The middle ages traditionally ascribed to Gilbert the treatise known by the titles of De sex principiis, or Liber sex principiorum. It is a metaphysical interpretation of Aristotle’s treatise on logic, the Categories. Logically equivalent, the categories of Aristotle are not so for the metaphysician. When we say: substance, quantity, quality, etc., it is obvious that, in reality itself, substance is something very different from color, figure, size, etc. Dividing the ten categories into two groups, the author of this treatise listed together, on the one hand, substance, quantity, quality and relation, and on the other hand, the last six categories (sex principia): place, time, situation, habit, action and passion. To him, categories are not merely types of logical predication; they are forms. The first group of four comprises “inherent forms”; the second group of six comprises “accessory forms” (formae assistentes). It is to be noted, with Hauréau, that Abelard also calls the two categories of “place” and “time”: principia adjacentia, but the chronology of their respective writings is too uncertain for us to draw any conclusion as to possible relations between them.

Taken in itself, the distinction was an important one. This treatise calls “inherent” the forms or principles which are either substance itself or inherent in substance itself irrespective of its relations with other substances. Such is manifestly the case with quantity and quality, the quantity of a substance being its own quantity and its qualities its own qualities. At first glance, the contrary seems true of relations, yet, taken in itself, relation is the natural aptitude of a substance to be one of the two terms of a relation. As such, it is inherent in the substance, since it is of the essence of a substance to be apt to become one of the terms of a relation. In thus binding relation to substance, this treatise initiated a controversy which was never to cease during the middle ages: is relation real, or is it a mere ens rationis? As to the six remaining principles, it is clear that each of them is only an accessory determination of substance. Situation is the one most closely related to substance; place and time come next; then action and passion; finally habitus (permanent possession), which is the most extrinsic of the six, since its possessor is often another being than the thing possessed.

— Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 3.1

[1] On Form

[01] /35/ Form, however, is a contingent composition, consisting of a simple and unchangeable essence.

[02] For composition is not form, since it is separated from the nature of composition; for every composition which comes into being in another composition, in some way makes itself joined to a greater composition, but this is not the case with form. For in that which is a white body, it is not said that it is greater or less by being white; nor if it is not white, has there been any destruction or lessening of composition, but only alteration.

[03] But since it is perhaps possible for the same thing to be said in other cases, I have added appropriately, “consisting of an unchangeable essence”; for in the soul there is found alteration of contrariness, such as of sorrow and joy.

[04] But since, as they say, something belongs to simplicity which is not subject to any variation, as the soul of the world separates it from all, I have added “contingent composition” to separate it. Therefore, this definition will be the limit of what is called form; for it neither contains anything superfluous nor is it deficient, and if someone investigates it subtly, he will find it to be so.

[05] However, there is a doubt arising from what has gone before, as to whether no form is unchangeable. But this seems to be the case in most instances; for the same proposition is true and false, as is whiteness of clarity and obscurity, and the reason for that which is in a thing and that which is not. But it is not so, for there is no difference between saying that something is a clear whiteness and saying that its subject is clear; nor is a proposition of contraries true and false at the same time, nor is the reason for that which is in a thing and that which is not. But these things are notes of passions which are in the soul. But these matters have been discussed elsewhere.

[06] Substance, however, is that which you obtain through some kind of composition, so that it is impossible for it to be absent; for example, reason and sensation, or things similar to them, such as the continuous and the discrete. But it will be either as matter or as form; for the body is the matter of man, and the soul is his form. Therefore, substance will be such as man is as a body and as reason. But these matters have been expounded in those which belong to the categories.

[07] But it seems that form is one thing by nature and another in actuality; for reason is by nature, but heat and passion consist in actuality. However, in some cases, there is a doubt as to whether they begin by nature or by actuality, as in the figure of an incision (for there is no addition, but rather a kind of separation of parts); but I say that the figure is by nature, but it is felt by actuality. But what is a conjunction is actuality, as is a house. But these matters are clear.

[08] But those things that are in many are not openly visible; for those things that are in many, it is impossible for them to be in action, and it does not seem to be possible from nature. Sometimes, those things that are from nature take their origin from a creature that exists; however, it is clear that creatures do not exist (for there is absolutely no reason why such creatures should exist).

