negation, it is evident that they are not opposed in any of the ways previously mentioned. For in these cases alone, it is necessary that one is true while the other is false. For it is not necessary in contraries, relatives, nor in habit and privation that one is always true and the other false. For example, health and sickness are contraries, but neither of them is true or false; similarly, double and half, which are opposed in relation to something, are not such that one is false and the other true; nor are those things that are according to habit and privation, such as sight and blindness. In fact, none of the things that are said without any combination are either true or false; but all the things we have mentioned are said without combination.
Having explained these differences by which contraries are distinguished from relatives, or privation and habit from relatives, or again privation and habit from contraries, it now follows to see how these are all distinguished from those opposed according to affirmation and negation, and he gives the unique characteristic of affirmation and negation, so that we may always seek to recognize them. If there are any that are not bound by this characteristic, we can say that they are removed from the opposition of affirmation and negation. For in affirmation and negation, it is impossible that if the affirmation is true, the negation is not immediately false; if the negation is true, the affirmation cannot be free of the mark of falsehood, as if someone says: Socrates is walking, Socrates is not walking. If it is true that Socrates is walking, it is false that he is not walking, and conversely if it is true that he is not walking, it is false that he is walking. However, no one will ever be able to find this division of truth and falsehood in other oppositions. For in those that are relative, not only is it unnecessary for the opposition itself to divide truth and falsehood, but in these there is no truth or falsehood at all. For if someone simply says: father or, again, son, they pronounce neither something true nor something false. And the same is true for contraries; for when good is contrary to evil, if someone names good and if someone simply pronounces evil, there is no falsehood or truth in this predication. The same is also true for those that are said according to habit and privation. Similarly, nothing is true or false if someone names sight or blindness. This happens because everything that can be found to be false or true is said according to some combination. But those things that are simply uttered lack the expression of truth and falsehood, as he himself says when he was counting all the categories in the beginning, stating that each of those that had been said is said in no affirmation, but rather the truth and falsehood are generated by some combination among these categories. Aristotle taught that truth and falsehood cannot be found in speeches beyond any combination.
Indeed, this is clear by example. For if I say, Socrates is a man, it is either true or false. But if I simply say Socrates, or again, man, there is nothing of truth or falsehood in it. Therefore, since every affirmation is made with a combination, either truth or falsehood can be found in it. But those things that are relative are said simply and without any combination. Similarly, contraries, and those that are opposed to each other according to habit and privation, such as father and son, good and evil, sight and blindness, are said without combination (where there is no combination, there is neither falsehood nor truth). In affirmations and negations alone, which are said according to combination, either truth or falsehood is found, and the opposition according to affirmation and negation is distinct from all the other superior ones.
But this seems to occur more in those that are said according to combination (for Socrates being healthy and Socrates being sick are contraries), but even in these, it is not always necessary for one to be true and the other false. For when Socrates exists, this is indeed true and that is false; but when he does not exist, both are false. For neither being sick nor being healthy is true when Socrates does not exist at all. But in privation, when he does not exist, neither is true, and when he exists, it is not always necessary for one to be true or false. For Socrates to have sight and Socrates to be blind are opposed as habit and privation, and when
In privation, however, when he does not exist, neither is true, and when he exists, it is not always necessary for one to be true or false. For socrates to have sight and socrates to be blind are opposed as habit and privation, and when he exists, it is not necessary for one to be true or false (for when he is not born to have it, both are false). But when socrates does not exist at all, both are also false, having him see and him be blind.
Since some contraries seem to be said according to combination, in which either falsehood is found or truth, but neither as affirmation nor as negation, he also speaks about how they differ from those combinations that are said according to affirmation and negation. For just as sickness is contrary to health, so too is Socrates being sick contrary to Socrates being healthy. The speech that says Socrates is healthy is contrary to the one that declares Socrates is sick. In these, both truth and falsehood are found. Therefore, these differ from the opposition that is opposed according to the force of affirmation or negation, namely, that while the thing about which both are said exists, either of them is true if they, however, predicate contraries that lack intermediates. For, while Socrates is alive and exists, since sickness and health are immediate contraries, if someone says about Socrates: Socrates is healthy, and again someone else pronounces: Socrates is sick, one must be true and one false. For Socrates, being alive, is either sick or healthy, and if it is true that he is sick, being healthy is false, and if it is false that he is sick, being healthy is true. But if Socrates himself does not exist and is not at all, it is false to say both things about him, because he is sick and he is healthy. For he who does not exist at all can be neither sick nor healthy. Therefore, in contraries, when the thing about which they are predicated exists, one predication is always true, the other false, in these contraries that are said according to combination and lack intermediates. When the thing does not exist, both contrarieties are false. But those that are said according to privation and habit, if they are predicated with combination, and the thing exists, it is not necessary for one to be true and the other false, and when the thing does not exist at all, both are false. For Socrates, when he is already in his mother’s womb and not yet born, indeed, he is not brought forth into the light, yet he exists and lives, but then he is neither seeing nor blind, and he is not seeing because he has not yet been brought forth into the light. But he is not called blind because he could not yet see. Therefore, when the thing about which habit and privation are predicated exists and subsists, it can happen that both are falsely predicated about it; but if the thing about which it is said does not exist, it is necessary for both to be false, as when Socrates does not exist at all, it is false to say that he is either seeing or blind. For he sees and is blind who lives and exists, but when the one about whom it is said does not exist at all, both are falsely said about him. The same is true for puppies, for when they are already born, they indeed exist, but they are neither blind nor seeing because they have not yet been able to have sight by nature. But if they do not exist at all, again it is false for both to be predicated about them.
