Tuesday, April 25, 2023

Philosophy and Worldview, by Mário Ferreira dos Santos

Philosophy and Worldview, by the Brazilian philosopher Mário Ferreira dos Santos, is an introduction to philosophy, an encyclopedic presentation of philosophical ideas, and an original work of philosophy. The book is didactic, erudite, and profound, and according to the author, one cannot learn philosophy without doing philosophy. The author recognizes the Brazilian people’s intelligence but notes a lack of discipline and a rush for knowledge due to the autodidacticism that is mandatory in the country. He chooses to present philosophy in a way that is considerate of these gaps in knowledge, and uses language that is rigorous but not presumptuous of the reader’s understanding. The book progresses from a simple explanation of philosophical concepts to a more detailed analysis, with the ultimate goal of providing a worldview and methodology for life.

Preface

A German professor, the first to introduce me to the studies of philosophy, well-acquainted with our people, used to express his admiration for the intelligence of our nation. To him, who had traveled through many countries, taught lessons at numerous universities and schools in the West and the East, the Brazilian student was the most vibrant, intelligent, and astute in reasoning, with the deepest insights he had ever encountered. However, he had a restriction. He considered us excessively restless and unbalanced when it came to knowledge. He claimed to have found great values and men of extraordinary capacity but, in many aspects, lacking certain elementary knowledge, which were like chasms amidst mountain peaks. He attributed this imbalance to the natural haste of the American peoples1 and the lack of stricter discipline in work. At that time, I considered his words somewhat exaggerated. However, over time, through classes and numerous conferences, lectures, and debates that I undertook, I realized that my old and venerable master possessed a great deal of truth.

This defect of ours is attributed to the self-taught nature to which everyone, without exception, in this country is subject. I have always been an admirer of self-taught individuals because a careful study of history and the biographies of great men reveals that among the greatest creators, the number of self-taught individuals is always greater than those bound by rigid education, which often hampers creative ability.

However, this would not be the sole decisive factor, as others could still be proposed.

Considering these real aspects of our people, when I embarked on my courses and later decided, at the request of many students, to turn them into books, I understood that philosophy should not be taught in Brazil following the methods of peoples who have a very different study discipline from ours. For this reason, I always believed that alongside the deeper subject matter, it was necessary to consider those chasms of which he spoke. That was the reason that led me, when publishing this first book in the series of my philosophy courses, to use a language within a certain philosophical rigor, but to consider those chasms in the exposition and to never assume the reader’s knowledge of certain elementary aspects of philosophy, which must and need to be clarified from the beginning.

And thinking this way, I executed this work, starting from a simpler explanation and then, in the “Worldview” (second part of the book), addressing the profoundest subjects of philosophy, albeit still in a synthetic form, with a more rigorous language.

It is possible that many readers who have already handled philosophy books and have had contact with philosophical thought may find certain passages too simple. But they will only form a part of the readers, and not the majority, and they should understand that if I proceed this way, it is because I consider it a characteristic of our people, which leads me to use a method that corresponds to our nature and can, therefore, be of greater and more general benefit.

In the successive books that form the series of my philosophy works, the subjects will be treated while taking into account the knowledge presented in this volume, in order to advance more and more analytically in the study of the subjects, to conclude them in a global concretion, which is the third stage of the method I have chosen for the study of philosophy and which experience has already shown to be the most effective.

After the synthetic study, the analysis of the abstractly addressed subjects follows, in order to return them to the concretion they are part of, thus avoiding that the study of philosophy becomes, as it has generally been, a field of abstract speculations, transforming it into a broad vision of the world and a methodology for life itself.

And nothing attests to the convenience of the chosen method better than the progress observed among those dedicated to studying philosophy according to my classes, which, without false modesty, I cannot help but consider as the best reward for my efforts.

Mario Ferreira dos Santos

Part I. Introduction to General Philosophy

1. An apologue for introduction

What would we say about someone who wanted to give value only to sensory facts and proclaimed, for example, “the experience of my senses is enough”? And if they added: “What my eyes see is the only truth, and they are the measure of all truth.” Or: “Only what I hear is strictly accurate for me.” It would be the same if the senses, when turned to the brain, said: “Your generalizations, your coordinations, are purely abstract, mere speculations without any reality. We don’t need your reflections on our actions; we just need to feel and nothing more. What you do is dead, stagnant work; a poor ghost created by you.”

Well then. The specialized sciences are like the senses; they are predominantly empirical, experimental. But our experience is not only this. Intelligence regulates our activities, chooses, selects, discovers relationships that the senses cannot immediately grasp: it shows us errors and illusions that they commit and suffer from; it corrects them, improves them, adapts them, teaches them to proceed more carefully, urges them to reach more solid foundations.

Such is philosophy.

What we have said above does not exhaust what is meant by philosophy. It touches lightly only on its meaning, which is very broad, and which we will examine gradually, as we penetrate these marvelous gardens that are the most beautiful creations of human intelligence. But, although it does not exhaust what is meant by philosophy, it serves to immediately show the usefulness of its study, which we are now beginning.

Let’s study philosophy, and this book is an invitation, an incitement to philosophize, because one does not learn philosophy without philosophizing.

First and foremost, we must know what the object of our study consists of.

The first question then arises: what is philosophy?

Well, before we answer “what it consists of,” let us digress a little, and let the reader accompany us in these musings.

If we look at a starry night, we will immediately be struck by the mystery enclosed in those trembling lights.

Today, after millennia of studies and investigations, we know that this sidereal world is composed of planets, stars, satellites, galaxies, nebulas, novae. In short: a Universe of worlds.2 Our planet is part of this universe of worlds, and naturally, we are too, as part of this world.

Philosophy is also a “universe,” but a “universe of discourse.” The expression is due to the English logician Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871) and means "the set of ideas, or more precisely, logical classes, that are taken into consideration in a judgment or reasoning."3 Thus, for example, the statement “no dog speaks” is true in the “universe of discourse” of zoology, but not in that of fables, where a dog can speak.

Regarding philosophy, it has a “universe of discourse” in a broader sense than that of logic, as it is interested in the whole, studies everything, and its universe of discourse encompasses the set of all ideas. It has its words, its problems, its interrogations – true stars, stars, nebulas, novae, etc. There are principles that shine more intensely like suns, others are seen as distant, like nebulas. There are clear expressions, others are timid and stammering.

Philosophy is a set of ideas that we form, that we construct over time. Now, we observe that to arrive at the idea of philosophy, we need to previously know what this “we” we mentioned above is. This is the first problem that arises: what is “we”? What idea do we form of ourselves? What do we think we are?

Are we all living beings or only human beings? Or a limited number of them? When a scientist speaks of “we,” does it only refer to scientists? And Christians, when they speak of “we,” do they only refer to Christians? And the same does not apply to other social groups that always have a limited consciousness of what “we” is?

With this question, we are already questioning, and in this questioning, we are already beginning to do philosophy.

What do we want with this questioning? What do we tend to achieve with this questioning?

We tend to an answer. The questioning demands an answer.

But any answer? No; it requires an answer that clarifies, that enlightens, an answer that responds. The questioning reveals, therefore, a desire to know. It wants to know. Philosophy is thus a knowledge, a desire to know.

But let us continue our explorations, which, although they may seem simple to us, are necessary because over time we will see many things that seem complex to us because we did not take the care to break them down into their simple parts.

Man is a being that constantly questions. This is how it is with us, as it was with the men who came before us, and as it will be with those who will come after us. What did man seek with these questions if not answers that were enlightening? But what if we were to ask: did man respond because he questioned, or did he question because he responded?

The question is not unfounded. Let us see: let us imagine a primitive man who, for the first time, witnesses the eruption of a volcano. He is astonished, frightened. That new, unusual fact pricks him, incites him. He is faced with something he has never seen before. All these emotions he feels are a questioning. What is this? He seeks explanations.4 Thus, he wants to know what that is. But he wants something that clarifies. And to say that it is a god rebelling, a powerful enemy manifesting, or a punishment from his god for the mistakes committed can be an explanation that satisfies him or not. If it is not, he will seek new answers because he wants to explain all of that.

Now, to answer or to question, the following are required:

  1. The man;
  2. A provocation, an incitement;
  3. Thinking, desire, aspiration;
  4. A need to know, to respond; and this implies:
  5. Dissatisfaction or satisfaction.

We now note five elements that are the most primitive to conceive what philosophy is. They are five notes.5

We have already begun to establish, in a primary way, “what” philosophy consists of.

The dissatisfaction with the answer generates new questions. The dissatisfaction would only stop at satisfaction, and this would be reaching an end, a limit. We enrich the concept of philosophy with something more: reaching a limit, which is the sixth note.

It is easy to perceive that philosophy is not static but dynamic, and it aims at an end; it is a knowledge that “moves,” through questions and answers.

The activity of philosophy is the seventh note. By finding these seven “notes” of philosophy, we have not exhausted its concept, but we are already philosophizing about philosophy.

What do we seek to reveal with philosophy? Where do we intend to penetrate? The analysis we have already made reveals another element: the unknown, a problem, a difficulty, an aporia, a word that means theoretical difficulty, a term that we will often encounter in philosophical works – popularly, it would be a “puzzle.”

Here is the eighth note. Indeed, the desire for knowledge already implies, already carries within it, the idea of the unknown because we would not seek to know what we already know. What impression does this unknown give us? It gives us the impression of a limit, of something that restricts us, that appears as a barrier we want to overcome. Therefore, there is a desire to surpass the barrier. What instrument do we use?

Thought

We find ourselves now facing a question: what is philosophy? And we want to answer.

If we seek to overcome this barrier, to overcome the limit with thought, we are therefore guiding thought, giving it a direction. In this way, we highlight another element in philosophy: that it requires a direction of thought (ninth note), a direction in its clash against the limit, against the obstacle, in order to overcome it, to conquer it.

Another element soon reveals itself to us, which is the tenth note: a overcoming.

Philosophy seeks to overcome the obstacles that are the unknown; it wants to reveal them and go beyond.

But to achieve this goal, a concentration of thought is required, a tension of thought (eleventh note); when directing thought, we need to give it a tension that focuses it on the struggle against this barrier.

The dynamic element we discovered in philosophy shows that to understand it, we need to do philosophy. Many may say, “You are not telling us anything new; we already knew everything you said.”

And indeed, this is one of the most interesting aspects of the concept of philosophy: it reveals to us what we already know because all of us, without realizing it, often philosophize. And this is because in philosophy, we use thought as a tool to delve into thought itself; we think about thinking. But we do not proceed only in this way because to do so, we must first live what we do.

It is not original to say that we will never understand what philosophy is before we have philosophized, that is, until we have lived it.

And we are living it when we do philosophy.

When reading the philosophers, we easily come to the conclusion that there is not a single concept of philosophy, but multiple ones.

And why is that? Because these philosophers reproduce their experiences of philosophy. This term “experience,” widely used nowadays, indicates that what we assimilate, what we grasp and what we live of something form a whole, an affective experience.

There are examples that illustrate well what “experience” means, and we will give one, paraphrasing the famous example of Henri Bergson (1859-1941).6 Let us say that someone hears about Avenida Rio Branco. They may have also seen several photographs that depict parts of it. They may have an idea of it, the broadest possible.

But when they are on that avenue, when they have walked through it, they have a lived experience of it because, in addition to what they have learned, they have also lived that avenue.

Thus, to philosophize, we need to live philosophy, to have an experience of it. Now, such experiences form diverse perspectives and therefore condition a variability of interpretations of what philosophy is.

That is why different statements arise, which we will have the opportunity to study and analyze when we delve into the general currents of philosophical thought, which will allow us to understand why some see philosophy in one way and others in another.

By no means have we exhausted the concept of philosophy with our explanation; we have merely pointed out the notes that constitute the most general aspect of its content. And we cannot delve deeper because to do so, we must delve deeper and deeper, overcome new obstacles, surpass them, invade this unknown world of complications, in order to make it clear under the light, which is thought.

And to better understand the concept of philosophy, let us study historically how it was formed.

Historical formation of the concept of philosophy

In the Greek language, there is the verb philosophein [φιλοσοφείν], formed by phileô [φιλέω], which means “to love,” and sophia [σοφία], which means wisdom, which means to strive with love in the pursuit of knowledge.

Thus, etymologically, the word philosophy means “love of wisdom.” Philos [φίλος] means the one who loves: philosopher [φιλόσοφος], the one who loves wisdom, knowledge. The word is attributed to Pythagoras (572-497 BC) and his disciples, who used it first, as did Herodotus (490-424 BC) and the Socratics.7

The verb philosophein [φιλοσοφείν] means, in Greek, to strive, to exert oneself to know.

Heraclitus (536-470 BC) says that a philosopher is the one who knows the reason (logos [λόγος]) that governs everything, and he distinguishes between those who truly love knowledge and those who are mere erudites. In the sense we have explained at the beginning, philosophy encompasses all knowledge, but among the Greeks, we will increasingly find a more specific sense of its concept, without philosophy ceasing to investigate the Whole, that is, all things, all beings.

And this is because the concept of philosophy is not confined to just the 11 notes we have indicated. Let us see: in the earliest phase of humanity, the big questions were answered by poetic fictions of the imagination, by symbols, by myths, which we will study later. Then another phase emerged: a rational phase, in which an attempt was made to provide a rational solution, that is, through reason, through reasoning.

Initially, knowledge was empirical, practical, based solely on experience. From this empirical knowledge, speculation emerged, which the Greeks called theoria, which would form theoretical knowledge. Let us analyze: thought is not merely a means of action aimed at practice, but above all at knowing, at explaining (explicare). Theoria [θεωρία], for the Greeks, was contemplation, vision, rational contemplation, intelligible vision. Thus, knowledge became speculative, theoretical.8

Let us clarify: the philosopher, among the Greeks, out of love for knowledge, aspires to truth, to the ultimate limit of explanation, to an explanation that in itself would not require further answers because it would clarify everything, explain everything.

The Greek sought to explain, and philosophy was for him an answer, an answer driven by the love of knowledge and therefore aspiring to truth. This was the first phase of philosophy. Over time, it ceased to be just the love of knowledge and became knowledge itself, wisdom itself. Thus, philosophy, among the Greeks, became speculative, theoretical because speculative thought, as we have seen, aims to know or to explain, unlike thought as a means of action that tends towards practical, utilitarian purposes. Thus, the Greeks called the theoretical life the one that opposed practice, as well as the one that opposed poetic life, which for them had a practical sense, practical creation.

But is all knowledge philosophy?

There is common knowledge and speculative knowledge, sought after, pursued.

The first, the vulgar, the Greeks called doxa [δόξα], a word that means opinion, and the second they called epistéme [ἐπιστήµη], which is speculative knowledge, according to Plato’s division (428-338 BC). Thus, philosophy was not only knowledge, nor a love of wisdom, but a sought-after, pursued, guided knowledge that had a method to be achieved, which was reflective.

Philosophy, therefore, lost in extension, as it no longer encompassed all knowledge, but gained in content, as it delimits, contours, specifies more, becoming a theoretical, reflective, speculative knowledge, a cultured knowledge. This cultured knowledge aims to understand what reality is.

The expression “knowledge of salvation” is often encountered. This knowledge is superior to technical, utilitarian knowledge, and to cultured, theoretical knowledge. The goal of this knowledge is divinity, the salvation of humanity in divinity.

Thus, among the Greeks, there is religiosity in their conception of the world; knowledge prepares individual perfection for blessedness and happiness. In Neoplatonism,9 salvation is achieved through the identification of the soul with the One, ecstatic participation in the supreme divine unity. In Christianity, salvation is the redemption of the soul from sin; in Buddhism, it is immersion in nirvana, the annihilation of individual consciousness. In the present time, for many, knowledge is salvation through progress.

In short: salvation is a transcendence, a not limiting oneself to “this world,” going beyond it – outside of it, or within it – by its overcoming.

The meaning of philosophy, as rational knowledge, reflective knowledge, acquired knowledge, is that of Plato and also that of Aristotle (384-322 BC), but the latter added a greater volume of knowledge thanks to the investigations he conducted and for which he had many valuable helpers.

For Aristotle, philosophy was all that knowledge and also included what we call science. Thus, philosophy was the totality of human knowledge, rational knowledge.

In the so-called Middle Ages, this sense continues to prevail, but the central idea of God polarizes philosophy. Thus, it is the totality of knowledge acquired through natural light or divine revelation. Knowledge about God and the divine separates from the rest and forms theology. Theology encompasses the sum of knowledge about the divine; philosophy, in turn, encompasses human knowledge about natural things. This concept of philosophy will prevail for centuries and is still presented this way today.

In the 17th century, the so-called particular sciences, with their own objects and methods, gradually moved away from philosophy, acquiring increasing specialization to become independent disciplines.

However, philosophy remains within the realm of science and forms a specific synthesis thereof.

For example, in mathematics, there is a philosophy of mathematics, which studies the ideas of number, extension, time, and mathematical space, just as there is a philosophy of physical chemistry, which has as its object the ideas of force, substance, energy, extension, extensity, and intensity.10

It is by living it that we will understand its full extent and its meaning for life, and we will also understand that theoretical, speculative knowledge, although distinct from technical-practical knowledge, exerts a beneficial influence on it and, in turn, has a significant influence on it in a productive reciprocity.

Thus far, we have presented philosophy as a general knowledge, without yet precisely showing its peculiarities, which will be revealed throughout this book.

When humans began to philosophize, they did so without clearly knowing what philosophy was. Only subsequent analysis would allow them to better understand the difference between the judgments they formulated in the face of facts. Only when they had distinguished the judgment of taste – purely subjective – from a judgment of value, and this from one of existence and ethics, could philosophers delve into the broader meaning of “value,” and likewise be able to provide a better analysis of their mind and how it functions in their intellectual and affective polarizations.11 Once this point is reached, the analysis of the concept and its contents, of knowledge as the result of a cooperative process between subject and object, which we will see shortly, will lead them to grasp what frônese [φρόνησις] and its contents, the fronemas, mean as an affective “knowing,” where the subject-object relationship is different from the first.

At that point, the student of philosophy will understand more deeply the often-presented differences between Western and Eastern philosophy, which have sparked so many controversies.

For now, we can simply say that in Western philosophy, which is specifically speculative and markedly autotelic,12 speculation is disinterested, which means that it has no end outside of itself, it is not pursued as a means to obtain this or that. When a child takes clay and makes dolls or vases with it, they are “playing” (and the toy is autotelic). When the potter uses clay to make vases and sells them, with a naturally economic purpose, their activity is heterotelic.13 Their action is “interested,” so to speak.

The Sumerians and the inhabitants of ancient Chaldea, whether they came from the Indus Valley or not, faced significant meteorological, ecological, and astrological problems when they built their civilization in the Mesopotamian delta. They likely already faced these problems when they inhabited the Indus Valley, just as the Egyptians did with the Nile floods, etc. The primitive knowledge of these people was heterotelic, it had an end outside of itself, it served to meet this or that need. This interested knowledge (as is the case with science today, for example) predominated throughout the Mesopotamian region and in Ionia. It was there, and from there, that Greek philosophical speculation originated and gained strength. The first sophoi [σοφοὶ] (Greek sages) directed their studies toward solving problems that troubled the Ionians – a seafaring people, therefore dependent on meteorological knowledge. Sophia [σοφία], the knowledge of that time, was predominantly interested. We say predominantly because a clear, rigid separation would be impossible. Also in Ionia, as in the countries of Mesopotamia and especially among the Egyptians and in India, there was disinterested knowledge long before the Greeks, as archaeological examinations prove.

In Greece, thanks to different socio-historical and ecological conditions, which are extensively examined in our work Philosophy and History of Culture, sophia could take a different course. The sophos [σοφος] did not seek knowledge for this or that purpose, but solely for the love of knowledge, for the satisfaction of itself, for an autotelic, disinterested knowledge. This does not mean that there was no heterotelic knowledge as well, but this statement indicates that with the Greeks, sophia [σοφία] predominantly became autotelic, disinterested. It is the love of wisdom for wisdom’s sake, namely philosophia [φιλοσοφία]. It is this tendency that allows for the subsequent polarization between philosophy and science.

It is with this perspective that many scholars have denied the existence of an Eastern philosophy distinct from Western philosophy. Philosophy is simply speculative and disinterested knowledge. However, it must be clarified: the difference between Eastern and Western philosophy does not lie solely there.

When we speak of Western and Eastern philosophy, we do not mean that there are two philosophies. In reality, philosophy, as a body of doctrine with its characteristics, is one, just as science is. But just as we speak of Arabian physics, Faustian physics, Euclidean or non-Euclidean mathematics, European and Chinese music, the division of philosophy into Western and Eastern serves only to indicate certain accentuations of notes that occur in both, with varying degrees of intensity in one or the other.

There is interested knowledge in both the West and the East, as well as disinterested knowledge. However, the distinction lies in this: in the West, disinterested knowledge is more pronounced (as with the Greeks, for example), while it is less pronounced in the East. Magical thinking, whose characteristics we will examine further, is more intense in the East than in the West, as is mysticism. In magic, there is an acceptance of powers that facts possess and that are not fully revealed. There are powers in facts that exceed our predictions. They are magical. When an Eastern person spoke, before Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and atomic discoveries, of the immense and hidden power of things, their thought was magical. Scientific speculation allowed for the understanding and capture of this power, as well as its liberation.

Mysticism, which is prevalent in Egyptian culture and Eastern cultures, is more intense and even permeates philosophy. However, mystic philosophers also emerge in the West.14

The mystical philosopher seeks to reveal what is “concealed,” and the “guide” who leads the initiate to know what is “unsaid” about things is the "mystagogue."15

However, if Western philosophy shows us such objectivity and tends so much towards the object, we also see objective philosophers among the Eastern thinkers.

Thus, there remains only one distinction: between Eastern and Western philosophy, there are only different degrees of intensity, although both are equal as philosophy.

There could be other more significant distinctions, but they can only be made after we have understood the difference between intellect (logos [λόγος]) and affectivity (pathos [πάθος]), which can only be done in future works. In that case, it would be easy to understand what yoga (fusion), brahma, advaita, maia, sânkara, and other Hindu concepts and categories mean. It would also require a study of the concept itself and the construction of an analysis of our knowledge. Such studies, which will appear in our later works, will allow for a clear distinction between Western and Eastern philosophy and an understanding that the contribution of other peoples to Greek thought is much broader than commonly thought.

On Philosophical Reflection

We have seen that philosophy is a reflection, which consists of responding to the questions that are posed. But how does this reflection occur? What elements do we use? What do we utter here? Words.

Philosophical reflection employs words. Among these words, some are technical expressions that have a conventional meaning in philosophical works: the terms.

Terms are voices that, as technical expressions, are used with a conventional meaning. We express philosophical reflection through terms. Many of these terms have been chosen from common language with a special meaning, while others have been created with their own connotation. They are indispensable aids that facilitate clarity, allow for the transfer and exchange of opinions. Every philosophical reflection requires a precise vocabulary in order to avoid constant misunderstandings. Philosophers must adhere to the normal meanings of the terms used to avoid misinterpretations. Many of them create new words, which are essentially new disguises of old ideas, while others merely argue over words, oblivious to their true meaning.

All of this generates or constitutes the torment for those who delve into the study of philosophy and, because they do not know the accepted meaning by the author, judge it based on the common meaning, making confusions that increasingly hinder the apprehension of the expressed thought. Terms, in general, do not have univocity, that is, a single meaning. Very few possess that. Various shades, different connotations, resulting from different experiences and historical, ethnic, and class conditions, can be observed in almost every word. Two men belonging to different classes may have a different sense when they use the same word.

To maintain the continuity and universality of speculative thought, an essential element is required: definition.

Definition, to speak in clear language, is the answer to the question “What is this?” The study of definition belongs to logic.

Definition is an attempt to establish, to delimit the proper sense of a term. There are authors who often use terms carelessly, with personal subintentions.

In summary, definition consists of explaining an unknown term through a known one. We want to establish an identity with it. It would be the same as saying: the term X is equal to the definition Y.

Definitions are often subdivided into nominal, real, formal, and material.16

Many consider them fictitious. Those who accept real definitions derogatorily qualify nominal ones, calling them tautologies, that is, repetitions.

As long as we deal with terms and definitions, we are only in the realm of words, and if we remain there, we are confusing the vehicle of verbal transmission with the facts.

What is a fact? A fact is not defined, it is intuited. The word “fact” comes from the Latin factum, which means deed, thing, or action done, event. It is a familiar word to us.

Although everyone knows what a fact is, it is not easy to say what it is, what it really consists of. A fact is what is presented to us here and now, in a specific place, at a specific time, that is, conditioned by notions of space and time.

Being in time and space is what is called chronotopic existence.17 We do not attribute, we do not lend existence to the fact; it has existence. When facts exist in space, they are called bodies. There are others that exist in time, such as psychic facts, states of the soul, etc. Current facts constitute our own existence and the sphere in which we live and act.

Past facts constitute the elements of biography or history.

Now let us emphasize the use of two commonly used terms, especially today: eidetic and factic. Eidetic comes from eidos [εἶδος], a Greek word that means idea.

The eidetic is immutable and timeless, it refers to intrinsic form; while factic means something mutable and contingent, that is, not necessary.

It is easy to clarify the meaning of these two words now.

The first refers to the idea, which is immutable, for example, the idea of a horse, which refers to all horses and not to a particular one. This idea does not undergo changes over time: it is valid timelessly.

The factic represents what happens, what is mutable in time and space; however, an idea does not occupy a place in space.

Returning to the topic of facts, we can say that when they are bodies, we intuit them through the senses.

When they are states of the soul, we grasp them immediately, that is, directly. We call this capacity to apprehend facts in general intuition – from intus ire, to go inside.

There are sensible, intellectual, emotional, poetic, mystical, etc., intuitions.

The concept of intuition will be further clarified as we delve into the study of philosophy.

When examining a fact, we attribute unity and stability to it, separating it from its surroundings.

But unity is relative; thus, a herd is formed by numerous individuals. We seek the unity of facts; for example, the atom is the unit for inorganic matter, the cell for organic matter, sensation, as some believe, for psychic acts. Today, science does not give this unity a character of isolation. The stability of a fact is also a fiction because facts emerge and disappear in constant becoming, they transform, thus having relative stability.

The isolation and delimitation of facts are partly artificial because there are no isolated facts, only an interconnection of facts.

Unification, stabilization, and distinction are mental operations that we use to know the real world.

Why does human reason proceed in this way? Reason seeks to bring order to what we intuit, which is why we enumerate, separate, and give names to particular facts.

Now we ask: how does reason proceed to master this chaos of knowledge? How does it act to organize this set of facts? What instrument does it use to achieve this dominion?

The concept, that is the instrument.

2. Concept – Fact – Comparison – Identity – Similarity – Difference – Reason

If we observe words carefully, we will see that they express concepts: house, chair, book, etc.

To distinguish concepts, one or more notes are necessary to individualize them. We should not confuse the concept with the word that expresses it. The concept is the product of a mental operation; the word is merely its verbal statement, a verbal sign. Therefore, we should avoid falling into verbalism, which consists of an exaggerated use of words without precise content.

Just as we should not confuse the concept with its verbal statement, we should not confuse it with the fact.

There is no doubt that concepts are based on facts, but in the concept, there is an abstraction from the fact.

In the concept, we have already stripped away some elements of the fact, made a mental abstraction.18 The fact has existence in time and space; the concept only exists when we think. We intuit the fact; we think the concept.

We had the opportunity, in what we said above, to delve into numerous points that, treated synthetically, are now demanding a more comprehensive analysis. We will not study the concept in all its aspects because, as it relates more to logic and psychology, it is there that we will have the opportunity to examine it.

To dominate events, humans needed to give them an order that allowed clear visibility among the facts. And the instrument to achieve this ordering was the concept.

Let’s analyze its genesis.

If the reality of the world around us were uniform and homogeneous, if everything seemed the same to us without any distinction or differentiation, we could never come to know the facts because events would be just one big fact. But it happens that reality appears to us as heterogeneous, diverse, different, and diversified. If the color of (material) facts were the same, it would be impossible to understand that there are colors. Certain parts of visible reality give the eyes an impression of a different kind, different from other parts of reality. That is why we perceive different colors. Hence, we can compare the color of one object with that of another and verify if they are similar, and also perceive if there are differences. We could never perceive that one thing resembles another, for example in color, if there were no objects of different colors, dissimilar and distinct from one another. Therefore, the understanding of the similar, the alike, is contemporary with that of the different, for we cannot understand the different, the diverse, if we are not simultaneously able to compare it with the similar, the alike.

A question arises here: is similarity, in humans and animals, prior to the perception of differences, as asserted by Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and Henri Bergson?

Our sensation is accompanied by memory, and one sensation evokes another, past sensation that resembles it. Comparison is an association. David Hume (1711-1776) emphasizes that associations by similarity are more important and numerous than others, besides being easier and more in line with our natural mental laziness. For example, he asserts that a child grasps similarities first.

Thus, the feeling of similarities is more primitive than that of differences. There is no comparison where there is no similarity.19 Moreover, to compare, we do not need the different, which is dispensable, for we can only compare two parts of reality that are similar, never allowing us to compare parts of reality that are absolutely different.

No matter how solid these arguments may seem, as outlined above, we still firmly adhere to the position of contemporaneity for the following reasons.

Firstly, the perception, by a living being, of a part of reality is already an act of differentiation because the act of perceiving requires and implies a difference between the knower and the known. And since the field that interests us is that of philosophy, and therefore that of humans, they only perceive the external world because it is heterogeneous, thus different. Humans could not separate the material fact from a part of reality from the rest of it if it did not present a difference, which would be evident if it could perceive that, in some aspect, it resembled another part.

Nor could the act of comparison occur without requiring a fundamental condition, which is occupying different positions from the bodies being compared. To place one in front of the other, that is, to compare, it is necessary for them to subsist, coexist side by side, necessarily having something in between that differentiates them; otherwise, they would be perceived as a unity. Furthermore, the idea of comparison does not imply identity. We compare one part of reality with another, even though we perceive that there are different intensities.

When we compare one leaf to another, we already find something similar in it and we verify this similarity. The very act of desiring and wanting to compare implies an implied difference, for we compare to see if there are similarities, as well as to verify if there are differences.

The interest in comparison could never arise in humans if they did not already know the difference, for why would they compare what could not be different or could be similar?

Thus, there is contemporaneity between the notion of the similar and that of the different.

When Frédéric Queyrat (1858-1926) and Bernard Perez (1836-1903) studied this theme, they concluded that, in children up to three years of age, the only associations of ideas are those by similarity, but this does not imply that children have a notion of the similar. On the contrary, in children, the distinction between themselves and the environment has not yet been fully processed. Therefore, the notions of heterogeneity, as well as homogeneity, have not yet formed. If we examine the lives of animals, we will see that they need to know the similar due to a vital requirement. Knowledge of the similar is essential to animal life, especially in higher animals.

There is a process of selection. They choose this and reject that. They choose what is assimilable and reject what is harmful or judged harmful.

This selection work is based on the search for the similar and the rejection of the different. This food should be consumed, that should not. This can be done, that cannot! This resembles that, so it should be rejected. Higher animals, in their actions, reflect this process because the “education” among animals is observable, as they advise their offspring “Eat here; not here” when performing the act of eating and the act of repelling, etc., to convince them of the convenience or inconvenience of ingesting certain foods or performing certain acts, etc.

Perception is selective because it does not capture everything it is possible to capture from the environment, but only what is convenient. There is a selection of notes offered by parts of reality; it captures some and not others. In this act, there is a certain automatism of selection of the different and the similar, as well as a pre-consciousness when it comes to selection conditioned by social or professional order, etc.

Difference is a characteristic of the individual. Individual things are distinguished because they differ because if everything were homogeneously the same, there would be no knowledge of bodies.

Now, the similar is not a category of the identical.20 Because we say that something is identical when it is equal to itself.

Let us analyze this point of great importance and interest for the understanding of future topics to be examined.

We say that two facts are identical when there is no difference between them. Now, the concept of identity implies difference, its opposite, which supports it – or rather, one supports the other, one implies the other. For this reason, the identical is considered indefinable.

Some philosophers argue that we cannot understand, because it is unthinkable, pure difference. Others claim that identity is also unthinkable. We will show later why. Thus, there is an antinomy between the different and the identical.21 We disregard here other meanings given to the term identical, preferring only the one we mentioned above as it prevails in philosophy.

Leibniz denies the identity of substances, based on the principle of indiscernibles, for according to him, two real objects cannot be indiscernible without being strictly confused.

Thus, metaphysically, only the Absolute is identical to itself. Everything else, also considered metaphysically, does not possess identity; that is, there are no beings identical to one another. Therefore, we can strictly conclude that there either is identity or there is no identity. The concept of identity itself does not allow for greater or lesser identity because this concept does not admit degrees. That is why we affirm that the similar is not a category of the identical. Two things are not more or less identical because they are similar.

Could one say that there is quantitative identity and qualitative identity? Is one drop of water not identical to another drop of water? Is one kilogram of this or that not identical to one kilogram of that or this? Before giving our opinion, let us hear what Victor Émile Egger (1848-1909) says:

The two drops of water in the popular saying are not identical unless the requirement is only that they are drops of water. All objects of our experience are in the same case, sometimes identical through rapid and superficial experience, that is, identical in appearance, identical in their ability to receive the same name, but only if considered attentively. Thus, qualitative identity is a conception simply suggested by experience.22

André Lalande (1867-1963) defines qualitative identity with these words: "Character of two distinct objects of thought, in time or space, which would have completely the same qualities."23

Thus, when someone says that a kilogram of beans is in weight identical to a kilogram of sugar, giving it as an example of quantitative identity, they are using the term identity in the sense of mathematics, which considers identity an equality between known quantities, like 2/4 and 1/2. When someone says that the vitamins in a certain food are identical to the vitamins in another, they are merely judging that there is qualitative identity, when in reality it is an equality like the previous one.

Returning to Leibniz’s thought, we saw that he maintained that two things can only be two when they offer some difference in quality; they must differ by something other than number, that is, by “intrinsic determinations,” which would explain the prodigious variety of nature.

Now let us understand similarity since we have discarded the idea of identity (principle of reason, which we will have the opportunity to study).

According to Lalande, similarity is the characteristic of two objects of thought that, although not qualitatively identical, present elements or aspects that can be called “the same.”

Now, how can we conceive two things as similar if there are no equal aspects and other different ones between them? Because if there were no different characteristics, they would be identical. In nature, in human reality, there is no pure identity; there is similarity. Therefore, similarity itself, as a fact, that is, factually, implies difference.

On the other hand, we have seen that every existent is singular, individual.

This book is this book, and not another; that table is that table, and not this one. In this sense, this book is identical to itself because it is not another. That table is identical to itself because it is not another.24

There is identification with oneself only when it is the same thing.25

Any part of reality can only be considered identical to itself in the sense that it is not another. As long as we consider it to be itself, it is different from something else, just as this book is different from another book with the same title and edition. Considered individually, both are different. However, there is something that resembles them because both – although distinct in time or space, as one occupies a different place from the other – present the same qualities. What does all this suggest? Is the problem solved? Absolutely not. Let’s examine further.

In the face of reality, humans perceive that it is not uniformly the same. It presents differences, as we have already studied. But these differences are more or less intensive, for one stone and another stone present smaller differences than a stone and a river.

Psychologists study a law called the “law of similarity” or “law of resemblance,” which they refer to as the general disposition of the mind to evoke a perceived or remembered object in the presence of the idea of a similar object.

Let us analyze: how could humans live if each experience were always a new experience? How could they maintain their existence if they had to experience every fact as something new? Bergson imagined a man who had completely lost his memory and had no memory at all. When he performed an act, he would completely forget it immediately afterward, and the next act would be entirely new to him, with no connection to the previous acts. That man could not live if left to himself, for his memory would not guide him in any of his actions. He could burn himself in the fire as many times as he approached it; he would die of hunger because he would not retain the memory of food to satisfy that urgent need.

Notice that, in nature, bodies occupy a place and have a dimension, and that these bodies are softer or harder; that is, they offer greater or lesser resistance to touch. Some, when they receive light, emit colors, that is, luminous vibrations, more or less intense.

But we verify that there is a lesser difference between the green color of one tree and the green color of another tree than between it and the gray color of an animal. Thus, man soon noticed that there was something that resembled, that is, both trees participated, therefore, in a resemblance greater than that of the tree with the animal. The degrees of difference allowed man to perceive the similarities. Now, it was a vital imperative for man, as it is for higher animals, to simplify the experience, classify the experience, gather the similar or less different ones, and exclude the most different ones.

Let us see how this process of differentiation took place. Man compared one tree to another. They were not completely identical, that is, one could not be identified with the other. However, in this comparison, he found that the color of one resembled that of the other. If the two trees were different, there was a point where one did not resemble the other. What was given by the resemblance, man withdrew, separated from one and the other, that is, abstracted, which means to separate, from the Latin verb abstrahere.

This function of comparison, necessary for human life, created in his mind what we could call an “organ,” using the term from physiology for philosophy, in a somewhat crude sense. This organ, this function of comparison of the mind, is what subsequently generates in man reason. This comparison is immediate, intuitive, but reason is activated in a work of comparison, in a search for identity, as we will have the opportunity to study later.

Reason “comes after,” in man, as we can observe in children. Faced with nature, it intuits the facts. But these facts show that they contain something that seemed identical.

It is the already developed reason that abstracts this “identical” and gives it a name, a common denomination, which is the verbal term of the concept.

In the face of the green fact of one tree and the green fact of another tree, and of many other trees, reason abstracts what is similar in one tree and another tree, which is the green. This common note of the color of the tree, of another and of another, allows the formation of the concept of green. In its form, this tree was similar to that other one and to others. It abstracted from one tree and from others a common fact in them, which consisted of being a body rooted in the earth, with trunks, branches, leaves, etc., and named it tree. Thus, the concept of a tree emerged. And the same goes for branches, trunks, and leaves.

It is not difficult to verify even today among us that new concepts of specific facts emerge every day, which previously did not have a name. For example: a new fact is discovered, and we immediately feel the need to give it a name. It is because having already arisen the concept, which is a mental operation, we need a word that enunciates it, which is the corresponding term. It is easy to also verify that certain concepts, until then general, have expanded into new specific concepts. It is because the search for similarity is increasingly demanding. For example: in the concept of animal, we include all living beings that zoology considers animals; but among these, there are others, such as vertebrates. These concepts are no longer as general as that of animal; they are more specific.

It is characteristic of our spirit to unfold itself into two functions: the one that seeks the similar and the one that perceives the different.

While the first function, that of comparing to grasp the similar, is the one that best corresponds to human nature, as it simplifies and ensures economy in mental work, the second one, that of grasping the different, the individual, is more exhausting. Therefore, the rationalization it performs is constant. But through this rationalization, man enters the realm of abstractions, because, as we will see, reason works with abstractions and tends towards the similar and, hence, towards identity. Reason, due to its increasing demand for the similar, arrives at identity. The movement, fluidity, and constant transformation of things, which intuition reveals to us, clash with reason’s tendency to stratify, stop, identify, and homogenize. Reason operates with the similar, and intuition with the different, which is why each one forms its own concepts a posteriori.

In our work General Noology, we study in detail the formation of this process of polarization of intellectuality into intuition and reason.26

3. The antinomies and antinomic dualism – Gnosiological and ontological dualism – Concepts – Abstraction – Experience

It is worth noting that a concept, by including a set of singular facts, excludes others.

That is why we cannot think of a concept without its opposites. When we conceptualize vertebrates, we exclude invertebrates; when we conceptualize the identical, we exclude the different; when we conceptualize humans, we exclude everything that is not. This dualism is a consequence of the rational act of conceptualization, that is, giving a concept, with a common denomination, to a certain number of facts that appear identical to us. By doing so, we are already making an exclusion, meaning we are separating everything that is not similar to what we conceptualize.

Therefore, every concept includes what it wants to name and excludes everything that cannot fit into that denomination. This dualism is thus fundamental to the logical structure of our mind, which is forced to abstract, polarizing itself into opposites.

When creating a concept, its opposite spontaneously emerges: affirmation gives rise to its negation. This is particularly evident in relation to qualities. When conceptualized, qualities exclude their opposites and, therefore, the opposite concept, as is the case with abstract nouns.

For example: good and evil; freedom and determinism; absolute and relative; abstract and concrete, etc.

These dualisms have been one of the greatest and most intricate problems in philosophy and have given rise to the most complex and ambiguous speculations, as we will see later. However, it seems to us that the problem is false because what is united in fact is mentally separated – and we think we have achieved a real division. We fragment reality into abstract concepts – as indeed all concepts are – and then we are astonished that we cannot bring them together into a unity.

This is where the problem of antinomies arises, which we will study. In philosophy, in general, the term antinomy is used to denote the combination of two propositions, one called the thesis and the other the antithesis, which, although contradictory, can both be supported by arguments of equal strength, as expressed by Edmond Goblot (1858-1935).27

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, calls the antinomies of reason those that are discovered in the ideas of pure reason applied to cosmology (the science of the Cosmos), which we use here as examples.

  1. Thesis: The world has a beginning in time and limits in space. Antithesis: The world does not have a beginning in time nor limits in space.
  2. Thesis: Every composite substance is composed of simple parts. Antithesis: Nothing in the world is composed of simple parts.
  3. Thesis: There is freedom in the transcendental sense as the possibility of an absolute and uncaused beginning of a series of effects. Antithesis: Everything in the world happens according to natural laws.
  4. Thesis: In the world, there exists, as its part or cause, a necessary being. Antithesis: There is no necessary being in the world, neither as part nor as cause.28

Kant considers that the theses are proven by refuting the antitheses and vice versa.

These four antinomies of Kant have been the subject of fierce disputes among philosophers.

(The value of these antinomies is examined by us in Concrete Philosophy and in Kant’s Three Critiques.)29

A Starting Point

We will present a starting point as well as support, a reference point, so to speak, that offers the perspective of each school, allowing us to penetrate the intricate tangle of philosophical opinions.

In the 19th century, a man lived in France whose political disputes and infamy made him largely unknown to present generations. However, his work, which had been almost entirely forgotten, is now resurfacing little by little to shed new light on the problems of the 20th century. This man’s name was Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1864). In his work La Revolution Sociale, we read:

True philosophy is knowing how and why we philosophize, in how many ways and on what matters we can philosophize, and to what purpose all philosophical speculation tends. As for systems, there is no longer a place for them, and seeking a philosophy today is proof of philosophical mediocrity.30

Proudhon noticed, when reading Kant’s antinomies, that they did not prove the weakness of human reason or provide an example of dialectical subtlety, but rather were a true law of nature and thought. For Kant, these antinomies showed that human understanding operates outside its domain and, not grasping the real, functions through illusory processes. This was his main argument for condemning metaphysics and founding agnosticism.31

But regarding the antinomies, Proudhon differed from Kant. For him, they existed in the spirit because they existed in being, in nature, in the physical world, and in the social world. And he said:

The moral world, like the physical world, rests upon a plurality of irreducible and antagonistic elements, and it is from the contradiction of these elements that the life and movement of the universe arise.32

The antagonistic, antinomic dualism, in Proudhon’s sense, has a broader meaning than Kant’s. We have already seen the two antinomic tendencies of our spirit: (1) intuition, which tends toward the individual and the different – the direct apprehension of the individual fact, a simple act of the mind and a process of reason; (2) reason, which tends toward the similar and the general, which compares, an action more complex than the former. Reason is posterior to intuition, formed more slowly and gradually.

But reason and intuition, the two intellectual processes of our spirit, are formed and solidified through the dual and dialectical process of the same.

We have seen how humans grasp the different but need to generalize in order to understand, control, and, above all, transmit because humans begin to create concepts and, when socialized, need to convey what they feel. We have also observed that the creation of concepts is proportional to the analysis of reality. To understand it and to transmit to others what he has learned from it, humans are compelled to constantly create concepts and their verbal statements, terms.

We have seen that while intuition is knowledge of the individual, immediate knowledge, reason abstracts from the individual those characteristics that it generally finds in other individual facts and then gives them a verbal statement, which is the conceptual term.33

Now we need to know the following: does this dualism we observe in knowledge between intuitive and rational, reflective and discursive, arise solely from a functional dualism of our spirit, or does this dualism actually exist in nature and is apprehended by it?

Or, in philosophical language, is there a gnosiological dualism (dualism of knowledge), or an ontological dualism (that is, a dualism in the very being)? Are these dualisms modes of knowing or modes of being?

It is not easy to penetrate this point now, one of the most important in philosophy. For example, we have already seen the tendency of many philosophies to simplify nature and explain it through a single being, thus reducing dualism to monism and explaining contradiction as purely gnosiological, that is, of knowledge (from gnosis, in Greek, knowledge).

Attempting to reduce reason to intuition, making reason merely a result of intuition, is erroneous. The stratification of reason in humans is slow and gradual. As they cannot know the different without the similar, they cannot know the similar without the different. Yes, because, as we will see, knowing is in a sense re-knowing.34

In intuition, there is not yet true knowledge, although this term is often used. In intuition, there is only an immediate apprehension of the fact. In knowledge, there is recognition, thus requiring memory. For we only know what we have in a sense already known. It is a knowing again, for what is given for the first time we cannot yet know – for that, we need to classify, to say what it is.

The act of comparison is not yet true rational knowledge.

The slow formation of reason arises from the constant and spontaneous application of our spirit toward the similar. All animals tend toward the known, toward what has already been perceived. It is like an instinct of self-defense. Humans behave in the same way. Reason is a subsequent sedimentation over schemas, when conceptualization (the elaboration of concepts) reaches such a degree that the mind can already function within a world of discourse, a world of concepts, with their verbal statements.35

Reason, by tending toward the similar, the homogenous, constantly generates a worldview directed toward the identical, while intuition tends toward the individual, the different, the heterogeneous, the variable, the plural. This antinomic dualism is constitutional to our spirit. Investigating whether it is only a result of the mode of knowing or whether the dualism exists in the nature itself, which it apprehends, would be delving into another realm. Many philosophers argue about the subordination of one pole to the other of this dualism or the reduction of one to the other. In that case, they admit the dualism, but hierarchical, or they reduce one to the other, meaning one of the poles is only a manifestation of the other. Another position is also possible: admitting the homogeneity of our spirit, which, faced with the heterogeneity of reality, acts dualistically to grasp it. This is the prevailing position in philosophy. And we have the three classic positions that result from this:

  1. Those who admit a distinction between nature and spirit – the spiritualists;
  2. Those who do not admit this distinction – the materialists, etc.; and
  3. Finally, those who admit the primacy of the spirit, as in knowledge, thought can only know thought, and things are nothing more than our own thoughts – the idealists.