[09] Therefore, nature operates secretly in these things; just as a certain composition of many things produces something that exceeds the quantity of the previous things, so by the distinction of singular things, something beyond their predication is understood. Therefore, the entirety of nature is a community because it proceeds from singularity, which is equal to creation.

[10] However, by speculating subtly, just as we have found nature operating secretly in actions, we find the creator of creatures in nature from actuality; for nature has been established by number. But these things are enough; they belong to another consideration.

[11] One form, indeed, is in the subject and is spoken of as concerning the subject, such as knowledge is in the subject, which is the soul, and is spoken of as concerning the subject, like grammar. But some are in the subject and are not spoken of as concerning the subject, such as the whiteness of Socrates (similarly, all forms that are individual). But some are spoken of as concerning the subject, and are not in the subject, such as rational and mortal.

[12] Of those things that are in the subject but are not spoken of as concerning the subject, some are perceptible, and some are imperceptible. Perceptible things are those that are comprehended by the senses (such as whiteness, sound, taste, smell, heat, impact, and sweetness), but imperceptible things are those that are understood by reason (such as knowledge). Simply put, none of the things that are spoken of as concerning the subject are perceptible.

[13] It is clear from what has been said that some things are located somewhere, such as blackness in the eye; but it will be difficult to assign some things, such as knowledge, paternity, and filiation, unless in the complexity of those who generate and those who are composed.

[14] Each individual thing that has been mentioned is a notation of that which is in the voice. However, this will either be subsistent or contingent. Of those things that happen to exist contingently, each thing is either introduced from outside or is simply considered within the substance (such as a line, surface, or body).

[15] However, those things that require something external will necessarily have an act, be passive, have a disposition, exist somewhere, be in motion, or be necessarily present. But concerning those things that subsist and those that require only that in which they exist, a sufficient discussion has been given in the book titled “Categories.” Concerning the remaining things, let us continue.

[2] On Action

[16] Action is that by which we are said to act on the thing that is subject to us, just as one who cuts is said to act on the thing that he cuts. There are two kinds of action: one pertaining to the soul, and the other to the body. They differ because what is bodily necessarily moves the thing in which it is (for the body that acts is also a movable body), while the action of the soul does not move what is in it, but that which is united to it (for the soul, while acting, is immobile, but moves the body).

[17] The soul, however, remains immutable because it is not moved by anything either in respect to place or in respect to any other kind of movement except alteration. For it is not moved by taking on growth or by decreasing or by passing over to the opposite place.

[18] For a place is a body, but the soul is not a body, and it is impossible for something non-bodily to be moved by something bodily. Therefore, the soul undergoes no change of place. Only a body is moved as it passes from one place to another.

[19] However, this may seem doubtful to some people, for it appears that when a fixed mirror remains the same, the motion of the image is produced by the opposite change. Therefore, it will be impossible to resolve the issue if it is conceded that the form is truly present there. If it is not, the common belief will be regarded as an incredible error (though it is more appropriate to say so).

[20] It must be understood that everything in motion is an action, for to move is itself an action. Therefore, if something is in motion, it necessarily acts, and every action will be established in motion, and every motion will be established in action. Therefore, it is the nature of action to be in motion, just as it is the nature of motion to be in action.

[21] Some of these actions are evident in processes that involve generation. However, some might object that processes that involve corruption may not involve action since someone who destroys something does not appear to be doing anything (for nothing is produced, but rather what was done is destroyed). I say, however, that action demands not a thing, but a what upon which it acts.

[22] However, motion is not action but rather is a kind of what. For to be at rest is also a kind of what, so that the kind of motion will also include the kind of rest. For whatever things receive the opposition of contraries, they receive the predication of the same kind.

[23] The natural property of action is to produce a passion in that which is subjected to it. For every action that produces an effect is itself a passion, and every action that produces a passion is itself an action. However, it is possible for one action to produce another action. For the action of that which is moved by itself is generative of the action that is generated by something else, and the action that is inflicted by an animal takes its origin from that which belongs to the animal.

[24] However, it makes no difference whether an animal is said to act or to be acted upon, provided that the principle of acting belongs to the animal (though the act is indeed the principle, but to be acted upon is mixed). Therefore, the act of action and passion is generative.

[25] But to produce something of a certain quality is to do something of that kind. For example, heat is a quality, and the action that produces heating is its effect. The position of particular qualities and quantities is the productive cause of them (for roughness and smoothness and other such qualities are quantities, while lines and surfaces and solids are quantities, but all of these have their substance and generation from position).