In affirmation or negation, however, whether it exists or does not exist, one of them will always be true, and the other false; for socrates to be sick and socrates not to be sick, when he is the same, it is evident that one of them is true or false, and when he does not exist, similarly (for to be sick when he does not exist is false, but not to be sick is true). Therefore, in these alone, one of them will always be true or false, whatever is opposed as affirmation and negation.
In affirmation, he says, and negation, whether the subject exists or does not exist at all, truth is always found in one, falsehood in the other. For it is not the same to say that someone is sick as to say that they are not healthy, and it is not the same to say that someone is blind as to say that they do not see, as he clearly teaches. For one who is sick cannot be sick unless they exist. However, not being healthy is not the same, for even if someone does not exist at all, this negation can be predicated of them. For what does not exist at all cannot be healthy, and what cannot be healthy is certainly not healthy. The same applies to blindness and sight, for it is not the same to say that someone is blind as to say that they do not see; for one who is blind exists and lives so that they may be blind, but not seeing can also be said of someone who does not exist at all. For one who does not exist at all cannot see, and one who cannot see does not see. Therefore, in affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or does not exist, one is always true, the other false. For when Socrates exists and lives, if it is true to say about him that he sees, it is false to say that he does not see, and if it is true to say about him that he is healthy, it is false to say about him that he is not healthy. If the negations are true, the affirmations are false. But if the subject does not exist at all, the affirmation about it is false, and the negation is always true. For in our time, since Socrates does not exist and does not subsist, if someone says Socrates sees, and another says Socrates does not see, it is indeed false to say about him that he sees, but true that he does not see. For one who does not exist at all cannot see, and one who cannot see does not see. Thus, it always remains firm and unchangeable in affirmations and negations that one is always true, and the other false in predication. Therefore, since in contraries and in those according to privation and habit, if both are said with combination about a non-existing thing, both are false that are predicated. Since this is not the same in affirmations and negations, all other oppositions disagree with affirmation and negation.
Therefore, four oppositions and six differences have been shown: first, contraries and their relation to something; second, contraries and those according to habit and privation; third, contraries and their opposition according to affirmation and negation; fourth, relatives and their relation to habit and privation; fifth, relatives and their relation to affirmation and negation; sixth, privation and habit concerning negation and affirmation. But after these differences in oppositions, some questions about contraries leading to many advancements are handed down by Aristotle.
Moreover, it is necessary that the contrary of good is evil (this is evident from every induction, such as health to sickness, justice to injustice, and courage to cowardice, and similarly in other cases), but sometimes the contrary of evil is good, and sometimes it is evil (for example, excess, which is evil, is contrary to deficiency, which is also evil). In a few cases, this may be seen, but in most cases, the contrary of evil is always good.
In this passage, it is shown that every good is always contrary to evil, but not every evil is always contrary to good; for whatever is good, only the opposite evil is contrary to it, but to evil both good and evil can be contrary. For health, which is good, sickness, which is evil, is contrary. Again, happiness, which is good, is contrary to unhappiness, which is also evil. However, it is possible to find an evil that has two contrarieties, namely of good and of another evil. For since contraries are those that are furthest apart, when cowardice is the worst disposition of the soul, it has two contrarieties, namely, rashness and courage; for one who fears everything and is cowardly, and one who fears nothing at all, in which rashness lies, are far apart and differ, therefore they are contraries, although both are evils.
Moreover, since the good is contrary to the evil, and courage is good, cowardice will be evil, and cowardice will be contrary and opposed to courage. Thus, two contrarieties are opposed to cowardice, rashness and courage; but rashness is contrary in terms of the greatest distance and quantity of differing dispositions and contrariety. Cowardice, on the other hand, appears to be opposed to courage in terms of the quality of goodness and evil.