As for those who admit the existence of the reality of the objects of our knowledge, many assert that it is guaranteed by divine truth, such as René Descartes (1596-1650), or by pre-established harmony, such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716).

Regarding the position that admits an antinomy of our spirit and nature, it has less influence in philosophy. We can highlight the figure of Heraclitus and, to some extent, those of Proudhon and Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), who are close to us.

We have seen that concepts always originate from facts. However abstract they may be, we always find a residue of facts, whether real or psychic. When the starting point is a real fact, the concept retains more corporeality, for example, love.

But there are concepts in which abstraction surpasses time and space, meaning they do not have the support of these, and can only be thought, not intuited. These are called negative concepts. Let’s exemplify: intuition shows us that in reality there is fluidity, variation, measurability, finitude, conditionality. Reason creates its own concepts, denying what intuition shows us, and thus we have: incommensurability, infinitude, unconditioned, variant, etc., which do not have positive content when considered intuitively. Reason’s concepts are generally formed by negative concepts, like the ones we mentioned above, even when the negative particle is missing. For example: absolute, which is defined as unconditioned, not conditioned; atom (from “tomos” meaning fragment, part; and “a” as a privative alpha in Greek, meaning not fragmented, that which has no parts).

Negative concepts should not be confused with those that have empirical content, such as “non-self”.

It should also not be thought that those concepts, by containing negation, are devoid of positivity. This will be demonstrated as we advance in the study of philosophy.

There are also necessary concepts, a major problem in Metaphysics – the categories.

According to Kant, who also studied them, they are fundamental concepts of pure understanding, they are a priori forms; that is, they are present prior to the experience of our knowledge and represent all the essential functions of discursive thought.

Kant establishes that every judgment can be considered from four points of view: quantity, quality, relation, and modality, and from each of these points of view three classes of judgments are possible. Let’s enumerate them:

Quantity Quality Relation Modality
Unity Affirmation Substance Reality – Non-Reality
Plurality Negation Causality Possibility – Impossibility
Totality Limitation Community Necessity – Contingency

This classification by Kant is a modified version of the one presented by Aristotle. Many others have been formulated subsequently. What seems fundamental to us to understand the significance of these categories in philosophy is that they are necessary for reason to have knowledge, that is, they are not sensed intuitively; they are given in knowledge, but they precede it as a means of classifying, understanding, and ordering rational knowledge, which is formed by concepts and therefore abstractions. Tradition calls them “universal concepts,” of which the most important are substance and cause. It is easy to understand why they are called universal. We cannot think of anything without referring to something that is or to a predecessor. This universality is a characteristic of human knowledge, a characteristic of reason.

We will not discuss Kant’s position here, nor whether it is valid or not. Others, like the scholastics, affirm that the categories are constructs of our reason, through abstractions, but founded on things (cum fundamentum in re).

The logical process requires a sufficient reason.

This sufficient reason is the necessary relationship of an object or event with others.

By virtue of this principle, we consider that no fact can be true or existent, and no true statement, without a sufficient reason for it to be so and not otherwise. This definition is by Leibniz.

Reason, as it acts on schemes of comparison of the similar, tends, in its development, to elaborate the concept of the identical.

The sufficient reason links, coordinates one fact with another, seeks among them a homogenous, a resemblance, a “sufficient reason”.

If it does not find it, it cannot comprehend.

Thus, reason requires the categories, that is, homogenous elements that link one fact to another. Let’s take, for example, the concept of substance, one of the categories according to Kant.

Substance is what underlies things, what sub-stands, what is behind phenomena. For example, this book we have in front of us can be white or dark, have certain dimensions. But the substance is what remains behind all of this, after separating the attributes we find in this book. Let’s take another example: we have a piece of wax in front of us. Let’s remove all the qualities it presents, imagine that we heat it, melt it, fuse it, and cool it down, and we see that it solidifies again. However, there always remains something that is substance: the wax, the same wax. Things change, but there is always something permanent, something that is invariant – it is the substance that always remains the same.36

Where do these concepts come from? Singular facts? No, from constant relationships between the facts themselves. They express coexistence and succession, spatial and temporal connections that establish an interdependence among the entirety of existence. Let’s see, for example, what quantity is. Aristotle said that quantity is the answer to the question: “How much?” Now, reason conceives quantity as something homogeneous, thus divisible into parts. Quantity is the possibility of more or less. In order to have the concept of quantity, we strip things of all their qualities, which are heterogeneous. Quantity is always homogeneous. These universal concepts are fruitful when applied to a concrete case because they allow us classification, which is the foundation of knowledge.

When taken as real facts, independent of the logical process, they appear empty to us. For we can think of substance, quantity, but we cannot sense them intuitively.

Let’s consider causality and its principle, which obliges us to form an indefinitely long chain of causes. The first link is impossible for us to reach. Therefore, we have to admit a cause without a cause.

Thus, when we have an object and want to know it, we promote a categorical knowledge by observing the object according to each category. We see it as substance, as quantity, as quality; a unity or plurality is formed, and so on.

Therefore, the categories preside over knowledge.

Many philosophers reduced the categories to only one, that of relation. To think is to establish relations. For this, the aid of concepts, the universals, is efficient. It is with them that we organize the knowledge of singular facts into rational systems.

Intuition is what gives the tribute of reality because it is the apprehension of the individual, the concrete. Kant said that every concept, without intuitive content, is an empty concept. Knowledge, organized through concepts, gives a schema of reality, a vision of reality itself, but not an exact vision. However, the instrument to obtain an adequate notion of empirical knowledge is the concept.

In our other works, we will see that not all concepts of this kind are empty. Metaphysics, whose object is beyond sensory experience, can have rigorous foundations.

Now we would like to address, with some important elements, a term that we have used extensively and that requires a better explanation.

We are referring to the term abstraction.

Abstraction consists of the action of the mind that considers apart an element (quality or relation) of a representation or an idea, placing special attention on it and neglecting the other elements. Abstraction is also used to refer to the result of this action: what we manage to abstract.

Through abstraction, we think apart what cannot be given apart. For example, geometric figures are abstractions of concrete figures, in which we only consider extension. We talk about the circle, but not about a specific circle, but about the circle in general. We abstract from the circle all concreteness, all extension given concretely, and we think of the circle as a figure that is abstracted from the qualities or relations that we individually find in one circle or another.

The concept, as we have seen, is the result of an abstraction. We have this book and we have that one; this one is bigger, that one is smaller and green; this one has a yellow cover. That one is thick, this one is thin. We abstract these concretions and arrive at a general abstraction, which is the concept book, a collection of handwritten or printed sheets, bound or paperback. Book is an ideal book, a book that is not placed in space, that has no dimensions, that has no time, for it does not have a year or two of existence.

It is something that we abstract from all its qualities and think apart. However, although all this seems very simple to us, abstraction is the subject of lengthy controversies in philosophy. It is natural that we do not address them here but only highlight the general and most interesting aspects, which are essential for a good understanding of philosophical matter.

Some confusion arises in the use of the term abstraction. For example, it is common to see it used to express the separation made from an object. Let’s see: we have a book on the table. We separate it; that is, we think of it apart, independently of the table, as we can think of the table apart, independently of the book.

In reality, we are not performing an abstraction because, truly, we can separate this book from the table. We saw that in the concept of abstraction, there is a separation, but as an action of the mind, which considers an element apart. We can actually separate the book from the table and take it somewhere else. In abstraction, the separation is from what cannot be given apart. So, when we think of quantity, we abstract it from the qualities, but in reality, the quantity of wax, which we have already mentioned, is not separated from its qualities, which also constitute it.

We can also think of the light color of the wax independently of its quality. We can abstract it, but this color, in reality, is not given apart from the wax, from its quantity. This point is extremely important and deserves the utmost attention.

Thus, to abstract is to disassociate what cannot be disassociated.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) emphasized that when we think of a quality apart, it does not mean that this quality is apart, but rather that it is thought of apart.

Let’s consider another important aspect: at the moment we propose to abstract the white color of this book, we have in our mind images of similar colored surfaces.

If we did not have these images, we could not make the abstraction.

We only abstract what we compare.

Is comparison prior to abstraction? We can only abstract a quality when we compare it with others whose images are present in the mind. Reason operates with abstractions, works with them, as we have seen. Abstraction is a later stage of comparison, therefore requiring previous schemata, which is not a settled matter in philosophy.37

4. Thinking – Experience – Space and time – Subject and object

What is experience? If the reader is sitting, they have some experience of the chair. This chair, in turn, is a fragment of reality.

A fragment, like this book, this table, this lamp, that chair, those books; all are fragments of reality.

The reader has knowledge of this chair, this table, this book. But this knowledge is fragmentary. It is not a knowledge of all things; only of fragments of reality. Thus, experience is a fragmentary knowledge of a fragment of reality.

But does this experience occur in isolation? Independent, always the same? No; it expands, deepens, rectifies itself.

Let’s see: the book has a blue cover, it’s not very thick, it has a sober presentation. And, placed there, in that corner of the table, it seems more beautiful. Knowledge expands.

Let’s consider other aspects often referred to as experience, such as the act of feeling, or the result of feeling, of suffering, of receiving something.

But does all of this remain separate? Like one, two, three, four, five pieces of paper? No! Each experience adds to what was previously known. And if we were to ask: is experience a copy of reality? Yes, a copy, we could answer. But complete? No; deficient, limited. And so too is individual experience, like accumulated experience that some communicate to others, and generations transmit to generations.

Each new experience entails new knowledge and a new problem. Do we already know what experience is? We know something, but still very little. A little history of thought will help us.

A little history of thought

The ancients opposed sensory experience (of the senses) to reasoning, to knowledge acquired through rational reflection, that is, through reason.

They said that sensory experience remained only in the appearances of things, while the second reached the depths of these very things.

One aspect deserves prior examination. It is a simple classification of experience that arises from the dichotomy presented earlier. Could we classify experience as:

  1. mediate; or
  2. immediate?

In the first case, it is clear, as we admit that experience is obtained through the senses, reason, etc. But, in the second case, it would be a direct experience, an immediate contact with the object.

Could we apply “intellectual intuition” to experience?

Let’s take a brief digression on the concept of intellectual intuition as explained by Bergson. He said:

Intuition is this kind of “intellectual sympathy” by which we transport ourselves into the interior of an object to coincide with what it has that is unique and, consequently, inexpressible.38

It is something similar or comparable to instinct and artistic sense, which reveal to us what beings are in themselves, as opposed to discursive and analytical knowledge, which makes us know them from the outside.39

Once this immediate experience is accepted, what is acquired through experience would be different from what is acquired through discursive reasoning or deductions. The former would be a direct experience, like what we feel, what we “experience” in the face of a person with whom, at certain moments, we feel so fused with their soul, in their most intimate being, as if we were penetrating inside and seeing what the person truly is.

Let’s consider the various ways in which experience is understood:

  1. according to its intentional content: as internal experience, it is directed toward consciousness and provides the complete and immediate reality of it;
  2. as external experience: equivalent to perception, in a very broad meaning of the term, whose precise concept can only be formulated by psychology.

Thus, one speaks of an intelligible experience, a psychological experience, a metaphysical experience, etc. This shows that the use of the term is varied, and the concept of experience is too broad. Therefore, it is often used purely empirically, in tenacious opposition to the various senses that philosophers lend to it.

This is, for example, the sense employed by Kant.

For him, our knowledge begins with experience. But does Kant refer to all our knowledge?

No. Otherwise, how would we have universally valid knowledge, i.e., valid for everyone? In short, how would we have science? Therefore, something else is involved.

That is to say, if science begins with experience, it is not solely based on it, nor do all knowledge proceed solely from experience.

But how does this happen? Let’s analyze it further: knowledge through experience is posteriori knowledge, empirical knowledge. How does it become universally valid knowledge? Through the conjunction of experience with the principles of understanding.

These principles must act as a “form” that “shapes” the matter of experience, without ever “transcending” it, as long as it wants or intends to limit itself to the realm of science.

Kant used the term “transcendent” in a precise sense. For him, what was transcendent was what was above and beyond all possible experience, whether it be reality, beings, or the principles of knowledge.

Kant’s own words are very clear and will already familiarize us with another term that we will encounter many times in philosophy books: "We call ‘immanent’ those principles whose application is entirely limited to the boundaries of possible experience, and ‘transcendent’ those that must soar above those limits."40

Now it becomes clear what we meant earlier when we stated that anyone who intends to confine themselves to the realm of science must combine the principles of understanding with experience, making them act as a “form” without ever transcending experience.

Therefore, the true scientist remains within the realm of science, which is immanent, that is, it applies only to the limits of possible experience. The rest belongs to philosophy.41

The understanding of experience in different philosophies is not a settled matter, as there are various ways to comprehend it.

Philosophers have such difficulty in clarifying it that many philosophies revolve around its notion.

In times of crisis and unrest like ours, there is a noticeable concern to base all philosophy on experience. The balance observed in all systems of beliefs accepted until then is threatened. The old truths no longer satisfy because only a few know them, and caricatures replace them. The constant transformations that have occurred, the inability of certain principles to allow a normal evolution of humanity, and their transformation into arguments to hinder the next evolution of the social order have put us in check.

Formulas have lost their power,and that is why experience now assumes great significance. And that is also why it is difficult to precisely define its notion, given the great controversies that have arisen and resonate in the pages of philosophy.

Can the notion of experience be exhausted in action or in vague sensitivity?

“The immersion in experience for the acquisition of experiences” and consequently, the enrichment of life or the subject who lives them, does it necessarily represent an identification with the experiences themselves?

Let’s reexamine what we have said. Can reality be like this or otherwise? We know it. How do we know it? To the extent of our frameworks, within the limitations common to all human beings.

Sensory intuition gives us the materials of knowledge. Concepts serve us to coordinate these materials, and the product of all this is, for humans, the image of reality. So, what does experience depend on? It depends on the flow of intuited facts and the accuracy of the employed concepts. What will we do then? We will continually strive to improve the image of reality.

Can we compare this image, this copy, with the original?

There is a classic definition that says truth is the agreement of mental representation with its object. How can we verify this agreement? Herein lies a problem of knowledge, and it is the Theory of Knowledge that deals with it.42

However, there is a spontaneous inclination to identify the image of things with the thing itself, which Kant refers to as substance. This inclination is called naive realism. But in philosophical reflection, this state of innocence is abandoned out of necessity, and it is concluded that experience is a mental process.

From everything that has been said, we conclude that experience can be analyzed from the two aspects in which it occurs. Experience is both interior and exterior. And we attribute equal reality to both. We have this conviction, and everything confirms it.

Otherwise, everything around us, including people, would be mere phantoms.

Thus, we see that the problem lies in the relationship between experience and reality, and this problem no longer belongs to the realm of experience. That is why experience imposes a restricted character, although we recognize its great value. But what is this advantage based on? It is based on data provided by sensitive intuition, that is, on data that are given here and now, in time and space.

Knowledge that does not occur within the data of time and space is no longer an experience but knowledge of another order. Thus, the condition of experience, as well as its limit, is time and space. But now we face another question: who is time? What is space? 43

One of the most fascinating and controversial themes in philosophy is time and space. If we say that space “is the ideal medium, characterized by the externality of its parts, in which our perceptions are located, and therefore contains all finite extensions,” if we say that it is the “medium of coexistence, while time is the medium of succession,” if we say that time is “the period that goes from a previous event to a subsequent event” or a “continuous (generally considered continuous) change, by which the present becomes the past,” or an “undefined medium, in which the sequence of events unfolds, but which, in itself, would be given integrally and indivisibly to thought,” we will have offered something for the analysis of such an important theme.

But instead of seeking a definition in advance, let us proceed differently.

In the face of space and time, we can take two approaches:

  1. Either space and time are aspects of reality, independent of their representation; or
  2. They are inherent forms of the structure of the mind.

In other words, they either have being, independent of human knowledge, or they are merely modes of that knowledge.

This dilemma is imposed in philosophy and divides philosophers. A third question could also arise: would both modes enclose reality itself?

Let us further examine these two ways of seeing. Does time and space exist here and now? Do they have an ontic character? Do space and time exist as modes of Being, independent of us? Or are they mere representations of our mind, forms elaborated by the structure of our mind?

It is not the first time we have said that in philosophy, whenever a theme is examined, analyzed, or studied, there is always a dualistic approach. Philosophical thought always positions itself between two extreme opposing modes of observing facts. Neither of them alone satisfies, because despite the controversies and debates, the mind oscillates between the two positions, finding powerful arguments in both.

Otherwise, let us consider: if we attribute to space and time their own reality, we inevitably fall into conclusions that repugnate our reason.

Is space infinite? Is space limited?

If we want to assert that space is infinite, we have to admit that it has no end, that there is always space, more and more space, space beyond.

If we consider it limited, we feel the need to ask: what lies beyond? It is not space, for space is limited. Then what contains it?

If we meditate on what we have said, we can easily feel that neither of the two positions satisfies. We are faced with one of Kant’s antinomies. In the case of time, we find ourselves in the same situation:

  1. Either we admit a beginning in time,
  2. Or we deny this beginning. And in this case, there would be no beginning or end in time, which would put us in another unsustainable, antinomic situation. In trying to solve this antinomy, Kant presented his opinions, which we will study later. But before we reach them, let us make comments and establish some very simple reasoning.

Are space and time merely forms of mental representation? Can we abstract them?

Before answering, let us consider some interesting aspects: when we speak of coexistence or succession, we already presuppose space and time. We cannot have a concrete intuition without accepting them. Let us imagine that the universe, the entire universe, does not exist. We can remove the representation of space and time associated with our own existence.

Where do we grasp reality? In space and time.

Now we find ourselves in a tangle of questions that we need to answer.

But for that, nothing is better than studying a little of the history of human thought about time and space, so that we can offer clarifying answers. Let us start with space.

The notion of space in history

The Greeks opposed the fullness (το πλείων – to pleon) to the void (το κενόν – to kenon). Space was very simple and intuitive. They did not have a word to express this concept because the Greeks did not have a categorical understanding of space, but only of fullness and void, that is, what the external environment presents to sensitive intuition. Thus, space was the void that could be filled with matter. When taken ontologically, space (void) would then be non-being. Unlike Parmenides (530 BC-460 BC), Democritus (460 BC-370 BC) affirmed, in addition to the reality of being, the reality of the void, the reality of non-being, which existed between atoms, a thesis that he later had to abandon.

Aristotle considered space, which he called topos, as the place where phenomena occur, the place where becoming takes place, where all delimitation and determination of things occur.

To matter, the attributes of spatiality and extension were given, that is, forms of matter. In this way, there was an identification between space, time, and matter. Since time is not rationalizable (and we will see why, as it is a concept typical of intuition), it was understood as space, that is, measurable, thus reduced to space, a concept that still persists, in many aspects, in the discussions of modern science. Descartes, for example, following in Parmenides' footsteps, eliminates time and ends up eliminating matter to reduce everything to filled space. And by defining extension as the essence of bodies, he turns physics into a kind of geometry.

Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677) will continue on this path, in which the finite modes of the attribute of extension, one of the attributes of Being, constitute spatial forms and, consequently, the material entities themselves.

Leibniz completely changes the aspect of the problem. At that time, a new possibility arises that will completely change the technique of human work. These are the first experiments with the force generated by the steam engine, initiated by Denis Papin (1647-1712), continued by Thomas Newcomen (1663-1729), and later by James Watt (1736-1819).

Leibniz brings a new notion to philosophy: force, but force as expansion. Byconverting force into the true substance of bodies, matter can no longer be simply identified with space, and space becomes a separate (ideal) entity. Thus, Leibniz significantly alters the radical and extreme geometrization found in Descartes and Spinoza.

Afterwards, Kant emerges, contributing to the subject with new elements. Space is not, for him, an empirical set derived from external experiences, “because external experience is only possible through the representation of space”.44 It is not possible for us to have an external experience without previously having the representation of space. Thus, space is “a priori representation (prior to experience), which serves as the foundation for all external intuitions,” because, he says, “it is impossible to conceive of space not existing, although it can be thought of without containing any object.” Therefore, space will be the condition of possibility for phenomena, that is, "a priori representation, the necessary foundation of phenomena."45 Space, for Kant, is not something we talk about, something discursive, but a pure intuition. In other words, space is the form of external sensible intuition of things.

However, it is worth clarifying this point further. In the exposition of Kant’s ideas, "space does not represent any property of ‘things’; it is nothing more than the form of external sense phenomena, that is, the only subjective condition of sensibility through which external intuition is possible."46

Thus, Kant attributes to space the characteristics of apriority, independence, and transcendental intuitiveness.

Space is a pure intuition and, therefore, a “pure form of sensibility,” just like time, which, along with space, constitutes the two pure forms of sensibility since the sensible is given with the priority of time and space, which preside over all sensation and sensible knowledge.

But there is a common confusion about Kant’s thought. The priority of the pure forms of sensibility (time and space) does not consist in chronological priority, but rather in a priority of validity not based on experience. In other words, the idea of space and time arises from experience but is given priority over future experiences. In children, the ideas of space and time gradually form, which later become the preexisting forms for new experiences; Kant did not consider these forms as innate to humans.47

However, the investigations did not stop at Kant. The relationships between time, space, and matter continue to be studied and discussed. Thus, we hear about absolute space, relative space, psychological space, tactile space, visual space, etc.

In modern physics, we hear about multidimensional spaces, hyperspaces, spacetime continuum, etc.

The problem of time

Let us examine the subject of time. Time has always posed great difficulties for philosophical reflection because it is impossible to rationalize it, except by reducing it to space, that is, by making it spatially measurable. A study of the history of philosophy shows that time has always been set apart, inhibited from the great investigations, which mostly remain in the realm of space.

In the face of change, mutability, philosophers have sought what lies behind things, what is immutable, timeless. The oppositions that occur among phenomena are oppositions that occur in time; therefore, the immutable being must be timeless. Time is the realm of becoming, while Being, being static, cannot have time and, therefore, when considered unconditioned, is always eternal and immutable. This is why reason can only conceive of time when it spatializes it, when it reduces it to something homogeneous, like space, which, to reason, is always self-identical, simple, one. Time is relegated to the realm of the particular, the contingent, the contradictory; time belongs to the living, the existent, the phenomenal.

With Saint Augustine (354-430), time already appeared with its historical character, not as spatialized as it had appeared in Aristotle’s philosophy.

Bergson emphasizes that "intelligence [...] abhors the flowing and solidifies everything it touches. We do not ‘think’ real time, but we live it, because life surpasses intelligence."48 According to Kant and Leibniz, time exists only in human thought. “Whoever considers these observations well will understand that time is merely an ideal thing, and the analogy of time and space will make it clear that one is just as ideal as the other,” says Leibniz.49

As we have seen, Kant considers time and space as pure forms of sensibility. He said:

Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. [...] Different times are only parts of one and the same time [...] To say that time is infinite means only that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through the limitation of a single time that underlies it.50

This is what many refer to as “duration.”

Descartes made a distinction between time and duration and expressed it as follows: "Time, which we distinguish from duration taken in general, and which we say is the ‘number of movement,’ is nothing more than a certain way of thinking in this duration."51 Thus, time, as Goblot points out, will be the part of duration during which a phenomenon occurs; duration will be infinite, time will be a quantity; duration will exist objectively, not because it is a reality in itself, but in the sense that things actually endure; time will only exist in the mind that measures it.52

There is always a need to distinguish between time as heterogeneity and the spatialization of time. Abstractly considered time is a time of the phenomenon, determined, measurable. The same applies to “space” and “extension”: the former is abstractly considered; the latter, as the space of the phenomenon, is measurable, determined.

Summing up

Space is immediately given to us. Bodies exist in space, and it is not a relation, as it is measurable because it is homogeneous, but it is measurable when it has reference points. We measure the space between one thing andanother.

Things depend on space, and extension is not independent of it; all extended things (bodies) have a connection to it. “But space exists only where things are given” (measurable).

Time appears to us as succession; one time is replaced by another, while space appears to us as simultaneous. Time also appears to us as a relation, and when considered in a spatialized manner, it is measurable. All bodies exist in time, and all things depend on it. As extension, every space can be understood as existing within time. In bodies, time presents heterogeneity. The time of a human is not the same as that of a granite rock or a fleeting microbe whose life lasts only minutes. Thus, in addition to the problems posed by the duration of pain, which is prolonged, we have existential time, which has a different meaning for each individual, each species. As for physics, it is interested in spatialized time, measurable time, time reducible to something homogeneous, and is concerned with how to measure it, as the object of physics consists of metric objects, the “objects that can be measured.”

We intentionally left out the study of how the Scholastics conceived of time and space, to which they did not attribute an inherent reality, which we will address in “Ontology and Cosmology” and “Concrete Philosophy.”

Subject and Object

It is easy to conclude that our vulgar and naive image of reality is quite problematic. We readily see that there is a distinction between reality itself and knowledge of reality.

Why does this fact occur? Because reflection unfolds reality into two parts and opposes one to the other, which it calls the subject and the object.

Let us now examine these two concepts. We will not examine the subject from a logical point of view, as that belongs to logic; nor from an ontological perspective, which belongs to metaphysics; nor from a psychological perspective, which belongs to psychology. What interests us is the gnosiological viewpoint, that is, the perspective of the cognizant being, the being that knows.

This being is attributed autonomous existence. It is the Ego, opposed to the non-Ego, which, in this case, is the object. This opposition is primary.

But a simple reflection shows us right away the error of this position, this disconnect from the universal process, this abstract way of treating this dualism, making it an antagonistic dualism.

Now, we can only conceive the subject and the (psychological) object in a reciprocal relationship, as they are correlative.

Their antagonism is purely antinomic, in the sense that we have already explained. One cannot exist without the other. If we remove one term from this duality, the other disappears. An isolated subject without an object does not exist. In knowledge, one cannot be understood without the other because there is no knowledge without an object, nor knowledge without a cognizant subject. The denial of the object would be the solipsistic position of George Berkeley (1685-1753), who denies the existence of the object in order to affirm only the existence of the subject.

Now let’s examine the content of these two words, subject and object.

In psychology, the development of the Ego is studied. We know that the child, when born, is unaware of the external world. But gradually, it shapes the environment through perceptions and, at the same time, becomes aware of itself. Thus, a division between itself and the external world occurs.

Ego + non-Ego. But the Ego does not live independently of the non-Ego. There is an interpenetration that we will study in its functional aspect.

This interpenetration is formed through the multiple exchanges between the organism and the environment.

Philosophy encounters a problematic issue here, which we can summarize with the following questions: Is there interpenetration? To what extent does this interpenetration occur? Is there reciprocal influence? Can they truly influence each other? This problematic issue has led to great debates in philosophy, and the problem extends into various fields, such as psychology, sociology, ontology, dialectics, etc.

Does the Ego have autonomous existence? Does the Ego oppose the non-Ego? Is the so-called “antagonistic dualism” well-founded?

This expression has a very relative value because we never know where the Ego ends and the non-Ego begins. Through psychology, we see that the distinction between the Ego and the non-Ego is not very clear, to the point that the Ego itself unfolds into its own object when it knows itself. The reciprocity, observed in the interaction of one upon the other, shapes the image of the non-Ego, formed by the Ego.

As for the total separability between the Ego and the non-Ego, this presents one of the most debated issues in philosophy, a problematic issue that stands out in the work of ascetics and mystics, in metaphysics, in the knowledge of the essence of Being, etc.

Based on common experience, the Ego is linked to the non-Ego. The separation between the Ego and the non-Ego mentioned here is not the same as in chemistry. We have seen that the separation between the Ego and the non-Ego is accompanied by an increase in the non-Ego as well as the Ego. This is knowledge: knowledge of the Ego about itself or about the non-Ego.

In knowledge, there is no object without a subject. The object implies the subject. Therefore, we can take one of two positions:

  1. Existence of the subject and the object;
  2. Existence of the subject alone.

In the latter case, the subject is everything. This is, for example, the position of solipsism attributed to Berkeley.53

Now let’s analyze what is relevant to the scope of our study: how knowledge is verified, that is, how the apprehension of the non-Ego by the Ego is verified.

Let us examine four positions found in philosophy that seek to solve the problem of knowledge.

Empiricist position

The Ego is a tabula rasa on which the object impresses the perceived matter, which is called experience. Consciousness is passive, and the non-Ego acts upon it. Knowledge is the product of experience. It is easy to see that the notion of experience, for empiricists, is different from what we have already explained.

In the sense used by empiricists, knowing generally consists of the fact and the result of feeling, suffering, or receiving something that becomes part of the set of previous experiences.

This is the position of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-1704), Hume. According to them, knowledge depends on experience.54

Rationalist-apriorist position

The Subject creates the external world; it does not depend on experience. Examples: the creation of geometrical figures that do not exist in the external world; unreal beings. This response admits two positions:

  1. An extreme position, that of solipsism, in which the Ego is the absolute creator of the external world;
  2. A moderate position.

Let’s examine it:

Let’s focus on the book in front of us. The empiricist says that the book is located outside the Ego, which impresses a representation of it on the tabula rasa of consciousness. The moderate position says: not only consciousness participates in the knowledge of the book, but the book itself is also necessary. However, in knowledge, the decisive factor is the Ego, that is, certain laws common to all human beings from the beginning, innate to the Ego, not born but already established, belonging ab initio (from the beginning) to the Ego. Examples of these necessary concepts are the concept of substance (since there must be something persistent in change) and the concept of causality (everything has a cause), etc.

This position, that of the moderates, is defended by Descartes, Spinoza, etc. From the first position, we have Leibniz, who declares that the subject creates the external world.

Criticist position

In the midst of this debate between empiricists and rationalist-apriorists, Kant emerges with his doctrine, the criticist one.

We haveseen that the sources of knowledge are, for empiricists, experience and the object; for rationalist-apriorists, reason.

In the first case, the subject apprehends the object; in the second case, the subject apprehends the subject and creates the object – this is the position of extremists, solipsists, etc. – or the subject apprehends both the subject and the object, which is the position of moderates.

Kant, in the face of this distinction, seeks to reconcile the two solutions. How? Through criticism. Let’s see: we have the sensible and reason; the object and the subject. There is no contradiction between them; there is a synthesis. Experience and reason are equivalent. Knowledge begins with experience, but it is shaped by reason. Let’s consider our example: we have the book in front of us. We see it, touch it, etc. But that’s not all; we don’t exhaust the knowledge of the book with that, otherwise the subject would be just a camera.

We reflect on the book, think about the book; we bring together perceptions, create a concept that we call a book, which is not formed solely from perceptions; it is something shaped. Categories come into play in this process because all rational knowledge is also categorical (and conceptual). These categories are necessary concepts given beforehand, a priori, before the perception of the object.

Thus, when faced with the book, reflecting on it, we say that it is big, thick, interesting, a whole, green, a valuable work. Therefore, according to Kant, knowledge is empirical and rational: the object is shaped by the subject in its representation, but it also influences the subject by increasing its experiences.

At first glance, Kant’s position may seem empiricist-rationalist, like that of Aristotle. However, the differences are fundamental, as will be evident when studying the Theory of Knowledge.

Mystical position

It is knowledge through inner vision, in which experience is taken with affectivity. Mystics affirm mystical knowledge, that ecstasy in the absolute, through immediate and direct intuition of what lies beyond the phenomenal.55

5. Science – Theory of knowledge – Hypothesis – Metaphysics

We have outlined in general terms the main doctrines that compete with each other for the best interpretation of the great problem of knowledge. The big question of how our knowledge is verified has had various answers in philosophy.

We have already studied the empiricist, rationalist, critical, and mystical positions.

In philosophy, “theory of knowledge” refers to the philosophical explanation and interpretation of human knowledge, and in this chapter, we examine the possibility of knowledge, how it is processed, its scope, its limits, and its future possibilities.

This is a topic of great importance and fundamental to philosophy, and it is considered by many scholars that all studies should begin with it. However, the theory of knowledge has only recently been established as an independent discipline, although its main themes were studied in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. John Locke can be considered the founder of this discipline with his work “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” which was published in 1690.

We can start with the “five fundamental problems” regarding knowledge, generally proposed following the classification presented by Johannes Hessen (1889-1971):

  1. Possibility of human knowledge, which can be characterized by the question: can the subject really grasp the object? The question is about whether there is truly a contact between the subject and the object.
  2. Origin of knowledge. This problem arises as follows: we have seen that there are two forms of knowledge – theoretical, speculative, rational, mediate knowledge, and immediate, sensible, intuitive knowledge. Which of the two is the source and basis of human knowledge? This is the question that characterizes this problem.
  3. Essence of human knowledge. Does the subject determine the object, or does the object determine the subject? This is the characteristic question of this problem.
  4. Forms of human knowledge. Is there, in addition to discursive, rational knowledge, an intuitive knowledge?
  5. Criterion of human knowledge. Is there true knowledge? If so, how can we know this truth?

Let’s now look at the answers.

1) The possibility of knowledge

The dogmatic answer

For this position, there is no problem of knowledge because dogmatism assumes the possibility and reality of contact between the subject and the object, affirming the apprehension of the latter by the former. Dogmatism is the oldest position in Greek philosophy since the Greeks, initially, did not discuss the possibility of knowledge, assuming the full capacity of human reason to grasp the object. It was the Greek sophists who first raised this problem, and their critique of knowledge cast doubt on the dogmatic position in philosophy.

The skeptical answer

For skepticism, the subject cannot grasp the object. Skepticism can manifest itself in various ways: logical skepticism, which denies the possibility of metaphysical knowledge; methodical skepticism (which uses skepticism as a method), which, by doubting everything that presents itself, aims to reach the true by discarding the false; and systematic skepticism, which recognizes the impossibility of attaining this true and exact knowledge.

The subjectivist and relativist answer

For these currents, which we have also studied, truth has only limited validity. Subjectivism limits this validity to the subject who knows, while for relativism, it is merely relative; it has limited validity. Thus, it is determined by the influence of the environment, cultural background, and historical conditions that act as determining factors, thus determining its variability.

The pragmatic answer

This is the answer given by William James (1842-1910). According to pragmatists, humans are practical beings, driven by will and action, guided by intellect. Therefore, truth is useful, and its value corresponds to its convenience or inconvenience for life. Thus, truth is founded on its usefulness to human existence.

The critical answer

We have studied this answer previously.

2) The origin of knowledge

Rationalist position

This view sees reason as the source of knowledge, and knowledge is acquired when it is logically necessary and universally valid. Thus, reason guarantees knowledge because it is through reason that knowledge is obtained. Only rational knowledge is true, and reason is the source of knowledge, surpassing all experience, as it has its own laws that are necessarily logical and universally valid.

Empiricist position

For empiricists, reason is not the true source of knowledge; rather, it is experience from which we derive the contents of reason. This is the theory of “tabula rasa” that we have already discussed. Empiricism relies on concrete facts in its favor, emphasizing the evolution of human thought and knowledge based on experience. It is observed, for example, that most rationalists rely on mathematics, while most empiricists rely on natural sciences because experience plays a decisive role in them. Rationalists tend towards metaphysical dogmatism, while empiricists tend towards metaphysical skepticism.

Intellectualist position

Intellectualism sought to find a middle ground between the extremes of rationalism and empiricism. For intellectualism, experience and thought form the basis of human knowledge. Intellectualism derives concepts from experience, but these concepts act upon sensible intuitive representations.

3) The essence of knowledge

Objectivism solution

According to this solution, the object determines the subject, and the subject is governed by it. The object is something given that is reconstructed by conscious cognition.

Subjectivism solution

Subjectivism places knowledge in the subject. There are no objects independent of consciousness; rather, consciousness generates them, and they are merely products of thought.

Realism solution

Realism affirms the existence of real things independent of consciousness, thus asserting the independence of objects from the perception of the knower.

Idealism solution

For idealism, real objects are objects of consciousness or ideal objects. We have seen Berkeley’s position, which is also an idealistic position (solipsism). Thus, the object of knowledge has nothing real but only ideal, as all reality is enclosed within consciousness.

Phenomenalism solution

According to phenomenalism, we do not know things as they are but only as they appear to us. We know that things exist, but not what they are. Therefore, phenomenalism accepts the idealistic position by limiting knowledge to consciousness.

4) Types of knowledge

We have already mentioned the controversy surrounding this point. Let’s analyze it in its general aspects.

Discursive, theoretical, mediate knowledge

Most philosophers affirm that there is only one type of knowledge: discursive, theoretical, reflective, mediate knowledge acquired through reasoning, where the object is apprehended, compared with others, and so on.

Note the exact meaning of the term “discursive,” which comes from “to discourse,” to go back and forth, to move from here to there. This is how reason proceeds. It moves from here to there, carries the image of the object, compares it with others, takes, brings, fixes it, associates it with others; in short, it performs a work of knowledge through a multiplicity of actions (hence it is “mediate” knowledge), through a plurality of acts.

Alongside this knowledge, others argue that there is another form of knowledge – immediate knowledge.

Immediate knowledge (instead of mediate)

This is intuitive knowledge instead of discursive knowledge, a knowledge that does not go from here to there, that does not reason or compare but is an immediate apprehension of the object. Inthis case, we are not referring to sensory intuition but rather intellectual intuition. When we notice a difference between a green object and a blue one and intuitively perceive this difference, we have an example of intellectual intuition. Descartes, in his “cogito ergo sum” (I think; therefore, I exist), accepted intuition as an autonomous means of knowledge. However, most philosophers affirm that there is only one knowledge: rational (discursive) knowledge.

However, aesthetic and ethical values are apprehended through intuition, and the artist, as such, works with intuition. We have intuitive certainty about ourselves, the external world, and other people. Bergson claimed that rational knowledge only grasps the mathematical-mechanical form of reality, while intuition alone penetrates its inner content, the core of things. Both the position of extreme rationalists, who deny any knowledge to intuition and claim that only theoretical, rational knowledge is valid, and the position of irrationalists, who deny the value of reason in knowledge, err by favoring one of the extremes.

5) Criterion of human knowledge

How do we know whether a judgment is true or false? This question examines the problem of truth and its concept. Without examining various other aspects of philosophy beforehand, it is not easy to penetrate a field of such great importance as the criterion of truth, which is the subject of “Criteriology.”

We have already seen that truth in knowledge generally consists of the agreement between thought and object.

However, this concept of truth implies a series of other elements that have not yet been studied. The criterion of truth requires the establishment of the concept of truth. For logical idealism, truth is not transcendent, as in the previous assertion where we accepted that truth is the agreement between the object and the content of thought. In this case, the object transcends thought; it is something that is placed before thought. For idealism, agreement occurs within thought itself, and this agreement consists of the absence of contradiction. Thus, the absence of contradiction is the criterion of truth. In the case of formal or ideal sciences, this criterion is valid because when thought encounters ideal or mental objects, it remains within its sphere. However, this criterion fails when confronted with real objects. The certainty of evidence proves certainty, not evidence. The feeling of certainty is an emotional, intuitive certainty that cannot claim universal validity. It is a lived certainty, intuited but not formally demonstrated. Scientific knowledge demands universal validity. It is valid here and anywhere else. Evidence is a criterion of truth, but this evidence can be emotional or rational, or both simultaneously.

On the Elaboration of Hypotheses

Man has the need to provide answers to the demanding great questions that arise. Where there is a gap, man seeks to fill it; where there is an enigma, he seeks to solve it. He needs to complete his knowledge, expand it to encompass the whole, to be able to explain everything, clarify everything. When he lacks this knowledge, he creates a hypothesis.

Let’s see what a hypothesis is. The word comes from two Greek words: hypo and thesis, which mean “placed beneath,” equivalent to “supposition.”

Human imagination can create, but man lives in reality. However, a hypothesis is not a mere creation of fantasy without pragmatic purpose. The hypothesis needs to be a rational creation and depends on what we already know, the material already known; it is on this ground that it establishes its consistency. It must not contradict already tested facts and must have subsequent verification.56

Hypotheses are employed in both science and philosophy. They serve as provisional knowledge, a possibility that allows and has allowed the progress of science. They stimulate reflection and discoveries. Often, experiments destroy them, and they are subsequently replaced by better, more suitable ones. Decisive observations determine their validity or lack thereof.

Science is based on hypotheses. Many hypotheses, due to their enduring nature, are deemed indubitable, and much of this is due to the scientists themselves. When imagination takes precedence and challenges the concepts of time and space, when it wants to go beyond all experience and intends to give creations the character of real entities, it is no longer a matter of hypotheses, but of hypostases (from hipo, below, and stasis, what exists).

Hypostasis is the creation of entities that are foreign to the spatiotemporal reality. It is not an object of sensory experience, and its affirmation, for many, is merely an act of faith.

On Metaphysics

Metaphysics presupposes intelligible knowledge without empirical content. It is the result of an intellectual, conscious, and reflective attitude. It is not inspired by fear or mystery, but by curiosity in the face of the mysteries of existence. Metaphysics, structured as a discipline, assumes an advanced state of culture because it requires a reflective phase and mastery of reason.

When religion loses ground, when it loses its power of conviction, and many no longer have a personal experience of its affirmations, metaphysics emerges because it gives a logical character to facts, connecting the ephemeral to the eternal.

We can make a distinction: in the religious sphere, an affective attitude predominates; in metaphysics, an intellectual attitude prevails.

With this, we want to point out that many foundations of metaphysics are intertwined with those of religion, which are nothing more than rationalized expressions of religious principles, whose deeper meanings we will analyze shortly. In the East, philosophy is not easily separated from faith. It is not speculative there as it is in the West, where man has not been as dominated by nature and has freed himself to impose his dominion over it. Speculation is predominant in Western philosophy, not in Eastern philosophy.

In the Middle Ages, in the West, a return was made to this state. Philosophy became secular, separated from the Church, especially with the work of William of Ockham (1288-1347), Bacon, Descartes, and others.

An examination of the various doctrines of metaphysics shows that it does not always free itself from emotionality, nor is it purely rational. It contains a mixture of illogical elements (conscious and unconscious). History shows us that over time, we can construct various metaphysics that oppose each other.

By avoiding the empirical and not relying on it, metaphysics often falls into purely abstract constructions. It creates “entities of reason” (entities that exist only in human reason, metaphors, allegories, often).

Skeptics often mock metaphysics. Kant believed that he had destroyed it with his work but ended up entangled in its webs. Metaphysics always returns, even in the works of those who sought to combat it ardently. We need only mention the examples of materialists who end up giving matter an absolute and truly metaphysical character as the all-powerful creator of all things.

After Aristotle’s death, his commentators organized his works and, in doing so, placed the more general investigations he had carried out immediately after the scientific-natural treatises. The scientific-natural works bore the title Περὶ τὰ φυσικά (Peri tah physikah – On Natural Things), and the subsequent works were called Τὰ µετὰ τὰ φυσικά (Tah metah tah physikah – On Things after Natural Things).

It was in the Latin language that the term metaphysica appeared. From a classifying sense, it acquired a deeper meaning, becoming a knowledge that delves into what remains beyond physical being as such.57

Metaphysics thus became knowledge, not of the sensible but of the intelligible, stripped of the sensible. Other philosophical sciences were formed to study this intelligible in its particular aspects, but metaphysics became the science that studies them in general; in short, it became knowledge of the transcendent, that which transcends the physical, the experimental, the empirical.

Long debates have been and still are held in philosophy to determine the exact meaning of metaphysics, given the various interpretations and meanings that have emerged. This word has been lent the most varied senses, in addition to having been used by opponents in a very different sense from the actual one, almost as a kind of pure and simple mythology. If there is indeed much mythology in the metaphysics of certain authors, many illogical elements, as we have already mentioned, then research and clarification work is necessarily required, which has already been undertaken. Today, metaphysics is experiencing a resurgence in splendor thanks to the revival of the study of the great scholastic authors.

The category of substance has been the starting point and foundation of metaphysical studies. Faced with flow, constant transformations, the emergence and passing away of things, the human mind needs to admit something stable and fixed, something that subsists, that is always itself, identical to itself, an antinomic characteristic of our mind, which we have already partially analyzed.

The separation between man as spirit and man as body presents a duality that seems to belong to different spheres. The relationship between body and spirit has therefore been one of the most important themes of metaphysics. A comprehensive understanding of nature, which incorporates the general results of all sciences, the integration of universal knowledge, the investigation of the deepest problems that transcend the scope of science, the universe, the root of being, the interior of the world, the deepest foundation of all things—these have all been within the realm ofmetaphysics, which always transcends the realm of the sensible to penetrate its own territory: that of suprasensible objects. There are five possibilities for answering the big questions posed by metaphysics:

  1. Dualism. There are two juxtaposed modes of being, irreducible to each other, distinct and separate.
  2. Spiritualism and materialism. The thing-in-itself is univocal; therefore, one of the modes must be reduced to the other: either (a) the physical is reduced to the spiritual, resulting in spiritualism, or (b) the spiritual is reduced to the physical, resulting in materialism.
  3. Monism. Neither the physical nor the spiritual exists in and of themselves. Both are understood as manifestations of a third, higher unity that includes them, an element that supposes them and, in principle, annuls any difference between the psychic and the physical world. This is the monist conception, theory of identity, or theory of unity.
  4. Monopluralism. This conception admits two dynamic orders that manifest themselves to varying degrees and allow for the establishment of a dualism between the spiritual and the physical, representing manifestations of a superior being that transcends both and whose creation is dualistic, opposing itself. In other words, finite existence is a dualistic and antagonistic manifestation, allowing, for example, the dualistic formation of the human spirit, which is monopluralism.58
  5. Creationism. The cosmos is a creation of divinity.

For a better understanding, let’s begin with an example: we encounter the sensible thing house in many individual examples, but we can only understand the fact of the house by admitting an idea, which is spiritual, immutable, and encompasses the diversity that characterizes each individual house, which can be large, narrow, small, tall, short, even though the concept remains immutable.