[26] Quantity is the quantity of quantity (for example, the length of a line, the breadth of a plane, and the height of a solid body); quality is also the quality of quality (for example, the heat of warmth); position is the doing and being acted upon (for in the composition of dispositions, the generation of simple things is brought about, which must necessarily consist in motion and action). But where there is a place; and to have a body is what we are said to do with respect to the things that are around the body.

[27] In regard to things that are not individuals in the subject, corruption primarily applies, but generation applies to those things that come after the destruction of the first things. As for those things that are predicated of them, there is no predication whatsoever from which they are derived (for example, all men are of that man who is common and universal).

[28] But to do and to suffer allow for contrarieties and for more and less. For cutting is contrary to planting, and burning is indeed contrary to making something wet. And to become warmer or cooler is said to be more or less, as is to become drier or wetter, or to become more sad or joyful.

[3] On Passion

[29] Passion is the effect and result of an action which is experienced by certain things, but not by others, according to the degree to which they are animate (for example, a brute is more animate than a tree, and a rational being is more animate than an irrational one).

[30] Moreover, everything that has been said about generation can also be said about that which is in action in things; some are produced directly, while others are produced by a process of transformation.

[31] To suffer is to experience those things which are said to have multiple aspects. For every action of the soul, there is a corresponding passion, which we have placed under the action. For example, love, hatred, sorrow, and joy are all passions of the soul that we call passive actions. Passion is also said of that which acts upon nature, such as illness, fever, and other similar conditions. Passion, as we have said, is the first generation of action.

[32] However, there is no passion in the agent, but rather in that which is acted upon and receives the effect of the agent’s action. For example, the one who strikes is not said to suffer, but rather the material that receives the blow. This is sufficient for what has been said about passion; what remains will be discussed in “On Generation and Corruption.”

[4] On When

[33] When we say “when,” we refer to what is left behind by time and what is not yet present in time. However, the relationship between the two is connected. The past, for example, is no longer present, but its effects and influence are still felt, as something is said to have been when it was present.

[34] The present moment also has an effect, even though it is not present in the same way as the past or future. It is defined by its equality or inequality, and something is said to be present when it exists at that moment. The future is not yet present, but what will happen in the future is necessary, and so it is considered future.

[35] Therefore, when we talk about time, we refer to what has passed, what is currently happening, and what is necessary to happen in the future.

[36] In the Categories, it is said that the past and future are quantities and, more importantly, continuous with the present. The past does not remain in substance, but it has not yet passed away. The future is necessary to happen and is the same as what is currently happening. There is no difference between what remains, what is in the future, and what has passed.

[37] Therefore, we can talk about the future and describe it using sentences like “the sun will rise tomorrow,” “there will be a naval battle tomorrow,” and “Socrates died yesterday.” We can also talk about the future by using verbs that indicate future actions, like “Callias will debate tomorrow” or “Callias will not debate.”

[38] The difference between “when” and “where” is that in any given moment, something can be present, past, or future, but it is still in the same place. However, when something is not present, like the past or future, it is never in the same moment as the present. Additionally, “where” refers to a physical location, which can change over time.

[39] However, there is a difference between when something comes from the past versus the future. When something comes from the past, it is later than what comes from the future. When something comes from the future, it is earlier than what comes from the past. When something is both from the future and present, it is first future, then present, and then past, like time itself.

[40] Just as time can be composed or simple (composed when it involves multiple actions, simple when it is just one action), so can “when.” Simple when it is just a moment or the present, and composed when it involves hours, days, weeks, and the like.

[41] Additionally, just as time’s parts succeed each other quickly, so does “when.” The past and future are connected to the present in a continuous way.

[42] Time is different from “when” because time can be measured, like a year being a long amount of time, or a motion being long-lasting. “When” cannot be measured, but can be said to exist at certain times, and can be both temporal and variable.

[43] “When” cannot be measured in more or less, like days cannot be said to be longer or shorter than each other. Likewise, no other “when” can be said to be more or less than another.

[44] “When” is also not contrary to itself, as something present can be the same as something future or past. It is impossible for the same thing to have two contrary predicates at the same time.