Therefore, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that goods are always contrary to evils, and evils can also be contrary to evils. Induction, however, is the collection of individual examples and the reduction to universal knowledge and collection through them, as when someone says that one who knows music is a musician and is denominated from it, and a doctor who knows medicine, again, a grammarian who knows grammar, and from these individual things, he universally collects and asserts that whoever knows any art is designated by the same denomination, such as a grammarian from grammar, a doctor from medicine, and other similar things. Therefore, Aristotle confirmed with the clearest induction of examples what we said above about contraries.
He also added that evils can be contrary to evils, found in very few cases, but always contrary to goods. For even in these cases where evils are contrary to evils, it is inherent that they also seem to be contrary to goods at the same time, such as cowardice, which is contrary to rashness, is also contrary to courage. But it is not necessary that whatever evil is contrary to good, must also be contrary to evil, for example, sickness is contrary to health, which is good, but it is not contrary to another evil. It is therefore rightly said that evil is contrary to evil in fewer cases.
Furthermore, in contraries, it is not necessary that if one exists, the other must also exist; for in all healthy things, health will indeed exist, but sickness will not; similarly, in all white things, whiteness will exist, but blackness will not.
Furthermore, if being healthy and being sick are contrary to socrates, and it does not happen that both are in him at the same time, it will never happen that, when one of the contraries exists, the other exists; for when socrates is healthy, he will not be sick.
It has been said in relation, that some relatives naturally exist together, as when there is a son, there is a father, and when there is a father, he cannot exist without a son. Therefore, father and son always exist together, but this is not the case in contraries. For he says it is not necessary that contraries always exist together. For if no one is sick and everyone is healthy, when health exists, there will be no sickness, and with one contrariety remaining, the other will not exist at all, as if someone were to say the same about swans, for all swans are white, and there will be no blackness among swans. And this must be referred to universals as well. For if all things that exist are white, blackness will not exist at all. However, this seems to be derived individually from parts. For two contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time, as when Socrates is healthy, he is not sick, and when he is healthy, with health remaining, sickness cannot exist. And it is not necessary that when one contrary is posited, the other immediately follows. For if it were necessary that when one contrary is established, something else immediately follows, the same Socrates could be healthy and sick at the same time, which cannot happen. Therefore, it is not necessary that when one contrariety exists, another immediately follows. Consequently, it is possible that when one contrary exists, the other does not. And this is necessary in individuals as well, as in the case of Socrates being healthy, Socrates being sick does not exist, which is contrary to Socrates’ health. For although Socrates is capable of contraries, since he is a substance, he does not take on both contraries at the same time.
Moreover, it is evident that contraries are naturally produced around the same thing, either in species or in genus; for sickness and health are around the body of an animal, whiteness and blackness are simply around the body, and justice and injustice are in the soul.
He teaches about the things around which contraries can always exist. He says they are around things that are the same either in genus or in species, as the body of an animal is one according to genus, for all animals have one genus, and around this, sickness or health is found. Similarly, around every body indiscriminately, whether animals or inanimate, there is whiteness and blackness, and every body itself is one according to genus, for their genus is substance. Also, justice and injustice are in the soul. However, every soul that receives justice and injustice is rational, that is, of a human being; but all humans are the same according to species, therefore all souls are the same according to species; thus, justice and injustice are found around the same things according to species. Therefore, it has already been rightly concluded that all contraries are found around the same things either according to genus or according to species.
It is necessary, however, that all contraries are either in the same genus or in contrary genera, or they themselves are genera; indeed, white and black are in the same genus (for color is their genus), but justice and injustice are in contrary genera (for the genus of one is virtue, and of the other is vice); but good and evil are not in any genus but are themselves genera.
He demonstrates what remains, that is, where contraries can always be traced. For all things that are contrary are either under the same genus, under contrary genera, or they themselves are genera. Contraries are under the same genus, as white and black are under one genus, that is, color, for color is the genus of whiteness and blackness. Thus, these are under one genus. However, other contraries are found in contrary genera, such as justice and injustice. For the genus of justice is good, and the genus of injustice is evil, and evil is contrary to good; therefore, justice and injustice are under contrary genera. Moreover, others themselves are genera, such as good and evil, both are genera under which good and evil things are positioned, and it is not said now that goodness and evil are subject to no other genus, for they are placed under quality. But for particular goods and evils, there are no other genera than good and evil in general. Therefore, good and evil are rightly counted as the genera of other particular goods and evils. Thus, it has been most correctly said that all contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black are under color, or in contrary genera, as justice and injustice are under good and evil, or they themselves are genera, such as good and evil themselves, which are counted as the genera of justice and injustice.
