Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s paper on the book of an English anti-Trinitarian, containing considerations on several explanations of the Trinity, was published in the year 1693-4. Leibniz discusses the Trinity and his objections to the concept of three absolute substances, each infinite, eternal, and perfect. He argues that the Sabellian opinion, which considers the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three names for the same being, cannot be reconciled with the passages in the Holy Scriptures. Leibniz also believes that the explanation given by the Socinians is too violent. He proposes that divine honors should only be given to a single individual, absolute, sovereign, and infinite substance. Leibniz acknowledges that the explanation of the mysteries of religion is not necessary, and it would be best to stick to the revealed terms as much as possible. He further discusses the difficulties in explaining what a person is and suggests that there are relations within the divine substance that distinguish the persons. Leibniz believes that there is no example in nature that adequately corresponds to the notion of divine persons, but finds the reflection of spirits to be the most suitable illustration.
Firstly, I agree that the commandment to worship one God is the most important of all time and must be considered the most inviolable. Therefore, I do not believe that we should admit three absolute substances, each of which is infinite, all-powerful, eternal, and supremely perfect. It also seems very dangerous at least to conceive of the Word and the Holy Spirit as two intellectual substances inferior to the great God and yet worthy of a worship that approaches the worship that pagans rendered to their gods, or rather surpasses it. Thus, I believe that divine honors should only be given to a single individual, absolute, sovereign, and infinite substance.
However, the Sabellian opinion, which considers the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit as three names, as three aspects of the same being, cannot agree with the passages of the Holy Scriptures without violating them in a strange manner. Likewise, the explanations given by the Socinians to these passages are also very violent. As for us, when we say: the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and one of these three is not the other, and yet there are not three gods but one, this could appear to be a manifest contradiction; for this is precisely what the notion of plurality consists of. If A is C, and B is C, and if A is not B, nor B is A, it must be said that there are two Cs, that is to say: if John is a man and Peter is a man, and John is not Peter, and Peter is not John, there will be two men, or else we must admit that we do not know what two is. Thus, if in the Symbol attributed to St. Athanasius, where it is said that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and yet there is only one God, the word or term God was always taken in the same sense, both in naming three, each of which is God, and in saying that there is only one God; it would be an untenable contradiction. Therefore, in the first case, it must be taken as a person of the Divinity, of which there are three, and in the second as an absolute substance that is unique. I know that there are scholastic authors who believe that this principle of logic or metaphysics: Qua a sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se (Those things that are equal to a third thing are equal to each other), has no place in the Trinity. But I believe that this would give cause for victory to the Socinians by overturning one of the first principles of human reasoning, without which we could no longer reason about anything or assure anything. That is why I was very surprised to see that clever people among the scholastic theologians admitted that what is said about the Trinity would be a formal contradiction in creatures. For I believe that what is a contradiction in terms is so everywhere. One could undoubtedly be satisfied with saying only that we recognize and worship only one and unique all-powerful God, and that in the unique essence of God there are three persons, the Father, the Son or Word, and the Holy Spirit; that these three persons have this relationship among themselves, that the Father is the principle of the other two; that the eternal production of the Son is called birth in the Scripture, and that of the Holy Spirit is called procession; but that their external actions are common, except for the function of the incarnation with all that depends on it, which is proper to the Son, and that of sanctification, which is proper to the Holy Spirit in a very particular way.
However, the objections of opponents have led to further exploration, and an attempt to explain what a person is. This has been all the more difficult to achieve because explanations depend on definitions. Those who give us sciences usually give us definitions as well, but this is not the case with legislators, and even less so with religion. Thus, the Holy Scripture as well as tradition provide us with certain terms, but do not give us precise definitions at the same time. This means that when we try to explain things, we are forced to make possible hypotheses, much like in astronomy. And often lawyers are obliged to do the same, seeking to give a meaning to a word that can satisfy all passages and reason at the same time. The difference is that the explanation of the mysteries of religion is not necessary, whereas that of laws is necessary to judge disputes. Therefore, in matters of mystery, it would be best to stick precisely to the revealed terms, as much as possible.
I do not know enough about how Messrs. Cudworth and Sherlock explain things, but their well-known erudition makes me doubt not that they have given a good sense to what they have advanced. However, I would dare to say that three infinite spirits, being posited as absolute substances, would be three gods, notwithstanding the perfect intelligence that would make one understand everything that happens in the other. Something more is needed for numerical unity; otherwise, God, who perfectly understands our thoughts, would also be essentially united with us, even to the point of becoming the same individual. Moreover, it would be a union of several natures if each person has their own, namely, if they have their own infinity, knowledge, omnipotence: and it would not be the union of three persons who have the same individual nature, which should be the case.
I have not seen what Mr. Wallis and Dr. S-ht, who have been cited here, have written on this subject, and I have no doubt that they have explained it in a manner consistent with orthodoxy, for I know the penetration of Mr. Wallis, who is one of the greatest geometers of the century, and who will never be found wanting, no matter which way his mind may turn. Furthermore, the author of this book admits that Mr. Wallis’s explanation has received public approval. However, I dare say that a personality like the one Cicero spoke of when he said, “Tres personas unus sustineo” (I hold that there are three persons in one), is not enough. Therefore, I am certain that Mr. Wallis must have added something more. It is also not sufficient to say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit differ through relations similar to modes, such as postures, presences, or absences. These kinds of relationships attributed to the same substance will never create three distinct persons existing at the same time. So, I imagine that Mr. S-ht, whoever he may be, will not be satisfied with that either. Therefore, it must be said that there are relations within the divine substance that distinguish the persons since these persons cannot be absolute substances. But it must also be said that these relations must be substantial, which cannot be adequately explained by mere modalities. Furthermore, it must be said that the divine persons are not the same concrete being under different denominations or relationships, as would be the case with the same man, who is a poet and an orator, but three different respective concretes in one absolute concrete. It must also be said that the three persons are not as absolute substances as the whole.
It must be acknowledged that there is no example in nature that adequately corresponds to this notion of divine persons. But it is not necessary to find one, and it is sufficient that what has just been said does not imply any contradiction or absurdity. The divine substance undoubtedly has privileges that surpass all other substances. However, since we do not know enough about all of nature, we cannot say with certainty that there is no absolute substance that contains several respective ones.
Nevertheless, to make these notions more accessible with something resembling them, I find nothing in creatures more suitable for illustrating this subject than the reflection of spirits, when the same spirit is its own immediate object and acts upon itself, thinking about itself and what it is doing. For the reduplication gives an image or shadow of two respective substances in the same absolute individual substance, namely, that which understands and that which is understood. Both of these beings are substantial, both are individual concretes, and they differ by mutual relations, but they constitute only one and the same absolute individual substance. However, I dare not take the comparison too far, and I do not claim that the difference between the three divine persons is no greater than that between what understands and what is understood when a finite spirit thinks of itself, especially since what is modal, accidental, imperfect, and mutable in us is real, essential, complete, and immutable in God. It is enough that this reduplication is like a trace of divine personalities. Therefore, the Holy Scripture, calling the Son, the Word or Logos, that is, mental word, seems to give us to understand that nothing is more appropriate for clarifying these things than the analogy of mental operations. It is also for this reason that the Fathers attributed his will to the Holy Spirit, as they attributed understanding to the Son and power to the Father, by distinguishing power, knowledge, and will, or rather the Father, the Word, and the Love.
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