It is the idea, or rather, the form. Thus, there is a world of forms, a world of primary images, a world of primary types, archetypes, an immutable world eternally equal to itself; and a world of appearances, of singular things that change, transform, and fluctuate (as seen in Plato).

For Aristotle, the singular being is composed of matter and form. Form seizes matter, restricts it, molds it. In this way, matter is the end, the purpose of form. In nature, everything aspires to higher forms and ends; this is the teleological conception.59 Thus, at the beginning and end of every evolutionary process, there is a pure, incorporeal form that is God, the creator of all things, the modeler of all matter. This is already a creationist thought, as seen in Thomas Aquinas and the scholastics in general.

Descartes established a thinking substance, non-extended, the mind, and another non-thinking and extended substance, the body. One does not require the other, and they can exist independently because the body can remain without a soul (for Descartes, animals were pure automatons). In humans, however, both substances combine, the extended and the unextended – the corporeal and the spiritual.

Descartes' position posed a problem to philosophy: what is the influence, what is the interaction between the physical (extended) and the spiritual (unextended)? This led to various responses in the field of psychophysical relations. The parallel conception was established with Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887). Just as two parallel lines, according to Euclidean geometry, never meet, the same would apply to this relationship: one of these parallels would be the physical and the other the psychic, which would coexist without ever meeting. For Fechner, the spiritual was the inner side, and the physical was the outer side of the world. With this conception, he sought to overcome dualism.

We always find that dualists seek to overcome dualism by interpreting one aspect in terms of the other. This is the approach of spiritualism and materialism.

Materialism has some elements in its favor. Favored mainly by the sciences that deal with the sensible, the extended found its strongest arguments in them.

Democritus, in the Western world, was the founder of materialism, the first to describe the world as composed of atoms, indivisible units. According to Democritus, there were physical atoms, more extended and less mobile, and psychic atoms, more mobile and agile.

Democritus understood the world as mechanically organized, without the idea of purpose that Aristotle held dear. Events occur without a purpose (teleological), but they obey mechanically arranged forces, thereby eliminating the difference between the inorganic and the organic.

Democritus’s materialist conception experienced periods of decline and resurgence in human thought. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) and Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach (1723-1789), materialism reached its peak. However, in this case, materialism is singularist, recognizing only one kind of matter, and the psychic is explained in materialistic terms because the soul is subject to mechanical laws.

Psychic functions are explained as functions of the brain. Karl Vogt (1817-1895), Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899), and many others emerged later on. Materialism is thus a version of naturalism that subordinates everything, including human occurrences, to the influence of the laws of Nature. Human society is explained materialistically (historical materialism), and a worldview is constructed on its foundations.

Spiritualism entered Western philosophy later than materialism. According to spiritualism, true reality is constituted solely by the psychic, to which everything material is reduced.

Let us now distinguish between spiritualism and gnosiological idealism. The former is metaphysical in orientation, while the latter is epistemological, affirming that true existence lies in consciousness. The nature of this reality is not of interest to the theory of knowledge, as it pertains to metaphysics.

Thus, spiritualism accepts the primacy of the spirit in explaining psychic phenomena (psychological spiritualism) and furthermore, that the world is fundamentally constituted by the spiritual (metaphysical spiritualism).

These are two forms of manifestations of spiritualism. Often, both are combined, as in the case of Leibniz and Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), where the psychic and the spiritual are essentially identical. The psychic has various degrees, ranging from absolute unconsciousness to absolute consciousness. When it reaches that point, spiritualism becomes monistic, as the material is conceived as a manifestation of the spiritual. There is also a dualistic spiritualism, as represented by Descartes.

The weakness of monistic spiritualists lies in the difficulty they encounter in explaining the spirit as immaterial, pure, and simple. However, the term spiritualism has undergone various modifications in its true sense, with an emphasis on being decisively anti-materialistic and anti-sensualistic, affirming the primacy of the “spiritual” over the material.

This sense is more polemical than strictly philosophical. Thus, there are people who, although purely idealistic, present themselves as spiritualists when, in reality, they are not.

Monism, as we have noted, aims to eliminate the dualism of “body and spirit” by not reducing one to the other but understanding them as manifestations of a higher being. Many call it the “two-faced theory,” and its greatest proponent is Spinoza. For him, there is only one real and unique world, which he called Substance, Nature, God.

The world is merely a personification of God, who cannot admit any other being. God is only the sum of what exists; everything is God, and everything is within him (pantheism). This world appears to humans as thought and extension. And within ourselves, these qualities of being are manifested in body and spirit, which are not juxtaposed but distinct modes of the same reality.

Idealism seeks to solve the great problem of the thing-in-itself by asserting that things are merely contents of thought.

Thus, it eliminates the thing-in-itself and considers the world of phenomena merely a product of the self. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), a German philosopher, is the representative of this orientation. According to him, there is originally a substance that we approach when we reason about ourselves.

In this act, we immediately encounter the self, which is consciousness, reason, intelligence. This primary self is in unconscious activity. It not only produces the form but also the content of knowledge. The existence of a self naturally implies the existence of a “non-self” that is not identical to it. From this limitation between the self and the non-self arises the external world as the world of phenomena.

We can summarize the fourth and fifth positions as follows: pluralism holds that the world is composed of independent and mutually irreducible realities. Thus, pluralism opposes monism.

Monopluralism upholds the independence of the One and claims that the multiple realities maintain, directly or indirectly, an interaction that gives unity, based on the One.

Pluralism can also admit that the lack of interaction between realities does not allow for any reducibility from one to another, nor deny the possibility of articulation, which is known as absolute pluralism. Another tendency asserts that, while maintaining independence and absence of intervention, it must admit some principle capable of articulating multiple realities, as in the pluralism advocated by William James and Proudhon.

However, the monopluralism mentioned above goes beyond the scope of pluralism as it is classically presented since plurality is formed by the multiple fields of Being in its manifestation.

Each field is irreducible to another in existence. Therefore, the modes of Being are potentially infinite.

In this general overview, as simple as possible when dealing with a subject of such magnitude, we believe we have presented the meaning of metaphysics.

Now let’s briefly look at the opponents of this discipline. Among them, we find _positivismand criticism.

According to positivism, the only path to knowledge is through sensory experience, and the only object of knowledge is what can be sensibly experienced. This is the theory of sensationalism, which is the only theory of knowledge that positivism can adopt.

Positivism denies any knowledge beyond the realm of the sensory. Many mathematicians and scientists adhere to this doctrine.

Philosophers ask: when positivists assert that there is no knowledge beyond the sensory, do they affirm this because they cannot reach it or do they completely deny anything beyond the experiential?

If the answer is the former case, then let the positivists continue creating their books on mathematics and natural sciences and leave philosophy to philosophers. But if the answer pertains to the latter case, then positivists are claiming that nothing exists beyond the sensory.

In this case – philosophers argue – there will be no positivist who fails to understand that this assertion is already metaphysical, and they make it while attempting to combat metaphysics. Ultimately, philosophers conclude that positivists are metaphysicians without knowing it.

Furthermore, the world is not the world of perceptions but a perceived world, meaning that perception does not grasp the totality of the world.

Regarding Kant’s criticism, we have already had the opportunity to examine it.

The skeptical position, which we have also examined, seeks to oppose metaphysics by claiming the impossibility of suprasensible knowledge. However, when it remains within this framework, it does not claim to be anti-metaphysical, as it only asserts the impossibility of affirmation or negation.

However, this assertion is already affirmative. Thus, skepticism refutes itself.

6. Science and its possibilities – Science and metaphysics – Science and technique – History – Values

The true knowledge, which is the goal of metaphysicians, many say, may not be achieved through their endeavors, but it is up to humans, at least, to have a relative knowledge of temporal-spatial reality. And that is the task of science.

The preliminary study of what science is will clarify a lot about the essence of philosophy.

We said that science gives us the possibility of a relative knowledge of temporal-spatial reality. Since such knowledge does not satisfy us, we continue, through philosophy, in search of the absolute, because we are nostalgic for the absolute, hungry for certainty.

The word science comes from the Latin “scire,” which means to know. Like knowledge in general, in ancient Greece, science was called “episteme” (ἐπιστήµη), it constituted the set of knowledge and was sometimes confused with philosophy, sometimes with art, sometimes with technique.

Over time, the differentiation between science and philosophy has gradually taken place, until the autonomy of particular sciences was achieved, especially with the establishment of “natural science.”

The history of these distinctions is of little importance today. What is observed, however, is that philosophy is losing in scope in order to increase in content, an aspect that we have had the opportunity to emphasize several times. In reality, philosophy has not lost anything because its content has gained, in compensation, a more distinct character, allowing a clear distinction between what is science and what is philosophy. 60 It should not be thought that scientific knowledge consists only of mere experience. In addition to empirical elements, aprioristic elements are also joined. Investigation of the given is supplemented by investigation of the supposed. Order, structure, meaning, legality, and identification are added to the lack of method and system. The nature of science is limited because science is restricted to the ontic, while philosophy goes beyond the entire ontic framework and investigates, at its ultimate foundation, in its metaphysical aspect, what precisely makes what “is” (the essences). 61

Thus, science is interested in being as an entity, while philosophy is interested in being as being.

We have already seen that being is, for many philosophers, the supreme genus, while entities are the facts in which the genera are actualized. 62 A man, as an individual, exists ontically. The principle of identity, for example, is ontological, not ontic.

Aristotle claimed that science was knowledge of the universal, an investigation of causes. But today the concept of science has become more specific.

Let’s clarify: science is, or at least desires to be, the mathematical interpretation of objective reality. It abstracts and studies only quantitative relations. There is no science of the singular; science operates with concepts abstracted from a set of analogous cases.

Through experience and experimentation, it investigates these quantitative relations. (However, it should not be assumed that science is not interested in qualitative relations, although to a much lesser degree. Today, especially, scientists appear who investigate these relations. But, without many suspecting it, they inevitably fall into the field of philosophy.)

Science coordinates these quantitative relations through hypotheses and, with the help of mathematics, formulates the laws of physical phenomena. Mathematics is the instrument of scientific systematization, but it can only provide an abstract and formal solution. By itself, it cannot solve a factual question. However, when applied to experience, it assumes a prior measure. The precision of this measure determines the accuracy of the calculations. In truth, only the extensive can be measured, that is, everything that occupies space or occurs in space or can be reduced to space; bodies, and the motion of bodies, when reduced to space. What cannot be measured also cannot be expressed in mathematical language, at least by the mathematics as it is still considered; therefore, it has not been the object of science because it departs from its sphere of influence. In conclusion, for many, there is no science of the non-extensive.

These aforementioned characteristics may be too narrow to give an idea of science, but they undeniably circumscribe it within its true scope. In this way, all objective reality, the entire spatial world, everything that can be measured, belongs to science. Thus, mechanics, astronomy, physics, and chemistry are sciences. However, when we enter the field of biology, a problem arises. Biological facts are not as measurable as others. Fractional numbers are no longer applicable; only whole numbers are. One can speak of one life, two lives, three lives; not of “one and three-quarters life.” This is because in biology, we already work with individual entities. The same applies to subjective attitude, psychic processes, and historical processes. Although empirical facts, they only develop in time and, due to their lack of spatiality, are not measurable. Their knowledge cannot be reduced to quantitative mathematical formulas.

While the physical sciences have precision, which is revealed by mathematics, these other sciences only have a certain rigor.

Hence, there is no science of the subjective.

One of the errors of the scientists of the last century was to think that every human problem could be reduced to a scientific, physical-natural problem. They believed (like the positivists) that, with the inductive method, with the concepts of causality and immutable law, they could include everything in the immutable mechanism.

Scientific truth is relative. Not only because it renounces penetrating to the ultimate ratio (reason) of things, but also because it only applies to the objective part of temporal-spatial reality.

Scientific laws are not immutable or irrefutable, as many of them are now experiencing a reduction in their axiomatic values. Powerful hypotheses become weak, and science is forced into constant renewals that become more numerous from year to year. How little the knowledge of the past century serves us now! What will science be like a hundred years from now? Isn’t it naive to say that it is constituted of irrefutable truths?

In the last century, there was a conviction, which significantly influenced this century, that science was something sacred, which we can call the sacralism of science. No one wants to diminish the real value of science. Only this sacralism was a consequence of a false vision.

Indeed, science is a high human creation, a means of human dominion over nature. Thanks to science or technique, constantly interacting, it has become a means of liberation.

It is not the mission of science to delve into the depths of reality but to find means of positive action. However, in discovering something, science encounters a new enigma. The concrete notion precedes the abstract, technique precedes science. Before knowing the laws of the lever, man knew the lever and used it. Today’s science turns back to technique and emphasizes it, which, in turn, contributes to its further development and allows for exciting experiments.

But pure science aims for practical purposes. It is fromthis perspective that it must be judged, to establish its hierarchy and admire its greatness. Without science and without technique, humanity would not have a history.

But before moving on to this topic, let’s examine some important points: Auguste Comte (1798-1857) distinguishes between abstract science and concrete science.

Abstract or general science focuses on the laws that govern a certain class of phenomena, while concrete science, more commonly known as natural science, “consists of applying these laws to the actual history of different existing beings.” 63 It can be seen that Comte has a very particular sense of what is abstract and concrete, hence his distinction.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) refers to abstract sciences as logic and mathematics, which have as their object abstract relations under which phenomena present themselves to us, the “empty” forms through which we conceive them; and concrete sciences are those that focus on the phenomena themselves.

He further distinguishes between abstract-concrete sciences, such as mechanics, physics, and chemistry, and completely concrete sciences, such as astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociology, etc.

There are numerous disagreements among philosophers regarding the classification of sciences. Modern classifications, such as those of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), already reveal another phase of science. After being united with philosophy, it separated from it, only to merge with it again in certain aspects. From a synthetic point of view, based on the object of science, they can be classified as:

  1. Sciences of the real object, the sciences of nature and those of the spirit;
  2. Sciences of the ideal object, such as mathematics.

Many criticisms can be made of these classifications. The relationships between all these sciences and philosophy must be clearly distinguished. Furthermore, the criterion of objects is not the only one, as pointed out by José Ferrater Mora (1912-1991), because the purpose of the sciences must also be considered—the problem of the so-called normative sciences, for example, whether technique is an action rather than knowledge and whether it can be eliminated from the structure of scientific knowledge (which we do not believe)—and then the philosophical foundation of theoretical knowledge, which links a particular science to others and to the general. Thus, numerous problems are proposed, which philosophy must discuss and propose solutions to.

However, if we want to start from the object, we can understand this classification, but we do not solve the problem. Let’s see.

All thought is thought of something, and that something is the object of thought, which is never identified with it.

I think, “This book is on the table.” The object of thought is that this book is on the table. It is a specific situation of this book, which could be in another place—on the shelf, as it will certainly be tomorrow. This thought, this situation, is not something material, nor is it in space. But the book and the table are.

This is studied by formal logic, for which the object has a vast extension. Everything capable of admitting any predicate, everything that can be the subject of a judgment, is an object. This is the notion of logic.

The book is something that we are aware of through sensory experience, through external perception. It is a physical object.

All these objects are temporal, immersed in what is called the course of time. But this book is also in space, in addition to time. Psychic objects are in time but not in space.

A representation, an emotion, do not occupy space. This does not mean that psychic objects do not have an indirect spatial reference, as every conscious fact belongs to a conscious subject that, although not spatial, is attributed to a body.

But there are objects that are neither in time nor in space: ideal objects, such as numbers, geometric figures, relations, concepts, and thoughts in general (not thinking as a psychological act, which is in time). We also have the so-called metaphysical objects—for example, Kant’s thing-in-itself, substance—which are known through reasoning, according to some philosophers, or through immediate acts, such as Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling’s (1775-1854) intellectual intuition, or through non-rational intuition, according to Bergson, or through mystical intuition of mystics, etc. We have values, which are qualities of a very special order that do not refer to the being of the object but to its worth.

We have not said anything here that we have not already analyzed in other topics. Well, based on the object, we can arrive at a classification of science:

  1. Natural sciences, which have nature as their object, as the set of all temporal-spatial beings, corporeal reality, both inorganic and organic, that is not a product of human action. The human body is a natural object.
  2. Cultural sciences (or sciences of the spirit), which study the specifically human realm of reality, humans in their peculiarity as creators, humans of the world of culture, and culture itself. Finally, all cultural objects, which include everything that humans create or modify.

Thus, it can be seen that modern classifications of science give it a much broader scope, merging with philosophy again in some aspects, which remains knowledge of the general, with the whole as its object, while the sciences have, as their object, the particular considered ontically. The ontological remains the object of philosophy, and science is content with the ontic domain without ever transcending it. However, we will see that this is impossible because science today, whether it wants to or not, penetrates into the realm of philosophy, just as philosophy is led to penetrate into the realm of science.

We are in an era of reevaluating values, of profound transitions, and it is natural that both philosophy and science are influenced by the historical moment. As science influences philosophy, it will lead it to new and unexpected territories, the consequences of which we are still far from being able to predict.

We said earlier that without science and technology, man would not have history.

Originally, history meant investigation, but an investigation of a special nature that opposed theory and system.

We have already seen that theory, in the sense used by the Greeks, means contemplation, vision, and hence rational contemplation, intelligible vision.

Theoretical life is opposed to practical life, but also to poetic life because it is not, like these, immanent or transcendent action, but an expectant attitude, thought, and ultimately what is also equivalent to contemplation: intuition.

In its current meaning, theory is a form of scientific knowledge consisting of unifying various laws about an aspect of reality. System is any set of elements of any order, related to each other and harmoniously combined.

As for History, it is now considered a coherent action of the development of human culture. There is a succession of real events and there is a conception of this process. The first constitutes the chronicle, the indifferent and anecdotal enumeration of the cases that occurred; the second, the selection and coordination of historical facts.64

Chronology and history interpenetrate without ceasing to be distinct disciplines. The historian needs the materials provided by the chronicler, but gives preference to the appropriate ones, elaborates them, gives them meaning because not all events that occur are historical.

Something peculiar is needed for them to have the character of historical. And this character is given to them by the considerable influence attributed to them in the sequence of the evolutionary process.

For example, on a given day, many children were born. But one of them may give that date a historical character, like the day of the birth of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) or William Shakespeare (1564-1616). A simple fact – considered of little importance or appreciated as simple – can generate or influence future events. It is then said that this fact was a historical fact.

The historian describes the historical value of this fact. It is not difficult to understand how many dispositions of a psychological nature, conditioned by time and space, intervene in this assessment.

There is variability in the assessment of these facts, and this variability is manifested in the historian, who can assign more value to one fact than to another. This is how episodes judged important can lose their importance, while others that were received coldly can have higher evaluations. And since the historian’s perspectives penetrate these evaluations, there is talk of greater bias or impartiality in judging the facts. Today’s interests modify the assessments of past events.

In a restricted concept of science, we could say that history is not a science because it cannot be mathematized. It does not employ the inductive method or arithmetic measurement. Its subject is human activity, which is the subject, not the object, of history.

However, it could be objected that the protagonist of the drama has the reality of time and space as a backdrop. He does not act in a vacuum but in harsh collision with his ecological surroundings. However, for History, the decisive factor is not the external circumstances but the reaction of man to face them. Peoples who acted in the same geographical environment had different histories. There is no doubt that physical conditions influence. A people without maritime coasts will not perform nautical feats. Man did not create his culture by adapting to the environment; but emancipation is the theme of History.65

When we analyze the reality of time and space, we distinguish two processes, just as in the unity of consciousness we must distinguish the duality between object and subject without intending to divide it with a single blow. To the natural process, we oppose the historical process, as to subjective activity, the objective.

Positivism, for example, wanted to see in historical evolution only the continuation of material evolution, that is, a process subject to physical and fatal laws, a nexus of causes and effects, without purposes or motives. Real facts do not conform to an abstract conception, however logical it may seem. The work of human will is one thing, the work of natural energies is another. The river, the tree, even man himself, are creations of nature, but the loom, the Bible, are historical creations – and they belong to the world of culture.

While science deals with the general, history deals with the singular: an individual, a class, a century, a people, an episode, something that unfolds, a unique experience that will not happen again, that only persists in memory.

Science can prove its conclusions; history cannot. It can only prove chronological facts. We cannot experiment in it. We do not know if other men, under the same conditions, would behave differently. Accuracy, found in science, corresponds only to a certain rigor in history.

Science abstracts its concepts from a multiplicity of analogous facts, while history cannot do the same because events are unique. However, this does not imply the uselessness of history. It gives us magnificent lessons, and everyone will verify that an important distinction can be made: the differentiation between the historical fact, which does not repeat itself, and the sociological fact that is repeatable. It is then observed that the variant is the field of history, while the invariable is more the field of sociology.66

History studies man in all phases of his complex activity. It is also a lesson in psychology and, because it does not refer to abstract themes, it examines the real development of human culture, technology, etc. History teaches us that human personality, in conflict with the adverse world, is not something insignificant.

Historical work is also the work of will, effort, and sacrifice of man. It is a heroic epic that we, each one of us, are commanded to continue, playing the protagonist.

If we examine historical facts, we see that they do not unfold disorderly as many think. The analysis of the past reveals to us a certain coherent continuity of facts. We see individual acts conditioned by collective actions. There is a reason behind history. Will we find a law there?

Let’s look at some interpretations:

  1. The reason for history lies in Divine Providence, say those who see in historical facts only the influence of the Creator;
  2. The Hegelian rationalist dialectic sees a supreme Reason in the facts that realize the cycle of the Idea;
  3. Economic materialism sees in history the actions of the forces of production and their relations, which determine the facts.

All these interpretations have their adherents. However, they are not satisfying because they grasp partial aspects of reality. As social facts present a strange variety in their occurrence, a multiplicity of incidents, different theories arise. Since it is not yet possible to grasp the entirety ofhistory, these partial interpretations arise. This subject belongs to the philosophy of history.

Let us remember that throughout history, there are men who struggle to oppress and dominate others, or to use them, and men who struggle to free themselves from this exploitation.

Man rebels against destiny, and in his act of rebellion, he ceases to be a mere cannibal and becomes a man. He fights against nature; he fights against his fellow men; he fights against himself. It is a triple struggle. The will aspires to overcome the obstacle that opposes it, to emancipate itself from all limitation, to assert itself in all its fullness.

It is the myth of Prometheus and Faust – two great rebels challenging supreme power!

In every action, in the face of every fact, man defines, analyzes, assesses, accepts, or rejects what occurs. He gives a epithet, an adjective to every fact, either elevating it, exalting it, or diminishing it, degrading it.

These epithets are different from adjectives that express qualities. These epithets do not add or remove any attributes. If I say that this is useful or useless, beautiful or ugly, good or bad, I do not add or take away any attributes it already has because this remains what it is.

Acts of giving epithets to things or facts are called valuations. History is a valuation of human activity. It tells us about the creation, the discovery of these valuations, as well as the transmutation, opposition, and agreement that can be observed among them. Therefore, we are now compelled to delve into the theme of valuation so that gradually the main elements that will allow us to clarify the foundations of philosophy become evident.

In all acts, before all facts, man defines, qualifies, estimates, accepts, or rejects. If I see this book, I can say that it is rectangular, that it is heavy, that it is red or blue. But I can also give it certain epithets that enhance it when I call it useful, beneficial, beautiful, or that diminish it when I call it harmful, ugly, etc. I can say that this book is on the table, it is to the right of the ashtray. In everything I have said, I have affirmed facts or relationships that I verify to be or occur in the things I speak of.

I can see the rectangular shape in the stereometric form of the book; I assess its weight when I hold it; the vision tells me that it is red; I can also intuit that it is on the table and to the right of the ashtray. But when I say that it is useful, beneficial, and beautiful, or harmful or bad, I am not referring to aspects that I can intuit through sensory intuition. By calling it beautiful or ugly, I do not add or remove anything from the book. However, if I call it red, it is because it appears to me in that color. By calling it beautiful or ugly, I do not add or remove any of its attributes. I perform a valuation.

Human history is a valuation of human activity. It relates the creation, the discovery of valuations, as well as the transmutation, opposition, and agreement of valuations.

Every appreciative human reaction to a fact or an event is a valuation. Valuation is an appreciation of values.

Axiology is the discipline that studies values.

Values are specific objects, and their study belongs to ontology. But we can characterize certain aspects that are sufficient to give us an understanding of them. Values are not connected to the being of objects, but to their worth, their dignity. When we affirm that an object has value or lacks value, we do not add or remove any of its attributes.

The reader might ask: Are values something in themselves, something that is valuable to us, or something that is in things?

The science of values is a new discipline that, especially after Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), began to take shape in philosophy and have its own field of action.

Three are the main doctrines that study values:

  1. The platonic: according to this doctrine, values are independent of things. They are something in which valuable things are founded. Thus, a good would only be good because it participates in a value, situated in a metaphysical sphere. Values would be independent of things.
  2. The nominalist: according to this doctrine, values are relative to humans or any beings that possess them. Thus, they would be subjective because the subject would be the creator of values, which consist only in being considered valuable, in producing pleasure, etc.
  3. The doctrine of Max Scheler (1874-1928) is the theory of appreciation. It denies, like nominalism, the independence of ethical estimative phenomena. It accepts subjectivity but limits it through the appreciation of the value that is in the appreciation itself or that is revealed through appreciation when it is not produced by it. Thus, for Scheler, there is a material basis of value.67

There is a distinction in modern logic regarding judgments:

  1. Judgments of existence;
  2. Judgments of value.

In the former, something is said about a thing, stating its properties, attributes, predicates that belong to its own being. Judgments of value state something that is not added to or removed from the existence or essence of the thing.

Thus, it can be seen that values are not things or elements of things.

According to the relativist theory (nominalism), it is the pleasure or displeasure that things produce in us that reveal their values. Something can please us and be bad at the same time. On the other hand, we can discuss values. However, we cannot discuss pleasure and displeasure because they are subjective. For example, the beauty of a painting may or may not please us, but we can discuss it. Now, if we can discuss it, there is objectivity in values, and they are not just a relationship. The inventors of values, in the Nietzschean sense, the discoverers of values, reveal those that until then no one had perceived. But after this discovery, others will feel them. The banks of the Rhine, the surrounding mountains, did not have the value that the Romantic movement discovered and revealed before. Since then, the banks of the Rhine have become a source of inspiration and a fountain of deeper aesthetic emotions.

It was Lotze who said that “values are not; values are worth” – one thing is to be and another is to be worth. Values do not have the category of being but that of worth. Something that is worth is not more or less than something that is not worth; something that is worth is something that has value. Having value does not mean having a being, that is, an additional entitative reality.

Let’s take an example: color requires space because what has it occupies space. But we can mentally separate one from the other. But we cannot ontically separate value and the thing that has value. Thus, we see that value is not a being but something that implies the thing and implies the subject. This is Scheler’s opinion.

Are values absolute or relative? Do they hold value today and not tomorrow? This is a great controversy in philosophy.

In values, there is a variable aspect and an invariable aspect. Prudence, as an invariable aspect, is a virtue that avoids inconveniences and dangers in time. But the feudal lord was prudent when arming himself, and the bourgeois today is prudent when surrounding himself with good documents, etc. This is the variable aspect.

Every value has a counter-value. Good and bad, courageous and cowardly, strong and weak, beautiful and ugly. This characteristic is called the polarity of values.

In addition, values reveal a hierarchy because some are worth more than others. In this case, value has value.

A value that has value can have more than another of the same order. Thus, one good can be more than another good.

Consequently, in summary, values reveal:

  1. Polarity;
  2. Hierarchy;
  3. Scalability.

Some values are hierarchically higher, and others are lower. Scheler presents the following hierarchy:

  1. Religious values: holy and profane.
  2. Ethical values: just and unjust.
  3. Aesthetic values: beautiful and horrible.
  4. Logical values: true and false.
  5. Vital values: strong and weak.
  6. Useful values: appropriate and inappropriate – convenient and inconvenient.

However, this hierarchy is not accepted by everyone. Some do not consider religious values to be the highest. An artist might consider aesthetic values; a utilitarian, utilitarian values; a logician, logical values. And so on. Nietzsche, for example, opposed the scale of values of our mercantilist era, in which utilitarian values prevail, without considering religious values the highest, but rather vital and ethical values. When we talk about the transmutation of values, we mean to overthrow the prevailing scale and establish a new one. All eras of humanity have known their scales of values, and sometimes some prevail, and sometimes others do. This classification by Scheler can be expanded, as many have done. It is natural that in Axiology, there is so much disagreement about the classification of values.

Many scales have been proposed, and to give some examples, let’s mention socialists who distinguish and divide themselves regarding the scale of values. Marxists place utilitarian values at the top; anarchists, ethical values; fascists, partly vital values and utilitarian values; Christian socialists, religious values.

Individually, there are also scales of values because the order can be changed. Let’s say, for example, that a sincerely religious person can give an order like this: religious values, ethical values, utilitarian values, vital values, logical values, and finally, aesthetic values.

7. Unitary analysis of philosophy

Before the multiplicity of objects of knowledge and achievements, it is natural that our spirit, through an eminently rational process, desires to give philosophy unity, to make it, finally, the science of unity, the ultimate unification of all our knowledge.

Philosophy, which was once the entire theoretical knowledge with the Greeks and gradually separated from science, has never lost its universalizing and unitary sense. Thus, everything that is, everything that exists, everything that constitutes our world of immutable forms, everything, in short, constitutes the object of philosophy.

All the great problems of all disciplines, all the major and greatest difficulties that arise are difficulties that philosophy is responsible for analyzing and solving. In this way, the philosopher is a kind of supervisor of all knowledge; it is the one who connects an isolated fact to the chain of larger factors, seeks the relationship that binds, that associates one idea to another, one fact to another. Seeks the laws of laws, the constants of constants, why something happens or does not happen.

In laboratory experiments, the physicist often encounters problems that transcend experience. He questions what energy is, what motion is. The same experiences cannot always satisfy him. When he interrogates like this, he appeals to the philosopher within him or, if unable to follow the path that transcends his profession, he leaves it to the philosopher to conclude what he could not do with only the means of experience.

In this way, philosophy is the transcendence of all fragmented knowledge of particular disciplines. Each of these disciplines is concerned with a field, a region, which is its object.

And where all the regions of knowledge come together is in philosophy, the “mater” knowledge of all knowledge, the sublime and never sufficiently praised Philosophy, whose brilliance opponents have never managed to tarnish.

Amidst the multiplicity of facts, man has two intellectual functions to understand them. One analytical, intuition; the other synthetic, reason.

Thus, all things, all the facts that happen, whether in the external world or the inner world, reveal what they are in their singularity, but also what they are in their generality.

In order to “know” this universe of varied and heterogeneous facts and to recognize what is homogeneous and invariant in them, reason and intuition work together as organizing functions.

One of the most important problems in philosophy arises here: the problem of knowledge. What are the limits of our knowledge, how is it achieved, what is its nature, etc., all these aspects, which we have already studied, are the great problems that remain constant. They are not only of interest to philosophy because they are proposed and addressed in every particular science. Thus, philosophy is constantly called upon to examine them, and amidst the debates of skeptics, dogmatists, rationalists, and idealists, the problem of truth is always present. How true is our knowledge?

This question demands demanding answers. What is truth?

Now, everyone feels that truth is an identification between the representation we have of a fact and that fact. If what we state about a fact corresponds to the fact, we will say that this statement is true.

The true is what aligns with this concept of perfection that we conceive as a goal to be achieved, whose accuracy we never feel we reach because the dissatisfaction of human nature in knowledge encourages man to always seek.

We do not admit degrees of truth because its perfection does not allow for them. The concept of this perfection is always a denial of gradations. Thus, truth is the supreme ideal that reason seeks, and all partial truths, all truths that do not have this attribute of perfection, are merely flawed applications of this supreme concept of value that we give to the unattainable. Every idea of God includes the idea of truth. No believer would attribute a denial of truth to his God because God has the attribute of infinite perfection.

If certainty often satisfies us and seems to be the truth, it is because in the concept of certainty, we give some of the deepest meanings of truth. Certainty is only an appearance of truth, it is how truth presents itself to us, but transient, fleeting.

It is like a messenger, a herald that announces to us the supreme goddess who, through her magnificence, allows us to imagine the majesty of truth, but only suggests what it is and does not satisfy us.

The problem of truth is an important problem because the solution to it leads to the solution of the struggle between skepticism and dogmatism.

But let us apply our method to analyze this magnificent problem.

Instead of answering the question "what is truth, what is true?", let us ask: why do we ask the question? Here we practically employ our method of indications.

How does the concept of truth appear to philosophers?

Sometimes as an identity between the knower and the known, sometimes as the adequacy between the fact and the idea, sometimes as the coherence of thought with itself, as idealists posit it…

There are many statements, but in all of them, what they mean is always included. Identity or adequacy and the coherence of idealists are always the same identity. Truth shines through as the desire for an identity between the objective and the subjective, between the knower and the known. Now we ask: are these not the deepest intentions of reason? Is this not the concept of truth, a purely rational concept? And is our knowledge solely rational? No. Our knowledge is also intuitive, practical, singular. Singularity is indefinable and therefore unidentifiable.

The truth of the authentically singular is only with itself.

Truth is “being,” here. The truth of intuition is not an adequacy but simply being or “being” itself. Thus, there is truth in everything, which is being itself. When we grasp the image of a fact, we grasp a part of that fact. The rational truth of a fact is the rational part that we can align with the fact: then we have a rational truth. The intuitive truth of a fact is given to us by practice because we do not intuitively apprehend everything that the fact is but only what it is as singularity, and we generalize this singularity through reason. Therefore, truth, concretely conceived, is the conjunction of the knowledge we have of a fact, rational and intuitive in their reciprocity. But what is the value of this knowledge? How do we know if this knowledge is true?

If it does not offend the coherence of the dialectical norms of knowledge, within these norms, it is the true image.

If it is true, practice proves it because man also dominates nature, and in this dominion lies one of the means of verification, although we cannot equate this knowledge with the known because we are recognizing that knowledge is only partial.

We will answer as follows: rational knowledge, as such, can be truly rational; as intuitive, it is knowledge of the heterogeneous, the different, and can be truly intuitive; reciprocally, intuitive and rational knowledge complement each other and give us concrete knowledge. If we increase the means of knowledge, if we increase the possibilities of penetrating other aspects of things, this new knowledge does not negate the previous ones but completes them. Within one field, we have one truth; within another, we have another. Just as I can have a physical truth about a body, I can have the chemical truth of that body without one excluding the other.

Thus, there is a rational and universal concept of truth, as a great ideal possibility, and there is the actualization of this truth, whichis an act, which is therefore consistent with the act, which is always determined.

Translation:

Build with truth a concept of perfection, a being-in-itself, is an abstract way of understanding it; it is understanding it only from one aspect. To understand concretely is to bring it down from the world of abstractions. A truth without real, existential foundations would be an empty truth, a ghost hovering like a shadow covering nothingness. Truth, as concretion, is living truth, pulsating, creative.68

We have already studied the concepts of absolute and relative, and we can add little for now. Both are concepts, the first offered by reason, and the second by intuition, as we will see later.

They are antinomies, distinct but inseparable. The affirmation of the absolute does not exclude the relative, just as the idea of the relative cannot be maintained without its opposite. We cannot conceive of the conditioned without the unconditioned, the determined without the indeterminate. These polar concepts reflect in the mind the great polarity of all things: the complementary antinomies.

Science studies the part, the particular; it is the theoretically organized knowledge of the particular. Science knows, philosophy wants to know, religion believes, art creates.

There is no science without an object, and the object of science is the regional, the particular. Science is the knowledge of the finite through its immanent causes. It does not transcend its object.

Religion believes. A rationalized religion ceases to be properly faith, as it requires the full assent of the spirit, independently of demonstration or proof. Religion is the acceptance that we can penetrate the transobjective, the transcendental, the transintelligible, through faith, through mediated or immediate revelation.

Art does not want to know, nor just believe, but create. Art is the manifestation of man as a creator. We all have the idea of something that is the supreme of our desires, the perfectly desired, the supreme beauty. Art is that constant approximation, realized in works by man. Every true artist has an ideal of beauty that they want to materialize, actualize, make real.

This actualizing, this transition from potentiality to actuality, from mere possibility to reality, is creation. The artist is a creator.

Only when, after its great evolutionary drama, it reached the phase of aesthetic creation, did man feel that everything had a creator, a supreme artist, the maker of all things.

God always has, in His essence, the attribute of the artist. To give life to the inert, to give form to the formless, to give significance to what means nothing is to create, to make real what was only a dream, a desire. The artist is a creator. And God, in almost all religious conceptions that accept creation, is always a great aesthete, a great lover of beauty, perfection, because He is the supreme artist.

But there is a fundamental difference here. God, as a creator, does not create by giving new orders to what already exists, as the artist does.

He creates what receives form, what did not exist before, as such.

The artist brings together in a work what already exists; God creates what He will order, which previously was nothing; that is why it is said that He creates from, starting from nothing, and not out of nothing, for the creature, before, was not an existing thing, neither as a part nor as a whole. There is no precedence of absolute nothingness before divine creation, for there is God, who is, for religions, the Supreme Being.

Part II. Worldview

1. Philosophy of the conditioned, the unconditioned, and relativity

What is the “World Overview” (worldview), which we are now beginning, can be presented, in general terms, as follows: from the general sum of knowledge, philosophers have systematically or not organized a general perspective of the world, a kind of comprehensive panorama of all knowledge, forming a totality of vision, a coordination of interconnected opinions.

With this systematization, it is possible to formulate not only a general opinion of everything that happens but also to understand and relate an individual fact to the general view formed of the whole.

Let us examine the positions manifested in various philosophical currents, as well as construct a general perspective within the framework of philosophical knowledge that serves as a reference point for analyzing the various currents and also as a support for a broader perspective of knowledge, without disregarding the attempts already made.

Science has its “world overview,” also called “scientific conception of the world,” which is a global idea of the organization of the material cosmos according to scientific discoveries.

It forms an image of the world by generalizing partial data from science and is, therefore, susceptible to modification and development according to the progress of science itself. However, the worldview is given as a totality and is unalterable. We emphasize this difference between the worldview and the worldview to avoid common confusions. The worldview is variable, while the worldview is unchangeable.

The worldview, as a philosophical discipline, was only perfectly delineated in our days. The world conception (worldview) presents itself as a set of intuitions that dominate not only theoretical particularizations and a human and cultural type but, as Scheler asserts, conditions all science and also encompasses normative forms, becoming a norm for action, as Ferrater Mora notes.

Thus, materialism, spiritualism, and idealism are worldviews. What characterizes these different worldviews?

They are: first, a desire for integral knowledge; second, the apprehension of a totality; third, the solution to the problems of the meaning of the world and life.

In addition to the worldviews provided by science and philosophy, we can enumerate those determined by psychology, race, social class, historical culture, as well as those provided by biology, mathematics, and physics. Thus, from the point of view of the interpreter of the world (whether an individual, a social group, a caste, or an estate), they seek to provide an interpretation of the world coordinated by their specialty or perspective. This is why some establish a true hierarchy of worldviews, in which the broader and higher ones encompass the narrower ones in their field. However, it is difficult to distinguish between the different worldviews due to the points of contact they establish with each other. In modern times, Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Eduard Spranger (1882-1963), Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), and others have carefully studied the problem of the worldview, and each of them started from different points.

Dilthey, for example, understands basic worldviews as materialism, objective idealism, and freedom idealism. Scheler, on the other hand, bases the theory of worldview forms on a Sociology of Culture and a theory of evaluative preferences (axiology, the science of values). Others, like Jaspers and Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), study it from a psychological point of view.

Included in the worldview are philosophy, metaphysics, thescientific image of the world, ethics, and aesthetics. However, it should not be concluded that the worldview is merely a sum of various philosophical and scientific disciplines. It forms a kind of “organism,” irreducible to these sciences, with its object, although not perfectly mastered, and also accepts methods that go beyond those commonly used by philosophy and science because it is not just theoretical knowledge like philosophy, as it largely invades the realm of intuitions, the irrational, the transintelligible, that is, what goes beyond intelligibility, as we will have the opportunity to verify, explain, study, and clarify throughout our work.

Here, we will examine the main problems that form the great questions related not only to the structure of the worldview as such but also to its function in human life, its differentiations from other philosophical and scientific disciplines, the influence of psychological, social, racial factors, those of a historical nature, etc.

The worldview, as we will approach it, will be interested in the development of a working method that will allow the reader, in the future, to undertake, on their own, the analysis and solution of all these problems and those that arise subsequently.

It would be impossible to attempt to present all the opinions, controversies, and debates raised by a theme as vast as that of the worldview. However, it seems to us that the method we use, although departing from the commonly employed in the study of this discipline, is the one that best equips the interested individual to undertake, with their own resources, the investigation of its main themes.

In the face of the spectacle of the world, in the presence of an object, man asks what that object is. Let us exemplify. In front of a tree, one asks: what is this? The answer would be: “it is a tree.”

If we imagine that the questioner comes from another planet, they could continue their dialogue with a man as follows: “What is this tree made of? Of what is it composed?” The other would respond: “This tree is composed of organic plant matter.” “But what does organic plant matter consist of?” the questioner would ask. The respondent would reply: “It consists of a combination of mineral substances provided by the earth, the air.” “And what do these minerals consist of?” the questioner would ask again. “They consist of various manifestations of matter.” And if these questions were to continue in this manner, the interlocutor would eventually realize that one thing consists of being made of another, and that other of another, and so on, until they formulate this question: “But there must be an end. There must be something that is not another, something that composes the other things.”

Indeed, if that something is composed of other things, the question would continue. Therefore, behind all things, there must be something that is itself, that is not another, that cannot be composed, for if it were composed, it would be constituted of others.

Since it is the first, it is naturally simple. Therefore, it must be identical to itself. Thus, this first thing must be simple, one, and identical to itself.

The Greeks had a word: arkhê [ἀρχή], which we find frequently used in our language in philosophical works, and spelled arquê, whose simplest meaning is principle, beginning. We find it in words like archaic (ancient), archaism, archive, archaeology, and in compound words like monarchy.

We can use this word to denote what philosophers seek: a principle that is identical for all things. A sufficient reason for everything that exists, a principle from which everything derives.

In philosophy, there is a constant desire throughout all times: to find certainty, an Archimedean point of certainty.

Archimedes asked for a lever and a fulcrum, and he could move the world. The fulcrum that every philosophy seeks is the supreme principle, that arkhê.

Studying philosophy in the West, alongside the ancient Greeks, we see that they understood the world, in terms of its origin, as the work of the gods.

For example: for Homer (928-898 BC), the Ocean was the progenitor of all gods and thus admitted the derivation of the cosmos from a single principle, from an arkhê. This myth is the same as found in ancient Eastern civilizations, such as Babylonian, Egyptian, Hebrew, Phoenician, etc. For Hesiod (750-650 BC), the primordial being was Chaos, and the motive and generative force was Eros. The Orphics established Night, Chaos, black Erebus, and deep Tartarus as the first beings from which all others were born and formed.69

For Hieronymus and Hellenicus, the primordial beings are Chronos (Time) and Ananke (Necessity).

It is with the Ionians that scientific and philosophical inquiry begins in Greece. Thales (624-543 BC), one of the earliest Greek philosophers, who was from the city of Miletus, sought in things what would be the principle (arkhê) of all others, what would be deserving of being considered the principle from which all others are mere derivatives. And he affirmed that it was water. He referred to the moist principle, which we see in the mythologies of Asian peoples, a symbol of plasticity capable of receiving all forms.

According to Thales, all things would derive from water (the moist principle), the principle of all things, the primordial existence. Other philosophers of that time also accepted that the principle of all things was a material substance, such as Anaximenes (585-528 BC), who asserted that it was air, that is, an aeriform principle. As it could not be advantageously explained, for example, that marble was derived from water or air, Empedocles (490-430 BC) emerged, asserting that the supreme principle of things consisted of four primordial elements: water, air, earth, and fire, that is, a plastic element, an aeriform element, a solid element, and a fluid element.

Also arising at this time was Anaximander (610-546 BC), who accepted that the principle of all things was a material substance but believed that this principle was not any specific thing but a kind of proto-thing which he called ápeiron [ἄπειρον], an indefinite principle that was neither water nor earth, nor fire, nor air, but had within itself the potential, the possibility of becoming any of these things. This principle was primordial, and from it, all things derived. It was also infinite or indefinite, for it had no limits, contours, or form.

During this time, Pythagoras emerged, and it occurred to him that the principle from which all things derive is not something that can be touched, seen, in short, accessibleto the senses. Pythagoras’s arkhê, the One, is the generator of number. Things are numbers and are differentiated from each other by numerical differences.70 During this same period, another great philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, observed that things are never, at any moment, what they were in the previous moment or will be in the next moment; things are constantly changing, and when we try to define something, to say what it consists of, it no longer consists of what it did when we posed the question. Thus, for Heraclitus, reality is a constant flow, a constant becoming. Therefore, the being of things is not static but dynamic, and things do not simply are but become. Existence is a perpetual change, a constant process of being and not being.

Another great philosopher strongly contradicts the statements of Heraclitus and will provide the prevailing sense in philosophy for twenty-five centuries. This man was Parmenides of Elea. In the controversy he engaged with Heraclitus, he claimed that Heraclitus' theory was absurd because we would have to affirm that something is and is not at the same time, as being, for Heraclitus, consists of constantly becoming, of flowing. Parmenides realized that in Heraclitus' idea of flowing, which we can replace with the Portuguese word “devir,” meaning “to become” (in Latin “fieri”), being ceases to be what it is and starts to become something else. Heraclitus asserted that all things were constantly becoming, that is, they ceased to be what they were to become something else. If something ceases to be what it is to become something else, it simultaneously ceases to be what it is.

Therefore, Parmenides observed a logical contradiction in Heraclitus: being is not, and what is, is not because what is at one moment is no longer at another moment as it becomes something else.

Thus, what characterizes being is non-being. This is the absurdity, Parmenides said. How can someone understand that what is, is not, and what is not, is? Therefore, this idea is unintelligible. Hence, Parmenides established this principle: being is; non-being is not.

Anything beyond that is error. Moreover, what changes, what flows, is something that flows, that changes. And if being is only a transition to non-being, it would be incomprehensible, unintelligible. Thus, things have a being, and this being is. And if they have no being, non-being is not.