On the Modes of Priority
Priority is said in four ways. Firstly, and properly according to time, in which we say that one thing is older or more ancient than another (for that which has more time is said to be more aged and ancient).
After explaining the discussion of opposites as far as it pertains to the present time, he now discusses which things can be called prior and which can be called posterior. He says that firstly and properly, and what we ordinarily call prior, is when one thing precedes and surpasses another in time, and when speaking properly according to the procession of time, we call one thing more ancient and another more aged. We say “more ancient” for inanimate things, as Porphyry suggests, and “more aged” for things that are not without a soul: as if someone says that the Theban war was more ancient than the Greeks’ destruction of Troy because it precedes it in time, for the sons of the leaders who perished in the Theban battle participated in the battles of Troy, such as Diomedes, the son of Tydeus, and Stenelus, the son of Capaneus. And this is so, since there is something more ancient even in inanimate things, as we say that the rule of kings in the Roman state is more ancient than that of the consuls and magistrates. However, for animate things, we call them more aged. For we say that Pythagoras is more aged than Socrates, and Socrates more aged than Aristotle, because they precede one another in time. Therefore, priority is said properly according to time, and there were four distinctions of priority, as Aristotle himself says when he states: Priority is said in four ways. He briefly enumerates these distinctions, to which he added a fifth, which was unknown to ancient philosophers.
And since we have spoken of the first mode of priority, we will discuss the second.
Secondly, that which does not convert according to the consequence of subsisting, as one is prior to two (for when there are two, it immediately follows that there is one; but when there is one, it is not necessary for there to be two; therefore, the consequence of the other’s subsistence does not convert from one); but that seems prior from which the consequence of subsistence does not convert.
The second meaning of priority, he says, is not understood by time but by nature, and he says that it is from which the consequence of subsisting does not convert. For if two things are opposed in such a way that if one exists, it is necessary for the other to exist, and if the other exists, it is not necessary for the other to exist, the former is prior because when it is posited to exist, it is not necessary for the other to exist, and this has been said universally.
Furthermore, examples will clarify this. Indeed, the binary number and the unit retain that nature, so that if someone proposes that there are two, he has also shown that there is one, for one is included in the two, and the binary cannot exist except through two units. Therefore, if someone posits that the binary number exists, it follows that one also exists because the binary requires the unit. But if someone posits that there is a unit, it is not yet necessary for there to be a binary. Therefore, the consequence of subsisting does not convert from the unit. For with the unit posited, it was not necessary for the quantity of the binary number to follow, because the unit does not depend on the binary, just as the binary depended on the unit. Therefore, the unit is prior to the binary: and if this is so, and whatever is such that the consequence of subsisting does not convert from it, will be proved to be prior according to Aristotle, as in the case of a human and an animal. When I say human, I have immediately said animal; when I say animal, nothing has been said about a human yet. For every human is an animal, but not every animal is a human. 285A
Thirdly, according to a certain order, prior is said, as in disciplines and in speeches; for in demonstrative disciplines there is a prior and a posterior according to order (for elements are prior to descriptions according to order, and in grammar elements are prior to syllables), and in speeches similarly (for the introduction is prior to the narration in order).
He proposes the third meaning of priority, as in geometry, he says, elements are prior to descriptions. By elements, he means what we call terms, that is, where what a point is, what a line is, and what a figure is predicted. For with these known and faithfully grasped by the mind, all geometrical descriptions are made afterward, which are called problems and theorems. Therefore, since elements are learned first and then the transition is made to descriptions, elements are prior to descriptions, namely in order, since in order for a description to be understood, the elements are taught first. And in grammar too, individual letters are taught first before the syllables that are joined from them, and so in this order, they are prior to syllables. Rhetoricians, however, often begin arguing cases not from narration but from introduction, because introductions are prior to narrations in order. Thus, the third mode of priority is that which is established according to the connection of a certain order in any art.
Moreover, besides all these, what is better and more honorable seems to be prior by nature; many people, however, are accustomed to call those more honorable and those they most revere prior; but this mode is almost the most alien.
And these are the modes of priority that are said.
He says that something appears to be prior, which sometimes is not according to time, nor according to the consequence of subsisting, nor according to order, but whatever is more valuable seems to be prior, such as the sun is prior to the moon, the soul to the body, and the mind to the soul. He proves this with the following argument: those who revere some people and consider them more honorable say that they are prior among them, and those who have the most power in public affairs are called prior by those who revere them the most. But, as he himself says, this fourth mode, now mentioned, is farthest from the meaning of priority; indeed, it is better to say that they are more venerable and honorable, but to call them prior is more of a misuse rather than any propriety.
