On the Eternity of the World, by Boethius of Dacia

True to their Aristotelian leanings, the Latin Averroists acknowledged Aristotle’s assertion that the world did not begin in creation and is eternal. As Richard Dales has, shown, however, even so ardent a proponent of Aristotle as Boethius of Dacia did not accept Aristotle’s conception of time and eternity uncritically. Indeed, when he set about to write his own account of the eternity of the world, Boethius of Dacia’s main source was neither Aristotle nor Averroes, but Maimonides. Boethius chose the complex problem of eternity to illustrate his thesis that there is no conflict between Christian faith and classical philosophy. His argument rested on his belief that natural philosophy-the observation of the world as it actually is-has no connection with speculation about the possibility of supernatural creation. Like Maimonides, Boethius believed that neither the eternity of the world nor its creation in time could be proven through demonstrable arguments, although he showed a greater willingness than Maimonides to accept the possibility of an eternal world. In an attempt to correct the misconceptions of his predecessors , however, Boethius followed an argument proposed by Maimonides to demonstrate that Aristotle had not successfully proven the eternity of the world. Preoccupied as he was with the thirteenth-century debates concerning the relationship of faith to reason, Boethius felt compelled to find a way of balancing his own deep commitment to philosophy with the religious concerns which dominated his age. His reading of Maimonides aided him in envisioning the problem of eternity as a significant but abstract problem which the methods of neither theology nor natural philosophy could solve. His conclusion that faith and reason should not be forced to compete in the search for truth is an approach which was not regularly taken in the middle ages. Nevertheless, his atypical approach focused attention on the struggle between faith and reason which influenced all medieval discussions of time. As we shall see, those fourteenth-century theologians who eventually tried tentatively to separate faith from reason were profoundly disturbed by the implications their predecessors’ speculations had for both theology and natural philosophy.

—Edith Wilks Dolnikowski, Thomas Bradwardine, §3

[1] Just as in matters that must be believed on the basis of faith, which do not have a reason of their own, it is foolish to seek a reason because those who do so are searching for something that cannot be found; and it is heretical not to believe in those matters without a reason, so in matters that are not self-evident but have a reason of their own, it is not philosophical to believe in them without a reason. Therefore, in order to bring the Christian belief in the eternity of the world and the belief of Aristotle and some other philosophers into harmony, so that the belief may be firmly held even though it cannot be demonstrated in some cases, we must avoid the foolishness of seeking a demonstration where it is not possible to find one, and also avoid heresy by not believing what must be held by faith because it does not have a demonstration of its own, as was the custom of some philosophers who were pleased with no established law because the articles of the law did not have a demonstration of their own, so that the belief of the philosophers may also be preserved, as far as their reasoning can conclude, for their belief contradicts the Christian faith only among the unintelligent: for the belief of the philosophers is based on demonstrations and certain reasons that are possible in the things they speak of, while faith is based on many miracles and not reasons. For what is held because it is concluded by reasons is not faith but knowledge. And so, in order to show that faith and philosophy do not contradict each other on the eternity of the world, and also to show that the reasons of some heretics do not have the force by which they hold that the world is eternal against the Christian faith, let us inquire by reason whether the world is eternal.

[2] And it seems that this is not the case: the first principle is the cause of the substance of the world, because if not, then there would be many first principles. But that which has being from another follows it in duration, therefore the world follows the first principle in duration. But eternal being does not follow anything in duration, therefore the world is not eternal.

Also, nothing can be equal to God; therefore, if the world were eternal, it would be equal to God in duration, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore, finite power cannot create infinite duration, because duration does not exceed the power that creates it; but the power of the heavens is finite, just as the power of any finite body is. Therefore, the power of the heavens does not make duration eternal, and thus neither is the heavens eternal, nor the entire world since the world does not precede the heavens.

Moreover, God precedes the world according to nature, but in God, nature and duration are the same. Therefore, God precedes the world according to duration. Therefore, the world is not eternal.

Also, everything created is made from nothing. This is what distinguishes creation from generation because every generation is from a subject and matter, and the generator cannot make the whole substance of the thing. But creation is not from a subject and matter, and thus the creator can make the whole substance of the thing. However, the world is created because before the world, there was no subject and matter from which the world could be made. Therefore, the world is made from nothing. And something that comes to be from non-being is new. Therefore, the world is new and thus not eternal, since new and eternal do not belong together in the same thing.

Moreover, that to which something can be added can be made greater by it. Therefore, to all the time that has passed, time can be added, and therefore all the time that has passed can be made greater by something else. But nothing can be greater than the infinite, so all the time that has passed is not infinite, and therefore neither is motion nor the world.

Also, if the world were eternal, then infinite humans, animals, and plants would have been generated and corrupted. But if generation were eternal, then this individual human would have preceded another, and that one another, and so on infinitely. However, for one effect to be from infinitely many agents is impossible. Because if there were no first agent or mover, there would be no motion, since the first mover is the cause of all motion, as stated in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Moreover, among infinite agents, none can be the first. Therefore, this generation is not eternal, and thus neither is the world.

