Confession of Nature Against Atheists, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

The Confession of Nature Against Atheists, written by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in 1668, is divided into two parts. In the first part, Leibniz argues that the explanation of bodily phenomena cannot be given without an incorporeal principle, that is, God. He argues that bodies cannot exist without an incorporeal cause and demonstrates this by showing that a determined shape and size cannot exist in bodies left to themselves. Leibniz then goes on to argue that the incorporeal being governing the entire world is God.

In the second part of the work, Leibniz argues for the immortality of the human mind. He does this by demonstrating that the human mind is a being whose action is thought, and that thought is a thing immediately sensible without the imagination of parts. He goes on to show that a being whose action is a thing without parts is not a body and therefore not subject to dissolution. Leibniz concludes that the human mind is immortal.

Part I. That the explanation of bodily phenomena cannot be given without an incorporeal principle, that is, God.

The divine genius Sir Francis Bacon of Verulam rightly said that philosophy, when only superficially tasted, leads away from God, but when thoroughly understood, it leads back to Him. We experience this in our own century, which is both rich in knowledge and impiety. For when the mathematical arts were highly cultivated, and the inner workings of things were explored through chemistry and anatomy, it appeared to many that the explanations for the phenomena of bodies could be given mechanically from their shape and motion, which the ancients had attributed either solely to the Creator or to some unknown incorporeal forms. Some ingenious people then began to try whether natural phenomena, or those things that appear in bodies, could be preserved and explained without assuming the existence of God or employing Him in their reasoning. As soon as they had some success (before they had reached the foundations and principles), they prematurely congratulated themselves on their newfound security, claiming that they could not find God or the immortality of the soul through natural reason, but that the belief in these things was due either to civil precepts or historical accounts. This is the opinion of the most subtle Hobbes, whose merits I will pass over in silence here, unless it were necessary to specifically counter his authority to prevent its abuse. And if only others had not gone further, already doubting the authority of sacred Scripture, the truth of history, and the validity of historical accounts, and had not introduced atheism into the world, not so secretly.

This seemed to me to be quite unworthy, that our own mind, by its own light, that is, by philosophy, should be blinded. Therefore, I myself began to devote myself to the investigation of things, with all the more zeal, as I could hardly bear the thought that I might be deprived of the greatest good of life, namely, the certainty of eternity after death, and the hope of divine kindness someday appearing to the good and innocent, by the subtleties of these innovators.

So, setting aside prejudices and postponing faith in Scripture and history, I mentally approach the anatomy of bodies, trying to see whether it is possible to give an explanation of the things that appear in bodies to the senses without assuming the existence of an incorporeal cause.

At first, I readily agreed with modern philosophers, the revivers of Democritus and Epicurus, such as Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, and Digby, who are aptly called corpuscularians by Robert Boyle, that in explaining bodily phenomena, there is no need to resort to God, or any other incorporeal thing, form, or quality without necessity.

(Nor should God intervene, unless a problem worthy of His intervention arises)

Instead, everything should be derived, as far as possible, from the nature of the body and its primary qualities: Size, Shape, and Motion.

But what if I were to show that even the origin of these primary qualities cannot be found in the nature of the body? Then, I hope, our naturalists would admit that bodies are not sufficient for themselves and cannot exist without an incorporeal principle. I will demonstrate this neither obscurely nor circuitously.

If indeed these qualities cannot be deduced from the definition of the body, it is clear that they cannot exist in bodies left to themselves. For the reason for any affection must be deduced either from the thing itself or from something external. The definition of a body is to exist in space. And all people call that a body which they find in some space, and conversely, they find that a body is in some space. This definition consists of two terms, space and existence.

From the term space arises magnitude and shape in the body. For a body has the same magnitude and shape as the space it fills. But the question remains why it fills such and such a space rather than another, and thus why, for example, it is three-footed rather than two-footed, and why square rather than round. The reason for this cannot be given from the nature of bodies, for the same matter is undetermined for any shape, whether square or round. Only two answers can be given: either the proposed body has been square from eternity, or it has been made square by the impact of another body if you do not want to resort to an incorporeal cause. If you say it has been square from eternity, you do not give a reason; for why could it not have been spherical from eternity? Eternity can be understood as the cause of nothing. But if you say it has been made square by the movement of another body, the question remains why it had such or such a shape before that movement; and if you again refer the reason to the movement of another, and so on to infinity, then by following your answers with new questions through all infinity, it will appear that there will never be a lack of material for seeking the reason of the reason, and thus that a full reason will never be given. It will therefore appear that a certain reason for their shape and magnitude cannot be given from the nature of bodies. We have said that the definition of a body has two parts: space and existence; but from the term space arises some magnitude and shape, but not a determined one; on the other hand, the term existence in that space belongs to motion, for when a body begins to exist in another space than before, it moves from it. But upon closer consideration it will appear that mobility indeed arises from the nature of the body, but not motion itself. For by the very fact that the proposed body is in this space, it can also be in another equal and similar to the previous one, that is, it can move. For being able to be in another space than before is to be able to change space, and being able to change space is to be able to move. Movement, however, is the change of space. But actual movement does not arise from existence in space, but rather from the body left to itself, its opposite, namely, permanence in the same or rest. Therefore, the reason for movement cannot be found in bodies left to themselves. Their escape is therefore in vain, who give the reason for movement thus: Every body is either moved from eternity or moved by another contiguous and moved body. For if they say the proposed body has been moved from eternity, it does not appear why it could not have rested from eternity, for time, even infinite, cannot be understood as the cause of movement. But if they say that the proposed body is moved by another contiguous and moving body, and this again by another, without end; they have given no more reason why the first, second, and third or any number should move, as long as they have not given a reason why the following body moves, by which all preceding bodies are moved. For the reason of the conclusion is not clearly given, as long as the reason for the reason has not been given, especially since in this case the same doubt remains without end.