Parmenides structured in this way the fundamental principle of logical thinking, which would later be called the “principle of identity.” It was thanks to Parmenides' contribution that a series of attributes were formulated for being, which logically follow from the concept of identity. Let us see: being must be unique. For let us suppose that there are two beings; in this case, what distinguishes the first from the other “is” in the first and “is not” in the second, so we would understand that the being of one is not the being of the other, and in this case, we would reach the contradictory absurdity of the non-being of being. Yes, because by admitting two beings, we would have to admit between them a non-being, but to say that there is non-being is the same as saying that non-being is, and this is absurd.

Thus, we conclude that being is unique, one.71

We can also affirm that it is eternal, for if it were not, it would have a beginning and an end. In this case, we would have to admit that before being, there would be non-being. Since we cannot admit non-being, for to admit it would be to affirm that non-being is, therefore, being had no beginning, and for the same reason, it has no end, for it would be admitting non-being at the end.

This being is also immutable. Inevitably so, because any change in being would imply the admission of the being of non-being, since every change is the ceasing to be what it was to become what it was not, and both in the ceasing to be and in the coming to be, the affirmation of the being of non-being is implied, which is absurd.

This being is limitless, infinite. It cannot have limits or be in any place. To affirm it would give it the character of extensiveness and therefore have limits, and it cannot have limits because if we were to admit them, we would have to accept beyond the limit the non-being. If it cannot have limits, being is not in any place and is therefore limitless. Furthermore, being is motionless, it cannot move because to move is to pass from one place to another. Now, as it is limitless and immutable, being cannot be in any place; therefore, it is motionless.72

Having provided this brief explanation about arche, which is the being of all things, we can add the following: the discipline that studies being is ontology.

Ontology is the theory of being, and gnoseology is the theory of knowledge, of knowing. The theory of being answers the question “what is being? And who is being?”

For now, let us remain in the realm of arche, the supreme principle of all things, whose observation led philosophers to take three perspectives.

  1. This supreme principle truly exists – it is the philosophy of the unconditioned;
  2. This absolute is mere fiction – it is the philosophy of the conditioned;
  3. There is relativity among things – it is the philosophy of relativity.

Before we proceed, let’s examine the terms used above; the arché, the supreme principle, is presented as unique and identical.

Unique, because it is supreme and absolute, and identical because it could not be otherwise, being absolute and unique. The arché is attributed the attribute of unconditionality, meaning it has no conditions for its existence; it exists by itself, does not depend on another being, and is not conditioned by another being. These are the characteristics of the absolute. Both the philosophy of unconditionality and the philosophy of conditionality seek this certainty, this Archimedean point.

The former asserts the absolute; the latter claims that this absolute is mere fiction of the human spirit.

The philosophy of unconditionality or the unconditional was clearly presented by Descartes. He affirmed the supreme principle and how to reach it.73

Historically, in the pre-Cartesian phase, there was a desire for ontological unconditionality (God), ontological metaphysical position, anti-relativistic.

The philosophy of conditionality, which, as we have seen, denies the absolute and classifies it as mere fiction, is represented by Comte, Émile Littré (1801-1881), William Hamilton (1788-1856), Baron d’Holbach, Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933), and some materialist currents. We say “some” because there are materialists who attribute to matter a character of absolute, of unconditioned, as we will see in due course.

The philosophy of relativity denies the absolute and affirms the relativity among things. It began with Protagoras (490 BC-420 BC), who declared “man is the measure of all things; of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.”

Relativism affirms the relativity of knowledge, moral relativism, etc. We could place this tendency in the philosophy of conditionality.

Between the conditionalists and the unconditionalists, there has been, is, and will be a great controversy, whose aspects we will study next. But among those who defend unconditionality, this controversy is no less significant and has been going on for millennia.

Unconditionalists take two points of view, which we will try to summarize.

  1. Those who declare that the supreme principle is homogeneous. This is the position of realists, intellectualists, and rationalists;
  2. Those who affirm that it is heterogeneous. This is the position of nominalists, anti-intellectualists, and irrationalists.

These currents will all be studied, analyzed, and criticized in due course.

Supporters of both positions accuse each other of superficiality.

How to reach the essence of this reality? For realists, reason is the best means (geometrical spirit, l’esprit d’ordre, by Blaise Pascal [1623-1662]). The natural means of reason is identity, already established by Parmenides, as we have seen. Now, identity is the opposite of difference, which is antagonistic to it.

Accepting identity leads to deindividualizing reality. Reason seeks the homologous, whether the homogeneous or the identical. Something is intelligible to the extent of its identity. Let’s clarify this further: knowledge only occurs when intelligence recognizes the similar; it only knows when it can recognize. We can only say that something is when we already know what we affirm about a thing.

If I say that this object in front of me is a book, I recognize that this object has what is identical to the concept I have of a book, that is, I see that there is adequacy between what this object is, here and now, and the concept I have of a book.

Thus, through comparison, reason proceeds from the similar to the similar. As for the procedures of reason and its foundations, we will study them next.

For anti-intellectualists, intuition is the best means of knowledge (finer spirit, l’esprit de finesse, by Pascal).

Intuition is deeper and reaches the individuality of multiple realities. It does not seek to compare this with that, but to intuit, to go inside the thing, to penetrate it, to live it as it is. Before we analyze Reason and Intuition, we need to examine the philosophy of unconditionality and conditionality in their manifestations.

Let us examine some of the Archimedean points of those who accept the philosophy of the unconditioned. The bases that serve as a point of support are:

  1. The rational: reason is the Archimedean point for Descartes, who, starting from methodical doubt – that is, used as a method – arrived at a single point about which he could not doubt: precisely that he was doubting. Now, to doubt is to think and, therefore, “cogito, ergo sum,” “I think; therefore, I exist.” Descartes' position will be examined later on.
  2. The empirical experience: for Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), the realist-sensible intuition gives us the Archimedean point of support that we need to reach the unconditioned.
  3. The mystical: the immediate intuition of the mystics, the union of the human soul with divinity, that immersion, that contact with the divine principle.
  4. The Wesenschau of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology (1859-1938): the essential intuition, the apprehension of essences, which, for him, are not abstract generalities but concrete and apodictic evidence, whose analysis will come in due course.
  5. The experience of the empirical subject by Johannes Volkelt (1848-1930), who says: “The possibility of an unconditional theory of knowledge is only given if I start with a certainty that relates solely to my own empirical and individual consciousness.” The certainty of a transubjective reality constituted by the “other selves” and the external world, alongside subjective immediate evidence or certainties, was what Volkelt wanted to achieve. It was with this reality that he wanted to establish his Archimedean point of certainty.
  6. Will, for Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), “that universal principle of instinctive effort by which every being realizes the type of its species, in struggle against other beings to maintain the form of life that is its own”…

In a certain aspect, Nietzsche’s “Will to Power” can be included as an Archimedean point, in its manifestations through man, as the will to power, the will to dominate, the will for more, the will to persevere in being, that Mehrwollen, that wanting more, which is the foundation of all certainty and affirms the universal “Will to Power.”

The Archimedean point of the existentialists – “I suffer, therefore I exist”; “I desire, therefore I exist”; “I act, therefore I exist”; “I love, therefore I exist”; “I anguish, therefore I exist,” etc. – is not fundamental for the foundation of a philosophy of the unconditioned because existentialism is a philosophy ofconditionality, and the empirical certainty of the subject does not allow for the transcendence of Descartes, except in the Christian existentialist tendency.

Before we delve into the foundations of the philosophy of the unconditioned and the critique we will present, we must establish a quick overview of the characteristics of reason, although this topic will be addressed more thoroughly later on.

We have already seen that the natural medium in which reason develops is identity, and that, at least for us, it is the abstraction of the similar when equal to itself, hence homogeneous. We have also seen that the sensible reality shows us aspects that “resemble” or “differ” from each other because a single and uniform reality would not allow for any comparison, and comparison, in essence, can only occur because there are differences. And also, if everything were absolutely different, there would be no possibility of knowledge. And knowledge occurs when intelligence “recognizes” the similar, encounters the similar, the repeated; it only knows when it can recognize because recognition is comparison, and in knowledge, there is the identification of the new with the unknown in order to become known. We say that the natural medium of reason is identity because it is in the measure of identity that intelligibility presents itself to us, for something is intelligible to us when we can measure it, that is, compare it with what resembles it. Beyond the similar, there is not enough intelligibility for reason, just as there is no possible intelligibility of singular facts when they are singular, which we can only penetrate through intuition, as we have seen.

How does reason proceed? Reason proceeds by repelling the different, the individual, deindividualizing reality. It proceeds through “classification,” through which it establishes a relation of identity among the classified: it starts from the multiple to reach unity. To classify is to strip beings of their heterogeneity, to obtain an undifferentiated and indifferent universe. What means does reason use to achieve this end?

It accomplishes it with the help of its principles, such as the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason.

In classification (whose most characteristic aspects are studied in Logic and, later on, when we deal with the concepts of reason), there is a purely quantitative hierarchy that increasingly seeks the general up to the supreme concept, the widest of all, which is the logical concept of Being.

It is not a hierarchy of values or qualities. In quantity, there is a distancing from singularities that individualize things. Thus, I can say quantitatively that this room is 24 m², and this house is 300 m². Quantitatively, I find a point of similarity in meters, in dimension, but qualitatively, each part is different because it has singularities that individualize it.

After this synthesis, we can delve into the foundations of the philosophy of unconditionality.

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Fundamentos da filosofia da incondicionalidade

Posição aristotélica

É Aristóteles o representante da filosofia ontológica. Já vimos que a ontologia é a ciência do ser enquanto ser. Define a verdade como o acordo, a adequação entre o pensamento e o objeto. Essa foi a noção que predominou durante a Idade Média e pervive ainda na filosofia escolástica e em outras. Tinha Aristóteles uma fé profunda na realidade. Para ele, a existência do objeto não era um problema, e o acordo entre o pensamento e o seu objeto é muito simples, segundo a lógica formal, porque o objeto é despojado de suas singularidades.74 No pensamento ontológico, o grande problema é o da estrutura do objeto. Não se trata de saber se ele existe ou não, mas por que ele existe. A causa é o mais importante. Sua essência é o que o torna cognoscível, e descobrir a essência é o que o torna compreensível, inteligível, o que constitui seu núcleo metafísico, o fundamento ontológico. Essa é a posição aristotélica.

Posição parmenídica

A posição parmenídica sustenta que só o ser absoluto existe, e que é idêntico ao pensamento. Coloca-se na posição ontologista para quem o absoluto explica o empírico. Para Aristóteles, a verdadeira ciência é a ciência pelas causas e pelos princípios. Se um fato não desvenda a sua causa, é ele irracional e, sob o ponto de vista ontológico, a causa é a base da realização do fato. Vê-se que esta compreensão está ligada à definição de verdade que ele dá.

Ambas (compreensão e definição) põem o problema da inteligibilidade. De um fato empírico, é preciso separar o elemento “metaempírico” para poder “compreendê-lo”, para apreender a “razão” e poder incorporá-lo a um sistema de ideias inteligíveis por si mesmas. Dessa forma, não há para o filósofo ontologista qualquer problema ou discussão quanto à existência do elemento ideal, porque, seguindo ele seu ponto de vista, não pode compreender que possa haver aí qualquer divergência entre o ser e o pensamento corretamente formulado. Para Parmênides, o que é pensado existe, o pensamento não pode atingir senão o existente, porque o nada não pode ser objeto de pensamento. O não ser é impensável. Ver-se-á posteriormente quanto pesou este ponto de vista sobre o pensamento de G. W. F. Hegel (1720-1831), como também sobre a fenomenologia de Husserl.

Para nós, porém, o problema é a constituição íntima da realidade, a heterogeneidade do mundo exterior. Em meio a essa heterogeneidade, descobre-se que alguma coisa há de semelhante, de parecido. A razão (como a concebe o racionalista moderno) vai criar com ele o idêntico, o imutável, a imutabilidade, a Lei que desencadeia os fatos. E é por essa abstração do semelhante, do idêntico, que ela chega ao absoluto, como examinaremos em breve. E toda inteligibilidade ficará condicionada a esse absoluto, que passa a ser a última razão do mundo sob o ponto de vista ontológico. Então, o ser e a ideia terminarão por reunir-se no absoluto. A razão não se dobra mais ante a si mesma. Ela olha para a frente, mergulha o seu olhar no mundo objetivo, que lhe é exterior.75

Não duvida mais do seu poder, não se coloca criticamente ante si mesma. Não duvida mais e, na ânsia de incondicionalidade, ela encontra o incondicionado através de si mesma; torna-se uma ciência do absoluto, sem ser, no entanto, uma ciência absoluta. Ela, não há dúvida, compreende o valor absoluto para a filosofia, mas apreende apenas um dos seus aspectos. Esse é o motivo por que a razão, isoladamente, não pode resolver o problema magno da filosofia.

Posição cartesiana

A posição cartesiana é antidogmática. Descartes recusou-se a aceitar qualquer verdade da qual não pudesse ter uma garantia. Duvidou de tudo, metodicamente, mas não podia duvidar de que duvidava, do ato de pensar em que duvidava; portanto, pensava e, se pensava, existia. Este foi o princípio incondicionado que fundamentou sua nova ciência. Dessa forma, fundava a verdade na evidência, a qual lhe era revelada pelo pensar. Também encontrou depois essa evidência nas verdades matemáticas. Esse critério foi encontrado por ele sem problemática interna. Não propunha, como critério da verdade, uma regra que necessitasse ser verificada, discutida, longamente estudada. Na verdade, estabeleceu o choque entre afirmação e negação, choque que ele superou posteriormente pela dúvida, como facilmente se pode compreender pela leitura de seus textos. Como dissemos, a dúvida, como meio de atingir a incondicionalidade, era apenas metódica, usada como método.76 Mas no próprio ato de duvidar há uma certeza. Quem duvida tem em si alguma coisa de certo, como já o sentia Santo Agostinho. Quem põe em dúvida a verdade já tem em si uma certeza.

Para chegar à incondicionalidade, a dúvida tem de ser (a) motivada; (b) fugaz – não deve ser como a dúvida mórbida do doente, dos maníacos da dúvida.

A evidência pode ser fundada:

  1. Sobre a intuição;
  2. A imediata, sobre a intuição mental;
  3. A discursiva, sobre a dedução.

A evidência manifesta-se na clareza e na nitidez das ideias. Para Descartes, essa evidência é dada por Deus, pela veracidade de Deus. Muito impressionou essa sua posição aos filósofos que o sucederam. Não podemos definir a clareza, porque precisaríamos compará-la com algo que fosse mais claro que ela, e o que é imediatamente claro é a própria clareza. Friedrich Uberweg (1826-1871) critica o critério de Descartes, alegando que nem sempre o que é mais claro é o mais seguro. Exemplos são dados pela ciência. E podemos recordar que, para o homem ignorante, o sol se move de horizonte a horizonte. A incondicionalidade cartesiana já a encontramos nos Upanixades (tratados filosóficos hindus), na Summa Veritate, de Tomás de Aquino, e também em Ockham e Tomaso Campanella (1568-1639), no Universitatis Philosophiae – obras anteriores a Descartes –, mas num sentido não tão universal como a dele.

Façamos agora uma rápida análise do pensamento cartesiano. O termo consciência tem para ele dois significados, que decorrem de sua opinião de que nossos estados de vontade e sentimento existiriam para a consciência, enquanto esta pensa neles. Os dois significados são:

  1. de estado e de conteúdo;
  2. de reflexão sobre ambos.

Ora, se o momento da reflexão pode distinguir a ambos, é porque tem a sua realidade psicológica independentemente do pensamento e não é, portanto, a reflexão.

Precisaria Descartes demonstrar:

  1. que seja necessário esse momento de reflexão para ser qualquer coisa advertida;
  2. que sem pensamento nada é advertido.

Estamos aqui já em face de um postulado metafísico, que não pode tornar-se um dado de experiência. Temos, então, à nossa frente uma série de problemas: (a) que todo ato, momento, conteúdo da experiência, seja pensado; (b) que o pensamento concorra, em todo caso, para constituí-lo; (c) que a própria autoconsciência seja pensamento; (d) que o eu, sujeito da autoconsciência, seja um eu pensante; (e) que este eu pensante se realize e se manifeste a si mesmo unicamente e sempre em pensamento; (f) além disso, que o eu confira a própria realidade a uma experiência somente pensada à qual basta o ser pensado para ser.

É verdade que Descartes, em suas “Réponse aux (deuxiéme) objections” e na “Lettre… à Mons. Clerselier”, defende-se da acusação de preconceito que lhe atribuem ao Cogito (o que é muito importante, porque muitos não o citam). Ele expõe e aclara que a sua afirmativa é uma experiência, uma intuição, um todo, um julgamento sintético, não um silogismo.

Uma pergunta importante nos surge agora. É o ser igual ao pensar? Se fosse igual ao pensar, teríamos uma tautologia, e o cogito seria tautológico, pois Descartes, ao dizer “cogito ergo sum” (penso, logo existo), diria o mesmo que “existo, logo existo” ou “sum ergo sum” ou “cogito ergo cogito”.

Apesar da grande crítica que sofreu o argumento cartesiano, podemos aproveitar do seu pensamento o que segue: o pensamento, até ao negar a si mesmo, conscientemente se coloca. Se duvida de si mesmo, afirma-se ele na dúvida; e o pensamento, ao afirmar, é sempre pensamento. O pensamento, quer verdadeiro, quer falso, é sempre pensamento. Além disso, a dúvida é posterior; pois não há dúvida sem que o pensamento a preceda.

A filosofia da condicionalidade e os relativistas

Positivismo era o nome dado à filosofia positiva de Auguste Comte, e que também se estendeu a outras filosofias distintas, como as de Spencer, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Hyppolite Taine (1828-1893), etc., que também se orientam no sentido de excluir a Metafísica. Para tal doutrina, o absoluto não existe nem objetiva nem subjetivamente. Para Comte, a humanidade atravessou três estados: o teológico, o metafísico e o positivo, que é o atual.

O absoluto não é mais a meta de nossa era, afirmava. Entretanto, não se deve pensar que ele considerasse essas três épocas nitidamente separadas, isto é, que ocorresse uma, a qual desapareceria quando ocorresse outra. Apesar das muitas opiniões expressas nas obras de filosofia, a leitura da obra de Comte revela que ele compreendeu esses três estados como uma constante dominadora, isto é: a época em que dominou a concepção teológica; a época em que dominou a Metafísica; e a época em que domina a positividade, embora em todas as eras posteriores haja um pouco das outras, mas sempre hierarquicamente inferiores à predominante.

Em nossa época, há ainda o estado teológico e o metafísico, e este conhece agora um surto inesperado e extraordinário. Essas três épocas são intensistamente diferentes, pois ora a positividade é maior, ora menor; ora o teológico é maior, ora menor, etc. Olhando a história do Ocidente, Comte, em sua época, tinha grande soma de razão; mas a história humana não é apenas essa, e temos variações interessantes.

Posição empirista

Para o empirismo (de empireia, experiência), todo conhecimento é atribuído aos sentidos. Ora, os sentidos não podem apreender o absoluto. Não há dúvida de que o conhecimento tem elementos empíricos.

Mas o racionalismo tem certa razão ao sustentar o a priori, pois os princípios diretores do conhecimento e as categorias são invariantes (em parte, pelo menos), o que lhes dá certo aspecto de absoluto, pois só por meio deles se pode apanhar o empírico, quando examinamos a experiência.

O empirismo é representado por Locke, Hume, etc.

On skeptical criticism

Let us now consider the criticism of skepticism.77 This school originated in Greece with Gorgias, whose philosophical attitude consists of denying absolute knowledge. We will see how the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, supported by science, which does not require absolute knowledge, has shifted the problem of skepticism, as it cast doubt on the possibility of knowledge and science, a position that, despite current science, is being reconsidered.

But let us see, for now, how skeptics objected to the philosophy of unconditionality.

Gorgias presented three propositions:

  1. There is nothing absolute since it is necessary to demonstrate both that being began to exist and that it did not begin to exist; that there is both unity and plurality.
  2. If something existed, it would not be knowable because neither sensory experience nor thought provide us with guarantees of certainty.
  3. Even if we could know something, we could not communicate it to anyone else because each person lives their own life, and we do not know if what we say to others evokes in them the same representations and thoughts as in us.

The attitude of Gorgias influenced Pyrrho (360 BC-270 BC), who was the founder of the Pyrrhonian school.

Pyrrho was a contemporary of Aristotle and introduced “doubt doctrine” that follows science, which is a result of it and tends to destroy it; while Descartes' doubt is methodical and precedes science. The latter goes from uncertainty to knowledge. It is ascending, whereas Pyrrho’s doubt follows a regressive path; it departs from science to negate it and seeks to justify its negation.

In fact, skepticism seeks to destroy reason with reason itself.

Pyrrho makes doubt systematic. Now let us examine its foundations: starting from the impossibility of knowing anything for certain, he verifies “isostheneia” [ἰσοσθένεια], which means equality in strength, in the conviction that resides in each contrary theory, which led to “acatalepsia” [ἀκαταληψία] – a Greek word meaning the impossibility of comprehension – the incomprehensibility of things or the philosopher’s inability to comprehend anything. From there, he arrives at “ataraxia” [ἀταραξία] – tranquility of mind – perfect unconcern, the happiness of the soul.

Pyrrho was antidogmatic, and his influence can be seen in the Platonic Academy with Arcesilaus (316 BC-241 BC) and Carneades (214 BC-129 BC). While Arcesilaus was skeptical of the Stoic dogmatism that flourished in Athens, Carneades developed a theory of probability. Pyrrhonism even cast doubt on his own theory.

Carneades accepted three forms of probability:

  1. Representations can be probable in themselves.
  2. They can be probable and consistent with others.
  3. They can be probable in themselves, consistent with others, and universally confirmed.

Thus, we see that Academic skepticism resembles Cartesian doubt. With the death of Carneades, the Academy returned to dogmatism. But Pyrrhonism continued in the 2nd century BC with Enesidemus of Cnossos (1st century BC), who gave it a dogmatic character and presented the ten famous tropes, namely:

  1. There is diversity among living beings. What is suitable for one is not suitable for another. So, how can we admit that the human perspective is the most acceptable? Does the understanding of things not vary with beings?
  2. There are differences even among humans, differences in character, temperament, intelligence. There is variety in the subjective consideration of Good and Evil.
  3. There is a difference in the structure of the senses, the organs of the senses, which allows for different evaluations. Thus, tactile, visual, and auditory images differ. Which one characterizes the object definitively?
  4. The senses work differently and provide different perceptions according to the state of health. The madman and the drunkard see a horse where there is a pile of wood. There are hallucinations, and furthermore, judgment differs according to age.
  5. There are differences in the position and distance of the object.
  6. Nothing can be taken in its purest form, and it is impossible to discern a consistently valid state.
  7. There are differences in the very constitution and quantity of objects, which leads to differences in perception. Two men are different, two dogs are different. Which one is true? The whole is different from the isolated elements.
  8. The relativity of things. This is Sextus Empiricus’s (150 BC-220 BC) strongest argument.
  9. Something can be extraordinary or ordinary depending on whether we see it once or many times. For a Hindu, as Hume later said, cold water is extraordinary.
  10. Education, religious and philosophical beliefs, prejudices, customs, and habits influence judgment. Differences in behavior between a wise person and a vulgar person make their evaluations different.

Sextus Empiricus reduced these ten tropes to five. Let us see:

  1. Contradiction in different assertions among wise men and systems regarding essential points.
  2. “Regressus in infinitum” (infinite regression), which requires that each thing be proven by another and so on infinitely, which is practically unrealizable.
  3. The relativity of science to the constitution of human intelligence.
  4. The arbitrariness of premises, which leads each philosophy to take different points of view.
  5. The dialelle, the vicious circle (Greek word “di’allelon,” meaning “one through the other”), an argument used by dogmatists who demonstrated the worth of human reason by admitting the worth of reason itself.

However, skepticism also falls into the vicious circle, the dialelle, in its fundamental contradiction because it denies the worth of reason through reason itself.78

Positions regarding unconditionality

Theological position

For Theology, the unconditional only exists in God. It is impious to seek it elsewhere. The absolute being is ontologically unconditional. Science does not start from it but desires to reach it. God is not a starting point for science.

Relativist position

Within the theoretical position, relativism is the opposite pole of absolute skepticism. While the latter says “nothing is true,” relativism asserts “everything is true, but relatively true.” It was Protagoras, five centuries before Christ, who, in Greece, based on Leucippus (5th century BC) and Democritus (460 BC-370 BC), concluded that the world is as it appears to each individual. All perceptions are equally justified. Everything thought is true for the one who thinks it. “Man is the measure of all things; of things that are, as they are, and of things that are not, as they are not.”

Our era suffers from a great relativistic influence. For many, there are no absolute values, whether logical, ethical, aesthetic, religious, etc. Relativism, as we have seen, originates from a purely gnoseological conception but ends up becoming a true worldview. Thus, according to relativism, unconditionality is impossible to achieve. For relativists, all epistemological doctrines are based on fundamental undisclosed dogmas that are undemonstrable, which influenced their doctrines. Both Berkeley and Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Locke, Descartes are based on these dogmas.

The weakness of some unconditional systems has served as an argument against this philosophy. In general, unconditionalists start from what they wish to prove. Therefore, the following questions can be posed:

  1. Is the principle of unconditionality possible?
  2. If possible, can we attain it? If we answer yes or no to the first question, the second question is valid only in the first case. If we answer “yes,” we can still ask whether its “necessity” is affirmable.

Those who oppose unconditionality argue that if it exists, it must reveal itself. Unconditionalists claim that it does reveal itself; conditionalists say it does not. Who is right?

Kant’s critical position

We can place Kant here in the middle ground. He remains faithful to the first postulate of rationalism, namely, that all experience is thinking. Therefore, all thinking is judging, and all judging is completing a synthesis through categories, that is, synthesis in the forms of the intellect. Kant was a critic, but by criticism, we mean any theory that admits true knowledge but also acknowledges limits to knowledge. In truth, he was only a kind of criticist.

2. Reason

The simultaneity is the order of space. Without simultaneity, without space albeit ideal, there is no possible comparison.

Therefore, from its beginning, from its first procedure, reason needs the idea of space as a natural medium in which it develops. Reason later separates from it all concrete aspects to make it increasingly pure, clearer, more homogeneous, and more abstract.

Referring back to Kant, we see that for him, space is a pure form, albeit rational, of sensibility, while time belongs to sensory intuition. The genesis of time and space within us, in relation to Kant’s doctrine, is examined in “Três Críticas de Kant” (Three Critiques of Kant).

An analysis of our senses will facilitate the understanding of this subject.

For example: vision provides us with the means to awaken in us the idea of simultaneity. It is a faculty of fixation, stabilization, immobilization of the real. Vision does not show us a change about to happen, the becoming, or the production of one thing into another. Both mutation and becoming, as well as production, occur within the things themselves. Vision apprehends the result when it is significant enough to be perceived.

Human vision is binocular. There is a convergence of optical rays onto an object. When we have a moving object near us, we cannot fixate it. The entire process of vision tends to fix, to stop, to render static. It fixes one object and fixes another for comparison. Vision and touch, which indicate continuity, offer comparison to reason because humans penetrate reality as something apart.

Vision offers greater memory than any other sense and has also developed the most in humans, as humans are beings that see, while dogs are beings that sniff.

Vision is the principal organ of knowledge because it more easily offers re-cognition, which is true knowledge, as we have seen. This is evident in the fact that vision needs to review, to re-perceive in order to perceive since what we see once is completed by imagination, which structures a form, whereas on the second occasion, vision is clearer because it re-perceives the similar points.

When seeing some lines on a wall for the first time, we seem to see a human image. However, upon repetition, we realize that there are merely similar lines that, on the first occasion, thanks to imagination, remind us of a human figure, and we complete it with imagination. The theory of Gestalt (form, structure) is based on such facts, which we have studied in “Psychology”.

The sense of hearing provides us with multiple, more confusing sensations than vision. It does not localize as easily as vision. Smell, by allowing the perception of diverse sensations, contributes to revealing the existence of an external world; therefore, it also provides something of space. Taste, on the other hand, despite allowing us to perceive simultaneous sensations like smell, is the least spatial of our senses.

Touch allows us to perceive distinct sensations and provides us with elements for the formation of the idea of space, although it is less subtle than vision, and although everything indicates that it is the fundamental sense, as seen in psychology.

Comparison is the first movement of our mind to structure reason, as seen in the construction of noetic schemas examined in “Tratado de Esquematologia” (Treatise on Noetiology). Rational knowledge is, in truth, recognition; we know what we believe we already know. Rational knowledge is a recognition because it requires an assimilation to pre-structured schemas.

Rational knowledge is a process of comparison since it is conceptual. If I say that this object is a book, it is because I compare it with the concept of “book” and verify that the assertion of it being a book holds true for this object.

Reason is not opposed to life, as some irrationalists believe. Both humans and animals seek the similar. A higher form of life would not be possible without obedience to this vital impulse (a true instinct), which leads higher living beings to compare the similar to the similar.

Reason, as one of the functions of the mind, distinguishes the similar elements and extracts what is similar from them, leaving only the unknowable, the ineffable, the individually incommensurable, which we have already discussed. It is important to note this point: reason extracts from what is different what “can be” similar, rejecting what is no longer rationally knowable because it is not comparable.

Another point: an absolutely different object, rationally unknowable, that is, not subject to conceptual knowledge, when it presents itself to consciousness again, is no longer different but comparable to what remains of it in consciousness (memory).

Consciousness can recognize it and, therefore, know it rationally. This is why much of what excites us the first time escapes us.

The reason, the function of our spirit, is not satisfied with recognizing once or several times. It wants to always recognize. Here, a principle of economy of effort comes into play, which is biological. If every time new objects were presented, it was necessary to start the comparison again to verify if it is similar to this or that, life would be complicated and difficult, and the results would be null, because we would have to repeat the same process. This economy of effort, which we have already observed in the selective procedure of life itself, leads reason to separate, to isolate the relevant similarity, the only way to make it always recognizable, comparable. In this way, it is elevated to the category of an independent reality, necessarily immutable, identical to itself, because otherwise, it would fail by not allowing comparison, and the entire comparative process would become laborious, consequently tiring, uneconomical, and detrimental.

This is abstraction. And this separation does not occur concretely in the object, but in the mind, as we have already studied. The opposite of the abstract is the concrete. But concrete is the combination of the similar and the different, while the abstract is only the rationalized similar or different, separated, isolated from the concrete by the human mind.

Thus, the similar is elevated to the category of the immutable; we give it an independent existence, always remaining the same – it becomes a concept. In this way, the unknown can be reduced to the known, and the concept precedes experience. Experience results from a synthesis of intuition and concept, as we have seen before. It is the concept that shapes intuition and produces experience, thereby reducing intellectual effort. That is why the concept comes from a long past, and its elaboration, which must have been slow and difficult, ended up giving a new function to the human spirit, economizing its forces.79

The concept is the basis of all language, for there would be no possible language if we gave a name to every fact. Language functions with concepts, and it is the conceptualization of a language that demonstrates its superiority.

A primitive, wild people have deficient conceptualization, as is the case with our indigenous people.

If we observe carefully, vision has the dialectical capacity to harmoniously combine the continuous and the discontinuous, without confusing them.

Vision immediately grasps the continuity of reality, but through fixation, it establishes the discontinuity of the objects it perceives, highlighting them from the environment. It fixes the discontinuous onto the continuous, distinguishes an object from the background, details, separates the different, instinctively and automatically proceeds with abstraction. As we have seen, all our senses are abstracting organs because they apprehend only a region of reality: the ear, sounds; the nose, odors, etc.

Thus, abstraction, as a function of the spirit, finds its basis in the senses. But vision is the sense with the greatest abstracting capacity. There is a very significant example. The painter works with a limited number of colors, just as reason also works with a limited number of concepts. And, just as the painter, with these elements, creates an image of reality; reason, with them, makes the unknown known, makes the different similar. It reconstructs the universe with the help of concepts and combinations of concepts. Reason cannot work with the individual, cannot leave the diversity of facts, but only what more or less repeats, resembles. Reason carries out utilitarian work.

Thus, the antinomic nature of our spirit between intuition (knowledge of the individual) and reason (knowledge of the general) is perfectly established, which is the foundation of the discipline we call “Noology,” which has the functioning of the spirit as its object.

The elaboration of concepts is not the only function of reason as reason. It needs to give order to these concepts, compare them, and in doing so, it continues to function as reason, grasping universalities. It needs to fit them together, give them an extensive hierarchy, reduce them to content and container, what is included and what includes. This process is classification, which consists of organizing individual objects into species, species into genera, and genera into broader genera.

We have seen that reason is guided by a selective activity (which we observe in every vital function), comparing, simplifying, and uniting. Order, clarity, and therefore simplicity, unity, are characteristics of reason’s economy. All classification is a reduction to unity, a unification. Concepts are like concentric circles; the broader one contains all the others. But as we ascend from the singular to the species, from the species to the genera, as seen in logic, we increase comprehension but decrease content.

The farther we go, the more things we see; the higher we go, the more we embrace. However, in return, we see less of the individual and the singular. Extension increases, content decreases, and we lose details. From the top of a mountain, we can see a vast panorama that encompasses many things, but we lose the details of distant things. Let us imagine a human being who could, from one place, see the entire universe with their eyes, with its suns, stars, nebulas, galaxies, novae, etc. They wouldn’t even be able to discern our planet or the largest stars. The entire universe would be a uniform mass without diversity.

This image allows us to understand the logical idea of Being, the supreme abstraction. It is worth noting the analogy between our reason and vision. The more things we want to see, the more we lose the details of them; the more reason wants to encompass more concepts, the more it also loses their details, which are different, to increasingly reach the most general, the “most” similar.

Once the hierarchy is established through classification, reason follows an inverse path: it descends from the more general to the less general and from there to the singular. We then have definition, whose logical characteristics we have already studied. We have seen that defining means delimiting, specifying; placing the different within the similar means detaching what was attached. Logicians say that the individual cannot be defined because defining means limiting a richer concept to a poorer one. The individual corresponds to no concept other than itself.

“Species are defined, individuals are described,” say logicians. But species are within individuals; they are not separable from them. The human race is in every individual human being. The definable, then, is the species, the genus; in an individual, we define the genus that belongs to it.

In reality, every definition is a description. There is no language to express the individual, just as there is no science of the individual.

It is worth clarifying the difference between individual and individual. The individual is a concrete whole given by reality. The individual is an element of that whole separated from the individual only by abstraction, an element that characterizes it as individuality.

The science that could be created about the individual would be based on the characteristics it has and that belong to the group, which are common to the group. In this way, thescience of the individual is the science of the species embodied in the individual. There is no science of the individual, which is inexpressible and incomparable because the individual is the absolute different, the character of the principle of individuation.

This absolute different, which is the individual, is multiple because there are many absolute differences. Being is the supreme similar because it encompasses all beings that, when observed individually, are absolute differences.

We are thus faced with a new antinomy of reason, the one between Being as the absolute similar and the individual as the absolute different. The individual is the absolute different. Therefore, the individual has a quid proprium (a distinct quality). If we were to admit that the similar is subsumed under the different, that the homogeneous is subsumed under the heterogeneous, as rationalism affirms, there would then be a possibility of rational knowledge of the individual.

But reason does not grasp the individual; it grasps the individualized, what is common in individuals. Let’s consider this: all real things are individual, indiscernible, distinct from each other. If there are individuals in nature, they are indefinable, therefore incognizable by reason. Thus, rational and scientific knowledge of reality as total knowledge becomes impossible, but it can only be a knowledge of the general alongside the particular, of the similar alongside the irreducible different. This is, for example, the relativistic interpretation; this is how it interprets knowledge. This interpretation comes from Kant, who presented it initially. That is why he declared that science is only of the phenomenal.

What is called individual, singular, he called noumenon (the thing in itself). Phenomenon is what appears from the noumenon, what appears, what manifests itself to reason. Only common characteristics are communicable. That is why he said that there is only science of phenomena. Therefore, we can say that science only knows relations, and we are in the relativistic conception of today. Consequently, it cannot reach the thing in itself. Science is a mathematization of these relations; it quantifies the world, transforming qualities into quantities. Bergson showed us that to understand time, we have to make it “timeless,” spatialize it, as we do when we measure it. Thus, to understand, grasp, apprehend the particular, we have to make it universal.

We have seen that dogmatism affirms the total unknowability of reality by intelligence. Skepticism denies dogmatism. Relativism seeks reconciliation. All intellectualists believe that reality can be fully known by intelligence, which is adequate to reality.

Let us now return to the definition, so that we may analyze all its elements necessary for further analysis. In its classical sense, the predicate is contained within the subject. Thus, the definition is an analytic judgment, but of maximum determination.

Logic teaches us that we can only define species. However, species are constructions of reason, logically considered. It is impossible to define singular beings, just as there are indefinable concepts, such as the supreme abstracts, the summa genera (the supreme genera, the categories). In these concepts, differences are not distinguished. (Let us remember that definition is accomplished with the aid of the proximate genus and the specific difference.) In individual cases, differences are absolute. We can have an intuition of the individual; however, we cannot provide a definition for it. We can describe it, but not define it. Every science relies on definitions, which, nevertheless, does not imply refutation of it, besides its validity being in the realm of facts that we will see later.80

Science, nonetheless, carries out its work, just as Geometry carries out its own, without having defined what a straight line is.

Pascal argued the weakness of definition and the impossibility, through it, for science to reach effective and secure knowledge.

Through l’esprit de finesse (intuition), there is a possibility to know man, the Universe, and God, not in terms of extension, but in depth; not in terms of quantity, but in quality, as Pascal affirmed, thus being a precursor of Kant and Bergson regarding the relativistic conception.

Some claim, with Élie Rabier (1846-1932), that definition precedes classification. But let us remember that definition requires the proximate genus and the specific difference. Genus and species are necessary, creations of classification, prior to that.

Where does this critique lead us? To skepticism? No, to the analysis of antinomies, which will clarify the creative power of the spirit, which is profoundly dialectical.

Classification is the foundation of rational science and establishes a causal relationship. Fitting concepts into one another is classifying; for when we remove them, they make others produce them. There is a classical rule that states that beings are classified by extension and comprehension (content).

Comprehension is sacrificed for extension, which, as it increases, reaches the supreme abstract, whose comprehension is almost nil.

However, often, to move from the most restricted term to the broadest one, we must appeal to the principle of causality. Examples will clarify this further.

Blue or red are species of the genus color. This is a species, in turn, of the genus physical quality; this is a species of the genus quality. Here, we arrive at a supreme genus, as it logically appears to us, which we cannot reduce to a higher genus.

Quality is the apex of abstraction. We cannot stop there, and we reach Being. But how will we move to Being without resorting to the principle of causality? In quality, we find no common character between it and something else. Thus, from the perspective of extension, quality cannot be the species of any other genus. Quality is not sufficient in itself; it is not explained by itself; it does not have its own sufficient reason. It cannot exist by itself; it requires something to sustain it, support it, be its substrate, explanation, and reason for being.

And what is this support? It is Being. Being is the cause of quality. Thus, the principle of causality intervenes, or rather, the principle of sufficient reason. Being is the sufficient reason for quality. To complete the conceptual chain, the chain of concepts, we need to resort to the principle of causality or the principle of sufficient reason, which we will distinguish and analyze opportune.

Hence, between Being and quality, there is a relation of cause and effect, or rather, of sufficient reason. Being is the reason and cause of quality. Therefore, it is evident that extension alone is not sufficient for classification. The same can be observed between beings and Being. A relation of sufficient reason is necessary. Thus, in addition to extension, as the classical definition affirmed, classification requires causality.

We cannot define quality simply because it is not a species of any genus. Being hovers above quality. We can only connect it to quality through the principle of causality.

Which precedes, classification or explanation? Explanation precedes. Classification is a recapitulation of explanation in simplified and immediately recognizable terms.

Classification condenses coordination within a remarkably reduced volume. The modifications in classifications observed in science originate from the explanations that occur. Explanations are not definitive. New concepts require new terms. The new concept demands a broader one that includes it, that is its genus. When none exists, a new genus is invented to introduce the new species into it. The discovery of steam and electricity required the modern and broader concept of force, which has no exact counterpart in the vocabulary of the ancients. Every new hypothesis, every new causal explanation, every new theory implies a modification, an enrichment in the established classification. To explain heat, the ancients spoke of caloric, which was its cause and genus. Later, it was replaced by motion, which is a true genus for heat, as it comprises, as species, light, electricity, etc. Another example: fire. To explain it, they had the genus phlogiston, until it was understood to be a phenomenon of combustion (a chemical phenomenon).

Thus, there is progress in science, as well as in philosophy, although of a different nature. Simplifying the explanation, that is, including a greater number of species in a genus while reducing them, implies a certain clarity. However, this clarity is largely ephemeral. When science explained physical phenomena by establishing the atomic theory, it satisfied and clarified the known facts up to that point. But new facts emerged, and the previous explanation no longer sufficed. Physical science was forced to affirm the existence of subatomic particles as electric particles. Such an explanation satisfied us, even though we still did not know what electricity was, just as we did not know what it was when we were told that lightning was a species of the genus electricity, which satisfied and impressed people in the last century.

When science found it necessary to subdivide atoms to clarify other emerging phenomena, that explanation satisfied us, even though physical science has not yet completed the phase of discovering new particles and will have to discover many more while remaining in the merely quantitative explanation of the universe. However, all of this is progress because, starting from these simple explanations, the dominion of man over nature has been greater, and the number of facts included in the explanation has increased.

When we say why a being exists, why a phenomenon occurs or is produced, we indicate a antecedent, its cause, its reason for being. And we see that, in all these explanations, there is a hierarchy of concepts that moves from genus to species.

When it is said that Earth is a planet, there is an explanation in that statement. Let us see: in the past, it was believed that Earth was an independent,central body, the reason for the existence of the Universe. Earth became merely a small sphere detached from the central Sun, and it revolves regularly around it. In this simple statement, there is a whole explanation, an explanation that arises from long and painstaking observations, from lengthy and detailed studies.

We stated that explanation precedes classification. The human mind, faced with a fact, wants to explain it in order to understand it.81 Classification is a subsequent work because we only classify what we have already understood, explained. Classification is the consecration of explanation. It is coordination, the reduction of knowledge and all accepted explanations.

The conceptual chain, which is one of the processes of reasoning, occurs in two ways: in judgments, in the form of propositions, and in reasoning, in the form of syllogisms.

We have already had occasion to talk about analytic judgments and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments are not a true sequence of terms. The predicate is contained in the subject and thus corresponds to arithmetic equations. Here is an example of an analytic judgment: “10 = 6 + 4”.

There is no progress in these judgments because there is no sequence of terms, as thoughts do not move from one different, new term to another. It simply combines, through the verb “to be,” two equivalent terms.

In these types of propositions, the extension of the subject and the extension of the predicate are the same; one can replace the other. Therefore, one can say interchangeably: “All bodies are heavy” or “All heavy things are bodies.” There is equality of extension. However, if we observe qualitatively, in terms of content, there is a difference. In the judgment “All heavy things are bodies,” the word “body” is richer in characteristics than the word “heavy” or the expression “heavy things.”

But reason is only interested in the quantitative, in extension, and not in content, which is qualitative. Soon we will see why this is. As for synthetic judgments, there can be two cases: the terms can be in a relation of partial identity or total identity. Let’s take two classic examples. “Man is an animal” and “Man is a rational animal.” The relationships between the terms in these two propositions are not the same. In the first one, we have an example of partial identity because we couldn’t say that “every animal is a man.” In this case, there is no possibility of substitution, of exchanging one term for another because they are not equivalent, as they have different extensions. But in the second case, there is total identity because both the predicate and the subject have the same extension, and I can say “all rational animals are men,” just as I can say “all men are rational animals.”

In the first case, “man is an animal,” there is partial identity because one concept is subsumed under a larger concept. We only have a classification there. In the second case, there is a relation of equality, and we are facing a definition. The second term has a larger concept than the first, which is its species, and the word that restricts this genus expresses the specific difference.

Man (Species)

is

a rational (specific difference)

animal (genus)

In this way, only synthetic judgments, as Kant explained, bring positive knowledge. Thus, every affirmative or negative proposition can be reduced to a judgment, and if this judgment is synthetic, then there is progress. In this case, we have a classification, a definition. Now, every definition is a kind of classification; therefore, every rational proposition is a partial expression of classification.

One of the most difficult points to understand in logic, or rather, to explain, is that of induction. Induction makes the mind move from an individual fact to a totality.

By what means does the human mind, in induction, move from the singular to the general, from the finite to the infinite? This has been one of the most persistent questions in philosophy, demanding an answer that satisfies it.

The same problem is the transition from the concrete to the abstract, from the singular to the general.

The mind, when it rises from the singular to the general, from the concrete to the abstract, does so in order to grasp reality, to obtain a larger, broader, and also clearer panoramic view because, for humans, knowledge is reducing to unity.

A person feels more confident in their philosophical or scientific knowledge when they can reduce it to an increasingly restricted number of principles. And this is because reason, as we have already seen, tends towards homogeneity. The best hypothesis is the one that simplifies the most, that explains the greatest number (quantitative) of phenomena, and that requires the fewest number of principles (greater homogeneity). Our intelligence tends to accept a law through an explanation.

Induction is also an embedding, a classification, like the others processed by reason, although more complex.

As for deduction, we are faced with another classification. Let’s see: deduction can be mediate or immediate. In the first case, we have the syllogism; in the second case, we have conversion or opposition.

We studied in “Logic” the syllogism, which consists of affirming that a quality belongs to a being or an object because it belongs to the entire class to which that being or object belongs.

Let’s examine the classical syllogism: “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” Does it bring any new knowledge? Absolutely not because, if we examine it closely, we are faced with a classification. The individual Socrates belongs to the species man, which belongs to the genus of mortal beings.

If we examine any species of syllogism, we will see that they all fit into a classification. Reason tends toward homogeneity and therefore simplifies and clarifies through it. All rational, philosophical, or scientific work is always predominantly this. Goblot even declared that classification was the whole of science. Rational knowledge is a unique process of this kind. Classifying is dominating, distinguishing, comparing, joining the similar, the equal with the equal, ordering, coordinating, subordinating. Classification requires the classification of classification. All science is this operation, but reason classifies classifications, giving particular sciences an embedding in the one that corresponds to the total science.