Aristotle also argues in Physics VI that magnitude, motion, and time are of the same nature in terms of finiteness and infinity. But since no magnitude is infinite, as Aristotle proves in Physics III, neither is motion, time, nor the world, since the world cannot exist without these.

Furthermore, if the world were eternal, then an infinite number of humans would have been generated and corrupted, but when a human dies, the rational soul remains, since it is ungenerated and incorruptible. Therefore, an infinite number of such substances would be in actuality at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Also, if the world were eternal, then an infinite motion would have been traversed and infinite time would have passed, because if the world were eternal, then the preceding time to this moment would have been infinite. But it is impossible for the infinite to be traversed or accepted. Therefore, etc.

Also, that which has another cause has a beginning, and the world has another cause. Therefore, the world has a beginning. “For the sea was made because the world was made,” as it is said in Meteorology II. That which has a beginning is not eternal. Therefore, etc.

[3] On the contrary, it is argued: first, that the world can be eternal, and that nothing impossible follows from this; second, that it is shown that the world is eternal. The first argument is as follows: although an effect follows its cause naturally, it can still exist simultaneously with its cause in duration. The world and all created being are the effect of the first being. Therefore, since the first being is eternal, the world can be coeternal with it. The major premise is evident because the priority and posteriority of nature and the simultaneity of duration are compatible. The minor premise is also evident because, just as in every genus, the first thing must be the cause of all other things, so in the genus of being, the first being must be the cause of other things. And from this it follows that the first being is an uncaused being, because it must be the sufficient cause of all things. But no caused thing is a sufficient cause of any of its effects, because the essence of the caused being depends on the same thing from which all its effects depend. Therefore, the first being must be an uncaused being, otherwise, it would not be the first being.

The same argument appears in Aristotle’s Physics VIII, where he says that although something may be eternal, it should not be assumed to have a beginning. For example, a triangle having three angles equal to two right angles is eternal, yet another cause must be sought for this eternal thing. Therefore, the eternal can have a cause. Therefore, since nothing can precede the eternal in duration, an effect can be coeternal with its cause. The world is the effect of the first being; therefore, the world can be coeternal with it.

Likewise, this is evident through an example: if the sun had always been in our hemisphere, then light would always have been in the middle, and it would have been coeternal with the sun, yet still its effect. This would not be possible if an effect could not exist simultaneously with its cause in duration.

Also, if a foot had always been in the dust, then the footprint would have been coeternal with it, yet still its effect.

Likewise, this can be argued through reason: nothing is eternal in the future without a past, because the power that can make the duration of something eternal in the future could also have made the duration of that same thing eternal in the past, since that power is unchangeable and always has itself in one way. However, the world is eternal in the future, according to the Christian faith and the opinion of some philosophers. Therefore, through the same power, it could have been eternal in the past. Thus, the world can be eternal, and nothing impossible seems to follow from this by reason, nor can any inconvenience be argued from it. And this will become clear to those who dedicate their studies to this.

[4] The argument for the eternity of the world is as follows:

<1> Everything incorruptible has the power to exist always, because if it did not have such power, it would not be incorruptible. But the world is incorruptible, because everything ungenerated is incorruptible; therefore, the world has the power to exist always. And since a thing endures throughout the duration of the power of its being, the world is eternal.

<2> That which has no duration before it is eternal, because everything new has some duration before it. But the world had no duration before it, since there was no time before the world. Time follows the motion of the first mover, as passion follows the subject. Neither was there eternity before the world, for that which has a duration before it is not eternal. If therefore there were an eternal duration before the world, the world would never have come to be.

<3> What is made anew can only come to be because if it were not possible, then it would be impossible. The possibility of a thing coming to be lies in its matter. But before the making of the world, there was no matter out of which the world could be made. Therefore, the world was not made anew, but is eternal, since there is no middle ground between the new and the eternal.

<4> Everything new is made by transmutation, because whoever removes transmutation removes all newness. But every transmutation has a subject and matter. As it is written at the beginning of the eighth book of the Metaphysics and the seventh book of the same and the third book of the Physics, all motion and every change is the act of something in potentiality, insofar as it is such. Therefore, since there was no matter or subject for transmutation before the making of the world that was required for the making of the world anew, the world was not made anew, but is eternal.

<5> Everything new is in time, for something new that endures for a certain duration must be in part of that duration. That which happens during an entire day is not new for that day, and that which is in an entire year is not new for that year, but that which is new in a year must be in some part of that year. All durations of time have parts, but the world naturally exists before time. Therefore, the world is not new, but eternal.

<6> Every generation comes from corruption, and every corruption from generation. Therefore, before any generation there must have been generation, and before any corruption there must have been corruption. Therefore, there cannot be a first generation or a first corruption, and generation and corruption are eternal. Therefore, the world is eternal, because what is generated and corrupted are parts of the world that cannot precede the world in duration.