The fifth mode, which he himself added, is of this kind:
There seems to be another mode of priority besides those which have been mentioned; for those things that convert according to the consequence of essence, that which is the cause of another in any way is worthy to be called prior by nature. However, there are some such things; for instance, the existence of a human being converts according to the consequence of subsistence to a true statement about him; for if there is a human being, the statement in which we say that there is a human being is true, and it converts (for if the statement in which we say that there is a human being is true, it is necessary that there is a human being); but a true statement is in no way the cause of a thing’s subsistence, but a thing seems to be in some way the cause for a statement to be true; for because a thing exists or does not exist, a statement is said to be true or false. Therefore, prior is said to be one thing to another according to five modes.
We know that some things can be converted in predication. If one of those that are converted is the cause of the other and, as it were, provides its natural subsistence, it is considered naturally prior. He himself affirmed this with the most appropriate example he proposed. For if there is something, it is true to say of it that it exists. Conversely, if it is true to say of it that it exists, then that very thing must exist: for instance, since there is a human being, it is true to say that there is a human being. And if it is true to say that there is a human being, there is no doubt that a human being exists. Therefore, since these two things are converted to each other, let us now examine which of them is the cause of the other so that it can subsist and exist. I see, however, that a thing gives the principle of subsistence to a true statement, for because there is a human being, it is therefore true to say of him that he exists, but not because it can be truly said of him that he exists. For a thing is the principle of the statement so that truth is present, but not so that the thing subsists, it is effected by the statement. Therefore, it is prior to be a human being, and later, for the statement about him to be true. Therefore, although they are converted, one of these things is still the cause of the other’s subsistence. He says, indeed, that among those things that are converted according to the consequence of essence, that which is the cause of another in any way is prior. As in this very statement about a human being, both are indeed converted, but the human being is the cause and the principle for the statement to be true. Aristotle says it this way: A true statement is in no way the cause of a thing’s subsistence. However, a thing seems to be, in some way, the cause for a statement to be true. For it is not because the statement exists that a thing exists, but because the statement is true, the thing itself subsists.
Therefore, there are these five modes of priority, of which he mentioned four earlier: according to time, according to that which is not converted to the consequence of subsistence, according to order, according to reverence, and according to conversion, when one thing is the cause of another’s subsistence.
But since priority has been discussed, he now begins with those things that are simultaneous.
On the Modes of Simultaneity
Things are said to be simultaneous simply and properly whose generation is in the same time; for neither is prior or posterior to the other; they are called simultaneous according to time.
When discussing priorities, he had argued that proper priorities are those which are said according to the force of preceding time. Therefore, when discussing those things that are simultaneous, he recalls the same point, and rightly so. For if time alone makes the greatest mode of priority, why should time not also make simultaneous the nature that is produced? He says, therefore, that those things that have been produced at the same time, both simply and properly, are said to be simultaneous, as if those things are older and prior which are not produced in equal but preceding time, those that do not precede each other in time are most rightly placed as simultaneous.
For those things that are produced and brought forth at one time are said to be simultaneous according to time, that is, they simultaneously receive their natural principle and substance, and these things are indeed said to be simultaneous according to time. But those things are said to be simultaneous according to nature which are converted to each other when one thing is neither the cause nor the principle of the other’s subsistence, as in the case of double and middle: for when there is a double, there is a middle; when there is a middle again, there is a double. Slave and master are also in the same way, as well as son and father. For these things, whatever they may be, when brought about, bring about other things, but when removed or existing simultaneously, they always convert to each other: for if I say father, it is also necessary to understand son; if I say son, the father immediately falls under understanding. But if I remove one, I destroy both: for if I remove the son, there is no father; if I remove the father, the son must also perish. And these things are so converted to themselves that one thing is not in any way the cause of the other: for since the father is converted to the son in predication, it is clear, but neither is the father the cause of the son’s existence, nor the son to the father, but this is of such a kind. If Aeneas had a son Ascanius, we do not say that Aeneas was the cause of Ascanius’ existence, but the father was not the cause of the son’s existence. For when I say Ascanius, it is a certain proper substance; when I say son, it cannot exist unless it is referred to something, and when I name Aeneas, I have mentioned a substance; if I call him father, it does not stand for any reason unless it is referred to the son. Therefore, Aeneas was the cause of Ascanius’ existence, but the father is not the cause of the son’s existence. For a father becomes so when there is a son. If these things are not prior in time itself, and the cause of any thing is prior to that which it is the cause of, so that it may arise, there is no doubt that the father and the son, which are both equal predications in time, neither is the cause of the other, although the substances themselves are the cause of predication for them to exist. Nor should it in any way seem similar to what was said a little earlier about a human being, that is, that there is a true statement about him, namely that he exists. For there, when something existed, then a true statement about it could exist. For it is prior for something to exist, and later for something true to be said about it. But now it is not so that someone is a father first, and then a son. For as soon as there is a father, it is necessary for there to be a son, and as soon as there is a son, the father’s predication undoubtedly follows. In this way, Aristotle explains this mode which is simultaneous according to nature.