[45] Contraries cannot exist together, but something that is present, past, and future can exist together. What exists is both true and will remain true. Contraries cannot exist together in the same individual at the same time, so contraries cannot be expressed in “when.”

[46] “When” is in everything that begins to exist, like the whole body that undergoes changes in different seasons. The soul also changes according to the body’s composition. Some people are more active in winter, some in summer, and some in spring, depending on their body composition.

[47] Similar to animals and seasons, other things can also exist in time, undergoing variations in the body. However, it is not appropriate to mention a few or no other examples.

[5] On Where

[48] But where the limitation of the body proceeds from the limitation of place, and place is that which contains and limits, therefore, in a place is whatever is circumscribed by a place, but not in the same place and where, for place is in that which contains, but where is in that which is circumscribed and embraced.

[49] However, it seems that it is not present everywhere; for the soul is nowhere, for it occupies no place nor fills it. For the soul can occupy another thing, but it is never openly evident that a thing that is occupied can also occupy and embrace another thing with the occupant remaining.

[50] For example, a grain cannot be retained in a measure while the air inside it remains still; but when the air is expelled, the grain is received. Therefore, two things cannot be in the same place, nor the same thing in different places. Therefore, the soul cannot be localized since it occupies no place. Similarly, anything that is separated from the nature of the body lacks the limitation of place.

[51] However, someone may raise a question, concluding that the same thing can be in different places and situations. For example, the sound in the ears is different for different people; but if there is no air, there can be no sound. Therefore, there is air in the ears of different people. Similarly, the same body can be in different places, for the sound cannot be exactly the same in different parts of the air.

[52] Therefore, if we concede that the same sound is heard in the ears of different people, we must also acknowledge that the same particle of air reaches the ears of different people. For something that is simple cannot exist in multiple places at once. Therefore, we must admit that either something different is heard in different ears, or the same thing is left in multiple places.

[53] However, it is conceivable that different senses are generated and perceived in different ways. Therefore, there are some sounds that are not from animals (for those that are imagined and not animal cannot be produced by an animal). But we say that every sound is from an animal, for who has ever heard a sound produced by an animal in complete silence? Therefore, any sound made by an animal is called a sound of that animal. Therefore, one sound is directed to the ears of different people, but it cannot be exactly the same.

[54] However, where one thing is simple and the other is compound, the simple thing comes from a simple place, and the compound thing comes from a combination. Therefore, a simple place is the origin and constitution of that which is continuous. However, a composite place has particles joined together at the same boundary where the particles of the body are joined, and the particles of the body are joined to a point. Therefore, parts of a place must be next to a point; therefore, a simple place will have a point adjacent to it, but the particles of solidity of a place enclose particles of solidity. For simple places are the smallest occupied by a body. Therefore, there cannot be a place without a body, nor solidity without a place.

[55] However, the question arises about the boundary of a sphere. For nothing is outside of it, and a place cannot be in it (as it has been said before) because it is surrounded by that place. Therefore, if we concede that a sphere has a place, we must also admit that there is another thing in which the boundary of the sphere exists. But nothing else can be the same, so the boundary is not in a place. However, this is an unusual and mysterious subject, and goes against what we can sense.

[56] Now, pay attention to the concepts of tension and relaxation; for one is not said to be more or less in a place than the other, although they may occupy a smaller or larger space, not according to where or any quantity, but according to its quality.

[57] However, nothing contrary exists where there is existence, because even contrariety is not inherent in place; for a place is not contrary to another place. But since this is not evident to others, up and down are perceived as contrary by many (for they seem to be greatly different from each other, just as up and down are different from each other); therefore, contrariety is perceived most strongly in relation to up and down, just as quantity is perceived in relation to place.

[58] However, it is possible for two contrary things to be in the same thing; for up and down are in the same thing (for the same thing is up and down in different respects; for example, the height of a tower is up to us, but compared to the top, it is down).

[59] Furthermore, it is also possible for the same thing to be its own contrary; for if up and down are contrary to each other and the same thing is up and down, it follows that the same thing becomes its own contrary. Therefore, there is no contrariety in what exists in a place.

[6] On Position

[60] Position is a certain arrangement of parts and their ordering of generation, according to which they are called either standing or sitting, rough or smooth, or otherwise arranged; however, sitting and lying down are not positions but are denominatively named from them.