<7> An effect cannot follow its sufficient cause in duration. The sufficient cause of the world is eternal, since it is the first principle. Therefore, the world cannot follow its cause in duration, because the first principle is eternal, so the world is coeternal with it. This is confirmed by the fact that an eternal being, in substance and in every disposition, to which nothing is added in the future, and from which nothing is taken away in the past, through which it produces its effect, makes its effect coeternal with itself. God is an eternal being in substance and in every disposition, to which nothing is added in the future, and from which nothing is taken away in the past, and the world is his immediate effect. Therefore, the world is coeternal with God.

<8> Furthermore, Aristotle says in Book IX of the Metaphysics that “an agent acting voluntarily, when it can and wishes to, acts, and there is no need to add ‘if it is not impeded,’ for the power removes the impediment.” But God had the power and will to create the world from eternity, so the world was created eternal.

<9> Moreover, every new effect requires some novelty in one of its principles. If all the principles of an effect always had the same mode of existence, then no effect could arise from them, since it did not exist before. However, in the beginning of the world, which is the first being, no novelty is possible. Therefore, the world is not a new effect. This reasoning is confirmed by the fact that if an agent is new in substance, it can still be the cause of a new effect, either because it is eternal in substance but new in some power or position (as in the case of the celestial body), or because it was previously impeded, or because a new disposition has arisen in the subject from which it acts. However, none of these possibilities can apply to the cause of the world, as is clear from its nature. Therefore, the world is not a new effect.

<10> Furthermore, anything that moves after being at rest is reduced to a continuous and eternal motion, for something that moves and then rests cannot be caused by an immobile cause. Therefore, since motion cannot proceed infinitely, with each motion being caused by another, the first motion must be continuous and eternal. For this reason, in Book VIII of the Physics, Aristotle reduces every new motion to the first motion, as to its cause, which, according to his opinion, is eternal. He holds this opinion because a motion that always has sufficient causes cannot be new, and the first motion always has sufficient causes. If it did not, then another motion would have preceded it, through which sufficient causes were brought about when they previously did not exist. This would mean that it was both first and not first, which is impossible.

<11> Also, a will that postpones what it wishes expects something in the future. Before the world existed, there was no expectation because there was no time. Expectation can only exist in time. Therefore, the world is not posterior to the divine will, which is eternal, so the world is co-eternal with the divine will.

<12> Additionally, every effect that sufficiently depends on a will, and between which and that will no duration intervenes, exists simultaneously with that will. This is because they are in the same duration, between which no duration intervenes. The world sufficiently depends on the divine will, for it has no other cause, and between them no duration intervenes because there is no time. Before the world, there was no time or eternity because then the non-existence of the world would be eternal. Therefore, since what exists in eternity is eternal, the non-existence of the world would be eternal, which is impossible. Therefore, the world is co-eternal with the divine will.

<13> Finally, every new effect requires some change either in its agent or in the subject from which it arises, or at least the arrival of the time when the agent, always acting in the same way, wishes to act. Before the world, no such change could have occurred. Therefore, the world cannot be a new effect.

[5] Someone might respond that the world is actually a new creation because it was the eternal form of God’s will to create the world at the moment when it was created. From an ancient will, a new effect can proceed, and therefore it is not necessary for there to be any transformation either in the will or in the one willing it. For example, someone may have the will to do something in three days, and on the third day, they will do what they willed previously and from ancient times, and yet no transformation has occurred in the will or in the one willing it. In this way, the world can be new, even though it has an eternal and sufficient cause.

However, against this way of reasoning, it is argued that whoever posits an antecedent also posits everything that follows from it and cannot verify it. You posit such a form of God’s will from eternity, and you cannot demonstrate it, making it easy to posit anything. Someone could tell you that such a form of divine will did not exist from eternity, and you have no way to contradict them. Therefore, you also posit that the world is new, and you cannot demonstrate this either.

Similarly, against this way of reasoning, it is argued that what is willed proceeds from the will according to the form of the will. Therefore, if the form of God’s will was such that he willed to create the world at a certain hour from eternity, it would have been impossible for God to have created the world before then, which seems inconvenient since God is an agent who acts through the freedom of the will.

To this argument, one may respond that actually God could have created the world before then because, just as he had this form of will from eternity, he could have had another form, and therefore, just as he produced the world at the moment of its creation, he could have produced it earlier.

However, against this response, it is argued that what is transmutable according to wills can be changed into another form, but God is entirely immutable; therefore, he cannot have another form of will than the one he had from eternity.

<14> Furthermore, from an ancient will, between which and its effect there is no transformation, no new effect can be produced. Whatever effect is not simultaneous with its cause in duration results from a transformation that takes place between them. Whoever eliminates transformation eliminates all expectation. However, between the will of God, which is eternal and with which the world cannot undergo any transformation, there can be no transformation before the world. Therefore, the world is coeternal with the divine will.