Rational knowledge is panoramic knowledge; it is knowledge of the exterior. But intuitive knowledge is the one that penetrates, that invades the individual; it is detailed knowledge.

Classifying is dominating, encompassing. Intuition is penetrating, living, having experience.

Reason compares, verifies the similar characteristics that it reduces, step by step, to a single similar. This is also how human vision works. But vision precedes reason in humans; therefore, it influences reason, as well as intuition. Gradually, this dualistic antinomic aspect of our mind becomes clearer to us, which, once well understood and explained, as we will try to do later, will give us the “noological” method, which we present and defend, and which will allow us to penetrate the most arid areas of philosophy and knowledge armed with powerful instruments that will facilitate understanding and the general view of all culture.82

3. Dialectical analysis of contradictions – Antinomies – The dualism of energetic notions of extensity and intensity – Analytical noology – Factors of intensity and extensity

We accept as established the functional dualism of our spirit, which has its foundations in the very constitution of our organs of sensation, which in turn have their foundations in the functioning of life itself, which is selective. To select is to separate, distinguish, prefer, divide, choose this and prefer that; consequently, to distinguish this from that, to establish distinctions.

We observe the functioning of reason (from the similar to the like, from the like to the same, from this to the equal, from the equal to the identical, a sequence of rational ascent) in increasing distance from what distinguishes, from what is different, in order to reach the supreme of similarity, which would be, erroneously, the identical; from this functioning, we examine the concept, the classification, the conceptual chaining of generalized and generalizing reason; we observe the functioning of intuition (from the different to the unequal, from the unequal to the ineffable, from the ineffable to the unique), in a sequence of ascension (intuitional), from everything that resembles, to reach the supreme of difference, the absolute different, which is the ineffable unique, whose other aspects of functioning we will examine next.

Thus, we see that these aspects have already been established, allowing us to understand why, when examining the facts of cosmic occurrence, we always distinguish two polar interpretations, two partial ways of seeing phenomena, which are the foundations of all distinctions in philosophy, and which have generated the various positions that allow for such diverse perspectives.

It is necessary for us to clarify now two terms that we have used throughout this book: intensity and extensity. They are valuable terms that encompass numerous meanings and represent the fields in which our spirit dialectically oscillates, in this great and profound dialogue of nature with itself, of nature with humans, and of humans when contemplating themselves. This constitutive opposition, however, is dynamic, and there is always a opposition between both (intensity and extensity) that the human spirit has sought to resolve, either through the reduction (alternative) of one to the other or through the suppression of one or the other. In rare moments, however, as we see in the study of the history of philosophical thought, both are given the same reality, and this conflict is conceived as immanent to reality and logic. In philosophy, an effort has always been made to consider one of them as apparent, for the benefit of the reality of the other. No philosophical vocabulary that we know of studies the term extensity. And if we search our dictionaries, we will not find it, except as an expression used in Brazil to indicate great extensions.

However, the term intensity is found. The term extensity has only been used by physicists.

Let us now try to provide a clear explanation of these two terms, so that we can proceed with our analysis.

Lalande defines extensão (extension) with two meanings: as the action of extending and with the characteristic of being extensive.83 In Physics, we find the use of two expressions: fatores de extensidade (factors of extensivity) and fatores de intensidade (factors of intensity). Let’s quote Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), a famous physicist:

To emphasize the opposition between them (the energy factors, which have characteristics contrary to the factors of intensity) and intensities, we designate them… with the name of extensidade.

From there, Ostwald proposed replacing the use of the term quantidade (quantity) with fatores de quantidade (factors of quantity), and the term capacidade (capacity) with fatores de capacidade (factors of capacity). Later, he preferred the expression fator de extensidade (factor of extensivity) to denote these extensive quantities of energy, the “material factors,” because, as he says, “it is the consideration of these two quantities that determines the ancient conception of matter.”

The preference we give to the term extensidade arises from it not having been used yet with various meanings, as the other terms generally have, thus allowing it to have a clear and distinct sense. The word extensidade is formed from the Latin verb extendere, that is, ex and tendere, to stretch out. The word intensidade comes from intensus, which in turn comes from tendere, in tendere, to tend inward. The two prefixes ex and in indicate the direction of tension, the inverse dynamism of tension. These two Latin words, after so many centuries, come to be used to denote a series of facts from scientific experience.

However, these two words are constantly used in everyday language. We have intensidade (intensity), intensivo (intensive), intensificar (to intensify), intenso (intense), extensão (extension), extensivo (extensive), extensibilidade (extensibility), and extensidade (extensivity).

When we use expressions derived from extensão, we always mean something that extends, something that goes outward; it is a dynamic of distance, unfolding, elongation; it is a “direction taken towards the object,” towards what is heterogeneous, changeable, to encompass it, incorporate it; it is centrifugal. When we use expressions derived from intensidade (intensity, intense), we want to refer to something internal, something that comes from the heterogeneity of succession, from the movement of changes from the outside to the inside; it is a transformation in itself, turned inward; it is centripetal.

When we talk about the extension of a plan, a program, we give the sense of encompassing, prolonging, embracing; when we talk about the intensity of a sound, we think about the character of that sound itself, it is a sound that is modified (more intense, less intense) as sound, it is a “direction taken towards the subject,” it is more of a subjective aspect because it is a relation to itself. While the former leads to the object concept, the latter leads to the subject concept. There is no more objectivity; instead, there is more subjectivity. While extension tends to assimilate, intensity tends to differentiate.

For Descartes, "continuous quantity, or rather, the extension in length, width, and depth that exists in that quantity,"84 is included in the notion of extended, distinct from thought, from the soul. Descartes vaguely placed the notion of intensity in his idea of the soul.

Kant says that a magnitude is extensive when the representation of the parts makes the representation of the whole possible. It is the sense of homogeneity, whose parts are homogeneous, just as the whole is homogeneous.

For him, a magnitude is intensive when presented as unity. Quantity, in this case, can only be represented by greater or lesser approximation of negation (faster, slower, for example). “Intensity is not the quantity of things that are ‘counted,’ nor is it duration or extension, quantities that are ‘measured’ by means of homogeneous units,” expresses Goblot.85

Philosophers and lexicographers face immense difficulties in defining intensity. The reason is that defining is comparing, measuring, and intensity, by its very nature, eludes definition. Thus, this concept can only be clarified through intuition and experience.

The synthetic character is fundamental to extensivity, while the analytic character is fundamental to intensity. Synthetic because it is a synthesizing dynamism, always implying a magnitude, an operation, unfolding in reality, while intensity develops in intensity itself, in separation, distinction, analysis.

We feel intensity more, but we know more about extensivity, which is why the latter is more definable than the former.

Lalande, in an attempt to define the two concepts, uses these words:

Intensidade (Intensity) – Character of that which admits states of more or less, but in such a way that the difference between two of these states is not a degree of what is thus susceptible to increase or decrease; for example, a feeling of fear can decrease or grow, but the difference between a slight fear and a stronger fear is not a degree of fear that can be compared to others, as the difference between two lengths or two numbers is a length or a number, having its place on the scale of magnitudes of the same kind.86

Bergson and his school absorb intensity into quality; thus, any true conflict, any contradiction between it and extensivity is eliminated, in turn absorbed into quantity. But quantity is not opposed exclusively to quality, nor can they both be confused, essentially, as both define vectors whose natures are strictly closed to each other.

It is already easy to understand that there are three positions regarding the antagonism between intensity and extensivity: a) the position of those who reduce intensity to extensivity; b) the position of those who reduce extensivity to intensity; c) and the position of those who reduce both to a third entity, where this antagonism disappears.

The third position, ours, is that extensivity and intensity form two dynamic, antinomic orders of nature. It is, therefore,a dialectical position, affirming the contemporaneity of both, which can be concretely admitted as part of all existence and every chrono-topical (spatio-temporal) being.

We will leave aside the metaphysical aspects of this dialectic, as discussing them here would go beyond the scope of this book, and we will take advantage of this antagonism as a methodological means for the study of philosophy, given the great and fruitful insights it offers us.

The concepts of extensivity and intensity have found new applications in modern science, allowing it to penetrate unexplored fields, as we will have the opportunity to study when examining the topics of time, space, and the general views of the world by Albert Einstein (1879-1955), Willem de Sitter (1872-1934), Georges Lemaître (1894-1966), and others.

Energy is conceived as the product of two factors, one of extensivity and the other of intensity.

It was Macquorn Rankine (1820-1872) who decomposed energy into two factors. However, for him, these factors only appeared as living force and force of tension, actual energy and potential energy.

Before continuing this analysis, it is necessary to clarify two terms frequently used in philosophy: act and potency. Let’s examine only the most general aspects, seeking the most concise synthesis for the exposition of these terms, which will be used many times from now on.

It was Aristotle who best understood that things are not only what they are but also what they can be.

Thus, every change can be:

  1. possible;
  2. in the process of realization;
  3. realized.

The term act (in act) applies to moment b, in opposition to moment a and moment c. Moment a is in potency (possibility), and c is the already realized being that results from the change. Aristotle called them:

  1. Dynamis [δύναµις], moment a (potency);
  2. Energéia [ἐνέργεια], moment b (act);
  3. Entelékheia [ἐντελέχεια], moment c (end, entelechy).

The word act served to express both moment b and moment c.

For Aristotle, matter was potency, that is, it had the possibility of becoming this or that. But what transformed it into something was the form, the act that informed and shaped it.

Thus, predominantly in Aristotle’s work,87 potency depends on and is subordinate to act. Potency comes into existence through act because potency is indeterminate, and it becomes determinate through act, which is the principle of being. It is through act that a possibility becomes reality, as act is the reality itself of a being that was still indeterminate. An example clarifies this well. We have here a block of shapeless clay, but the artist molds it into a human figure, giving it form. The block would be (although rudely exemplified) the potency, and act the moment when this shapeless clay takes on a form. This distinction between act and potency remained in Aristotelian philosophy and entered into the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, for Aristotle, potency is passive, incapable, on its own, of actualizing itself; it is inert. Act88 is what propels it, gives form to potency. The artist, by transforming the clay into a realized figure, actualizes the figure, giving form to the clay that, on its own, could not transform into a figure.

It is with Leibniz that the word potency takes on another meaning in philosophy, partly the same as later used by Nietzsche and modern science. For Leibniz, potency is an active force, the original source of action, effective causality. "Active potency is sometimes taken in a more perfect sense when, in addition to being a mere faculty, there is a tendency; and it is in this sense that I take it in my dynamic considerations."89 We have already seen that, with Leibniz, the sense of force is different from the classical sense.

Modern physics accepts this interpretation. Ostwald says:

It is [...] risky to consider only living force as actual energy and view the other as merely potential energy, because it is not legitimate to consider that an energy that is not real, because it is not present, can transform into real energy, and vice versa.

It is now easy to see where Rankine made a mistake when he considered energy to have two opposing aspects, actuality and potentiality. Each aspect of energy (intensity and extensivity) can, in turn, be actual or potential.

An intensity can be actual, and an extensivity can be potential. Let’s quote Ostwald:

The only legitimate way to understand the terms “actual energy” and “potential energy” is to consider actual energy as energy present at the moment under consideration, and potential energy as energy that, under the present circumstances, can be formed through the present energy. If we attribute these meanings to the two expressions, the tension force or distance energy found in a mass elevated above the Earth is actual, and the motion energy it contains is potential; it is the opposite after the fall. For the pendulum, the distance energy is actual when it is at the highest point of its swing; the motion energy is actual when it is in its lowest position, and during the oscillations, these two energies constantly exchange their characteristics.

Therefore, to summarize: both intensity and extensivity can be either actual or potential.

Both cannot be actual and potential at the same time, and there is a constant oscillation between their actuality and their possibility in every physical event. The applications of this observation to philosophy will be made as we continue to discuss them.

Referring to intensities, Ostwald expresses himself as follows:

They are by no means magnitudes in the ordinary sense of the word. When we combine two equal magnitudes, as is well known, we obtain a double magnitude. Now, if we combine two equal temperatures, that is, if we bring two bodies of the same temperature into contact, the temperature does not become double but remains the same. [Thus,] when we indicate the magnitude of a mass, we do not say everything about that mass that can be said about it. If a mass is divided into two halves

Lalande defines extensivity with two meanings: as the action of extending and as having the characteristic of being extensive.83 In physics, we find the use of two expressions: factors of extensity and factors of intensity. Let’s quote Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), a famous physicist:

To underline the opposition between them (the factors of energy, which have opposite characteristics to the factors of intensity) and intensities, we designate them… with the name of extensity.

Based on this, Ostwald proposed replacing the use of the term quantity with factors of quantity and capacity with factors of capacity. Later, he preferred the expression factor of extensity to designate these extensive quantities of energy, the “material factors,” because, as he says, “the consideration of these two quantities determines the ancient conception of matter.”

The preference we give to the term extensity stems from the fact that it has not yet been used in various senses, as the other terms generally have, allowing it to have a clear and distinct meaning. The word extensity is derived from the Latin verb extendere, which means “to stretch out” or “to extend.” The word intensity comes from intensus, which, in turn, comes from tendere, in tendere, meaning “to stretch inwards.” The two prefixes ex and in indicate the direction of tension, the inverse dynamism of tension. These two Latin words, after so many centuries, now serve to designate a series of facts in scientific experience.

However, these two words are constantly used in everyday language. We have intensity, intensive, intensify, intense, extensity, extensive, extensibility, and extensiveness.

When we use expressions derived from extensity, we always mean something that extends, something that moves outward; it is a dynamic of separation, unfolding, elongation; it is a “direction taken towards the object,” towards what is heterogeneous, mutable, to encompass it, incorporate it; it is centrifugal. When we use expressions derived from intensity or intense, we refer to something internal, something that arises from the heterogeneity of succession, from the movement of changes from the outside inward, it is a transformation in itself, turned inward; it is centripetal.

When we speak of the extent of a plan, a program, we give the sense of comprehending, extending, embracing; when we speak of the intensity of a sound, we think of the character of that sound itself, it is a sound that changes (more intense, less intense) as sound, it is a “direction taken towards the subject,” it is more of a subjective aspect because it is a relation to itself. While the former leads to the concept-object, the latter leads to the concept-subject. There is no more objectivity in one, and more subjectivity in the other. While extensity tends to assimilate, intensity tends to differentiate.

According to Descartes, "continuous quantity, or rather, extension in length, width, and depth that exists in this quantity,"84 is encompassed in the notion of the extended, entirely distinct from thought and soul. Descartes vaguely placed the notion of intensity in his idea of the soul.

Kant states that a magnitude is extensive when the representation of its parts makes the representation of the whole possible. It is the sense of homogeneity, whose parts are homogeneous, just as the whole is homogeneous.

For him, a magnitude is intensive when presented as unity. Quantity, in this sense, can only be represented by greater or lesser approximation of negation (faster, slower, for example). “Intensity is not the quantity of things that are counted, nor is it duration, nor is it extension, quantities that are measured by means of homogeneous units,” as expressed by Goblot.85

Philosophers and lexicographers have immense difficulties in defining intensity. The reason is that defining means comparing, measuring, and intensity, by its very nature, eludes definition; it cannot be apprehended by a definition. Therefore, this concept can only be clarified through intuition and experience.

The synthetic character is fundamental to extensity, while the analytical character is fundamental to intensity. Synthetic, because it is a synthesizing dynamism that always implies a magnitude, an operation, unfolding in reality, while intensity unfolds in intensity, in itself, in separation, in distinction, in analysis.

We feel intensity more, but we know extensity more; therefore, the latter is more definable than the former.

Lalande, in his attempt to define the two concepts, uses these words:

Intensity – Characteristic of something that admits degrees of more or less, but in such a way that the difference between two of these states is not a degree of what is thus susceptible to increase or decrease; for example, a feeling of fear can decrease or grow, but the difference between a slight fear and a stronger fear is not a degree of fear that can be compared to others, as the difference between two lengths or two numbers is a length or a number, having its place on the scale of magnitudes of the same kind.86

Bergson and his school absorb intensity into quality; thus, all true conflict, all contradiction between it and extensity is eliminated, in turn absorbed into quantity. But quantity is not exclusively opposed to quality, nor can both be confused, essentially, because both define vectors whose natures are strictly closed to each other.

It is now easy to understand that there are three positions regarding the antagonism between intensity and extensity: a) the position of those who reduce intensity to extensity; b) the position of those who reduce extensity to intensity; c) and the position of those who reduce both to a third entity, where this antagonism disappears.

The third position, ours, is that extensity and intensity form two dynamic, antinomic orders of nature. It is, therefore, a dialectical position that affirms the contemporaneity of both, which can be concretely admitted as part of all existence and every spatio-temporal being.

We will leave aside the metaphysical aspects of this dialectic, as discussing them here would go beyond the scope of this book, and we will take advantage of this antagonism as a methodological means for the study of philosophy, given the great and fruitful insightsit offers us.

The concepts of extensity and intensity have found new applications in modern science, allowing it to explore uncharted territories, as we will have the opportunity to study when examining topics such as time, space, and the general worldview of Albert Einstein (1879-1955), Willem de Sitter (1872-1934), Georges Lemaître (1894-1966), and others.

Energy is conceived as the product of two factors: one of extensity and the other of intensity.

It was Macquorn Rankine (1820-1872) who decomposed energy into these two factors. However, for Rankine, these factors only appeared as kinetic energy and potential energy.

Before continuing this analysis, it is necessary to clarify two terms frequently used in philosophy: act and potency. Let’s examine only the most general aspects and seek a concise synthesis for the exposition of these terms, as they will be used extensively from now on.

It was Aristotle who understood that things are not only what they are but also what they can be.

Thus, every change can be seen as:

  1. Possible
  2. In the process of realization
  3. Realized

The term act refers to moment B in opposition to moments A and C. Moment A represents potency (possibility), and moment C represents the realized state resulting from the change. Aristotle referred to them as:

  1. Dynamis [δύναµις], moment A (potency)
  2. Energéia [ἐνέργεια], moment B (act)
  3. Entelékheia [ἐντελέχεια], moment C (end, entelechy)

The term act can encompass both moments B and C.

For Aristotle, matter was potentiality, that is, it had the possibility of becoming this or that. But what transformed it into something was the form, the act, which informed it, shaped it.

Thus, predominantly in the work of Aristotle,87 potentiality depends on and is subordinate to act. Potentiality comes into existence through act because potentiality is indeterminate and takes determination through act, which is the principle of being. It is through act that a possibility becomes reality because act is the very reality of a being that was still indeterminate. An example clarifies this well. We have here a shapeless block of clay, but the artist molds it into a human figure, giving it form. The block would be (though rudely exemplified) the potentiality, and the act is the moment when that shapeless clay takes a form. This distinction between act and potentiality remained in Aristotelian philosophy and entered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, for Aristotle, potentiality is passive, incapable on its own of effecting itself; it is inert. Act88 is what propels it, what gives form to potentiality. The artist, in transforming the clay into a realized figure, actualizes the figure, giving form to the clay that, on its own, could not transform into a figure.

It is with Leibniz that the word “potentiality” takes on another meaning in philosophy, the same, in part, that will later be employed by Nietzsche and modern science. For Leibniz, potentiality is an active force, the original source of action, effective causality. "Active potentiality is sometimes taken in a more perfect sense when, besides simple faculty, there is a tendency; and this is how I take it in my dynamic considerations."89 We have already seen that, with Leibniz, the sense of force is different from the classical sense.

Modern physics accepts this understanding. Ostwald says:

It is [...] risky to consider, among these two kinds of energy, only living force as actual energy, that is, real, and to view the other as merely potential, that is, possible but not real [...], [because] it is not legitimate to consider that an energy, which is not real because it is not present, can transform into real energy, and vice versa.

It is now easy to see where Rankine’s mistake was when he considered that energy had two opposing aspects, actuality and potentiality. Each aspect of energy (intensity and extensity) can, in turn, be actual or potential.

An intensity can be actual, and an extensity can be potential. Let us quote Ostwald:

The only legitimate way to understand the words actual energy and potential energy is to view as actual an energy present at the moment considered and as potential an energy that, under the present circumstances, can be formed through the present energy. If we assign to these two expressions the meanings we have just expressed, then the force of tension or energy of distance, which is found in a mass elevated above the Earth, is actual, and the energy of motion it contains is potential; the reverse is true after the fall. For the pendulum, the energy of distance is actual when it is at the top of its course; the energy of motion is actual when it is in its lowest position, and during the oscillations, these two energies constantly exchange their characteristics.

So, in summary: both intensity and extensity can be either actual or potential.

They cannot be both actual and potential at the same instant, and there is a constant oscillation between their actuality and their possibility in every physical event. The applications of this observation to philosophy will be made as we discuss them further.

Referring to intensities, Ostwald expresses himself as follows:

They are by no means quantities in the ordinary sense of the word. When we combine two equal quantities, we obtain, as is known, a double quantity. Now, if we combine two equal temperatures, that is, if we bring into contact two bodies at the same temperature, it does not become double but remains the same. [Thus,] when we indicate the magnitude of a mass, we do not say everything about that mass that can be said of it. If a mass is divided into two halves, these two halves do not differ from each other; each one, therefore, has, as a mass, the same properties as the other.

Thus, homogeneity, externality, or objectivity is what characterizes extensity; and, on the contrary, heterogeneity, internality, or subjectivity seem to engender the process of intensity. Time intervenes in intensity, and we see that modern physics, when dealing with intensity, requires time for its calculations, while it is space that is necessary to measure extensivity.

A quick analysis of all forms of physical energy allows us to distinguish extensity from intensity. Ostwald organized this table:

ENERGIES EXTENSITIES INTENSITIES
Volume Volume Pressure
Form (elasticity) Vector displacement Corresponding force
Weight (or gravity) Weight Gravitational potential
Kinetic energy Mass Velocity squared
Electricity Entropy Electric potential
Chemical energy Mass Affinity
Thermal energy Electric charge Temperature

This is the usual table by Jean Perrin (1870-1942), Urbain, etc.

ENERGIES EXTENSITIES INTENSITIES
Elastic Volume Pressure
Elastic elongation Length Force
Elastic torsion Angle Pair of equal and opposite forces
Mechanical Displacement Force
Kinetic Entropy (changes sign) Absolute temperature
Apermic Momentum Velocity
Surface (capillarity) Surface Surface tension
Electric Charge Potential
Gravitational Mass Potential

Thus, reality is a real existence, dualistic, constituted of two contrary factors, contrary to what Descartes thought. When one of them increases, the other decreases, like entropy and temperature, extensity and intensity of thermal energy.

In macrophysical phenomena, extensity predominatesover intensity. In atomic physics, in microphysical phenomena, intensity predominates over extensity. In psychological facts, intensity has a greater predominance over extensity. Soon, we will see how this understanding will allow us to explain phenomena of thermodynamics and the problems that now form the framework of the theory of relativity initiated by Einstein.

Now let’s examine the effects that the use of these two notions can offer to philosophy and the formulation of “noology.” In extensity, we sense that there is order, homogeneity, homogenization, objectivity, and objectification at the same time, while in intensity, which tends towards itself, there is heterogeneity, heterogenization, subjectivity, and interiorization.

We are faced with the “same” (the similar, the alike) and the “different,” the “distinct.” These are the two aspects of reality that reason and intuition will apprehend differently.

Spatiality is in extensity, just as temporality is in intensity. Extensity is predominantly the field of reason, and intensity is the field of intuition.

There are transformations in nature because there is intensity, for without it, as physicists affirm, there would be no transformation because transformation is the disappearance of one form and the appearance of another. Thus, there is that which varies, which is variant, intensity, alongside that which does not vary, that which is invariant, extensity.

We affirm the complementarity of these two expressions: one requires the other; one is incomprehensible without the other. We will see, when we study dialectics, the sense that modern science gives to dialectics and complementarity. Here, we only want to assert the following: there is no extensity without intensity, nor intensity without extensity in the unfolding of natural events. Not everything is homogeneously pure, nor heterogeneously pure. This is the dialectic of all existence, which is an opposition, but at the same time, a complementarity: one opposite is completed by the other.

Stéphane Lupasco (1900-1988) offers a framework for these two dynamic directions of existence. Here it is:

Extensity Intensity
Identity – homogeneity Non-identity – heterogeneity
Materiality – spatiality
Simultaneity Succession
Permanence and conservation Disappearance and destruction
Invariability, “invariant” Variability, “variant”
Objective extension, exteriorization Subjective development, interiorization
Synthesis Analysis
Causality and determinism Incausality and indeterminism
Affirmation Negation

We want to emphasize above all the dialectical aspect that manifests itself in existence and that our spirit apprehends through the dialectic also of its functions. And the discipline that will study this dialectic, that will characterize the concepts of reason and intuition, that will highlight the influence that the antinomic dualism of nature exerts on the antinomic dualism of the spirit, and that will analyze it through its multiple formations for a general understanding of the development of the philosophical conception of the world, is what we call Noology (from Nous, spirit), the dialectical science of the spirit; founded on the dialectic of existence itself. However, we will not examine it in its metaphysical aspects, but only in its methodological aspects, as we have already said; we will take advantage of it to make it a point of support and reference for the study of philosophy, thus allowing universal thought, in its various phases, to achieve a new systematization that enables us to clarify why some philosophers followed this path and others followed the opposite path.90 We have already spoken of the “indications,” for they will give us a new road to tread. We will now understand why such and such questions were asked, and in clarifying the why of the question, we will also understand the why of the answers, because, although it may seem paradoxical, in every question there is an indication of the desired answer.

The study of the principles of reason and their concepts, such as intuition, will allow us to construct a better scientific view of the world and clarify the genesis of the great global visions of philosophy. Along this path, the themes of philosophy will also acquire a different meaning, and we will be able to delve into them without fear of failures, as we will be armed with valuable tools that will serve us for research. We will see how throughout the history of philosophy, there has always been an attempt to triumph of extensity over intensity, or of one over the other, in order to avoid conflict, the dialogue of antinomies, the dialectic of existence. At times, one was updated while the other was virtualized (we use “virtualize” in the sense of inhibiting), and vice versa. And we will see why philosophy has always remained at an “impasse,” always persisted in being surrounded by antinomies, why it sought to escape conflict through the mere negation of one of the antagonisms. We will see how modern science, following the dialectical path we have studied, managed to penetrate completely new territory and allowed for the possibility of new visions, contrary to those who say that no light would come from science for philosophy. Science, by working inductively, can only be interested in one aspect of reality and could never offer philosophy any new path. Some even thought that all new possibilities for philosophy had been exhausted, that it had already exhausted all solutions. However, by divesting science of the dictatorship of a merely partial view of the universe, it allowed new possibilities to be unveiled.

Thus, science facilitates for philosophy a qualitative leap that takes it to new unknown lands, which we will soon explore.

4. Principles of reason: the principle of identity, the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of causality

All facts of reality are different because there is no identity among singularities. Each being is a singular being. To equalize them, it is necessary to strip them of their singularities.

Here we have João and Pedro. João is a short individual; Pedro is another individual, tall. How will I identify João and Pedro? It is not possible to consider João as Pedro, nor Pedro as João. I need to find in them what allows me to consider them as two. I can identify them as men, and then I will say that Pedro and João are two men.

But if there is a young woman among them and I want to include her in the same “identity,” how will I identify the young woman with them? As men, it is impossible because she is a woman. As a person, yes, because I can say that there are three people. Let’s say that with the young woman, there is a little dog. And if I want to “identify” the dog with them, should I call them four people? Impossible. I will have to call them living beings, and then I will say that there are four living beings. But there is also a bench where they sit, and if I want to “identify” the bench with them, I will have to call them not living beings but beings, and I can say that there are five beings.

This example may seem somewhat crude, but it is clear enough to expose how reason proceeds to order the world.

In the classification carried out by reason, there is a quantitative hierarchy (of extension) that seeks, each time, the most general, until it reaches the supreme concept, the broadest of all, which spreads to the smaller ones, in lesser quantity.

Being is the concept of reason with the greatest quantitative (extension).

It encompasses everything: the bench, the little dog, the young woman, Pedro and João, as well as all beings in the universe, the universe in sum.

Supreme genus, considered gnosiologicaly, is not definable because it can only be reduced to itself, and it can only be said that being is. It is the identity constituted by reason.91

In this hierarchy categorized by reason, values and qualities do not enter, but differences of extension (quantity) do. Thus, Being is the greatest, organic or inorganic beings are smaller, animal beings even smaller, dogs, humans increasingly smaller, and finally Pedro, the smallest, the individual, the singular. Qualities and values are not classified by reason for being qualitatively this or that, but only by the extension that the concept encompasses, that is, by the quantity of beings it includes in its classification. Reason, when classifying, does not seek to delve into what Pedro is or what any of the existing beings are, but only to find what identifies this with that, and that identification, that point of identification, is a point of greater extension. Reason wants to grasp through involvement, not penetration; it does not intuit, it does not go inward, it does not address the singular, but the general, what encompasses, like our vision from the top of a mountain that captures, in a panoramic view, the entirety of the landscape. And as we have seen, reason disregards what varies, what diversifies, what makes different, what differentiates. It keeps stripping things of their singularities to achieve a formal unity, a unity that encompasses all beings. It reduces all the heterogeneity of the diverse to total homogeneity. Reason does not tolerate the irreducible difference; it wants to recognize, it does not tolerate movement, mutability; it seeks stability, permanence, the invariant, the immutable, all the negative concepts of what the world of reality presents to us. Despite all the appearances of things, although they seem to be constantly becoming, it “affirms,” it wants there to be something beneath them that is identical: being. The principle of identity is thus enunciated: “What is, is; what is not, is not.” The principle of identity is not a principle chosen by reason; it is a principle that reflects, that expresses a fundamental necessity, an irresistible necessity of reason, a function of our mind. To think is to unite, but it is more: it is to unify, to make similar, identical. Faced with two different facts, reason unifies them through an identity. It identifies them in another concept, as we have seen. This principle, already examined, is fundamental in formal logic. Reason is satisfied when it compares, when it reduces one to another or to a third; when it identifies.

In this process of stripping away what diversifies, distinguishes, and differentiates, reason abstracts everything from the fact that it cannot identify, clinging only to what it recognizes, to what it can reduce to the already known. Thus, reason proceeds in two ways:

  1. By making similar, it starts from the individual towards the total, supreme unity.
  2. By recognizing the similar, it starts from the supreme unity towards diversity.

Now, the individual is the singular, the different. Reason does not operate with the singular; it generalizes.

The modern philosophy revives the famous controversy of universals under different names. Let’s see: the intellectualists (modern realists) say that the similar is hidden under the different, and that we must seek identity beneath apparent diversities. The anti-intellectualists and also the empiricists (modern nominalists) say that the different is hidden under the similar and strive to lift the veil that covers things and binds them externally, in order to find the individual characteristics that irreducibly separate them. The rationalists claim that reason sees more deeply because, by separating what is different (appearance, what appears), it penetrates into the homogeneous depths of things, whereas the anti-rationalists argue that reason is carried away by the desire to homogenize, to identify, and does not perceive the deepest, which can only be penetrated by intuition, the irreducible different. Both tendencies accuse each other, calling themselves superficial.

Pascal, with his finesse, classified men as follows: those endowed with l’esprit de géométrie (the rationalists, those who tend to homogenize everything) and those endowed with l’esprit de finesse (the intuitives, those who seek the different).

Thus, there is an interrogation for philosophy: is the similar or the different the foundation of reality?

We have already shown that noologically we have two functions that dialectically process: reason, which actualizes the similar and virtualizes the different; and intuition, which proceeds in reverse. There is both the similar and the different in everything, just as there is extensity and intensity in everything. In extension, all beings are homogenized, and in intensity, they all diversify. Our spirit apprehends both and classifies them, sometimes by the predominance of one, sometimes of the other. A vision that goes beyond reason (rationalistic) and beyond intuition (irrationalistic), and that encompasses both in their reciprocity, in order to construct a concrete (of concretion, of totality) vision of reality with both, would have to be a suprarationalistic position, like ours, which we will have the opportunity to explain further through various themes. There is no pure rationalization or pure intuition: there is only the predominance of one order over the other.

The intelligibility, for reason, is contained in the measure of its identity. The irreducible individual (the singularity spoken of by existentialists) is not intelligible by the reason of rationalists because it only compares, reduces, and what is incomparable, irreducible, is therefore unintelligible. We saw, with Parmenides, how the desire for rational identification led to the extreme of complete, absolute unification, in which all differentiations were denied.

The principle of identity is inherent to reason, and we see it in a series of principles that form the basis of science, such as the principle of conservation of energy, the principle of conservation of force, by Leibniz.

Although they think they establish themselves with these principles in a real cause, they are actually based on a rational cause.

This is the reason why so many philosophers and treatise writers have confused the principle of sufficient reason with that of causality, as we will see next.

In summary: everything that is, is; all beings are. Being is the absolute identity in which all beings are found. Being is homogeneous, identical, unique, perfect. Absolute identity is also absolute singularity because it is irreducible to any other, and all things either participate in it or are not. And thus, the supreme concept that reason constructs in its activity of stripping away singularities, differences, which, from one abstraction to another, would reach the supreme abstraction: Being.92

Let us now examine the other principles of reason: the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of causality.

The principle of sufficient reason is formulated as follows: "nothing exists without a reason for being what it is and not being what it is not". Everything that exists must have a sufficient reason (Leibniz calls it the “determining reason,” and we will see why) for it to be so and not otherwise.

We mentioned that in modern philosophy, there has been a great confusion between the principles of sufficient reason and the principle of causality, which can be stated as follows: “Every phenomenon has a cause.” For Leibniz, both principles are encompassed in what he calls the “principle of determining reason.”

Leibniz made a distinction between cause and sufficient reason. (He was the first to clearly enunciate the principle of sufficient reason.) However, he employed them with little clarity. In the principle of conservation of force, as explained by Leibniz, there is confusion between the principle of sufficient reason and causality, as when he intends to refer to a “real” cause, he actually refers to a “rational” cause.

We know that rationalism has always confused logic with metaphysics. Hegel identified the theory of being with the science of being (everything that is real is rational, everything that is rational is real). He considered the elaborations of reason as data of reality and believed that aprioristic thoughts could yield the same results as sensory experience. These are the reasons for the rationalists' disdain for sensory experience.93 For example, Spinoza considered sufficient reason as the cause of beings and phenomena because he logically deduced beings from the universal Being, recognizing it as the sufficient reason for all beings, thus attempting to establish a cause-and-effect relationship, which is the basis of his pantheism. In Definition III of his “Ethics,” it is written: "By substance, I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it must be formed."94

Real existence is confused here with logical existence. The substance, which is, subsists by the concept that does not need another concept for its comprehension. In the Being, he recognizes the sufficient reason for all beings, which he derives from it, establishing a causal relationship between the Being and beings. However, Spinoza goes further in surpassing this confusion by establishing the necessary nature of Being, while other entities are contingent, modes of Being that can exist or could not exist because they are not necessary. Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Schelling, Hegel, and even Kant himself have also fallen into these confusions, which would require extensive study and analysis.

In all of them, logical cause prevailed over real cause.

Therefore, we must distinguish:

  1. The principle of sufficient reason (purely logical);
  2. The principle of causality.

The first is considered a priori (Kant, for example) and concerns reason (logical reason for some, absolute reason). It operates outside the concrete world, in the conceptual world created by reason; it is the exercise of pure reason, striving to make the real world and the ideal world intelligible (rational). It is an imposition of reason on reality. Therefore, it is transcendental.

Considered a priori, it is included in the innate ideas of Platonism and its derivative schools.

Considered a posteriori, it is a consequence of experience (habits acquired by reason and imposed by necessity on nature). And in this case, it can result from:

  1. Immediate concrete experience: contact of our mind with reality;
  2. Mediate (through) and abstract experience: contact of our mind with its own abstractions.

Analysis of the principle of causality

This principle operates within concrete reality, in direct experience, and sets in motion all the extra-rational resources of the mind: observation, imagination, intuition, common sense. It is immanent to reality (belongs to reality and does not require the intervention of an external agent to manifest itself. It is the opposite, not exclusive, of the transcendental).

As it pertains to experience, it arises from the observation of experience.

It concerns the “real reason,” as some call it, such as action or becoming. The concept of cause is given by experience or intuition.

It is an empirical term that serves to explain a phenomenon preceding a fact, of the same nature as that fact, or an agent producing a being that is at least partially of the same nature as that being. In any case, the idea of cause has something mysterious, veiled, enigmatic, and obscure to reason, like everything that is dynamic, mobile, and mutable. After extensive experience, long observations, the idea of cause appears as something obscure to rationalists.

Reason has appropriated the idea, given it a rational content, made it more fixed, but despite everything, it could not prevent the obscurity from remaining in this idea. And it is this obscurity that serves as the foundation for those who attack the principle of causality (the cause-and-effect relationship), as it was challenged by Hume with seemingly powerful arguments.95

In the “sufficient reason,” it is the rational term whose existence implies the term to be explained. Reason is an abstractor. The sufficient reason for a singular being is its species; the sufficient reason for the reader’s existence is the human species. The species has, as its sufficient reason, the genus. And Being is logically (note well, logically) the sufficient reason for everything that exists. Thus, the sufficient reason has a purely logical existence; it is extratemporal, while the cause is temporal (it occurs in time). The sufficient reason stems from rational thought. It is this that gives it a necessary form to make static reality intelligible, such as the reality of reason, which is fixed, unchanging, non-evolving.

It rationalizes reality, and that is how Hegel understood it.

Characteristics of the principle of sufficient reason

We have seen that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a logical principle, purely rational, powerless against the different and applicable to the similar. Both the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of causality are means of explanation, the only means that satisfy reason, and they are accepted when they provide a “sufficient” explanation of a phenomenon. The sufficient reason is a sufficient explanation, it is enough, it is sufficient.

Let us see the differences between these two principles: “While every cause is at the same time a sufficient reason, not every sufficient reason is a cause.” This difference is of great importance but easily understandable because the sufficient reason orders the world of ideas and reality, while causality only orders the world of reality. The principle of sufficient reason does not precede its product in time because the sufficient reason is not presented before its product. It precedes it in space, it appears earlier in logical intelligence as a principle, not as a fact. In other words, it precedes for intelligence, not for experience and intuition.

It is simultaneous with the consequence; it coexists with it. Because it is simultaneous, it precedes in space and allows reversibility. (Simultaneity and reversibility are conditions of space.) There is no space without simultaneity and reversibility.

In the case of the sufficient reason, simultaneity and reversibility are at least “ideas,” but possessors, therefore, of the characteristics of space (of ideal space), since, as we have seen, the field of action of reason is spatial. Regarding coexistence, simultaneity, and reversibility, a single example would suffice to clarify everything: man and the human species; one is understandable simultaneously with the other, and it is reversible because I can start from the species to the individual.

The precedence of reason to its point occurs “spatially,” not in “time,” and that is because it appears to intelligence as a principle, not as a fact.

Schopenhauer shows how human intelligence took centuries to realize that a rational concept is not a real principle, that the “reason for being” is not the cause, that logic is not life. But, it should be noted, Aristotle had already realized this.

Schopenhauer classified the principle as follows:

  1. Principle of sufficient reason for becoming (principium rationis suficientis fiendi);
  2. Principle of sufficient reason for knowledge (principium rationis suficientis cognoscendi);
  3. Principle of sufficient reason for being (principium rationis suficientis essendi);
  4. Principle of sufficient reason for action (principium rationis suficientis agendi).

We have:

  1. Knowledge and being, which are of rational origin;
  2. Becoming and action, which are of empirical and intuitive origin.

Schopenhauer, who criticized other philosophers so much, ended up placing these concepts on the same scale. Knowledge and being are indeed of sufficient reason since they are logical causes, not real ones; they are principles of knowledge, not of existence; they are gnoseological principles, not ontological. They are static, obtained by reason at the expense of stripping reality of many of its aspects.96

Becoming and action, on the other hand, are dynamic concepts. They constitute principles of sufficient reason, but weaker than the former because they are intuitive and arise from direct contact with living reality, marked with the potentiality of the real. The difference between the two principles is increasingly characterized, a distinction we emphasize since both are so commonly confused in philosophical works.

The idea of cause originates from real, experimental, and temporal existence. It is the object of all scientific inquiry. It is elusive, obscure, it lies within things, it has the mystery of everything that is dynamic (a mystery because it escapes reason). The cause precedes the effect, and there is no reversibility between cause and effect. It is not necessary, as it can be conceived as contingent. It is irreversible because the cause turns into the effect, flows in time as it becomes the effect, and when we are in the effect, we no longer have the cause as cause but as effect. We have already seen that the condition of time is succession; one instant succeeds another. The same applies to space, as one space coexists with another. The cause occurs in time, it is of a temporal nature, and thus it opposes, without excluding, the sufficient reason, which is normally of a “spatial” nature. The cause in general is in potentiality, and it is in its effect that it passes into actuality, which is why it is obscure to reason, like everything that has potentiality.

This obscurity consists of not being able to “see it,” that is, to fix it, to make it static. Reason fully dominates only what can stop, what can be fixed. Thus, when reason works with concepts of intuition, such as movement, mutability, transformation, etc., it seeks to fix them, and since it cannot make them static, they always have, for reason, a certain obscurity, a mystery.97

Therefore, reason conceives the cause in two ways:

  1. As passive and necessary, in the form of a preceding state or as potentiality developing, realizing, actualizing (in becoming);
  2. As active and contingent, in the form of a producing agent or free force, applied to an object to transform or destroy it, that is, with the idea of action.

In classification, the cause becomes the genus of the effect, and the effect becomes its species. Reason makes the real cause a logical cause. And it does so because, as a logical cause, it is clearer, more intelligible than the real cause. Here, the same principle can be applied: “every cause is a sufficient reason, but not every sufficient reason is a cause.”

When the cause becomes the effect, it is called “causa fit effectus” (cause becomes, turns into the effect), and in thiscase, there is no reversibility. There is transformative activity, mutation. When it is said that “causa equat effectum” (cause equals effect), in this case, there is an “identity” and not just an equality, and we have only a logical relation. Today, for the majority, “causa est effectus” (cause is effect) because the genus is the collective name of the species, and the species is the collective name of the individuals, which is only partially valid, as we will see in our other works.

Critique

In addition to the observations already made regarding the confusion between the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of causality, we can make further clarifying comments on this significant topic in philosophy.

The principle of sufficient reason is nothing more and nothing less than the principle of identity itself. When there is truly sufficient reason, there is reversibility, coexistence, simultaneity. Beings are merely modes of Being. Reason identifies one with the others, and it is this identity that constitutes the sufficient reason. In summary, the sufficient reason for a fact consists of what is identical between the fact and the reason for the fact. For example, in science, we see the action of reason trying to impose identity on the principle of causality, as emphasized by Émile Meyerson (1859-1933), who wants to attribute to this activity the character of a necessity of science when, in reality, it is a necessity of reason that imposes it on science. When science seeks the cause, it is not seeking identity but rather the cause.

Reason, by needing to identify, imposes identification on science. It is a serious mistake of rationalists to confuse science with reason. In this case, it would be imposing the a priori on experience and taking away the meaning of the real and intuition, which are powerful aids to it.

The great discoveries of microphysics and subatomic physics reveal aspects that do not fully fit within the aprioristic canons of reason, although they can be rationalized a posteriori.

Over time, reason will seek, in the different and the unspecific, that which identifies it with another known thing, because reason works by reducing the unknown to the known, that is, by identifying what is new, different, with what is similar, the same. Modern discoveries go beyond the realm of reason, such as rational mathematics, and pave the way for a mathematics of intensities, which will inevitably, we believe, be one of the mathematics of the future, just as it was for the Pythagoreans of the degree of perfection (masters).

Reason works under the condition of necessity (we will see in the next point how dear this concept is to it); it fears contradictions because they negate it. It is because humans need a point of support, a security beneath their feet, but they are also adventurers who venture into unknown seas.

Reason provides hope, solidity. Intuition is connected to love for distances, the unknown, nostalgia for the mysterious. Rationalists deceive themselves when they try to aprioristically rationalize reality. Rationalized reality would be nothing more than an act, identical to itself. But reality is also potentiality because it can be, it can become. If reality were only act, it would be completely simultaneous and coexistent, and difference would be impossible. Therefore, potentiality would not be potentiality because it could not be. And potentiality, as the ability to become, can be both identical and necessary, as well as contingent and different. Since this aspect belongs more to metaphysics, its study is reserved for later works in this Encyclopedia. However, it serves to understand that the rationalist view is not the only possible view of reality.

There is another side to this view, which is intuitive. It is through the concretion of both views that we can have a superior vision of the world. By confusing cause with sufficient reason, rationalists arrived at the remarkable absurdity that Being is causa sui, its own cause. And why? Because they could not give it a sufficient reason since there was no genus that included it.98

Being at the top of the pyramid and therefore its sufficient reason and cause, because they confused cause with sufficient reason, it could only be the author of itself, which they solemnly proclaimed. However, the true reason for Being was in the reason that justified it, that necessarily placed it at the end of the cycle of its abstractions, in its eagerness to always reduce the multiple to unity, the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, the compound to the simple.

Reason accepts the real cause, which is a concept born of experience and intuition. It accepts it because it cannot deny it, but it accepts it in order to transform it into sufficient reason, to make it logical.

By transforming the cause into a genus, whose species is the effect, it made it sufficient reason, logical cause. This is the only explanation that satisfies reason because it is a sufficient explanation. And that is why it also makes it necessary because it is sufficient, and it is sufficient because it is necessary.

We have now reached the logical cause of sufficient reason and can identify one with the other. The logical cause is reversible, but the real cause is not. One is spatializing, and the other is temporalizing. Reason examines it, just as reason examines a judgment. It is the mind that actualizes the real cause, which is virtuality, which is potentiality in the Aristotelian sense, to make it actual in the mind, transforming it into a logical cause.

