On Secrets, by Thomas Aquinas

In this short work, Saint Thomas Aquinas addresses various questions related to secrets. He argues that in cases where someone accuses another of a hidden sin that cannot be proven, the superior should not order the accused to tell the truth in the presence of the accuser, nor is the accused obligated to expose themselves. He also states that in secret matters, man cannot be a judge and, therefore, should not order or proceed unless they are a judge. However, if there is an imminent danger of scandal or harm to the community, the superior can order the subject to reveal the secret. Aquinas also discusses whether a confessor is obliged to reveal the origin of a letter containing dangerous evils of another person, which he received under secrecy, and concludes that the superior should not order the confessor to disclose where he got the letter. Lastly, he addresses the question of whether the superior can inquire by command, and the one who did it, reveal who committed a crime that is not known, and provides his opinion that the superior can order in general, but other masters do not agree.

Question 1

The first question was, if one brother accuses another, or someone else of a hidden sin that cannot be proven, or that is known only to the accused or the accuser; can the superior order the accused to tell the truth in the presence of the accuser; and whether the accused is obliged to expose himself because of the command. If he does so, and he can be convicted by two, namely the superior and the accused, the secret will then be made public.

I answer by saying, the superior should not order it, and he commits a grave sin if he does, nor is the accused obligated to answer, because he is not bound to expose and reveal himself.

Question 2

The second question was: whether in the aforementioned case, the superior should separately order the accused to tell the truth to him alone.

I answer by saying, he should not order, nor is the other person obligated to answer, because hidden matters are left to divine judgment, and public ones to human; therefore, in secret matters, man cannot be a judge: and so neither can he order nor proceed unless he is a judge, nor is the other person bound to obey.

Question 3

The third question was: if someone accuses someone of a crime that he alone knows, or that he cannot prove, whether the superior should inquire, or order, that the truth be told in the chapter before everyone; and whether the accused is obliged to confess before the superior because of the command.

I answer by saying as above, and even more strongly, that the superior should not order, and if he does, he commits a grave sin, nor is the other person obliged to expose himself; but he should say: let the accuser prove what he says, otherwise I seek justice for an unwarranted accusation; or he should respond with something like this; or remain silent: because in secret matters, man is not a judge, as stated above, question II.

Question 4

The fourth question was: whether a subject is bound to reveal matters committed under secrecy at the command of the superior.

It should be answered that if, due to the reception of the secret, there is imminent danger of scandal and ruin, or serious prejudice, or harm to the community, which can be avoided through the revelation of the secret, the superior can order in this case, and the other person is bound to reveal: because a greater evil outweighs a lesser good. Hence, if a greater evil follows from keeping the received secret than from revealing it, the secret should not be kept, especially where it is required by command: because just as an oath is not a bond of iniquity, as Augustine says, so the promise of a secret should not be a bond of iniquity or a veil. However, if no danger or scandal is imminent from keeping the secret, or any of the aforementioned situations, neither should the superior order nor is the subject bound, or should he reveal the secret by command where there is no imminent danger of any seriousness, as stated above: because if there were, the secret would not be kept faithfully, but contrary to faith, to the great prejudice of others. The things said about not ordering and not revealing the secret should be understood, as the aforementioned masters say, where fame or infamy has not preceded, because where such fame has preceded, that an inquiry would be made into the crime in a judicial or contentious forum, the superior can order and inquire and require an oath.

Question 5

The fifth question was as follows: someone mentions dangerous evils of another person in confession, giving the confessor permission to report it to the superior, without mentioning the confessor’s name. Also, on the other hand, a letter is given secretly to the confessor, containing the same matters to be reported as were said in the confession; an investigation is carried out, and finally it is found through the confession of the accused or the informant that the denunciation was true. After this, the superior, wanting to know the origin of the denunciation, orders the confessor to disclose where he got that letter, which he had received outside of confession. The other person answers: although I received it outside of confession, I received it under secrecy, and it cannot be disclosed to the superior without revealing the confessed sin, and the matters that were reported were confessed to the superior, and the confessor asserts this because he is sure of what is being said. The question then arises whether the superior should order and the other person should obey, or whether the superior should believe the person who is speaking.

I answer that the superior should not order, nor is the other person bound to obey, not only because of the confession which he would believe to be revealed, but also because of the secrecy under which he received it; and especially in the proposed case, there is no question, where it is known that the denunciation was true, and no danger is feared, nor any serious threat is imminent. In such a case, it is not allowed to inquire into or reveal a secret outside of confession. Brother Thomas, however, said that if it is dealt with judicially, namely if the accuser says he will prove it or binds himself to a penalty of retaliation, the superior can inquire by command, and the other person is bound to obey and answer the truth as to the judge because where the secular judge can demand an oath, the religious superior can give a command. But it is objected against this that man is not a judge in secret matters, but only God, and the laws want that if someone swears by the command of a judge to tell the truth, he is not bound by such an oath to tell the truth about hidden matters, namely those that cannot be proven, because such things are called hidden in law, which cannot be proven. Therefore, it seems that such a person is not bound to expose himself because of the superior’s command, nor to be so because of the oath required by the judge. Hence, in this his opinion does not agree with the opinions of other masters.

Question 6

The sixth question was: some evil deed happens, but it is not known who did it, for example, a theft occurs in the house, or a house is burned down, or something of this sort; can the superior inquire by command, and the one who did it, reveal it?

I answer: Brother Thomas said that the superior can order in general, like this: I command that whoever did this or knows about it, is bound to say. Other masters do not agree with Brother Thomas Aquinas on this point.