<15> Additionally, according to the example presented, it is not suitable to the argument. The example refers to a person who currently has the will to do something in three days, and on the third day, they do what they willed from the beginning. However, this example is not suitable for the argument because, although there is no transmutation in the will or the person, there is a transmutation in the arrival of the third day. If there were no transmutation in the will or in the passive element from which the new effect should have arisen, nor in the arrival of a specific hour, then no new effect could occur from any will because every new effect requires a transmutation before it. And since no transmutation was made in the will or in the matter from which the world was made before the world existed - since matter did not precede the world - and no transmutation occurred before the world in the arrival of any hour, it seems that the eternal will could not have produced a new world. Therefore, this example is not appropriate to the argument.

These are the reasons by which some heretics who uphold the eternity of the world attempt to challenge the belief of the Christian faith that the world is new. It is expedient for a Christian to study diligently to understand how to solve them perfectly if any heretic opposes them. These are the reasons:

Solution

[6] Firstly, it must be carefully considered here that no disputable question can be raised that the philosopher should not dispute and determine by reasoning, to the extent that the truth in that matter can be comprehended by human reason. The explanation of this is that all the reasons by which the debate is conducted are based on accepted things. Otherwise, they would be a product of the intellect’s imagination. However, the philosopher teaches the nature of all things, as philosophy teaches being, and the parts of philosophy teach the parts of being, as is written in Metaphysics IV, and this is self-evident. Therefore, the philosopher has to determine every disputable question by reasoning because every disputable question can be categorized within some part of being, and the philosopher speculates on every kind of being: natural, mathematical, and divine. Hence, the philosopher has to determine every disputable question by reasoning, and whoever says the opposite, does not understand their own words.

Secondly, it should be noted that neither a natural scientist, nor a mathematician, nor a metaphysician can demonstrate by reasoning that the first motion and the new world exist.

[7] It is declared that neither the natural philosopher nor the mathematician nor the metaphysician can prove through reason that the first motion and the new world exist.

To demonstrate this, two suppositions are taken, both of which are well-known by themselves. The first supposition is that no craftsman can cause, concede, or deny anything except from the principles of his own science. The second supposition is that although nature is not the first principle absolutely, it is the first principle in the category of natural things, and the first principle that the natural philosopher can consider. Therefore, Aristotle, considering this in his book “Physics,” which is the first book of the doctrine of natural things, began not from the first principle absolutely but from the first principle of natural things, which he calls the prime matter in Book II of the same. From this, we move to the proposition.

Nature cannot cause any new motion unless another motion that is its cause precedes it. However, the first motion cannot be preceded by another motion because then it would not be the first motion. Therefore, the natural philosopher, whose first principle is nature, cannot, according to his principles, posit that the first motion is new. The major premise is evident because material nature does not act anew unless it is acted upon first by something else. For how can the generated being be the first mover? And every material agent is a generated being. Nor can the objection be raised about the body of the heavens because even if it is a material entity, it does not share the same matter as generable things. Mutually transmutable things share the matter of one nature.

Furthermore, every new natural effect requires some novelty in its immediate principles, and novelty cannot exist in anything without preceding transformation. For whoever takes away transformation, takes away novelty. Therefore, nature cannot cause any new motion or effect without a preceding transformation. Thus, according to the natural philosopher, whose first principle is nature, the first motion, which cannot be preceded by any transformation, cannot be new. The major premise is evident because if all the immediate principles of a natural effect were always in the same disposition, that effect could not exist now if it did not exist before. For instance, why now and not before? I say in this argument “immediate principles” because although a natural effect is new, it does not follow that there has been any transformation or novelty in its mediate and first principles. For even though the immediate principles of generable things are transmuted and sometimes are not, their first causes are always the same.

Therefore, it is clear that the natural philosopher cannot posit any new motion without some motion preceding it that causes it. Therefore, since it is necessary to posit a first motion in the world (since we cannot go infinitely backward in motions that cause one another), it follows that the natural philosopher, using his science and principles, cannot posit a new first motion.

Thus, when Aristotle, in Book VIII of “Physics,” asks whether motion was ever made when it did not exist before, and using the principles mentioned above and speaking as a natural philosopher, he posits an eternal first motion on both sides. He also answers in the same Book VIII why some things move and some rest, saying that this is because they are always moved by a mover that is itself moved. For since the mover from which they are moved is a moved mover, it varies in its own behavior, causing its mobile things to move sometimes and rest at other times. However, things that always move, such as the celestial bodies, are moved by an immovable mover that always remains the same in itself and towards its mobile things.

Therefore, if nature cannot posit a new first motion according to its principles, then neither can it posit the first mobile itself, since the mobile causally precedes motion, as it is some cause of it. Therefore, nature cannot posit a new world either, since the first mobile did not precede the world in duration.

From this it also clearly follows that if someone carefully examines what we have already said, nature cannot consider creation. For nature produces every effect from subject and matter, but creation is not a production from subject and matter but rather generation. Therefore, nature cannot consider creation. How can nature consider what does not extend to its principles? And since the production of the world, or its production into existence, cannot be generation, as is clear, but is rather creation, from this it follows that in no part of natural science is the production of the world or its production into existence taught, because that natural production does not exist and therefore does not pertain to the natural.