Things are naturally simultaneous which are converted according to the consequence of subsistence, if in no way one is the cause of the other’s subsistence, as in double and middle; for these are converted (for when there is a double, there is a middle, and when there is a middle, there is a double), but neither is the cause of the other’s subsistence.
In those things which were said to be prior in such a way that they are converted, although according to the essence of their consequence, yet because in these things one is the cause and principle of the other, this was why one seemed to be prior, indeed, that of which it was the cause. This differs from those things which are converted and mutually remove each other, which, since neither is the cause of the other and yet they are converted, are rightly said to be naturally simultaneous.
And those things which are divided from the same genus into the contrary are said to be simultaneous by nature. They are said to be divided into the contrary according to the same division, as in flying, walking, and swimming; for these are divided into the contrary, since they are from the same genus; for animal is divided into flying, walking, and swimming, and none of these is prior or posterior, but they seem to be simultaneous by nature.
He added this third mode of those things which are simultaneous, that those things are also simultaneous which are placed under a genus by equal division, as if someone places the genus of humans and horses under the genus of animal, and divides humans and horses from the genus, that is, from the animal, humans and horses, since they are under the same genus, are said to be simultaneous by nature. And the rule is fitting in all genera whatsoever, for when divisions of species occur, there the species are simultaneous by nature, and if under these very species certain other things are placed, they too are said to be simultaneous by nature among themselves.
For let the genus, that is, animal, be divided into flying and walking, and since they are under the same genus, they are simultaneous by nature. And if any of these are dissolved into their underlying parts and species, as flying is divided into birds that feed on seeds, those that feed on meat, and those that feed on plants, these three species again, which are under flying, are called naturally simultaneous, which Aristotle thus says.
Each of them is also divided into species again according to the same division, as walking animals, flying animals, and swimming animals. Therefore, those things will be simultaneous by nature, which are from the same genus according to the same subdivision. However, genera are always prior; for they are not converted according to the consequence of substance, as when there is a swimming animal, there is an animal, but when there is an animal, it is not necessary for there to be a swimming animal. So, things are said to be simultaneous by nature, which are indeed converted according to the consequence of essence, but in no way one is the cause of the other’s subsistence, and from the same genus, those things which are divided into their contrary; and simply simultaneous are those whose generation is at the same time.
And for this reason, it is impossible for a genus to have only one species. For if everything under a genus is simultaneous, then they cannot be simultaneous unless there are multiple. Therefore, a genus cannot have only one species under it. For if there is only one, it cannot be said to be simultaneous, because it is customary for some things of the same genus which are naturally found to be simultaneous. But this is about species. Genera, however, are always prior, for they are not converted according to the consequence of subsistence. One mode of the prior is according to which those things that are prior are said, which in no way are converted to subsist, which also happens in genera. For genera are not converted to the consequence of subsistence in this way. Let animal be a genus, and human be a species. Indeed, when I say a human exists, it also follows that an animal exists. If I say an animal, the consequence of subsistence is not converted to a human. For it can be an animal, but not a human. Therefore, the consequence of subsistence is not converted from animal to human.
If, by positing a human, it is established that there is an animal, but by naming an animal it is not necessary for there to be a human, the animal exists before the human. That description of the prior also applies, that those things which are prior, when removed, remove others, but when introduced, do not introduce others. For when the animal is removed, it also takes the human with it; but when it is said that there is an animal, it does not immediately bring the human with it. Later things, however, are different. For when introduced, they simultaneously introduce others, but when removed, they do not remove others. When a human is mentioned, it immediately brings the animal with it, for every human is an animal. But if a human is substantially removed, it is not necessary for the animal to be removed as well since the name “animal” can be applied to multiple species. If this happens, with the human removed, the animal will remain. Therefore, it concludes that there are three species of those things which are simultaneous according to time, according to nature when both are converted in such a way that neither is the cause of the other. The third genus is according to the same division under the same genus. Since in doing and suffering, there was a certain motion, and he had connected doing and suffering with predicaments, he now treats motions and pronounces that there are six in number.
On the Species of Motion
There are six species of motion: generation, corruption, growth, diminution, alteration, and change of place. It is clear that these motions are different from each other; for generation is not corruption, nor is growth diminution, nor is change of place alteration; and similarly for the rest.