[61] There is usually a question raised about curved and straight, rough and smooth, quadrilateral and triangular, two cubits and three cubits, large and small, short and long, and the like; for they seem to signify a certain arrangement of parts (for example, rough is said of something whose one part surpasses another, smooth, however, of whose particles are evenly extended, and the same applies to the others).

[62] However, not all things that are mentioned are positions, but only those that exist around the situation; for it is from the fact that parts are arranged in this way that they are judged by the senses, and not because they are rough or smooth or two cubits or three cubits; similarly, this applies to other such things that have an arrangement in the parts. Therefore, each of the aforementioned things is not a position, but a quality that arises around positions.

[63] However, position seems to involve contradictions; for sitting seems to be contrary to standing (for contraries are things that cannot be found in the same individual at the same time but can be possible alternately; for a sitting person can immediately stand and a standing person can sit, but it is impossible for the same person to stand and sit at the same time).

[64] But if we assume that these things are contrary, we are forced to accept the inconvenience that one thing is many; for according to the containment of a collection, sitting to what is contrary to standing is no more so than lying down (for just as sitting and standing are never found together in the same thing, so too sitting and lying down, and standing and lying down). Therefore, in these discussions about position, there is no contradiction involved.

[65] Moreover, it will perhaps not even be considered unusual for one thing to be many: for paleness, for example, seems to be contrary to black and white, for they are never found together in the same category, and they are mutually transmutable; therefore, one thing is against many. However, paleness is not contrary to black or white, for it is present with both of them; for paleness and other colors are made from black and white; therefore, it is necessary that in whatever there is paleness, there is both black and white. Similarly, this applies to the other colors.

[66] Furthermore, the reason for contraries exists in the same nature, but sitting and lying down do not exist in the same nature but are separate (for sitting pertains specifically to what is rational, while lying down and reclining pertain to the opposite; and the sign of this is the similarity between horses and humans, in which lying down is undoubtedly proven).

[67] However, it is proper to position that it is not said to be more or less; for sitting is no more a position than lying down, nor less, and neither sitting nor lying down is said to be more or less than the other universally according to any other positions.

[68] However, it seems more proper to the substance of position to be closer to all other superimposed forms; for position is nothing but the natural arrangement of the substance itself, which is either innate from the beginning, such as what is inherent in rough or smooth, equal or unequal, or is customary through natural movement, such as sitting and lying down and the like. Therefore, whatever is immediately adjacent to the substance is necessarily a position, and every position of this kind accepts predication.

[7] On Habit

[69] Habit refers to the condition of bodies and the things that are adjacent to them, according to which these things are said to possess or be possessed by them. This is not true for the whole, but rather for a particular division, such as being armed or shod. However, simple names are not used to describe these, but rather the names “arming” and “shoeing” are given to them, according to their proportion and other qualities.

[70] Habit can also be more or less pronounced; for example, a knight who is heavily armed is said to be “more armed” than an infantryman, and someone who wears boots and shoes is said to be “more shod” than someone who only wears boots or shoes. However, in some cases, it is not true that one thing is more or less than another, such as being clothed and similar things.

[71] There is nothing contrary to habit; for example, arming is not contrary to shoeing (since someone who is shod is also armed), and it is clear that it is not contrary to other things as well. Similarly, this applies to other things.

[72] Habit, however, is peculiar in that it exists in many things, such as in the body and the things that are adjacent to it (since it is adjacent to the body and the things that are adjacent to it). As mentioned, this happens according to the division that exists in the parts.

[73] However, you will find few other principles of this kind; in quantity, you will only find things that are similar to something else; for example, similarity and dissimilarity, which are present in many similar and dissimilar things. Quantity, on the other hand, refers to numbers, which are found in numerals and always increase according to a variety of unit-based ascensions (however, you will not find anything that can be divided into parts as much as a number).

[74] However, not all quantities or relations are of this kind; habit necessarily exists in many things, such as in the body and the things that are adjacent to it, and everything that exists in the body and the things that are adjacent to it can be attributed to habit. Therefore, habit is more peculiar when it exists in the body and the things that are adjacent to it, according to the division of its parts, and exists in many things.

[75] Habit can be said in many ways. We can say that we possess an alteration, such as whiteness or blackness, or a quantity, such as length. However, to say that we possess whiteness or length is simply another way of saying that we are white or long.