From these things that have been said, it also follows that nature from its own knowledge cannot posit the first human being, and the reason is that nature, as intended by the natural, can do nothing except by generation, and the first human being cannot be generated. For a human generates a human and a sun. The way in which the first human being is made is different from generation, nor should it be surprising to anyone that nature cannot consider those things to which the principles of its science do not extend. For whoever carefully considers what the natural can consider on its own, it will appear reasonable to them that what has been said is true: for not every craftsman can consider any truth.

But if you object, since this is the truth of the Christian faith and also the truth that the world is new and not eternal, and that creation is possible, and that the first human being was, and that a dead human being will return to life without generation and that the same human being in number who was once corruptible will be incorruptible, and thus in one species there will be these two differences, corruptible and incorruptible, although the natural cannot cause or know these truths because the principles of its science do not extend to such difficult and hidden operations of divine wisdom, nevertheless, it should not deny these truths. For although one craftsman cannot cause or know the truths of the sciences of other craftsmen from his principles, he should not deny them. Therefore, although the natural cannot know or assert what has been said from its own principles because the principles of its science do not extend to such things, it should not deny them if someone else asserts them, not as true by reason, but by revelation made by some higher cause.

It should be said about this that the truths that the natural cannot cause or know from its own principles, but which do not contradict its principles or destroy its science, should not be denied: such as the truth that there are four possible right angles around any marked point on a surface, which the natural cannot cause or know from its principles, but it should not deny it because it does not contradict its principles or destroy its science. However, the truth that the natural cannot cause or know from its own principles, but which contradicts its principles and destroys its science, should be denied, because just as what follows from principles must be granted, what contradicts them must be denied: such as a dead human immediately returning to life and a generable thing being made without generation - as the Christian asserts, who posits the resurrection of the dead, so that the corruptible will return in the same number - the natural should deny this because the natural only concedes what it sees as possible by natural causes. But the Christian concedes that these things are possible through a higher cause which is the cause of all nature, so they do not contradict each other in this matter, as well as in others.

But if you further object, since it is true that a dead human immediately returns to life and in the same number, as the Christian faith asserts in its articles, does not the natural, by denying this, say something false?

It should be said about this that it is possible for the first motion and the new world [to exist through higher causes], and yet not be new through natural causes and natural principles, so they can coexist. If one examines it carefully, it is true for the Christian to say that the world and the first motion are new, and that the first human being existed, and that a human being can return to life in the same number and a generable thing can be made without generation, even though this is only possible through a cause whose power is greater than that of natural causes. And it is also true for the natural to say that this is not possible through natural causes and principles. For the natural only concedes or denies based on natural principles and causes, just as a grammarian only concedes or denies based on grammatical principles and causes. And because the natural only considers the powers of natural causes, it says that the world and the first motion cannot be new based on them, while the Christian faith considers a higher cause than nature and says that the world can be new based on it, so they do not contradict each other. So two things are clear: one is that the natural does not contradict the Christian faith’s view on the eternity of the world, and the other is that the newness of the world and the first motion cannot be demonstrated through natural reasoning.

But what the mathematician cannot prove is clearly explained in this way: because one part of mathematics is astrology, which has two parts: one that teaches the different movements and velocities of the stars, which complete their course faster or slower, and their distances, conjunctions, aspects, and other such things; the other part of the science of the stars teaches the effects they have on the whole body that is under the orbit. Neither the first part nor the second part of the science of the stars can prove that the world and the first motion are new because such movements, conjunctions, and powers of certain stars in their spheres with respect to others could also be slowness and velocity, even if the world and the first motion were eternal. And for this reason, neither can the second part of the science of the stars prove that the first motion and the world are new because they could have the same movements, conjunctions, and powers as they do now, even if the world and the first motion were eternal. Therefore, neither the first part nor the second part of the science of the stars can prove that the first motion and the world are new.

Likewise, neither the first part nor the second part of the mathematical sciences, which is geometry, can prove this. This does not follow from the principles of geometry because the opposite of the consequent can stand with the antecedent, namely, that the first motion and the world are eternal can stand with the principles of geometry and all its conclusions. For if it is false that the first motion and the world are eternal, does it follow that the principles of geometry, such as “to draw a straight line from one point to another,” or even “a point is that which has no parts,” and other such things, or even their conclusions, are false? It is clear that they are not. Would all possible magnitudes be demonstrable from their substances and by the same causes, even if the world were eternal, as if the world were new? It is clear that they would be.

And I say the same about the third and fourth parts of the mathematical sciences, which are arithmetic and music, and in the same way as it has been explained for geometry. And this is evident to one who is advanced in these sciences and knows what they can do.

As for the fact that even the metaphysician cannot prove that the world is new, it is clear as follows: the world depends on the divine will as its sufficient cause, but the metaphysician cannot demonstrate that any effect in duration can follow its sufficient cause, or that it can be postponed to its sufficient cause. Therefore, the metaphysician cannot demonstrate that the world is coeternal with the divine will, but the world was made by the divine will.