In this way, the mind actualizes it (reason is the actualizing function of the mind). Potentiality passes into actuality, thus transforming from an obscure idea into a clear idea. It identifies, transforms what it did not know into what it already knows. It provides a sense of stability, of the static; it replaces the dynamic with the static. This is the discovery of reason: it uncovers, reveals the obscure to highlight what is clear. (Note how much vision influences reason. The idea of clarity originates from vision. Visual certainty is the certainty we have when we fixate on something.)

With sufficient reason, we do not move from one reality to another reality; we remain in a single existence, in the similar, the alike; in short, in identity. On the other hand, with the real cause, there is a transcendence; we move from the real fact to another fact. Thus, while the principle of sufficient reason is a logical principle, the principle of causality is metaphysical. We said that the principle of sufficient reason is a consequence of the principle of identity, a special form of it, just as the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle are, because all of them tend toward an identification of diversities and a unification of reality. Referring back to what we discussed in classification, it can be said that the principle of identity is reason’s aid for classification. Thanks to our binocular vision, the ability to fix both eyes on an object to visualize it, humans tend toward stability, the static, the stationary, the immobile.

When we want to see something, we need to stop it. This characteristic of human vision (and this is our opinion) has contributed to the formation of a function that fixes knowledge, a fixing function of the mind, which is reason.

Since cause, due to its dynamic aspect, escapes vision because it often goes beyond visual perception, Hume and Nietzsche were able to establish many seemingly powerful arguments against the idea of cause using rational arguments. According to Hume, the idea of cause is merely a belief. Kant, taking advantage of Hume’s criticism, transformed causality into a category, a pure concept of understanding. Causality came to be accepted as a possibility for determining all moments of phenomena in time.99

5. Concepts of reason – Concepts of intuition

The supreme genera are, in terms of hierarchy (conceptually), of different degrees. Some philosophers claim that these genera are aprioristic forms necessary for our thinking. Others consider them innate forms of our spirit, and almost everyone affirms that they are given by experience. These supreme genera will inevitably structure and coordinate our representations. It was in this sense that Aristotle called them categories.

However, Kant observed that time and space were not properly concepts but pure forms of our sensibility.

For the elaboration of concepts, we have seen that two activities are necessary: sensation and intelligence, the latter being dialectically arranged in two functions, which are intuition and reason. There is an antagonism in the functioning of these two processes of our intelligence. Intelligence is considered by Édouard Claparède (1873-1940), Ludwig Klages (1872-1956), and Nietzsche, with slight variations that we can disregard for now, as a means of adaptation for humans, an instrument of adaptation. Instinct, when diverted, “unleashed” (in the case of humans), becomes intelligence because it becomes self-aware.100

As we have seen, our knowledge is discontinuous and cinematic. There is always an element of ignorance in all knowledge; to know is to separate, select, choose. The perception of a difference (and also the intensity of that difference) is the basis of consciousness (this was Stuart Mill’s thought, as well as Bergson’s conception, similarly).

Instinct101, when it becomes self-aware, is intuition for Bergson; reason would be a subsequent development. Instinct has a purpose, it is directed towards an end. But when it reverses and turns inward, reflecting on itself, it becomes selfless. (Let us remember Nietzsche’s opinion on the internalization of man. Unable to fulfill in society everything that his instincts urge him to do, he withdraws into himself, internalizes himself, becomes sick of himself, creating a bad conscience alongside consciousness.)

This opinion about reason being a mere reversal of instinct cannot be accepted because it is not merely an elaboration of instincts. The selective role of life itself, of the organs of the senses, and the accentuation of the dynamism of homologues, which we have already studied, show us that reason has multiple and complex origins and has roots much deeper than many philosophers think. Introverted instinct is a fact of reason, but a cooperating fact that acts predisposingly and is not the only form formally adequate to reason.

In reason, there is the coexistence of many other elements that go beyond instinct. When nervous tension, previously directed outward, introverts and, with the cooperation of many factors, favors the emergence of reason, it reveals itself as selfless, in the sense of the interest that is peculiar to instinct. Reason has a different interest.

According to the general opinion of these authors, when intuition becomes impotent because knowledge of the individual would be an obstacle to life, and life manifests a dynamism towards the homologue, as we have seen, reason arises to better understand. Reason tends toward an end that belongs to the economy of existence itself. From this standpoint, as long as instincts are sufficient, as in lower animals, reason does not arise. When they prove incapable on their own of defending existence, and intuition is insufficient, reason appears and develops simultaneously with the reduction of the potential of instincts and intuition, as is the case with humans. However, we can only investigate this point more deeply in Noology, for we need to know whether reason arises due to the insufficiency of instincts or whether the instincts diminish due to the advent of reason.

Thus, reason serves life, and because it is interested, it has a purpose. If philosophy has always given more value to reason than intuition (especially Western philosophy, which, as we have seen, is speculative, theoretical, and eminently rationalistic), it is because reason offers, presents, and provides greater possibilities than previously thought. It does not offer complete knowledge (and in this, the mystics and irrationalists are right because it does not provide complete knowledge). However, armed with reason, and using it as an instrument of investigation to its ultimate consequences, philosophy could penetrate secure territories, as it did with scholasticism, which knew how to use it. This is why the rationalistic impulse was so predominant in the West, where social and environmental conditions allowed for the blossoming of the rational. If, in the last century and in this one, there has been a wide irrationalistic trend in philosophy, it is not meant to devalue reason, as many believe, but by determining its limits, it seeks to develop the part of intuition that should not be forgotten, as it was after the (partly apparent) failure of the mystical movement.

We have already established the correlation between reason and the sense organ of vision. Reason offers us clarity (nitidus in Latin, clear, lustrous, brilliant). Clear ideas are those that can be seen (the word idea comes from a root that means to see). Clear vision gives us a visibly outlined image, distinctly separated in space, abstracted from the rest that surrounds it. Reason schematizes, separates, gives clarity to the idea, which it also abstracts.102

Thus, we have also shown how spatializing reason is. In order to understand time, we spatialize it, not because we are in space, as Bergson thought, but due to the influence of reason, which “spatializes” in order to better perceive. Reason is therefore interested and utilitarian because it serves life, because it is suitable for the maintenance of life, and because humans, with their more fragile instincts, have developed reason. (This is a naturalistic thesis that has a certain positivity.)

After this exordium, in which we have reiterated many of the points discussed, we can now delve into the concepts of Reason and Intuition and analyze them. Reason, being spatializing (as we have seen, space is the medium of coexistence, simultaneity, and reversibility), is eminently extensist; to use an old expression from classical psychology, it gives us the notion of extensity. Thus, its preferred concepts (basic concepts) are:

  1. Similarity. (We have already thoroughly studied similarity and the path that goes from the similar to the same, from the similar to the identical, which is absolute homogeneity, the maximum abstraction of the abstracting function of reason.)103
  2. Quantity. Materiality and spatiality give us the idea of quantity, which is homogeneous. From there, we have magnitude, number, all genetically visual.
  3. Immutability. Through what flows, what changes, whatis transformed, what is mobile, there must be something immutable, something permanent that is preserved. This concept emerges as a pinnacle of reflection and establishes the principle of identity.
  4. Immobility. Vision needs to fix, stop, reduce movement to a minimum in order to see. The concept of immobility is linked to invariability, to the “invariant.”
  5. Being. The ultimate abstraction of reason, an affirmation of existence (when taken logically).
  6. Eternity. It is necessary to deny time, becoming. Eternity makes all being simultaneous, giving it the attribute of immutability. But rational experience is not sufficient.104
  7. Necessity.
  8. Determinism (causality). In truth, contingency and freedom are unintelligible to reason. The principle of causality connects, welds, provides spatial continuity to facts through the nexus of cause and effect.
  9. Actuality. Becoming is the passage from potentiality (as virtual) to actuality. To contradict becoming, everything is actualized because we only “see” what is actualized. Potentiality is not visible. Hence the position of actualism, which only values what is realized, while everything else is marked with the generic name of possibility. Note that almost all rationalistic philosophies are actualistic. What has been actualized, realized, was inevitable, had a sufficient reason or a cause, which also allows for a justification of what happens.
  10. Space. It is static infinity. It is a consequence of spatiality. It is an abstraction operated on concrete extension. (Vision immobilizes. Reason proceeds by negating the dynamism of differentiation.)
  11. Substance. Reason eliminates from reality the individual, contingent aspects in order to seek what lies beneath, what substands, the unvarying substance, the substratum.
  12. Unity. It is synthesis taken indivisibly.

These are the supreme concepts of reason, as we have summarized based on the works of those who have studied them well, such as Lupasco, Frank Grandjean (1879-1934), etc.

Now let’s look at the concepts of intuition in order to then provide the necessary comments and analysis.

Just as the concepts of reason tend towards fixation, towards a dynamism of extensity, of spatialization, those of intuition tend towards a dynamism of intensity, of temporalization.

  1. Difference. It is the opposite of identity, of homogeneity. It is the heterogeneous. What is not comparable, what is not properly seen, but understood through negation (the non-equal, the non-similar, the non-identical).
  2. Quality. This is not intrinsically seen. We see yellow things, not yellow itself (which is a concept).
  3. Change (mutation). This is given to us by disappearance, by destruction, which is a slow manifestation.
  4. Movement. Vision is cinematic. It captures a series of displacements, a succession of rests, a discontinuous succession. Intuition penetrates into the essence of movement.
  5. Becoming. Becoming is invisible. We only perceive the results.
  6. Time. We posit time as the opposition to eternity (which is not time, where all time ends). Time is outside the visual, and reason cannot comprehend it. Reason negates it through eternity, which, in turn, also cannot explain it. Eternity requires a lived experience that is not merely rational.
  7. Contingency.
  8. Freedom, indeterminism as the internal intuition of uncausation.
  9. Potentiality.
  10. Force. It is dynamic infinity; it is not visible.
  11. Self. It is not spatializing. It is based on affectivity. It is not visible. Its development is subjective, internalized.
  12. Plurality. Multiplicity. It is analysis.

Let us now study these concepts in detail in their antagonism, to further clarify what we understand by Noology, the discipline that studies the functioning of the spirit as intelligence, affectivity, and also in its transintelligible functions, which belong to Metaphysics.

Similarity and Difference

We have already exposed the contemporaneity of the similar and the different. The absolute similar and the absolute different are antinomies. The absolute is a concept of reason, while the relative is born from intuition. The absolute similar is the identical, an attribute of Being; the absolute different would be the ineffable, unique individual, as described by the Scotists and existentialists, for example. Both form the two extremes of intelligibility, and one imposes restrictions on the other. How can we understand the individual as an absolute different in the face of the identical? Here, the significance of Nietzsche’s phrase should be noted: “If God exists, I am God”. 105

These are antinomies that complement each other by opposing each other, but without excluding each other, as one needs the other to be intelligible.

They are extremes that “touch” each other. Everything that is different reveals the similar because where there is the different, there is the similar; where we perceive the different, we separate the similar, and vice versa. Thus, when Parmenides affirmed the appearance of Being, he actualized the similar to virtualize (inhibit) the different.

Parmenides highlighted that reason tends to actualize the similar. When reason, in a later elaboration, creates the concept of identity, it is founded on the similar, which is contemporary in every intelligible act because intelligence dialectically elaborates the separation between the similar and the different. 106 To understand is to separate and dialectically complement the rational and the intuitive. Rationalists become excessively abstract, and in our view, they make a huge mistake when they reduce the intuitive, the different, to the similar, that is, when they explain the former by the latter, such as explaining quality through quantity. And irrationalists make a significant mistake when they reduce reason to merely a function of intuition, distorting existence. One does not exclude the other, although they are opposed.

Thus, vision has a field in which it fixes and gives clarity to the object; what is on the margins, what is “marginal,” as it is said in optics, is not fixable, but through it, movements are better captured, while the field of fixation becomes static. Our own vision functions dialectically.

Everything we fix excludes what is marginal to it. A movement is better apprehended with the “corner of the eye,” as is popularly said.

Any slight movement that occurs in this marginal field is immediately perceptible and better than in the central field of fixation. Every act of reflection is a delay. To reflect on something, it must be stopped in relation to others. Those who claim that the similar is not given to us by reality, like Grandjean, are mistaken. Parmenides, and the entire Parmenidean tendency, which is predominant in Western philosophy, had its foundation. The weak point was in excluding the different, the heterogeneous, because it could not reconcile it with the homogeneous. 107

In the multiplicity of appearances, the similar occurs; otherwise, we would arrive at the absolute different for everything. But the similar also demands and implies its opposite, the different; otherwise, we would fall into Parmenidean exaggeration, which has its consequence in Zenon of Elea’s conception. Reason is a complex function but useful for life, and it does not deny instinct. The division of intuition and reason is a dialectic division of the operation of intelligence. Reason is also utilitarian because by preferring the similar (more useful to life than the different), it favors life, which is a selection for homologous beings because living beings tend to return to what they have learned to know and move away from what they are ignorant of.

Only quantities are comparable, and the reason for quality is the quantitative aspect of quality, the degree of intensity, what is quantitatively reducible. I cannot compare one quality with another, a color with a taste, but I can compare a shade of yellow with a “less” yellow shade. We have seen that in quantity, addition “increases”; in quality, it does not. One green plus one green does not make twice as green, whereas one quantitative measure plus another equal measure makes two. I can only compare qualitatively, as in the case of yellow with yellow when there are two specifically equal qualities.

So, what I compare is the quantitative aspect: one object heavier or lighter than another, one yellow more or less yellow than another.

Qualities are heterogeneous. Each forms its own order, its own order, and when we move from one quality to another, we move from one order to another. I do not compare green with heavy, color with flavor. Quantities, like qualities, are incomparable and incommensurable. When I say that a certain color is the result of so many vibrations and quantitatively compare it to another color with a lower number of luminous vibrations, I am only comparing the quantity, the “number” of vibrations, not the quality. One should not argue with aesthetic comparisons that speak of a green sound or a blue sound because they are not comparisons but transpositions, substitutions, metaphors.

Psychophysicists wanted to compare qualities based on intensity, reducing them to extension. Reason prefers quantity. And we will show why.

What “appears” is the quality. 108 We see objects that are yellow, reddish-blue, heavy, light, fast, etc. Quantity is revealed immediately. Reason seeks what is firmer, more solid; not what appears, what changes. It seeks quantity because it allows comparison. I can quantitatively compare a book with a table. I can say that this table is 150 centimeters wide, and the book is 15 centimeters. I can compare the book with the table as quantity and say that the table contains 10 of these books in width. But qualities cannot be compared in the same way. Reason seeks to explain the qualitative through the quantitative. When a rationalist expresses various qualities through a differential equation, they feel as if they have reached the universal mystery.

For reason, becoming is mere displacement, transitivity; dynamism is merely mechanistic. By reducing quality to quantity, reason reduces multiplicity to unity, the different to the identical.

In the case of the mechanical, which we mentioned earlier, reason soon encounters a difficulty. It is that the mechanical requires a mysterious concept for reason, which is force, its sufficient reason. But force surpasses reason; it already demands purpose, another concept that it cannot easily grasp, except through detours that we will examine. 109

Quality, by definition, tends toward the different. Through quantity, reason unites, synthesizes. Émile Boutroux (1845-1921) criticizes what he calls “quantitative rationalism,” which tends to reduce quality to quantity.

[...] The hypothesis of a pure quantity of every quality [...], but what idea can we form of such an object? Quantity can only be a magnitude or a degree of something, and that something is precisely quality… 110

In summary, quantity is incomprehensible without quality. They imply each other. Where there is quality, there is quantity, and where there is quantity, there is quality because they are antinomies.

They are two concepts, one of reason and the other of intuition, which dialectically imply each other. Pure abstraction of quantity, as well as of quality, leads to a “dead end” of reason, as seen in rationalism. Abstractly (separately), both become unintelligible. When considered concretely (dialectically), when considered together, they complement each other. It is another antagonism that complements itself because it is the result of the dialectical functioning of intelligence, as seen in Psychology and General Noology.

Immutability and Mutability (Change)

Rationalists, faced with mutability, sought what did not change, the immutable. Plato conceived the immutable sphere of forms above this world. The sphere of mutability belongs to beings that transform, beings that are sensitive and perishable. Being is immutable, and the degree of immutability gives value to things. The concept of immutability is revealed in opposition to mutability, which is given to us by intuition.

This immutability sought behind everything that exists is the “point of support” sought by philosophers of unconditionality, which we have already discussed. What changes, what undergoes transformation, is something that is ultimately fixed. It is a great vital desire for self-preservation that leads our reason (which in no way denies our instincts) to affirm permanence. Heraclitus was the first among the Greeks to affirm the mutability of everything. But Parmenides' reaction was not long in coming, and this reaction left its mark on all of Western philosophy. Only in modern times, with Hegel, Bergson, William James, Nietzsche, does the theme of mutability return to philosophy. But all of them, ultimately, affirmed something immutable: the supreme law of Idea in Hegel; the “will to power” in Nietzsche; “matter” for the materialists, etc.

What reality reveals to us, thanks to science, is that there is mutability, but this mutability is not equal for all facts.

We cannot conceive an absolute mutability of finite things, nor an absolute immutability. Again, we cannot escape the antinomies, the antagonisms of the two opposing concepts that remain antinomical. We cannot conceive being without becoming, becoming without being. But by understanding both as dialectically antinomical concepts, as elaborated by the dialectic of our mind, we can also understand their complementarity. Faced with either extreme, we encounter an obstacle, which is its “negation.” We can understand being as immutable as being, as form that it is, and not as a turning into nothingness. But this understanding does not exclude the positivity of the mutation of finite entities. Being is always being, even when it is now this, now that.

We cannot understand something as mutable without conceiving it as belonging to something immutable. We cannot break away from the concrete by wielding concepts that are merely abstract. 111

Immobility and Movement

For these concepts, the same arguments already presented can be applied. Ernst Mach (1838-1916) announced a law of the Economy of the Spirit, showing that reason is a coordinating and saving function of the spirit. Reason economically reduces all variability of the differences that intuition provides us, reducing everything to increasingly homogeneous classes.

If we examine the various religions, we will see that the idea of immobility predominates in them, with very few exceptions. The idea of perfection is associated with the idea of immobility. The idea of perfection implies that something is finished, completed, that it has reached its end and no longer varies. It is inconceivable to touch a perfect work, to change it, to make it vary.112 Only the imperfect moves, and various religious conceptions assert the imperfection of things to explain their mobility. Mobility is the attribute of imperfection.

To rationally conceive movement, reason breaks it down into immobile positions, reducing it to a kind of discontinuous immobility, like points of immobility, as a sequence of immobilities amid immobilities.

Aristotle conceives God in himself, as pure act, immobile, eternal, attracting matter by virtue of its absolute perfection, which is potentiality and aspires to actualize itself. Plato has an immobile idea of his world of forms. This is the predominant opinion, and we will not discuss it now, as the Platonic view is different, and quite different, from Aristotelian immobility.113 Today, we are in the era of philosophies of mobility, which we have already discussed. Modern theories of science prefer to affirm a primordial movement rather than rest. Bergson emphasizes that it is easier to understand rest starting from movement than to understand movement starting from rest. We do not agree, and a simple reasoning proves it. If we start from a primordial movement, we can never reach rest, because rest would be the cessation of movement, and its cessation would require one of two things: either the movement would reduce spontaneously or it would encounter an opposing force. It would either diminish on its own or due to an opposing force. In the first case, how would the reduction of movement occur? Through wear and tear, fatigue? It is easily seen that these explanations would be naive because movement could not fail to occur unless there was something opposing it.

In the second case, we would have to admit rest as the coexistent opposite of movement. We cannot remove movement from rest, nor rest from movement. Some philosophers have tried to camouflage one with the other. We could not arrive at the idea of movement without that of fixity. One could argue with relativism: there are larger or smaller movements, and fixity would be just an appearance because everything moves. Mobility is the postulate of contemporary mobile philosophies.

If we only understand and feel movement through its negation – for example, like in a train, we feel the movement more when it stops or at the beginning when it starts – we could never establish an absolute mobility, because we would fall into an absurd abstraction. Every extensive being has movement, but it cannot be absolute, a movement without intervals.

But the reason of rationalists does not understand movement without immobilities, without decomposing it into positions, and these positions imply fixity, place, which always indicates immobility.

Thus, the strange dialogue of the spirit (the dialogue between reason and intuition) continues here. These two concepts are antinomical. Our spirit formulates them as antagonists, but it always reveals that it cannot understand or comprehend them, ultimately, without affirming one through the affirmation of the other, which is their negation. When we actualize movement, we virtualize it by camouflaging the other, and we fall into an incompatibility of reason.

Being and Becoming

In classical philosophy, the idea of Being, the immutable being, the absolute being, perfect, immobile, eternal, reigned supreme. Intuition reveals to us Becoming, the constant coming-to-be of things, the transformations they undergo. But reason seeks, behind Becoming, Being, because in everything that undergoes transformation, there must be something that does not transform, something fixed.

We have already studied the idea of Being, which always arises when reason encounters Becoming. Today, we are in a phase of philosophy in which Becoming predominates, where the idea of Being experiences a temporary setback. But this does not prevent it from returning in the work of philosophers with the same demand that arose in the work of the Eleatics. It is another dialogue. The world of cosmic events leads us, through intuition, to the affirmation of Becoming and, through reason, to the affirmation of Being. But how could we understand and create one or the other if these events did not appear to us as opposites, as antagonists? And when we want to affirm one to deny the other, we inevitably fall into an aporia. To affirm Becoming is to affirm Being. We cannot escape this complementarity when we seek to understand the language of existence.

Eternity and Time

We have already examined the idea of time and seen that for many, it is a kind of internalized space, just as space is externalized time. Many consider time to be a part of eternity, as if eternity were endless time. No; eternity is the opposition of time, the negation of time. Plato said that “time is a movable image of immovable eternity”.114 And this statement is sufficient to understand what rationalists mean by eternity. Time gives us the idea of succession. Between the past and the future, we have the present. Each passing moment replaces the past moment. This is the characteristic that distinguishes time from space because in space, there is accumulation, coexistence. In time, one moment does not coexist with another; one moment replaces the other. We cannot reverse time, make the past become the present and the present become the future. In space, on the contrary, we can measure a body, see it, appreciate it from one side to another because there is simultaneity and reversibility. Well, eternity would be a constant present, a coexistent present in all its aspects: a time in which moments coexist, are simultaneous. In order to understand time, reason needed to spatialize it and thus measure it. Just as time is the field of action for intuition, space is the field of action for reason.

To deny time, which is mutable, elusive and fluid, reason constructed the concept of eternity as the absolute spatialization of time.115

Modern physics needed to include time and create the complex of space-time to understand movement. Ideas of disappearance, destruction, modification, and transformation always imply time. The present makes us desire a present that eternalizes. It is the irresistible desire to live that overwhelms us, this hunger for the eternity of the human being, as it is commonly said. Mystics affirm that through the present, in asceticism, humans commune with eternity in rapid and profound contemplation.

However, the idea of eternity still dominates the human spirit. Spinoza wanted to consider the universe from the perspective of eternity, sub species aeternitatis. Classical philosophy, which is marked by the spirit of Parmenides, is a philosophy of eternity. Even science does not shy away from this spatialization of time when it considers time to be homogeneous in order to distinguish it from the heterogeneous time of psychology. Bergson said that the scientific notion of time was a spatial and distorted representation of real time.116

Necessity and Contingency

We emphasize that, for many philosophers, it is not absolutely necessary that there always be a cause-and-effect relationship between things linked by necessity, as causality is contingent and derived from experience.

The concept of necessity is a rational concept and finds its foundation in experience. The idea of necessity opposes that of contingency. What cannot be otherwise is necessary.

Now, experience shows us contingency, the possibilities for facts to be otherwise. The relationship of necessity established between two terms of a relation is stipulated by reason.

What is necessary cannot be otherwise. We have the impression that all beings could not exist. This book we have here could not exist. All beings have possibilities, and possibility belongs to the essence of everything that exists. Since any being has not only one possibility but many, and only some are actualized, we can admit that, instead of this one, another could have been actualized, which leads to accepting the contingency of events that “occur in this way but could have occurred otherwise.” But if that is the case, reason asks: what is the sufficient reason for it to occur this way and not otherwise?

There must be a reason. And that is necessity. Human beings are creators of possibilities; they dream, imagine, invent. All those who have desired to dominate others have always been necessitarians. Political and religious doctrines, when aspiring to supreme authority, assert necessity, the inexorability of events, which, when transformed into consciousness, prepares humans for bondage. The idea of necessity is essentially rational and is contained in the conceptual chain of reason that we have already studied.

Science, in truth, is not a collection of causes and effects but of laws, which are the expression of a universal and necessary connection between various phenomena. But what do we see today in modern science? We see that the principle of law, as the expression of a necessary connection, is losing its force. Science is beginning to abandon the necessitarian idea of law. Psychology, sociology, biology, little by little, understand that in that concept there was a deeply rationalistic view of necessity. Modern science decisively enters the realm of contingency. It seeks the “invariants,” which no longer have the rigidity of necessity. It is because the concept of necessity, as an abstraction of reason, encounters opposition from existence, which is contingent. The same antinomy presents itself here. One concept is incomprehensible without the other; one limits the understanding of the other. The affirmation of one necessitates the affirmation of the other, which negates it. Only a suprarationalistic view, such as the one we adopt, allows us to comprehend this complementarity, this natural contradiction of existence, which appears to us as necessary and contingent because both concepts only express abstractions of reality. At this moment, when contingentism reassumes its place in modern science, it is strange that unilateral necessitarian doctrines are being formed and sought to prevail.

Determinism, Indeterminism, and Freedom

We will not delve into the long controversy between determinists and free-will advocates here. This problem shifts once we understand that determinism is a concept of reason, derived from its already studied and analyzed principles, while the idea of freedom is given to us by intuition, by direct intuition that each of us has from our own experience.

Goblot, in his Vocabulary, defines determinism as follows:

Doctrine according to which every phenomenon is determined by the circumstances in which it occurs, so that, given a state of affairs, the state of affairs that follows from it necessarily results. 117

In our study of the principle of causality, we examined the concept of cause and effect and their relationships.

The formula of determinism, as we have seen, is cause aequat effectum, cause = effect, or effect = cause, or still: the sum of antecedents = consequent, or consequent = sum of antecedents. But cause and effect occur in time, and here is an important element that modifies everything:

Cause + time = effect;

or sum of antecedents + time = consequent.

We can no longer reverse the formula because time is irreversible, as time is not a static, transportable element.

Thus, there is no qualitative similarity between cause and effect, but only a quantitative similarity. Now, since the reason of rationalists always prefers quantity and wants to reduce everything to it, it believes it can reduce the effect to the cause by equating them. But this equalization is only abstract because, upon closer examination, it also fails, as there is qualitative mutation.

If we say: H₂ + O = H₂O (water), it indeed seems that the second term contains everything that the first one did. Everything that was in the antecedent is in the consequent, qualitatively different. Two molecules of hydrogen with one of oxygen form a molecule of water. But water is qualitatively different. The effect is equal to the cause only quantitatively.

Rudolf Clausius (1822-1888) stated this axiom: “Heat passes from a hot body to a cold body and not in the reverse direction.” 118 Nature as a whole shows us the irreversibility of phenomena. Change occurs in only one direction. We cannot reverse history, and this is the meaning that science and knowledge as a whole embrace today: the recognition of the historicity of everything that happens.

The notion of cause and effect is given by experience, but their necessary connection is given by reason through the principle of sufficient reason that governs the logical world. The principle of identity, when applied to time, gave rise to the principle of causality, this “convenient” working hypothesis, in the words of Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), useful and indispensable as it was for the development of science, which now transcends it to enter a dialectical field that will yield better results, avoiding the false quantitativist interpretation of this principle.

After establishing physical determinism, modern rationalists extended it to the psychological field, which is irreducible to the former. Furthermore, in the field of physics itself, the possibility of establishing some indeterminism is already apparent, and this is important to emphasize.

What does this dialogue between determinism and freedom in psychology and ethics show us, if not the antinomies we have discussed so much?

However, the concept of freedom is not exhausted here solely in the sense of negation of rigid determinism. This theme is now richer and allows for greater penetration into the field of science than many realize, but it cannot be fully addressed in this book.

Actuality and Potentiality

We have seen that potentiality arose with its participation in reality in a world where the actualist view of facts prevailed, as in the Greek world. Traditional metaphysics, with few exceptions, conceived the world as an immutable and eternal block, two concepts of reason and attributes that it grants to total reality. What things are, and how they are, has always been considered reality, while what they can be or could be has not received greater interest from reason.

Thus, the idea of God, for Aristotle, as Pure Act, completely actual, is at the same time the idea of identity and perfection. And imperfect, indeterminate matter is potentiality, which receives from God the form that shapes it, that transforms it into act. The idea of potentiality has always been an obscure, mysterious idea, something that cannot be seen, like act, unintelligible. How can we understand that a seed can transform into a tree without accepting a cause and effect relationship? Potentiality has no extension, no form, no quantity. But how can we conceive reality solely as act when everything that happens is a constant transformation? Therefore, what is, here and now, is not all that is because what is changes, shifts, transforms. Reason cannot comprehend time without spatializing it. Reason also cannot comprehend potentiality (in the Aristotelian sense) without act. Thus, potentiality is subordinate to act, but finite act is incomprehensible without the potentiality to be this or that. Here we are faced with another insoluble antinomy because both are indispensable for the understanding of each other.

Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) sought to overcome this difficulty by conceiving God as infinite act and infinite potentiality. Thus, God is eternity but also being-able-to-be and being-able-to-do, for being omnipotent, for having in himself, infinitely, all power.

This opinion of Giordano Bruno, which he obtained from Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), decisively influenced Spinoza’s conception of the world.

All existence is a dialogue between potentiality and actuality, the mysterious passage from potentiality to actuality, where actuality is the potentiality of another act, and this passage is becoming.

The antagonism between potentiality and actuality reveals the antinomy between the two concepts: actuality, the concept of reason that wants to see, delimit, fix, and wants the realized; and potentiality, which belongs to intuition, which observes, apprehends transformation, passage, mutation.

Space and force

Here is the most important concept of reason: space. And also the most important concept of intuition: force.

We can now highlight the distinction between abstract space, which is a concept of reason, and real space, which is given to us by experience.

The main characteristics that distinguish them were exposed by Grandjean, and we deem it appropriate to reproduce them, as they show us the fundamental differences between the two.

ABSTRACT SPACE REAL SPACE
It is empty. It is full.
The forms are immovable. The forms that inhabit it are movable.
The figures have three dimensions. The figures have four dimensions and perhaps many more.
The figures are clear, defined, distinct, undeformable, perfect, symbolic. The figures are mutable, dependent on each other, transformable, imperfect, and only represent themselves.
The bodies here are all solid. Here, bodies are sometimes solid, sometimes liquid, sometimes gaseous.
The figures here are colorless or of a vague indefinable color. Here, the figures are all colored.
Here is the world of geometry. Here is the world of physics.

Reason, the more it moves away from the concrete, the closer it approaches the truth. Thus, the more it moves away from the singular, from the particular to the general, the closer it approaches absolute reality, supreme reality, Being. This is the thought of the rationalists.

The space of reason, empty space, is nothingness, it is the nothingness in which existences occur. Remove the bodies and you will remove time, and nothing but nothingness will remain. Space is the name that reason gives to nothingness. Ponder well on this statement and you will see how much meaning it holds. Here, we cannot ask you to penetrate with reason, but with your own affectivity, with your deepest affective intuition, because intellectualism and rational intelligence no longer penetrate here. You will feel like a coldness penetrating your being, and that repels you from this nothingness. It will be existence in you that asserts itself. But it is also possible that this nothingness exerts an attraction, overpowering you like a desire not to be. Perhaps some may live this immense contradiction of existence, this struggle of what exists against non-being. And if you live it, you can be certain that you are interpreters, then, in the most tragic moment of existence, and also in the most fruitful for the most extraordinary experiences that philosophy will still offer you.

Leibniz completely modified the old concept of force, from “impulse” to force as “expansion”. The force contained in bodies is also potentiality, but potentiality no longer in the merely passive sense, but in the active sense, as accepted by modern physics. Force is a concept foreign to reason because it is mysterious and hidden. To know it, reason reduces it to its effects, measures them, and spatializes them. But force is not the static instinct of abstract space, but infinite dynamism, the dynamic, intensity in action. With the abstract conception of space, you will reach nothingness. But existence is affirmative. Dynamism (force) affirms. These two concepts oppose each other but complement each other, for you cannot understand the concept of force without the concept of abstract space of reason. We are now faced with another antinomy.

Substance and the Self

We have often talked about substance and the Self.

Here, the antinomy is not as fundamental as in other cases. In our view, there is a point of interference between intensity and extensity. Stripping away all mutable forms, reason constructs the concept of substance, immutable and undisturbed by change, as we have seen. The Self, being deeper, existentially profound, and a spectator of the drama of existence, possesses this substantial character, as exposed in psychology. This is the reason that led us to consider that between substance, as a concept of reason, and the Self, as a concept of intuition, there is a point of interference between extensity inherent to the former and the intensity specific to the latter.119

6. Antinomic dualism as a scientific and philosophical worldview

After the discussions on intensity and extensity, and the analysis of reason and intuition, as well as the antinomy between the similar and the different, we will not dwell on these points that have already been extensively discussed. Instead, we will add some aspects that will allow us to position ourselves comfortably for a deeper analysis of reality.

We have already talked about the selective action performed by life. Every living being is in constant opposition to the environment. There is a selection process, rejecting harmful external elements and capturing beneficial ones, in a complex series of actions that increasingly complement each other as the living being ascends the animal scale. This activity can be mechanical or conscious, driven by blind selection or intelligence. For such activity, the living being possesses analyzing organs, differentiated sensitivities, and heterogeneous acts. Faced with the multitude of stimuli from the environment, the living being undergoes rapid and continuous transformations, and the metabolism of life occurs through the movement of substances, the rejection of others, and the physical and chemical transformations they undergo. In short, there is an extraordinary intensive dynamism, but it is a dynamism of the “whole” – not just the part – of the organic whole that dominates the parts, which leads to a better understanding of the concept of purpose in the future. The living being accepts and rejects based on the whole, not just the part. The living being forms a whole that dominates the parts and determines the direction of the general dynamism. This fact has concerned philosophers and easily led them to justify the acceptance of a “final cause” because such dominance over the part is transparent in every biological phenomenon.

What is observed in living matter? The transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity. A mineral body is homogeneous: limestone, metal, etc.; a living body is characterized by heterogeneity, from the simplest unicellular organism to the complexity of a higher living body. In living matter, there is constant differentiation, complex internal exchanges, indefinite selection, the victory of the strongest at times, the assembly of forces for a common victory, the necessity of opposites, a dual antinomic current of determinism and indeterminism, a constant transition from potentiality to actuality. This dynamic and opposing process of life was rejected by reason until it could be dialectically understood, which is why this oscillation of opposites could not be accepted by the science of the past century.

When the dialectical movement of Schelling and Hegel emerged, along with the metaphysics built after analyzing contradictions, it should not be assumed that the purpose of this movement was to establish or validate the struggle of opposites, the opposition that characterizes every finite existent, and which takes on broader and more intense perspectives in the living phenomenon. Schelling established contradiction in order to resolve it. What is the desired synthesis if not another imperative of reason in its univocal and partial sense, seeking a third term, in immanence, to resolve the opposition?120

All triadic dialectics (i.e., those that accept the third term, synthesis) seek to resolve the conflict by negating it; they tend toward the ultimate victory of identity, the highest abstraction, the supreme state of reason, as we have previously discussed.121 (Hegel could also be considered this way, but we prefer to have reservations in this regard, as we consider him differently from the common view. Hegel’s dialectic is often misunderstood and would require a separate and extensive study that exceeds the scope of this book. We have already conducted such a study, which will be published in the future.)

We have seen that the concept of identity arises as an opposition to heterogeneity, to difference. Faced with a possible difference (as virtuality), identity imposes itself as actuality.

That which exists and desires to remain as such opposes that which desires and can negate itself. If A is the antagonist of B (A being the thesis and B the antithesis), and if A and B unite or merge into C, a transition occurs from non-identity (since A is opposed to B) to identity (since A will identify itself with C and, therefore, with B, which will also identify itself with C). Thus, the antagonism between A and B disappears, giving rise to the identity C, which, as identity, opposes the non-identity of A and B individually. And if non-identity A and B disappear in C, the victory of identity remains, what was identified in both A and B. Synthesis is not a reconciling dynamism of two antagonistic dynamisms but merely one of the antagonistic dynamisms.

In synthesis, there is identification. Therefore, in this case, the antagonism of non-identity, the differentiation between A and B, ends in C. However, this does not occur in nature, as demonstrated by science. In “Dialectics,” we explain what truly happens.

As an individual, the singular living being is differentiated and unstable, a process of identity, constant potential declines, imbalances, and continuous transformations.

It is important to note that the individual breaks the bonds of the species. Each element of the individual represents a negation and a difference in potential, as Lupasco has shown. Intensive heterogeneity passes into action and virtualizes homogeneity. And we will see how this truly occurs. As living beings ascend the animal scale, they break free from the chains of the past, liberating themselves from crude reflexes. The nervous system becomes more complex, intelligence replaces instinct, and a growing multitude of choices emerges. Extensive and heterogeneous aspects (such as tropism and automatism) gradually weaken. Is life not a dialectic impulse, heterogeneous in nature? Here, analytical heterogeneity dominates, along with differences in potential and intensive negation—a constant interplay between the “same” and the differentiated. In the realm of living phenomena, there is a triumph of intensity over extensity. Science, as demonstrated by Woodruf, Sergei I. Metalnikoff (1870-1946), Bodyreff, and others, proves how heterogeneity is the foundation of life, showing how monotony leads animals to insensitivity.

Georges Bohn (1868-1948) shows us that with the loss of heterogeneity, when the organism no longer experiences mutations, and homogeneity begins to dominate, death ensues—a long process in which homogeneity triumphs. In this case, we could perceive life as a constant and intensified struggle between opposing dynamics of homogeneity and heterogeneity. One represents life, the other death. In this struggle, death ultimately triumphs over the individual. Homogeneity prevails. This is the tragic aspect of existence and the antinomistic dialectic. Extensity triumphs over intensity in the object, in the external world, but intensity prevails in the vital, in the subject.

However, atomic microphysics reveals that the dynamic order is reversed in microphysical phenomena, in the subatomic world. Thus, in the physical-chemical realm, homogeneity triumphs, in the vital realm, intensity prevails, and in the realm of microphysics, intensity triumphs once again. The dynamic orders invert. However, in the organic world, this dynamic order differs from what is observed in the microphysical world due to the greater influence of the organic whole over the parts, while in microphysics, this is not equally pronounced. And so, who can say that what dies in us is the mineral that becomes homogenized, and that something, which forms our intensive nervous life, does not surpass this process of homogenization, remaining heterogeneously intensive according to its order of intensity, beyond the mineral, the victorious inorganic, and quantitative homogeneity? Doesn’t this open new perspectives for metaphysics, new possibilities for investigation, which would allow us to establish the survival of the intensive beyond the body as mere mineral?122

Based on the elements offered by the science of the past century, many could argue that our life ends with the death of the body, with the victory of homogeneity over heterogeneity, extensity over intensity. But we ask: in the face of science, in the face of dialectics that enable the observation and study of new forces, of opposing dynamisms, can anyone, based on this science, affirm the conception of the 19th century?

Can anyone today, based on science, possess the conviction that what we are in terms of intensity is perishable only through the victory of mineral, inorganic homogeneity within us, in constant opposition to that which is heterogeneous and intensive, which escapes the narrow measurements of rationalism?

These questions fall within the domain of metaphysics to resolve. For now, we merely wish to present them.

Every living being signifies a “separation within the cosmos,” but this does not imply absolute isolation. This fact is less noticeable in plants, more so in animals, and to a greater degree in humans. Humans excel as beings that separate themselves. This process is dynamic, characterized by growth or decline. It is observed in populations that separate, in tribes, castes, clans, families, and individuals that detach themselves. This process leads to a search for homologues, as seen in the formation of secret societies among young people (primitive tribes), in sexual societies, etc.

This search for homologues in forming groups gives the false impression of a collective spirit of extroversion when, in reality, it is a concentration based on the preference for homologues—a separation from heterologues.

This sociological phenomenon has corresponding counterparts in physics, chemistry, and other fields of knowledge.

The individual ascetic represents the ultimate example of someone who lacks homologues or is rare among them, seeking maximum separation from heterologues. It is the utmost separation, detaching oneself from others to merge with God or, alternatively, to return to the cosmos, not as an integral part but as the cosmos itself, thereby achieving the highest homology.

However, in achieving this homology through separation, it is simultaneously an act of differentiation and similarity. If a person distances themselves from those who are different, it is to assert their own difference and, therefore, seek those who are alike. Yet, this very act increases the differentiation among homologues and between them and those who differ from them. Thus, the search for homologues is an act of opposition; every affirmation of similarity is an affirmation of difference. Vital selection is a process of differentiation through the search for the similar; it is a heterogenization through the homogenization of functions, which, in turn, are heterogenizations among themselves through functional homogenizations, and so on.

Living beings seek the similar to assert and defend themselves. In doing so, they differentiate themselves from the environment because, as they assert themselves, they oppose the environment. Their organic functions repeat and homogenize, but in doing so, they also heterogenize because the homogenization of the anabolic function increasingly differentiates the catabolic function. Each homogenized function increases the heterogeneity of the organism. The homogenization of vision is completely different from that of touch, as is the case with taste, and so on. The homogenization of analyzing organs (the senses of the living being) leads to an increase in the heterogenization of the living being. This is the dialectic aspect that realizes a true division of labor among functions.

Man is a power that encompasses many possibilities within himself, whether they are realized or not.

In his manifestations, man exposes some of his possibilities through points of view, opinions, theories, etc. They may not “resonate” in one era but still have significance in others when the real conditions are favorable. That is why we always find a “precursor” in everything we build, and that is why it is said that “there is nothing new under the sun.” Everything we have and will have already existed in potential in primitive man.

This opinion can lead us to the construction of a “theory of resonances.” Thus, an idea “resonates” only when it encounters real conditions that give it greater significance through the content they provide. These real conditions shape the idea. Predictions, in general, are shaped by the real conditions of an era. How could someone in the Middle Ages conceive of radio except by conceiving of angels or semi-divine forces that would repeat sounds through space?

Examine predictions at any time. The possibility of man flying was predicted in many eras, but it would never have been possible to conceive of the airplane as we have it today in earlier times. The idea could arise, but the real conditions cannot be easily predicted. Therefore, predictions only “resonate” when they find real conditions to become acceptable. Genius has been, in this field, the one who has ideas that find real conditions in the future, ideas that only resonate in the future. In social life, a theory without real foundations cannot resonate. Now add this thought: are the recognized real foundations in one era the only real ones? Are there others unrecognized? In this way, we are faced with a question: are there real conditions that are not properly appreciated? And that are appreciated by small groups, by isolated individuals? In this case, a genius could be recognized in his era by some isolated elements, but he will only have his greatest influence when the real conditions favor the resonance of his ideas. Thus, many opinions, considered baseless, only demonstrate the incapacity of many to “see” those bases. Each human achievement already existed in potential in the previous human, and each achievement expands potential through the creation of new possibilities. If we observe carefully, we realize that man only truly became man by believing in his possibilities.

Man is only man because he knows and believes in his possibilities; he is a creator of possibilities, an actualizer of his possibilities, and that is why he evolves, transforms, and creates. He acts as a “contingentist,” not as a "necessitarian."123 In this way, man is not satisfied with waiting alone. He seeks, intervenes, and wants to transform.

Is wanting also a manifestation of this contingentism, of feeling contingent in man? Wanting something is not believing in a possibility? Is it not seeking to actualize a possibility that exists only as potential? Will, as the capacity to assess values, manifests itself in man because he is conscious of possibilities. Wanting is channeled by will, because wanting is primitive, which is why we also find it in animals. Would there not be a certain differentiation, at least in part, between wanting and desiring in the realm of possibility itself? In wanting, is there not a belief in the real basis of possibility, and in desiring, the recognition of the possibility as less possible?124

When I recognize a possibility through knowledge, my wanting can be more certain, it can be chosen. Could the “freedom” of my wanting be understood as a greater knowledge of possibility? In that case, freedom would be directly proportional to human knowledge. Belief itself would also influence wanting. Stronger belief in a possibility would allow for freer wanting. Thus, we recognize in wanting the conditioning of various elements, various influences, and at the same time, a freedom of choice through the weighing of different possibilities, which is will. Thus, knowledge can make me realize that it is possible to learn a language. I recognize that my knowledge of that language would allow me to enjoy certain advantages of various kinds. Recognizing my possibility of learning it can lead me to choose between studying it or not studying it. My “freedom” is there. I can recognize in this choice the influence of many conditions, such as my preference for study, sympathy for the language, for the literature of that language, the desire to increase my knowledge, etc. But the mere fact of recognizing various possibilities in a future act, the possibility of doing it, already gives me a dialectical, antinomian sense that allows me to establish the foundation of my freedom there. We do not live in a mineral way, but organically and humanly, as possibilities and as knowers of possibilities. That is why man “transforms” his environment, changes it because he accepts that it is possible to change, because he knows that he can change.

Only in this way can we understand why we sometimes accept a transformation, sometimes reject it, and why what was accepted in one era or by one people can be rejected in another era or by another people, why we react against a new idea or accept it, although many diverse factors coordinately influence this behavior, even in social events and their interpretation.

When we accept a possibility and find that the real conditions do not repel it, our belief in that possibility strengthens and can even become obsessive, delusional. Therefore, we do not always act as fatalists.

We can even say that we act less as fatalists and more as contingentists. We can go even further: necessity arises as a concept of reason. It is reason, with its homogenizing tendency, that gives us the idea of necessity.

But our intuition (as Anschauung, as direct and immediate vision of an object of thought currently in the mind and caught in its individual reality) gives us the idea of possibility, of contingency. This is the dialectical aspect of our spirit, antinomic, tragic. A position that captures this antagonistic dualism of our spirit, which is the theme of General Noology, would not be rationalist or irrationalist, but suprarationalist, offering a position “beyond” for man. Believing in possibilities, living them, and recognizing the coordinated conditioning that surrounds us are what allow man to be man and give him the knowledge of his freedom, which is dialectical, hovering over these antinomies, and leads us to reject purely causal explanations, which are still derived from the abstract view of reason and not from the concrete view, as it encompasses the totality of the suprarationalism in which we place ourselves.