Therefore, I think it has been sufficiently demonstrated that a determined shape and size cannot exist in bodies left to themselves, but rather an absolutely continuous motion. I will be silent on this point, because it is a matter of deeper investigation, that so far no one has given a reason for the consistency of bodies from the nature of the bodies themselves.

From the consistency of bodies, it follows (1) that a large body does not yield to a small impelling body, (2) that bodies or parts of bodies adhere to each other, from which arise those tactile qualities which are commonly called secondary, namely solidity, fluidity; hardness, softness; smoothness, roughness; tenacity, fragility; friability, ductility, malleability, fusibility, (3) that a hard body striking a non-yielding body is reflected. In short, from consistency, there are three things: resistance, cohesion, reflection. Whoever has given me the reason for these things from the shape, size, and motion of matter, I will gladly acknowledge them as a great philosopher. There is only one way that appears to be likely: that a body resists and reflects an impelling body because its parts on the surface are imperceptibly moving towards it. But let us suppose that the impinging body does not fall along the line where the parts of the impelled body will meet, but along another, perhaps oblique, line; then at once all reaction, resistance, reflection will cease against Experience. But the reason for cohesion cannot be entirely explained by reaction and motion. For if I push a part of a paper, the part I push yields, so no reaction and resistance motion can be imagined. But it does not yield alone, but it also takes away the remaining parts adhering to it. It is certainly true, and has a reason, that Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, and Lucretius of old, and today their followers Pierre Gassendi and Giovanni Battista Magnenus, have taught: that the cause of all Cohesion in Bodies is naturally given by certain interlocking figures, namely hooks, hooks, rings, prominences, in short, all the curvatures or bends of hard bodies mutually inserted. But these very interlocking instruments must be solid and tenacious in order to perform their function and hold the parts of bodies together. But from where does their tenacity come? Are we to suppose an infinite number of hooks? But the reason for doubting the first will also be in the second and third, without end. To these difficulties, the most acute philosophers of our time had no other answer than to suppose in the ultimate resolution of bodies certain indivisible corpuscles, which they themselves call Atoms, which by their various shapes combined in various ways produce the various qualities of sensible bodies. But in these ultimate corpuscles, there is no apparent reason for cohesion and indivisibility.

The Ancients provided some explanation, but it was so inadequate that the more recent thinkers are ashamed of it. Namely, the parts of atoms stick together because there is no vacuum in between; from this it follows that all bodies that have once touched each other must adhere inseparably like atoms, because there is no vacuum in any contact between bodies. This perpetual adherence is absurd and far removed from experience. Therefore, when explaining atoms, we rightly take refuge in God, who grants stability to these ultimate foundations of things. I am surprised that neither Gassendi nor any other of the sharpest philosophers of this age noticed this excellent opportunity to demonstrate the existence of God. For it is clear that nature cannot do without God’s help in the ultimate dissolution of bodies.

Having demonstrated that bodies have a determined shape and size, and cannot have motion without an incorporeal Being, it is easy to see that this incorporeal Being is one and the same for all, because of the harmony of all things with each other, especially since bodies have motion, not individually from their incorporeal Being, but from one another. However, why this incorporeal Being chooses this particular size, shape, and motion rather than another cannot be explained unless it is intelligent, wise for the beauty of things, and powerful for their obedience to its will. Thus, this incorporeal Being will be the Mind governing the entire World, that is, GOD.

Part II. The immortality of the human mind demonstrated by continuous sorites.

The human mind is a Being, some of whose action is thought.

A Being, some of whose action is thought, some of its action is a thing immediately sensible without the imagination of parts.

For thought is a thing (1) immediately sensible; the mind, indeed, sensing itself thinking, is immediate to itself. (2) Thought is a sensible thing without the imagination of parts. This is clear from experience. Thought is this unknown something that we sense when we sense ourselves thinking. When, for example, we sense that we have thought about Titius, we not only sense that we had Titius’s image, which certainly has parts, in our mind, but this is not enough for thought.

We have images in our minds even when we are not thinking about them, but we also sense that we have paid attention to Titius’s image, in which attention we find no parts in the imagination itself.

A Being, some of whose action is a thing immediately sensible without the imagination of parts.

Some of its action is a thing without parts.

For what is immediately sensed is such.

The cause of error is the medium, because if the object of the senses were the cause of error, it would always be sensed falsely; but if the subject, it would always sense falsely.

A Being, some of whose reason is a thing without parts, some of its action is not motion.

For every motion has parts, as demonstrated by Aristotle and acknowledged by all.

A Being, some of whose action is not motion, it is not a body.

For every body’s action is motion: for every thing’s action is a variation of essence.

The essence of a body is to be in space; the variation of existence in space is motion.

Therefore, every body’s action is motion.

Whatever is not a body is not in space.

For the definition of a body is to be in space.

Whatever is not in space is not mobile.

For motion is the change of space.

Whatever is not mobile is indissoluble.

For dissolution is motion according to a part.

Every indissoluble thing is incorruptible.

For corruption is an intimate dissolution.

Every incorruptible thing is immortal.

For death is the corruption of a living being, or the dissolution of its machinery, by which it appears to move.

Therefore,

THE HUMAN MIND IS IMMORTAL.

Which was to be demonstrated.