Moreover, anyone who cannot demonstrate that this was the form of the divine will, that it willed from eternity to produce the world at the hour it was made, cannot demonstrate that the world is new or coeternal with the divine will because it was willed by the willing according to the form of the will. But the metaphysician cannot demonstrate that such was the form of the divine will from eternity because to say that the metaphysician can demonstrate this is not only a fiction but also, I believe, similar to madness. For where can man find the reason by which he can perfectly investigate the divine will?

And from what has been said, a syllogism is formed: there is no question whose conclusion can be shown by reason that the philosopher should not dispute and determine, as far as it is possible by reason, as has been shown. However, no philosopher can prove by reason that the first motion and the world are new, neither the natural philosopher, nor the mathematician, nor the divine, as is clear from the above, therefore, the first motion and the world being new cannot be demonstrated by any human reason, nor can it be demonstrated that they are eternal, because whoever would demonstrate this should demonstrate the form of the divine will. And who will investigate it? Therefore, Aristotle says in the Topics, “there is a problem about which we do not have any opinion, namely, whether the world is eternal or not.” For there are many things in faith that cannot be demonstrated by reason, such as that the dead return to life, the same in number, and that the generable returns without generation; and whoever does not believe in these is a heretic, but whoever seeks to know through reason is foolish.

Therefore, since effects and works come from power, and power comes from substance, who dares to say that he perfectly knows the divine substance and all its power through reason? Let him say that he perfectly knows all the immediate effects of God: how they come from Him, whether new or from eternity, and how they are preserved in being through Him, and how they are in Him. For all things are made or exist in Him and from Him and through Him. And who can sufficiently investigate this? And because there are many such things that faith postulates that cannot be investigated by human reason, where reason fails, let faith supplement, which should confess that divine power is beyond human knowledge. And do not deny the articles of faith for this reason because some of them cannot be demonstrated, for if you proceed in this way, you will not stand in any law, for there is no law whose articles can all be demonstrated.

Therefore, it is clear that there is no contradiction between Christian faith and philosophy regarding the eternity of the world, if the above is carefully examined, just as we will also demonstrate, with God’s help, in other questions where Christian faith and philosophy superficially and less carefully considered by people seem to disagree.

Therefore, we say that the world is not eternal but newly created, although this cannot be demonstrated by reason, as seen above, just like some other things related to faith. For if they could be demonstrated, there would be no faith, but knowledge. Therefore, sophistical reasoning should not be brought in support of faith, as is evident in itself, nor dialectical reasoning because it does not create a firm habit but only an opinion, and faith must be stronger than opinion. Neither demonstrative reasoning because then faith would only be about what could be demonstrated.

[11] We must now respond to the arguments presented on both sides, beginning with those that attempt to prove the contrary to the truth, namely that the world is coeternal with God.

<1> To the first argument: Every incorruptible thing has the power to always exist, if by the term incorruptible we mean that which, being a being, cannot fail either through corruption (which the Philosopher speaks of in the last chapter of Book I of Physics, where he says that “everything that is corrupted is reduced to its ultimate state,” namely matter), or through corruption in the broader sense than the Philosopher ever uses the term, which can occur in any being that has another cause, as far as it is concerned. For every effect, as long as it lasts, is preserved in existence by one of its causes, as is evident from induction; but that which is preserved in existence by something else can fail as far as it is concerned. If incorruptible is understood in both of these senses, then the major proposition “Every incorruptible thing has the power to always exist” is true; but if so, it is not incorruptible [indeed], nor is it any being that has another cause.

And you prove: What is ungenerated is incorruptible. This is true with regard to corruption that is opposed to generation, because just as generation comes from matter, so does corruption opposed to it belong to matter, namely to its opposite and not to pure negation. However, if something is ungenerated, it does not follow that it is therefore incorruptible in the broader sense, which is not [in matter or] in opposition, but in pure negation, as every caused being can be corrupted by limiting the power that preserves it. And this preservation was called by the ancient philosophers the golden chain, by which every being is preserved in its order by the first being, but the first being, just as it has no cause before it, has no preserver before it either. And since it has already been said that every being [that exists] without the first one is preserved in existence by the power of the first principle, this should be further explained.

First, by the words of the authors. In the Book of Causes, it is written: “The essence and fixity of every intelligence is through pure goodness, which is the first cause.” By its essence, it means its production into being, and by its fixity, it means its duration. And if the intelligence endures through the power of the first principle, then all other beings do so to an even greater extent. And this agrees with what is written in the law: “All things are from Him and through Him.”

Similarly, Plato, speaking in the person of the first principle, says these words to the intelligences themselves: “My will is more effective in preserving your eternity than your nature.”