[76] We can also say that a vessel contains something, such as a measure of wheat, which is nothing more than saying that it contains it. We can also use the term “to have” for a body part, such as a finger wearing a ring, which is the same as saying that the finger has the ring.

[77] We can say that a man has a wife, and a wife has a husband; however, this is an unusual way of using the term “to have,” where the thing possessed is said to have the possessor. However, in this case, “to have” means nothing more than cohabitation.

[78] Therefore, the ways in which “to have” is used are five in number. However, there may be other ways of using it that are not included in these; a careful inquiry may find them.

[79] These are enough to say about the principles of habit; for further information, you may refer to Aristotle’s “Metaphysics.”

[8] On More and Less

[80] It is said that more and less are received in three ways. For some people say that they are based on the increase or decrease of the things that are received by the subject. Others, however, believe that the things that are received in the recipient itself can both decrease and increase. Still, others base it on both the decrease and increase of both.

[81] Therefore, I will first establish what is firm and certain about these beliefs. However, if someone were to refute both the first and second beliefs, then the third belief that results from the conjunction of both would also be refuted.

[82] Therefore, more and less are not solely based on the increase or decrease of the recipient itself. For there is no reason why we cannot say that a man, an animal, a substance, and other similar things can be called more or less, as long as we allow that anything can be called more or less according to the intensity or relaxation of the subject.

[83] Furthermore, while a horse often undergoes both increase and decrease in movement, a certain stone that has never undergone any increase or decrease is said to be smaller. Also, one mountain is said to be bigger than another even if neither is growing or shrinking.

[84] Moreover, a pearl is said to be whiter than a horse, even though it only touches the ground with a white foot. But this is not because a pearl is inherently superior to a horse. Therefore, we must conclude that a pearl is either whiter than a horse based on the size or smallness of the subject, or it is not true that a pearl is whiter than a horse, or there is nothing that can be called more or less based on the size or smallness of the subject, nor based on increase or decrease.

[85] It is clear that a pearl is not called whiter than a horse based on the size of the subject. And since it is false to say that a pearl is not whiter than a horse, it follows that nothing can be called more or less based on the size of the subject. Likewise, not based on its smallness either.

[86] Furthermore, nothing can be called smaller or less based on what makes it impure. For if something is called whiter than something else based on the size of its whiteness or any other quality, then surely a whiter horse or human or any other animal would be called whiter than a pearl (since the quantity of whiteness is greater than that of a pearl).

[87] Moreover, smaller or less is not based on the increase or decrease of either the subject or the accident. For it is clear that something cannot be called smaller than something else based on the increase or decrease of the subject, nor can it be based on the larger quantity of the accident. For the quantity cannot extend beyond the subject (since the body is the limit of quantity, and smallness is supposed to be a quantity). Therefore, the smallness itself cannot extend beyond the small subject. Therefore, the smaller the subject, the smaller the quantity of smallness.

[88] Therefore, it is clear that nothing can be predicated with more or less based solely on the increase or decrease of the subject or the accident. Thus, we must find other things that can be described using more and less.

[89] Such things are those found in the words that are used, not based on the increase or decrease of the subject or the moving object, but rather because of their proximity or remoteness from the words used in the imposition. For when something is said to be more, it is because it is closer to the word being used, and when something is said to be less, it is because it is farther away.

[90] For example, “white” is used to describe something that has pure whiteness. Therefore, the closer something comes to the imposition of the word “white,” the purer the whiteness and the whiter it is assigned. Similarly, “small” is used to describe something that is inferior in size, dimension, and quantity when compared to others. Therefore, anything that is surpassed by something else in terms of quantity is immediately pronounced smaller. The same applies to other things.

[91] However, someone might wonder why this applies to more and less but not to substances. This is because the imposition of substances is finite and cannot be exceeded.

[92] There are also some accidents that are described without using more and less, such as “quadrangle” and “triangle” and similar words (for one quadrangle is not more quadrangular than another). This is because the designation of substances is taken into account (for example, a quadrangle is called a quality and a quadrangle-shaped body).

[93] Or the same reason as in the previous statements, where imposition is made at the limit beyond which it is not possible to go, as in superlatives. For “whitest,” “blackest,” and similar words are used without more and less because the imposition is at a limit beyond which it is impossible to go.

Thiago’s Translations Blog

Monday, April 24, 2023

Book of Six Principles, by Gilbert of Poitiers