We easily observe, in the unfolding of events, two dynamic orders: one order in which intensity predominates, and another in which extensity predominates. Organic phenomena and their subsequent processes are regulated or take place in the first order, the order of intensity, as we see in biology and also in psychology andsociology, which are based on it and irreducible to each other. Thus, qualitatively different phenomena and processes that are based on or require a foundation in the process we call organic present a dynamic order in which factors of intensity predominate.

In inorganic phenomena, that is, in events belonging to the field of physics and chemistry and the disciplines based on them, the dynamic order is reversed, and the predominance that occurs is that of factors of extensity. However, here and now (temporally and spatially), we never encounter a purely intensive or purely extensive happening. Both orders are asymptotes and vary, never reaching a point where one nullifies the other.

In the dynamic order of intensity, the factors coordinate oppositely, and that is why all attempts to formulate laws in sociology and psychology, similar to the laws of the physical and chemical sciences, have failed. Biology itself now abandons the mechanical sense of law. Furthermore, we see that in the physical and chemical sciences, this tendency also intensifies, especially after the work of Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976), and they move towards a pluralistic (quantum) physical conception, thus emphasizing the historical sense, as can be seen in the theme we approach in History.

Another aspect that further demonstrates the difference between the dynamic order of intensity (organic) and the dynamic order of extensity (inorganic) is the phenomenon of extinction and incitation, which appears in the first order and is almost non-existent in the second.

Thus, living bodies are subject to excitement and are excitable, therefore capable of acting in greater proportions to the stimuli received, which is not observed in inorganic phenomena (macrophysics).

Examples can be given, such as the phenomenon of a billiard ball receiving the impact of another, initially having the same force, which is then diminished due to friction, etc., and the excitement provoked in a living being whose reaction can surpass the quantum of the action suffered, such as the pricking of a spirited horse or a spoken word to a man, etc. In the order of intensity, there is the resource of resorting to energetic elements, greater resources. It is also possible to establish excitation in inorganic phenomena (but here already in microphysics).

The fact that man is excitable and acts with greater intensity than the intensity of the stimulus is crucial for understanding our theory of potentiality, in the sense in which we employ it. The repetition of these facts, through attentive influence, makes us believe in our possibilities. Man could never have consciousness of his possibilities, consciousness of what has not yet been actualized, if he had not had the experience that he can act with greater intensity.

The great consciousness of our possibility comes from this, and consequently from praxis, because we come to know our possibilities as we realize them, actualize them. Thus, consciousness of our potential is a product of itself, through the verification we constantly make of its constant action. Therefore, we condition the consciousness of our potential, with its possibilities, to the consciousness we form of our excitement and its acts. Only now is it possible to understand the role of parabolic thymos in the formation of the idea of values, both positive and oppositional.

Thus, man’s capacity to know his own possibilities and those of things allows him to compare what exists in actuality to the virtual idea he forms of that object; that is, he engages in estimation (thymos) by means of comparison (parabola) with the ideal he forms. He performs a parabolic thymos, the source of his evaluations of value, or rather, his appraisals, as the idea of value arises as something in potential in the classical sense, as something that can be actualized or that we can approximate through actualizations.

Before providing an example, it is necessary to explain another important point. The actualization of a value is something variable, although there is a virtual invariant in the value. Historically, a value can be observed in acts and things and have a perfectly historical aspect, but this value always remains virtualized, as something that does not vary, as an invariant.

An example will clarify this aspect: prudence is, as an invariant, “the virtue that makes one know and avoid inconveniences and dangers in time and that makes one know and practice what is suitable in social life,” as defined by a lexicographer. This is the virtual, invariant concept. Historically, it is actualized in various ways. In feudal society, for example, the prudent person is one who arms themselves well and takes precautions to avoid being caught off guard. In bourgeois society, the prudent person does not arm themselves for that struggle but takes care not to be caught off guard in a bad deal or excessive confidence, as Scheler showed.

Thus, prudence as a value exists virtually; as an act, it assumes various historical aspects. This is its variable aspect. Both aspects interfere in the evaluation because someone evaluating an act, historically considered, compares it as an act to the value as virtualization; that is, they compare its variable aspect to the invariant sense to appreciate its greater or lesser adequacy and thus give it the intensity of its value in relation to the value it considers virtually.

Isn’t it because of this aspect that there is so much difficulty in analyzing consciousness of value? If we actualize the variable, historical aspects into acts, the value presents itself to us as fundamentally “material” because its invariant aspect is virtualized, often even inhibited, repelled, concealed, or obscured.

If we actualize its invariant aspect, virtualizing the historical variant, the value loses its material consistency and appears only as value, as something that “is valuable.” We could also, using our conceptualization, call its invariant aspect extensivist due to its static and homogeneous characteristic, and its variable aspect intensivist due to its dynamic and heterogeneous characteristic. Thus, we would fall back into our postulation of asymptotes, recognizing in both aspects their antinomic nature but inseparability, for we could never recognize as a value something whose possibility of actualization we never recognized, nor could we perceive a value in what actualizes itself without some corresponding evaluation.

But another aporia arises here. Aren’t the inventors of new values (and inventors in the sense used by Nietzsche, similar to discoverers) those who “discover” in what actualizes itself the possibility of a possibility, that is, the possibility of establishing a value as invariant, thus as virtuality, allowing, therefore, an unexpected parabolic thymos in relation to the future as well as the past?

Final Note

It should not be assumed that this is the entirety of the notion that can be given of freedom. The theme of freedom, due to its complexity, belongs to metaphysics, and we cannot discuss it here. However, we can emphasize that the antinomic dynamism unprecedentedly underlies a new conception of freedom, as we can still highlight: when we actualize one of the dynamisms, we automatically virtualize the other.

In other words, when we virtualize one, we actualize the other. There is a moment of balance in this action, and it is in this moment that necessity does not surpass contingency, nor does contingency surpass necessity.

At this moment, there is a semi-actualization and a semi-virtualization.

Virtualization balances with actualization, and therein lies freedom, a point of unconditionality.

In every fact, in every logical operation, this moment occurs. Thus, all conditionality is surrounded by unconditionality; all necessity, which is homogeneous, is surrounded by contingency, which is heterogeneous: fleeting flashes of freedom. They are like those regions that Paul Dirac (1902-1984) found in quantum physics-mathematics, which he could only point out as “free will,” inherent in the ultimate particles of matter. Let’s give a somewhat rustic example, but one that may provide an image of what we have said. I am facing a tree in the countryside, a green tree in a landscape filled with mist and diffused light. (Up to this point, I actualize myself and virtualize the tree: I am the subject, the tree is the object.) And I continue: “This tree is green, a light green, and its leaves are laden with dew.” (I actualized the tree and virtualized myself. This transition from my actualization to the actualization of the tree was a true leap, a leap that reveals something about what freedom is.) We can never consider freedom abstractly as a formality. We can only form the concept of freedom in opposition to necessity. I could continue actualizing myself and virtualizing the tree, but now I actualize the tree and virtualize myself. This moment that lies between the virtualization of myself and the actualization of the tree, transitioning from one actualization to another, is a free act. We know it is difficult to understand because it encompasses possibilities and operates with elements that are not rational in a univocal sense, but we want to emphasize that it cannot be properly understood and, above all, experienced (that is, having a lived experience of it) without undergoing and acquiring knowledge of new studies that go beyond the topics of this book.125

7. Mathematical thinking and scientific elaboration of experience – The views of Einstein, de Sitter, Lemaître, and Eddington

Among scientists and mathematicians, there is an evident duality that can be defined as follows: those who seek to discover invariants as the source of all intensities, and those who tend considerably towards intensity, diversity, and multiplicity, without, however, suppressing any of the other tendencies in either group. They merely demonstrate the predominance of one tendency as a temperamental manifestation, to a large extent.

Poincaré, the great mathematician, felt this duality and emphasized it in his famous book Le Valeur de la Science:

"Some [mathematicians] are primarily concerned with Logic [...] Others are guided by intuition [...] It is not the subject matter that imposes one or the other method upon them. Although the former are commonly called analysts and the latter geometers, this does not prevent some analysts from remaining so even when doing geometry, while others are still geometers even when engaged in pure analysis. It is the very nature of their minds that makes them logical or intuitive."126

These minds dominated by reality prevail in science and mathematics. But what is reality? Are cells or atoms that make up our bodies or matter more real than an idea that arises in our mind?127

Is an isolated fact more real or the general comprehension of that fact framed within a concept that includes it?

What do we see in these so-called objective minds if not the domination of extensity? Do they not seek to reduce the captured, the individual, to its extension and fit it into a larger concept of extension?

We need not recapitulate here what we have already studied about intensity and extensity. We need not repeat what has already been discussed. However, to understand mathematical thinking and scientific thought, this duality offers valuable possibilities.

Pierre Boutroux (1880-1922), another famous mathematician, observed that in the entire history of mathematics, there have always been periods when one type or the other predominated, sometimes the analysts and sometimes the synthesizers.

[...] these tendencies that we seek to oppose always coexist, to some degree, during periods of great mathematical activity, not only among scholars from different schools but often within the same individual. Since we distinguish these tendencies in time, we simply mean that one or the other is predominant at a given moment and characterizes the scientific ideal of an era.

Boutroux highlights the period of Greek mathematics, which he calls aesthetic, in which the two tendencies coexisted in an antinomistic dynamism. In the medieval period, the synthetic tendency already emerged amid a heterogeneous era in which an agitated intensity predominated, as the European Middle Ages were far from the static, stagnant era that many describe.

To compose increasingly complex structures from simple elements and thus build, through one’s own industry, the edifice of science using all the pieces—this seemed to be the mission of the mathematician at the time. The creative faculty of the scholar was so exalted in this new period that it transformed from being a means to becoming an end in itself. Leaving the interpretation and application of their theories to practitioners, the mathematicians of the algebraic school attached less value to the theories constructed and the results obtained than to the method by which they were achieved. Their main goal was not to discover new facts but to enhance their creative power and their sources of construction by continually improving their processes.

These two tendencies, which emerge throughout the history of mathematics, engage in a constant struggle, full of victories and defeats, in which one predominates at times and the other at others. Both of these tendencies are necessary for the progress of mathematics, and it is impossible for one to achieve definitive victory over the other, and we know why. The same spirit is observed in science, with either the cold analyst, especially the investigator, or the synthesizer, who gathers facts to construct the theory that identifies them, dominating at different times. How much does science owe to error? How much does it owe to failure? Have not failed experiments become the genesis of new and significant discoveries? What does astronomy show us if not a series of balances and imbalances that motivate the entirerange of celestial bodies that populate space? How could there be stars without there having first been nebulae? And what are nebulae but vast fields of diverse collisions, balances, and imbalances in various forms? From the primordial Chaos, we must grasp two antinomic aspects to understand them, two possibilities, sometimes more or less actual, sometimes more or less virtual, but always antagonistic.

If stars require condensations in the energy of nebulae to be created, those condensations were imbalances at a certain moment.

If the movement within each condensing gas mass had been directed towards the center at every point, a spherical nebula would have eventually resulted, completely motionless. However, the slightest asymmetry in a system of currents would have given each mass undergoing contraction a slow rotational movement at first, increasing as the mass contracted further, due to the principle of conservation of angular momentum. (James Jeans [1877-1946])

This rotation, in turn, scatters cosmic matter. Concentration leads to an accelerated rotational speed, and if the matter is in a liquid state, it breaks into two; if it is gaseous, its lenticular shape flattens further, expelling matter. Through the theory of tides, when stars pass near each other, matter is extracted.

And thus, planets are formed. The imbalance persists. Astronomical bodies disintegrate due to radiation emissions.

The theories formed to explain astronomical phenomena always reveal this dualism, this constant antagonism of balance and imbalance in nature. However, if we set aside these lengthy theories and examine the scientific approach in general, we always see that everything that is variable, ephemeral, and negative is reduced to non-existence. A disturbing agent cannot justify itself. The theories do not explain what the invariant is, just as reason, despite all its efforts, can never define or show what is fundamental to it. Nevertheless, it must assert that only one order, a single order, can constitute the absolute. And science has chosen homogenizing extensity, influenced by the reason of the rationalists, as the basis for explaining the physical-mathematical world.

Science, in general, fights against the a priori to affirm the a posteriori, as we have seen. But what is interesting is that metaphysics, although some metaphysicians and scientists argue otherwise, is a posteriori, while science, by allowing itself to be dominated by extensity, always proceeds a priori. Metaphysics works a posteriori, based on the general cognitive sets from which it emerges, even if it does not seem so, while science always places itself, in the face of reality, under an aprioristic perspective.

Science is based on a universally valid theoretical principle. It is not like philosophy, which has a particularly valid theoretical principle because philosophy questions and seeks knowledge.

Science is based on a universally valid principle because science knows. Alongside these, we can place Religion, which believes.128

To provide a quick and clear, yet profound explanation of the theory of science, we want to analyze it in its epistemological foundations, utilizing everything we have already studied and also employing our method, which we are certain will yield significant benefits. While we cannot delve into the entirety of this subject, which would require a larger work, by employing our method, we can demonstrate how it is possible to analyze the theoretical foundations of science, thereby facilitating an illustrative application that will be quite useful for further investigations.

To avoid a historical study of science, which is not feasible given the size of this book, let us establish a framework by dividing it into two distinct phases: a) the pre-relativistic phase and b) the relativistic phase, which we are currently in.

Pre-relativistic science was based on the principle of the geometric homogeneity of absolute space and an absolute time, that is, a homogeneous and invariant succession. With that solid point of reference, it was easy to understand motion and any situation, with only those antinomies of reason, already explained by Kant, threatening it. However, the certainty on which the science of that time relied was a constant promise to overcome such antinomies. In reality, at that time, time had been eliminated in favor of space. Time had a content given to it as an application of geometric extension. In other words, time was reduced to space. Indeed, to say that time was a homogeneous and uniform succession was to accept it as a continuum, whose parts could be experienced infinitely, all identical to each other.

What is significant about this conception?

It directly opposes any heterogeneity that may be insinuated in any part of time. In the notion of absolute space, it is rigorously and absolutely homogeneous, an identity that nothing can disturb. Objects and forms are of extreme variety but are founded on perfect homogeneity, with an identical background that is contrary to any antagonism within it; therefore, they are subject to non-annihilation, to non-disappearance, eternal and constantly the same. Hence, the fundamental laws of this science, such as the conservation of matter, the conservation of energy, and the conservation of force. Space is absolutely simultaneous, an infinity of identity.

As reality shows us solid bodies, more or less solid, rigid, more or less rigid, this science, entirely founded on reason and its principles, constructed space with something rigid, absolutely rigid, thus transcending experience to create an idea of simultaneity, of absolute extensity. For this science, to move was to change position.

But change implied the inclusion of time because changing meant moving from one place to another, and this passage, not being simultaneous, required time. However, as time was understood merely as space, it did not disturb the identity that was in motion. Classical kinematics, the science of motion, encountered no difficulties in its foundations. Inertia would be a tendency of identity to maintain itself, and although Antoine Henri Becquerel (1852-1908) said that “inertia is that tendency of matter to maintain its state of motion,” nothing contradicted this, as these concepts obeyed the rigid principle already accepted by science as fundamental. Consequently, as no modifications occurred in the moving object, which remained identical to itself, motion did not destroy anything, but rather, one identity replaced another. However, to explain motion, whose identity had to remain invariant, it was necessary to accept an element that was the source of these modifications, a cause of these disturbances that, in reality, were apparent, and a mysterious agent emerged, to which the name “force” was given.

This concept was itself identical and acted at a distance without disturbing the identity of the moving object. But force was not acceleration. Acceleration was the result of the force acting on mass, which was an invariable quantity of moving matter.

Thus, force became an abstract cause of acceleration, just as absolute time was the cause of succession.

Therefore, pre-relativistic science was based on extensity, dominated and overwhelmed by it, and fromthe philosophical perspective, it was entirely under the protection of Parmenides' conception, which we have already examined. It was a colossal work of the Reason of the rationalists but completely absorbed within its own domain.

We have seen that the point of reference in pre-relativistic science was a solid point, the homogeneous and absolute space. However, relativistic science would revolutionize all of science by considering this point of reference not as absolute but as relative, no longer homogeneous or firm.

The Theory of Relativity

We know that it is not easy, without the use of mathematics, to explain the theory of relativity, nor could we examine it here, even in its general aspects. But let us try to present it in a way that provides at least some rigorous content.

A famous experiment conducted by Albert Abraham Michelson (1852-1931) in 1881, and later repeated by other scientists, opened up the field for a new conception of space as well as time. A body (which has three dimensions like all bodies) contracts when it is in motion, and this contraction is progressive. When the body reaches the speed of light, it would have only two dimensions. Thus, the mass, which in Newtonian dynamics, in pre-relativistic dynamics, was invariant, becomes a variable quantity in relativity.

A piece of matter will have a mass relative to the reference system and will increase in velocity. This increase is proportional to the velocity. The higher the velocity, the greater the mass increases. While this happens, there is a decrease in proper time. And when the velocity reaches the limit value, which is observed in light, that is, when the piece of matter moves at the speed of light, the mass becomes infinite and the course of time would be suspended. (In reality, this cannot happen because it would require the object to possess infinite energy, and infinite energy is completely contrary to the very concept of energy, which must be limited because if it were infinite, it would negate its own concept.) Let’s take an example: let’s imagine a body that moves through space, whose mass is m, and has a velocity v. As v increases, the velocity, the mass of the body m increases, and time decreases. If we imagine that this velocity is as fast as that of light, the mass would grow infinitely, and time would disappear. An observer would simultaneously see the body at the starting point and at the destination, and the mass would no longer be the invariant accepted by pre-relativistic science. Relativity thus brings mass and energy together; and the principle of conservation of mass and the principle of conservation of energy, which were previously distinct, are based on a new quantity, but relative to the reference system. In this way, the identity of pre-relativistic science disappears, leaving only relativity.

Thus, the prevailing extensivist conception now faces restrictions from another factor, intensity. But this position does not satisfy reason, and many attempts have been made to overcome this uncomfortable situation. It is necessary to find something unique behind everything that changes and moves, something identical to itself. This natural tendency of the human spirit toward identity, the desire for the eternal, the perfect, the absolute, arises because it knows the relative, the intense, the varied, the different. Arthur Stanley Eddington (1882-1944) concludes, after recognizing this impulse of our spirit, that the “substance,” the “nature of things,” remains forever unknown to us. He concludes that heterogeneity resides in the object, in this world that we may never truly know, and not in the subject. However, Einstein disagrees with him. Heterogeneity, the variable, resides in the subject, not in the object. It is in the subject that discontinuity resides, and it is in the subjective that heterogeneous intensity resides.

What can be concluded from this? That both cannot escape dualism, the antagonism of existence, the antinomic dualistic structure of our spirit as well as the spacetime world. By failing to understand that the situation in which the spirit finds itself is a consequence of not considering its dialectical character, as well as the dialectical character of all existence, Eddington, in his book La Nature du Monde Physique, recalling the phrase from Hamlet, "I must confine myself to a nutshell and consider myself the king of infinite space,"129 exclaims: “What is is an envelope floating in the infinity of what is not.” But Eddington’s exclamation is perhaps deeper than he realized, and it goes further than he could have imagined because it is profoundly dialectical in accepting the antinomy of affirmation and negation. This is the reason for the unstable equilibrium of existence, the dynamism of nature itself.

Here comes De Sitter, a great physicist, and he verifies that

the properties of his universe [...] show him [...] that space tends to contract and expand, and that all objects within it tend to move away from each other or approach each other rapidly.

Abbot Georges-Henri Édouard Lemaître (1894-1966), from the University of Louvain, concludes in his recent work that the Universe “is an unstable structure: it could not remain at rest for long, but would immediately start expanding to infinity or contracting until it becomes nothing more than a point.” Abbot Lemaître concludes that the universe is currently expanding but is alternated by phases of contraction.

No matter how hard relativists try, they cannot free themselves from the antinomic nature that constitutes the unstable Universe. And if there is some stability, it can only be conceived as dynamic: a stability as equilibrium of becoming. This is the current situation of science in its theoretical foundations.

Relativity is also based on an antinomistic conception of the universe.

All attempts made so far to overcome it and construct an identical universe have failed.

But a position like ours, which places itself above this dualism and can conceive the universe with this pulsating character, as found by Abbot Lemaître, and can see this pulsation in all existence, this antagonism in all being, opens up a new path for new investigations. It also allows us to view human thought from a higher angle and understand the divergences, and transcend the limitations of a univocal conception. It allows our spirit, by knowing another subtlety, to venture into new territories without fear of confronting them. Thinkers have lived seeking to hide, conceal, consciously or unconsciously, anything that would disturb the sweet tranquility of a homogeneous and stable conception. The new philosophy that is to emerge will no longer fear delving into the jungle of antinomies and will accept them as constitutive of finite existence in order to achieve a broader, more general, and more concrete understanding of reality.130

We have seen, and examined on several occasions, the common tendency in philosophy to reduce time to space or vice versa, and we will not repeat the arguments of one side or the other. We all constantly talk about time and space, yet these are two concepts rich in problems, some of which we have already had the opportunity to address, but we are still far from having examined all aspects.

In psychology, we see that the notion of space has its origin in the sensory world much more than that of time. But there is no doubt that both notions arose from experience and subsequently exerted their shaping influence on experience. Whether we consider them pragmatic appearances of the mind or arising from some unknown principle, a _noumenon, for example, they cannot be detached from experience. The notion of space always has something real about it, while the notion of time always involves something that begins and develops. However, neither time nor space can be directly intuited or perceived. They remain as concepts alongside experience. The most concrete we have of space extends only to mathematical space, which is an abstraction.

The same applies to time, which is an abstract reality like space. Everything that exists corporeally can be a symbol of time because everything has time. However, we cannot go beyond this symbolism. Yet, in our interiority, we feel and live time because all our conscious psychic construction takes place in time. Similarly, in external experiences, space imposes itself without us being able to grasp it. When consciousness is studied in psychology, memory is inseparable from it. Memory includes the acceptance of time; memory reverses the time that has already passed. To remember is to reverse. There would be no consciousness if something did not remain in the mind. Consciousness is “knowledge with” something. Something remains until something new arrives. And when I state that one experience is the same as another I have had before, it is because something from the first experience remains; otherwise, I would not be able to compare. The consciousness of the different arises from the clash between the past and the present. Thus, the experience of the “same” requires an effort of memory. To say that “this” is the same as “that,” I must have the memory of the second to be able to compare them; and when I say they are different, it means the second contradicts the first.

But to grasp the heterogeneous, the different, the varied, only immediate sensation is necessary. To discover the homogeneous, memory must intervene. However, we could never say that direct experience is different if we did not already possess the criterion of the identical and the contrary, the different. If that were not the case, we would never distinguish anything to say that it is heterogeneous. Knowledge of these two notions requires a reverse logical order. Thus, all knowledge, as consciousness requires, demands memory, requires that something remains the same.

The idea of space, as we have seen, is an abstract idea. Space is separated for us from sensory perception. We consider it transcendent to perceptions, and it is where perceptions occur.

Through reason, we consider it identical to itself, always the same. The notion of space is inseparable from memory, a static, immovable memory. As we cannot know space, as it is not something, it is not properly static but rather rendered static by us.

Space is reversible, while time is irreversible. But reversibility is a characteristic of memory. How could we have the notion of reversibility without memory? How could we know that we travel a path and then retrace it in reverse, with an awareness of this reversibility, if there were no memory?

How could we say that one perception is similar, equal, or different from another if we did not have memory?

In truth, we do not perceive “space” itself, but we perceive “in space” or through space. We do not perceive mutation either but the changed thing.

We perceive an appearance and a disappearance, and the identity or difference between one state and another is given by the persistence of that appearance or the force of that disappearance. As for time, we see that we do not apprehend the passing instant, but the passing instant is made known to us through the future and the past that we remember.

When I feel that something appears in my perceptual field, I naturally feel that something disappears. We have already shown that we would not have the notion of time if our perception were continuous. In that case, everything would be given to us as a whole. We would perceive everything. But our senses are limited, selective, and therefore partial and discontinuous; they only capture a part. Where there is perception, there is non-perception; where there is knowledge, there is ignorance. Our consciousness also requires a pause. Our inability to simultaneously grasp everything (hence knowledge is discontinuous) gives us the notion of time. We live continuity through intermittences. Some may say that these intermittences are only apparent. Whether apparent or not, they exist and succeed, but how could they succeed if everything were continuous?

The dynamism of time is a dynamism between being and relative nothingness, between what is, ceases to be, and becomes again. A discontinuity of being is an intercalation of non-being. As our knowledge is discontinuous, disappearance intercalates with appearance, what emerges and what vanishes. This discontinuity gives us the idea of the passage of time, which we later abstract as homogeneous, constant duration through reason. But time is linked to our psyche as a whole, and our subjectivity is time. The concept of disappearance is so intrinsic to the concept of time that we know time as succession: one instant comes and replaces another; it follows another. The passing minute is replaced by another passing minute. One minute does not remain beside another minute. On the other hand, as for space, we feel that simultaneity exists; one space is comprehended alongside another space; we do not conceive of one part of space succeeding another. Thus, time is destructive, transitory, fleeting, while space is conservative, constant, unchanging, and static. We cannot conceive reality outside of these two concepts, which impose themselves on all our objective experience, and yet they are in opposition from which we cannot escape, an antinomy that we cannot fail to recognize.

We talk so much about nothing and represent it as the absence of something, which is why its concept is empty because we cannot have a representation of it, only the representation of the absence of something.

We can eliminate one thing, this room, for example; we accept this room as “nothing,” but we accept this house. Let’s continue eliminating the house, our country, this planet, the solar system, our universe. Up to this point, we can represent these absences, but when we want to eliminate everything, everything, leaving nothing behind, then we feel something within us rebelling. Something in us rejects that absolute nothingness as impossible. It is not only our mind that cannot conceive it, but our very being opposes it. We have the patency of existence.[^136] Both our mind and our being resist it. We cannot accept absolute nothingness. It is an impossibility for us. But we also feel that our reasoning cannot penetrate it; the nothingness eludes us as a concept. This condition of our mind shows us that both the static and the dynamic cannot be absolute. To know, we need to render the fluent static because knowing is actualizing something by stopping it. Our antagonism of space and time, an antinomic and therefore irreducible antagonism, places us between the static and the fluent. It is this very situation that does not allow us to have absolute knowledge or absolute ignorance. To know is to recognize. Recognizing is finding the “same,” the identical, the similar. Nothingness can be conceived in other ways, as we have explained in the Dialectics and other works. Kant said, “We cannot represent to ourselves that there is no space, although we can very well conceive that there are no objects in it.” Indeed, but could this representation we have of space exist without precisely suppressing, through our thinking, the objectsthat are in it? Is it not by eliminating the objects in it that we obtain the notion of space without objects, which is essentially a great emptiness, nothingness?

It is this emptiness that rationalism eventually reaches.

8. Consciousness – The theory of action

The word “consciousness” is generally used to designate two orders of psychic phenomena, distinct from each other, whose characteristics and nature we will study here.

These are the two orders: a) the state of consciousness in relation to unconscious movements, tendencies, mechanisms; b) the totality of psychic life, which includes both conscious and unconscious orders.

We will use the term “consciousness” here, encompassing these two senses, but clarifying, whenever necessary, what it refers to. We have already studied many times the functional dualistic aspect of our spirit: the rational, reflective, intellectualized part, and the intuitive, irrational part.

When intuition predominates in consciousness, the identity, synthetic tendencies of reason pass into the subconscious, without ceasing to exert their influence on intuitive action, because, based on our principle of contemporaneity, there is no knowledge of the singular without the “inclusion” of the general.131 The intuition of an object by the mind, although the mind intuits it, performs a classification, which is already a function of the intellectual part.

A person cannot have singular knowledge without rational aspects; reason is always involved. If I see something for the first time, a new, unknown object, at the same time as I intuit it, I “compare” it to something already known. When reason functions in real objectivity, which cannot do without intuition, and when it is engaged only in thoughts, it never completely departs from the intuitive, which also provides it with thoughts about the singular (images, etc.) to compare, strengthen, corroborate, or oppose a thought process. When we rationally meditate on a moral or political problem, singular mental facts, images of events, isolated observations penetrate through these thoughts, which come to strengthen or refute the opinion we have formed. What does all this show us? It shows us that our mind always functions dialectically. There is not only intuitive thinking. In the first case, in the intellectual part, there is a predominance of the rational, that is, here, in the clash, thoughts based on the principles of reason always prevail, while in the second case, the dynamic order is reversed, and intuitions, the irrational, the different predominate, while the rational is virtualized.

Consciousness is always present when these two powers of our mind are functioning. We find that they are the result of a process of “coordinates,” and the term serves us perfectly well. The “coordinates” of the rational, intellectual function are of a dynamic order with a predominance of extensiveness (since reason is extensive), in a clash of intensive (intuitive) and extensive vectors, with a predominance of the latter, which are actualized; the “coordinates” of the intuitive, irrational function are of an inverse dynamic order, with a predominance of intensity (since intuition is intensive), in a clash of extensive (rational) and intensive vectors, with a predominance of the latter, which are actualized.

Now, it so happens that we are neither pure rational nor pure intuitive. There is an internal dialectic formed by consciousness and unconsciousness. In the field of consciousness, we have the opposition between the coordinates of reason and those of intuition, and within the latter, an internal dialectic.

Individually, individuals differ by the greater or lesser predominance of these functions. There are the intuitives and the rationals, which are subcategories of the larger classifications of typology.

Intellectual consciousness (consciousness with reason) and intuitive consciousness (consciousness with intuition): these are the two orders of consciousness we will study.

In intellectual consciousness, the conflict between the rational and the intuitive reveals the predominance of the former over the latter; the deductive is actualized, and the inductive is virtualized; identity is actualized, and non-identity (difference) is virtualized.

In intuitive consciousness, the opposite occurs.

By intellectual consciousness, we understand the set of states of consciousness and the antagonistic subconscious dynamisms that provoke them (because the coordinates of reason have the contemporary participation of the coordinates of intuition). However, in this consciousness, the entire functioning of the conscious process tends toward the predominance of identity, of the rational, as we have seen.

Intelligence is considered the set of all functions that have knowledge as their object, in the broadest sense of the word (sensation, association, memory, imagination, understanding, reason, consciousness). It is commonly placed in opposition to affective and active or motor phenomena. This is how psychologists generally consider intelligence. Intelligence is not just a part of psychological life, nor is only what is capable of good reasoning considered intelligent. Intelligent is what is capable of actualizing intensity and difference, intuition, among identities, still with the ability to traverse all these coordinates of the mind and experience differentiations, similarities, and syntheses. Therefore, intelligence is not something that can be taught, but is inherent in the individual. The most intelligent person experiences the inner struggle of the diverse dynamism of the mind. They can acquire a method capable of remaining in this conflict, without ever being overwhelmed by one or the other of the mind’s coordinates, and derive from them the concrete sense of reality that they offer. All functions considered part of the mind are studied in Psychology.

Now, let’s focus on some aspects of actional consciousness (volitional), which correlates with intuition.

An observation made between the living phenomenon and the physical-chemical phenomenon, in their various complexities, leads us to a general view of actional consciousness, which we aim to achieve here.

This task allows us a general visualization of what we have already studied in “Psychology” and what we will now study. Although subtle, it is worth making an immediate distinction between action and activity on one hand, and action and passage to act on the other, which are often confused.

In action, psychologically considered, there is an end to achieve, a mission to accomplish, a goal to reach. It arises from a process that “intends” and proposes to accomplish something, and at that moment, this thing is only a possibility, or there is still something that is possible because the goal is still unattained, what it intends to achieve. In every action, there is a passage to act, but this does not define it, because it is not only the passage to act, but also the intention.

Activity is the characteristic of a being that is active.

In the natural sciences, the term “action” is used in a broad sense.

However, we use it within psychology, which previously includes a goal to be achieved, to differentiate it from any “event” where there is the influence of one being on another being. That said, let us recall the studies already conducted on the difference in the dynamic order between living beings and brute beings, between organic and living matter and inorganic, brute matter.

In brute matter, action and reaction are always constant and symmetrical. Every action has a corresponding reaction. This relationship is constant and equal. In living beings, however, physical-chemical action and reaction do not have such a pronounced symmetrical relationship, as the reaction can surpass theaction. That is, the energy expenditure of a reaction can be greater than that of the action and, moreover, variable. A billiard ball, upon receiving the impulse from another ball, will always move in a constant relationship of forces studied in mechanics. A living being reacts in an inconstant or more or less inconstant relationship because in living beings, another more complex set of processes occurs, which we have already discussed: incitation.

As life becomes more complex, the actions and reactions of living beings also become more complex. In every action of a living being, there is a goal to achieve, an end to reach, and therefore, it sets in motion not only the part affected but the entire organic unity that moves, that utilizes its reserves to react. Thus, it exerts a more or less greater impulse without a constant relationship. With the complexity of life, simple action and reaction are replaced by tropism, which is replaced by tactism, which is replaced by instinct, conditioned reflexes, and finally, through intelligence, by will and other aforementioned functions. Thus, as the animal becomes more complex, we see the emergence of a function that deliberates, chooses, and executes, as we have seen in the examples of tactism and instinct, which are always coordinated with an actional function. When a living being reaches the complexity of humans, there is a complete inversion in the order of living nature. Reflexes, which are predominant in lower animals, are replaced but not eliminated in higher beings until humans are reached.

For humans, instincts are no longer sufficient to navigate life; thus, “culture” emerges. Humans need to deliberate, choose, execute, tap into their energy reserves, and organize them into action through will. Their actional life follows an inverse order. As the reactive part of nature decreases, the intellectual part increases. Actional consciousness develops, and humans want and know that they want; they self-stimulate, self-incite.

Some psychologists argue that will is a degraded form of action. Yes, if we consider action only in the sense used by the natural sciences. However, if we consider the germ mentioned by us in every biological action, which is a tendency towards something, a goal to be achieved, we see that this goal grows as life becomes more complex, while action in the purely natural sciences sense decreases and will emerges to replace it, until it reaches the degree we know in humans.132

Will as wanting is the intensively developed goal, which gradually separates from action to constitute, over time, the entire sense of volitional psychology. The regression only pertains to action, excluded from the goal to be achieved, that is, from its telos.133 We have already seen that we understand this end as the domain of the organic whole, as the whole influencing the part, because every living being is first and foremost a unity, and everything that develops within it tends to serve that totality.134

Will is individual, it arises in the individual, it is an emanation of the individual. It arises from an inner conflict (deliberation), it chooses, it transitions (actually determines) into action. This complexity of life, which leads to the development of the volitional part and the reduction of the purely reflexive part of humans, places them entirely in the face of a heterogeneity of possibilities from which they must choose. This “will” has a history within each individual because it does not arise immediately but blossoms, develops through youth until it reaches its highest point in adulthood, and then decreases, ceasing to be itself and becoming habit.

Faced with life, humans, as complex and supremely heterogeneous beings, had to develop their intelligence, organize their functions, classify them, in order to confront life. Will emerges, then, amidst this immense world of possibilities to make a choice. We have already seen that humans are the beings who best know and believe in possibilities, and by being aware of them and believing in them, they have executed, accomplished, created, “cultured” themselves. The world of culture, which belongs exclusively to humans, is the product of accepting possibilities. Will affirms “confidence” in possibilities. That is why children have so many desires—because children believe in every possibility they imagine and want to realize it.

Wanting is this “belief” in the possibility put into action but already under the influence of reason, reasoning, intelligence, studied choice. Will has degrees in terms of the action aspect. And it is these degrees that lend it the qualification of reflective will, intelligent will, and others, which everyday language employs so deeply unconsciously.

When studying vital phenomena, we see that scientists in general consider the living being either a synthetic entity that defends itself or reacts against the chaotic variation of the external environment, or merely an emanation of natural facts, a form in continuity with physical and chemical reality, subject to a determinism as rigorous as that of this reality; a mathematically general determinism.

However, if the living being only participates in the physical and chemical world, how could it turn against it?

In this case, we would have to accept that the physical and chemical world possesses, in its order, a dualistic character: a synthetic interiority and an analytical exteriority in antagonism.

But this is not the conception of scientists in general. Few recognize that the physical and chemical aspect is only one aspect of reality and that science, despite all its objectivity, establishes its objects on abstractions that can only achieve rigorous concretion dialectically.

9. Affectivity

The logic cannot be interested experientially in the affective, when it operates with rigid concepts, homogeneous, such as identity, true, false, etc. What comes from affectivity is full of warmth, dynamism, diversity, heterogeneity, difference. Does logic not eliminate the subject with his life in order to be interested in all that is immutable, stable, rigid, under all this agitated multiplicity of life? What does cold and objective truth have to do with feeling, with emotions?

However, man is this affectivity. They are these sympathetic and antipathetic moments, constant, contrary, because all existence is an alternating passage through these instants, and in each sensation, in each thought, in each act, there is a multitude of small, quick, and fleeting pleasant and unpleasant moments. Nothing would be more eloquent to speak of life than affections. However, what deadly silence is there through the pages of philosophy! Philosophers, as cold, insensitive, marble-like beings, have always studied affectivity as if it were only the rigid and lifeless part of the concept created by reason. Some rare authors dared to penetrate the mystery of affectivity, which many naively tried to explain only through physiology, physical-chemical combinations, the function of our organs, etc.

However, what profound mystery in pain and joy! What diversity, what heterogeneity! Nietzsche said that “joy was deeper than pain because to pain we say 'pass!’, but for joy, we want eternity, deep eternity”. 135

One thing we are all certain of, because we experience it within ourselves, because it overwhelms us, penetrates us: affectivity (pain, pleasure, joy, sympathy, unpleasantness). We live pain, we are pain and joy. Could we say that we have consciousness of pain? No; we have the experience of pain.

We live pain and joy. Is pain just a relative being? Do you feel it as a relation? Do you not feel it sufficient in itself? Do you feel pain without needing anything else to experience it, because you experience it within yourselves, directly, intuitively. It is itself, in itself, it does not transform into something else, it is not a cause of anything, different from itself, it is not related to anything to be what it is. Experimental conditions that accompany it have deceived us, judged as if they constituted it when they only awaken it. An affective state neither denies nor affirms: it is. It is neither contradictory nor non-contradictory. It is. It does not exist in opposition to something else; its existence is not based on a contradiction. It is.

The affective state is a singularity. It is characteristically different from any fact of the external world. We can anticipate pain as a possibility. We can avoid it. We are potentially sufferers, and we know that a life without pain or joy is impossible. The affective state is unique in its existentiality, unrepeatable.

What happens is another new state that our memory allows us to compare with a previous one. But the affective state is intensity, almost pure intensity, and we can understand it as more or less intense. When a pain is absent, we feel joy coming.

After acute pain, its absence brings us joy. But all this does not deny its singularity, because we could not conceive this joy merely as an absence of pain, because it is something that presents itself as it is, because it is, it has positivity, position. It arises with positivity and presence.

Just as logic sought its deepest concepts from affectivity, such as substance, being, absolute, singularity, today, more than ever, the new logic that is forming, essentially dialectical, will have to seek new concepts in affectivity to explain the dynamism of existence, just as philosophy has already sought terms such as pathency, pathos, etc.

When we observe our body, we see that it is the object of our knowledge, but when we feel pain in an extensive part of the body, it is no longer just an object. In fact, it is neither an object nor a subject anymore, and as the pain increases and grows, it overwhelms us, and it ceases to be a body. (In this case, when the pain intensifies to exceptional high degrees, we feel that there is a sharp conflict within us, a struggle, a debate between what feels and what is felt, two opposing fields, but whose position gradually disappears until it is no longer a subject or an object, until everything is just pain.) 136

Affectivity has been a disregarded topic, marginalized by philosophy, studied only from general aspects, but in reality, it offers a new field, a new regional metaphysics, the “metaphysics of affectivity.”

10. Aesthetics and ethics

Aesthetics or theory of beauty

With Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762), the word “aesthetics” took on its current meaning of “theory of beauty.”

Thus, the initial interpretation that arises in Aesthetics is to understand the essence of beauty, which is its object.

If we go back to the Greeks, we see that Plato and Aristotle identified beauty with the good. In the Middle Ages, beauty was of secondary importance, and it remained so until Kant.

With Baumgarten, beauty was still conceived as a kind of vaguely understood perfection. It is with Kant that the distinction between subjective aesthetics and objective aesthetics can be established, a division that marks the predominance of the fundamental idea, as we will see.

For subjective aesthetics, which is a psychological aesthetics, beauty resides in man, it is subjective. Beauty is not in things; it is in man. It is he who lends beauty to things. And since human nature is more or less homogeneous in all men, they can equally feel beauty when imagination harmonizes with understanding. Then we call this object, which can evoke such a state, beautiful.

It is the form of the object that our aesthetic judgment refers to because it is the form that elicits the harmonious interplay of understanding and imagination in us. But this form was not created so that we would find it beautiful. The form of the object is not a purpose, according to Kant.

It is our subjectivity that achieves this harmony, that allows us to call it beautiful.

After Kant, subjective aesthetics conceived beauty as an experience, and this aesthetics has been predominant to this day.

However, one could ask the following question: if beauty is a subjective act, how can we explain that only some objects evoke it? In this case, it must be admitted that the object has something within itself that provokes the aesthetic emotion of beauty; otherwise, all objects would be capable of evoking this experience. Therefore, there must be something in the object. And those who defend objective aesthetics exclaim: there is an experience in beauty, but beauty is not an experience.

Objective aesthetics can be either formal aesthetics or material aesthetics. The first, outlined by Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) and continued by Robert von Zimmermann (1824-1898) and others, establishes the existence of certain beautiful ideas and concepts. When the object agrees with these ideas, with the formal, it is beautiful. In this case, the ideas are beautiful.

Material aesthetics can be apocryphal or authentic.

It is apocryphal when beauty is explained by extrinsic data.

This is how the religious person proceeds when they affirm that the beauty of the world lies in the revelation of the Absolute that created it, or Hegel, who, to define beauty, starts from the Absolute Ideas, which for him are the only reality.

In this way, beauty is the sensible manifestation of the Idea. Apocryphal material aesthetics introduce something else to explain beauty. If it is the revealing of the Absolute, then everything would be beautiful.

Authentic material aesthetics sees in the phenomenon of beauty something that is sui generis, that is typical and cannot be derived from anything else known. Thus, beauty is something typically beautiful. Numerous authors, such as Moritz Geiger (1880-1937), Max Dessoir (1867-1947), etc., seek this original something that is the reason for beauty. However, they have not been able to find the essence of this original something. Currently, however, with Geiger, a trend begins to consider this original something of beauty as its value. Thus, an aesthetics of values emerges as authentic material aesthetics.

Let us now study why the understanding of the various opinions presented is essential to grasp the essence of beauty.

It is accepted that beauty is apprehended immediately, without the need for knowledge or reflection. When we look at a work of art, we perceive beauty, apprehend it without the need for reasoning, and when we gaze at a work that has not yet provoked this emotion in us, we wait until it emerges unexpectedly. Therefore, beauty presents itself to us as something original, as something of a peculiar type. Beauty is not this or that—it is beauty.

Since only some things appear beautiful to us and others do not, there must be something objective about it, not just subjective.

Here arises a point of view that deserves attention: it affirms that beauty is supraindividual. Something sweet is pleasant or not to each individual; it is relative to each individual. Beauty is not relative; it is beauty. It is independent of the individual; that is why not everyone understands it, and that is why there are connoisseurs of beauty.

We cannot say that the beauty of a painting lies in the pigments, nor in the canvas, nor in the frame. That something, which is beauty, is not in the painting; it is an aesthetic value. And it is called a value because it is not a physical entity. Works of art have relations with aesthetic values. Value does not pertain to someone or something; value is valuable. We intuit value through a nonsensory, hence direct, intuition. Consider these terms that express values, such as sublime, vivid, tragic, simple, tension, rhythm, unity, multiplicity, elevation, amplitude, etc.

Many of them are terms drawn from sensory experiences, but they all have aesthetic value.

The means of expressing beauty in a work of art are diverse, such as words, sounds, colors, etc. These means serve to express aesthetic values. And they should be considered merely as means. When an artist transforms them into ends, we then have an inauthentic work of art, which is very common even among great artists. On the other hand, the artist must use them appropriately. There is an immense variety of means of expression and a true order among them.

Before concluding this topic, we would like to recall the application of our method in aesthetics, which can offer new possibilities for integrating the various scattered thoughts in the diverse and numerous works on the subject. It cannot be denied that throughout Aesthetics, we can observe the same antagonism that manifests in extensity and intensity. When the artist exaggerates extensity, they exaggerate the means, emphasize them. Intensity symbolizes the qualitative characteristics of the work of art, what the artist expresses. Aesthetic values are apprehended differently. Sometimes, some people apprehend them intensely, to a greater or lesser degree.

This serves to show that there is relativity, not of the values themselves, but of the contemplator and the creator of the work. Aesthetic values vary historically in terms of their apprehension. What is actualized in one era may not be in another, or it may be to a lesser extent. Thus, we see the historical nature of art itself, which also reflects the soul of an artist, a people, an era. There are values discovered by an artist that only future generations are able to comprehend.

These facts have led many to believe that there is relativity of values when, in fact, there is relativity of the subject apprehending them. Values, as potentiality, already exist in everything, and their actualizations vary historically, as we have observed when studying values.137

Ethics or the Science of Morality

The word “ethics” derives from the Greek word “ethos” [ἦθος], which means custom. However, it is with Aristotle that ethics becomes the science of morality. Morality, in ethics, encompasses both morally good and morally bad.

Regarding the essence of morality, and according to its answers, we can divide ethics into “formal ethics” and “material ethics.”

Kant is the representative of formal ethics. He stated that morality could not be defined based solely on experience. A judgment of universal validity is necessary to affirm whether something is good or bad. Neither good nor bad have anything to do with what is pleasant or unpleasant because what is pleasant can be morally bad, and what is unpleasant can be morally good.