The same is shown by reason. A caused being does not have a nature to exist of itself, because if it had a nature to exist of itself, it would not be caused by another, but what endures and is preserved in existence by its own power and not by another higher power, has a nature to exist of itself. Therefore, no caused being is preserved in existence by itself. And thus, just as all beings that are without the first principle are from it, so they are also preserved in existence by it. And if the first principle were to take away its power from beings, they would not exist at all. And this is what is written in the Book of Causes: “All dependent virtues are from one first virtue, which is the power of powers.” Averroes, speaking about this first principle in his commentary on the second book of the Metaphysics, says, “That cause is more worthy in being and in power than all beings; for all beings do not acquire being and power except from this cause; therefore, it is the being itself and the truth itself, and all other beings are beings and true by its being and truth.”

Moreover, the power that makes duration eternal is an infinite power, because if it were finite, then a greater power could be conceived. Therefore, since no duration can be greater than eternal duration, it would follow that a greater power does not make greater duration than a smaller power, which is impossible. But no caused being has an infinite power, because every caused being is received by way of transition or production, and this is incompatible with infinite power.

This same thing is also proved by another argument. Because the power of the first mover is greater than the power of any posterior mover, and nothing can be greater than infinity, therefore no caused being has an infinite power, nor is eternal duration per se, but by the power of the first principle, whose power is eternal and infinite per se. And the reason is explained as follows: just as a duration that always exists cannot be greater, so the power that makes duration that always exists, or eternal, must be such that it cannot be conceived as a greater power, and only an infinite power is such.

Regarding the second argument, when you say, “That is eternal which does not have any duration before it,” I say that it is false. Although time is not before the world, eternity is before the world, for it always exists. You say, “That which has eternal duration before it never exists.” I say that it is not necessary. For that which is new, created today, has eternal duration before it, because it has that eternity which always exists, and yet it is not said to never exist.

<3> In the third argument, it must be said that although being, whose production is from a subject and matter, whether through generation, depends on a twofold potency, namely the active potency of its agent and the potency of its matter. For nothing is made from matter except that for which it had passive potentiality. However, those things whose production is not from matter or generation, only depend on the potency of the agent principle, not matter. For how can you say that it depends on the potency of matter whose production is not from matter, such as the world? For it is evident to everyone that the making of the world could not have been generation. Therefore, if there were no other way of making besides generation, then nothing at all would have been made. Therefore, I say that the world was made, and made anew because it is not coeternal with God. And when you say, “So it could have been made,” I say that it is true, it could have been made by the sole potency of the agent, not the subject and matter. And since it has already been touched upon in the solution that some effects sufficiently depend solely on the potency of the agent, about which one might doubt, it is thus declared:

“Every being whose making depends on matter, if matter does not exist, is impossible. Every being that exists without the first principle is made because it has a cause, and I call a made being that has another for its production. Therefore, if every making depends on matter, and not solely on the potency of the agent principle, and there was no matter besides the being that exists without the first principle, it follows that every being, which is the first principle, is impossible. Therefore, something has been made that would have been impossible to make.”

<4> In the fourth argument, it must be said that when you say, “Everything new is made through transmutation,” it is true only of beings whose production is through generation. For only in things that can be generated is transmutation found. Hence, even the celestial bodies that have innate substances, just as they are transmuted according to their position, so are they generated according to their position.

<5> In the fifth argument, when you say, “Everything new is in time, because the new must be made in some part of its duration, for if it were simultaneous with any part of that duration, it would not be new in that duration, and the only duration that has parts is time,” I say to this that something can be called new in two ways: either because it exists when it did not before, but having being after its contrary, not because it exists in one part of its duration and not in another, and thus the world is new, and such newness need not be in time. Or something can be called new because it has being in one part of its duration and not in another, and everything that is new in this way is necessarily in time because the only duration that has parts is time, and thus the world is not new. Hence the world cannot be new in any duration: not in time because the world began with time, therefore no part of time preceded the world; nor in eternity, because eternity is indivisible, and what is in eternity always has one mode of existence.

<6> The sixth argument states: "When you say that every generation comes from corruption, it is true. When you say secondly that every corrupted thing was generated before, I say that this proposition is conceded by natural philosophers because they cannot posit the making of a generable and corruptible thing except through generation. However, anyone who posits the making of a generable thing without generation, as one must if they posit the existence of the first man - for man is a generable thing and its production cannot be through generation if it is the first - must deny the proposition that says every corrupted thing was generated before, because it contradicts their position. For the first man was once corrupted, even though he was never generated. Hence, the sixth argument is based on natural principles, and it has been said above that whoever posits the world as being newly made must dismiss natural causes and seek a higher cause.

<7> The seventh argument states: “When you say that an effect cannot follow its sufficient cause in duration, this is true of natural causes but not of voluntary ones. Just as God, with eternal understanding, can understand new things, though they are not new in relation to Him, so with eternal will, He can do new things.”

<8> The eighth argument states: “What is capable and willing acts necessarily according to the time to which its will is determined. Even though God’s power by which He could create the world is eternal, and His will by which He willed it, because that will was only with respect to the time when the world was made, therefore the world is new, even though God’s will is eternal.”