In his Physics, Aristotle divided the species of motion using another rationale. He says that there is a difference between change and motion, and he claims that there are two species of change: generation and corruption. Motion, however, has three species: according to quantity, according to quality, and according to place. Therefore, since this book is somewhat intended as an introduction, he did not want to overcomplicate the division’s reasoning, lest it confound the minds of those entering with a more subtle division. Thus, he makes the division of motion in this way. There is one species of motion according to substance, another according to quantity, another according to quality, and another according to place. According to substance, there is generation and corruption, for both of these occur in substance. For something is generated according to substance, and something is corrupted according to substance. According to quantity, there is growth and diminution. For things are said to grow or diminish according to quantity when increased or decreased. According to quality, there is the alteration, which occurs according to certain passions, which are evidently qualities. According to place, there is change in length or curvature; and inwardly in length, it is from upward to downward, from the front to the back, from right to left; and again, if you reverse these and proceed in a straight line, they will be the same motions.
It is also true that these are all species of motion, for they do not participate with each other except in the name of their genus, which is called motion. For generation is not the same as corruption, as generation is the entrance into substance, and corruption is the exit from substance. Nor is diminution the same as growth, nor is change of place similar to any of the higher ones. Alteration, however, may have some doubt, as it does not seem to differ from the higher ones, which question he proposed in this way.
In alteration, there is some doubt, lest perhaps it is necessary for what is altered to change according to some of the remaining motions. But this is not true; for it almost happens to us that we are changed according to all or many passions without sharing any other motions. For it is not necessary that what is moved according to passion grows or diminishes, and similarly for the others. Therefore, alteration will be different from the other changes (for if it were the same, it would be necessary for everything that is altered to grow or diminish immediately, or to follow some other motions; but this is not necessary). Similarly, for what grows or changes according to any other motion.
However, in alteration, there is some doubt, lest it might be necessary for what is altered to change according to any of the remaining motions. For if everything that is altered is either generated, corrupted, diminished, or grows, or it is necessary to be transferred according to place, there is no doubt that this species does not differ from the others above, which is called alteration; which Aristotle rejects, saying: BUT THIS IS NOT TRUE. But since what is altered is not entirely generated, nor corrupted: as someone who has stood in the sun for a long time, if they have turned from white to black, they are said to be altered according to color, but they are not generated or corrupted, nor indeed has any growth or diminution been made for them, nor is there any change of place, for one can remain in the same place and be altered by some external passions that come to them, and they can also grow and decrease, apart from a change in quality, which Aristotle himself proclaims.
But there are some things that grow and do not change, such as a square that grows with the addition of a gnomon but is not changed; and similarly, for others of this kind. Therefore, these motions are different from each other.
What he says is as follows: If a gnomon is added to a square, the square indeed grows but is not changed. Therefore, by removing the gnomon, the square is diminished but not changed. For example, let the square be ABCD, and let an angle BC be drawn, and let the four sides AC, AB, BD, AC be divided equally by points GEHF, and let lines GHFE be drawn. The square AD is then divided into four smaller squares: EG, FG, EH, and HF. If any three of these smaller squares around the same angle are removed, the remaining figure is called a gnomon. For instance, if EG, GF, and FH are removed, the gnomon MN is found, which is separated from the square ABEH by the gnomon MN. The entire square AD has indeed been diminished, having become small from its previous large size, but it has not changed the form of the square. If the square EH alone exists and a gnomon MN is placed around it, the square has indeed grown and become larger, but it has not changed. For all squares are similar in their proper quality. If this kind of motion were an alteration, and not completely separated from the previous ones, there would be no doubt that whatever is altered would always have to change according to some mode of the prior motions. So it would either be born, or corrupted, or diminished, or grow, or change according to place. But since this is not the case, this species of motion is distinct from all the previous motions. But it was demonstrated above that the five superior species of motion are completely separated from each other in terms of substance. Therefore, these six motions are similarly distinct and diverse.
Simply speaking, motion is contrary to rest; for each motion, corruption is contrary to generation, diminution to growth, and rest according to place is contrary to change of place. Most of all, change of place seems to be opposed to the contrary place, as from what is downward to what is upward and from what is upward to what is downward.
Now he proceeds to the oppositions of motions, and to the genus itself, that is, motion, he says rest is contrary, for motion has rest as its contrary. However, for each species of motion, there are contrary motions, such as corruption being contrary to generation, and since generation is motion and corruption is motion as well, both are contrary to each other. Diminution is also contrary to growth. Therefore, these species of motion have oppositions in different ways than the genus we have shown before: motion itself has rest as its contrary. But for the species of motion, it is not only rest but also other motions that are contrary, such as corruption to generation and diminution to growth, while for change of place, the opposition is similar to the genus. For it also has rest according to place as its contrary, as it is contrary to move from one place to another and not to move, and not moving according to place is rest, while moving according to place is change of place.