Experience can only provide contingencies and probabilities. In order for morality to be independent of experience, it must be given a priori. There must therefore be a moral law that is valid in any circumstance.

The practical life of man is regulated by a whole class of principles and laws, such as maxims, opinions, etc. These laws are objectively valid; they are imperatives.

Kant divides imperatives into two types: hypothetical imperatives, which are valid under certain assumptions, and categorical imperatives, which are valid without conditions.

As an example of the first type, we have courtesy to please others; as an example of the second, “thou shalt not steal”.138

All moral laws are categorical imperatives, which reside in a prioristic principles.139 Therefore, the moral law can only say: “Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can always hold at the same time as a universal principle”.140

All criticism of Kant’s a priori falls on his conception of morality.

Material ethics can be considered ethics of goods and ethics of values.

Ethics of goods is the one that makes morality dependent on real goods, which are objects valued by humans, or ideal goods, which are ultimate objects of their esteem or aspiration. Therefore, it encompasses everything that allows or assists in achieving those goods or ends.

These include pleasure, happiness, usefulness, culture, strengthening of life, etc.

The main currents of ethics of goods are:

  1. Hedonism,141 which makes morality dependent on sensory pleasure. The Cyrenaics advocated this doctrine, which sporadically appears in the works of some materialistic authors.
  2. Eudaimonism,142 which aims at spiritual happiness, the state of contentment of the soul. This was the doctrine advocated by Socrates.
  3. Utilitarianism, which is the doctrine that defends morality based on the utility or well-being of the individual or the community.
  4. Perfectionism, which asserts that morality lies in the full realization of human essence, in the perfect guidance according to the rational nature of man. This was the opinion of Aristotle.
  5. Naturalism, which advocates the full development of all inclinations and impulses of human nature as moral facts.
  6. Evolutionism, which asserts that the progress of humanity is the determining end of morality.
  7. Religious ethics, which affirms that morality lies in conformity with the will of God, and evil is to rebel against that will.

Another division that can be made regarding ethics of goods is based on the destination given to the goods or ends aspired to: if they tend towards the individual, we have individualism; if they tend towards the community, we have universalism. Individualism is egoism when the acting individual wants to be useful only to themselves, and altruism when they want to benefit others. Thus, there can be altruistic individualism when the desired goods or ends are intended for individuals within the community.

Ethics of goods, in all its tendencies, is criticized because it does not explain morality, as it already accepts it as a given.

As for ethics of values, it is still in its early stages, despite the extensive bibliography and notable studies by Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), etc.

Advocates of this current affirm that an action cannot be good or bad. An action is a psychic or psychophysical process that occurs in a specific place and time. The action transpires; it simply is. And in that being lies its entire reality. It is merely a simple existence that, once passed, leaves no trace. Is the course of a river true or false? Is the blowing wind true or false? These processes simply “are”. The very will of man, according to the proponents of this doctrine, is only a process and nothing more. They are neither good nor bad, just as they cannot be true or false… The good or bad lies in the values, and values do not exist, they “are”. It is these values that such actions depend on in order to be called good or bad in a metaphorical sense. Ethical values do not exist, they “are”. Values are not thoughts because thoughts can be true or false.

We have seen that values are polarized. For every positive value, there is always a corresponding negative value. Only values can be good or bad. A thought is neither good nor bad. And when this is said in common language, it is said metaphorically because being good or bad only applies to values. That is the form of their reality.

This ethics of values, as we have said, is a new current of thought that has not yet borne its best fruits. However, we have outlined the content of this doctrine in general terms for the reader’s understanding.

Let us now examine how scholars of morality consider the origin of the binding force of moral precepts.

From this perspective, ethics can be divided into “heteronomous ethics” and “autonomous ethics”. Heteronomous ethics asserts that the foundation of moral obligation comes from a law external to the individual. According to this view, the will submits to a superior will, whether from God or the State, etc. Autonomous ethics accepts its own laws and affirms that moral obligation must come from the very fulfillment of moral action. This is the position advocated by the majority of ethicists. As for the origin of morality, ethics can be divided into “a priori ethics”, which asserts it independently of experience, such as Kant’s ethics, for example; and “empirical ethics”, which asserts that morality stems from experience. Among the former, we have Socrates, Kant, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, etc. Among those who defend the second position, we have Spencer, Charles Darwin (1809-1882), Morgan, John Lubbock (1834-1913), Adolf Bastian (1826-1905), and many others. A third school, not examined by ethicists, is the “immanent ethics” advocated by Proudhonand further developed by Piotr Kropotkin (1842-1921). According to Proudhon, ethics is immanent to all humans, and there are fundamental principles of intrinsic order in all things, acts, and processes of humans. Kropotkin sought to establish a biological ethics based on mutual support. Bisexual animals need to rely on each other. Humans cannot live in isolation and need their fellow beings. All communal life is a life of mutual support, where individuals must rely on others out of biological necessity.

Therefore, anything that strengthens this support, the union among individuals, and the empowerment of the individual, always for the benefit of the community, is moral. Thus, morality is founded in biology itself. Humans, with their ideas, do nothing more than contradict in the spiritual realm what is taught by biological nature.143

We can now delve into the major themes of philosophy, which are examined in the works that comprise this “Encyclopedia”.

Brief Biographies

The purpose of the brief biographies of the authors covered in this volume is quite modest: it aims to provide the reader with data that allows them to position the author within the intellectual field in which they operate or operated. Here, you will find primarily the period in which the author lived, their nationality, and their area of expertise. The main source of the information presented here is the appendix prepared by Mário Ferreira dos Santos himself and published in Volume IV of his “Dictionary of Philosophy and Cultural Sciences,” with the exception of the names marked with (*). [^168]

Anaximander (610 BC-547 BC): Greek, born in Miletus, disciple of Thales of Miletus.

Anaximenes (588 BC-524 BC): Greek, born in Miletus. According to Diogenes Laertius, he was a disciple of Anaximander.

Arcesilaus (316/15 BC-241/40 BC): born in Pitane (Aeolis). One of the main representatives of the so-called Middle Academy.

Aristotle (~384/3 BC-322 BC): Greek philosopher born in Stagira (Macedonia). Works: “Organon,” “Metaphysics,” “Physics,” “On Generation and Corruption,” “Nicomachean Ethics,” etc.

Bacon, Francis (1561-1626): English philosopher. Works: “Instauratio Magna,” “Novum Organum.”

*Bastian, Adolf (1826-1905): German ethnologist and founding director of the Museum of Popular Art in Berlin.

Baumgarten, Alexander (1714-1762): German philosopher. Professor in Frankfurt. Works: “Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnulis ad Poema Pertinentibus,” “Philosophia Generalis,” “Ethica Philosophica,” etc.

*Becquerel, Antoine Henri (1852-1908): French physicist. Winner of the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1903.

Bergson, Henri (1859-1941): French philosopher. Works: “An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness,” “Matter and Memory,” “Creative Evolution,” “The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.” Nobel Prize laureate in 1927.

Berkeley, George (1685-1753): Irish philosopher. Bishop. Idealist. He sought to consolidate theism through his critique of matter.

Bohn, George (1868-1948): contemporary French scholar of animal psychology. Main works: “La Naissance de l’Intelligence” (1909) and “La Nouvelle Psychologie Animale” (1910).

*Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769-1821): political and military leader during the final stages of the French Revolution.

Boutroux, Émile (1845-1921): French philosopher, professor at the École Normale Supérieure and the Sorbonne. Works: “De Veritatibus Aeternis apud Cartesium,” “Science et Religion dans la Philosophie Contemporaine,” etc.

Bruno, Giordano (1548-1600): Italian philosopher. Works: “Della Causa, Principio e Uno,” “De l’Infinito,” “Universo e Mondi,” etc.

*Büchner, Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig (1824-1899): German philosopher and naturalist. Work: “Kraft und Stoff.”

Campanella, Tommaso (1568-1639): born in Calabria, Italy, belonging to the Dominican Order. Died in Paris. Philosopher, theologian, and poet. Works: “Philosophia Sensibus Demonstrata,” “Philosophiae Rationalis et Realis Partes Quinque,” and “The City of the Sun,” translated into almost all languages.

Carneades (~214-129 BC): native of Cyrene. The thought of Carneades was spread by his disciple Critolaus.

Claparède, Édouard (1873-1940): Swiss psychologist. Scholar of child psychology, hypnosis, animal psychology, psychopathology. Founder of “Archives de Psychologie” (1902). Author of “Psychologie de l’Enfant et Pédagogie Expérimentale” (1905, 6th ed., 1916).

*Clausius, Rudolf (1822-1888): German physicist and mathematician.

Comte, Auguste (1795-1857): French philosopher. He publicly expounded the philosophy of positivism in a course, which was later published in a limited edition under the title “Système de Politique Positive” (later “Treatise on Positive Politics”). Principal work: “Course of Positive Philosophy.”

Darwin, Charles (1809-1882): English naturalist. In his book “Origin of Species” (1859), he studied the nature of instincts. In “The Descent of Man” (1871), he explored the development of intelligence in humans and animals. His psychological work is “The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals” (1873).

*De Morgan, Augustus (1806-1871): British mathematician and logician.

*De Sitter, Willem (1872-1934): German mathematician, physicist, and astronomer.

Democritus (~460 BC-370 BC): native of Abdera. Disciple of Leucippus. Diogenes of Smyrna was one of his indirect followers. Only fragments of his works remain.

Descartes, René (1596-1650): French philosopher. Works: “Discourse on the Method,” “Meditations on First Philosophy,” etc.

Dessoir, Max (1867-1947): German professor who worked in Berlin. Works: “Das Dopples-Ich,” “Psychologische Skizzen,” etc.

Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833-1911): German philosopher, psychologist, historian, and educator. Professor in Basel. Works: “Das Leben Schleiermarchers,” “Über die Einbildungskraft der Dichter,” etc.

Dirac, Paul (1902-1984): British physicist and mathematician.

Eddington, Arthur Stanley (1851-1940): British astronomer who dedicated himself to the philosophy of nature.

*Egger, Émile (1813-1885): French Hellenist.

Einstein, Albert (1879-1955): German physicist. Naturalized American since 1940. Nobel Prize laureate in 1921. One of the founders of the theory of relativity in physics.

Empedocles (~490 BC-430 BC): native of Acragas. Only fragments remain of his books: “On Nature,” “Purifications,” etc.

Enesidemus (1st century BC): native of Knossos (Crete). Professor in Alexandria. Work: “Pyrrohnian Discourses.”

Euclid (~450 BC-380 BC): native of Megara. Disciple of Socrates. Founder of the so-called Megarian school.

Fechner, Gustav Theodor (1801-1887): German professor at the University of Leipzig. Works: “Über das Höchste Gut,” “Elemente der Psychophysik,” etc.

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814): born in Rummenau. Studied theology in Pforta, Jena, Leipzig. Professor at the University of Jena. Works: “Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung,” “Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder sogennante Philosophie,” etc.

Galilei, Galileo (1564-1642): born in Pisa, Italy. Works: “Il Saggiatore,” “Dialogo sopra i Due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo,” etc.

*Geiger, Moritz (1880-1937): German philosopher, disciple of Edmund Husserl.

Goblot, Edmond (1858-1935): French philosopher and logician. Works: “Essai sur la Classification des Sciences,” “Vocabulaire Philosophique,” etc.

Gorgias (fl. 380 BC): notable Greek rhetorician and orator.

*Grandjean, Frank: philosopher from the first half of the 20th century. Author of “Une Révolution dans la Philosophie: la Doctrine de M. Henri Bergson” (Geneva, Librairie Atar, 1916); and “La Raison et la Vue” (Paris, Felix Alcan, 1920).

Hamilton, William (1788-1856): professor in Edinburgh. Representative of the Scottish school. Works: “Discussions on Philosophy and Literature,” “Education and University,” etc.

Hartmann, Nicolai (1882-1950): German philosopher. Metaphysical realist. Most famous work: “Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis.”

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831): German philosopher. Works: “Wissenschaft der Logik,” “Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,” etc.

*Heisenberg, Werner (1901-1976): German physicist.

Heraclitus of Ephesus (~535 BC – 475 BC): Only fragments remain of his works. A key figure of the Ephesian School.

Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776-1841): German philosopher and politician. Works: “Tractatus de Veritate Prout Distinguitur a Revelatione, a Verisimile, a Possibili et Falso,” “De Religione Gentilium Error Umque apud eos Causis,” etc.

*Herodotus (484 BC – 425 BC): Greek historian.

*Hesiod (~750 BC – 650 BC): Greek oral poet.

*Homer (between the 9th and 8th centuries BC): Greek poet, famous for his works “Iliad” and “Odyssey.”

Hume, David (1711-1776): English philosopher. Lived in France. Works: “Essays Moral, Political and Literary,” “Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding,” etc.

Husserl, Edmund (1859-1938): German philosopher. Professor in Göttingen and Freiburg. Works: “Über den Begriff der Zahir,” “Philosophie der Arithmetik,” etc.

James, William (1842-1910): American psychologist. Physician (1870). Professor of physiology and eventually psychology (1889). Considered one of the founders of pragmatism. Works: “The Principles of Psychology” (1890), “The Varieties of Religious Experience” (1902), etc.

Jaspers, Karl (1883-1969): German psychiatrist and philosopher. Main works: “Allgemeine Psychopathologie” (1911) and “Psycologie der Weltanschauungen” (1919).

Jeans, James (1877-1946): British physicist, astronomer, and mathematician. Works: “Physics and Philosophy,” “The Mysterious Universe,” etc.

Jung, Carl Gustav (1875-1961): Swiss psychiatrist. Founder of analytical psychology. Considered libido to be a will to live rather than a manifestation of sexual instinct, diverging from Freud. Major works: “Über die Psychologie der Dementia praecox” (1907), “Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido” (1912), “Psychologische Typen” (1921), and “Die Energetik der Seele” (1928).

Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804): German philosopher. Major works: “Critique of Pure Reason,” “Critique of Practical Reason,” “Critique of Judgment.”

Kierkegaard, Søren (1813-1855): Danish philosopher. Existentialist. Works: “The Concept of Anxiety,” “The Sickness Unto Death,” etc.

Klages, Ludwig (1872-1956): German characterologist. Wrote: “Handschrift und Charakter” (1917), “Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft” (1913), “Persönlichkeit” (1917), and “Prinzipien der Charakterologie” (1910).

Kropotkin, Peter (1842-1921): Russian anarchist. His works form the basis of modern anarchist theory. Works: “Words of a Rebel,” “The Conquest of Bread,” etc.

Lalande, André (1867-1963): French philosopher. Works: “Le Théories de l’Induction et de l’Experimentation,” “La Psychologie des Jugements de Valeur.”

La Mettrie, Julien Offroy de (1709-1751): French philosopher. Identified man as a machine and organized a system of materialistic philosophy and psychology. Wrote: “Histoire Naturelle de l’Âme” (1745), “L’Homme Machine” (1748).

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1716): German philosopher. Works: “Discours de Métaphysique,” “Système Nouveau de la Nature,” “Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain.”

*Lemaître, Georges (1894-1966): Belgian Catholic priest, astronomer, and physicist.

Leucippus (5th century BC): disciple of Parmenides or Zeno and teacher of Democritus. Born in Eleia, Abdera, or Miletus.

*Le Verrier, Urbain (1811-1877): French mathematician.

Littré, Émile (1801-1881): French philosopher. Works: “Análise Raciocinada do Curso de Filosofia Positiva” and “Fragmentos de Filosofia Positiva.”

Locke, John (1632-1704): English philosopher. Works: “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” “Some Thoughts Concerning Education,” etc.

Lotze, Rudolf Hermann (1817-1881): German philosopher. Works: “System der Philosophie” (I. “Logik,” 1874; II. “Metaphysik,” 1879), “Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland,” etc.

Lubbock, John (1834-1913): English scholar of animal psychology. Works: “Ants, Bees and Wasps” (1882), “Sense, Instincts, and Intelligence of Animals” (1888), etc.

*Lupasco, Stéphane (1900-1988): Romanian philosopher who developed a non-Aristotelian logic.

Mach, Ernst (1838-1916): German physicist and philosopher. Works: “Über Umbildung und Anpassung im naturwissenschaftlichen Denken” and “Über das Prinzip der Vergleichung in der Physik.” Founder of Empiriocriticism, a theory based on sensations.

Maine de Biran (1766-1824): French philosopher. Works: “Mémoire sur l’Influence de l’Habitude sur la Faculté de Penser,” “Memoire sur les Perceptions Obscures,” etc.

*Metalnikov, Sergei I. (1870-1946): Russian zoologist, immunologist, and evolutionary biologist.

Meyerson, Émile (1859-1933): French epistemologist, chemist, and philosopher of science. Works: “La Déduction Relativiste,” “Essais,” etc.

*Michelson, Albert Abraham (1852-1931): American physicist.

*Mora, Ferrater (1912-1991): Catalan philosopher.

*Newcomen, Thomas (1663-1729): born in the United Kingdom, inventor of the first steam engine.

Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464): Cardinal of the Church since 1448. Bishop of Brixen since 1450. Works: “De Docta Ignorantia,” “Apologia Dictae Ignorantiae,” etc.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844-1900): German philosopher. Works: “Will to Power,” “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” etc.

Ockham, William of (1287-1347): called “Doctor Invincibilis,” educated in Oxford, England. Belonged to the Franciscan order. Works: “Quaestiones in Octo Libros Physicorum,” “Tractatus Logicae,” etc.

*Ostwald, Wilhelm (1853-1932): German physicist and chemist.

*Papin, Denis (1647-1712): French physicist and inventor.

Parmenides of Elea (5th century BC): Greek philosopher. Main work: “On Nature.” Representative of the Eleatic School. Only fragments of his work remain.

Pascal, Blaise (1623-1662): French physicist, mathematician, engineer, theologian, and philosopher. Works: “Pensées,” “Les Provinciales,” etc.

*Perez, Bernard (1836-1903): French psychologist of the late 19th and early 20th century. Author of “La Psychologie de l’Enfant: les Trois Premières Années” (Paris, Germer Baillière, 1882); “L’Éducation dès le Berceau” (Paris, Germer Baillière, 1880), among other works.

*Perrin, Jean (1870-1942): French physicist. Nobel laureate in physics in 1926.

Pyrrho of Elis (360 BC – 270 BC): Greek skeptical philosopher. Known for the exposition by Sextus Empiricus of his skeptical doctrines.

Pythagoras (died in 500 BC): Greek, originally from Samos. Philosopher, mathematician, with encyclopedic knowledge. Founder of the Pythagorean School, which played and continues to play a unique role in history.

Plato (427-347 BC): Greek philosopher. Works: his famous dialogues. One of the greatest names in philosophy.

Poincaré, Henri (1854-1912): French mathematician.

Protagoras (~480 BC – 410 BC): from Abdera. Philosopher of relativism.

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865): French philosopher. Main works: “The System of Economic Contradictions or the Philosophy of Poverty,” “Organization of Credit and Circulation,” “The Political Capacity of the Working Classes,” etc.

*Queyrat, Frédéric (1858-1926): French psychologist. Author of “Les Caractères & l’Éducation Morale; Étude de Psychologie Appliquée” (Paris, F. Alcan, 1901); “L’Imagination et ses Variétés chez l’Enfant” (Paris, F. Alcan, 1896); and “L’Abstraction et son Rôle dans l’Éducation Intelectuelle” (Paris, F. Alcan, 1893).

*Rabier, Élie (1846-1932): French pedagogue. Professor of philosophy at the Lycée Charlemagne in Paris.

*Rankine, Macquorn (1820-1872): Scottish engineer, physicist, and mathematician.

Saint Augustine (354-430): born in Tagaste (Numidia). Bishop in Hippo. Works: “De Immortalitate Animae,” “De Genesi contra Manichaeos,” “De Magistro,” “De Vera Religione,” etc.

Scheler, Max (1874-1928): German philosopher. Professor in Jena, Munich, Cologne, etc. Works: “Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen Prinzipien,” “Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos,” “Ethika,” etc.

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (1775-1854): German philosopher. Works: “Antiquissimi de Prima Malorum Origine Philosophematis Explicandi Tentamen Criticum,” “Systhems des Transcedentalen Idealismus,” “Philosophie und Religion,” etc.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860): German philosopher. Works: “Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde,” “Über das Sehen der Farben,” “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung” (The World as Will and Representation), his major work.

Sextus Empiricus (2nd century AD): Greek skeptical philosopher.

*Shakespeare, William (1564-1616): English poet and playwright, recognized as the greatest playwright of all time.

Socrates (470/469 BC – 399 BC): teacher of Plato.

Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903): English philosopher. Works: “A System of Synthetic Philosophy,” “Essays Scientific, Political and Speculative,” etc.

Spinoza, Baruch de (1632-1677): Dutch philosopher. Works: “Princípios da Filosofia Cartesiana,” “Tratado Político,” “Ethica,” etc.

Spranger, Eduard (1882-1963): German philosopher. Professor in Leipzig and Berlin. Works: “Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenchaft,” “Lebensformen Ein Entwurf,” etc.

*Stuart Mill,John (1806-1873): English philosopher. Major works: “Principles of Political Economy” (1848) and “On Liberty” (1859).

Taine, Hyppolite (1828-1893): French critic and historian. Professor at the School of Fine Arts in Paris. Works: “De Personis Platonicis,” “Philosophie de l’Art,” etc.

Thales of Miletus (585 BC): Greek. Founder of the Milesian School or School of Miletus. Considered one of the Seven Sages of Greece. The founder, according to Aristotle, of Ionian philosophy, which was concerned with the nature of matter.

Thiry, Paul Henri, Baron d’Holbach (1725-1789): lived in France. Collaborated in the “Encyclopédie.” Main work: “Système de la Nature ou les Lois Monde Physique et du Monde Moral.”

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): Italian, from Roccasecca. Founder of Thomism. Major works: Commentaries on the Books of Aristotle, “Summa contra Gentiles,” “Summa Theologica,” “Quaestiones Disputatae,” “Quaestiones Quodlibetales,” etc.

Uberweg, Friedrich (1826-1871): German philosopher. Work: “Die Entwicklung des Bewusstseins durch den Lehrer und Erzieher,” etc.

Vainhinger, Hans (1852-1933): German philosopher. Professor at the University of Halle. Works: “Goethe als Ideal universeller Bildung,” “Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft,” etc.

*Vogt, Karl (1817-1895): German scientist dedicated to zoology, geology, and physiology.

Volkelt, Johannes (1848-1930): professor in Leipzig. Work: “Pantheismus und Individualismus im System Spinozas.”

*Watt, James (1736-1819): Scottish mathematician and engineer.

Windelband, Wilhelm (1848-1915): German professor who worked in Strasbourg and Heidelberg. Works: “Die Lehre vom Zufall,” “Geschichte der Philosophie,” etc.

Wolff, Christian (1679-1754): German professor who worked in Halle and Marburg. Works: “Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften,” “Logik,” etc.

Zeno of Elea (490 BC-430 BC): disciple of Parmenides.

*Zimmermann, Robert (1824-1898): Austrian philosopher.

  1. Translator’s note: Mário routinely used this word in a sense that includes all North and South Americans, not just U.S. citizens↩

  2. It is considered “universe,” in a naturally philosophical language, the set of everything that exists in time and space.↩

  3. Augustus De Morgan, Formal Logic: Or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable. London, Taylor and Walton, 1847, p. 55. Also see “Universe of Discourse”. In: Ferrater Mora, Dicionário de Filosofia, vol. 4. São Paulo, Edições Loyola, 2004, p. 2953. (Editor’s note.)↩

  4. Explain comes from “ex-plicare,” a Latin verb that means to unfold. “Plicare” means to make folds, wrinkles; “explicare” means to smooth out, to undo, for example, a package, etc.↩

  5. A term widely used in philosophy, which means a known component of a thing. For example, the rational being in man; the quadruped being in the horse; the “having a seat” in the chair, etc.↩

  6. The reference may be the beginning of Creative Evolution, in which Bergson takes stock of the experience of being in temporality. However, a similar discussion can be found in An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. (Editor’s note.)↩

  7. The term Socratics refers to all the disciples of Socrates (Greek philosopher, 470-399 BC) and those founders of schools who developed his ideas.↩

  8. The Greeks called theoria [θεωρία] the rows of inhabitants from different cities who gathered at temples for religious festivals. As they were united by a connection, the word theoria took on the meaning, among philosophers, of a vision that connects a set of facts and explains them.↩

  9. [Philosophical school that endured from the 2nd century AD onwards.]↩

  10. Mário employs “intensity” and “extensity” as technical terms, which he explains further on. (Editor’s note.)↩

  11. [This is extensively examined in the work General Noology.]↩

  12. [From autos (Gr.), self, and telos, end; that is, having its end in itself.]↩

  13. [From heteros (Gr.), other, and telos, end; having its end in another.]↩

  14. [Let us clarify these words: mystic and mystery are words that come from the Greek myo, to conceal; from mythis, that which is silent, that which is not spoken. Mysterium is what is not revealed, what lacks eloquence to say what it is. The mystic is the person who delves into these mysteries, who sees more in facts than the common person. A piece of bread is merely food for the objective person, but for the mystic, when they say that bread is food, they “conceal” what it truly is: the divine essence it contains, the power it offers us, its divine origin, etc. The word myth comes from there and means what can only be expressed through symbols.] [Mário will address this topic again in Treatise of Symbolics. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2007. (Editor’s note.)]↩

  15. [Gogia (Gr.), leading; thus, pedagogue, the one who leads the pedes (Gr.), child; hence, pedagogy.]↩

  16. [From chronos (Gr.), time; and topos (Gr.), place, space. Chronotopic is equivalent to what occurs in time and space.]↩

  17. [From Latin abs trahere: to bring to the side.]↩

  18. [The verb compare comes from Latin comparare, formed from the adjective par, which means equal, similar, thus meaning to place side by side.]↩

  19. The concept of identical (from idem, same) indicates absolute perfection and excludes all difference from its formality. On the other hand, the similar does not. It is true that this term is not used with such rigor.↩

  20. [Antinomy, in the classical sense, is the contradiction between two seemingly true terms.]↩

  21. It was not possible to identify the source of the quotation. (Editor’s note.) [Translator’s note: The editor couldn’t find it, but I found it: the quote is from the entry “Identique” in André Lalande’s “Vocabulaire”.]↩

  22. See: André Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique e Critique de la Philosophie. Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1985, p. 334. (Editor’s note.)↩

  23. [This subdivision is not important and is better clarified in Logic.]↩

  24. [The characteristic of “being another” is called in philosophy by the term alterity and is opposed to that of identity.]↩

  25. In a contemporary edition, see: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Manuela Pinto dos Santos and Alexandre Fradique Morujão. Lisbon, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1985, p. 418 ff. (For reference to other editions, see: A426-B454 ff.) (Editor’s note.)↩

  26. In Concrete Philosophy. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2009, Book I, p. 175-233; Kant’s Three Critiques is an unpublished manuscript by Mário, which we will soon publish. (Editor’s note.)↩

  27. We will see in the future that by seeking the why of this or that mode of philosophizing, we will pave the way for better understandings, which lends some positivity to Proudhon’s thought, despite the exaggerations characteristic of his century. [Pierre Joseph Proudhon, La Révolution Sociale Démontrée par le Coup d’État du 2 Décembre. Paris, Garnier Fréres, 1852, p. 45. The cited translation is by Mário himself. (Note by the editor.)]↩

  28. The characteristic of agnosticism consists of appealing to the Incognizable as a means of explaining nature, which, for agnostics, is the manifestation of a power that we cannot know, but whose nature we still need to explain.↩

  29. Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Théorie de la Propriété. Paris, Librairie Internationale, 1866, p. 213. In a contemporary edition, see: Théorie de la Propriété. Paris, Editions l’Harmattan, 1997. (Editor’s note.)↩

  30. This activity of reason is studied in Psychology and Theory of Knowledge, and its problematic is examined in the books of General Noology.↩

  31. We only apprehend sensibly what is assimilable to the schemas of our sensibility after they have already been actualized, as seen in children. To know, new assimilation is necessary, a re-knowing. In General Noology and in The Treatise on Schematology [an unpublished book by Mário], we examine this point on new grounds.↩

  32. This statement does not imply that reason (rationalitas) is created by intuition. Its actualization in humans is conditioned by intuition, which acts as a predisposing factor, but its emergence is more remote and cannot yet be studied.↩

  33. The concept of substance varies in philosophy and is examined in Ontology and Cosmology. The opinions on the other categories are also discussed in this work.↩

  34. All of these themes, especially those related to categories and abstraction, are addressed in a generic manner in our books Psychology, General Noology, and Treatise of Schematology.↩

  35. We will soon see that this identity consists in the characteristic of a thing being the same in different moments of its existence, for this table or this book do not remain always the same, statically the same, as they present distinctions.↩

  36. A major problematic issue arises here, which would require broader analyses, as examined in the works of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical and Social Sciences. Thus, the formation of the concept, as an abstract-noetic scheme, and its grounding in facts, as well as the problem of universal concepts, are topics that require further studies, which will come in due time.↩

  37. Edmond Goblot, Le Vocabulaire Philosophique. Paris, Libraire Arman Colin, 1901, p. 58.↩

  38. In a contemporary Brazilian edition, see: Henri Bergson, “Thought and the Mover.” Trans. Bento Prado Neto. São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 2006, p. 187. (Editor’s note.)↩

  39. Later, in the “Worldview” section, we will study intuition more extensively.↩

  40. In a contemporary edition, see: Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason.” Trans. Manuela Pinto dos Santos and Alexandre Fradique Morujão. 5th ed. Lisbon, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2001, p. 322 (Second Division – “Transcendental Dialectic”; Introduction – “On Transcendental Appearance,” A 296).↩

  41. “Immanent” comes from “manare,” “to flow within,” that is, what flows within a certain being.↩

  42. This refers only to gnosiological truth, not ontological truth, as the latter belongs to the study of Ontology.↩

  43. The study of knowledge that does not occur within the data of time and space falls within the scope of Noology.↩

  44. See Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason,” op. cit., p. 90 (Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, First Part – Transcendental Aesthetics, First Section, “Of Space,” A23). (Editor’s Note.)↩

  45. Ibid. (Editor’s Note.)↩

  46. In “Theory of Knowledge” and “Kant’s Three Critiques,” we present this opinion of Kant from new perspectives, which would not be appropriate to discuss here.↩

  47. Ibid., p. 93. (Editor’s Note.)↩

  48. In a contemporary edition, see: Henri Bergson, “Creative Evolution.” Translated by Bento Prado Jr. São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 2005, p. 50. (Editor’s Note.)↩

  49. G. W. Leibniz, “Correspondence with Clarke.” Translated by Carlos Lopes de Mattos. São Paulo, Abril Cultural, 1974, p. 439 (Collection “The Thinkers”). (Editor’s Note.)↩

  50. Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason,” op. cit., p. 96-97.↩

  51. In a contemporary edition, see: René Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy.” Translated by João Gama. Lisbon, Edições 70, 1997, p. 47. (Editor’s Note.)↩

  52. Edmond Goblot, “Le Vocabulaire Philosophique.” Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1901, p. 193. (Editor’s Note.)↩

  53. [Solus and ipsis in Latin, alone and oneself: the affirmation of oneself only.]↩

  54. The empiricist-rationalist position of Aristotle, developed in scholasticism due to the extension of its themes, we leave for examination in Theory of Knowledge.↩

  55. As this work aims to introduce the student to Philosophy, it is understandable that we cannot examine this problematic issue here, which arises in the Theory of Knowledge.↩

  56. Philosophy can and _should also be based on universally valid postulates. This is what we demonstrate in Concrete Philosophy. [In a contemporary edition, see: Mário Ferreira dos Santos, Concrete Philosophy. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2018. (Editor’s note.)]↩

  57. In fact, Aristotle considered such works a study of the “transphysical,” but the clarification of this point belongs to Ontology.↩

  58. Monopluralism has many points of similarity to the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception. In our works on metaphysical themes, we will study these points of contact and the variants that arise from them.↩

  59. [Telos, which means end in Greek, hence teleology.]↩

  60. [However, these distinctions are no longer so clear for many today.]↩

  61. [We have already emphasized that the “ontic” refers to the being – while “being”; the forms or structures of the being are called ontic, while those of being are called ontological.]↩

  62. In truth, being, ontologically considered, is not a genus, as we will see in “Ontology,” although the concept of being, logically considered, could, in a certain sense, be taken as a genus.↩

  63. See: Auguste Comte, Course of Positive Philosophy. Trans. José Arthur Gianotti. São Paulo, Abril Cultural, 1978, p. 24 (Coleção Os Pensadores). (Editor’s note.)↩

  64. This indifferent and anecdotal enumeration of facts constitutes the historial. We will see in other works that the term historical offers other meanings that, for now, we cannot study.↩

  65. The study of emerging and predisposing factors (which we do in Logic and Dialectics), when applied to the History of Culture, is examined in our work Philosophy and History of Culture.↩

  66. However, there are sufficient elements for the construction of a historiology, a science of history. This topic is analyzed in Philosophy and History of Culture. From its validity, a new great possibility for man can be expected because his main problems will find a solution when history becomes a science, and thus dominates it.↩

  67. In the “Concrete Philosophy of Values,” we study the main themes of value and the corresponding historical process, as well as propose a decadilectic solution to the problem. Furthermore, in this work, we study the conceptions of scholasticism, which are much more solid than those proposed by so-called modern philosophy.↩

  68. In Theory of Knowledge, in the chapter on “Criterionology,” we analyze the decadialectics of truth to reach concrete, dialectical truth.↩

  69. These gods are merely symbolizations of divine orders that exoterically were not considered symbols but symbolized. We examine this theme more thoroughly in our Treatise on Symbolism. [In a contemporary edition, see: Mário Ferreira dos Santos, Treatise on Symbolism. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2007. (Editor’s note.)]↩

  70. There is no more controversial thought than that about Pythagoras. For him, number is not only quantitative but also qualitative. Later disciples interpreted his thinking differently, as we demonstrate in our other works, especially in Pythagoras and the Theme of Number.↩

  71. There are other proofs, stronger ones, that Being as being is one and unique, as we see in “Ontologia” (Ontology), “O Homem Perante o Infinito” (Man Before the Infinite), and “Filosofia Concreta” (Concrete Philosophy). [In a contemporary edition, see: Mário Ferreira dos Santos, “Filosofia Concreta”. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2018.]↩

  72. Naturally, this refers to the One Being, unique, and not to the being of finite entities.↩

  73. We are not examining medieval philosophy and scholasticism here because, due to the distortions they suffered from their adversaries, they require more careful study, as we do in other books of this Encyclopedia.↩

  74. [Veremos que, não muito distante, no conhecer formal, há a virtualização das singularidades, que são inibidas, separadas, desprezadas, para se captar apenas o que é universal, geral.]↩

  75. A razão, como a pomos aqui, é no sentido do racionalismo moderno, que lhe empresta um valor excessivamente exagerado.↩

  76. [Método – palavra de origem grega que etimologicamente significa procura, busca orientada.]↩

  77. [The word comes from “skeptomai” (σκέπτοµαι) which means "I examine."]↩

  78. In “Theory of Knowledge,” we will examine skeptical theses, reducing them to their true meaning.↩

  79. The concept is preceded by the anteconcept, which is a singularity that is generalized, as studied in Psychology, in General Noology, and in the Treatise of Schematology.↩

  80. It is worth considering that we adopt such concepts according to modern rationalism. The study of their ontological content is done in Ontology and in Man’s Encounter with the Infinite.↩

  81. [From cum prehendere, a Latin expression meaning grasp, dominion, seize.]↩

  82. The study of general dialectics as presented in our corresponding book “Logic and Dialectics” is essential, where Decadialectics (dialectics of ten fields) is specifically presented. As for Logic, in addition to that work, we examined its main themes in “Logical and Dialectical Methods”.↩

  83. See: André Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie. Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1985, pp. 234-35. (Editor’s note.)↩↩

  84. In contemporary edition, see: René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated by Fausto Castilho. Campinas, Ed. Unicamp, 2004, p. 133. (Editor’s note.)↩↩

  85. Edmond Goblot, Le Vocabulaire Philosophique. Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1901, p. 307. (Editor’s note.)↩↩

  86. André Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie. Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1985, p. 399. (Editor’s note.)↩↩

  87. [We say predominantly because there are moments when he thinks differently, and it would not be convenient to analyze here the whole variety of his observations about Act and Potency.]↩↩

  88. [Energéia, a Greek word formed from ergon, work, which means efficiency, achieving an effect.]↩↩

  89. Aristotle divides potency into passive and active. The former is the potency of undergoing determination, while the latter is the potency of being able to bring about determination. In Leibniz, this latter is already inclined to realize—it is already, therefore, in act, in the exercise of act. [Gottfried W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding. Translated by Luiz João Baraúna. São Paulo, Nova Cultural, 1997. (Editor’s note.)]↩↩

  90. Noology, studied as an autonomous discipline, is presented in our book Noologia Geral.↩

  91. We want to emphasize that Being, ontologically considered, is not gender. Rationalism transformed the abstract scheme of being into genus; not ontological being, which we cannot examine at the moment.↩

  92. As absolute identity and as absolute difference, Being surpasses opposites, transcending them. This concept of reason actually transcends reason itself, and its justification belongs to Ontology. In this discipline, we will see that the logical concept of Being is eminently dialectical.↩

  93. This is the interpretation that is generally made of Hegel; however, in “Dialectic,” we have the opportunity to show the scope of this statement and propose some restrictions based on Hegel’s work.↩

  94. In a contemporary edition, see: Spinoza, “Ethics.” Translated by Tomaz Tadeu. Belo Horizonte, Autêntica, 2009, p. 9. (Editor’s note.)↩

  95. We say “seemingly” because the concept of cause in medieval philosophy, as well as in Aristotelian philosophy, was crystal clear, as we demonstrated in “Ontology.”↩

  96. That being is merely logical is true for Schopenhauer. However, in Ontology, we can distinguish being as logical and being as real, ontically existing.↩

  97. This statement does not imply any derogation of reason as a noetic faculty, as long as it is comprehended in a balanced manner. What we reject are the rationalistic excesses of modern philosophy. We dialectically demonstrate the limits of reason when it acts aprioristically.↩

  98. Like Spinoza, for example.↩

  99. Rationalism, as an -ism, is an abstractist position. In Aristotle and in the great scholastics, such an excessive stabilization ofideas is not observed, as seen in modern rationalist philosophy. This does not prevent criticism of certain exaggerations by the aforementioned philosophers, although smaller, but which were accentuated by their disciples. The same can be seen in art: Petrarch is great despite Petrarchism, which highlighted more the flaws than the virtues, and the minor virtues, due to excess, became deficiencies.↩

  100. This objectification of self-consciousness is an unfolding in infinitum, as consciousness can still be conscious that it is conscious. In this way, it can distance itself from itself. This acting power of consciousness is the subject of Noology, the science of the spirit.↩

  101. Instinctus, in Latin, means impulse.↩

  102. The critical examination we make of the reason of modern rationalists does not invalidate rationalitas, which is peculiar to the human spirit. What we want to emphasize are the acquired characteristics (habits) of reason, which make it eminently abstract.↩

  103. The concepts of reason, taken in an abstract sense, do not correspond to the totality of reality, but this does not mean they are false. They are abstract noetic schemas, but they may be adequate to what fundamentally corresponds in things, as we see in the Theory of Knowledge and General Noology. The excessive use of such rational concepts, taken abstractly and not dialectically, is due to rationalism, which, as an ism, we repeat, is vicious.↩

  104. There is also a rational experience, just as there is a sensory experience and an affective experience. Experience includes living, and reason is not something that exists outside of life.↩

  105. The phrase, originally, is from the novel The Demons by Dostoevsky. Nietzsche comments on this passage in “The Logic of Atheism,” in: Kritische Studienausgabe. Berlin / New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1980, pp. 143 ff. Apud: Jorge Luiz Viesenteiner, A Grande Política em Nietszche. São Paulo, Annablume, 2006, pp. 71-72. (Editor’s note.)↩

  106. The concept of identity has its ontological foundation. If we show how reason genetically constructs its concepts, we do not consider their contents as fictional. By considering them as such, the irrationalists have fallen into aporias resulting from the vicious position they took in opposition to the excesses of rationalism.↩

  107. This is one of the aspects of the crisis in philosophy, as we have explained in Filosofia da Crise (Philosophy of Crisis). [In a contemporary edition: Mário Ferreira dos Santos, Filosofia da Crise. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2017. (N.E.)]↩

  108. The stereometric figure of bodies is a qualitative delimitation ofquantity. Quantity itself is not perceived by the senses, but always in the qualitative-quantitative whole because touch, which is the sense where the quantitative predominates, never excludes quality.↩

  109. To avoid the deficiencies of reason, a super-reason is imposed, as understood by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, who never detached themselves from experience, whether external, like the first two, or also internal, especially the latter.↩

  110. Émile Boutroux, De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1898, p. 25. (Editor’s note.)↩

  111. The mutability of being does not ontologically contradict the immutability of being. Being as being is immutable, and being as mutable is always being through its mutations (generation, corruption, increase, decrease, movement, etc.), which belong to being, not in being.↩

  112. This idea of perfection is Greek. The idea of perfection in Faustus (Western) thought, which certainly originated in Alexandria, is dynamic. Perfection lies in the infinite power to accomplish, not in being finished, as it did for the Greeks.↩

  113. All corporeal beings are movable, and mobility is essential to physical beings. The immobility of the Supreme Being is not rest but immutability because, being pure act, it cannot change, as that would imply a passive potentiality, which would be contradictory. In this sense, one must understand the immobility of God, who is not a corporeal being. Platonic forms (eide) are immobile because, not being corporeal in their essence, they do not possess what is essential to corporeal things.↩

  114. Cf. Plato, Timaeus. (Editor’s note.)↩

  115. Here we have another flawed way of considering eternity as a negation of time, through its deprivation. If eternity is not time, it is because time is a modality of corporeal beings, while eternity is essential to the infinite, as seen in Ontology and in Man in the Presence of the Infinite (Theology).↩

  116. In Ontology, the theme of eternity is studied from other perspectives, which dialectically place it before the idea of time in order to transcend it. Outside of this transcendence, which can only be studied logically, eternity is nothing more than a spatialization of time, as seen in modern rationalism.↩

  117. Edmond Goblot, Le Vocabulaire Philosophique. Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1901, p. 175. (Editor’s note.)↩

  118. Rudolf Clausius, The Mechanical Theory of Heat. London, Macmillan, 1879, p. 295. The original German version Die mechanische Wärmetheorie is from 1876. (Editor’s note.)↩

  119. The “immutability” of substance is a feature of modern rationalism, not Aristotelianism. In Aristotle’s philosophy, substance is what endures, not what becomes immutable. Every substance of corporeal beings is subject to mutations, and we studied this point in “Aristotle and the Mutations.”↩

  120. The synthesis in the immanent is a reduction of the conflict to one of the conflicting terms, and it is still a “crisis,” as we saw in “Philosophy of Crisis.” The synthesis can only be transcendental, as explained in that work. [See: Mário Ferreira dos Santos, “Philosophy of Crisis.” São Paulo, É Realizações, 2017. (N.E.)]↩

  121. Identity is valid in the ontological realm, not the ontic. Moreover, it can only be fully realized in Being, as seen in “Ontology,” i.e., in the transcendent and not the immanent.↩

  122. These important aspects find their explanations in “General Theory of Tensions,” where organic totalities and inorganic ones are better distinguished.↩

  123. Two horrible words to express two tendencies: those who believe in the “power to be” and those who believe that what is actualized is what necessarily had to be actualized, two points of view from which numerous attitudes arise, which even influence social events and their interpretation.↩

  124. Here is an important theme of noology because will as the overcoming of animality and as the capacity to appreciate higher values should not be confused with mere wanting, which is a primary and instinctive impulse.↩

  125. Freedom and necessity can be considered in a “both… and…” manner. Where there is freedom, there is necessity. Freedom without necessity would already be something else. Licentiousness seeks to escape necessity and is, therefore, unethical. Freedom implies ethics, which is why its broader study requires further analysis.↩

  126. Poincaré, Le Valeur de la Science. Paris, Ernest Flammarion, 1908, pp. 11-12.↩

  127. Ibidem, pp. 25-26.↩

  128. In Filosofia Concreta, we present a view of philosophy based on apodictic grounds, that is, on universally valid judgments, making that book an axiomatic work. [Mário Ferreira dos Santos, Filosofia Concreta. São Paulo, É Realizações, 2018. (Editor’s note.)]↩

  129. William Shakespeare, Hamlet. Act 2, Scene 2.↩

  130. The acceptance of the antinomies of the finite does not exclude the supreme unity of the Transcendental Being, as we see in other works that constitute this Encyclopedia.↩

  131. The general (the form) is included in singularity. It is possible to be understood intellectually because it is given to us “confusedly” (merged) with the thing. It is abstracted from the thing by the intellect later on.↩

  132. It is common in psychology to confuse “wanting” and “will,” a distinction we have already made. [See, in this volume, p. 228, note 5.]↩

  133. In Greek, “end,” hence teleology.↩

  134. This thesis is developed by us in “General Theory of Tensions.”↩

  135. In a contemporary edition, see: Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Mário Ferreira dos Santos. Petrópolis, Vozes, 2011. (Editor’s note.)↩

  136. In fronese, which is affective knowledge, there is greater or lesser fusion between subject and object because the subject knows what happens within him. He is the object of his own knowledge. In Psychology and General Noology, we study affectivity in its metaphysical characteristic, especially in the latter of the cited works.↩

  137. This is what we examined in Concrete Philosophy of Values.↩

  138. The seventh commandment. See: Exodus 20:15. (Editor’s note.)↩

  139. [We have already studied well what a priori consists of for Kant.]↩

  140. In a contemporary edition, see: Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason”. Translated by Artur Morão. Lisbon, Edições 70, 1995, p. 42. (Editor’s note.)↩

  141. From “hedonai,” a Greek word meaning “I delight myself”.↩

  142. From “eudaimonia,” meaning happiness.↩

  143. In our work “Fundamental Sociology,” we discuss the development of this discipline and perform decadialectical analyses of its fundamental themes, so as not to disregard the great positivities offered by various doctrines.↩

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