<9> The next argument states: “When you say that every new effect requires some novelty in one of its principles, I say that this is not necessary for a voluntary agent, because according to an ancient will, new actions can be done besides the fact that there has been a change in the will or in the one willing. To confirm this argument, it must be said that not only can an agent produce a new effect because it has a new substance or a new power or position, or because there was an impediment before, or because there was a new disposition in what it acts on, but also some agent can produce a new effect by having an eternal will determined for some time when it wants to act according to that will.”

<10> The following argument states that it is not necessary that everything that moves after rest be reduced to eternal motion, but rather that everything that moves after rest be reduced to the first motion as to its cause, which is not after rest. Therefore, although the first motion is new, it is not after rest, for not every immobility is rest, but only the immobility of that which is naturally moved, as is written in Physics III. And before the first motion, there was no naturally moving thing, and I mean before in duration.

<11> The next argument states: “When you say that the will that postpones what is willed expects something in the future, this is only true of a will whose action is in time, because only in time is there futurity and expectation, but this is not true of a will whose action is before time, and the divine will’s action is before time, at least that which created the world and time.”

<12> According to the following argument, those two things that are in the same duration are simultaneous if no part of that duration falls between them, just as two temporal things are simultaneous in time between which no part of time falls. However, if no duration falls between any two because one is in the present of eternity and the other is in the present of time, and thus no duration falls between them, it is not necessary for them to be simultaneous. This is how the will of God in the present of eternity and the creation of the world in the present of time relate to each other.

<13> According to the other argument, as was said, you argue against this because to posit such a form of will in God is to imagine something. I say that this is not true, for not everything that cannot be demonstrated is a figment of the imagination.

To your second objection, I say that since such a form of divine will has existed from eternity, the mode of proceeding willed from the will had to be such that the willed was perfectly conformable to the will.

<14> To the following argument, it must be said that when you say that from the ancient will, between which and its effect there is no transmutation, no new effect can be produced, this is only true of a will from which an effect proceeds through transmutation; such is not the divine will.

<15> To another objection, I say that that example is somewhat appropriate, though not perfectly so.

Arguments may be conceded to the opposing side for the sake of the conclusion, although they can be refuted, since they are sophistical.

[12] From these things, it is clear that when a philosopher says something is possible or impossible, that is to say, to say it is possible or impossible based on reasons that can be investigated by humans. For as soon as one abandons reasons, one ceases to be a philosopher, and philosophy does not rely on revelations and miracles. Therefore, when you yourself say, and should say, that many things are true, but if you cannot affirm their truth based on human reason, you should never concede them, such as the resurrection of humans posited by faith. And it is right to believe in such things based on divine authority, not human reason. For I ask you, what reason demonstrates this? I also ask, what reason demonstrates a generable thing returning without generation after its corruption, and also being the same in number as it was before its corruption, as must happen in the resurrection of humans according to our faith? However, the philosopher at the end of Book II of On Generation and Corruption says that a corrupt thing can return the same in species but not the same in number. He does not contradict faith because he says that this is not possible according to natural causes. He reasons from natural causes. Our faith says that this is possible through a higher cause, which is the principle and end of our faith, God glorious and blessed.

[13] Therefore, there is no contradiction between faith and the philosopher. So why do you murmur against the philosopher when you concede the same thing yourself? And do not believe that a philosopher who has devoted his life to the study of wisdom contradicts the truth of the Catholic faith in any way. Rather, strive to understand their words, for you have limited understanding compared to the philosophers who have been and are the wise of the world. For a teacher’s words are to be understood for the better, and it is not valid what some wicked people say, who put their studies to finding reasons that are opposed to some truth of the Christian faith, which is undoubtedly impossible. For they say that a Christian, as such, cannot be a philosopher because their faith obliges them to destroy the principles of philosophy. That is false because a Christian concedes that a conclusion reached through philosophical reasoning cannot be otherwise than by the means by which it is concluded, even if it is concluded through natural causes. That the dead will not immediately return alive in the same number, the Christian concedes cannot be otherwise through natural causes by which it is concluded; however, they concede that this can be otherwise through a higher cause that is the cause of the whole of nature and all created beings. Therefore, a Christian who understands subtly is not obliged by their faith to destroy the principles of philosophy but saves both faith and philosophy without corrupting either. However, if someone in a position of authority, whether or not, cannot understand such difficult things, then they should obey someone wiser and believe in the Christian law, not because of sophistical reasoning, which deceives, nor because of dialectical reasoning, which does not make a habit as firm as faith because the conclusion of dialectical reasoning is accepted with fear of the other party, nor by demonstrative reasoning, firstly, because it is not possible in all that our law posits, secondly, because it makes knowledge. “For demonstration is a syllogism that makes one know,” as is written in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, and faith is not knowledge. Hence, let every Christian adhere to and believe in the law of Christ as they ought to do, as their author, the glorious Christ who is God blessed forever and ever, commands. Amen.