Above all, he says, change of place is contrary to the change of place in the opposite direction. For example, if something is upward and remains there, being at rest, and then has such motion that it moves downward, although rest is contrary to the previous motion, this kind of motion, which takes place in the opposite direction, is even more contrary to the previous motion. And this indeed happens in other motions: for example, if someone is on the right, and their motion is to the left, the motion is said to be made in the opposite direction. And this can be seen in other motions as well; but Aristotle doubts whether there can be something contrary to the remaining motion, that is, alteration, which question he proposes as follows:
But for the remaining one of those assigned to motion, it is not easy to assign what is contrary to it; however, it seems that there is neither anything contrary to it, unless someone opposes rest according to quality to change according to quality, which is in the opposite, just as rest according to place is opposed to change according to place, or change to the opposite place (for alteration is change according to quality).
From the similarity of the motions, we also gather their oppositions. For since earlier he found rest according to place to be contrary to motion according to place, and since every alteration that occurs according to some affection changes according to quality, he places the opposition of its motion in rest according to quality: for example, if a stone is cold, and remains so, that quality has remained and is at rest; but if it becomes warm, that quality has changed, and this change is contrary, and indeed motion has occurred, and in the warmth of the stone, there has been a change according to quality, while there was rest in the coldness according to the same quality. Therefore, although it may seem that this motion has no contrary at all, yet, just as it was said earlier that rest according to place is contrary to change according to place, why should rest according to quality not also be said to be contrary to change according to quality? For the definition of alteration is change according to quality; when the quality of any thing is moved, there is a change, namely according to quality.
But if it seems that not only rest according to place but also change to the opposite place is most contrary to change according to place, then not only will rest according to quality be contrary to change according to quality, but most of all, change to the opposite quality: for example, when something is white and becomes red, the change of quality itself was contrary to the rest that could have remained in the white color, so that it changed from white to red; for if something changes from white to black, it is most changed, and this is contrary to the previous change, since it has changed to the opposite quality. And this is what he says:
Therefore, rest according to quality or change to the opposite quality is opposed to it, as something black becoming white; for it is changed, with the change made to the opposite quality.
This is also illustrated by a very clear common example. Therefore, since we have dealt with the motions, let us explain the ambiguity that follows.
On the Ways of Having
Having is said in several ways: either as a habit or an affection or some other quality (for we are said to have knowledge and virtue); or as a quantity, as the magnitude someone has (for one is said to have a two-cubit or three-cubit magnitude); or regarding clothing or a tunic on the body; or in a part (such as a ring on the hand); or a part (such as a hand or foot); or in a container (such as a measure of wheat in a bushel or wine in a cask; for wine is said to be in a cask, and a bushel of wheat; thus, these are said to be had as in a container); or as possession (for we are said to have a house or land). We are also said to have a wife, and a wife to have a husband; however, this way of having seems to be the most alien from the others; for having a wife signifies nothing else than cohabiting. Perhaps other ways of having will also appear; but those which are commonly said are almost all enumerated.
It is evident that the way of having is ambiguous, for having is said in so many ways, yet it is predicated equivocally. For we are said to have some quality, such as a habit or disposition. We are also said to have knowledge or virtue; we are also said to have a quantity, for we are said to have a measurement of five or four feet. Moreover, we are said to have something in the parts of the body themselves, and to have the parts themselves, for we are said to have fingers, and rings on a finger. We are also said to have something around the body, such as a tunic, or any other garment. Furthermore, something is said to be held in a container, such as wheat in a bushel and wine in a cask; these, namely, are said to be had in this way, as in a container. It is also said that someone has a wife, which, namely, has no common meaning with those mentioned above, but (as it seems to Aristotle himself) this meaning is far removed from the predicate of having; for we do not properly have wives, but that someone is said to have a wife, signifies living with a wife, for we say to have as living, as in the case of having Socrates, that is, living with Socrates and associating with him. Therefore, Aristotle also says that there may be perhaps other ways of having besides those that are said, and he encourages us to some further inquiry, so that we may also seek through what other ways, besides the previously mentioned ones, having can be predicated. And enough has been said about this ambiguity of having.
But perhaps someone may doubt why, since he mentioned having earlier as a genus, he now places it as an ambiguous term; but this question is solved in this way. It is not absurd for the same category to be predicated now univocally, now equivocally. Univocally indeed, as earlier when he proposed examples of the same species, such as being shoed or being armed, for the genus of such things. Equivocally, however, as in the ways he explained above.
And if the predicate of having also has some proper species, and the name itself is said in multiple ways, there is nothing incongruous in it being counted as a genus; for it is sufficient to demonstrate that it is a genus and a predicate of having that it contains some parts and species under itself.
The End, Happily
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